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Eric Teachout
Philo 298 IS on Virtue Epistemology
Prof. Mike Fuerstein
Final Research Paper, 2nd Draft
May 28, 2012
Virtue Ethics: Pure or Integrated?
An Evaluation of Zagzebski’s Account of Intellectual Virtue
In the last century, virtue epistemology has enabled scholars in both ethics and
epistemology to have wider and deeper dialogues between these fields, which previously had
been conceived as more distinct. At the beginning of the 21st century, this field sprang up when
confusion and frustration plagued the field of epistemology, and virtue epistemology rose up as a
possible way beyond the impasse. In his influential article “The Raft and the Pyramid”, Ernest
Sosa pointed epistemologists to the fresh concept of “intellectual virtue” as the future solution to
the Foundationalism vs. Coherentism quandary. Similarly, in her work Virtues of the Mind
Linda Zagzebski seeks to use intellectual virtue to resolve the issues of “justified true belief”
inherent to the Gettier problem of epistemology. In light of this history, it is clear that virtue
epistemology, as it has been practiced thus far, is the application of virtue ethics to the issues and
questions relevant to epistemology. Thus, virtue epistemology postulates that the virtuous
person will naturally tend towards the right belief, and so conceives the person, i.e. the agent, to
be more basic than belief. This view is shared by David Solomon (“Virtue Ethics”), Julia Annas
(“The Structure of Virtue”), and Linda Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind), who all agree that virtue
epistemology seeks to aid the study of knowledge with an understanding of virtue.
However, while the goal of virtue epistemology has been to benefit the study of
epistemology, the real focus of this subject is virtue ethics. In virtue epistemology, we wish to
describe the character and nature of the “good knower”, the intellectual agent whose dispositions
lead him towards knowledge. Therefore, in describing this sort of person, we must focus not on
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the specific content of his beliefs, but on the inner properties which dispose him towards
knowledge, i.e. the intellectual virtues. Thus, the concepts and questions relevant to virtue
epistemology are primarily moral, not epistemological. For it is in virtue ethics that all
groundwork must first be laid for virtue epistemology, and it is there that we should look if any
problems should arise in our account of intellectual virtue.
Linda Zagzebski, who has been a longtime frontrunner in this field, takes these notions to
heart in her work, Virtues of the Mind. There, Zagzebski argues for what she identifies as a pure
virtue theory. By this, she means an ethical theory derived not from the concepts relevant to the
other approaches to ethics, i.e. deontological ethics and consequentialism, but only from the
virtues themselves. She explicates her account of virtue into two primary components: the
knower‟s motivations and his reliable success in attaining the ends of these motivations.
Zagzebski then applies this virtue theory specifically to the intellectual virtues and concludes
with a conception of knowledge according to this account of intellectual virtue.
Among the various contemporary virtue theories, Linda Zagzebski‟s is unique in
endorsing a supposedly “pure” account of virtue. Because Zagzebski seeks to isolate her theory
of virtue from the concepts of other ethical approaches, her theory is a good candidate for
evaluating the role of the virtue ethics approach in virtue epistemology. In advocating so
strongly for the use of virtue theory within epistemology, she wishes to show the deep
connections between good character and true beliefs. And when read in earnest by the
intellectual, Zagzebski‟s work has the potential to provoke real self-examination, leading him to
take her ideas and apply them to his own life. And considering the nature of virtue
epistemology, it only makes sense that we, as eager intellectuals, begin to take this approach and
be so affected. At the same time, I think there are several critical issues in her account of virtue,
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specifically concerning the supposed purity of her virtue theory. Using Zagzebski‟s writings, I
will explicate her account of virtue in terms of emotional/ontological and teleological
components. Yet in survey of her whole theory, I believe Zagzebski spends a large amount of
time focusing on the emotional aspects of virtues, but hardly enough on its teleological
components. For, if a goal is an intrinsic aspect of a motive, we cannot discuss the virtuousness
of a motivation apart from the goodness of its end. Further, throughout her work, Zagzebski
draws upon the concepts of consequentialist ethics. And because motives are generated from our
values, we cannot strictly divorce the goodness of virtues apart from our values. In Part I, I will
lay out the primary components of Zagzebski‟s account of virtue, showing how she builds upon
previous work in virtue ethics. In Part II, I will proceed to give my critique of her theory
presented in Virtues of the Mind. In concluding, I will summarize my points and discuss the
future role of virtue theory in ethics and the development of virtue epistemology.
Part I: Zagzebski’s Pure Virtue Theory, Explicated
In Virtues of the Mind, Linda Zagzebski begins her work with a general description of the
virtue theory approach to ethics. She writes that while there exists some degree of variance
between the forms of virtue ethics, they all share the common notion of an inner trait: an
overarching property of a person‟s general character (Zagzebski 15). A virtue is a general moral
trait of a person, i.e. the set of inner properties that dispose him or her towards a general (but
related) set of actions and/or ends. For example, we could say that Sarah is intellectually
courageous or that she possesses the virtue of intellectual courage. Either way, we mean the
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same thing: that Sarah is generally disposed towards those actions and ends which can be related
in such a way that they can described as deriving from a single trait, namely intellectual courage.
Further, Zagzebski says that a virtue is a deep and personal moral concept, extending to
multiple levels of one‟s personality. A virtue is includes a person‟s characteristic dispositions to
certain desires, emotions, motivations, and attitudes (15). In response to a given situation, the
individual will emote in a certain manner that contributes to his status of virtuosity. Drawing
upon the previous example, we could envision a situation in which Sarah is constantly rejected
by her philosophical colleagues who look down upon her original, yet very idiosyncratic
theories. But Sarah, holding some confidence in her ideas despite her colleagues‟ opinions,
responds not out of fear or self-deprecation, but with conviction and a strong will. Sarah‟s virtue
of intellectual courage allows her to hold fast to those theories she might have otherwise let go
of.
Having laid out this general description of virtue ethics, Zagzebski takes the above
mentioned concepts and reduces them to simple components, giving her audience a more
intelligible and systematic account of virtue. Because of this, Zagzebski is better able to apply
her theory to the concept of knowledge in contributing to the study of virtue epistemology. In
her work, Zagzebski defines virtue as…
“a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic
motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that
end” (Zagzebski 137, emphasis removed).
From this definition we can derive two main components of a virtue: a characteristic
“motivation” and “reliable success” in attaining the end of this motivation.
To understand the concept of motivation, we must first understand its more particular
corresponding object: the motive. We have noted that a virtue is very involved in the emotive
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properties of a person (emotion, attitude, desire, motive, etc.). But in isolating the motive,
Zagzebski goes further in her theorizing by showing how this concept best explains all the others
in relationship to virtue. Zagzebski defines a motive as “an emotion or feeling that initiates and
directs action towards an end” (131, emphasis removed). From this, we see the motive as the
driving aspect of a specific emotion in seeking a particular goal. When Zagzebski discusses this
connection of emotion and goal, she frequents the language of being motivated “out of” an
emotion, and then being “led to” the specific action and goal (131). Thus, we observe that a
motive is a kind of inner movement. In saying this much, Zagzebski stays etymologically true to
the original meaning of this term. The word “motive”, dating back to the 14th century, derives
from the Medieval Latin “motivus”, meaning “moving” or “impelling” (“motive” OED). And
since the concept of movement implies going from somewhere to somewhere, we can describe
these two notions, emotion and end, as the ontological and teleological components of a motive.
Further, we can use this terminology to demonstrate how a motive operates as a virtue.
For example, we might say that Maggie possesses the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness and
envision a situation in which she is faced with a piece of information that challenges her views.
Perhaps for a moment Maggie experiences a subtle feeling of cognitive dissonance and
frustration. But, she quickly halts this emotion by means of another: a controlled calmness that
allows her feelings of insecurity to dissipate. In this emotional state, Maggie knows that she can
better listen to the information as it comes and be receptive to the knowledge in its content. In
being motivated out of her emotion of calmness, Maggie is better able to make a more coolheaded, objective decision about the truth value of this piece of information. Here we see that
the emotion of calmness provides the ontological component of this motive, and the goal of
truth-receptivity provides the teleological component.
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I believe Zagzebski is correct in articulating that a motive cannot be identified purely
with a “desired end” or a “mere aim”, as many do in their daily discourse (Zagzebski 130-131).
To demonstrate her point, we might say that Kevin told his colleagues in psychology that he was
investigating Freudian psychology simply because he wanted to enhance his knowledge of the
subject. However, his fellow scholars knew that his real motive was to disprove the validity of
Freud‟s theories. In speaking in this manner, we identify a person‟s motive with a specific goal,
which may or may not be the more latent reason given by this person. And even if these kinds of
judgments are accurate in what they do say, they remain incomplete in respect the entire motive.
For these kinds of statements reduce a motive to its teleological component, neglecting the
ontological, the emotional state that drives the individual. Why did Kevin even desire to
disprove Freud‟s theories? Was he alarmed about their extreme nature, and so was compelled by
an emotion of earnest concern to reveal their falsehood? Was Kevin acting out of pride and, in
seeing an easy target, just wanted to give his intellectual abilities an ego-boost? Or perhaps was
Kevin actually driven by a sort of hate-filled insecurity towards these theories, as he had been
sexually repressed in his upbringing? Our understanding of Kevin‟s emotional state
fundamentally changes our perception of his entire motive, and further, the status of his
intellectual virtuousness in this situation. Thus, it is clear that both the ontological-emotional
and the teleological aspects of a motive have their own unique contributions that together
provide a full understanding of a given motive.
Zagzebski specifies that particularity of the concept of a motive; it is a single occurrence
of an emotion/goal tie that can be used to explain a particular act (132). Yet, she observes that
motives usually do not occur in anomalistic manner, but rather, they tend to persist on multiple
occasions. In this way, the singular motive becomes a motivation, which Zagzebski defines as “a
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persistent tendency to be moved by a motive of a certain kind” (132, emphasis removed). From
this definition, we see that a motivation retains both the ontological component and teleological
components of a motive. The important distinction here, though, is that these components are
pulled from their particularity and generalized into a larger disposition. What was a simply a
singular occasion for an emotion is now generalized into a larger disposition of one‟s
personality. What was previously conceived as a momentary goal is now conceived as an
overarching end of one‟s efforts. Thus, in the case of intellectual virtue, we can observe how a
person‟s particular intellectual goal, such as seeking an answer to a particular question is
extended into one‟s overall disposition towards the entirety of knowledge. As Zagzebski
describes, “a benevolent motivation is… a disposition to have a benevolent motive” (132-133).
Here, we observe that the goodness of a motivation is dependent on the goodness of its
corresponding motive. Basically, if an emotion/goal tie can be observed both to occur in a
similar manner across multiple situations and to operate ineffectively in attaining its particular
goals, it must be inferred that this emotion/goal tie is generally an inferior disposition. If the
motive misses the mark on multiple occasions, its extended motivation fails to attain its
overarching end, and so should be deemed a vice.
However, Zagzebski notes that having the virtuous motivation is still not enough for a
person to be called virtuous:
“The motivation to gain knowledge of a certain sort and to act in a certain way does not
reliably lead to success, although it reliably leads the agent to do as much as in her power
to be successful” (133).
In thinking of a virtuous individual, we are drawn to envisioning someone who is effective in
their pursuits. The rightly motivated individual certainly desires to be successful, for they are
genuinely drawn towards it. And yet, we should acknowledge the difference between wanting to
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be successful and being successful. In fact, Zagzebski remarks that for many virtues, there exists
only a “weak connection” between the motive and its desired end (133). And so, Zagzebski
argues:
“Virtue possession requires reliable success in attaining the ends of the motivational
component of the virtue. This means that the agent must be reasonably successful in the
skills and cognitive activities associated with the application of the virtue in her
circumstances” (134).
By Zagzebski‟s definition, a person is not virtuous until her pursuits have this component of
success. Yet, success is not simply a matter of having the right motivations. For as Zagzebski
puts it, the success feature of a virtue is entirely distinct from the motivational feature (133-134).
In Zagzesbki‟s terminology, a motivation can be virtuous but at the same time not be a virtue.
For all that is necessary for a motivation to be virtuous is to have the right ontological and
teleological components. But to constitute a virtue, one must have reliable success in attaining
the end of this motivation, i.e. actually fulfill its teleological component. In the case of
intellectual virtue, wanting knowledge does not mean that one holds the ability to acquire this
knowledge.
Still, Zagzebski emphasizes the motivational component as fundamentally crucial to the
acquisition of virtue. She writes,
“Intellectually virtuous motivations not only lead to following reliable procedures but
also lead to the development of particular skills suited to the acquisition of knowledge in
a certain area” (176).
Thus, while not constituting the virtues themselves, motivations set one on the right course
towards virtue. When a person genuinely desires knowledge and truth, they are motivated,
perhaps even compelled, to go after it. In this process, a person will be more likely to develop
the necessary skills for acquiring knowledge, because her desire enables her to be receptive to
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those procedures known by others to be truth conducive (176). In arguing as much, Zagzebski
demonstrates that even while the intellectually virtuous motivations are not virtues, she evokes
the real emotive power that they have in driving a person towards knowledge.
Part II: Zagzebski’s Pure Virtue Theory, Critiqued
To begin my critique, I believe that the success component of virtue in Zagzebski‟s
theory is not as distinct from the motivational as she would like to say. Indeed, Zagzebski does
argue that we should expect the motivational component of virtue to be at least generally related
to success (177). In fact, Zagzebski argues that motivation is often a prior necessity to success,
for it enables a person to acquire the skills that enable him to become generally effective in his
goal-seeking (176-177). It is simply that the sole possession of a motivation does not imply the
possession of a virtue. Having the virtuous motivation only means that one wants to become
successful, and is set on a path that will guide them towards it (133). This does not mean that
one is actually virtuous.
However, I wish to argue that there is more than a general relationship of motivation and
success. If the right motivation is always a precondition to virtue, the concept of motivation
should be more closely examined in how it leads one to virtue. And since a motive is defined in
terms of emotion and end, a motivation‟s likelihood to succeed should be greatly dependent on
the nature these two components. One might argue that these two should not be in any way
divorced, for there is a fundamental necessary connection between them such that, in every case
of a motive, the emotion and goal always exist together. In this way, the distinct examination of
either the emotion or goal or a motive would be seen as a misguiding and arbitrary endeavor.
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Still, I wish to show that we can see how each has its own individual contribution to a person‟s
success, and hence to the degree of his virtuosity.
As Zagzebski argues, virtues are not themselves emotions or feelings, but she, along with
almost every writer on the moral virtues, connects these with the virtues (128). For to identify a
virtue purely with its feeling would be to incorrectly reduce virtue to the ontological component
of its motivational feature. Zagzebski describes the theories of many who argue that the role of
virtue is to correct or negate the effects of emotion. But in seeing a fundamental connection of
emotion to motive and motive to virtue, Zagzebski suggests that “…the concept of a motive is
the place at which we can see the true connection between virtues and emotions or feelings”
(129). With this focus on motives, Zagzebski incorporates emotions into virtues in the following
manner.
As has been shown, the motivational component of Zagzebski‟s account of virtue is the
concept of a motive, generalized. Additionally, we know that a particular motive always has an
ontological-emotional component. Taking these two notions together, we can observe that a
motivation is simply a disposition to a set of particular emotions that are generally related in
motivating a person towards some general end. And so, the emotions relevant to a given virtue
are those which generally contribute to the success in attaining that virtue‟s end. Having such
emotions only constitutes virtuous motivations, not the actual virtue, which requires reliable
success as well. However, in discussing motivations purely in the sense of being virtuous, I
think Zagzebski would agree with me in that, to a certain extent, we generally associate certain
emotions with certain virtues. Thus, we can begin to affirm or at least negate the virtuousness of
certain emotions by their reliable success in guiding a person towards the general end of their
motivation. For example, we might identify pride, confidence, or boldness as particular
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emotions that could possibly contribute to the success of the virtue of courage because they
motivate a person to continue forward in the face of danger. In contrast, we can negate the
virtuosity of such emotions as fear and sadness purely in respect to the virtue of courage.
In respect to the intellectual virtues, the identification of virtuous emotions is more
difficult since knowledge is so general and broad a notion that its reception cannot be limited to a
simple set of particular emotions. Rather than saying that the totality of all knowledge is best
received under these emotions, it would be most fitting to say that certain kinds of information
are best received under certain emotional influences, and probably also under relevant situational
factors. For example, if Sarah is learning to become a social worker, her information-receiving
abilities will require her to generally emote in a way that is very different from John-Paul, who is
a studying to be a mathematician. It is in Sarah‟s best interest to develop a fair-minded sense of
empathy in the course of her training and studies. But for John-Paul, his need for more
analytical attentiveness will require a wholly different set of general emotional dispositions.
And in the same way that we identify emotions as being connected to virtue by their
reliable success, I think we should examine the component of the end in terms of its
virtuousness. For in order for a person‟s motivation to be deemed intellectually virtuous, it must
actually be aimed towards knowledge. For example, let us imagine that Daniel asserts to himself
that he wants knowledge and so he goes to college. However, in spite of his asserted goal,
Daniel really just wants to feel secure and confident about himself, and this is the real reason for
his pursuit of knowledge. Because of this, we would certainly observe that Daniel is not
intellectually virtuous. In the space of the statement “I want […]”, Daniel inserted “knowledge”,
when truly he should have placed “those intellectual properties that help me to feel more secure
and confident about myself”. We can certainly predict that in receiving a college education
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Daniel will easily be kept from most falsehoods, not simply the most preposterous or
contradictory. However, if we argue in favor of a motivation-based account of intellectual
virtue, we must assert that Daniel isn‟t really motivated to pursue knowledge. But in fact, he will
be more greatly tempted whatever beliefs are secure and confident about himself. Thus, we must
conclude that if what a person generally desires is in fact not knowledge, then his motivation will
not allow him to be successful, and hence he cannot be called intellectually virtuous.
At this point, Zagzebski would begin to diverge from these arguments. For in the above
example, I have argued that a good criterion for determining knowledge is not whether it helps
me to feel more secure and confident about myself. And from this I make an argument about the
inner properties that lead one towards knowledge, i.e. the intellectual virtue. I have stated,
“Knowledge is not a matter of „X‟, therefore someone inclined to believe a proposition based on
„X‟ is not disposed towards knowledge, therefore, this person is being motivated by an
intellectually non-virtuous motivation.” Even in saying, “Knowledge is not „X‟”, I have begun
my argument about virtue with at least some conception of what knowledge is. In saying this
much, I am setting forth a form of reliabilism, an epistemological theory in which the
righteousness of an action, virtue, emotion, motivation, or whatever is dependent on its ability to
bring a person towards a certain kind of knowledge. And as Zagzebski argues, the ethical
equivalent to reliabilism is consequentialism, since both formulate their theories based on a
previously conceived good state of affairs:
“According to reliabilism the epistemic goal is to form true beliefs and not to form false
beliefs, just as on consequentialist theories the moral goal is to produce good states of
affairs and not to produce evil states of affairs” (25).
But in putting forth a pure virtue theory, Zagzebski argues strongly that her account of
intellectual virtue is not based in a particular kind of knowledge. Instead, Zagzebski wishes to
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give an account of intellectual virtue which can be described as “the motivation for truth or
cognitive contact with reality, where that is understood to include contact that is high-quality and
non-propositional” (168). In describing such epistemological terms like “knowledge” and
“truth” as a sort of “cognitive contact with reality”, Zagzebski retains the evaluative concept of
epistemic truthfulness and evades postulating any specific content of belief. For if she were to
put forth even the smallest postulation of what knowledge is apart from virtue, her theory would
enter into the realms of reliabilism and consequentialism, thus negating the purity of her account
of virtue.
Instead, Zagzebski seeks to give an account of the goodness of all virtues, including the
intellectual ones, apart from any particular end or good state of affairs or belief system. She
provides the example of the virtue of benevolence, shaped according to her definition of virtue,
and goes on to say the following:
“According to a motivation-based theory there is something intrinsically good about the
motive of benevolence that is independent of any consideration of the goodness of wellbeing. In other words, the motive of benevolence does not derive its goodness of that at
which it aims. In a strong form of the theory it can be maintained that the goodness of the
state of affairs we call „well-being‟ is itself a derivative of the motive of benevolence”
(Zagzebski 202).
In the following passage, Zagzebski argues that we can observe the validity of this strong form
of the theory by looking to our own experience (203). However, it is unclear whether she
extends it to all kinds of virtue. Zagzebski does say that the goodness of intellectual virtues
exists apart from the goodness of knowledge itself (203), but she does not say that the goodness
of knowledge is only derived from the goodness of intellectual virtue.
However, in arguing this much, I believe that Zagzebski is extending virtue theory
beyond its proper limits. Throughout her work, Zagzebski does well in emphasizing the
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importance of the ontological-emotional component of a motivation-based theory of virtue.
However, because she is so ardent in maintaining the purity of her account of virtue, Zagzebski
fatally neglects the teleological component of the motivation feature within virtue. By
investigating the nature of this teleological component more deeply, I wish to demonstrate how
Zagzebski‟s virtue theory is, in many ways, consequentialistic, and thereby revealing her account
of intellectual virtue to be reliablistic.
To begin this investigation, I wish to argue that, at least in many instances of a virtue, a
person cannot be motivated virtuously unless one has a prior value of the goal associated with
that motive. One must ascribe a certain degree of value to an end state of affairs in order to be
motivated towards it. For example, when Zagzebski is first defining the concept of the motive in
Part II of Virtues of the Mind, she explicates her theory with an example of courage:
“A courageous person is motivated out of emotions characteristic of the virtue of courage
to face danger when something of importance is at stake. The courage, then, implies both
an element of emotion and the aim to protect something of value” (131).
Here, we observe a courageous person is one motivated to protect something of “value” or
“significance”. From this, it would be incorrect to presume that Zagzebski is arguing that the
goodness of courage derives from the goodness of the thing she is protecting. Rather, we can
conceive the goodness of the motivation in courage and the value of the protected object as being
distinct.
However, while the motivation in the virtue of courage is not derived from the value of
this object, we can see how the motive in any particular situation is generated from a prior
conception of what is valuable. In the particular situation of the courageous individual, how was
this person motivated to act courageously in the first place? We can envision Max who sees his
close friend Robert being attacked by wolves. In response to seeing this situation, Max is driven
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by an emotion of compassion for Robert to risk his own life and to save him. But previously to
the occasion of the motive, Max had to have already conceived that his friend‟s life was worth
saving in order to be motivated to protect him. Max‟s motive to be courageous and save his
friend came in response to seeing the safety of something valuable being compromised. The
valuation of the object in his goal preceded the activation of the motive. Thus, we see that the
inception of the particular motive inherent to courage was generated according to his previous
conception of a good state of affairs. If courage is, as Zagzebski describes, the motivation to
protect something of value, that value must exist both independently of the goodness of the virtue
of courage and prior to the development of this virtue. For, we recall that a motivation is simply
a generalized and entrenched set of related particular motives. Thus, if we observe that every
occasion of a courageous motive must have a virtue-independent value in its end, we must
concede that the development of motivations is contingent upon a set of values that is
independent of the goodness of virtues.
Furthermore, one cannot have such a set of values unless one has some conception of
what is being valued. In the previous example, we observed that Max cannot value Robert to
protect him unless he has some idea of who Robert is. But to broaden the implications of this
example, we see that a person cannot be motivated to protect anything unless he has some
conception of what would be worth protecting in the first place. And so, the motivations
inherent to the virtues must always exist in connection with some conception of what is valuable
that is independent of the virtues themselves.
Continuing with the example of courage, let us envision that during the Vietnam War
Andrew and Joe have both been drafted into the army. As a pacifist, Andrew makes known his
stance as a conscientious objector and becomes a typist. Andrew believes nothing is more
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valuable than human life and despises the practice of war. In contrast, Joe fervently believes in
the cause of the war and the necessity of violent resistance, and so offers himself to fight on the
frontlines. He certainly values human life as Andrew does, but not at all in the same manner.
For his endorsement of the necessity of this war overrules (to a certain extent) his value of
human life. Because of their differing beliefs on the basic value of human life, the two will
necessarily develop radically different kinds of motivations in reaction to their experiences
throughout the course of the war. And so, they will develop very different kinds of courage in
their emotive dispositions, and accordingly will have wholly different conceptions of what
courage is. They may both affirm the goodness of the virtue of courage and agree that it is “the
motivation to face danger and protect something worth valuable”, or something along those
lines. But their conception of what is worth protecting will both decide what situations call for
courage and determine the nature of their courageous motivations.
By this example, we see that one‟s conception of the virtue of courage will always exist
in connection with a set of values that is virtue-independent. Yet, I believe that this argument
applies not just to courage, but to all the virtues, thus negating the purity of Zagzebski‟s virtue
theory. To put the argument simply, Zagzebski cannot discuss the nature of the virtues apart
from virtue-independent values because whenever we get down to defining the virtues
themselves, we will always do so in conjunction with such values.
I apply this same point to virtue epistemology to say that a person cannot begin to
describe intellectual virtue without having some prior conception of knowledge. If having
intellectually virtuous motivations means that I am set on the right track towards knowledge
(though I may not yet have the reliable success in attaining it that would make me virtuous), I
cannot describe such motivations apart from any conception of knowledge. For example, when
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discussing the connections of intellectual and moral virtues, Zagzebski presents the ideas of
William James who shows that faith operates in the intellectual realm in the same way that
courage operates in the moral realm:
“Faith is the readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us
in advance. It is fact the same moral quality which we call courage in practical affairs,
and there will be a widespread tendency in men of vigorous nature to enjoy a certain
amount of uncertainty in their philosophic creed, just as risk lends a zest to the worldly
activity” (148-149).
Supposing that faith does operate as an intellectual virtue in this manner, we understand it to be
the ability to persevere with a given belief or idea in the midst of intellectual risk and
uncertainty. It seems true that no one possesses the kind of absolute intellectual certainty about
anything that they could give an account for their beliefs that would satisfy the absolute skeptic.
In believing anything, every person has some level of uncertainty such that the virtue of faith
keeps them afloat in believing in the midst of this risk. But the virtuousness of faith does not lie
simply in its ability to keep a person from the total questioning and confusion that spirals him
down into the abyss of absolute skepticism. As shown previously in the example of Sarah who
was intellectually courageous, faith enables a person to take the intellectual risks that allow her
to hold onto worthy ideas when the surrounding community wishes to make her believe
otherwise.
The big question concerning faith is: how far should one go before such adherence to
beliefs turns into radical dogmatism and intellectual blindness? When should faith stop and
allow serious questioning to begin? When Zagzebski discusses faith, I believe she speaks of this
virtue in aiming towards a certain kind of knowledge that her audience would all agree is worth
seeking. We are scholars going after knowledge, hence we conceive the end goal as that which
we pursue. But, this is not the case for all people who desire “knowledge”, as there are many,
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especially those outside of the academic community, who conceive knowledge in a very different
way. We might imagine that Claire and Emily are each presented with scholarly material that
deeply challenge their Christian beliefs. In fact, they each find their opponents‟ arguments so
completely convincing on intellectual grounds that their beliefs are radically overturned. In
response, Emily entirely gives up her Christian beliefs, while Claire, as we might say, “holds fast
to the faith”. Emily made an even-handed intellectual decision in which she could no longer
continue in her Christian beliefs in the midst of that much uncertainty. Yet, Claire was much
more willing to continue beliefs despite of their lack of intellectual grounding.
If we were to evaluate who made the more virtuous decision in this situation in terms of
their “faithfulness”, I believe we would do so in accordance with some prior conception of what
constitutes knowledge. Even if we judge this example non-propositionally, i.e. entirely apart
from any of the content of their Christian beliefs or of the critical arguments, we still observe a
connection between our prior conception of knowledge and their motivational responses. In
deciding who possessed the proper kind of faith, a pure intellectualist would give favor to Emily
since she made her decision according to an intellectual conception of knowledge. Yet, there
would certainly be many in the Christian community who would favor Claire‟s kind of faith. For
in their beliefs, knowledge is always to some extent derivative from accordance with the gospel,
and no level of uncertainty ever warrants giving up these beliefs. Even if they ascribe a great
deal of value to the kind of intellectual knowledge that Emily favored, they cannot praise her
decision since she favored that kind of knowledge over the religious knowledge.
In this example, we see that our conception of intellectual virtues always exists in
relationship to some previous conception of knowledge. For in being motivated towards
knowledge, one must give it some value and possess some deep desire for it. Yet, it is
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impossible to love knowledge in a deep, motivational sense without some conception of what
knowledge is. And so, whenever one gives an account of intellectual virtue, she is necessarily
prone to define it in respect to some conception of knowledge, if at least a vague one.
As a final point, I wish to return to the etymological definition of a motive. In Part II, I
explicated Zagzebski‟s definition of a motive (a driving emotion towards a certain goal) as an
occasion of inner movement, a going from an ontological somewhere to a teleological
somewhere. If a person has a motive, he is already in a state of inner compulsion and movement.
A person who is motivated in a certain manner cannot help but move in the direction he is
headed. For at the very moment of a motive‟s inception, one already has a goal and is in some
manner progressing towards it. He is, as we often say, being moved. As shown in the previous
examples, I have shown that it is impossible for us to conceive a motive without a goal because a
goal is intrinsic aspect of a motive. Using this point, I ask: How can we conceive the
virtuousness of a motive, i.e. an occasion of inner movement, entirely apart from its goal, when
the goal is an intrinsic aspect of its conception and existence? If Zagzebski breaks down the
concept of a motive in terms of emotion and end, it is a contradiction to say we can describe the
nature of a virtuous motive without at all discussing the goodness of certain ends. If one were to
argue that having virtuous motivations is intrinsically good without any reference to that towards
which one is being motivated would be like saying it is good to be moved in a certain way when
we have no idea what we are being moved towards. The goodness of virtues lies in its ability to
describe the dispositional movement that enables a person to both act and emote righteously.
Yet, it is impossible to fully describe this kind of movement without in some way defining the
destination to which it is headed.
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Conclusion: Summary and Future Recommendations
To summarize my explication and critique of Zagzebski‟s pure virtue theory, I have
argued as follows. In Zagzebski‟s account, virtue is constituted by the components of motivation
and reliable success. Motivation is generally related to success, and reliable success is defined as
the attainment of the end of the motivation. Motivation is a disposition to a certain motive, and a
motive is a driving emotion which leads a person to a certain end. However, in appealing to an
etymological definition, I have defined a motive as an occasion of inner movement, which is
initiated by a certain motive (the ontological component) towards a certain action and goal (the
teleological component). This occasion of inner movement cannot be initiated towards a goal
unless one values some object in this goal independently of the goodness of the virtues. Thus, in
valuing this object, one must have at least some prior conception of what this object is. And if a
goal is an intrinsic aspect of a motive, the goodness of a motivation cannot be isolated from the
goodness of its end. Hence, by this definition of a motivation, Zagzebski‟s definition of virtue is
no longer pure. And though the virtuous aspects of an individual, including motives, cannot be
isolated apart from the concepts of deontic or consequentialist ethics, we need not throw out this
approach or fling ourselves towards the others. Instead, I recommend for future research that we
begin to see these approaches as integrally related to one another, and then to examine how they
can be structurally conceptualized in a systematic manner. Similarly, we need not throw out
virtue epistemology because we cannot define intellectual virtue apart from knowledge. Rather,
we must acknowledge that this field was begun out of a realization of a need for relationship
between differing theoretical subjects. If we acknowledge that there exist a fundamental
necessary connection between the subjects of ethics and epistemology, I argue that we might
observe how these studies are co-operative. So for in the field of virtue epistemology, we have
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primarily examined the question: Could good character be a prior necessity to the reception of
truth? But I wish to flip the causal chain in the other direction to ask: Is knowledge a necessary
component of our moral lives? For in the same way that motives, actions, and ends hold the
potential to be systematically conceived, so might intellectual virtues, skills, and knowledge be
related in an integral manner.
Works Cited
Annas, Julia. “The Structure of Virtue.” Intellectual Virtue. Eds. Michael DePaul and Linda
Zagzebski. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2003. 15-33. Print.
“motive.” Online Etymology Dictionary. 10 March 2012.<http://www.etymonline.com/
index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=motive&searchmode=none>. Electronic.
Solomon, David. “Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine?” Intellectual Virtue. Eds. Michael DePaul
and Linda Zagzebski. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2003. 57-80. Print.
Sosa, Ernest. “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of
Knowledge”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 5: Studies in Epistemology.
Ed. Peter French. 3-25. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980. Print.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus. Virtues of the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Print.