Social Policies
and Welfare
in Croatia
An Assessment/Review for UNICEF
April / February 2002
Dr. Vesna Bošnjak, Ms. Jadranka Mimica,Prof. Dr. Vlado Puljiz
Ms. Tanja Radočaj, Dr. Paul Stubbs, Dr. Siniša Zrinščak
SOCIAL POLICIES
AND WELFARE
IN CROATIA
An Assessment/Review for UNICEF
April 2002
Dr. Vesna Bošnjak
Ms. Jadranka Mimica
Prof. Dr. Vlado Puljiz
Ms. Tanja Radocaj
Dr. Paul Stubbs
Dr. Siniša Zrinščak
Draft – please do not quote or circulate without permission
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
Acronyms Used in Text
I:
Reforming Welfare
II:
Family Policies
III:
Child Care Policies and Child Protection
IV:
Youth Policies
V:
Return Policies
VI:
An Agenda for Social Mobilisation
Bibliography
Further References and Useful Web Sites
ii
ACRONYMS USED IN TEXT
BiH
CBO
CBS
CRC
CRS
CSW
DEM
DFID
€
ECRE
FRY
GDP
HDZ
HRK
IDP
ILO
IMF
LEDA
LTTP
MES
MOLSW
NGO
ODPR
PAYGO
RS
SIPMFY
STI
UN
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNPA
USAID
USD
UzU
WB
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Community Based Organisation
Croatian Bureau of Statistics
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Catholic Relief Service
Centre for Social Welfare
German Marks
UK Government Department for International
Development
Euros
European Council for Refugees and Exiles
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Gross Domestic Product
Croatian Democratic Community (political
party)
Croatian Kunas
Internally Displaced Person
International Labour Organisation
International Monetary Fund
Local Economic Development Agency
Law on the Temporary Take-Over of Property
Ministry of Education and Sport
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
Non-Governmental Organisation
Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees
Pay as you go pensions
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republika Srpska
State Institute for the Protection of Motherhood,
the Family and Youth
Sexually Transmitted Infections
United Nations
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Protected Area
United States Agency for International
Development
United States Dollars
Govt. Office for Co-operation with NGOs
The World Bank
iii
I:
REFORMING WELFARE
1. Introduction
This report seeks to address the current situation regarding aspects of the welfare of
those who live in the Republic of Croatia, particularly children, young people, and
families. The report seeks to scrutinise key interlinked elements of policy looking, in
turn, at Family Policies (Section II), at Child Care Policies (Section III), at Youth
Policies (Section IV), at Return Policies (Section V), and at An Agenda for Social
Mobilisation (Section VI). The context for the Report is the continued UNICEF
presence in a country where the last full UNICEF Situation Analysis of the Position of
Children and Women was written in 1998, and where elections for a new Government
and President, in early 2000, produced a clear mandate for democratic reforms,
modernisation, and integration into European structures, institutions, and ideas.
In the aftermath of a decade of war, crisis and authoritarianism, the new political map
in Croatia allows, for the first time, the possibility of a serious and coherent social
policy reform strategy emerging. This strategy could build on the many strengths of
the inherited welfare system, and harness the social innovations of new actors, in
order to combat social exclusion and poverty, as well as modernising the social
relations of welfare so that users are at the centre of a system of community-based,
non-stigmatising, services. The triangulation of social solidarities, social justice, and
social innovations, must be at the heart of this reform project.
However, two years on, the optimism, even euphoria, of the immediate post-election
period has faded somewhat, as the magnitude and complexity of the reform tasks
facing the Government becomes clearer. Within an, at times very shaky, coalition
united more by their opposition to dominant politics in the 1990s than by any clear
and coherent ideological and political agenda, social policy has not been a major
priority, beyond the immediate, and pressing, need to reduce social expenditures and
rationalise scarce resources.
The technical capacity of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (MOLSW) is,
fortunately, very strong, and, in combination with co-opted experts, a long-term social
policy reform strategy is being developed, elements of which are addressed in this
Report. This attempt to ‘depoliticise social policy’, as it were, is laudable, but cannot
be a substitute for open political discussion about choices regarding welfare futures.
Indeed, on occasions, this has appeared to be a Government which has so many
‘strategic plans’, ‘working parties’, ‘new initiatives’, and the like, that they reveal
only the lack of overall strategy, vision, and direction in what remains a deeply
divided and polarised society. In addition, at times, the Government has seemed
powerless in the face of pressures from external actors, particularly the International
Financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and, to a lesser extent,
the World Bank, who are tenacious in their reform agendas now that they have a
credible Governmental counterpart in place.
All of this means that Croatia, extraordinarily well-placed for the transition in 1990, is
now ten years behind many of its neighbours, and competitors, in Central Europe.
Arguments from pioneering research at the UNICEF International Child Development
Centre (now the Innocenti Research Centre) in Florence, Italy, warning in 1991, that
1
“the high social costs of … reforms can endanger the entire transition process (and)
rip apart the social fabric” (Cornia and Sipos, 1991; 33), is still applicable in Croatia
in 2002. Indeed, a recent speech to Parliament by the Ombudsman made precisely this
point (Ante Klarić reported in Jutarnji List April 2002). The need for ‘transition with
a human face’, and for ‘child-friendly policies’ characterised by equity concerns; age
and gender awareness; a concern with human and social development not just
economic growth; and an inclusive approach (de Vylder, 1999; 19), is vital in
contemporary Croatia. This report, in a small way, seeks to contribute to debates
about welfare futures, and adopts a long-term perspective on reform. It is not meant to
be the last word but, rather, is meant to stimulate controversy, debate, and discussion.
Written by a group of authors, it does not present a unified position but, rather,
explores key options and problems in a number of areas not normally brought
together in a single text.
Defining social policy widely as “any policy developed at supranational, state, local
or community level which is underpinned by a social vision of society and which,
when operationalised, affects the rights or abilities of citizens to meet their livelihood
needs” (ODA, 1995; 26), suggests that the most difficult task facing the authors was
what to include and what to leave out. Indeed, this wide definition is, itself, too
narrow when applied to Croatia since the issue of who are the ‘citizens’ of Croatia, in
the context of the wars of the Yugoslav succession and mass forced migration, is still
contested and problematic. Insofar as limits have to be drawn, the report focuses, in
particular, on the role of the national Government whilst also addressing the
contribution of emerging non-state actors. It notes in passing ongoing, and also
contentious, debates about decentralisation, and the powers of different tiers of local
and regional governance which will ultimately inform the wider constellation of
Croatia’s emerging welfare regime. This Introductory Section provides some basic
demographic and socio-economic data, placed in a perspective which looks at some of
the significant polarisations and exclusions in contemporary Croatia. It also addresses,
in a very limited way, the contribution of diverse actors, including supranational and
international bodies, to the reform process.
2. The Republic of Croatia: welfare, democracy and transition
Like its near neighbour Bosnia-Herzegovina, although in different ways, Croatia is
currently facing what has been described as the ‘triple transition’ (Papić, 2001): from
war to peace; from a socialist system based on a planned economy and political
monopoly to a free market economy, political pluralism, and a civil society; and from
external humanitarian assistance to international support for sustainable development
and institutional reform. Crucially, the 1990s was a period of state building, with
independence in 1991, war from 1991 until 1995, and full sovereignty over the whole
territory only realised in 1998 with the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia. Throughout
this period, the dominance of one party, movement and, indeed, leader, was based on
a fusion of nationalism, authoritarianism and a colonisation of ‘popular common
sense’, all of which can be seen as distorting or interrupting the transition.
The Population of Croatia
In 1991, Croatia had a population of 4.784 million people, of whom 78.1% described
themselves in the census as ‘Croats’, 12.2% as ‘Serbs’, 2.2% as having ‘no ethnic
affiliation’, and 7.5% were ‘others’, including Italians, Czechs, Roma, Slovenes, and
Muslims. In the census carried out in April 2001, the total population had fallen to
2
4.381 million. Perhaps significantly, no figures on the ethnic breakdown of the
population have yet been released, although many informed commentators suggest
that ‘Croats’ may now constitute as much as 92% of the population, with ‘Serbs’ only
4%. By 1999, GDP per capita was 4,484 USD, back to 90% of its 1990 level, having
fallen to less than half this at the height of the war in 1992. In 2000, GDP increased
by 3.8% in real terms, with a figure of 4.0% expected for 2001. The extent of
recovery is, however, questionable, given high unemployment, a very low purchasing
power parity index and, as noted below, high inequality and, hence, significant
relative poverty if not absolute large numbers in absolute poverty.
War and Social Solidarities
The war consequences are particularly important to note, with 54% of the territory of
Croatia directly affected by war events, and 26% of the territory not under Croatian
Government control from the time of the Vance plan until the Croatian military
actions in 1995, followed by the reintegration of Eastern Slavonia/The Croatian
Danubian Region, staged over time until 1998. Official figures suggest that 13,583
people lost their lives in the war, with 37,180 people wounded. Croatian Government
estimates suggest that direct war damages amounted to over 20 billion USD, with
26% of secondary schools, 39% of primary schools, and 32% of kindergartens
destroyed or damaged (UNICEF, 1998; 5). The crisis of forced migration, discussed
at length elsewhere in this report, was highly disruptive of the social fabric and whilst
it is true that war did cement and reinforce certain (albeit primarily ethnicised) social
solidarities, it destroyed others. Perhaps of greatest lasting significance is the way in
which the war contributed to a polarisation between the ‘two Croatias’. The one,
visible in some of the larger urban centres, exudes an air of relative prosperity, at least
for some groups. The other, including most of the war-affected areas and front-line
towns, resembles much more of a classic ‘zone of exclusion’ in which high levels of
need co-exist with few material resources and low levels of human and social capital.
It is in these zones of exclusion that competition between different groups in the
population is played out in terms of continued tensions, threat of violence, social
exclusion and continued community fragmentation.
Poverty, Inequality, and Social Justice
It is not insignificant that there were no objective measures of poverty and inequality
in Croatia until the election of the new Government in 2000. Indeed, the contradiction
between a populist call for unaffordable social rights, and a widespread cynicism
about the creation of a new elite benefiting from war, corruption, a grey economy, and
uncontrolled privatisation, probably forced such research off the agenda. With the full
support of the MOLSW, and utilising data from the Croatian Statistical Institute from
1998, the World Bank published a crucial study in late 2000 on ‘Economic
Vulnerability and Social Welfare’ (World Bank, 2000). The study is referred to on a
number of occasions in this report. It combines factual information with a number of
assertions regarding causal mechanisms behind the findings. The study was based on
a sample of just over 3,000 households throughout Croatia, excluding the former
occupied territories. Utilising a threshold of 4.3 USD per day, the study calculated
that 8.4% of the population was living in absolute poverty, although suggesting that
the true figure, given the disproportionate poverty in the formerly occupied territories,
was probably closer to 10%. Compared with most of its neighbours, excluding
Slovenia, Croatia has a relatively small proportion of its citizens living in absolute
poverty.
3
Far more worrying, however, was the study’s findings regarding inequality, as
measured by the Gini coefficient which expresses ratios of incomes for each decile of
the population. With a Gini coefficient of 0.353, Croatia has inequality far in excess
of most of Central and Eastern Europe, and almost on a par with that of Russia.
Indeed, it is this which helps to explain what is referred to in Section 2 as the ‘poverty
paradox’ in Croatia, with a large proportion of the population seeing themselves as in
poverty, despite the objective indicators of absolute poverty. The Government has
recently begun work on a national Poverty Reduction Strategy, which focuses on
relative as well as absolute poverty, and which seeks to increase the importance of
cash benefits, properly targeted, as a source of poverty alleviation. The large numbers
of employed persons who state that earnings are insufficient to cover expenditures,
suggests that wider reforms are needed, a point returned to in Section VI of this
report. Beyond this, the issue of social exclusion – of ethnic minorities; of the longterm unemployed; of persons with disabilities; of people in institutions; and so on,
needs to be seen as a crucial element of an anti-poverty strategy. The struggle for
social justice in the new Croatia will be, it seems, a long, hard, and contentious one.
Seeds of Social Innovation
In discussing social innovation, it is important not to lose sight of the strengths of the
social welfare system inherited from the socialist system when Croatia was part of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In particular, the development of professional
responses to social problems, from the late 1950s, including the establishment of
social work training and Centres for Social Welfare, is particularly important. There
are currently 78 CSWs, and some 26 branch offices in Croatia, employing almost
2,000 people, many of whom are trained professionals: social workers, pedagogues,
lawyers, psychologists, and so on. In the 1970s and 1980s, a number of these CSWs
pioneered innovative approaches to social problems and, whilst there has been a
degree of stagnation in the 1990s, the potential of CSWs and the cadre of
professionals should not be underestimated, albeit within a more mixed model of
social welfare, and one which combines professional skills with community-based
approaches.
In the 1980s, particularly in Zagreb and other urban centres, a number of civil
initiatives emerged, in the sphere of responding to violence against women, for
example, which complemented a culture of voluntarism and of charitable work which
existed before the Second World War and, to an extent, continued in the socialist era.
War events contributed to a surge in grassroots and professional activism, with many
local NGOs forming to respond to the needs of refugees and displaced persons,
women victims of war, children and youth, and so on. A new third sector emerged
which was, itself, sometimes polarised politically, with the dominant politics labelling
many more progressive local NGOs as ‘anti-Governmental organisations’ whilst
promoting its own agenda through movements of war veterans, women’s groups, and
so on (Stubbs, 2001). An elite of local NGOs, heavily dependent on foreign funding,
emerged, much less focused on social issues than on human rights. Later,
Governmental funding has led to increasing emphasis on partnership approaches
although this has only, rarely, been translated to local level initiatives.
In summary, the existing system faces a number of challenges, many of which are the
focus of this Report. These include:
4
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
A lack of co-ordination and systematisation of welfare structures, with a
proliferation of benefits and a bias towards groups with a strong political voice
rather than, necessarily, targeted to those in most need
An over-emphasis on institutional care and medical/professional models at the
expense of community-based approaches and the stimulation of social capital
An over-centralised system which, in any case, devotes relatively little resources
to pro-poor social welfare, health and educational services
The absence of systematic attention to a new welfare mix, or mixed economy of
care, including public-private partnerships
Limited use of new technology and limited analytical capacity for planning, policy
development and evaluation of programmes and initiatives
A lack of attention to anti-discriminatory policies in terms of welfare access and
outcomes
A lack of an advocacy culture focused on clients’ rights, access to services, and
genuine and transparent mechanisms for appeal.
The most important general statement of social welfare reform is found in a paper
authored by Vlado Puljiz and Nino Žganec, in the context of a wider strategy
document (Puljiz and Žganec, 2001). This states two broad goals:
I.
to improve the efficiency of the system (through greater transparency,
computerisation, professionalism, and better training), underpinned by
attention to European models of social rights and ratification of the European
Social Charter; and
II.
to modernise the system through redefining rights to entitlement to benefits
and services; a thorough decentralisation of the social assistance and social
welfare systems; a strategy of de-institutionalisation and local social
partnerships; and are-definition of social assistance in terms of social inclusion
and re-integration into the labour market.
3. Social Policy Reforms in Croatia: actors and agendas
Looking at the inter-relationships between diverse social actors in social policy
reform is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is clear that, at least, the
following different types of actors all play a role in Croatia:
I.
Supranational Organisations such as the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and Regional Organisations such as the European
Union and the Council of Europe, as well as Bilateral Donors such as DFID,
USAID, who all offer policy advice, technical assistance and, in some cases,
specific funding for programmes. Recent initiatives by the World Bank, DFID
and the Government of Japan have provided important technical asssistance to
social protection reform.
II.
International NGOs, Private Aid Agencies and International Foundations
and Trusts, who may offer the same things as Supranational Organisations,
but are also involved in direct provision themselves. They tend to focus on
particular project themes and, thus far in Croatia, have been overwhelmingly
concerned with the war-affected regions.
III.
Governmental and Quasi-Governmental Institutions, involving different
Ministries (including the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare), and an, at
times, baffling array of Institutes and Policy Advisory bodies.
IV.
Social Institutions and Professional Associations, including Centres for
Social Welfare, Health Centres, and Associations of Social Workers and
5
V.
VI.
VII.
other professional bodies. These are involved in the direct implementation of
social protection and social work and in the development of research and
policy.
Local Non-Governmental Organisations and Associations of Citizens,
including professionalised, service-oriented NGOs, self-help and mutual
benefit organisations, and a range of user groups. All are involved in provision
of services, policy advice, or the articulation of members’ interests.
Private Organisations, often quite small, who may provide services to
particular groups on a for-fee basis. This is much less developed in Croatia
than in Western Europe.
Kinship and Extended Family Structures, often ignored in terms of formal
provision but of immense importance, both as providers of care and income
support, and in terms of assumptions made about family care by other actors.
Currently, the nature of Croatia’s emerging ‘welfare regime’ seems to be in flux.
Professor Vlado Puljiz has remarked insightfully on the basic contradiction between
national and global pressures for reform. In the context of war and state building,
there remains significant internal pressure and support for a Keynesian welfare regime
which is interventionist and, itself, contributes to national solidarities. In the wider
global arena, however, there is pressure to move to a more Schumpeterian welfare
regime marked by deregulation, pluralization of funding and provision, and increasing
concern with global competitiveness (Puljiz, 2000) . The possibility of a ‘third way’
which refers to, both, an active, and decentralised, welfare state and increased
community responsibility, rather than either a passive, centralised, welfare state and
reduced social expenditures, is one which appears politically attractive to some in
Croatia (cf. Kregar, 2000).
4. Reading this Report
Section II of this report, authored by Vlado Puljiz with assistance from Siniša
Zrinščak, provides a comprehensive analysis of family policies in Croatia, arguing in
favour of a more modern conceptualization of family policies as a key link between
social security and social development. In particular, the assumed link between family
policies and demographic trends is questioned. In addition, the section looks at the
competing interests which mitigate against a coherent set of family policies across all
spheres of Government.
Section III, authored by Tanja Radočaj, examines child care policies focusing, in turn,
on institutional care and moves towards a broader continuum of child care resources;
and at the emerging ‘newly discovered’ issue of child abuse. In comparison with
other countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Croatia
does not have an alarmingly high rate of institutional care (a fact shared with other
post-Yugoslav countries). However, Section III shows that there are no grounds for
complacency, with large numbers of children who have both living parents still placed
in institutional care, with institutions still the ‘driving force’ of the system, and with
insufficient resources devoted to alternatives to institutional care, particularly
fostering. The issue of child abuse shows the absence of inter-disciplinary work
according to clear standards and procedures, with practice very much left to
professional discretion and little scaling up of innovative approaches in specific
6
localities. Crucially, in the whole arena of child care policies, the Section concludes
that children themselves still have very little or no say in the services they receive.
Section IV of the report, on Youth Policies, authored by Jadranka Mimica, shows the
cumulative and systematic disadvantage faced by significant groups of young people
through the education, employment and health systems. In particular, the Section
addresses the absence of appropriate ‘youth-friendly’ services, and points to a patchy
picture of success of particular initiatives in the youth policy field. Section V on
Return Policies, also authored by Jadranka Mimica, shows the effect of recent
initiaitves to stimulate return within and to Croatia, but also the considerable work
which is still needed to make this return greater and more sustainable.
Section VI of the report, authored by Vesna Bošnjak, reviews options for reform from
a perspective which looks at the wider social impact of policies and practices.
Underpinned by a rights-based approach, oriented fundamentally towards equity and
social justice, the Section sees social welfare as an investment in the future, and seeks
to promote social mobilization and the strengthening of the involvement of wider
publics in the reform process. The right to information, choice, participation and
protection from discriminatory practices need to be placed at the centre of the system,
and enforced through legislation, professional standards, and public scrutiny. It is,
perhaps, this message, which is the most important statement within this report which,
whilst not comprehensive, adopts an approach which can be applied by others to
groups and issues which have had less attention paid to them here.
7
II:
FAMILY POLICIES
1. Defining Family Policies
Family policies can be defined as those state measures which systematically act on
behalf of families, particularly families with children. Such measures attempt to
mitigate the difficult economic, social, health and related circumstances which
families face; try to ease the financial burdens which children represent; contribute to
the protection of pregnant women; and also seek to adjust the family and work
obligations of parents, above all mothers with small children (Stopnik, 1996).
An important distinction can be made between family policies and population
policies. Population policies seek to achieve particular demographic goals. In many
European countries, including Croatia, the primary goal of population policies is to
increase the birth rate. On the other hand, family policy measures are much more
concerned with attempting to improve the overall quality of family life. Of course,
population and family policies overlap in many aspects. For example, child
allowances, tax benefits for children, and family services may be instances of family
and population policy measures at the same time. On the other hand, support to single
parent families is primarily a measure of family policy.
Family policies can be distinguished among themselves with regard to their stated and
main goals. Thus, family policy can be primarily directed to overcoming child
poverty, common in countries caught in economic and social crisis. In addition, the
main goal of family policy may be the achievement of equal opportunities for men
and women in the labour market, in society and in the family itself. The goal of
family policy can be also maintenance of the traditional (nuclear) family, with a sole
income deriving from an employed husband whose wife stays at home and raises
children. Family policy can put an individual family member in the centre, and
consequently neglect the family as a social and community unit. Usually, different
family policy aims are mutually combined, with some or all of the above priorities
emphasised to a greater or lesser extent, dependent upon wider political, ideological
and cultural factors.
Family policies can be distinguished with regard to the measures they use. It is
customary to distinguish between three basic family policy instruments: i) benefits
and tax deductions (money); ii) paid or unpaid leave of absence from employment
(time); and iii) family services (Kamerman and Kahn, 1994). Benefits and deductions
decrease the financial burden which children represent to families, while the other two
instruments primarily serve to adjust family and work obligations. Taking this as a
starting point, it is possible to distinguish between family policies which are
economic, with the emphasis placed on monetary benefits, and those which are more
ecological, with the emphasis on services provided to families and children (Gauthier,
1992). Other typologies of family policies have been constructed, including those
which focus on the role of different providers and carers (cf. Lewis, 1996).
2. Characteristics of the Economic and Social Situation in Croatia
Many relevant features of the social, economic and political circumstances in Croatia
in the last decade, a period strongly marked by war and post-socialist transition, are
addressed in Section I above. Here, it is important to note a number of key factors
relevant for the study of family policies. Firstly, in terms of the war, we must note the
8
massive damage, human and physical (the State Committee for Estimation of War
Damages suggests a figure of 65.3 billion DEM overall, two thirds of which was
material damage, and one third costs in terms of human health. It should also be
considered, however, that the war period was marked by a significant upsurge of
solidaristic energy by large parts of Croatian society and that family and kinship
played a crucial role in this. Perhaps the nest example relates to care of displaced
persons and refugees, with approximately 80 % of displaced persons and refugees
living in families of relatives and friends, and only 20 % housed in state and other
institutions, collective centres, and camps.
The second factor which strongly marked the economic and social situation in Croatia
was post-socialist transition, at the centre of which was the privatisation of former
public property. It was particularly unfavourable that privatisation was implemented
in Croatia at a time when economic activities were considerably reduced as a result of
the war, with the market for Croatian goods and services also significantly reduced. In
the privatisation process there were many abuses and scandals, planting a firm and
widespread belief, particularly amongst the impoverished population, that
privatisation was an unfair game through which the new political and economic elite
sought to redistribute the national wealth to their advantage. Furthermore, during the
last decade the dramatic increase of unemployment and social stratification occurred.
In 1990 Croatia had 161,000 or 8.2 % of the unemployed. Five years later the number
of the unemployed reached 242 thousand or 14.5 %. According to the latest data the
number of the unemployed reached 385 thousand or 23 %. The lower unemployment
rate (17 %) comes from the data obtained through labour force survey, which uses the
ILO definition of unemployment. The total share of the employed in the population
able for work in 2000 was 42.8 %.
The dramatic increase in unemployment and the problematic transformation of social
stratification are noted in Section I, also. The share of women in the total number of
the employed is particularly important for family policy. Of the total employed
population, approximately 45% are women, so that it could be argued that war and
transition did not significantly disrupt the gender structure of the employed. On the
other hand, 52.7 % of those registered as unemployed in 2000 were women. More
flexible labour legislation has been announced in Croatia, and it is anticipated that this
will influence increasing rates of employment of women, especially in the service
sector, including in family and child care services which have not been sufficiently
developed in Croatia, and which are in considerable demand.
We must also note what might be termed the ‘poverty paradox’ in Croatia with high
levels of subjective poverty, in which citizens themselves evaluate their social status
or the status of others, as against relatively low levels of objective or absolute poverty,
measured in terms of an ‘adult equivalent’ necessary annual income, in the context of
very high levels of inequality. According to data obtained through the survey about
income and expenses of the population which is annually conducted by the Marketing
Research Centre, more than 80 % of the households included in the survey declared
that they do not have an income which would be sufficient for a normal life. In the
1998 survey, the interviewed households stated that they had a monthly income of
1,017 DEM , and that they needed 1,696 DEM for a living. This contrasts with figures
from the same period suggesting that only 10% of the population were below the socalled absolute poverty line, which was estimated at 15,474 HRK (approximately
9
€2,000) annually (World Bank, 2000). The constant increase of life expenses
influenced the widespread feeling of subjective poverty, as well as the unfulfilled
aspirations of the majority of those surveyed who had expected a better life after the
establishment of an independent national state.
It could, therefore, be concluded that the significant drop in economic activity and in
gross domestic product in the past decade has been accompanied by strong processes
of social differentiation, increased poverty, and increased levels of frustration of the
vast majority of Croatian citizens. According to expectations, most dissatisfaction can
be found in those ranks of society which are considered to be the greatest ‘losers’: war
victims, the unemployed, and retired persons.
3. The Demographic Situation
The demographic situation in the country is very important for family policies. This is
made clear by the 2001 census, as well as other key statistical data. As noted in
Section I, the total population of Croatia was reduced from 4,784,000 in 1991 to
4,381,352 in 2001. The cause of the population reduction was not only the war, but
also the negative birth rate in the 1990s. In that period, the number of deceased
persons in Croatia exceeded the number of children born by 55,000. This difference
has increased even more in recent years. For example, in 2000 6,500 more people
died than were born, and it is expected that the difference will amount to 7,500 in
2001. The general fertility rate, which is the best indicator of demographic trends, was
1.38 in 1999 in Croatia, among the lowest in Europe. We do not have more recent
data, but it is reasonable to assume that the rate is even lower now.
The decrease in the population was also accompanied by a significant disruption of
the age structure. The share of the population between 0 – 14 years of age in the total
population declined from 19.8 % in 1991 to 17.5 % in 2001. In 2001, 15.5% of the
population was older than 65 years, so that it is clear that they will soon outnumber
the youngest category of the population, between 0 and 14 years (Akrap, 2001). This
large number of elderly persons was implicated in the crisis of the pension and health
systems, discussed later in this Section.
In the last 2001 census, Croatia had 1,474,298 households, which means that, in
general, three members lived in one household. However, we do not have any data on
the average family size, since one household can consist of one or more families.
There are also many households which include individuals who do not have the status
of a family member. According to the official definition, a family consists of a
married couple or parents (one or both) and their unmarried children.
The number of legally contracted marriages is also on the decline. In the period
between 1985 and 1989, there were, on average, 30,300 marriages contracted
annually, whereas in 1999 there were only 23,778 (a reduction of 21.5%). The
average age at which marriage takes place is, also, constantly on the rise. Thus in
1969, 26.2 % of brides and 51.7 % of grooms were over 25 years of age, while in
1999, 48.6 % of brides and 63.3 % of grooms were above that age. However, the
divorce rate is still relatively low in Croatia. In 1969, there were 154 divorces for
every 1000 marriages, and thirty years later, in 1999, there were 156 divorces per
1000 marriages. There is also a low rate of giving birth out of wedlock, amounting to
10
8.2 % in 1999, considerably lower than in Western European countries and other postsocialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.
It can be argued that the family as a basic social community structure is still relatively
stable in Croatia today, according to the basic indicators. The war and crisis of
transition may even have contributed, to some extent, to a strengthening of the family
as a unit. However, processes which will contribute to the destabilisation of the family
in the future can be observed in the reduced fertility rate and the number of legally
contracted marriages. This can be considered as a rational reaction by young people to
the bad economic and social situation in which they currently live, and the uncertain
prospects for a more favourable future. Unfavourable demographic processes and
trends have become very sensitive issues for the Croatian public. Dramatic warnings
of the consequences of a reduced birth rate are an everyday occurrence in the mass
media, for example. It seems that there is a widespread belief that population policy
measures are the only way of changing the situation quickly and dramatically, which
is, of course, a fallacy.
4. Reforms in Social Security
In addition to income from work and property, the so-called ‘secondary income
distribution’ which the state performs through social security systems, including the
pension system, the health care system, social protection of children and families,
protection of the unemployed and the poor, and so on, is very important for families’
living standards. It is through these measures that the state can correct the injustices of
the market and regulate social inequality. In this way, citizens can be insured against
social risks, have their opportunities equalised, thus affecting the level of general
social welfare. Given that the fundamental social rights of its citizens are guaranteed
in the Constitution and laws, it can be argued that Croatia is a welfare state.
As a result of the extended economic and social crisis of the past decade, large
numbers of socially endangered Croatian citizens sought to find relief through the
social security systems, primarily the pension and disability systems. Due to the large
number of unemployed and pauperised citizens, these social security systems came
under great pressure, so that these systems, in Standing’s words referring to much of
Central and Eastern Europe, “slipped their anchors” and “their social-safety nets were
torn” (Standing, 1998).
As an illustration of this pressure from a large number of pauperised citizens on social
security systems, we can refer to pension system. The number of persons insured
through the pension system, which means employed persons who have been paying
pension contributions, decreased from 1.968 million in 1990 to 1.381 million in 2000,
a reduction of some 30 %. At the same time, the number of pensioners grew from
656,000 to 1,018,000, an increase of 55 %. The ratio of insured persons to pensioners
declined in this ten year period from 3:1 to 1.36:1. In 1992, an average pension
constituted 63.19 % of the average salary, whereas by 2000 it had declined to only
37.62 %. In 2001 the situation was slightly improved as a result of a Constitutional
Court decision to return money owed to pensioners, so that average pensions rose to
45 % of average salary. When we consider that the overall share of pension
expenditure in GDP rose from 7.7 % in 1992 to 13.22 % in 1999, it has clear that
Croatia has relatively high pension related expenses.
11
In 2000, social expenditures on the central state level amounted to 26 % of GDP. Of
these, the largest art, 51%, was spent on pensions; with 32% on health protection;
only 5% on social care; and only 3% on children’s allowances. If provisions for war
victims and defenders, expenses for some smaller social programmes, various fiscal
deductions, and education related expenses are added, then social expenditures in
Croatia amount to approximately one third of GDP. In international terms, Croatia has
comparatively very high levels of social expenditure, which would need to be reduced
in order to redirect funds into investments and development, and in terms of meeting
conditionalities for membership of significant international associations.
In summary, it can be concluded that there is a fundamental tension running through
contemporary social policy in Croatia. On the one hand, there is the dynamic of the
poor, and all who perceive themselves as ‘losers’ in the transition, for an
interventionist social policy which would correct injustices in the national income
distribution which occurred in the last decade. On the other hand, there is the
globalisation pressure and the development imperative in general, which presupposes
a reduction of social expenditure and a less important role of the state in the solving
social problems.
Currently, reform efforts are concentrated in three areas:
1. Pensions Reform. This was defined in two laws passed in 1999, in which the World
Bank had a crucial influenc, coming into force in the beginning of 2002.
Compulsorily, for insurance beneficiaries younger than 40, and optionally for those
aged between 40 and 50, a new, second pillar of personal pension saving is
introduced, i.e. a fully-funded pension plan (5% of contributions), to complement the
first pillar of inter-generation solidarity (PAYGO) (14.5% of 19.5% contributions),
which is the continuation of the pension system to date. A part of contributions
intended for the second pillar will accumulate on personal accounts of the
beneficiaries. These funds will be managed by special financial institutions which are
expected to increase them through profitable investments. Furthermore, a third pillar
of voluntary pension savings is also established, in which those beneficiaries who so
choose will accumulate additional pensions.
2. Health Care Reform. This reform allows for the financing of health care from three
sources. The first source would be a decreased contribution rate (10% from 16%)
from employees’ gross salary, to be paid by employers and employees. Such a
decreased contribution rate will reduce current high labour costs. The second source
of health care financing would be the state budget. Out of the budget the health care
of socially vulnerable social groups, such as children, the elderly, unemployed and
uninsured citizens would be financed. The state would also finance public health care
measures, such as preventive medicine and health promotion. The third source of
financing would be additional medical insurance paid for by citizens themselves. The
additional insurance would pay for those services not covered by the compulsory
health insurance. Furthermore, health care funds could be realised partly by local
governments, including the counties and municipalities. An important health care
reform instrument would be the list of medical services guaranteed to all citizens.
Health services not covered by the list, as well as higher level of care, would be paid
for by the additional health insurance paid by citizens on a voluntary basis. However,
some negative consequences of the health care reform could be expected. Increased
differences and health care inequalities between citizens are likely to occur. In any
12
case, health care reform is an exceptionally important and delicate endeavour which
exerts considerable influence on the wider social situation in the country, and, of
course, in terms of the welfare of families and children.
3. Social Assistance and Social Care Reform. Over time, these reforms will be
increasingly significant. Demographic changes, as well as weakening of traditional
forms of family-based solidarity will cause more and more citizens to face poverty
and social exclusion, and thus be in the need of social assistance and social care
services. Therefore, Croatia will have to expand its existing structures and develop
new programmes of social assistance and social care. Those programmes will have to
be connected with an active employment policy, which means that some sort of the
Croatian ‘workfare programme’ should be developed. Civil society organisations will
play an important part in fighting poverty and social exclusion, together with local
authorities and communities, which are their natural partners. A social care
decentralisation programme is currently under preparation. Decentralisation is made
difficult by the fact that many areas were either devastated or impoverished in the past
period, that they are themselves very resource poor, so that they fully depend on state
subsidies. Apart from that, most small self-government units, due to scarce human
and financial resources, are unable to carry out a complex and ambitious
decentralisation programme. Still, the first step in decentralising social care system
was made in 2001, and a continuation of this, to be carried out in the following years,
is being prepared.
To understand the development of the social care system, two documents that were
prepared by the Government of the Republic of Croatia in 2001, are important. The
first is the Programme to Combat Poverty and Exclusion, which anticipates a series of
measures to improve the position of the poorest and most excluded population in
various areas. The second document is a part of the Government’s wider project The
Strategy for the Development of the Republic of Croatia: Croatia in the 21st Century.
A part of this document is devoted to the development of the pension and social care
systems. The basic directions of social care development marked in the strategy are:
modernisation; decentralisation; deinstitutionalisation of the system; and overcoming
the passive and applying an active approach in the fight against poverty and social
exclusion. In addition, with the support of World Bank and others, a comprehensive
reform of the social assistance and social care system is being prepared. It will
elaborate the measures generally marked in the strategy, and is discussed in Section I
above and Section VI below.
The reforms in the main social security systems seem to be directed towards a
rationalisation and control of social costs on the one hand, and to the long-term
transformation of social security, aiming to reduce state intervention and increase the
responsibility of individuals, families and civil society organisations on the other
hand. In summary, and briefly, the future social security structure in Croatia will
consist of (1) a social-protection network for all citizens guaranteed by the state; (2)
compulsory social insurance based on employment; and (3) additional, private social
insurance on voluntary basis (Puljiz, 2001).
It is important to encourage and develop an active social policy in terms of the basic
social safety net, which consists of social assistance and social services, and to
gradually overcome passive social allowances which used to mark the old welfare
13
state model. The application of a new social security model will not be simple, and
will require a lot of time and effort. Private pension insurance will be faced with the
weaknesses of underdeveloped financial markets and financial institutions. On the
other hand, the social-protection network will have difficulties in encompassing all
socially endangered citizens due to a lack of funds. It could be said that the current
system of social assistance and social care serves more to relieve poverty than it helps
the poor to find a place in the labour market. Non-governmental Organisations in
Croatia largely depend on state support and/or exist on relatively small funds, so that
they cannot have a greater influence on social circumstances, at least in the short term.
The role of NGOs is discussed in greater detail in other sections of this report and, in
particular, in Section VI.
5. The Development of Family Policy in Croatia
As in some other post-socialist countries, Croatia inherited relatively comprehensive
and universal rights in its family policy system from the era of socialism. Rights such
as maternity leave and benefits, for example, were, however, linked to employment,
with the unemployed and agricultural workers having no such rights. In this sense,
Croatian citizens were divided into two categories, so that socialist Croatia was a dual
society.
Article 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia from 1990 contains a
provision according to which the family enjoys special protection from the state, and
Article 62 conveys that the state protects motherhood, children and youth and creates
the social, cultural, educational, material and other conditions promoting the right to a
decent life. Similar attitudes towards children and families can be found in the
resolution on population policy adopted in the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia
(Sabor) in 1990. After gaining independence in 1991, the development of family
policy can be divided into three phases:
Phase 1: The Homeland War, 1991 – 1995. The war disrupted all economic and social
trends in Croatia, so that many children and families were endangered, with a
worsening of the social situation for the majority of the population. During this period
an exceptional social and family policy adjusted to the war situation was developed.
The Social Programme, adopted by the Government of the Republic of Croatia in
1993, as an additional programme of social welfare and social care, was important for
family policy. At the time, it was noted: “The Social Programme ensures the
protection of the standard of living of the most threatened parts of the population
through regular forms of social care (existing measures), and additional forms of
social care (new measures)” (Jurčević, 1994:70). The new measures anticipated by
the Social Programme, which were not anticipated in the mainstream system, were
intended for those households in a particularly difficult position. Such measures
included: exceptional, one-off, financial help to pay municipal bills; help with clothes,
food and shoes; subsidies to buy bread and milk; ensuring free school books; and
single payments for fuel.
To ensure the efficient application of the Social Programme, so-called social welfare
identity cards were issued, by Centres for Social Welfare or other social services.
One person was given a social welfare identity card on behalf of the entire household.
It was a document which determined that a certain household is in a particularly
difficult social position, such that it required additional help from the state. The social
14
welfare identity cards were introduced primarily to ensure purposeful and rational use
of humanitarian aid. In 1993, 105,107 social welfare identity cards were issued,
covering a total of 241,091 family members. The number of social welfare identity
cards was reduced later.
In addition to the Social Programme, which was managed by the Ministry of Labour
and Social Welfare (MOLSW), a special programme of social care was organised for
refugees and displaced persons by the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees
(ODPR) of the Government of the Republic of Croatia. Thus family policy was, at
that time, marked by these two additional programmes, which were adjusted to the
exceptional war situation. It is very important to note that numerous humanitarian
organisations, both domestic and international, played an important role in the
realisation of these programmes, with the Red Cross and Caritas having prominent
roles.
Phase II: The Post-War HDZ Government, 1996-1999. The second phase in the
development of contemporary family policy came after the war, from 1996 until the
change of Government in January 2000. In 1997, a new Law on Social Care was
introduced, which came into force in early 1998, and abolished the Social
Programme. Before that, in 1995, a Labour Law was introduced, regulating the
position of employed pregnant women, as well as mothers and parents. The National
Programme of Demographic Development adopted in 1996 was very important for
family policy. It contained a series of proposed demographic policy measures, which
were primarily intended to change the unfavourable demographic trends in Croatia
noted above. The Programme contained an exceptionally ambitious scheme of child
and family allowances, with allowances amounting to as much as 35 % of the average
salary in Croatia for a family with four or five children). It also proposed ‘pro-natality
housing loans’; free shares for families with three and more children; paid maternity
leave up to three years for mothers who give birth to a third or subsequent child, or
who gave birth to twins; an additional year of paid contributions credited for every
child born; the possibility of attaining the paid status of so-called ‘mother-educator’;
and other measures.
The notion of a ‘mother-educator’, proposed by this programme, and later adopted in
the Labour Law, was a clear attempt to re-traditionalise family policy. It raised the
possibility that mothers with four or more children could receive a salary and other
rights normally resulting from a work relationship, whilst staying at home. Proponents
of the measure believed that, as a result, more families would decide to have more
children, for which they would receive the strong support of the state. Conservative
attitudes on family policy became prominent in public debates on abortion, with those
opposed especially vocal. Nevertheless, public opinion did not accept this and
prohibition of abortion was not adopted. The loudest promoters of a new
traditionalisation of family life were a Catholic priest, Father Ante Baković, and a
group gathered around his magazine 'Narod' ('The People'). On one hand, they tried to
warn against negative demographic trends, and on the other hand, sought to impose
upon the public an idyllic picture of a traditional, patriarchal family with many
children and a mother who stays at home. However, these represented the attitudes of
a vocal minority and were not accepted by the majority, particularly by younger and
more educated groups in the population, who tended to accept the modern, more
democratic, family model. In the end, the National Programme of Demographic
15
Development was never implemented. Large funds would have been needed for its
application, and some of its basic, traditional standpoints were not in accordance with
the dominant social values and trends of Croatian citizens, particularly younger ones.
The Family Law adopted in 1998 is important in defining the position of the family
and its members. It regulated relationships within the family in a manner prescribed
by the international documents, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC). The prime obligation to support children rests with the family itself, whilst the
state is obliged to help based on the subsidiarity principle when necessary. Various
rights and measures of family policy are regulated by the Law on Child Allowance
from 1999, the aforementioned Labour Law from 1995 and its subsequent changes,
the Law on Social Care from 1997, and several laws on pension and health insurance.
However, some proposed measures, as well as some legal regulations which tried to
improve the family situation, particularly for families with children, proved to be
unattainable and were not applied in practice. It could be said that in the first years
after the war there was a surge of optimism in family policy, which would in time
give way to the reality of Croatia’s difficult economic and social situation.
Phase III: The New Coalition Government, 2000 – present. The third phase in the
family policy development followed the change of Government in January 2000. The
basic preoccupations of the new Government were to improve the difficult inherited
situation in the country, to adjust to globalisation, and to enter significant international
associations. Therefore the Government started a series of reforms, which led to a
restructuring and, indeed, reduction, of social expenditures. In regards to family
policy, it should be said that the total state expenditures for families were increased
overall, not least because the previous Government had simply postponed the
introduction of some laws which increased help to families, so the new Government
had to implement them. In late 2001, some rights were reduced and family policy
became one of the most important points of the confrontation between political
parties. We could, therefore, say that in the third phase, family policy was brought
within a more realistic framework, based on the economic and social situation on the
one hand. On the other hand, the public became highly sensitive to indicators of the
number and social position of children, mainly due to unfavourable demographic
trends.
6. Basic Family Policy Measures
In this part of the paper, basic family policy measures will be analysed, as well as the
changes that occurred in Croatia during the past ten years. In turn, we discuss:
Maternity Leave and Benefits; Children’s Allowances and Tax Benefits; and Child
Care Services. These measures, of course, do not constitute a complete family policy,
but they represent, and are often perceived as such by the public, as its 'hard core'.
a) Maternity Leave and Benefits
In the socialist period up to 1990, maternity leave lasted for up to the end of the first
year of each child’s life. The right to maternity leave was considered as one of the
basic rights of the employed mother. Compulsory maternity leave lasted up to six
months, with additional, optional, maternity for the next six months. In practice,
maternity leave was, almost without exception, taken for up to one year. This was
facilitated by the fact that maternity benefit was at the same level during the second
16
six months period. In general, the second part of the leave (parental leave) was used
by the mother, and only exceptionally by the father.
A similar treatment of maternity leave and benefits was maintained in the 1990s.
However, some changes were introduced as a result of the accentuated population
goals of the new Government formed in 1990. Thus the 1995 Labour Law kept
current rights and introduced new rights with regards to maternity leave and benefits.
The Labour Law prescribes basic measures for the protection of motherhood,
especially the rights of employed pregnant women and women who are breast feeding
(jobs which a pregnant woman and a woman who is breast feeding should not be
doing are prescribed; unequal treatment of pregnant women is prohibited; etc.).
Maternity leave is taken from 28 days prior to expected date of the birth up to one
year of the child’s life. Leave up to six months of the child’s life is considered
compulsory. A woman can come back to work before the six months expires, but not
sooner than 42 days after the child’s birth. Exceptionally, maternity leave, based on
the recommendation of an authorised physician, can begin 45 days prior to the
expected birth.
The Labour Law determined a series of other rights of employed mothers, i.e.
employed parents. After the compulsory maternity leave expires, a woman can work
part-time up to one year of the child’s life. The father can use this right if the mother
is working full time during that period. After the child turns one year, one of the
parents has the right to work part-time until the child turns three, if the child needs
additional care because of the child’s health and development, based on a physician’s
assessment. In the case of children with severe physical or mental disabilities, the
right to leave in order to take care of the child can be used until the child turns seven,
or one of the parents can work part-time. The right to shorter working hours can be
realised after the child turns seven in case of handicapped children. After one year and
up to three years of life, one of the parents has the right to realise unpaid parental
leave, during which the rights resulting from the employment are kept on hold.
The Labour Law introduced some major innovations in regards to maternity rights in
Croatia. Thus the right on paid maternity leave up to the three years of the child’s life
was prescribed for employed women in case of the birth of twins, the births of a third
child and every child after that. A break for breast feeding which every employed
mother could use (one hour twice a day during the first year of the child’s life) was
anticipated. However, it is very difficult to say to what extent this regulation was
applied because of the customary practice of one-year-long maternity leaves and
because of the difficulties in its practical application. The Labour Law introduced the
institution of the ‘mother-educator’, which was mentioned previously but which was
never applied in practice. Some new rights in the sphere of maternity leave were
expanded to other categories i.e. those that the Labour Law regulations did not apply
to. Thus the Law on maternity leave of self-employed and unemployed mothers from
1996 prescribed that self-employed mothers have the same basic maternity rights as
employed mothers.
An important innovation was the unemployed mothers’ right to a maternity leave up
to the third year of a child’s life, but only in the case of the birth of twins, or a third or
subsequent child. This same right was given to mothers who are pension insurance
beneficiaries. Thus distinctions between unemployed and employed mothers were
17
abolished, but only in cases in which they had a legal right to maternity leave for three
years, which means that unemployed mothers had no maternity rights for the birth of
their first or second child. This example shows that family policy pursued double
goals: on one hand, the intention to make certain family rights universal (maternity
leave is not an exclusive right of the employed women, but it also belongs to the
unemployed ones), while at the same time, such expansion of family rights was
motivated population-wise (rights of unemployed mothers only for twins, or third and
subsequent children), thus limiting its scope. When we look at data on the number of
children regarding their sequence of birth we see that, in 1999, 42.11 % of children
were first borns; 33.39% second; 15.77 third; and 8.73% as fourth and subsequent.
This means that over 75% children were first or second born. Hence, we can deduce
that financial reasons were probably important in deciding to give the same rights to
unemployed and employed mothers only if the former gave birth to twins or had three
or more children.
This expansion of maternity rights and the rising financial problems connected to their
realisation caused the funds for maternity leave after the compulsory maternity leave
to be determined every year in accordance with the Law on Execution of the State
Budget. Thus the Government of the Republic of Croatia had an option to reduce
some benefits and make significant savings. Consequently, the level of rights became
dependent on the budget situation, i.e. liable to annual variations.
Faced with a very high level of public expenditure, in which social expenditure takes
a prominent place, in the second half of 2001, the Government of the Republic of
Croatia, among other things, moved towards a reduction and restructuring of certain
rights in the family policy sphere. These measures are part of the document of the
Government entitled “The starting points for determining social policy until the end of
2001 and the basis of social policy for 2002”, dating from August 2001. Based on this
document, the Croatian Parliament terminated the right to maternity leave of the
unemployed mothers of up to three years for twins, the third child and every child
after that, but at the same time maternity benefits for unemployed mothers were
adopted for every child, regardless of which birth it was, for a duration of six months.
In truth, the maternity benefit for unemployed mothers amounts to only 900 HRK
(€120) per month, which is less than the employed mothers’ benefit. The maternity
benefit for unemployed mothers is financed from the budget, which means from tax
collection. The Government also proposed, and the Parliament adopted, the
termination of the right to paid leave of three years for twins, the third child and every
child after that, for employed mothers and mothers who are self-employed. At the
same time, the right to maternity leave for two years was introduced in case of giving
birth to twins or a larger number of children (triplets, quadruplets, etc). Maternity
benefit for employed mothers up to six months, depending on salary, amounts to
between 1,600 and 2,500 HRK (€210-330), deriving from salary contributions. From
six months up to one year of the child’s life, the maternity benefit for employed
mothers amounts to 1,600 HRK (€210) per month and is paid from the state budget.
These changes to the right to maternity leave and benefits caused lively public debate.
The opposition parties, primarily HDZ, warned that these reductions to maternity
leave and benefits could make the unfavourable demographic situation in the country
even worse. On the other hand, the Government representatives pointed to the
expansion of maternity rights of unemployed mothers and the increase in the number
18
of children entitled to child allowances. The lack of effectivness of previous
measures, particularly that of the long maternity leave, in terms of affecting an
increase in birth rate was also noted in public debate. The data shows that, regardless
of long maternity leaves and substantial maternity benefits, there was a decrease in the
birth rate. Thus 55,051 children were born in Croatia in 1997; 47,068 in 1998; 45,179
in 1999; 43,736 in 2000. In the first ten months of 2001 only 31,000 children were
born, which means that the worrying trend of a decreasing birth rate is continuing.
The reduction of the duration of maternity leave for twins, and for three and more
children, and the reduction of the amount of maternity benefits, were measures taken
to make financial savings. At the same time, it was estimated that the termination of
three-year-long maternity leave would not reflect negatively on trends in the birth
rate. It is known that many family policy measures do not have a direct effect
population-wise, and that decision about having a child depend on many factors, and
that measures which regulate the balance between the roles of mother and employee
play an important part. Croatian experience from the transition period shows that, as
well as the amount of maternity benefit, the duration for which it can be claimed is
also very important. The possibility of actually using maternity rights is, perhaps,
most important of all. Given high levels of unemployment, as well as the significant
extent of the grey economy (estimated to contribute up to 25 % of GDP), and the
consequent crisis of state finances, makes the realisation of such rights increasingly
difficult and lowers the level of rights of employed mothers – indeed, not only is the
right to maternity leave questionable, but also the right to leave in order to take care
of a sick child and the possibility of using family and child services subsidised by the
state.
Finally here, one-off help for equipment for a newborn child should be mentioned as
one of the maternity rights. This help amounted to 1,360 HRK (€180) in 2001, and the
funds were ensured in the state budget.
b) Children’s Allowances and Tax Benefits
Croatia inherited child allowances as a children’s right from the socialist period, in
addition to maternity leave. In that period, the children’s allowance was also linked to
the employment status of the parents, and it was financed solely from the
contributions of those employed. An additional condition for the realisation of the
right to child allowance was a means test of potential beneficiaries, i.e. with
entitlement based on the determined level of their income. Therefore child allowance
represented an important measure in the fight against poverty of families with
children even at that time.
After the fall of socialism, the new Government tried, at least declaratorily, to extend
the right to child allowance and to increase its level considerably. This goal was
emphasised in the aforementioned National Programme for Demographic
Development from 1996. The Law on Children’s Allowances from July 1999
extended the right to child allowance to children of unemployed parents, farmers and
craftspersons. Also, the source of financing child allowances was changed - instead of
coming from salary contributions of the employed, according to the new regulation
child allowances are paid from taxes i.e. from the state budget. The right to child
allowance is still linked to the amount of family income. New conditions prescribed
19
by this Law are Croatian citizenship and residence in the Republic of Croatia for at
least six months.
This Law should have come into force on 1 January 2000 but its application was
postponed because of financial difficulties. However, due to public pressure, the new
Government brought the law into force on 1 October 2000. The law introduced two
categories of entitlement. Children from families whose income per member was
lower than 27.5 % of an average net salary came into the first category. Children from
families whose income was higher between 27.5 % and 50 % of an average net salary
came into the second category. Children from families that have income per member
higher than 50 % of an average net salary did not have any right to the allowance. For
those in the first category, the allowance was 9 % of an average net salary, and was
increased by 5 % of an average net salary for twins and for three or more children. In
the second category, the child allowance amounted to 5 % of an average net salary,
and was increased by 4 % of an average net salary for twins and for three or more
children.
In addition, two groups of children had a right to an allowance according to special
regulations. One group is the children of soldiers disabled in the war, who had the
right to the higher category of entitlement to child allowance regardless of family
income. The other group is children without one or both parents, or children with
developmental difficulties, in whose cases the allowance was increased by 25 %, and
in the case of children not suited to independent life and work, the allowance
amounted to 30 % of an average net salary, regardless of the overall income per
family member.
The Law greatly increased the number of children who qualified as beneficiaries of
child allowances. By 1999 the number beneficiaries was 391,571 or approximately
40% of the overall child population. When the new Law came into force in October
2000, the number of beneficiaries increased to almost 600,000 or approximately 60 %
of the overall number of children. Out of that, the vast majority of children, 534,422,
realised the right to an allowance based on one of the two income-related
categorisations, while 53,973 children realised the right according to special
regulations, which means they had a privileged status. Among the former group, most
were the children of workers, 383,196; followed by the children of unemployed
parents, 100,168; and then the children of pensioners, 32,233. Out of the overall
number of child beneficiaries, 70 % had the right to a higher allowance, which means
that income per family member was lower than 27.5 % of an average net salary in the
country.
According to data on overall expenses for child allowance as stated by the State
Institute for the Protection of Family, Motherhood and , under the old law,
expenditure on child allowances in Croatia amounted to 1,179.96 million HRK
(€157m.) in 2000. When the new law came into force in the same year, the amount
increased by almost 60% to 1,860.533 million HRK (€248m.). The 2001 financial
plan predicted that the state would spend 1,450 million HRK (€193m.) on child
allowance in total. However, during the first six months alone, 1,026.75 million HRK
(€137m.) was spent, which meant that more than 2 billion HRK would be (€267m.)
needed for child allowance during the entire year. Due to this rapid increase in the
overall state expeses for child allowance, and the increase in the number of child
20
beneficiaries, changes to the Law on Child Allowances soon followed. A new Law
came into force on 1 January 2002 containing certain restrictions in regards of child
allowances.
The new Law determined two income bands for entitlement to child allowance. These
were on the level of 20 % and 40 % of the budgetary basic salary per family member,
the basis of which is determined by the Government every year. Child allowance for
the first category of children from families with a lower income was determined as 9
%, and for the second category of children as 5 % of the budgetary basic salary. This
Law did not allow for the previously anticipated increase of the allowance for the
third and every subsequent child, as under the previous Law. It also abolished the
privileged right to child allowance for special categories of children, such as the
children of war disabled, so that all children are now equal in regards of the right on
allowance, based on income and means alone. According to this Law, children have a
right to the allowance up to age 15, or to age 19 if they attend regular secondary
school. This is extended up to age 21 for children with damaged health attending
school, and up to age 27 for children with severely damaged health. The right of
university students to receive child allowance until age 27 was abolished. Due to
possible abuses, particularly on the part of potential beneficiaries from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a condition of permanent residence in Croatia for at least three years
prior to filing a request was introduced.
As can be seen, stricter criteria for the right to child allowance were implemented in
regards of the income per family member; the age limit up to which a child has the
right on child allowance was lowered; and privileged categories of child allowance
beneficiaries were abolished. This tightening of the conditions will undoubtedly
reduce the number of child allowance beneficiaries in 2002, although the precise
number is difficult to predict. It should also be mentioned that the relatively low
amount of the allowance does not significantly compensate for child-related expenses.
Hence, these measures should primarily be regarded as instruments in the fight
against poverty. Child allowance as a right for every child will, it seems, have to wait
for better times.
In addition to child allowances, the Croatian taxation system recognises tax benefits
for dependent family members, including children. These benefits are realised in the
form of reduction of the tax base on which citizens pay taxes. Tax benefits (rebates)
were introduced in the beginning of 1994, as part of a thorough change of the
country’s taxation system. According to the current Law on Income Tax, which has
been in operation since the beginning of 2001, every tax payer has the right to a nontaxable allowance of 1,250 HRK (€167) per month, and the tax-exempt amount is
increased based on the number of family members supported. For supporting a
spouse, another family member and the first child the additional tax-exempt is 625
HRK(€83), or 50% of the basic allowance. For the second child, the additional taxexempt amount is 70% of the basic deduction; for the third child 100%; for the fourth
140%; for the fifth 190%; and for every subsequent child the tax deduction factor is
progressively increased an additional 60%, 70%, 80%, and so on. As an example, a
family with three children, in addition to the basic tax-exemption of 1,250 HRK, has
the right to an additional tax-exempt amount of 2,750 HRK (€367) per month, making
a total of 4,000 HRK (€534) tax exemption. In the case of disabled persons, the basic
tax-exempt income is increased by another 30%.
21
The level of tax benefits depends on tax rates and on the number of children. Thus, for
example, a tax payer who has a monthly income of 2,500 HRK would have 93.75
HRK additional income for one child, 131.25 HRK for two children and 187.50 HRK
for three and more children. A tax payer with a monthly income of 6,000 HRK, would
have an additional 156.25 HRK for one child; 218.75 HRK for two children; for three
children 312.50 HRK; for four children 437.50 HRK; and for five children 581.25
HRK. Consequently, the larger the income, the greater the benefits for children are.
That means that such tax benefits are, in a certain sense, contradictory to other
measures of social and family policy, the main aim of which is to support poorer
families with children. Higher income earning parents have the opportunity to utilise
larger tax rebates based on their children, whilst those with smaller incomes realise
smaller tax rebates. Indeed, some of the latter have almost no benefit from such tax
examptions. Therefore it is understandable why some countries do not have tax
benefits for children at all, but prefer to help families with children by other measures,
primarily through child allowances and children’s services. During the last revision of
family rights in Croatia, there were proposals to abolish tax benefits, but these were
rejected in order to avoid the negative reaction of middle-income families with
children.
c) Child Care Services
Family policy during socialism had some specific features in regards to family and
child care services. In other words, employment incentives for women during
socialism were doubly motivated: on the one hand, such incentives were of an
ideological nature (promoting equality of women and men in the key employment
area) and an economic nature (there was a need for cheap labour due to the mass
industrialisation which followed World War II). However, other conditions for more
widespread employment of women were not sufficiently realised, in terms of child
care services. Therefore employed mothers had difficulties in balancing maternal and
labour market/employment obligations. While maternity rights, i.e. the right to be
absent from work in order to take care of a child, made employment of women easier,
such employment was jeopardised by insufficiently developed family and child
services. The poor development of services could be explained by two basic factors:
financial (public services are expensive), and value-oriented (the traditional structure
of Croatian society enabled reliance on the family, especially with regards to the
upbringing and taking care of children). This could, in fact, partly explain the fact that
today only some 35 % of children aged between 3 and 7 years attend public preschool educational institutions. The situation is even more dramatic regarding
children aged between 1 and 3 yeas, only 15 % of whom attend nurseries.
According to data for the school year 2000/2001, a total of 14,790 children were
placed in nurseries in Croatia: including 212 children up to 1 year old; 6,672 children
aged between 1 and 2 years; and 7,906 children aged between 2 and 3 years. In the
same year, 71,453 children attended kindergartens, out of which 16,728 children were
aged between 3 and 4 years; 20,029 aged between 4 and 5 years; 20,659 aged between
5 and 6 years; 13,816 children aged between 6 and 7; and 221 aged over 7 years. This
means that overall 86,243 children were placed in nurseries and kindergartens. These
were primarily children of employed parents (63,667 or 74 %), while all other
children were the children of the unemployed, pensioners and agricultural workers.
22
The lack of public provision for small children is substantiated by the fact that in June
2000, when children are enrolled in pre-school institutions for the next school year,
5,400 children of pre-school age were left on waiting lists. These were mainly
children of employed parents aged from 1 to 3 years, nursery age. In June 2001, 1,100
children remained on waiting lists for pre-school education in the city of Zagreb
alone. Abolition of the right to maternity leave for three years from the beginning of
2002 will make the situation in regards of placement of children in pre-school
institutions even worse.
Pre-school institutions belong to the compulsory programme financed by
municipalities (units of local self-government), professionally controlled by the
Ministry of Education and Sport (MES), applying specific pedagogical standards for
pre-school education. Parents co-finance the placement of their children in nurseries
and kindergartens, and local municipalities determine the level of parental
contributions. For example, in the city of Zagreb, parents co-finance the placement of
two children in a kindergarten to an amount of 400 HRK per child, which is reduced
for every subsequent child. Reduced participation fees are determined for children of
parents who are social welfare beneficiaries. In addition to a total of 292 public
kindergartens which are owned by municipalities, there are 45 private kindergartens
for children in Croatia founded by religious communities, and 80 private
kindergartens owned by companies or individuals (legal and physical persons). In
spite of the opening of possibilities to establish private kindergartens in the 1990s, the
growing needs of Croatian families for the placement of children in kindergartens
cannot be satisfied in this manner. It is clear that an increase in the number of
institutions for children, and an increase in the proportion of children included in
organised pre-school care, is a priority issue in the development of family policy in
Croatia.
7. Conclusions
Family policy cannot, of course, merely be reduced to those measures of support to
children and families which have been mentioned so far. There are other areas and
ways in which the state and other actors may help families and children. These
include: health, education, housing policies, employment policies, and so on. In the
war period, and also after it, numerous civic organisations for helping children and
families emerged and spread in Croatia. Due to this, it could be said that family policy
was partly transferred to the non-governmental sector. Finally, it should be added that,
in a wider sense, family policy also deals with older people. As it is known, their
number is constantly on the rise, and many older people today do not live with their
descendants. The old-age pension system is very important for the position of the
elderly, but their institutionalised and non-institutional care is also becoming more
and more significant. Considering the demographic processes and changes in family
forms, the problem of placement of older people will become increasingly more
difficult, with the private and non-governmental sectors undoubtedly playing an
important role in the solution of this problem in the future.
To summarise, then, we have seen how, in the past period, family policy in Croatia
was, as in other countries, determined by the overall economic and social situation. In
the difficult times of the war, the greatest attention was given to the existential
problems of war victims, primarily refugees and displaced persons, and especially to
their children. After the war, in the second part of the 1990s, a series of new laws and
23
measures defined a new family policy i.e. state support for families and children. In
this period, the level of family rights was expanded and increased, at least on the
normative level. This primarily related to maternity leave and benefits, as well as
child allowances. The aim was to improve the unfavourable demographic situation.
However, after the change of Government in 2000, when some of these rights should
have been applied in practice, the state was faced with a sudden increase of overall
expenditures for family policy.
As reforms attempting to control and reduce social expenditures have been
implemented in Croatia in recent years, the Government redefined basic family rights,
primarily maternity leave and child allowances, and thus reduced expenditure for
those purposes. Several new laws were adopted at the end of 2001 with this aim, so
that family rights became a central topic of public debates and controversy. As
citizens are sensitive regarding demographic trends and the rights of children in
general, there will probably be no new dramatic restrictions on family rights in the
next period. The level of family rights will be increased alongside the improvement in
the economic situation. All things considered, a restrictive policy in this area is of a
transient character, so that positive changes can be expected in family policy in the
upcoming years.
In conclusion, we suggest that there are three important factors on which the longterm development of family policy in Croatia will depend. The first is the
employment of young people, especially women. This is a reliable way to improve the
social situation of many families and also, according to some serious estimates, a way
to increase the birth rate. Just as other countries, Croatia must aspire to the two breadwinner family model, which guards against the risk of poverty. At the same time, the
dangers inherent in any possible attempts to re-traditionalise family must be avoided.
The second factor that will have a considerable influence on family policy is the
development of services for families and children. It has been mentioned that such
services are an important prerequisite for the employment of the second bread-winner
and the balancing of parenting and work obligations, especially in the case of
mothers. We have noted how Croatia now has poorly developed services for families
and children. Considerable opportunities for new employment, primarily of women,
could be opened through this service area. It is important to mention that services for
family and children are primarily located in the state sector. In the upcoming period in
the family policy sphere, an accelerated development of private and nongovernmental services should be expected.
The third factor important for the family is the development of flexible forms of
employment, which are increasingly marking the new economy. Since family
structure and employment structure are in conflict currently, flexible employment
could contribute to overcoming that conflict, through a better adjustment of family
and work obligations. Our estimate is, therefore, that Croatia will gradually develop a
new family policy which will rely on greater levels of employment; more developed
and varied services for families and children; and flexible employment adjusted to
family obligations. We believe that such a family policy will be crucial in challenging
unfavourable demographic trends and that it will contribute to the equality of sexes;
improve the position of children; and bring new investment to younger generations as
the basic resource that future social development depends upon.
24
III:
Child Care Policies and Child Protection
1. Introduction
This Section of the report does not purport to provide an overview of child care
services in Croatia. Rather, it focuses on two issues. In the first part of the section, we
address the institutional care of children and the status of reform processes based on
de-institutionalisation and the promotion of family-based care. In the second part of
the section, we look at the emerging issues of child abuse, violence against children,
and child sexual abuse. In the process, we highlight the wider role of key institutions
and groups in overall child care policy in Croatia. Whilst the focus is very much in
terms of child rights under the CRC, the text is based less on the testimony of children
and young persons, and much more on the views of those who constitute what might
be termed the ‘professional/bureaucratic complex’ of people and institutions who put
themselves in an expert and decision-making position vis a vis children. A complete
change of paradigm and a proper survey would be needed to provide an overview that
truly represents needs and opinions of those who are being assisted, as well as the real
effectiveness of services.
Part One: Children in Public Care
2. The Legal Framework
The Law on Social Welfare defines “rights in the social protection system” which
includes the right to care outside a family, which includes: foster care and placement
in social institution. Such care can be temporary, permanent, weekly or day-care.
Article 68 states that care outside the family will be provided to children without
parents, whose parents are neglecting them or abusing their parental duties, and to the
children and minors with behavioural disorders. Should the best interest of children
demand, care outside family would be provided to the children whose parents are
temporarily unable to care for them due to illness, lack of accommodation or other
difficulties. Under Article 70, care outside family will be provided to a physically and
mentally disabled person when this is the most appropriate way to provide care,
upbringing, education or psychosocial rehabilitation.
Article 93 defines types of public institutions for social care for children and adults.
Articles 114 –119 define foster care, not only for children but also for adults. In
general, one foster family can care for up to 10 persons, children or adults. In
particular, Article 120 states that Centre for Social Welfare (CSWs) which place a
minor in foster care needs to work on returning the minor to his/her own family or
place her/him for adoption, if that is considered to be the best interest of the child. The
Family Law provisions state that in the case of either severe parental neglect or a
child’s behavioural disorder, the Centre for Social Welfare can place a child in
another family or institution. This decision must be reviewed within 1 year. Whilst, in
a formal sense, the best interests of the child, and the right to family life, are
enshrined in legislation, it is clear that the child care system remains over-reliant on
institutional care.
3. The Nature of Institutional Care
There were ideas and attempts to challenge the dominance of the institutional model
of care in Croatia before the 1990s, especially through the expansion of foster care.
The war and refugee crises led to a deterioration of the overall quality and
25
development of social services and the de-institutionalisation trend was somewhat
interrupted. The old system has not been changed, although some new forms of
substitute care appeared, for example, there are small group homes supported by
international donors, such as the NGOs Nuevo Futuro and Nadomak suncu. At the
same time, some new large institutions were opened by private and church
organisations. A ‘professional’ model of care still prevails, with insufficient
consideration for the actual outcomes of such care.
Although the quality of care and basic standard of living has been perhaps on a higher
level than in some other countries in transition, this does not justify all the cases
where family-based intervention could have been sufficient and more beneficial to the
children. Child rights and human rights principles have not always been followed,
especially in regard to children with disabilities.
Once found “solution” is rarely critically reviewed, and an independent evaluation of
the outcome is even more rare. The old model of care is indeed reflected in this
concept of “solution” still used in social services, which creates an illusion of quality
and permanence of the chosen model of care. The concept of “case management”, on
the contrary, includes constant critical revision and adjustment according to client’s
needs and progress achieved.
Institutions for children deprived of parental care
There are 14 public institutions for children without parental care (Children’s Homes),
with 1133 children resident as of December 2000. The capacities of these institutions
vary from 40 to 100 children, with an average of 80. In addition to these institutions,
another 192 children were living in the Children’s Villages of SOS Kinderdorf, and
159 children in an institution established by Caritas. Although statistics show that
average stay in such an institution is 4 years, many children in fact live in the
institution until they finish secondary school or reach 18 years of age.
.
What is alarming is the fact that most of the children in such institutions, around 70%,
have both living parents (Ajduković and Sladović; 2000). Table 1 shows the
prevailing reasons for their institutionalisation which further indicates inadequacies in
child protection measures and need to shift from institutional to a family-based care.
Table 3.1: Reasons for placement in state institutions (Children’s Homes)
Reason for institutionalisation
Neglecting a child
Relationship problems in a family
Poverty (lack of means for rearing children)
Parents chronically ill
Physical abuse
Abandonment
Death of parent(s)
Parents missing
Parents in jail
Mental and emotional abuse
Sexual abuse
%age of children
(more than one
possible)
69.3
67.7
57.9
16.9
15.7
13.0
10.0
5.9
4.3
3.0
2.0
26
Centres for Social Welfare (CSWs)
Centres for Social Welfare are responsible for the placement of children either in
public institutions; private, non-governmental institutions; or in foster care. Decisions
are based on Social Welfare Law or on Family Law. In the case of a child placed in an
institution for reasons of inappropriate care, neglect or abuse, Centres for Social
Welfare also have the duty to work on improving family relations or living conditions
in order for the child to return to his or her own family. The CSW also must review
the decision after one year. In the case of abandonment or severe abuse, if there is
very little chance for the child to be reunited with its birth parents, Centres for Social
Welfare are obliged to work towards adoption, which usually involves a lengthy court
procedure. For many reasons, CSWs chose not to work in this direction, which does
not always respect the best interests of the child. There is sufficient interest in
adoption to meet the needs of children without parental care. It is therefore
unacceptable for children whose parents are not likely to re-assume their parental
duties to live in large institutions for the majority of their childhood.
Many professionals both in CSWs and in Children’s Homes believe that institutions
are not the best form of care for children, but do not seriously challenge it. On the one
hand, this is because of professional inertia. On the other hand, there is still an
implicit belief in institutions, unshaken by Bowlby’s revolutionary findings which
changed the policy of substitute care for children in many Western countries. Most of
today’s practitioners in social services finished their education many years ago and do
not have a firm knowledge and understanding of attachment theory and the
detrimental consequences of institutional care on the emotional, mental and social
capacities of children.
Children with disabilities
In regard to children with disabilities or, better to say, special needs, their integration
in the community still faces obstacles in the form of beliefs and prejudices shared by
the general public and sometimes professionals as well. It is still widely believed that
education and rehabilitation in large public institutions can do more good to children
than a normal family environment, regular schooling and integration in the
community.
Institutions caring for children with disabilities usually provide care, special education
and rehabilitation. Facilities include a boarding school type of institutions, but also
asylum-type, providing permanent care for children with severe disabilities. There are
24 public social welfare institutions for children with physical and mental disabilities
of which:
• 2 institutions provide care for children and young people with physical disabilities
• 1 institution works as a boarding school for children with visual impairments
• 3 institutions work as boarding schools for children with hearing impairments
• 18 institutions provide care, special education and rehabilitation for mentally
disabled children.
In some institutions children live together with adults with severe mental disabilities
which leads us to question both the overall quality of care and the outcomes of such
‘rehabilitation’. In such institutions, there are over 3300 persons accommodated, 1754
of whom (53%) are children. Whilst it is true that within the institutional care system
new forms of care are being developed, such as: in-home visits; day care; and weekly
27
care, a large number of children with disabilities are in ‘permanent care’. The total
number of children with disabilities registered by Centres for Social Work in Croatia
is over 9000, which includes children with wide range of disabilities and health
problems.
The MOLSW recognises that the best solution for children with special needs is care
in the family. Based on the Social Welfare Law, the Ministry provides some financial
means for families to care for their disabled children. In addition, a number of new
initiatives have been launched and supported from the Social Welfare budget or by
local government, such as: day-care centres; psychological and social support for
families; support groups for parents; etc. These new initiatives remain on the level of
isolated small-scale, pilot, projects and do not gain sufficient attention of
professionals or the general public.
Children with behavioural disorders
Within the social welfare system there are 14 institutions for ‘children with
behavioural disorders’ which includes children in conflict with law under the age of
criminal responsibility. These are minimum-security institutions that take juvenile
offenders sentenced by the court as well as children recommended by CSWs who
implement protection measures according to the Family and Social Welfare Laws.
The educative-correctional institutions had 415 children in residential care and an
additional 21 children in protected apartments at the end of 2000, while some 500
children attended day-care programmes and disciplinary centres. In addition to the 14
institutions under the Social Welfare system, there are closed institutions and juvenile
prisons within the judicial system. In the year 2000, according to the State Attorney’s
office, 58 juvenile offenders were sentenced by the Juvenile Court to educativecorrectional institutions which are part of the social welfare system; 38 were sent to
the closed Correctional Institute in Turopolje; and 10 to the Juvenile Prison.
Children with behavioural disorders usually include those who have committed
criminal offences but are under the age of criminal responsibility, or criminal charges
were dropped, ‘difficult’ children who do not attend school, and so on. No doubt,
many of them come from complex socio-economic background and have a history of
abuse in family. Sometimes a school or parents themselves request placement in an
institution. In other cases CSW bases its decisions on police reports or information
from the Public Prosecutor. The National Programme of Action for Children from
1999 recognises that such institutions do not fulfil their purpose, have detrimental
effects on children or prevent the integration of minors in the community. In addition,
there are unresolved questions regarding the blurring of the line between ‘criminal
justice’ and ‘social protection’, which may lead to a reduction of rights to appeal,
judicial review, and so on.
The recent Juvenile Courts Law provides for a variety of alternative measures, which
decreased numbers of juvenile offenders in institutional care. However, question of
the quality and outcomes of institutional care is still open. The new draft Law on
Implementation of Sanctions for Juveniles, that is still in discussion, could contribute
to the quality and outcome of educational measures in institutions. But, as usually, the
law itself will not change the existing practice.
28
4. De-Institutionalisation: Policy and Practice
The dominance of institutionalisation within child care policy is in the process of
change. There are growing pressures coming from concerned citizens, professionals
as well as policy makers which question the orthodoxy. The MOLSW has publicly
declared its commitment to reform institutions and transform the nature of public care
within a ten year period. A feasibility study, jointly developed by the Economics
Institute and a local NGO, The Association for the Promotion of Inclusion, has been
proposed to the Ministry. The intention of the Ministry is to transform old-type state
institutional care into a combination of foster care and small group homes in addition
to home care, family support services, referral centres, and so on, constituting a
genuine coninuum of care provision.
While the longer-term transformation of the overall system is still at the draft stage,
daily practice is also slowly changing, following impulses from inside and outside the
system. Some institutions have themselves initiated apartments for independent living
for older children deprived of parental care, in Zagreb and Osijek. In Split a similar
project is being carried out by the local Association for Inclusion ‘Lastavice’. The
NGO the Association for the Promotion of Inclusion from Zagreb is putting a lot of
effort into community integration of children and adults with disabilities, especially
mental disabilities, in Zagreb and Osijek. One problem identified by the MOLSW is
that children deprived of parental care, who left large institutions in order to live in
protected apartments, were immediately replaced by other children who entered the
institutions. This means that, as things stand currently, we are not really talking about
de-institutionalisation, but about increased numbers of children looked after by the
state. This fact leads to a conclusion that institutional care is still seen as an
appropriate intervention, only limited by the capacities of institutions, which still
operate as the central motor and dynamic of the system.
5. Alternatives to Institutional Care
Foster care: There are over 2500 children in foster care in Croatia. This includes
children placed within extended families. Foster placement is available to children
without parental care and children with special needs (placed, but to a lesser degree,
in specialised foster care). A a child with ‘behavioural disorders’ is, still, unlikely to
be placed in foster care, unless an extended family member offers to take care of him
or her. The Croatian system still has no experience of more flexible forms of foster
care, such as respite care, shared care, and weekend care, which are necessary to
support both foster parents and birth parents in caring for more demanding children.
The Social Welfare Law defines very basic requirements in terms of quality of foster
care and procedures. Foster carers are entitled to an allowance of between 1400 and
1600 HRK (c.€190 – 210) per month per child. One family can legally foster up to 10
children. For 5 or more children fostered, a person can obtain the formal status of a
self-employed person with associated benefits.
There is a widespread view, including amongst professionals and policy makers, that
there has been a relative neglect of fostering as a key element of the child care system,
and that much more could have been done to realise this. Some previous campaigns
for fostering have not been sustained. The capacities of CSWs to work on recruitment,
the training of foster carers, monitoring and support seem to be limiting factors. There
are great differences between regions: in some communities in the North of Croatia
there is greater social acceptance of fostering. Moreover, some professionals believe
29
that this form of self-employment was abused in a way that the best possible standards
of care for children were not always the first priority. This may be happening
especially in communities where large numbers of adults such as elderly persons in
need of care, mentally ill persons, and so on, are also being placed in family care,
which does not leave enough time for the local CSW to monitor the situation in all
families. This, of course, does not excuse the responsible CSW from the child’s place
of origin which bears ultimate responsibility for the child. It is clear, however, that
additional resources, both human and financial, need to be allocated in order to
develop alternative forms of care, including more foster families and small group
homes. Increased human and financial resources are needed not only to expand the
number and types of alternative forms of care, but even more so to develop a quality
support system to sustain and maintain standards. It is also advisable to explore
economic and cultural differences between regions of Croatia in regard to tradition of
fostering, so that promotion of fostering is better targeted and achieves more even
territorial coverage.
Obviously, there are, currently, serious doubts about the quality of foster care,
recruitment criteria, the quality of training, and the level of support provided to foster
carers. National standards for foster care do not exist. In the process of transferring
responsibilities from the central to the local level, as is occurring now, such standards
will be necessary. Should national standards be developed in a centralised and nonparticipatory manner, there is very little guarantee of their implementation. Measures,
regulations and standards proscribed from the centre not only miss the opportunity to
educate and mobilise, they regularly create active resistance and silent obstruction. In
the same way, the applicable law prescribes that a child should be placed in foster
care within the same local community, and only exceptionally elsewhere, which many
social workers ignore.
Small group homes and protected apartments for independent living: Most children in
substitute public care end up either in large institutions or in foster care. There are in
fact some small group homes, supported by NGOs, but the social welfare system
treats them, essentially, as foster care facilities. This lack of clarity about their status
leaves questions of standards and monitoring unanswered. The judgement about the
quality of such care is mostly left to the individual CSWs who may be under too much
pressure to provide an immediate solution and, therefore, are not the best monitors of
standards. Whilst it appears that such small homes, at the moment, provide decent
care, and are a key element of a new continuum of care, their exact status needs to be
clearly and appropriately regulated. As mentioned above, there are some small-scale
initiatives and projects providing protected apartments for independent living. So far,
only an extremely small number of children have benefited from them. It is almost
certain that the de-institutionalisation programme will make more room for such
smaller, family-like forms of substitute care.
Part Two: Child Abuse and Violence Against Children
6. Definitional Issues
It is very difficult to gain a common definitional understanding of child abuse.
Different interviewees and statistical data do not consistently speak of the same type
of abuse: some focus on violence in families, whilst others address physical violence
and emotional abuse in general. Even the definition of what is a ‘child’ varies
30
between services and between individuals. Croatian legislation still uses the term
‘child’ for the 0-14 age group, and the term ‘minor’ for the 14-18 age group.
Furthermore, different services and agencies had different definitions of abuse, also
changing over time. Sexual exploitation and, in particular, the commercial sexual
exploitation of children, still receive very little attention. Also, different forms of
abuse of children in substitute care, including but not limited to in institutions, has
also not yet been recognised as an issue.
7. Relevant Legal Frameworks
The Family Law of 1998 defines the protective role of the State in regard to children
and provides the basis for intervention in the family. According to this law, the Centre
for Social Welfare (CSW) has wide authorities to intervene in the family. The types of
intervention are defined as: warning; supervision of the family; removing a child from
an abusive environment and placing the child in foster care or an institution. Abuse
and violation of parental rights are defined by this law, under Article 115, and form
the basis for the denial of parental rights. The court can make such decision in a noncontested procedure, when proposed by CSW or the other parent. The CSW can issue
an exclusion order against a parent that is endangering a child or acting against the
child’s health or other vital interests. Parents and other family members must not
subject a child to a degrading treatment, physical and emotional punishment and
abuse (Article 87). Parents also have a duty to protect the child from violence and
degrading treatment by others (Article 91). Article 118 declares that violent behaviour
is forbidden in the family. Article 362 further states that violent behaviour in a family
can be punished, as a minor offence, with up to 30 days imprisonment.
The Law also defines the duty to report, thus: “Everyone has a duty to report to the
Centre for Social Welfare any violation of a child’s rights, especially any kind of
physical and emotional violence, sexual abuse, neglect and negligent treatment, abuse
or exploitation” (Article 108). As opposed to the Penal Code, the Family Law does
not make any exceptions for close family members in regard to this duty to report. In
2001, the MOLSW proposed, and Parliament accepted, a revised version of the
Family Law, which includes a definition of violent behaviour in the family, the
responsibility of the police and the CSW to report cases to the State Prosecutor’s
Office, and increased the penalties including a maximum fine of 10,000 HRK (€1300)
or up to 60 days imprisonment.
The Penal Code, a revised version of which has been in force since January 2001,
defines abandonment, neglect, abuse and exploitation of children as criminal acts
(Aricles 212-213). In the revised version, violent behaviour in the family is also
defined as a criminal act. Articles 191-197 define different forms of sexual abuse of
children and minors, including abusing children for the purposes of pornography, and
prostitution. The duty to report a criminal act is defined in Article 300. Close family
members - a spouse, children and parents, brothers and sisters - are not considered
guilty if they fail to report on criminal act or hide evidence. In earlier version of the
criminal law some professions were relieved of the duty to report the criminal act, but
this has now been changed. The revised version of the law (Article 300) states that
failure to report a criminal act against a child or a minor by a medical doctor of other
health professional, notary, psychologist or employee of the guardianship authority is
considered as a criminal act.
31
8. Registering Abuse: Official Statistics
The real extent of child abuse and child neglect in a society is difficult to establish and
may bear little relationship to official statistics of cases which are based upon a
particular level of awareness, the efficiency of protection services, the forms and
consistency of data collection and registration, and so on. Information on registered
child abuse cases is not collected in one place, as happens in some other countries, for
example with the Child Protection Register in the UK. Registration procedures within
the social welfare system are inconsistent, with significant numbers of children
removed from the family and placed in institutions for reasons of abuse and neglect,
but these interventions are registered not as protection measures against abuse
according to the Family Law but more as social measures in terms of the temporary
inability of parents to care for a child. UNICEF’s 1998 Situation Analysis on
‘Children and Women in Croatia’ notes:
“… that the number of reported cases of child abuse and neglect have actually fallen since
1990, before the war. Social Welfare Centres provided supervision and care for three times
as many children before the war as they have in the years since. Far from being a cause for
celebration, this is a very worrying trend. Given the growth in poverty and broken family
relationships in recent years, the data must be misleading. What it actually demonstrates is
the inability of professionals who come into contact with children and families to identify
cases of abuse or neglect.” (UNICEF, 1998; 30).
Criminal Statistics
Since 1998, there has been clear progress in legislation, awareness and interventions,
however inconsistent the registration remains. Data from the police show that the
number of registered alleged acts concerning child abuse and neglect has increased
nine fold between 1991 and 2000, with the lowest number of reported cases in 1993,
actually 48 times lower than in 2000. These statistics reflect changes in legislation and
changes in education as well as the internal organisation of the police, combined with
very different priorities during the war years.
Table 3.2: Police statistics on child abuse and child neglect cases, involving children
under 14, as defined by Article 213 of the Penal Code
YEAR
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Total
Number of cases
502
898
1808
3359
3834
10401
The most recent data from police sources state that, on average, police in Croatia
intervene in 29 cases of family violence daily, and 3.5 cases of alleged child abuse.
The State Attorney’s Office keeps a register on persons charged, indicted and
sentenced for various crimes against children (Table 3.3)
32
Table 3.3: Crimes Against Children (statistics provided by the State Attorney’s
Office)
1998
1999
2000
CRIME
Charged
Indicted
Sentenced
Charged
Indicted
Sentenced
Charged
Indicted
Sentenced
Sexual abuse*
134
114
49
149
106
64
158
117
64
Physical abuse
exploitation
and neglect**
1296
796
192
1206
730
330
1216
715
394
*Crimes against sexual liberty and morals, under Articles 188-198 of the Penal Code
**Crimes against marriage, family and youth, defined by Article 213, and including some other abusive and neglectful behaviour
as defined by Articles 214 and 215 of the Penal Code
Table : Trends of reported crimes against children
(Source: Ministry of Interior, 2001)
1598
1600
1444
1400
1200
1000
785
800
600
437
400
196
187
200
168
122
43
67
15 27
1992.
1993.
207
114
264
175
426
337
247
158
0
1991.
1994.
1995.
1996.
1997.
1998.
1999.
2000.
Sexual abuse and sexual exploitation
Neglect and abuse
Data from the Health System
From the health system, only fragmented and anecdotal information on child abuse
cases is available. There is no systematic identification and registering throughout the
Primary Health Care system. Doctors from the Zagreb Children’s Hospital analysed
data on children hospitalised for reasons of severe abuse, which included only cases
that were clearly diagnosed as physical abuse. Of 57 children whose hospitalisation
was categorised in this way, 39 were younger than 3 years, and 6 of the 57 died. The
children were abused mostly by fathers and step fathers. Among outpatients of the
same hospital, 113 treated children were diagnosed as having being abused, the
majority of whom were aged 13-15, mostly boys, and mostly physically abused by
persons, including other children, outside the family (Tomić, Fattorini, and Vlahović,
2001). Dr Jakušić from the Psychotrauma Centre of the Paediatric Clinic, Zagreb
33
reports that the Centre currently has in treatment around 500 sexually, physically and
emotionally abused children as outpatients.
Survey Data
Several surveys provide an indication of the incidence of abuse in families. As the
definition of violence and abuse was not consistent across the surveys, the results
vary, but all show a significant and pervasive presence of violence. UNICEF’s survey
of children and young people in Croatia (UNICEF Young Voices, May 2001) shows
that 71% of children report that they experience violent behaviour at home, with
violent behaviour also including verbal violence. 15 % of respondents in whose home
violent behaviour is present say that it happens often or quite often. A survey of
students attending the University of Zagreb shows that about 75% of students
experienced physical violence of some kind in their families, while 0.3 % students
were severely beaten (Pečnik, 2001). The most recently published survey (Globus,
2002), shows that 34% young adolescents, aged 13 to 15, experienced physical
punishment in families. 6.8% of the total population report being physically punished
often or very often.
9. Institutions, Groups and Agencies in the Child Protection System
The network to protect children from abuse include children and families, the
statutory social welfare system (CSWs and Children’s Homes), pre-school institutions
and schools, the police and the law enforcement system, local government, nongovernmental organisations, and the general public. While family members,
neighbours, primary health care services, and kindergartens, have greater access to
very young children who mostly suffer from abuse in families, schools and other
institutions face, or turn a blind eye towards, other forms of abusive behaviour against
older children and, sometimes, by children themselves.
The General Public: awareness and attitudes
There is a need for a proper survey of the attitudes and level of awareness of the
general public before judgements can be made. The assessment here merely reflects
the attitudes of persons interviewed for the purpose of compiling this study. While
everyone agrees that public awareness is a key issue and that the predominant general
value system is more in favour of family protection and parents’ rights than child
protection and children’s rights, there is no consensus about the current level of public
awareness of child abuse issues. Some practitioners in the field, working in both
governmental and non-governmental organisations, believe that awareness campaigns
could even be counter-productive at the moment, since there is no capacity to respond
once the abusive situation is recognised. They state that level of public awareness and
concern is already higher than the level of provided assistance, and, therefore, an
awareness campaigns is not a priority. On the other side, there is a belief that public
attitudes are far from satisfactory and that the lack of services should not and cannot
be an excuse. On the contrary, increased public awareness could lead to new services
being established, by local governments and/or through citizens’ initiatives. Also, the
increased awareness could provide a necessary public support to professionals
intervening in the family as well as to the victims of abuse. There is evidence that
child abuse became very high on the list of topics of public interest during 2001. The
‘Say YES for Children’ campaign revealed that stopping abuse and exploitation of
children was recognised by many children and adults, as the number one priority in
regard to children’s needs in Croatia.
34
Parents and Families
The traditional style of child upbringing, which sees corporal punishment and
verbal/emotional abuse as normal methods for imposing discipline, still prevails in
many Croatian families. Even professionals would not consider spanking or slapping
abusive if it happens occasionally, ‘for a reason’, and does not result in visible
physical marks. Parents who would like to avoid violence do not have many
opportunities to learn about alternative methods. Some pilot projects, usually called
“schools for parents”, remain on the level of local initiatives for small groups, while
larger education campaigns would be needed to teach parents and parents-to-be about
methods of discipline that would be more respectful of children’s rights. There are
some user-friendly educational materials for parents and families developed by
NGOs, in particular by Hrabri telefon (Brave Telephone), but they do not easily reach
parents outside the larger towns.
Pre-school and School Systems
While only some 30% of children attend kindergartens, as noted in Section II above,
98% of children are enrolled in primary schools. Data on enrolment in secondary
schools varies depending on the source, but can be estimated between 70% and 90%
of the population. Considering the large number of children in the system, a
surprisingly small number of abuse and violence cases is being recognised and
reported by professionals working in this system. Lack of sensitivity and training are
key factors. Teachers-to-be do not learn how to identify and protect abused children.
Pre-school teachers perceive themselves as a service to parents and do not come
forward with open criticisms. Primary schools, and even more so secondary schools,
keep parents at a distance and tend to focus mostly on the formal curricula. However,
since abused children usually have learning difficulties and behavioural disorders,
schools may request the assistance of social services. It is more likely in these cases
that it is the child who is identified as ‘problematic’. Unfortunately, most secondary
schools tend to exclude children who act out or show other symptoms related to their
history of abuse.
The Police
Since 1996 within the Ministry of the Interior and at the level of local police
departments, special juvenile offenders departments exist. Police officers receive
specialised training not only in dealing with juvenile offenders but also in addressing
crimes against children. There are many indicators that police officers, especially
within the Department for Juveniles, now demonstrate a much higher level of
sensitivity to child protection issues. While in some smaller communities there is still
a perception of the police as reluctant to intervene in abusive and violent situations in
families, in larger towns there is a noticeable dedication and sensitivity within the
police regarding the issue of child abuse. The problem is, perhaps, that specialised
juvenile departments exist only in larger towns, whilst regular community police
officers have not been trained and sensitised. There are, in the larger cities, many
positive developments, for example, the Police Department of the Split-Dalmacia
County has registered much higher number of cases of ‘crimes against children’ and
investigated them with a greater intensity since 1997, partially because of new
internal instructions and partially because of increased awareness at local level,
through awareness campaigns, public pressure, and training provided by a local NGO.
35
The Heath System and Health Professionals
As noted above, the Croatian Health System does not systematically reflect the policy
position of the World Health Organisation that child abuse and neglect is a public
health issue and therefore that health professionals are expected not only to combat it,
but also to work on prevention and public awareness. Health professionals are not
sufficiently sensitised and, generally speaking, do not often come forward with
reporting abuse, or even advocating for children. This especially applies to doctors
and nurses in primary health care, who have access to the entire population of
children from birth. It may be, in part, that doctors in primary health care are
‘hostages’ of the system, as parents can easily change their family doctor should she
or he ‘interfere in family matters’. Also, many doctors still believe that professional
ethics prioritise confidentiality over the protection of children. Some also blame the
law enforcement system, which they deem extremely inefficient. One doctor stated:
“We, as witnesses, are often treated as the accused – it seems that everyone would
have a much easier time if we had not reported the case”. Indeed, extremely slow
procedures and a lack of sensitivity by judges are also disincentives to reporting. As
the doctor quoted above argued, defence lawyers frequently count on the slow
procedures leading to the ultimate dismissal of the case. He, as the principle witness,
finds it unacceptable, for example, that the case of suspected sexual abuse of a four
year old boy can drag through the court system for years. All this diminishes the
incentive for medical staff to report cases, he suggests.
Centres for Social Welfare
The protection of children from abuse and neglect is still considered the prime
responsibility of a countrywide network of Centres for Social Welfare. The
responsibilities and tasks of CSWs cover a wide spectrum of interventions, from
warning and supervision, to an exclusion order or removing a child from the family
and reporting to the court. Such wide responsibility very often creates a feeling of
powerlessness among professionals in the CSWs, who feel exposed and left alone in
an extremely demanding job. Although the law provides a variety of measures, CSW
staff feel that they do not have adequate powers to impose those measures. Fear of
violence and reprisals overtly or covertly gets in a way of efficient protection. Most
CSW professionals, in small and large communities, report that the sheer number and
complexity of cases is much higher than the capacity of CSWs to deal with.
Intervention is, therefore, often limited to so called family-law protection measures,
while prevention and therapeutic interventions are beyond the capacity of public
social services. There are very few examples of a more elaborated preventive
approach, including primary and secondary prevention, such as the one in the ZagrebČrnomerec CSW office.
When asked about practice and procedures, professionals in CSWs stated that there is
no standardised procedure and written guidelines for practice, which leaves each
professional to act according to her/his own discretion. The absence of written
guidelines is also seen as an obstacle for new entrants in this professional field. Lack
of proper supervision and evaluation also gets in a way of good quality services for
children. However, as part of the transition from a paternalistic state system to a more
moxed system, including civil society, it is likely that many new professionals will be
employed outside state services. The MOLSW anticipates that private practice of
trained therapists, legalised only recently, could be a way to strengthen the system.
36
The question of national standards and protocols becomes even more critical with
increased number of service providers.
Opinions vary as to whether professionals are adequately trained to deal with child
abuse, and especially sexual abuse. Some professionals on the local and on the central
level believe that the professional knowledge and level of training obtained at the
University is sufficient. Others, inside and especially outside the state social welfare
system, believe that the level of specific professional knowledge of contemporary
social work practice and new research findings on the effects of child abuse and
neglect are not always available to practitioners and therefore not yet integrated into
their day to day professional lives.
Substitute Carers
In most cases of severe child abuse and neglect, if there is no possibility to protect the
child within the family, then children are placed in Children’s Homes or in foster care.
The staff of Children’s Homes believe that this type of intervention often comes too
late, and children suffer severe long-term consequences of prolonged abuse. They also
state that greater therapeutic support needs to be provided to the children. Many
professionals believe that Centres for Social Welfare do not work sufficiently on
finding alternative family care or on improving the conditions in the child’s birth
family, which leads to a situation, as noted in Part One above, that many children stay
in such institutions until they grow up. Also, the reluctance to initiate court
procedures against abusive or neglectful parents tends to deprive many abused
children of the chance of being adopted.
Little is known about children in foster families. Although the Social Welfare Law
defines the duty of statutory social services to provide training, support and
supervision to foster carers, this is rarely happening and they are mostly left alone.
While substitute care is important to provide safe environment to children, it should
be only a temporary measure. Unfortunately, many families whose children end up in
substitute care do not receive effective assistance to improve their conditions and
parenting skills. Again, this leads to unnecessary long-term institutional or foster care.
Prosecutions and the Courts
Since 1997 there has been great progress in terms of changes in legislation, with both
the Penal Code and Family Law seeking to criminalise family violence and abusive
behaviour, and reinforcing duties to report and to intervene. However, full
implementation of these changes is yet to be seen. In order to avoid further
victimisation of the abused children, some Croatian courts will soon have video links
enabling children to give their statements in less threatening environment. Given a
huge backlog of cases, over one million, it is widely believed that courts do not
sufficiently protect citizens. This also applies to children and therefore, indirectly,
further discourages those who want to report abuse in families or institutions. Some
recent, publicly known cases, indicate that child abuse and particularly sexual abuse
of children is being processed by the court more often and with greater sensitivity.
However, on the other hand, the public was recently shocked by a case involving a 50
year old man who was charged with sexual abuse of 14 children. Since the court
failed to process this within seven years, the case had to be dismissed and he walked
free.
37
An Ombudsperson for Children
The idea of creating the institution of an Ombudsperson for children was first
suggested many years ago. After a long and painstaking procedure of defining the
institution, a draft law has recently been submitted to the Government. In the best case
scenario, this institution could be established in the second half of 2002. It is not clear
how much support the proposal will receive from Government and, ultimately, from
Parliament. In the meantime, the Public Ombudsperson’s office has appointed a
Deputy Ombudsperson to work for children. Unfortunately, this person has no
capacity to deal with protection of children’s rights on the top of many other pressing
issues, and the general public, including children, has no information that such a
function exists.
Non Governmental Organisations, Community and Religious Groups
Self-organised groups of citizens, professionals and non-professionals, represent a
new force in fighting child abuse. Since 1997 there have been many activities aiming
at increasing public awareness on child abuse and/or domestic violence in general.
Awareness campaigns in some of the larger towns of Croatia were initiated by NGOs
such as Tić in Rijeka, MiRTa in Split, Potpora and Hrabri Telefon in Zagreb, the
Croatian Association for the Protection of Children from Abuse and Neglect, and
many others. Numerous interviews for newspapers, on TV and radio, were given by
individual activists and groups. Non-governmental organisations also provide
valuable services in their own communities, such as: SOS-telephones, counselling,
education for professionals and volunteers, shelters, individual and group therapy, and
so on.
Relationships between governmental and non-governmental services are complex.
Non-governmental organisations implicitly or explicitly criticise state services and,
therefore, encounter resistance or lack of trust. At the same time, many dedicated
professionals acknowledge their limitations when working within state services and
welcome new partners in the child protection field, and can be among the founders of
such NGOs or volunteer after-hours in counselling centres. Relationships amongst
NGOs themselves are also complex. Unlike organisations in some other fields, such
as the environment, human rights, and gender issues, NGOs involved in the protection
of children do not appear to value sufficiently communication, networking and
strategic alliances for lobbying.
Although existing NGOs are a great step forward in diversifying service provision, it
is important to note that they do not truly and completely reflect ideas of civil society.
As the ‘expert approach’ is still highly valued in the society, most NGOs are trying to
define themselves as ‘professional’ and ‘expert’ in order to be taken seriously,
reproducing some of the very problems of statutory provision. True participation,
especially participation of children, in policy-making and service planning is still a
strange concept for many. This clearly shows that a children’s right prospective has
not yet been integrated fully into local NGO work. The role of NGOs in policy
making is gradually changing, although the above-mentioned lack of networking
weakens their position and ability to influence policy. On the other hand, a “new
political correctness” since the election of the new Government in 2000, in part a
product of NGO campaigns, now requires the representation of NGOs in different
working or discussion groups and fora, which is, actually, very close to tokenism.
NGOs are, in most cases, funded by local governments with some funded through the
38
Governmental Office for NGOs. Smaller numbers of NGOs have also been able to
attract foreign donors to support their projects. There is no available information on
the activities of informal groups in regard to child abuse. Religious groups and
organisations tend to focus on conservative approaches to ‘family protection’ and do
not make public statements in regard to violence against children.
THREE EXAMPLES OF NON GOVERNMENTAL SERVICE PROVIDERS
1. The NGO MiRTa from Split, established by professionals experienced in the field of social work
and social services, has had combating child abuse as a focus of its activities since 1997. Starting with
a smaller awareness campaign among professionals, a core group was identified and trained. This
group opened a telephone line and counselling centre, and, at the same time, started to work closely
with the Police, Public Prosecutor, the Courts, Centres for Social Work, schools, and kindergartens. A
big public campaign was launched, including public lectures, posters, leaflets, and newspaper, radio
and TV presentations. Training was than provided for teachers, pre-school teachers and community
groups. The counselling centre is open 12 hours a day. MiRTa’s professionals provide expert opinions
to the courts in cases involving child abuse. A shelter for women and children victims of abuse will
soon open. The Split City Government has supported MiRTa from the beginning of its activities.
2. The Parents’ association Step by Step from Zagreb, dedicated to work for children and families,
initiated a training programme on ‘Child Assault Prevention’ (CAP) with funding from the Open
Society Institute. This internationally recognised training programme has been delivered to 35
professionals from different towns in a training-of-trainers format. Trainees have continued to train
teachers, parents and primary school students in six communities. The programme has been evaluated
as highly valuable and applicable and submitted to the Ministry of Education for consideration as the
basis for a programme in all schools on the primary prevention of abuse.
3. The NGO Hrabi Telefon (Brave Phone) was established as a hot-line service for children victims
of abuse at the Psychotrauma Clinic of the Children’s Hospital in Zagreb in 1997. A large number of
dedicated volunteers, mostly students and young professionals, enabled this service to develop new
activities and eventually become an independent NGO. In addition to a crisis line and counselling, new
activities include: public awareness campaigns, educational materials and publications for parents and
children, and training for volunteers and for professionals. The City of Zagreb provided a space for
community-based rehabilitation and social integration activities for children, now known as the House
of Friendship Borovje. Children from the local community and children referred by Centres for Social
Work and Children’s Homes participate together in many different activities. Most recently, the Brave
Phone has successfully lobbied Zagreb City Government to open a new institution, The Polyclinic for
Traumatised Children, first of its kind in the country.
Local Government
Decentralisation of social services puts more demands on local communities and local
authorities. This transition is slow and difficult, and some communities are doing
much better than others. There are not only differences in financial resources, but also
different attitudes of local officials, which contribute to their involvement or noninvolvement in the protection of children. Although officials in the local
administration may not have knowledge and initiative themselves, they are likely to
support projects proposed by local groups and organisations.
Central Government
Recently, Željka Antunović, the Deputy Prime Minister with special responsibility for
social issues, made a strong statement on behalf of the Government, expressing its
commitment to enhance the protection of children and the promotion of children’s
rights. In spite of this statement, this issue may not be high on the Government’s
agenda, as protection of children from abuse and neglect unfortunately competes with
39
many other social problems and is not yet recognised as a matter of general public
importance, in a way which goes beyond mere verbal declarations.
While on the level of individual Ministries, especially Ministry of Labour and Social
Welfare and Ministry of Interior, there is an interest and dedication to address child
abuse, some other ministries need to be more sensitised for this issue. In order to
improve protection of children in general, there is a need for a co-ordinated effort of
different ministries, which will only come true if this is recognised as an important
matter.
The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
The MOLSW is directly responsible for the standards of social work intervention in
the field and for the education of social workers. Within the Ministry there are
different opinions on the need for further training of social work professionals. While
there is a vision to decentralise services and include different service providers, there
is also resistance to the true nature of decentralisation, various grassroots initiatives
and diversity of solutions developed on the community level. The Ministry is
preparing a large public awareness campaign against child abuse. The purpose of the
campaign is to sensitise the general public and to increase the number of abuse and
neglect cases reported by citizens. The MOLSW also funds a number of NGO
projects providing services for victims of violence and abuse, primarily shelters in
Zagreb, Rovinj, Karlovac and Split. Those projects were selected through the annual
competition of the Governmental Office for NGOs.
The State Institute for the Protection of Family, Motherhood and Youth
This is an advisory body to the Croatian Government, established as an important cog
of policy development, advice and implementation. However, it remains unclear how
much capacity and influence this body has, and could be seen to over-emphasise
expertise in the form of ‘scientific and professional opinions’, rather than being
engaged with a wider constituency. The large number of tasks assigned to this body,
including the distribution of child benefits, tends to absorb its limited capacity, so that
only a very small team works on the numerous issues related to child protection. One
of its positive initiatives was to lead and co-ordinate efforts seeking to establish an
Ombudsperson for Children. The State Institute is also a leading agency in developing
important policy documents, such as Youth Policy, Family Policy, Disability Policies,
etc.
The National Council for Children
This was founded in 1998 as an advisory body to the government, bringing together
child professionals, NGOs, academics and the media. The Council for Children
receives secretarial support through the State Institute. In its first two years the
Council was not particularly active. With new members, clearer leadership, and
renewed energy, the Council became much more active in 2001, working, in
particular, on the revision of the National Programme of Action for Children. As a
part of that process, the Council organised a large two-day gathering of professionals
from different sectors focusing on violence against children in families. A long list of
recommendations to the Government of Croatia has been produced, including clear
recommendations for improvements in literally every sector (see insert).
40
Recommendations of the Council for Children to the Government
in Regard to Violence Against Children
The Council for Children made recommendations for medium- and long-term improvements in
different sectors, as well as important recommendations that address cross-sectoral issues:
- the need to develop an inter-Ministerial protocol to define action by and collaboration of sectors
- the need to develop implementation guidelines for each sector, as well as standards and procedures
to implement laws
- continuous education on prevention, intervention and treatment
- forming multi-agency collaboration and ongoing communication on the level of local communities
- upgrading professional skills and re-licensing for practitioners
- involving practitioners in the field and service users/beneficiaries in decision-making
The Governmental Office for Co-Operation with NGOs
Established at the end of 1998, this office has facilitated the selection of a significant
number of projects aiming at addressing child abuse and, in some cases, domestic
violence in general. The funding of such projects has been distributed between the
State Institute for Protection of Family, Motherhood and Youth; the Office for Human
Rights; the Office for Gender Equality; and the MOLSW. Some 1.5 m. HRK (Euro
200,000) has been allocated in total to support various NGO projects concerning
abused children and victims of domestic violence from the Government’s budget.
Science and Higher Education
Scientific research on issues related to child abuse and neglect in Croatia has
predominantly focused on discovering risk factors and causes of abuse. Only recently
has there been more research on the true extent of the phenomenon and even less is
known about the efficiency of interventions and protection measures. While it is
necessary that more research be conducted locally, it is perhaps somewhat arrogant to
believe that Croatia will be so different from other countries where much more is
known. It may be sufficient, sometimes, to translate and publicise well-founded
findings and make them more widely known outside of academic circles. It is the
case, still, that the lack of reading material on child abuse in the Croatian language is
an obstacle not only to practitioners keen to learn more about latest findings and also
to students of various disciplines. The School of Social Work of the University of
Zagreb, the only programme of graduate social work study in Croatia, has been
holding classes on child abuse and neglect since 1995, with some of its leading
Professors having child abuse as one of their main research interests. There needs to
be more learning on these issues among future psychologists, pedagogues, special
educators, health professionals, police officers, and other professionals.
A more or less formal programme of postgraduate continuing education and training
has been established recently and offered to, albeit a limited number of, professionals.
The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare organised, with funding from UNICEF, a
three year education programme for thirty social welfare professionals, focused on
family therapy and intervention in abusive or dysfunctional families. Non
Governmental Organisations have also been involved in organising and providing
different levels of training, from very specialised therapy interventions to more
general programmes, covering issues such as: recognising abuse; understanding the
legal framework; and so on.
41
Last but not Least?: the Children
Children have very little or no say still. It is only in the last few years that SOStelephones and simlar initiatives have enabled children to speak out and seek help.
Children and young people do talk about violence and abuse, when someone asks.
They are able to say what kind of services would be help them most, if listened to.
Croatian policy makers, professionals and adults in general do not consult children
when designing interventions and services meant to assist them.
Children’s councils are now being established in some local communities, as well as
student councils in secondary schools. It is unfortunate that the new Law on
Education does not yet provide for student’s councils in primary schools. Apart from
Children’s Forums led by branches of the local NGO Nasa Djeca (Our Children),
there is no developed systematic process of organising discussions and collecting the
views of children. Most recently, the Council for Children and the State Institute did
make an effort to involve children in discussions on the revision of the NPA and the
role of the Ombudsperson for Children but this was only a tentatvie first step in
attempt to find effective and meaningful ways to enable and facilitate child
participation.
10. Child Protection as a Process
i) Identification
Recognising and naming child abuse is still an issue. Not only the general public, but
also professionals in different services (kindergartens, schools, health services, social
services, and so on) still prefer to turn a blind eye to a disturbing reality, and are much
more likely to identify a child as having a ‘behavioural disorder’ than to focus on the
underlying abusive behaviour of adults. This is predominantly a matter of awareness
and knowledge, also connected to general public support for interventions in the
family.
ii) Reporting
Every citizen has the duty to report a case of suspected abuse according to the law.
However, the practice proves to be very different. Ordinary citizens, relatives and
neighbours often fail to report child abuse, and public servants frequently do the
same. A very worrying fact is that few health professionals, pre-school or school
teachers chose to report even obvious cases of child abuse. A psychologist on the
paediatric ward of a large hospital told of their immense frustration caused by the
complete refusal of medical staff to see the obvious, let alone to report severe abuse to
the appropriate body. The new regulation in the the criminal law (Article 300) is
intended to reinforce a duty to report but more will be needed to change these deepseated attitudes. Even when people are given the chance to report cases to the police
or other appropriate service anonymously, for example, through SOS telephones, the
response is still limited. When professionals finally learn about, and act upon, a case,
it often becomes obvious that many people knew about the abuse for a long time, but
chose to ‘mind their own business’.
iii) Processing and Investigation
There are three different systems through which child abuse and child neglect cases
can be processed:
1. the social welfare system with wide authorities in regard to child protection issues;
42
2. the criminal justice system through police, prosecution and courts in regard to the
criminal aspects of abuse; and
3. a community support and networking system that includes everything from the
general public, to local government and formal NGOs.
Each of these systems is currently in transition, experiencing change, flux and
adjustment. The criminal justice and law enforcement system is still adopting and
starting to base practice on recent changes in the law. The community support
network is still defining its true role in a developing civil society. Community groups
and NGOs, from their side, are still, on the whole, in what might be termed an
‘heroic’ stage, with little regard for the work of others and little awareness of the
importance of coalition building. In terms of statutory social services, the biggest
challenge is to accept and promote a shift from a paternalistic, omnipotent and
centralised Governmental service to a flexible, community based, public service that
works in close collaboration with other partners on the local community level. Since
all three systems are in change or being challenged to change, it is no wonder that
tensions and mistrust are present, with considerable criticism being launched by and
against all of the principle actors. In terms of child abuse, it is very important to note
that the health and education systems are much less involved, while in fact they are
crucial, being the only structures who get to see all children and certainly could do
more to protect them.
iv) Recovery
There is a very strong consensus that rehabilitation and social reintegration aiming to
overcome consequences of the abuse is the real bottleneck of the whole child
protection system. Children removed from their families for reasons of abuse need not
only a safe place to live and educational opportunities; they also need assistance in
dealing with traumatic experiences. Professionals in Children’s Homes state that the
available therapeutic treatment is insufficient. Even in the larger cities such as Zagreb,
Split and Rijeka only a few specialised therapists deal with children traumatised as a
result of abuse. The practice of placing abused children in institutions and foster care
unprepared to deal with the consequences of abuse does not help children to recover
and become socially integrated. Such placements sometimes merely satisfy the basic
requirement of safety away from the threat of continuation of abuse, Even this may
not always be true, given the existence of corporal punishment, emotional cruelty and
other forms of abuse in institutions as well.
There is no shortage of offer of activities seeking to contribute to children’s social
integration. Many NGOs organise playrooms, workshops and other creative activities
and the MOLSW also supports a large number of small, community-based, ‘creative
socialisation groups’. However, it is not clear how many children who are victims of
abuse participate in these activities, what channels for referral exist, nor how well
targeted the offered activities are. Sports groups, the scouts, church groups and others
need to have more awareness about particular vulnerability of children who have been
abused.
As many of those interviewed stated, the most worrying fact is that there is no
treatment for the perpetrators of abuse and violence. Without this, the abusive
behaviour remains unchanged and could be repeated, against other children. Legal
43
measures are not enough - abusive persons need professional assistance to deal with
their behaviour and its deep-seated causes.
11. Sexual Abuse and Exploitation
The steep curve of the graph in Table 3.4 shows that the numbers registered sexual
abuse cases is increasing dramatically. Again, we can reasonably assume that this has
to do with greater sensitivity and readiness of the police to deal with such cases. An
analysis of police data (Sladovic and Druzic, 2000) over the period 1990-1998,
revealed a total of 685 cases of sexual abuse of children under 14, with the average
age of those abused being 9.7. Registered assaults happened mostly at home or in the
close neighbourhood. The authors concluded that the key features of the sexual abuse
of children in Croatia do not differ from findings in other countries, and therefore
achievements in terms of prevention and protection can be applied in Croatia, too.
In general, the sexual exploitation of children has a very low profile. Trafficking,
modern forms of slavery, Internet pornography and child prostitution endanger young
boys and girls in Croatia as well. The public only learns about such cases periodically
through newspaper articles, usually highly sensationalised. The average citizen still
seems more inclined to blame the young women and men who are the victims of
abuse and exploitation, than those profiting from them and especially those who
demand such ‘services’. Denial is also present in the main public services which tend
to maintain a false image of Croatia as a transit only country for trafficking.
12. Abuse in Institutions
Violence in schools
Although corporal punishment is not allowed in schools, individual instances do occur
and are often pushed under the carpet. It is not an overstatement to say that every
parent and student would be able to name one or more teachers who practise more or
less ‘subtle’ forms of violence and degrading treatment in the classroom. The recent
deadly incidents in some Croatian schools brought to the surface the threat of violence
against children and by children. One such incident in 2001, when a young student
killed his teacher and himself, caused heated discussions in public and through the
media. The Vecerni list (Evening News) newspaper from Zagreb reported, at the time,
on about ten cases of violence in schools registered by the media in just one year.
Teachers, children, parents and grandparents were the perpetrators in such incidents.
The short public attention-span, as sensational stories go out of the news to be
replaced by others, has not, so far, led to any meaningful and comprehensive survey
much less to policy changes. A hot-line for violence in schools, established by the
Ministry of Education, was used more by teachers than by students. Some other
measures, such as identifying “potentially dangerous students” and suggestions to
have armed guards in schools, did not show much sensitivity and care for children.
Only in particular brief periods, when these issues gain the focus of the media, does it
become obvious that violence, threats and other abusive behaviours do exist in
schools.
Abuse and neglect in child-care institutions
There has been no proper survey of abuse which occurs in institutions. A first,
tentative, attempt to look inside the big state orphanages (Zizak, 2000) only presents
the opinion of carers, who speak about things ‘they had seen happening’ (i.e. abuse by
44
‘other people’). They reported corporal punishment and emotional cruelty practised
by some of the staff, and more serious abuse, including sexual abuse, exerted by some
of the children in care. Other research (Ajduković and Sladović, 2000) finds that
around 34% of children in orphanages report corporal punishment.
13. Violence as Self-harm: suicide in children
Although suicide is rarely categorised as violence against children, in fact it is a form
of violence that increasingly takes children’s lives. For young people in Croatia,
suicide is the second most common cause of death, after traffic accidents. Croatia
does not have a well-developed system of registering and responding to juvenile
suicide. Although the State Institute for Statistics keeps a register on suicides, data are
incomplete, especially for children, because of social stigma. It is even more worrying
that suicide attempts are not being registered and followed-up, as that is recognised as
the strongest warning signal for possible future suicide. The Psychotrauma Centre of
the Paediatric Clinic in Zagreb alone registered approximately 2000 attempted
suicides in a ten-year period.
Table 3.5: Official statistics on suicides committed by children (data from The State
Institute for Statistics)
Year
1996.
1997.
1998.
1999.
2000.
Number of suicides
52
38
39
48
28
Apart from some health clinics, interventions to deal with suicide and suicide
prevention are almost non-existent. Teachers, parents and peers are not educated to
recognise warning signals and respond appropriately. As it is not yet openly on the
public agenda (although the newspapers are reporting frequently about suicides by all
age group), suicide is considered as something that happens and cannot be prevented.
Even more so, it is considered to be a source of shame for the family, and something
that “cannot happen in my family”. In that atmosphere, any attempts to develop a
genuine community response (through telephone hot-lines, education for prevention,
support to families and survivors, and so on), such as that developed by the local
NGO MI from Split, have not yet gained sufficient public support.
14. Recommendations.
A. Institutional Care of Children:
The strategic decision by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare for a gradual deinstitutionalisation of care services is commendable. However, this deinstitutionalisation will face many obstacles unless:
i. The child’s right to live in a family and to participate in a community, based on
contemporary knowledge of the effects of institutional care and on the importance of
attachment in child’s development become guiding principles for all professionals
involved (those working in institutions, Centres for social welfare, different decisionmaking commissions and local community administration).
ii. Professionals in CSWs and in institutions, together with NGOs and families,
become advocates for change.
45
iii. Proper independent evaluation of existing services is undertaken as a basis to start
the reform.
iv. Considerable attention is given to educating and sensitising the wider public and
those involved in caring for children. Awareness raising and support for community
based projects is an essential tool in this process.
v. Foster care, as the most acceptable alternative to institutional care, is given
appropriate attention and allocation of resources (both financial and human). National
standards need to be developed in a participatory manner, involving practitioners from
the field, foster families, children’s biological families and children themselves.
B. Violence against children:
Recommendations prepared by the Council for Children refer, more broadly, to
family violence. These recommendations are of great value as they were achieved
through inter-disciplinary discussions and are re-iterated here:
i. Combating violence against children requires highest consideration be given to the
best interests of the child, at the state level, including all relevant Ministries; at the
level of families nad local communites; and by public services on the local level,
religious groups and media.
ii. When developing inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral protocols, guidelines, procedures,
and standards, the emphasis must not be only on the outcome document, but on the
process. Outcome documents will only be implemented if the process is based on an
attempt to reach agreement through mutual learning, and the building of trust and
respect between services and between people.
iii. Other forms of violence, including suicide but, also, violence outside the family,
(in schools and other institutions, street violence, sexual exploitation and trafficking)
needs more attention and efficient responses.
iv. It is of vital importance to speed up the process of establishing the office of the
Ombudsperson for Children, responsible for monitoring violations of children’s rights
and assessing the implementation of legal provisions to protect children.
v. NGOs, parents’ associations, and any other civil society groups are equally
qualified and resourceful players in child protection and need to play a much greater
role in policy making, service provision and in the monitoring of public services.
Allocation of funds to support these groups at the central and local levels is also
necessary
vi. Civil society actors, working for the benefit of children, need to strengthen their
alliances in order to support each other and have a respectable voice in advocacy for
child’s rigths.
vii. Children are the best experts on their own experiences and their opinions must
inform service providers as well as policy makers. Mechanisms need to be developed
for children’s voices to be heard and respected. That is not a luxury or a decoration,
but one of the obligations from the Convention on the rights of the Child.
46
IV:
Youth Policies
1. Introduction
This Section focuses on aspects of the situation of young people in contemporary
Croatia. For the purposes of this report we define as ‘young people’ those aged
between 15 and 24 years, whilst acknowledging that the CRC and other UN
documents refer to those under 18 as children. It is important to note that the
definition of youth is itself an issue of discussion in Croatia. The international
definition is not widely accepted, and national documents (e.g. the emerging national
plan of action for youth) tend to define youth as those aged 15 to 29.
The State Institute for Statistics estimates that youth make up 13.6% of the total
Croatian population, with the MONEE Regional Monitoring Report suggesting that
there were 674,000 young people in this age group in Croatia in 1999 (MONEE 2000,
127). Youth related issues fall under the responsibility of various Ministries. In 1997, as noted in
Section III, the State Institute for the Protection of Family, Motherhood and Youth was founded to
facilitate coordination between respective ministries and promote multi-sectorial approaches in this
field and others. This Institute has recently initiated the development of a national action plan for
youth, and created a team with representatives from different ministries. In this Section, we address
some of the key issues which help to understand the difficult situation which young people face in a
country in transition, looking, in turn at education; employment; health, with particular reference to
drug use; and values and participation. This is, as the MONEE Report notes for the whole region, ‘the
transition generation’, children when Croatia experienced war and rapid political, economic and social
change, and now the first generation to make choices under a new system (MONEE 2000, 5).
2. Education
School Enrolment and Drop-Out
Primary education is compulsory in Croatia and enrolment rates are very high, except
for Roma children, where no reliable data have been available, neither regarding their
number, nor school enrolment rates. However, leaders of Roma associations consider
the enrolment rate to be very low even in the areas where the Roma population is
economically relatively well off, and, to an extent integrated into the local
community. A recent incident where a school decided to segregate Roma children,
with even separate entrances and lunch places, has caused considerable concern, and
led to a revisiting of the problems faced by Roma children in accessing the
educational system (Mehmedi and Papa, 2001).
In general terms, notwithstanding a number of valuable initiatives aimed at improving
education, the schooling system remains rather conservative in Croatia. It is also
chronically underfunded, with only 2.8% of GDP currently invested in education,
which hardly guarantees more positive changes in the near future. The school
programme remains top heavy with content, based upon old fashioned teaching
methods, with little attention to more active learning. Due to the increased
understanding of the role that schools could play in young peoples’ health and
development, there is an increased interest in integrating life skills and health
education in the school curriculum, as well as to promote the participation of young
people through peer counseling and peer education activities, but these initiatives are
far from normal and mainstream, suggesting that change will be a long process.
Indeed, in recent discussions regarding the reform of the educational system In
Croatia, there has been almost no attention at all to the views of young people
themselves.
47
According to official data, (SIPMFY, 1998 ‘Youth in the Republic of Croatia’), some
90% of young people complete secondary education, although the report concerned
does not clearly indicate how many young people are actually enrolled. Information
on enrolment rates varies to a great extent. The Ministry of Education and Sport
reports that as many as 95-97% of the population enrol in secondary school, and out
of that number 85-90% finish. As they have a clear incentive for keeping statistics as
high as possible, school authorities are not always the most reliable source. The
World Bank and UNICEF estimate, based on official national statistics, that the gross
enrolment rate is 82%, which in fact includes those who repeat classes. WB estimates
that net enrolment rate is 66%. Both the gross enrolment and net enrolment rates are
lower than in countries Croatia is usually compared with, such as Hungary, Slovenia,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland.
Enrolment rates in tertiary education are increasing, if only slightly. Between 1991
and 1998, University enrolment increased from 14.1% to 17.8% of young people aged
19-24 (MONEE, 2000; 151). By the same year secondary school enrolment had
increased by 4% for boys and 7% for girls, compared to enrolment figures for 1989.
As education enrolment and continuing in the system are both very powerful and
significant protective factors for vulnerable young people, then the drop-out rates
reported in Croatia are a source of concern, and the need to decrease them should be
an urgent priority. Premature school leaving is closely correlated with a number of
risks to health including: early pregnancy; harmful drug use; criminality, and so on,
all of which tend to compound social exclusion, as research in Western countries
indicates. However, in the context of a very difficult transition from school to work,
in terms of limited access of young people to the labour market, and high levels of
youth unemployment, then this problem is even more difficult in Croatia and requires
urgent research and policy proposals.
A number of factors, often working together, can be identified as contributing to high
drop out rates. These include: a general lack of tolerance of schools for different
behaviour; a dominant perception by students of the lack of relevance of the
educational system; and a lack of proper attention and care being paid to those
vulnerable and at risk young people who need to be supported through the educational
process. In the process of cutting expenditures, schools have abandoned so-called
expert teams, which consisted of a pedagogue, a psychologist and special teachers,
who were capable of providing monitoring, counselling, and referral on, for those
children and young people who have difficulties in adapting to the school
environment. This creates a major gap in schools currently felt by both teachers and
students with, on average, each educational psychologist covering some 3,500
students.
Education of Ethnic Minorities
Croatia has a long tradition of providing supplementary classes for students belonging
to ethnic minorities in their mother tongue. In some areas, full primary and secondary
education is available in the language of ethnic minorities. It is not rare in Istria, that
children attend either Croatian or Italian schools for the sake of improving either of
the languages, regardless of their ethnicity.
However, in the aftermath of war, with the absence of a consensus in the
interpretation of recent history, and the huge similarities in Croatian and Serbian
48
languages, both the educational authorities and representatives of the Serbian
community will have to find new, creative, ways to approach the education of
children from the Serbian community in Croatia.
The Serb Cultural Society ‘Prosvjeta’ has been enabled by the Ministry of Education
to prepare a curriculum and organise courses in Serbian language and literature,
geography, history, art, music and religion for students of Serb ethnicity. The classes
will start in the school year 2001/2002 in Knin. This partnership is also a sign of the
beginnings of the removal of political barriers associated with this issue, and an initial
step, hopefully moving towards finding the best solutions both organizationally and in
terms of curriculum. The law on the Education of Children of Ethnic Minorities
enables schools to provide additional classed should more than 10 children be
interested in attending them. According to ‘Prosvjeta’, 118 elementary school
children will attend additional classes in Knin, which makes an average of 12 per
class.
The non-existaence of education in Roma language and educated Roma teachers, and
the lack of agreement between Roma communities on which language should be used,
seriously impedes the education of Roma children. Most children do not know the
Croatian language sufficiently when starting formal education, which leads to a lack
of succes and very high drop-outs in primary school. Numbers of Roma youth
involved in secondary school are extremely low compared to other ethnic groups.
Violence and Safety in Schools
As noted in Section III above, frequent debates in the media and in other public
spheres reflect a general impression that there has been a considerable increase of
violent behaviour in schools. It is certainly true that, in the aftermath of a long war
involving many front-line communities in Croatia, weapons are widely available and
many are kept in homes. This has sometimes resulted in very drastic consequences,
with a number of recent cases of shootings and, indeed, killings, in schools. After a
spate of recent cases, the Ministry of Education stated publicly that the issue of school
expert teams will be looked at again, and that the Ministry will support a project
aimed at addressing and reducing school violence as a matter of priority.
The availability of all kinds of weapons has been of great concern to the Government,
leading to the adoption of a national plan to increase security through encouraging the
voluntary and penalty-free handover of weapons and arms. According to available
data on legally registered weapons a total of 299,635 persons are recorded as
possessing some 383,289 individual weapons or arms, so that over 5% of the
population has registered firearms. It is estimated that the number of illegally
possessed pieces of fire arms actually exceeds those registered. Some 90% of criminal
acts involving firearms have been committed using illegal weapons. The Ministry of
Interior launched a huge campaign to motivate people to surrender illegal weapons. It
is important to note that this is not the first action of this kind, and that all previous
ones were not particularly successful.
The Ministry of Education has analysed the current state of security in schools, which
notes that, in the period from 1996 to 2000, a total of 4,018 criminal acts were
reported in schools. The majority of these relate to burglaries, destruction of property
and school items, with 2.26% recorded as acts against life and body. 51% of criminal
49
acts occurred in primary schools and 25% in secondary schools. 49 primary school
students were reported for crimes against life and body and seven for sexual crimes.
Somewhat dramatically, 12.32% of all crimes committed by secondary school
students were recorded as acts against life and body. 30 reports have been filed for
drug abuse in primary schools, and 49 in secondary school.
As noted above, the The Ministry of Education has drafted a national programme for
prevention of school violence. The program envisage identifying those students
particularly at risk of offending; the establishment of a hotline for reporting cases of
bullying and school violence; and the establishment of crisis intervention teams,
which should serve as a support for teachers in violence prevention programmes and
provide debriefing sessions for students who have been exposed to violence. In
addition, the Ministry is calling for increased cooperation between parents and the
local communities in achieving the goal of creating ‘violence free schools’. Increased
violence in schools also led to a number of discussions and more problematic
proposals, including the idea of involving professional security officers in schools.
Opponents of this model fear that this would lead towards a further ‘militarization’ of
the school environment and culture, whilst others suggest that it would lead to
increased security of students but also would be a good opportunity to provide a
number of work places for unemployed demilitarised soldiers. Meanwhile there are
several other initiatives, mainly coming from civil society groups which call for wider
mobilization of the community in response to rising violence in schools. There is a
need to approach this issue in a careful manner, considering the lack of capacities in
schools to deal with the issue of violence, and also limited referral opportunities for
children who might need additional assistance for their behavioural problems, as
noted above.
Both the Ministries of Education and of the Interior are currently involved in
attempting to prevent violence by and against young people, including violence in
schools, particularly that involving the use of fire arms, both according to their
mandates. Meanwhile, Croatia has a relatively well-developed network of peace and
human rights groups and organisations, which have been active for over 10 years
promoting peace and non-violence. Strangely enough, with few exceptions, the
resources of the peace movement have rarely been called upon for co-operation,
although their contribution could be valuable. The Ministry of Interior media
campaign, calling for surrendering of weapons, would surely have been strengthened
by the kind of events which civil society groups, including youth groups, are willing
and able to organise successfully.
3. Employment
Employment Opportunities
Croatia has one of the highest unemployment rates among transitional countries,
which is the result of the cumulative impact of the war in Croatia and in the wider
region; social transition; a period of failed economic policies; and a large amount of
corruption, which was particularly obvious in the process of privatization. The
number of registered unemployed people in February 2002 was 414,418. The
unemployment rate was 24%, an increase of almost 3% on that for the year 2000.
Amonst the unemployed population, women are a small majority, 54%, whilst 25.8%
of the unemployed are looking for their first job. In the age group 15-24 there are
about 110 000 unemployed (some 27 % of the total unemployed population) which is
50
very high, considering that many young people of that age are still involved in
education. The 15 – 29 age group accounts for about 42% of the total number of
unemployed in Croatia. The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
estimates that a third of labour active young people in Croatia, that is those under 25,
are unemployed. All of this suggests that the unemployment rate of youth in Croatia is
among the highest in transitional countries.
Recognizing the problem of unemployment, Parliament adopted a National
Programme for Employment, and obliged the Government to develop a programme to
creat new employment opportunities. This programme emphasised the need to
promote the employment of young people without previous working experience, by
reducing the cost, in terms of taxes and benefits, that employers have to pay for their
young employees. The programme was implemented for 18 months, and 5,188 young
people got their first job, as a result. Due to the lack of financial resources, the
programme was abandoned in early 2000.
The Government has recently launched two new programmes aimed specifically at
young people. One of these, ‘From Faculty to a Job’, seeks to facilitate the
employment of highly educated young people through subsidising salaries and
benefits. Given the normal trend in the labour market in favour of educated people,
this programme appears likely to be labelled a ‘success’, although it may, actually,
only have a marginal impact, hastening changes that would have occured anyway.
The other programme, ‘From Classroom to Workshop’, focused on incentives to
promote the employment of thoe who finish vocational trainnig, would, if successful,
actually have a greater impact, given its concern with less advantaged young people.
4. Health
Towards ‘Youth Friendly Services’?
The Croatian health service, itself in transition, remains far away from an ability to
deliver more appropriate, non-stigmatising, ‘youth friendly’ services. Instead of
developing in ways which are more responsive to the demands of young people
themselves, the system is still based on a reactive focus on ‘youth at risk’ which
reinforces stereotypes of young people as a problem group. The need to imporve the
accessibility and quality of health services for all is, therefore, particularly acute in
relation to young people.
Mental Health
Currently, mental health services for children and young people are being evaluated in
Croatia. The Ministry of Health has declared its commitment to reform and the
modernisation of the mental health system, considering this area as a strategic
priority. The reform will promote community based services, as opposed to
institutionally-based care. Specialised mental health services for children and young
people have been identified as a particularly weak part of the mental health system.
As noted above, there are insufficient numbers of psychaitrists and psychologists
within the system. Indeed, as no less than 24 of the 34 child psychiatrists work in
Zagreb, it is clear that specialised services are so difficult to access as to be virtually
non-existent in many other parts of the country. Perhaps even more importantly, the
system remains based on medical models of diagnosis, asessment and treatment, with
much less emphasis on a network of community-based care providers. As one
particular mental health issue, increases in suicides and suicide attempts, amongst
51
both males and females, is marked in Croatia, with 81 young people under age of 14
recorded as having committed suicide in the year 2000, as well as 190 in the age
range 14-18. The analysis of reasons for suicide among young people indicate that
anxieties related to school success, and problems with schools, are often associated
with suicide attempts, suggesting the need for a more comprehensive analysis.
Sexually Transmitted Infections
Although reporting on STI is mandatory in Croatia, experts believe that there is a
certain under reporting in the area of sexually transmitted diseases. Additionally,
reporting systems rarely include prevalence data, and the national epidemiological
system is based on case reporting. However, the available data indicate a ten years
decrease in the incidence of gonorrhea and syphilis, but an increase in the diagnosis of
Clamidia and Human Papiloma Virus among young people, which calls for intensified
sexual education and condom use promotion.
Research on the Sexual Behaviour of Adolescents in Croatia
A major longtitudinal research study has recently begun which sheds crucial light on
adolescent behaviour and which should form the basis for new youth-friendly
services. The study, based on research conducted in 1998, examined three aspects of
youth sexuality: knowledge, attitudes and sexual behaviour, as well as their interrelationships. Some of the key findings were as follows:
1.
Knowledge: Girls are better informed than boys; adolescents are least well
informed regarding sexually transmitted diseases; students at technical universities are
not well informed informed; sexual literacy is positively related to the level of
education of mothers; sexual literacy correlates negatively with the importance of
religion.
2.
Attitudes: The majority of Croatian youth can be characterized as moderately
non-traditional - open to condom use, with girls are less conformist than boys;
traditionalism is related to conformism and correlates negatively with condom use.
Religion correlates with traditionalism and conformism, but surprisingly, not with
negative attitudes regarding condom use.
3.
Sexual Behaviour: 52% of girls and 61% of boys (average age 19) have had at
least one sexual experience. The average age of the first sexual encounter is 16.7 for
boys and 17.1 for girls. During their first sexual encounter 42% of young people did
not use any contraception. Condoms are the most often used form of contraception,
followed by hormonal pills. Almost 90% of sexually active young people have had at
least one ‘risky’ sexual experience, in terms of not using contraception. Only 34% of
young people use a condom regularly, while only 27% perceive sexual encounters as
potentially risky in terms of contracting STIs including HIV/AIDS. Health problems
related to STI have been experienced by 9% of those surveyed, while 21% have
friends who have experienced some sexually transmitted health condition.
4.
Relationships between knowledge, attitudes and behaviour: Sexual literacy is
higher in those individuals who speak about it with their parents, peers, doctors, while
it is considerably lower among those who are more religious and more traditional.
Young people who rated high on the knowledge test tend to have a lower number of
sexual partners and are more likely to use condoms regularly.
The study provides strong evidence that sexual education is not reinforcing
‘promiscuity’ and risky sexual behaviors, as sometimes argued in the public. Given
52
that condom use is closely related to the attitudes that young people adopt on
condoms, and that traditional attitudes correlate negatively with the use of
contraception, it could be argued that a more successful health promotion policy
would seek to challenege these traditional atttitudes. The study is particularly
persuasive in countering the view of conservatives who argue that condom promotion
is actually encouraging promiscuity.
Drug Use and Approaches to Harm Reduction
The National Anti-Drug Srategy
Increasing drug use in Croatia has been a major concern of the relevant authorities,
and the national programme adopted by the Parliament has received considerable
support. However, the achievements of the programme are currently being
questioned, leading to a situation where a comprehensive evaluation is required in
order to strengthen the positive elements and reorganise those which did not meet
expectations. Drug use and related problems continue to be associated with young
people. The majority of drug users are men (the male/female ratio is 4.7:1), and 57%
of drug users registered by the health system are under the age of 25. During 1999, 54
drug addicts died. For 47 (77%) the cause of death was opiate overdose. An annual
increase of the number of deaths of drug addicts has been evident.
The national strategy for the control of drug abuse envisages the involvement of all
respective Ministries, and led to the changing of drug related legislation; the
establishment of County level centres for drug abuse prevention and treatment; and
the development of national school based prevention programmes. To prevent the
spread of HIV/AIDS, hepatitis and related diseases, the strategy encouraged the
development of harm reduction programmes including: methadone maintenance and
treatment; needle-exchanges; and more developed outreach services.
Albeit rather slowly, considering the support which the programme has received,
County centres for drug prevention and treatment are being established, making
treatment and counseling services more accessible to drug users. These facilities have
been a factor in changes in epidemiological data, which now show a constant increase
in the number of drug users receiving treatment within the health system. Further
analysis of the data indicates that there has been no increase in the number of newly
registered opiate drugs users. In addition, the percentage of opiate drug users among
newly registered cases continues to decrease. These findings indicate that the system
is proving increasingly capable of providing relevant services for young people before
they develop the symptoms of opiate addiction.
This more positive picture is also partly the result of legal reform. By adjusting its
national legislation in line with UN Conventions on drug control, Croatia committed
itself to prosecute all cases of possession of drugs as criminal acts according to the
criminal law, rather than treating them according to the law on minor offenses. The
office of the prosecutor can however decide to drop charges for possession of drugs
against those young people who agree to take counseling sessions together with their
parents, in one of a number of institutions licensed for this purpose. This practice is
considered to be a step forward, although no comprehensive analysis has been
performed so far. The quality of the counselling service provided depends largely on
the availability, or lack of it, of trained counsellors in some parts of the country, with
Croatia facing a problem with the geographical distribution of scarce human and
53
professional resources in this, such as in many other, fields. Another encouraging fact
is that not only governmental institutions but also NGOs can be tasked to perform
counselling, which represents one of the pioneering attempts to link governmental and
non-governmental services. It would be advisable to reflect on the achievements of
this project, ensure the good use of lessons learnt, and identify further steps which
will facilitate further service delivery and improvement.
The City of Split: lessons to be learnt
For a number of years, the city of Split was considered to be the most affected by the
heroin epidemics which peaked during the mid 1990s. Albeit with a time-lag, the
community responded with a number of co-ordinated activities. The social
mobilization of different institutions and groups, including: the local authorities,
grassroots organisations and individuals has been achieved, and a number of
community based prevention activities have been implemented in a more or less
coherent and co-ordinated way. The development of a range of services focusing on
treatment, counseling and/or harm reduction has been facilitated. A number of
comprehensive research projects, which analyzed local patterns of drug use, were
conducted and resulted in a significant increase in the scientific literature and
knowledge. The result is that Split is now fifth in terms of the number of newly
treated drug users, behind Zagreb, Pula, Zadar and Dubrovnik. A case study of Split’s
response to drug use would highlight areas of best practice, which would be of
relevance to other towns, as well as for the development of a new national strategy,
especially one based on amplifying the role of the local community in drug abuse
prevention. This reflection and documentation of lessons learnt has, unfortunately, not
taken place, so far.
Prevention in Schools
The school-based prevention programme is another important element of the national
strategy requiring serious reflection and further refinement. The implementation of
school-based prevention programmes did not facilitate the integration of communitybased and school-based approaches and programmes. Indeed, sometimes, such cooperation was actively discouraged, and the educational authorities imposed strict
control over programmes. The overall centralization of the educational system was
one of the factors contributing to such an unfortunate development which resulted in a
failure to adapt school programmes to specific local circumsatnces, much less to
mobilise all interested parties. A revised school-based drug prevention programme,
based on widely accepted methods such as peer counseling, peer education, and the
integration of life skills education into school curriculum could have much better
results, and also improve the overall spirit and atmosphere of the educational system,
for the benefit of students.
Croatia’s Methadone Programme
The Methadone maintenance programme in Croatia is organised through a network of
a limited number of psychiatrists who prescribe daily doses of methadone. The daily
application of methadone is the responsibility of family doctors. This decentralised
model of methadone maintenance requires urgent comprehensive evaluation, likely to
recommend new strategies leading to the reorganisation of methadone administration,
either towards a selected number of licensed and transparently supervised family
doctors, or towards the establishment of a network of methadone centres outside of
existing health facilities. Fortunately, there are as yet no serious voices which are
54
calling for the termination of the methadone programme as such, although this is very
likely to happen if improvements in the actual administration of the programme are
not made urgently.
Among the problems in the programme which such an evaluation would need to
address, are:
•
Over time, the criteria for participation in methadone programmes have become
less and less strict, which has led to an increase in the number of drug addicts
involved in methadone programmes.
•
Methadone has been prescribed by a very small number of psychiatrists, who deal
with a huge caseload of patients in very difficult conditions, with few
opportunities for self care and stress reduction. This leads to a large staff turn
over, leaving less experienced colleagues to deal with the heavy caseloads.
•
The administration of methadone by family doctors is not always user friendly for
addicts, and there has been an impression that some doctors are actually trying to
get rid of drug addicts, by being too strict with them, while the others are too
permissive giving large number of pills in advance.
•
Some independent psychiatrists estimate that every third methadone pill ends up
on the illegal market. Some of the drug addicts involved in the programme can
make up to Euro 1000 per month by selling methadone pills.
The problems and controversies in the methadone programme are particularly
instructive, since they highlight the wider issue that, in practice, many pioneering
programmes are being introduced within the health, educational and social services,
but there is little systematic attention to programme evaluation or action research, in
order to adjust the programmes accordingly. Rather than exclusively focusing, in an
urgent crisis mode, on addressing the specific problems which young people
encounter, it would be better to complement this with the development of research
based programmes, which would contain evaluation as a key component. Instead of
being based on research, programmes are often based on ‘expertise’ provided by
prominent institutions and individuals. Since this model of programme development
almost always leads into some kind of power struggle, programme evaluation is often
perceived as a personal insult to the programme authors. A more systematic approach
to programme development would minimise this likelihood.
5. Values and Participation
1.
Underpinning all of the issues above, there is a need to understand changes in
the underlying values of young people in Croatia, and the impact of wider
authoritarianism in society. A recent research project implemented by the Institute for
Social Studies on ‘Values and Authoritarianism of Youth in Croatia’ is particularly
valuable, because it enabled comparisons with similar research undertaken in 1986,
and thereby provides an interesting snapshot of changes that occurred during war and
social transition.
The values of individual affirmation and privacy such as: material welfare,
professional success, entertainment, family, self reliance, remain among the most
valued, positively evaluated by 90% of young people. Power, ethnicity and religion
are now rated significantly more important than 14 years ago. The only value
55
indicator significant lower is that of politics, with only 25 % of young people value
politics positively. When it comes to individual values, young people value highly
those related to interpersonal relationships reflecting needs which can be satisfied in
the private sphere, such as: love; friendship; honesty; family; work; and individual
rights and freedoms. Again political involvement is the least acceptable value.
By valuing highly resourcefulness, young people have shown a certain pragmatism
reflecting the general atmosphere in the country. Hence, 10% of respondents think
that giving a bribe is acceptable behaviour; 17% approve of earning money by using
‘intelligent’ methods; while almost 50% approve of using personal contacts for
individual benefits. Politics rates relatively low within young people’s value systems
all over Europe. This research indicates a reduction in young people’s positive interest
in politics, with only 4.6% of subjects seeing politics as an acceptable social value.
This attitude inevitably reflects a lack of interest by young people in political
participation, which is particularly dangerous in countries with weak civil society
institutions. Additionally, while politics rates low in the hierarchy of values, power
rates very highly (75%).
The research provided follow-up data on authoritarianism. Measured by the F-scale,
authoritarianism is examined neither as a model of interpersonal relationships nor as
an ideology, but as a personality trait. No significant changes of average values have
been identified as compared to 1986 when Slovenian and Croatian youth were rating
lowest on this scale compared with young people from the other republics of the
former Yugoslavia. Significant changes can however, be identified in the structure
and distribution of authoritarianism. While 22.3 % of young people could have been
considered highly authoritarian in 1986, 30.2% meet this criterion now. The
widespread attitude that a brave and committed leader is more desirable than good
laws and democratic practice has been expressed by 52.6% subjects (as compared to
36.2% in the previous study). Additionally 56.4% of youth believe that obedience and
respect for authorities are the most important issues that children should be taught.
These findings can relate to the disappointment of young people regarding expected
changes in the society, but they also, perhaps, reflect a giving up of the opportunity to
make decisions and the tendency to defer decision-making to a single body or person,
which is a rather dangerous idea.
Authoritarianism in Croatia is related to traditionalism, and the average family can
thereby be considered patriarchal, which includes an authoritarian parenting style, and
a lack of equality in gender relationships. However, the society is undergoing
significant changes in gender relations, which are now much more equal than 30 years
ago, leading to more permissive parenting patterns. Already now, there are no
differences in level of authoritarianism between boys and girls. More tolerance is
evident in the area of sexual behaviours such as a decrease of number of young people
who believe that homosexuals are actually criminals (17.8% now as compared to
27,5% in 1986). The level of education of parents impacts significantly on the level of
authoritarianism in young people, ranging from 56.4% among those whose fathers
completed primary education, to 1.9% among those whose fathers have a post
graduate degree. Young people in rural areas rate higher on authoritarianism scales
than those form urban areas, indicating the continued strong influence of
traditionalism.
56
Young people are experiencing a period characterised by a general lack of positive
perspective, particularly regarding employment and economic opportunities. In the
absence of achievable goals young people are turning to private values. This can be
defined as a defense mechanism aimed at assisting them to give some meaning to
their lives. Withdrawal into privacy and a rejection of political engagement, along
with an increase of authoritarianism, can create a fertile ground for autocratic political
solutions. Whilst young people show lack of trust in political and societal structures, it
is also the case that the political structure shows a lack of trust in youth. The number
of young people in the Parliament and in local governments is very low, even when
the Croatian definition of youth is applied.
Although young people seam to be rather uninterested in political participation, the
number of youth groups and organizations is growing continuously. The youth groups
‘scene’ seems to be polarized along the same lines as the whole society, meaning that
there is a continuous conflict between nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Despite
several attempts, youth groups have failed thus far in establishing a national umbrella
organisation. To facilitate the participation of young people several Counties,
including Osijek, Karlovac and Dubrovnik, have established Local Committees for
Youth. The committees will facilitate cooperation between local authorities and youth
groups, and recommend measures for improvement of quality of life and the position
of young people in local community. A number of youth NGOs have emerged, often
funded by international organisations, who can also make a contribution to increased
youth participation.
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V: Return Policies
In this section, we focus on the issue of return policies, in the context of the massive
forced migration within, into, and out of, Croatia consequent upon the wars in
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosova, from 1991 onwards. Whilst the focus
here is not, specifically, on children and young people, it is important to recognise
that these categories of the population are affected, particularly acutely, by forced
migration and long-term exile. The section starts by looking at the nature of the forced
migration processes, and the numbers of people affected. It then looks at recent
attempts to promote sustainable return, at some of the criticisms of return policies,
and examines the particular problems of some regions of Croatia. The section then
looks at the relationship between return and family life, education and employment.
Finally, the role of civil society in responding to refugee return and creating the
conditions for peaceful social re-integration, are addressed.
1. Forced Migration, Exile and Return
Three Waves of Forced Migration
Croatia has experienced three separate ‘waves’ of forced migration. The first occurred
in the early part of the war in Croatia in 1991, until the Vance plan froze the status
quo front lines, creating a swathe of territory not under Croatian Government control
and effectively cleansed of all non-Serb populations. In addition, at the same time,
many Croatian Serbs left areas which were under the control of the Croatian
Government. By late November 1991, at the peak of the fighting in Croatia, the
Croatian Government estimated that there were some 536,000 Internally Displaced
Persons in Croatia, a figure which has been seen as probably an over-estimate and
based on double counting (IDP Survey, 1998 p 195). By late, 1992, UNHCR figures
suggest that there were 265,000 IDPs. By this time, the second wave of forced
migration had begun, with the arrival of refugees, mainly Bosnian Croats and
Bosniaks, from the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By late 1992, this figure had
reached 350,000, so that almost 15% of the Croatian population were refugees or
displaced persons.
The third wave of forced migration was a consequence of the Croatian military
actions in UNPA Sectors West, North and South, in May and August 1995. Estimates
of the number of Serbs who fled their homes in this period vary enormously, but was
probably around 250,000 people. These people fled to Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
under RS control, and to the Croatian Danubian Region (approximately 70,000), the
former UNPA Sector East, which remained under UN transitional administration until
January 1998.
Refugees as Citizens
One issue which is particularly important concerns ethnic Croats from BosniaHerzegovina who came as refugees but who claimed Croatian citizenship and now
have full rights as Croatian citizens. There are estimates that the total number of
Bosnian Croat settlers who have obtained citizenship and the right to vote may be
between 120,000 and 150,000, with a recent ECRE report (para 3.2.7) suggesting a
figure of 140,000, with an additional 23,000 refugees from BiH (16,000 Bosnian
Croats and 7,000 Bosniaks). Importantly, when Croatian Serbs were displaced in
1995, many Bosnians were encouraged to settle in their houses, predominantly in
former UN sectors North and South. The Governmental Office for Displaced Persons
and Refugees (ODPR), however, estimates that between 40,000 and 50,000 people
58
who settled in the area are still in need of housing assistance.
Return
Figures on return are complex and contested, for two important reasons, Firstly,
‘spontaneous return’, which does not require the returnee to register with UNHCR, far
exceeds planned and registered return, perhaps by as much as three times. This means
that the ‘paper trail’ of return is made more complex and true figures hard to collate
given the possibilities of some returnees not registering and others being double
counted by different agencies. In addition, there is some concern that many returnees
simply return in order to settle their affairs, selling their house for example, before
permanently resettling outside the country. Again, this is a figure which is hard to
obtain.
Taking UNHCR and ODPR figures, we can see trends in returns for three different
groups, as follows:
1. Croatian Displaced Persons: In 1995, there were 220,000 registered IDPs in Croatia
with ODPR. Latest figures from ODPR to the end of January 2002 suggest that there
have been 200,763 registered returns (over 90%), with 77,323 people having returned
to the Croatian Danubian Region, and 123,440 returned to other parts of Croatia. Of
the remaining 19,991 people, two thirds are awaiting return to their homes in the
Croatian Danubian region.
2. Serb Minority Refugees. Far more problematic and, until recently, much less of a
priority, has been the return of the estimated 300,000 Croats of Serbian ethnicity who
fled from their homes. ODPR figures, again up to January 2002, suggest that there has
been 88,418 returns (representing only 29% of the total). UNHCR figures are higher
since they include numbers of registered spontaneous returns, as well as an estimated
number of other spontaneous returns, so that their figure is 127,119, still only 40% of
the total. Returns have increased since the beginning of 2000, however.
3. Returns to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 6,656 returnees to Bosnia have been registered by
UNHCR up to January 2002. Recent trends in return to Bosnia indicate that the
process of return to the Republika Srpska entity has increased. While the majority of
returnees during previous years were returning to the Federation, the increase of
return to Republika Srpska, particularly to Prijedor and Banja Luka, is a positive
trend. Indeed, minority return in BiH has increased in the last two years and, for the
first time, there is significant minority return to parts of RS.
There are no exact data on the number of potential returnees to Croatia. Currently,
UNHCR is doing a survey among refugees from Croatia, which will bring provide
more insight into this issue. According to current data based on the number of
individuals who filed an application to return to Croatia, some 13,746 people are
waiting to return. The number of potential returnees is not final, since the process of
submitting return applications is ongoing. Since the number of spontaneous returns
was always three times larger, we can estimate that perhaps as many as 40,000 people
are at this moment considering returning to Croatia, and will need assistance in that
process.
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2. Return: Problems and Possibilities
The election of a moderate, modern, European-oriented Government in Croatia in
January 2000, was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for more coherent and
sustainable return strategies. When democratic changes also occurred in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and in both entities of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it became
possible, for the first time, for a concerted regional approach to return to be
developed. Under the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, a coherent plan is
emerging to realise: “the right of refugees and displaced persons to make free and
informed choices whether to voluntarily return to their homes of origin, or finally to
remain and possibly integrate into the communities of their current residence” based
on “close cooperation on an interstate basis with the ultimate goal to strengthen
stability within the region” (Stability Pact, 2001), which focuses on the wider socioeconomic conditions for return.
It is also important to note the existence of a joint Croatian Government/UNHCR
return plan, adopted in 1998, which sets out the responsibilities of each agency in turn
of planned and spontaneous return. At national level, then, there is a commitment to
creating an environment for people to make ‘free and informed’ choices about return.
Increases in return since early 2000 have also been a result of increased perception of
safety, greater attention to housing reconstruction for returnees, and overall
improvements in inter-ethnic relations. A survey conducted among those who
returned reveals that three quarters or more of returnees to Croatia and Bosnia say that
ethnic relations in their communities are at least somewhat good, and that they
security situation improved significantly (Office of Research Opinion and Analysis,
Department of State, 2000). In practice, on the ground, however, many obstacles
remain.
Housing
As noted above, the number of displaced persons has decreased significantly, largely
due to reconstruction efforts that have been ongoing since 1993, together with the
integration of displaced people in their new communities. Several large reconstruction
projects are about to be completed, which will further decrease the housing
requirements for displaced people. However housing for refugees, mainly Croatian
Serbs, has been burdened by many problems, not only those caused by financial
constraints. After the military Operation Storm, the Croatian Parliament passed a Law
on the Temporary Take Over of Property (LTTP), and invited Bosnian Croats, many
of whom, at that time, resided in hotels on the Croatian coast, to settle in the
depopulated areas. Under that law, some 20,187 housing units were given for
temporary use to, primarily, Bosnian Croats. Since the Government obliged itself to
provide alternative accommodation for those settlers who wish to stay in Croatia, lack
of alternative accommodation has often been emphasised as a reason for delay in
repossession of properties by their rightful owners. The Law contained some clearly
discriminatory clauses and the newly elected Croatian Government received a
Parliamentary majority to repeal the Law. However, over almost five years of its
existence, it created the major legal obstacle, at national level, to sustainable refugee
return.
This still left the problem of local discretion, given that many local governments are
still controlled by hard-line members of the former ruling party. In March 2001 the
Croatian Government held a special session in Knin, and decided to implement the
60
revision of all decisions for temporary take over issued by local housing commissions.
A revision of 21,086 decisions relating to 18,650 housing units was undertaken. The
results indicate that 8,634 housing units were either empty or in the possession of
their rightful owners, whilst the remaining 10,007 houses were in the hands of
temporary occupants, and should be repossessed by their owners. 61% of these
temporary users were from BiH, 29% from Croatia, 6% from FRY, and 4% from
other countries. After taking into account families whose reconstruction has already
been approved or begun, some 7,846 families are entitled to alternative
accommodation at the moment. The Croatian Government is providing funding for
2,200 houses in the course of 2001 through different programmes which should
remove one more obstacle to return.
The revision highlighted complaints against local housing commissions. Namely,
local housing commissions are supposed to deal with the use of property, and
returnees often complain that they are not accurate in issuing repossession documents,
nor in assisting temporary occupants to solve their housing problems through
alternative accommodation. The revision found 4,168 empty housing units, which
could be repossessed by their owners immediately. For an additional 2,185 housing
units the revision indicated that eviction orders could be issued immediately or very
soon since the inhabitants had been using the houses without authorisation through an
LTTP decision, or where their own houses have been reconstructed or soon will be.
Although the requirements for alternative accommodation remain very high, this
revision showed that it is actually much lower than previously had seemed to be the
case. As a result of complaints in regard to the work of local Housing Commissions,
ODPR is now delivering instructions to HCs requiring them to cancel LTTP
decisions, issue eviction orders as appropriate, or to undertake any other measure that
might be required on a case by case basis. It is expected that this change of procedure
will further alleviate the process of repossession of properties and lead to increased
return in war affected areas, although this need to recentralise the system has not been
without local critics who will still, wherever they can, impede the process.
Increased return of Bosnian refugees, who temporarily reside in war affected areas,
will also contribute, in the future, to decreased need for alternative accommodation.
At the same Government Session held in Knin, the Government decided to provide
500 sets of construction material for those Bosnian settlers who want to return to
Bosnia. In addition, a systematic exchange of information between Croatia and BiH
on the state of properties in BiH of those refugees residing in Croatia is now in
operation. Through that process the beneficiaries of reconstruction programmes and
individuals who already repossessed their property in BiH will not be entitled to
alternative accommodation in Croatia. Supporting return to BiH for people who want
to return represents a change of perspective for Bosnian Croats, who until now
estimated that staying in Croatia is their best option, although this was grounded on
unrealistic promises and expectations. The availability of assistance for those who
want to return to their property enables them to evaluate their options, and decide
upon their future in a more constructive way.
The Right to Reconstruction
All Croatian citizens are entitled to reconstruction assistance or fair compensation,
and that right should not depend on their readiness and willingness to return to
Croatia. In a situation where reconstruction needs exceed financial capacities, it is
61
expected that those who want to return will be prioritised, although it is crucial not to
abandon this guiding principle. To enable planning and estimate reconstruction needs,
the Government required all citizens to file their reconstruction request by the end of
2001, and 17,500 applications were filed. However, there is another issue to be dealt
with regarding reconstruction. The Government acknowledges the right for
reconstruction of those dwellings damaged as a result of war. This ultimately excludes
over 20,000 houses of mostly Croatian Serbs, which were destroyed after Operation
Storm, which are considered to have been damaged by an ‘act of terrorism’. In
addition, houses were categorised in terms of the level of damage a long time ago, and
re-categorisation is required to assess current reconstruction requirements which are
much larger now. In order to foster the principle of equality and transparency these
two aspects of reconstruction will have to be revisited.
The central government plans to finish all reconstruction activities by 2003, and
particularly claims that they want to de-politicise reconstruction issues, by providing
reconstruction assistance to all citizens regardless of their ethnicity. However, these
non discriminatory ideas are not always translated in practice by respective field
offices. Many complaints regarding the work of county reconstruction offices have
been reported, and issuance of reconstruction decision to Croatian citizens of Serb
ethnicity is being delayed by a number of bureaucratic constraints, and often by the
absence of good will by respective officials.
There is little understanding on the part of the Croatian government that abandoning
discriminatory practices towards Serb returnees will not happen based on proclaimed
policies, and the changing of respective legislation, alone. There is a need to intensify
and strengthen control and monitoring over the work of local offices, which can be
achieved through partnership with NGOs operating in the area. Clear and transparent
reconstruction policies and practice, based on positive legislation, and managed with
care and sensitivity, can facilitate improvements in inter ethnic relations and
reconciliation at large. The perception of a tendency of Croatian Government to
prioritise Croats in reconstruction assistance, and of the international community to
prioritise Serb returnees, contributes to disintegration and deepens the conflict
between ethnic groups, as well as endangering the process of reconciliation and of
improvements in inter-ethnic relations. Co-ordination and partnership between
governmental and international reconstruction programmes should be intensified and
even more importantly should be more visible at local level.
3. The Development Context
Housing is still one of the major problems burdening the return process but as the
housing problem is being dealt with through reconstruction programmes, the problem
of lack of economic development is increasingly emerging. The areas of former
sectors North and, in particular, South have been under developed and rather
depopulated even before the war operations. This process of depopulation started in
the 1960s and continued later, with labour migration processes from less to more
developed areas and/or to abroad. According to some estimates, even if all Serbs
returned and all Bosnian Croats remained in the area, it would still be depopulated.
Along with war damages, the local economy experienced significant problems related
to transition to a market economy, and without considerable financial inputs it is not
unlikely that even the pre-war economic situation will be reinstated. The lack of
reconstruction of economic facilities, and the failure to generate new economic
62
activity, has led to a lack of employment opportunities, with unemployment rates up
to 90% in some municipalities. The Government, through the Ministry of Public
Works and Reconstruction has not, as yet, produced a clear policy and development
plan for the war-affected areas, although some measures have been initiated to
increase the capacities for local planning and regional development.
Economic development has been recognised as a major obstacle to return to the areas
of special state concern, and has been addressed through internationally sponsored
programmes. These programmes assisting returnees to start small businesses through
micro-credit schemes, mostly in the field of agriculture. Since the restarting of
agricultural production relatively inexpensive, it is much easier to assist people who
return to rural than urban areas, since those returning to towns, a crucial group, of
course, depend on rare chances to get employment, which make their future much less
secure. Recently, some agencies have started assisting returnees in marketing their
products, through newly established co-operatives. In order to support
entrepreneurship, UNDP has initiated the founding of Local Economic Development
Agencies (LEDAs), which will provide technical assistance and facilitate access to
bank loans for small and medium enterprises.
4. Social infrastructure
Although the majority of returnees to Croatia are older people, the ECRE report
quoting figures that suggest that over 50% of all returnees are over 60 years of age,
that the average age of returnees in the past 6 years is 57, and that returnees of school
age are only 4% of the total (ECRE; 2001, para 3.2.6), a trend of increased return of
younger families with children started during the year 2000. The availability of
education is one of the most important factors for families with children, when they
consider their return options. Although school places are available in most of the
areas, lack of transportation facilities, as well as widespread poverty often make them
inaccessible for children. In addition, NGO reports indicate that returnee children are
often scared of stigmatisation, which sometimes leads to a decision not to attend
school. Measures to increase school attendance, particularly at secondary level,
should involve the redevelopment of public transportation, as well as re-establishing
the system of stipends for those students whose families cannot support their
education.
In spite of many problems encountered in the education system, this remains the most
important resource for facilitating inter-ethnic reconciliation, and community
development in general. A programme by the international NGO Catholic Relief
Service (CRS) aimed at improving parent-school co-operation was very well received
by local communities, and pointed to the severe lack of governmental-led initiatives
in this area. It is clear that improving education in war affected areas will require
different and additional measures compared to the rest of the country. While in the
rest of the country, the need to improve teaching skills and revise the current
curriculum might be priorities, in war affected areas practical issues such as
transportation, education grants and even establishing or improving school kitchens,
should be prioritised. Since most of the local communities lack both financial means
and human capacities to deal with these issues, the responsibility of central
educational authorities is even more important.
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In the process of de-centralisation, funding and organisational aspects of education
should be handed over to local authorities, while those that have no capacity to fund
education will be assisted financially. It remains to be seen what this will mean for
war affected areas, but it is likely that, unless systematic assistance particularly in
management and organisational aspects is provided, the situation will deteriorate
further. Since the economic situation is not likely to improve significantly soon, there
is room for identifying innovative approaches aimed at improving education and
make it more accessible for students. Partnerships between local authorities, central
government and civil society could considerably assist in this process, for it could
facilitate identification and the sharing of best practice, which could add to the
motivation of respective institutions to explore creative opportunities for the
development of education.
5. Health and Social Welfare Entitlements and Benefits
Returnees are entitled to transitional health insurance for six months. During this
period they should work out their health insurance based on their entitlements such as
pension, employment, and so on. Although six months seams enough, it has proven
insufficient due to very demanding and time-consuming administrative procedures.
The same applies to social welfare assistance of cash amounting 150 HRK for those
with some other income, and 250 HRK for those with no alternative income. After six
months, returnees can apply for normal social welfare, which also involves a long and
complicated administrative procedure.
With high unemployment rates, the collapse of industry, widespread poverty, and
uncertainty about the future, it is clear that war affected regions share many
difficulties with other parts of the country. However, the extent of the problem is
much greater, which is why there is a need for considerably more interventions, to
alleviate immediate hardships and initiate further economic and social development.
Should this not happen, there is a risk that new migration to more developed regions
of Croatia or abroad will occur. This risk has often been stressed by agencies involved
in assisting war affected communities, which emphasise that the major challenge will
be how to make the return process sustainable.
6. Civil Society
The presence of a large number of local and international organisations is facilitating
the development of civil society in war affected areas. NGO programmes address
reconstruction, economic development, capacity building, legal assistance, human
rights monitoring, and many other important issues. Among the grassroots
organisations, associations of returnees, refugees, and settlers are of utmost
importance, particularly if they promote tolerance and corporation in resolving joint
community problems, instead of contributing to a radicalisation of issues. Positive
developments have been seen in this area particularly coming from the Serb National
Council, the Serb Democratic Forum and the Community of Immigrants and Settlers
in Croatia.
Promoting the participation and self-organisation of young people through youth
groups and associations at local level, has been on the agenda of peace groups and
NGOs involved in civil society and democracy building in Croatia. This type of
assistance and support for young people in war affected areas should be additionally
supported, since the opportunities for organising their free time and involvement in
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some extracurricular activities are considerably limited. In addition, these kind of
projects facilitate the communication skills of young people and contribute to trust
building, the improvement of inter-ethnic relations, and reconciliation. Peace groups
are particularly important actors, since they, through various trainings and other
activities promote peace, tolerance, and non-violence, crucial for the further social
revitalisation of war affected areas.
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VI: An Agenda for Social Mobilisation
1. Introduction
In addition to the legacy of the former regime embodied in its "authoritarian grip on
state, judicial, mass media, military and police power within populist ideology linking
religious, patriarchal, nationalist and historical elements" (DFID 2000), Croatian
society is witnessing an erosion of hopes for quick economic recovery and the
restoration and maintenance of pre-war social security. The situation is exacerbated
by heightened social demands oscillating between old patterns of expectations from
the state and uncertainties about alternatives. This section of the report looks at the
interconnection between economic and social issues, focusing in particular on
partnerships between the state and an emerging third sector, and the possibilities of
wider social mobilisations to challenge poverty, inequality and social exclusion. It
begins with a summary of some of the trends in inequality and relates these to the
need for wider economic restructuring. It then moves on to look at equity issues in
terms of social expenditure, and the importance of operationalising human rights
concerns in social welfare services, before looking at the pluralisation of service
providers and the nature of Croatia’s emerging welfare mix. Later parts of the paper
look at the wider reform agenda, in terms of inter-sectoral relationships, potential
stakeholders in the reform process, and the need to campaign actively, and mobilise,
for reform.
2. Economic Policies and the Poor and Excluded
According to World Bank data, inequality in Croatia has risen to levels far exceeding
those generally observed in transition and market economies. Both poverty and
inequality are a result of inadequate macro-economic policies and labour market
inflexibilities which hindered employment generation. High labour costs and
increased job stability for workers already employed contributed to rising
unemployment alongside the complete failure to develop incentives for small and
medium-sized enterprises.
As can be seen in other social spheres, the dominant enterprise and labour movement
culture is contrary to needed reform thinking and remains centred around two
concerns: "first, preserve existing employment (rather than the company's results) and
second, political connections" (World Bank, 2000). The recently elected government
has continued to apply subsidies, write-off debts, and has failed to enforce fiscal
obligations, as part of its platform of counteracting corruption through ‘popular’
measures. This implies that inefficient producers are being supported by the
government at the expense of the development of the national economy as a whole.
Furthermore, the maintenance of monopolies in communications, electricity, water
and gas, directly affect family consumption, since the tariffs for these services, the
highest in Central and Eastern European countries, disproportionately affect the poor.
Furthermore, the weak enforcement of anti-discrimination laws is reflected in
discriminatory practices in job hiring in regard to minorities, women and persons with
disabilities. This is a challenge to be addressed when the social aspects of economic
policies are considered.
The Croatian educational system also lags behind other transition economies, in terms
of secondary school enrollment, and lack of adequate skills and levels of education for
new labour markets are strongly correlated with poverty. In addition to this, children
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from poor families have severely limited access to secondary and higher education.
(World Bank, 2001, according to CBS 1998). Furthermore, in overall social spending,
the educational sector's relative share needs to rise not only because it is lower than in
other comparative economies, but also because it should become the most prominent
factor for economic restructuring and individual income generation as a basis for
social security to be acquired by individuals as opposed to dependency on the state.
Now may not be the time to press these claims, when one of the biggest challenges in
Croatia is excessive public spending. However, the priorities in the rationalisation of
public spending will necessarily have to be linked to the twin goals of human resource
development and poverty reduction.
All the above suggests that economic restructuring, necessary within a concept of
openness towards European integration, which is both politically and socially
desirable, cannot take off without simultaneous comprehensive strategic interventions
in the areas of governance and human resource development. Given the fact that
mutually reinforcing problems in these areas are responsible for the inadequate living
conditions of at least half of poor families, it is important that these concerns enter
into the social policy agenda. In particular, packages of forthcoming economic
measures either need to contain ingredients directly related to affirmative action for
the poor and excluded, or an anti-poverty strategy needs to be developed, in parallel
with the economic and human resource development strategy, containing specific
measures which will facilitate inclusion of these groups as beneficiaries of the
mainstream reform process.
Measures which seek to facilitate growth with employment will require an
institutional set-up which removes administrative barriers to market oriented
restructuring, includes the enforcement of anti-discriminatory laws and
comprehensive social packages to deal with mass lay-offs, and also emphasises retraining, redundancy payments, assistance to start new businesses, and so on. Shortterm policies need to be seized as an entry point for poverty stricken families with
young children, persons with disabilities, disadvantaged youth, and groups whose
difficulties are primarily caused by war and displacement, but who are at the same
time capable of the acquisition of skills and of economic inclusion. The development
of productive potential in these groups is not exclusively a ‘social’ issue, and cannot
be dealt with satisfactorily by social services and/or NGOs and CBOs.
Prioritising these groups within wider programmes of economic development and
training and re-training should be a major concern of stakeholders in both the
economic and social spheres. The financial resources needed for such partnerships
could and should also be shared with, for example, social sector funds being utilised
for vocational training, advocacy efforts, and for supporting special financial
incentives to employers for the initial period of employment or for work place
technology adaptations, for scholarships, training courses, and so on. Technical
assistance and corresponding advocacy and mobilisation efforts in these areas could
cover the following:
• Proposals for incentives and/or rewards for enterprises which would create
special conditions or affirmative action for employment of workers from
targeted groups (in the long term, this could become a part of wider
programmes for social responsibility in the private sector).
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•
•
•
•
•
The inclusion of enterpreneurial courses and education for citizenship in
vocational schools and all other skills training programmes.
Proposals for changes in conditions for credit facilities or for the deliberate
inclusion of a certain percentage of the targeted population into credit
schemes.
Proposals for the development of training and public work schemes for
temporary jobs (for example, during the tourist season, in areas of
reconstruction, and so on) for youth and others.
Proposals for sponsored internship of skilled persons in public, private and
community based services and productive outlets.
The establishment of funding criteria and targets for scholarships and the
identification of training programmes and education establishments which
may, under a set of incentives, extend their courses to groups excluded from
other programmes.
3. Social Spending and Equity
As the World Bank has noted, among all Central European countries, only the
Croatian public sector has been increasing during the last decade and remains the
largest in the region. The main areas of social spending, such as budgetary support to
the pension system, child allowances, health, education, social assistance and
numerous other social programmes primarily related to the social consequences of
war and displacement, represent the only source of family income through which the
basic needs of the poor can be met, particularly of those unable to work, suffering
from war-related problems, or discriminated against in the labour market.
The World Bank study shows that state transfers on the aggregate level do not act to
reduce inequality, which means that those who are relatively well-off benefit the
most. Combining household survey data (CBS 1998) with detailed budgetary
statistics, it was found that the poorest, while constituting 8% of the population,
receive only 2.5% of public health spending and 6% of spending in education. At the
same time, the poor spend from their incomes very little on these items, which clearly
shows a need for more favourable treatment of the poor within these sectors. Budget
cuts in the health sector may in the future additionally affect the poor and the poorest,
with ill-health and low educational attainment compounding material hardship.
Inequities will worsen if, in the health service, basic preventive srervices, such as
health education, primary health care, home health visitors, as well as basic medicines
are equally or more drastically affected by cuts in expenditures. The same applies to
indiscriminate introduction of patient cost sharing. Home health visiting services by
nurses are widely recognised as contributing significantly to the health of the 0-5 age
group, and are crucial in terms of survival and development, and the early detection of
disabilities and of child abuse. Such services, rather than being cut, should be
strengthened together with other key life chance determinants such as mental health
counselling and reproductive health care for young people.
In regards to education, the system fails to operate as a mechanism for social mobility.
The formal system is highly stratified and is lacking flexibility and adaptability to the
labour market. There are no connections between adult educational institutions and
other job training programmes, and there are formal age barriers for the entrance of
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adolescents and youth into formal systems. For secondary school dropouts and youth
at risk, the flexibility of the latter, with the necessary adaptations and provision of
scholarships, would be highly relevant. As noted in Section IV above, only 60% of
youth enroll in secondary level education. In addition, almost all adolescents who are
in institutions, either because of disability or because of behavioural problems, are
trained in ways which do not facilitate social integration and adequate insertion in the
job market. These are all additional reasons in favour of new initiatives for more
accelerated inclusion of young people in programmes for the acquisition of skills,
based on similar programmes which are already run for the unemployed and laid-off
workers. These, like adult education, are currently inaccessible to youth, either
because of formal barriers or prohibitive costs for individuals. In general, the needs of
children and young people who tend to be excluded from regular education as a result
of disability, poverty or cultural background (such as Roma) should have priority in
educational restructuring.
According to the World Bank (2000), social transfers have not been capable of
counteracting the rise in inequality and poverty. Targeting is insensitive to the poverty
level and criteria in different programmes are not unified along a defined poverty line.
Even though cash benefits in social assistance (for about 5% of the population) and
the sub-sector of social protection have good records in targeting, it would be
inappropriate to see the expansion of this sub-sector as a solution for the lack of
equity in wider areas of social spending. Furthermore, the sector of social assistance
(Centres for Social Welfare) at municipal level employ highly qualified personnel
whose role and tasks should be strengthened in terms of the c-ordination of local level
services and direct assistance, or referral to other services, for families at risk, to
victims of violence and abuse, to parentless children and other children at risk and to
the growing problem of an ageing population. These tasks should be prioritised above
the current emphasis on fiscal and administrative control of poor households which
reinforces dependence on the state through the clear message that only incapacity and
a lack of material advancement are of interest. Means testing in the social assistance
sector, highly praised by the World Bank report (2000), could be transferred to any
other administrative department (such as that responsible for the administration of
childrens’ allowances), while allowing room for manouevre in the culture of these
services towards client empowerment, social integration and the attainment of rights.
In other words, equity criteria should be operationalised in the whole area of social
expenditures and the definition of an official poverty level, as a criteria for all social
transfers, should be the first step. The above should be part of a more thorough
quantitative and qualitative assessment of poverty at household and family level.
However, social spending has to balance equity criteria with efficiency and relevance
for productivity. Sectors depending on public spending should be increasingly
managed within the rules of a ‘mixed economy of care’ and education should be
valued in terms of its relevance for human resource development.
In operational terms, targeting to achieve equity draws attention to the need for
national and local level establishment of programme priorities, the content and scope
of entitlements, the allocation of resources, and the assurance of equal access under
given conditions. Not all the services provided by the education, health and social
welfare sectors are equally relevant for the poor. Some of them are more important
because they ameliorate the cumulative effects of poverty, widely defined to include
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material hardship causing deterioration in interpersonal relationships, lack of money
for access to goods and services, such as housing, sanitation and hygienic conditions
leading to illnesses, lack of access to intercommunal links and lack of power due to
the inability to reciprocate.
Thus, in the analysis and decisions about priorities in social spending, there should be
a concern for the identification of those health, education and social services which
are of crucial relevance for low income and poor families because their absence
prevents access to all other services, and limits opportunities for social integration.
Furthermore, a proactive orientation of service providers and financial flows assuring
quality and access are essential for more efficient social spending on the poor. Some
of these services belong to general prevention and should be supplied free of charge
for everybody, for example child immunisation. Many other services should be selftargeted, used by those who need them, or specially targeted, soup-kitchens may serve
as an example of the first, scholarships of the second. The application of equity
criteria at national level implies an assurance that persons in the same conditions will
be treated equally in the whole country, regardless of the level of revenues available
at local level.
With the urgency of budget cuts at present in Croatia, it is difficult to expect optimal
solutions. Rationalisation of public spending requires thorough analytical work,
consultations and negotiations among sectors and with different sections of civil
society. The moment is ripe for both inter-sectoral coordination for unification of
criteria along a defined poverty line, and for the definition of the scope of
entitlements, as well as for setting in motion systematic negotiations and consultations
with civil society and between national and local stakeholders. Above all, analytical
work needed for technical discussions should be strengthened and social
communication strategies should be devised for informing the wider public and
specific target audiences. In terms of technical support to the process, the proposed
World Bank and DFID capacity building project will contribute to standard setting for
services and definition of other parameters needed for long-term solutions.
4. Operationalizing Human Rights in Service Provision
There are crucial issues of equity which have to be addressed in service provision.
Concepts of human dignity and the recognition of social rights must be seen as
entitlements facilitating social integration and improving the quality of life of citizens
who cannot assure access to opportunities for themselves and their children through
their personal income and assets. In addition to access to services, the right to
information, choice, participation and protection from discriminatory practices should
all be interpreted within the principle of the indivisibility of individual rights which,
in the case of children, is the basis for the concept of the best interest of the child.
Thus, the right to protection in an institution includes respect for all other rights and
these must be enforced through professional standards.
The importance of beneficiaries having information on their rights and the provision
of channels for their participation in service design and evaluation is a prerequisite in
the restructuring and reform of services. This will necessitate the adaptation of
existing internal procedures within public bodies and others licensed to provide
services, such as the private sector and NGOs. It will also involve greater emphasis on
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rewards and sanctions for individual workers, professional teams and service agents
as a whole.
With regard to the criteria of beneficiaries' choice of services, regulatory processes for
defining quality standards and conditions for service providers other than the
governmental sector will play a significant role. Government financing of fees for
some beneficiaries and for certain operational costs of new service providers may
apply for those services which are deficient at present and which do not imply public
mandatory functions.
The client's right to participation is not a dominant concern in standard social
services practice in Croatia currently, and is absent in operational definitions relating
to the functioning of public institutions. The most recent law on institutions for
children at risk, for example, seems to suggest that concern for ‘professionalism’ and
the importance of jobs being held by persons holding academic degrees predominates
over matters of substance including quality of services and the rights (the word is
conspicuous by its absence) of clients or their representatives. Family centered
outcomes, social integration in the mainstream social, cultural, educational and leisure
time activities, full development of a child’s potential, including enhanced self-esteem
and critical judgment, are not operationalised through professional standards, nor
indicated as criteria for evaluation of the efficiency of services.
5. Towards a Plurality of Service Providers
Creating a plurality of service providers cannot be done on the basis of legislation
alone. The planning of particular services, such as alternatives to the institutional care
of children, is far more complex then prescribing conditions for reform, since it
involves:
a) The assessment of needs and resources,
b) Changed procedures and attitudes of decision makers who decide upon
child placements,
c) Public campaigns for the recruitment of potential alternative service
providers,
d) The training of new providers,
e) The restructuring of existing institutions, and
f) Easier access to funding for alternatives than for mainstream solutions.
The issue of ‘de-institutionalisation’ of care, discussed in Section III above,
applicable for institutionalised children without parental care, children from problem
families, and children with special needs, is primarily one of the need for a familycentred approach in child care. This approach requires radical changes in the quality
of work of Centres for Social Welfare and other social services working with families
in crisis, with families with children with special needs, and with prospective
candidates for adoption and foster care. Furthermore, the fact that many children end
up in institutional care as a result of poverty and its cumulative effects, means that
subsidies to family incomes and to consumption, including additional financial
support for care of a disabled child within a family and for better remuneration for
foster care, should be elements of a new child-centred approach.
Social mobilisation around the issue of de-institutionalisation will represent the most
challenging task in the transformation of social services, given the deeply rooted
attitudes, convictions and vested interests of service providers in favour of the
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maintenance of the status quo. Targeting for the achievement of equity is not to be
seen only as a technical exercise for the design of predictable and quantifiable
outcomes in beneficiaries' life conditions. In a wider perspective, targeting has to be a
result of assessment, dialogue and consensus building among different stakeholders.
6. Intersectoral Themes: Nobody’s Mandate?
In a sense, the needs of diverse population groups should be assessed in broader terms
then the ones which fit existing compartmentalised service structures. This is difficult
to achieve in an institutional context where the definition of financing priorities
depends more on the history of particular services’ access to public resources, than on
present needs and potential institutional capacities. Sectors and particular institutions
are competing for public resources and there are no co-ordination mechanisms with a
mandate to harmonise these relationships in favour of potential service users. The
client is, in this way, far from being at the centre of the system.
There needs to be much more attention to analytical work, accompanied by intersectoral and other negotiations. For example, the sectors that should be involved in
the definition of strategic objectives and priorities for children and adults with
disabilities range from government and non-governmental stakeholders concerned
with health, education and social welfare to labour, employment, the business
community and other sectors such as spatial planners, the mass media, and so on. All
of these together either contribute to or create barriers against social integration and
non-discriminatory practices in regard to persons with disabilities.
In Croatia, positive inter-sectoral practice at national level is reflected in legal and
other normative advancements in the treatment of children in conflict with law, where
a special government commission not only updated the legislation, but also introduced
an enabling institutional framework which can gradually incorporate innovations
developed so far in pilot projects at the micro-level. Other positive practices including
the involvement of the NGO sector and of beneficiaries are also present in the
treatment of disabilities, in responding to violence and abuse of women and children,
and in the treatment of drug abuse and HIV/AIDS, but in these areas the wider
institutional frameworks capable of generating national strategies and scaling up of
successful approaches are still lacking.
As suggested earlier, the inter-sectoral nature of longer term responses to inequality,
poverty, disability, violence and other risks affecting families, women and children,
calls for shifts in financial flows and the design and management of programmes
carried out by government and non-governmental entities. The awareness of this
challenging task is evident in the already mentioned World Bank and DFID strategic
proposals related to capacity building in the areas covered by the Ministry of Labour
and Social Welfare including social protection, family policy, labour and
employment. The project addresses key areas of institutional functioning, such as the
relationship between cash and non-cash assistance, decentralisation in terms of the
mandates of different bodies and their fiscal implications, the relationship between
institutionalised care and community based alternatives, the relationship between the
governmental and the third sector, information and monitoring aspects, and others.
The structure of the project, to be carried out through technical teams and a high level
national co-ordinating body, and the dynamics of work within the sector, with other
government departments and with the third sector, represent a promising strategy for
gradual advancement in the achievement of long-term reform goals. Furthermore, the
transition period will be used for local level piloting of new standards, practices and
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institutional arrangements, which could be evaluated and then extended and
incorporated into the system as a whole.
Regional Disparities as a Constraint on Equity?
In addition to capacity building efforts, the process of social reform will depend on
fiscal policy reform and political decisions regarding decentralisation. Linking equity
considerations with financial flows for the decentralisation of basic services is
important in order to avoid poorer services in poorer municipalities. Financial
capacity, developmental potential, and levels of social cohesion vary widely among
municipalities and central level transfers of funds for a minimum of services will be
needed.
Croatian legislation on regions of special social concern introduces special measures
to stimulate demographic change and private investment and employment, but it does
not include transfers for basic education, health and social services which, at the time
of the enactment of the law, were not anticipated as being financed from local
resources. The rationale for the law was more congruent with geo-political and
demographic criteria for war-damaged and depopulated areas, than with equity and
non-discrimination criteria. Some of the incentives regulated by the above law have,
in any case, been swept away by recent budget cuts. There is, therefore, an urgent
need to rethink equity issues in the face of decentralisation.
7. Potential Stakeholders in the Reform Process
Within all the prescriptions of how reform should be implemented, there is no clarity
on which are the potential leading stakeholders with sufficient power, knowledge and
commitment to carry out such changes. Current institutional culture is characterised
by a mix of party politics, the corporate and individual interests of civil servants, and
a general authoritarian and centralist style of decision-making. Political connections
and ideology, of which populisms, both of the right and the left, are the most vocal,
determine the pace of change in individuals and institutions, and their commitment to
decentralisation and even enforcement of the law.
The helping professions in public services are immersed in this prevailing
authoritarian institutional culture, which manifests in the dogma of ‘professionalism’
reflected in an unquestioned right to decide on behalf of the client. Professional
practice is seldom questioned on ethical grounds, and rewards and recognition of
good practice are almost exclusively based on technical grounds, remote from the real
concerns of service users. There are also signs of a revival of nationalism at local
level and, in some ways, linkages are stronger within this ideological orientation and
more vocal in public than those which are more reform-oriented. However, there are
strong but fragmented potentials within civil society for alliances of a new kind.
There are many important documents addressing the programmes, future financial
commitments and development expectations from the non-governmental sector. Two
of particular interest are the DFID review of the Civil Society Initiatives Fund in
Croatia (June 2000) and the Programme of Collaboration between the Croatian
Government and the Non-Governmental and Non-Profit Sector (January 2001). Both
provide a clear basis for the strategic design and operationalisation of partnerships
needed for the reform process.
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The Programme of Collaboration, prepared by the Croatian Governments Office for
Co-operation with NGOs following several months of discussions and consultations
with parts of the Croatian NGO scene, although a "non-obligatory document",
represents an attempt to open governmental structures towards cooperation and
supportive actions for and with the third sector. The Programme intends to set up
further support at local level, and mentions obligations of both the governmental and
non-governmental sector, and includes ideas regarding a new legislative framework,
decentralisation, and the allocation of budgetary funds. Of particular interest is the
establishment of a ‘codex of positive practice, recognisinig the importance of ‘civil
initiatives’ as a basis for the selection of programmes and organisations of ‘public
benefit and interest. Nevertheless, the new Law on NGOs, although containing certain
improvements from the last Law, still imposes strong control mechanisms and
limitations, which are not affirmative and encouraging of NGOs.
Furthermore, along with the practice of dissemination of supervising roles vis a vis
receipients of government grants among diverse governmental bodies, allocating
different NGO programmes to particular ministries and offices such as the State
institute for protection of family, maternity and youth, the Ministry of Reconstruction,
the Commission for Gender equality, and so on, only adds to confusion and lack of
inter-sectoral co-ordination. The basis for decision making on the allocation of funds
and the criteria used by the particular committees are still not completely transparent.
In addition, the range of activities and the costs eligible for funding from the state
budget is still too strictly limited. Having said all of this, it is evident that there is a
will to improve things at the national level, adding to the momentum of positive
changes.
The DFID (2000) document synthesises conceptual and analytical thinking on the
third sector in Croatia and focuses on its specificities based on historical, political,
cultural and other conditions including international and bilateral contributions and
biases. The document also articulates a number of wider dilemmas in civil society
programming from a social governance perspective and therefore provides useful
methodological guidance for governmental-third sector relations. Particularly useful
are the following insights and recommendations:
- the need to avoiding a Zagreb bias in terms of national NGOs and
campaigns;
- the importance of complementarities between macro- and micro-level
interventions as well as urban - rural linkages;
- the necessity of including of a wider range of membership groups and
associations in civil society strengthening;
- the need to stimulate volunteerism, social innovation and critical approaches
rather than merely support technicised know-how;
- the importance of connecting advocacy and service delivery at macro- and
micro-levels;
- the importance of avoiding duplications and inefficiencies through discrete
financing of NGOs.
We would also endorse DFID’s preference claim for civil society programming
connected to:
a) Integrated programme development
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b) Longer project cycles and
c) Initiatives transcending concentration on particular organisations in favour
of "strategic support of campaigns, looser alliances and wider social
movements which seek … to challenge specific kinds of social oppression and
exclusion" (DFID, 2000)
The social reform themes and how they should be tackled fit well within DFID’s
search for a relational definition of civil society in preference to the usual
organisationally-based definition. The challenge is how to alter power relationships in
favour of poorer, powerless and excluded social groups. Linked to the above is the
valuable reference to an approach which mobilises around "new themes", in addition
to the "mobilization of private money" and the "mobilization of time" or volunteering
(Grdešić, 1999). Certainly, themes of social policy reform can be considered as new
themes, if not in substance, then in terms of the complexity of the regulatory
processes involved.
8. Campaigning for Reform
In conclusion, all of the above provide a framework for thinking about social
mobilisation on reform themes. Those who lay the ground for joint campaigning
around these themes, need to clarify their approach to others on the basis of:
a) The principles involved - equity, non-discrimination, the indivisibility of
rights, and social responsibility
b) The social practices ‘modeling’ behaviour in accordance with the above
principles, through proposals for rewards and/or the dissemination of good
practice
c) The desirable social consequences of any proposed campaign or course of
action, in terms of changes in practice, in attitudes and knowledge, in roles, in
access to goods, services and opportunities, and so on
The core preparatory activity or entry point should be a social communication
campaign, linked to topics such as:
1. Building a just society: with particular reference to:
a. Family income and consumption, and
b. Out of school and/or out of job youth
2. Building a tolerant and non-violent society: with particular reference to:
a. Children with special needs
b. Violence and abuse against women and children
c Children and families excluded and/or discriminated on ethnic, religious or
other grounds
3. Building a caring society: with particular reference to:
a. Family life for children without parental care
b. Care for the elderly
The campaign or awareness raising efforts should target potential stakeholders,
population groups whose interests are being advocated (including their own
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participation), potential and actual service providers, journalists, public figures with a
good track record and credibility, and the public at large. The organisation, methods
of recruitment and social communication methods should resemble more to a political
campaign than to conventional planning exercise, but the analytical and monitoring
infrastructure should be stronger and geared towards long-term impacts. It should be
expected that only some relevant bodies in civil society, whether constituted as
membership groups, professionalised (service oriented) NGOs, or politicised civil
society (Stubbs, 1999), would join the above efforts, since participation would not
guarantee grants. Hence a process of self-selection of participants would occur on the
basis of adherence to values, attitudes and commitments to explicit goals.
The means usually used by government bodies for joint actions may be too rigid for
the more open-ended approach needed here. The campaign would have to count on a
flexible social communication infrastructure facilitating direct contact with
organisations and citizens such as hotline telephone line and Internet; a proactive
relationship with media, through press releases, bulletins, Round table discussions,
posters, badges, and so on; and cultural and sport events advocating the causes of the
campaign. The recent action in support of public contributions for purchasing new
devices for hearing impaired children, is the kind of campaign which could be a
model for more general strategies in the future.
For longer term outcomes, there is a need to target researchers and professional
groups willing to invest time in conceptualisation and the development of relevant
methodologies. The agenda here would include ethical Codes in public services,
consumer initiatives, beneficiary participation, the social responsibilities of private
sector, affirmative action in favour of excluded social groups and so on. This type of
intellectual production is scarce in Croatia but needs to be expanded to balance
research which is more ‘clinical’ and technicised nature as well as research which
addresses areas of expertise of particular professions.
Monitoring and evaluation in all stages of the above initiative should both contribute
to boost the pride, commitment and popularity of stakeholders and indicate gaps,
inconsistencies and constraints. Those should be processed and spelt out by
stakeholders in round tables, press conferences, petitions, open letters, and joint
meetings with technical teams working on reform issues within government
departments. New courses of action, such as competitions for rewards on specific
themes or for specific audiences, should be carried out in order to make high
achievers socially visible in areas where positive practices is rare, such as teachers
working with the Roma population in new ways; mainstream schools and daycare
facilities including disabled children; towns or neighbourhoods without barriers for
physically handicapped; volunteers assisting functioning of support groups for
mentally ill, and so on. Once set in motion, such a campaign will develop a life of its
own and spawn sub-campaigns on particular themes and issues. Over and above the
necessity for basic technical and communication infrastructure, the rest will be a
matter of decisions, negotiations, and, above all, the creativity and commitment of the
organisations, groups, movements, and individuals involved.
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