State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
Why were these particular people victims of political violence there and then?
This essay will review in-depth the three day attack on Mumbai between November
26th-29th 2008 which were conducted by the Lashkar-e-Taiba Army (LeT), a terrorist
organisation based in Pakistan. The LeT targeted and bombed several landmarks in
Mumbai, India in a series of attacks killing 174 people and wounding over two
hundred more1. The terrorists appeared to specifically target foreigners and tourists
in the more affluent areas of the commercial capital. Targets included two five-star
hotels, the city's largest train station, a Jewish centre, movie theatre and a hospital.
This essay will examine who the LeT is, their motivations for attacking Mumbai, their
choice of targets and their consequent victims. It will also discuss whether they
fulfilled their aims and what the consequences of the terrorist attacks were and
whether the countries response was effective, in order to understand why these
particular people were victims of political violence there and then.
Article Summary
Much of the article is based on first-hand accounts of individuals who were in contact
with the terrorists, making it quite emotive. According to the article, the terrorists
were specifically targeting British and American nationals and were holding a
number hostage. A militant in the Oberoi Hotel stated “We want all the mujahedeen
held in India released and only after that we will release the people” 2. The article
provides a description of the guests staying at the hotels, which included members of
the European Parliament, executives from the multinational Hindustan Unilever and
foreign businessmen. A British citizen described a siege where gunmen ushered
1
BBC Website, “Mumbai Attacks: One Year On”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8379828.stm (accessed 8 December, 2012)
2
Somini Sengupta, “At least 100 Dead in India Terror Attacks” New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/world/asia/27mumbai.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 24
November, 2012)
Priya Patel B022934
1|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
approximately forty people asking specifically for British and Americans. Other
accounts include a Rabbi who described the “storming” of Chabad House. ‘The
article also quotes the chief minister of the state who confirmed the attackers hit
several targets, but emphasises that even several hours after the attacks began, the
full scale of the situation remained unclear. The terrorists are described as more
confrontational and organised than previous assailants, suggesting it is the worst
attack in Mumbai’s history. However it does state the police have killed six suspected
attackers, but remain unclear who is accountable for them.
The tone of the article is quite sensationalist, as evidenced by words used such as
‘storming’ and ‘brazen’, and depictions of hotel guests holed up in basements
making ‘desperate’ phone calls. A failing of the article is its narrow focus; it provides
lengthy descriptions of individuals staying in the luxury hotels, but glosses over the
taxi bombings and the atrocities in the station, where the most people were killed,
despite the fact these occurred prior to the attacks on the hotels. The article paints a
picture of a city in immense distress, but fails to provide more concrete facts.
Who Perpetrated the Political Violence?
The perpetrators are now known to be the Lashkar-e-Taiba Army, which is a
Pakistani-based Islamist organisation formed in 1986 that has enjoyed patronage
from the Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services-Intelligence (ISI), which
has allowed it to operate, recruit and network relatively freely in the past; it has been
described as being more akin to the Lebanese Hezbollah than the al-Qaeda3. This is
because it is largely supported by the government and is viewed more as resistance
movement due to the fact it does not advocate violence against Pakistan. Although
3
Anthony H Cordesman and others, “Pakistan: Violence Vs. Stability”
http://csis.org/files/publication/110607_Stabilizing_Pakistan.pdf (accessed 6 December, 2012)
Priya Patel B022934
2|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
the exact nature and intensity of the LeT’s relationship with the ISI is uncertain, the
fact a relationship exists is never questioned. Similarly, while it is known a
relationship exists between the LeT and al Qaeda, the exact nature remains
unverified4. This is important, as it demonstrates al Qaeda’s scope of influence and
suggests it affected the LeT’s choice of targets including the Taj and Oberoi Hotels
and Chabad House. The al Qaeda is notoriously against western, materialistic
values, and the treatment of Palestinians by Israel; therefore, by focussing on these
sites, the terrorists were able to target and victimise perceived enemies.
The LeT’s trademark modus operandi appears to be the ‘fidayeen’ attacks, which
featured prominently in the Mumbai bombings. Fidayeen attacks are distinguished
from suicide attacks in that their mission does not necessarily render them dead, but
places the individual in adverse, usually suicidal circumstances 5. The LeT has been
involved in several prior incidents in India and has been considered the most
effective, prolific and fearsome force fighting in Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) 6 .
Therefore, this was not the LeT’s first act of terrorism or political violence in India.
Although they have thus far been unsuccessful in ‘freeing Kashmir’ these attacks
were successful in other ways, as they were able to target people they believed
represented the enemy, for example, the Indian citizens in the train station and
hospital.
Members of the LeT are described as efficient, highly motivated and well-trained.
According to Zahab, their intake is selective and their training is described as
intensive with several stages; they promote transnational activities in the name of
4
Arvind Gupta, S Kalyanaraman and Ashok K Behuria, “India-Pakistan Relations After the Mumbai
Terror Attacks: What Should India Do?” Strategic Analysis, vol. 33, no. 3 (2009): 320
5
Syed MA Zaidi, Profiling the Lashkar-e-Taiba, South Asian Survey, vol. 16, no. 315 (2009): 321
6
Stephen Tankel, "Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai.” Developments in Radicalisation and
Political Violence, http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdffiler/Tankel_01.pdf (accessed 6 December, 2012)
Priya Patel B022934
3|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
jihad against infidels anywhere in the world where Muslims are perceived to be
oppressed7. This explains why they were able to successfully conduct such a highly
coordinated series of attacks in Mumbai and also explains their antagonism towards
India, where Muslims, who are a minority group, have historically been persecuted.
The terrorists were trained and equipped in Karachi and proceeded to enter India by
sea and were able to travel for thirty-eight hours undetected by the Indian Navy8.
The terrorists were highly skilled and organised as evidenced by their weapons
which included machine guns, AK-47s, hand grenades and bombs. The organised
planning of the attacks and powerful arsenal strongly suggests they intended to
cause maximum damage, confusion and mayhem. All the attacks occurred within
hours of each other at various points around a section of the commercial capital and
show evidence of comprehensive planning and dexterity.
Motivations Behind the Attacks
The violence perpetrated cannot be considered legitimate as their targets were what
Martin identifies as ‘noncombatants’, which refers to civilians; as the force was used
primarily against noncombatants, it is classified as terrorist activity according to the
Political
Violence
Matrix,
or
more
specifically,
unrestricted
terrorism,
as
indiscriminate force was applied against noncombatant targets with restraint by
dissidents9. One could argue these targets were selected because they represented
characteristics the terrorists associated with the enemy and thus symbolised the
enemy. More specifically, the LeT would fit into the category of national dissident
7
Mariam A Zahab, “‘I Shall be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise’: The Pakistani Martyrs of the
Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure).” In The Practice of War: Production, Reproduction and
Communication of Armed Violence, ed. Aparna Rao, (Oxford: Berghahn Books): 152
8
Bill Roggio, “Lashar-e-Taiba Operative Directly Linked to Mumbai”, The Long War Journal
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/lashkaretaiba_operat_1.php (accessed 8 December,
2012)
9
Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues 4 th Edition, (Thousand
Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), 50
Priya Patel B022934
4|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
terrorists as described by Martin. The attacks occurred “from below” and were
committed by a non-state movement, in this case the Lashkar-e-Taiba Army, the
targets were perceived enemies, i.e. India’s economic centre, British and American
nationals, Indian citizens, and furthermore, they believed the violence was necessary
to defend a higher cause, i.e. Kashmir’s independence from India, the plight of
Muslims in India and Palestine, and the freedom of mujahedeen held in India 10 .
Anecdotal evidence supports the theory that a motivation for the attack may have
been vengeance for instances of atrocities Muslims in India have suffered,
specifically the 1992 Utter Pradesh attacks and 2002 Gujarat attacks11.
Aside from their professed goal, the LeT appeared to have several underlying
motives which included creating chaos, conflict and fermenting hate between
Pakistan and India. In this sense they were successful; although they did not secure
sovereignty for Kashmir, they drew international attention onto the issue and
relations between the two states were considerably strained thereafter, especially
when considering their recent diplomatic progress. Since June 2004, India and
Pakistan had engaged in their most “wide-ranging and comprehensive peace
negotiations” regarding Kashmir 12. The attacks on Mumbai largely negated these
developments, as it fuelled mistrust and suspicion between the two states.
Furthermore, their choice of state appears to be a statement in itself; Pakistan and
India have historically had a contentious relationship and hold different political
values. Therefore, by bombing India, the terrorists appeared to have anticipated the
media frenzy which ensued. In this sense, they were successful as they received
10
Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues 4 th Edition, (Thousand
Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), 136
11
K. A. Kronstadt, Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests (DIANE
Publishing, 2011), 6
12
Anthony H Cordesman and others, “Pakistan: Violence Vs. Stability”
http://csis.org/files/publication/110607_Stabilizing_Pakistan.pdf (accessed 6 December, 2012)
Priya Patel B022934
5|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
widespread international media coverage and attention, and key actors including the
USA became involved, as the possibility of a future war between India and Pakistan
could have affected them in several ways. For example, the USA needed to sustain
a positive relationship with Pakistan in order to maintain the support they were
receiving in their on-going war against Afghanistan, they needed to maintain the
lucrative economic bridges they were building with India and more importantly, they
needed to ensure nuclear weapons never became a threat. This shows stability in
the region was important for the wider international society, which may have been a
motivation for the LeT, as the terrorists may have been hoping to disrupt the growing
relationship between Pakistan and the West and also damage India’s economic
growth, being that they disagree with most Western values. In this case, they were
only partially successful, as while most institutions remained closed, it was only
during the immediate aftermath of the violence. Furthermore, Pakistan and the USA
have maintained their diplomatic relationship and India subsequently recovered from
the attacks and continues to grow economically.
Another way to consider the motivations behind the attacks is to put the Pakistani
government into the equation; if one considers the historically tumultuous
relationship between Pakistan and India and the fact the ISI provided funding and
support to the LeT, it does not seem unreasonable that there may have some level
of government involvement in the attacks. The Pakistani army continues to possess
considerable power and the ISI’s impact on Pakistani society was primarily through
its patronage of jihadi organisations which were in reality paramilitary forces claiming
the “mantel of Islam”13. Therefore, non-state-actors could have been used to achieve
limited objectives in asymmetric conflicts, hence, the LeT could have been utilized as
13
Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror
(New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 151
Priya Patel B022934
6|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
a vital component in Islamabad’s anti-India strategy14. If so, this proved successful,
as they caused considerable chaos and destruction without any concrete evidence
linking the Pakistani government to the attacks. One could also argue Pakistan used
the LeT to fight a proxy war. This theory is supported by the Mumbai police and
evidence suggest a number of individuals within the ISI disagreed with Pakistan’s
involvement in the war the USA and other NATO countries are waging against
Afghanistan 15. This is corroborated by Jamwal who states in order to achieve its
strategic goals, Pakistan encouraged terrorism against India by providing training,
finance, weaponry and explosives16. This provides a good explanation for the attacks;
the terrorists clearly had access to wide range of resources as evidenced by their
arsenal, reconnaissance efforts, and organisation, and their targets suggest they
were pursuing more than the Kashmiri issue. In this respect, Chabad House is an
interesting choice of target. It appears the LeT actively sought out Israelis in India,
which could be linked to another set of tensions, i.e. the acrimonious relationship
between Israel and Palestine. Martin’s description of national dissident terrorism can
be applied here: the LeT appear to be championing the rights of a group whose
interests are subordinate, which in this case refers to Muslims in India and
Palestine17. Rice herself was quoted as saying their attack on Chabad House added
another layer of complexity to the whole situation 18. This reiterates the motivations
behind the attacks were complex and reemphasises it was possible the LeT had a
14
Arabinda Acharya and Sonal Marwah, “Nizam, la Tanzim (System, not Organization): DO
Organizations Matter in Terrorism Today? A Study of the November 2008 Mumbai Attacks”, Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 34, no. 1 (2008): 11
15
Saroj K Rath, “26/11 Attacks: Looking into the Legal Questions”, Social Research Reports, vol.9,
(2010): 30
16
N.S. Jamwal, “Terrorists’ Modus Operandi in Jammu and Kashmir”, Strategic Analysis, vol. 27, no.
3 (2003): 383
17
th
Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues 4 Edition, (Thousand
Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), 136
18
K. A. Kronstadt, Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests (DIANE
Publishing, 2011), 6
Priya Patel B022934
7|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
patron who influenced their actions. Historically, the LeT’s focus has been Kashmir’s
sovereignty, however, these attacks seemed to reflect a range of grievances.
Therefore it appears they may have benefited from a form of patronage they were
consequently influenced by. In this sense, they were partially successful in that
negated any diplomatic progress between the Indian and Pakistani governments,
which the Pakistani army was critical of, however, their actions did not affect the
treatment of Palestinians.
Their focus on luxury hotels suggests they were intentionally targeting foreigners;
this could be attributed to several reasons including the aforementioned hatred of
westerners, but also, due to the fact they knew international media attention would
be further saturated on these attacks should the Western public believe foreign
nationals were targets of the attacks. For mass media organisations, coverage of
prolonged incidents of terrorism provides endless sources of sensational and visually
compelling news stories capable of boosting audiences
19
. This provides an
explanation for why the article above and other international media outlets focussed
on the foreigners more than the local victims; the idea of our ‘own’ people being
caught in the catastrophes would be more horrific and attract more attention and
empathy than the images of another terrorist attack in a state many perceive as a
distant third-world country. The media attention itself may have been another motive
for the LeT; committing such atrocities in this digital age provided them with notoriety
otherwise unattainable. Bloom argues the primary target of terrorists are not those
actually injured or killed, but those made to witness it 20. While she argues this in the
context of suicide terror, one could arguably apply it to most forms of terrorism,
19
Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy 2nd Edition: The Liberal State, Response(New York:
Routledge, 2006), 114
20
Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005):
77
Priya Patel B022934
8|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
including the attacks in Mumbai. In this case, by targeting popular tourist venues, it
meant international audiences, especially those in the West, were more so affected
by the tragedies. The terrorists did not need to bomb a landmark in London or New
York to intimidate UK or US nationals, they were able to do so in a country which
was geographically and logistically more favourable, and still have an unprecedented
psychological effect worldwide, while also fulfilling their goals of drawing attention to
the Kashmir issue. This is supported by the article in The New York Times which
focussed primarily on the Western tourists affected by the atrocities, rather than
giving a comprehensive overview of the whole situation. Furthermore, by securing
media attention and worldwide publicity, they were able to gain legitimacy as a group,
while also potentially attracting followers and sympathisers 21. This could theoretically
lead to more funding for their causes and explains why they were willing to take such
risks and partake in the fidayeen attacks.
Consequences of the Attacks
A consequence of the attacks was it proved even smaller terrorist organisations have
access to sophisticated technology, are highly organised and are capable of
immense destruction. Whether or not this was an intentional, it highlighted al
Qaeda’s scope of influence over organisations they inspired. It has been suggested
the terrorists were not only inspired by al Qaeda and their brand of global jihadi
violence but also directed by them22. This reiterated what the UK learnt after the 7/7
bombings in displaying the astonishing capabilities of under-the-radar terrorist
organisations; while this was not a case of ‘home-grown’ terrorism, it was terrorism
21
Paul Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment”, Terrorism and Political Violence, vol.
9, no. 2 (1997): 52
22
K. A. Kronstadt, Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests (DIANE
Publishing, 2011), 6
Priya Patel B022934
9|Page
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
inspired at least in part by the al Qaeda. The prolonged and coordinated nature of
the attacks that allowed an unrelenting massacre to unfold proved the terrorists had
participated in a protracted period of planning and an extensive training regime. They
had come prepared with expensive equipment, enough ammunition for a prolonged
fight, possessed fairly sophisticated communication systems, as well as knowledge
of precise locations and layouts of the targets 23. This shows the risk posed by the
ever-growing influence of jihadi groups such as the al Qaeda, whose influence
caused the loss of numerous lives in Mumbai.
The State Response
There were several issues with Mumbai’s initial response, which had they been
executed properly could have potentially prevented the attack from being so
detrimental. The failures occurred from the beginning when the terrorists were able
to arrive into the city unchecked. Once the attacks unfolded, the first line of response
fell to Mumbai’s vaunted Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS); however, they were never
intended to be a Quick Reaction Team operating against heavily armed terrorists 24.
The result of employing an inadequate team to respond to the crisis prevented the
city from restraining the terrorists and limiting the impact of the attacks, as they were
unable to match the terrorists expertise and training and were thus out of their
league. Had an appropriate team been dispatched, it is very possible the causalities
and damage could have been limited, as they would have possessed the skills to
contend with the terrorists’ expert training. This is emphasised by the failure of the
23
Arabinda Acharya and Sonal Marwah, “Nizam, la Tanzim (System, not Organization): Do
Organizations Matter in Terrorism Today? A Study of the November 2008 Mumbai Attacks”, Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 34, no. 1 (2008): 7
24
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj, “The Mumbai Attacks – Lessons to be Learnt from the Police Response”
Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2009): 147
Priya Patel B022934
10 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
ATS to cordon off the attack sites to contain the terrorists 25. This suggests the impact
of the attacks could have been greatly limited had the terrorists been contained at an
earlier stage, for example at the train station and suggests the attacks would not
necessarily have been as prolonged as they were. Furthermore, these attacks could
have been prevented altogether had India’s Intelligence Bureau coordinated with
other central agencies. Indian intelligence officers received warnings from their own
and US sources suggesting a major attack was imminent 26 . This shows the
importance of speed in counter-intelligence. Had the information been analysed and
disaggregated correctly, the LeT could have been prevented from entering the
country, thus avoiding the atrocities which followed. Another issue was the lack of
appropriate weaponry; the Railway Protection Officers possessed relatively
‘antiquated’ weaponry, with approximately one for every two officers27. This shows a
failure on the part of the state, as officers should be equipped to perform their job in
any eventuality.
It is transparent the attacks could have been prevented or at the very least,
considerably contained. India has since announced a number of reforms aimed at
addressing these shortcomings. Efforts were made to improve India’s domestic
security, which included the creation of a Coastal Command to secure the shoreline,
the establishment of counter-terror schools, standing regional commando units, the
creation of a national agency to investigate suspected terror activity and the
strengthening of anti-terror laws, with the legislation approved by India’s lower and
upper houses28. These are examples of repressive options of counterterrorism which
25
Angel Rabasa and others, The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 10
Caren Kaplan, “The Biopolitics of Technoculture in the Mumbai Attacks”, Theory, Culture and
Society, Vol. 26, No. 301 (2009): 306
27
Angel Rabasa and others, The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 9
28
Angel Rabasa and others, The Lessons of Mumbai (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 12
26
Priya Patel B022934
11 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
have the potential to not only prevent future attacks, but also protect citizens should
they occur. For example, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act allows suspects to
be held for six months without charges and is designed to prevent unlawful
activities29. This is an example of a legalistic option, which allows the country to use
law enforcement agencies and criminal investigative techniques in the persecution of
suspected terrorists30. Additionally, police are being sent to Israel to study ‘policing
techniques’ to learn to control terror 31. This demonstrates India is taking numerous
measures to prevent future attacks. In addition to the recent execution of Abbas,
these measures can be viewed as a warning that terrorism will not be tolerated by
India.
To conclude, it is clear the Lashkar-e-Taiba Army were influenced by a range of
factors, and while foreign nationals may not have been the primary targets, they
were significantly affected. It appears as though this was intentional due the
locations of the targets, and it is clear they gained extensive media coverage as a
result. This may have been a key factor in why they were victims; the LeT were
shrewd in their manipulation of the media to gain unprecedented coverage for their
causes which were the issues of sovereignty for Kashmir, the treatment of Muslims
in India and Palestine and the Mujahedeen in India. Overall, the people affected by
the attacks, were targeted in what can be described as a combination of vengeance,
and an exploitative attack designed to attract media attention. Although they were
not successful in fulfilling their stated aims, they were able cause tension between
Pakistan and India. India has since made efforts to prevent such incidents, which is
29
PRS Legislative Research, “The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill, 2011”
http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-unlawful-activities-prevention-amendment-bill-2011-2159/
(accessed 7 December, 2012)
30
th
Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues 4 Edition, (Thousand
Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012), 433
31
Peter Adey, “Vertical Security in the Megacity: Legibility, Mobility and Aerial Politics” Theory,
Culture and Society, Vol. 27, No. 51 (2010): 56
Priya Patel B022934
12 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
imperative, as these attacks could have been seriously curtailed, if not foiled
altogether. These people were victims of a history of tension between Pakistan and
India which is based on religious and political conflicts, the adverse treatment
Muslims in India have faced and India’s economic growth, which is steadily making it
more akin to the ‘despised’ West.
WORD COUNT: 3293
Priya Patel B022934
13 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
Appendix
November 27, 2008
At Least 100 Dead in India Terror Attacks 32
By SOMINI SENGUPTA
MUMBAI, India — Coordinated terrorist attacks struck the heart of Mumbai, India’s
commercial capital, on Wednesday night, killing dozens in machine-gun and grenade
assaults on at least two five-star hotels, the city’s largest train station, a Jewish
center, a movie theater and a hospital.
Even by the standards of terrorism in India, which has suffered a rising number of
attacks this year, the assaults were particularly brazen in scale and execution. The
attackers used boats to reach the urban peninsula where they hit, and their targets
were sites popular with tourists.
The Mumbai police said Thursday that the attacks killed at least 101 people and
wounded at least 250. Guests who had escaped the hotels told television stations
that the attackers were taking hostages, singling out Americans and Britons.
A previously unknown group claimed responsibility, though that claim could not be
confirmed. It remained unclear whether there was any link to outside terrorist groups.
Gunfire and explosions rang out into the morning.
32
Somini Sengupta, “Atleast 100 Dead in India Terror Attacks”, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/world/asia/27mumbai.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed 24
November, 2012)
Priya Patel B022934
14 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
Hours after the assaults began, the landmark Taj Mahal Palace & Tower Hotel, next
to the famed waterfront monument the Gateway of India, was in flames.
Guests banged on the windows of the upper floors as firefighters worked to rescue
them.
Fire also raged inside the luxurious Oberoi Hotel, according to the police. A militant
hidden in the Oberoi told India TV on Thursday morning that seven attackers were
holding hostages there.
“We want all mujahedeen held in India released, and only after that we will release
the people,” he said.Some guests, including two members of the European
Parliament who were visiting as part of a trade delegation, remained in hiding in the
hotels, making desperate cellphone calls, some of them to television stations,
describing their ordeal.
Alex Chamberlain, a British citizen who was dining at the Oberoi, told Sky News
television that a gunman had ushered 30 or 40 people from the restaurant into a
stairway and, speaking in Hindi or Urdu, ordered them to put up their hands.
“They were talking about British and Americans specifically,” he said. “There was an
Italian guy, who, you know, they said, ‘Where are you from?’ and he said he’s from
Italy, and they said, ‘Fine,’ and they left him alone.”
Sajjad Karim, 38, a British member of the European Parliament, told Sky News: “A
gunman just stood there spraying bullets around, right next to me.”
Before his phone went dead, Mr. Karim added: “I managed to turn away and I ran
into the hotel kitchen and then we were shunted into a restaurant in the basement.
Priya Patel B022934
15 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
We are now in the dark in this room, and we have barricaded all the doors. It’s really
bad.”
Attackers had also entered Cama and Albless Hospital, according to Indian
television reports, and struck Nariman House, which is home to the city’s ChabadLubavitch center.
A spokesman for the Lubavitch movement in New York, Rabbi Zalman Shmotkin,
told the Associated Press that attackers “stormed the Chabad house” in Mumbai.
Israel’s Foreign Ministry said it was trying to locate an unspecified number of Israelis
missing in Mumbai, according to Haaretz.com, the Web site of an Israeli newspaper.
Several high-ranking law enforcement officials, including the chief of the antiterrorism
squad and a commissioner of police, were reported killed.
The military was quickly called in to assist the police.
Hospitals in Mumbai, a city of more than 12 million that was formerly called Bombay,
have appealed for blood donations. As a sense of crisis gripped much of the city,
schools, colleges and the stock exchange were closed Thursday.
Vilasrao Deshmukh, the chief minister for Maharashtra State, where Mumbai is, told
the CNN-IBN station that the attacks hit five to seven targets, concentrated in the
southern tip of the city, known as Colaba and Nariman Point. But even hours after
the attacks began, the full scope of the assaults was unclear.
Unlike previous attacks in India this year, which consisted of anonymously planted
bombs, the assailants on Wednesday night were spectacularly well-armed and very
Priya Patel B022934
16 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
confrontational. In some cases, said the state’s highest-ranking police official, A. N.
Roy, the attackers opened fire and disappeared.
Indian officials said the police had killed six of the suspected attackers and captured
nine.
A group calling itself the Deccan Mujahedeen said it had carried out the attacks. It
was not known who the group is or whether the claim was real.
Around midnight, more than two hours after the series of attacks began, television
images from near the historic Metro Cinema showed journalists and bystanders
ducking for cover as gunshots rang out. The charred shell of a car lay in front of
Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, formerly Victoria Terminus, the mammoth railway
station. A nearby gas station was blown up.
The landmark Leopold , a favorite tourist spot, was also hit.
Reached by phone, some guests who had been trapped in the Taj said about 1 a.m.
that they had heard an explosion and gunfire in the old wing of the hotel.
A 31-year-old man who was in the Taj attending a friend’s wedding reception said he
was getting a drink around 9:45 p.m. when he heard something like firecrackers —
“loud bursts” interspersed with what sounded like machine-gun fire.
A window of the banquet hall shattered, and guests scattered under tables and were
quickly escorted to another room, he said. No one was allowed to leave.
Just before 1 a.m., another loud explosion rang out, and then another about a halfhour later, the man said.
Priya Patel B022934
17 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
At 6 a.m., he said that when the guests tried to leave the room early Thursday,
gunmen opened fire. One person was shot.
The man’s friend, the groom, was two floors above, in the old wing of the hotel,
trapped in a room with his bride. One explosion, he said, took the door off its hinges.
He blocked it with a table.
Then came another blast, and gunfire rang out throughout the night. He did not want
to be identified, for fear of being tracked down.
Rakesh Patel, a British businessman who escaped the Taj, told a television station
that two young men armed with a rifle and a machine gun took 15 hostages, forcing
them to the roof.
The gunmen, dressed in jeans and T-shirts, “were saying they wanted anyone with
British or American passports,” Mr. Patel said.
He and four others managed to slip away in the confusion and smoke of the upper
floors, he said. He said he did not know the fate of the remaining hostages.
Clarence Rich Diffenderffer, of Wilmington, Del., said after dinner at the hotel he
headed to the business center on the fifth floor.
“A man in a hood with an AK-47 came running down the hall,” shooting and throwing
four grenades, Mr. Diffenderffer said. “I, needless to say, beat it back to my room
and locked it, and double-locked it, and put the bureau up against the door.”
Mr. Diffenderffer said he was rescued hours later, at 6:30 a.m., by a cherrypicker.
Priya Patel B022934
18 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
Among those apparently trapped at the Oberoi were executives and board members
of Hindustan Unilever, part of the multinational corporate giant, The Times of India
reported.
Indian military forces arrived outside the Oberoi at 2 a.m., and some 100 officers
from the central government’s Rapid Action Force, an elite police unit, entered later.
CNN-IBN reported the sounds of gunfire from the hotel just after the police
contingent went in.
The Bush administration condemned the attacks, as did President-elect Barack
Obama’s transition team. The White House said it was still “assessing the hostage
situation.”
Reporting was contributed by Michael Rubenstein and Prashanth Vishwanathan
from Mumbai; Jeremy Kahn and Hari Kumar from New Delhi; Souad Mekhennet
from Frankfurt, Germany; Sharon Otterman and Michael Moss from New York; and
Mark Mazzetti from Washington.
Priya Patel B022934
19 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
Bibliography
Acharya, Arabinda and Sonal Marwah. “Nizam, la Tanzim (System, not
Organization): Do Organizations Matter in Terrorism Today? A Study of the
November 2008 Mumbai Attacks.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 34, no. 1
(2008): 1-16
Adey, Peter “Vertical Security in the Megacity: Legibility, Mobility and Aerial Politics”,
Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 27, No. 51 (2010): 51-67
Badri-Maharaj, Sanjay. “The Mumbai Attacks – Lessons to be Learnt from the Police
Response” Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2009): 145-156
BBC
Website.
“Mumbai
Attacks:
One
Year
On”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8379828.stm (accessed 8 December,
2012)
Bloom, Mia. Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror. New York: Columbia
University Press, 2005
Cordesman, Anthony H and others. “Pakistan: Violence Vs. Stability”
http://csis.org/files/publication/110607_Stabilizing_Pakistan.pdf
(accessed
6
December, 2012)
Priya Patel B022934
20 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
Findley, Michael G and Joseph K Young. “Terrorism, Democracy, and Credible
Commitments”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2011): 357-378
Gupta, Arvind, S Kalyanaraman and Ashok K Behuria. “India-Pakistan Relations
After the Mumbai Terror Attacks: What Should India Do?” Strategic Analysis, vol. 33,
no. 3 (2009): 319 – 323
Jamwal, N. S. “Terrorists’ Modus Operandi in Jammu and Kashmir.” Strategic
Analysis, vol. 27, no. 3 (2003): 382-403
Kaplan, Caren “The Biopolitics of Technoculture in the Mumbai Attacks”, Theory,
Culture and Society, Vol. 26, No. 301 (2009): 301-314
Kronstadt, K. A., Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S.
Interests. DIANE Publishing, 2011
Mamdani, Mahmood, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the
Roots of Terror. New York: Pantheon Books, 2004
Martin, Gus. Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues 4th
Edition. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2012
PRS Legislative Research. “The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill,
2011” http://www.prsindia.org/billtrack/the-unlawful-activities-prevention-amendmentbill-2011-2159/ (accessed 7 December, 2012)
Rabasa, Angel and others. The Lessons of Mumbai. Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2009
Priya Patel B022934
21 | P a g e
State, Violence and Terrorism
Alexandre Christoyannopoulos
Rotella, Sebastian. “Militant Reaffirms Role of Pakistan in Mumbai Attacks”
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/09/militant_reaffirms_role_of_pakistan
_in_mumbai_attacks (accessed December 25, 2012)
Sengupta, Somini, “At least 100 Dead in India Terror Attacks” New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/world/asia/27mumbai.html?pagewanted=all&_r=
0 (accessed 24 November, 2012)
Tankel, Stephen. "Lashkar-e-Taiba: From 9/11 to Mumbai” Developments in
Radicalisation
and
Political
Violence,
http://www.ps.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/pdffiler/Tankel_01.pdf (accessed 6 December, 2012)
Wilkinson, Paul, Terrorism Versus Democracy 2nd Edition: The Liberal State
Response. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Wilkinson, Paul. “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment.” Terrorism and
Political Violence, vol. 9, no. 2 (1997): 51-64
Zahab, Mariam A. “‘I Shall be Waiting for You at the Door of Paradise’: The Pakistani
Martyrs of the Lashkar-e Taiba (Army of the Pure).” In The Practice of War:
Production, Reproduction and Communication of Armed Violence, edited by Aparna
Rao, 133-160. Oxford: Berghahn Books
Zaidi, Syed M.A. “Profiling the Lashkar-e-Taiba.” South Asian Survey, vol. 16, no.
315 (2009): 315-334
Priya Patel B022934
22 | P a g e