Class 8 Quiz
1. Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, for
which of the following exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality is it necessary that the lawyer
reasonably believe that the harm to be prevented
by revealing confidential client information be caused by
criminal conduct?
42%
A.
B.
15%
in
ju
Al
ry
l o
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ab
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o
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...
0%
Pr
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en
t s
ub
s
Pr
ev
en
t d
ea
t
h
0%
Pr
ev
en
Prevent death
Prevent substantial
financial loss
C. Prevent serious injury
D. All of the above
E. None of the above
42%
2. Under the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, which of the
following actions is NOT a violation of the rule on the lawyer's duty of
candor to the court?
A.
85%
15%
p
ar
t..
.
0%
ex
an
or
i..
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a de
...
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at
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e .
..
0%
in
Offering evidence to the tribunal the
lawyer reasonably believes is false.
B. Failing to disclose a material fact to a
tribunal if the result is only that the
client is able to commit a fraudulent
(but not criminal) act
C. Citing to the tribunal a decision of the
Georgia Court of Appeals as directly
supporting your position without
disclosing that the case has been
overruled by the Georgia Supreme
Court.
D. In a hearing for an ex parte restraining
order, failing to disclose a fact to the
tribunal that is relevant but adverse to
your client's position.
3. Assume DR 7-102 applies to the Simon case instead of
RPC 3.3. If Simon admits to her lawyer that the alibi is
false,
A.
64%
24%
12%
.
r B
B.
er
A
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Ne
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h A a
es
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.
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w
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The lawyer shall not knowingly use
testimony regarding this alibi in the
hearing before the administrative law
judge.
B. If Simon testifies on cross examination
that Gordon was with her on Sunday
night and then refuses the lawyer's
request to correct that false testimony,
the lawyer is required to tell the
administrative law judge
that Simon's statement was false.
C. Both A and B.
D. Neither A nor B.
4. Assume that ABA Model Rule 1.6 applied when Parsi
Rustomji told Gandhi that he had committed smuggling.
Under the facts as described by Gandhi, would he have
been permitted under MR 1.6(b) to report Rustomji's
past smuggling to the authorities even without Rustomji's
permission?
A.
B.
91%
an
c ia
se
th
e fin
to
m
ji h
a.
..
l..
.
3%
Ye
s, be
ca
u
No
, b
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se
R
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ug
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Ye
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Ye
s, b
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a
6%
0%
us
e Yes, because smuggling was a crime.
Yes, because the loss of revenue to the
government from the smuggling could
be considered "injury to the financial
interests of another."
C. No, because Rustomji had not used
Gandhi's services as a lawyer to commit
the smuggling.
D. Yes, because the financial injury caused
by the smuggling was substantial.
5. In the McKesson case, the plaintiff's motion to disqualify
Duane Morris should be denied because
C.
D.
E.
64%
36%
0%
0%
0%
e G
eo
rg
ia
co
Du
ur
an
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M
av
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...
Du
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ad
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e M
m
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No
ai
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ne
.
o
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ov
Al
e.
l o
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he
ab
ov
e.
B.
The Georgia courts have held that GRPC 1.7
is not relevant in deciding a motion to
disqualify counsel.
Duane Morris had complied with the
requirement in GRPC 1.7 (b) that it
"reasonably believes that the lawyer will be
able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client."
Duane Morris had obtained the "requisite
waiver" through its May 30, 2006
engagement letter, page 3 of which "plainly
satisfied" the provisions of GRPC
1.7(b) as quoted in Section B of its
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
motion.
None of the above.
All of the above.
Th
A.
6. In Sullivan County v. Town of Acworth, Laurence
Gardner was disqualified from representing the defendant
absent consent from the plaintiff because
A.
the plaintiff was not required to show that
its interests were materially adverse to
Gardner's current client.
B. the subject matter of his prior
representation of the plaintiff was
substantially related to the current case.
C. as prior counsel for the plaintiff, Gardner
had actually received confidential
information that he could use to the
advantage of the defendant.
D. the plaintiff proved there was a real risk
that the trial would be tainted if Gardner
was allowed to represent the defendant.
58%
21%
15%
he
r t
er
...
nt
if f
p
ro
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fo
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e p
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th
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th
p
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.
is . ..
f h
te
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r c
ou
ns
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as
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m
at
e s
ub
th
th
e p
l
ai
nt
if f
w
as
n
ot
re
qu
...
6%
7. In the Friedman's case, which of the following statements is NOT a
correct description of the court's decision?
18%
0%
3%
ts
o
f i
GR
nt
er
PC
es
1
t d
.7
w
i..
.
as
re
Al
l
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st
an
on
t i
&
n.
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..
ird
fa
il e
Al
st
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to
p
&
r ..
B
.
ird
w
as
n
ot
re
...
D.
79%
on
fli
c
C.
e c
B.
The conflicts of interest disclosed by Alston &
Bird in its letter of 10/24/03 were so great that any
consent provided at that time by the Friedman’s
Audit Committee was not permissible under
GRPC 1.7(c)
GRPC 1.7 was relevant in determining the
standard of care in the malpractice claim against
Alston & Bird
Alston & Bird failed to provide the Friedman’s
Audit Committee adequate information about the
material risks of its continued representation as
the scope of its investigation expanded.
Alston & Bird was not required to inform the Audit
Committee in writing of its right to consult with
independent counsel as a condition of obtaining
informed consent.
Th
A.