Implications of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Internet

The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series Implications of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Internet Surveillance for Society issue #1 The Privacy & Security - Research Paper Series Edited by Centre for Science, Society & Citizenship Co-edited by Uppsala University - Department of Informatics and Media ISSN 2279-7467 Implications of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Internet Surveillance for Society Authors: Christian Fuchs Research Paper Number #1 Date of Publication: July 2012 Acknowledgement: The research presented in this paper was conducted in the project “PACT – Public Perception of Security and Privacy: Assessing Knowledge, Collecting Evidence, Translating Research into Action”, funded by EU FP7 SECURITY, grant agreement no. 285635 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing from the Centre for Science, Society and Citizenship. Download and print of the electronic edition for non commercial teaching or research use is permitted on fair use grounds. Each copy should include the notice of copyright. Source should be acknowledged. © 2013 PACT http://www. projectpact.eu 1 The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Implications of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) Internet Surveillance for Society Christian Fuchs Abstract: ThisresearchpaperanalysessocietalimplicationsofDeepPacketInspection(DPI)technologies. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) surveillance technologies are communications surveillance tools that are abletomonitorthetrafficofnetworkdatathatissentovertheInternetatallsevenlayersoftheOSIRef‐ erenceModelofInternetcommunication,whichincludesthesurveillanceofcontentdata. Theanalysispresentedinthispaperisbasedonproductsheets,self‐descriptions,andproductpresenta‐ tions by 20 European security technology companies that produce and sell DPI technologies. For each company,wehaveconductedadocumentanalysisoftheavailablefiles.Itfocusedonthefourfollowing aspects: 1)DescriptionanduseoftheInternetsurveillancetechnologiesthatareproducedandsold. 2)Theself‐descriptionofthecompany. 3)TheexplanationoftherelevanceofInternetsurveillance,i.e.whythecompanythinksitisimportant thatitproducesandsellssuchtechnologies. 4) A documentation of what the company says about opportunities and problems that can arise in the contextofInternetsurveillance. TheassessmentofsocietalimplicationsofDPIisbasedonopinionsofsecurityindustryrepresentatives, scholars,andprivacyadvocatesthatwerevoicedinwhitepapers,techreports,researchreports,onweb‐ sites,inpressreleases,andinnewsmedia.Theresultscanbesummarizedintheformofseveralimpact dimensions: 1.PotentialadvantagesofDPI 2.Netneutrality 3.ThepowerofInternetServiceProviders(ISPs)forunderminingusers’trust 4.PotentialfunctioncreepofDPIsurveillance 5.Targetedadvertising 6.Thesurveillanceoffilesharers 7.Politicalrepressionandsocialdiscrimination TheconductedanalysisofDeepPacketInspection(DPI)technologiesshowsthatthereisavarietyofpo‐ tentialimpactsofthistechnologyonsociety.Ageneralconclusionisthatforunderstandingnewsurveil‐ lance technologies, we do not only need privacy and data protection assessments, but broader societal andethicalimpactassessments. Keywords: surveillance, DPI, Deep Packet Inspection, Internet surveillance, societal implications, tech‐ nologyassessment,society,informationsociety,InternetStudies Shortbiographyoftheauthor/s:ChristianFuchsholdsthechairprofessorshipinMediaandCom‐ munication Studies at Uppsala University’s Department of Informatics and Media. He is chair of the EuropeanSociologicalAssociation’sResearchNetwork18–SociologyofCommunicationsandMedia Researchandco‐ordinatoroftheresearchproject“Socialnetworkingsitesinthesurveillancesociety” (fundedbytheAustrianScienceFundFWF).Heisco‐ordinatorofUppsalaUniversity’sinvolvementin theEUFP7projects“PACT–PublicPerceptionofSecurityandPrivacy:AssessingKnowledge,Collect‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 ing Evidence, Translating Research into Action” and “RESPECT – Rules, Expectations & Security throughPrivacy‐EnhancedConvenientTechnologies” The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 1. Introduction TheWallStreetJournalwroteinAugust2011thattheFrenchcompanyAmesys,a unit of the firm Bull SA, sold deep packet inspection technologies to Libya, where Gaddafi’sregimeusedtheminanInternetspyingcentreinTripolitomonitortheIn‐ ternet usage of Libyan citizens and political opponents (Wall Street Journal Online, Firms aided Libyan spies. First look inside security unit shows how citizens were tracked. August 30, 2011). The International Federation for Human Rights and the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen filed criminal charges against Amesys (FIDH,FIDHandLDHFileaComplaintConcerningtheResponsibilityoftheCompany AMESYSinRelationtoActsofTorture.October19,2011).Similarly,itwasreported thattheBritishfirmGammaInternationalsolditsFinSpysoftwaretoEgyptiansecuri‐ ty authorities and the Italian firm HackingTeam surveillance software to security agenciesinNorthAfricaandtheMiddleEast(EUobserver.com,EUCompaniesBanned From Selling Spyware to Repressive Regimes. October 11, 2011). The Dutch MEP Marietje Schaake commentedthat the EU must make “the new technologies are not systematicallyusedtorepresscitizens.[…]Therearestandardlistsofmilitarytech‐ nologybannedforexportduringanembargoonacountry.Butthisisnotupdatedto include online weapons” (EUobserver.com, EU Companies Banned from Selling Spy‐ ware to Repressive Regimes. October 11, 2011). In September 2011, the EU Parlia‐ mentpassedaresolutionsuggestedby theAustrianMEPJörg Leichtfried “with567 votesinfavour,89against,and12abstentions”EuropeanParliamentNews,Control‐ lingdual‐useexports,September27th,2011thatbanstheexportofITsystemsthat canbeused"inconnectionwithaviolationofhumanrights,democraticprinciplesor freedom of speech [...] by using interception technologies and digital data transfer devicesformonitoringmobilephonesandtextmessagesandtargetedsurveillanceof Internet use (e.g. via Monitoring Centres and Lawful Interception Gateways)" (EU regulationno.1232/2011,EuropeanUnionGeneralExportAuthorisationNoEU005, annexIIe)fromEuropetocertaincountries.Theexportregulationwaspassedinthe formoftheEUGeneralExportAuthorisationNo.EU005thatconcernstelecommuni‐ cations. The regulation banned the export of IT surveillance systems to Argentina, China (including Hong Kong and Macao), Croatia, India, Russia, South Africa, South Korea,Turkey,andtheUkraine. Thisreportwillfocusontheanalysisofthesocietalimplicationsoftheproduction andsellingofInternetsurveillancetechnologiesusingDeepPacketInspection(DPI) byEuropeancompanies. There has been an increase and intensification of surveillance after 9/11 (Lyon 2003b, 2007). “Data mining, a technique for deriving usable intelligence from the analysisofmassiveamountsofcomputer‐accessibleinformation,becameincreasing‐ ly attractive to the government as a resource in the war on terrorism, although its strategicusewithinbusinessformarketingandriskassessmenthadlongbeenestab‐ lished”(Gandy2009,136). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 AlsointheEuropeanUnionthebeliefthatsecurity,understoodas“theprotection of the individual, but also of the collective self, the nation state”, “is a core value threatenedby‘globalterrorism’hasspread”after9/11(Bigo2010,263).TheEUFP6 CHALLENGEresearchproject(TheChangingLandscapeofEuropeanLibertyandSe‐ curity) concluded that after 9/11 “the framings of the relationship between liberty andsecurity”hasbeenredefined“infavourofcontrol,surveillance,policing,andwar” (Bigo, Guild and Walker 2010, 12). European security politics have therefore “been mainly oriented towards the right for governments to strengthen coercive and sur‐ veillancesecuritymeasures”(Bigo2010,265f).Atthesametime,thefocusonsecuri‐ tyandsurveillancepolicieshavebroughtaboutconcernsaboutthepowerconstituted bytheemploymentofnewsurveillancetechnologiesandtheimplicationsforprivacy, data protection, human rights, freedom and equality these technologies have (Ball and Webster 2003; Bigo 2010; Gandy 2009, Jewkes 2011; Lyon 2003a, 2003b; Mo‐ nahan 2010, Webb 2007). We live in times of heightened attention to surveillance, privacyanddataprotection.Thissituationisthecontextforthestudyofnewsurveil‐ lancetechnologies. 2. Deep Packet Inspection Internet Surveillance and the European Security Industry 2.1. Introduction In2011,71%oftheindividualsaged16‐74livingintheEU27countriesaccessed theInternet(withina3monthperiod;datasource:Eurostat.Internetusebyindivid‐ uals).ThisshowsthatInternetusehasbecomeaneverydayactivityforthemajority ofEuropeans.ThetopicofInternetsurveillancemattersbecauseitmuchaffectsthe livesofhumansincontemporarysocieties. Scholarsinsurveillance studiesand information societystudieshavestressedthe importanceofcomputingforconductingsurveillancesincemorethan20years.This hasresultedinanumberofcategoriesthatdescribetheinterconnectionofcomputing and surveillance, such as the new surveillance (Marx 1988, 2002), dataveillance (Clarke 1988), the electronic (super)panopticon (Poster 1990), electronic surveil‐ lance(Lyon1994),digitalsurveillance(GrahamandWood2007),ortheworldwide webofsurveillance(Lyon1998). The Internet processes a huge amount of personal data (see the contributions in Fuchs, Boersma, Albrechtslund and Sandoval 2012). Therefore analysing surveil‐ lance‐implicationsoftheInternetisanimportanttask,towhichthisreportwantsto contribute. This chapter focuses on the analysis of the implications of Internet sur‐ veillancetechnologiesthathavebeenproducedinEurope. Asdatasource,weareusingaselectionofdocumentsthathavebeenpublishedby WikiLeaksintheso‐called“SpyFiles”thatwerepublishedinOctober2011.Itisacol‐ lectionoffilesthatdocumentsurveillancetechnologiesproducedbyWesterncompa‐ nies (http://wikileaks.org/the‐spyfiles.html). On January 23, 2012, there were 287 documentsinthisarchive.Thearchiveconsistsofdigitalversionsofbrochures,cata‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 logues,contracts,manuals,newsletters,papers,presentations,pricelists,andvideos. WikiLeaks categorized the documented surveillance technologies documented into sixtypes:Internetmonitoring,phonemonitoring,Trojan,speechanalysis,SMSmoni‐ toring,GPStracking. WikiLeaks has described the purpose of this archive in the following way: “WhencitizensoverthrewthedictatorshipsinEgyptandLibyathisyear,theyuncov‐ ered listening rooms where devices from Gamma corporation of the UK, Amesys of France,VASTechofSouthAfricaandZTECorpofChinamonitoredtheireverymove onlineandonthephone.SurveillancecompanieslikeSS8intheU.S.,HackingTeamin ItalyandVupeninFrancemanufactureviruses(Trojans)thathijackindividualcom‐ putersandphones(includingiPhones,BlackberriesandAndroids),takeoverthede‐ vice,recorditseveryuse,movement,andeventhesightsandsoundsoftheroomitis in. Other companies like Phoenexia in the Czech Republic collaborate with the mili‐ tary to create speech analysis tools. They identify individuals by gender, age and stresslevelsandtrackthembasedon‘voiceprints’.BlueCoatintheU.S.andIpoquein GermanyselltoolstogovernmentsincountrieslikeChinaandIrantopreventdissi‐ dentsfromorganizingonline.[…]trovicor,previouslyasubsidiaryofNokiaSiemens Networks, supplied the Bahraini government with interception technologies that trackedhumanrightsactivistAbdulGhaniAlKhanjar.Hewasshowndetailsofper‐ sonalmobilephoneconversationsfrombeforehewasinterrogatedandbeateninthe winterof2010‐2011[...]TheWikileaksSpyFilesrevealthedetailsofwhichcompa‐ nies are making billions selling sophisticated tracking tools to government buyers, floutingexportrules,andturningablindeyetodictatorialregimesthatabusehuman rights(http://wikileaks.org/the‐spyfiles.html). Thearchivecanbenavigatedwiththehelpofaworldmapthatallowssearchingfor searchforsurveillancetechnologiesproducersin21countries (http://wikileaks.org/The‐Spyfiles‐The‐Map.html). It is a resource that provides material about companies that produce and sell communications surveillance tech‐ nologies,includingInternetsurveillancetechnologies.TheresearchteamatUppsala University downloaded all documents that were available on February 22nd, 2012, forthecategoryofInternetsurveillanceforcompanieslocatedintheEU27countries. These were a total of 17 companies from 9 European countries (Czech Republic, Denmark,France,Germany,Hungary,Italy,Netherlands,Poland,UK).Weaddedthree companies (Trovicor, Area Spa, Gamma Group) because a search for news articles aboutprivacyaspectsofEuropeanInternetsurveillancetechnologyproducersinthe databaseLexisNexisshowedthatthesethreecompanieshavebeenmentionedinre‐ spect to discussions about the actual or planned export of communication surveil‐ lancetechnologytocountrieswherepoliticaloppositionisrepressed.Thetotalnum‐ berofanalyzedcompanieswasthereforesetat20.ThenumberoffilesaboutInternet surveillanceofthese20companiesthatwefoundintheWikiLeaksSpyFileswas64. We searched on the websites of all 20 companies for documents (white papers, productspecifications,corporateresponsibilityreportsthatmentionprivacyaspects, etc)aboutInternetsurveillancetechnologiesandfoundadditional23documentsthat The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 weincludedintheanalysis.For2companies,twoimportantdocumentsweretaken fromadditionalsources(aproductofferfromthecompanyDigitask,aGammaGroup productspecificationthatcouldnotbefoundonthecompany’swebsite).Therewere atotalof89documentsasinputfortheanalysis.Thetwotablesbelowshowa)alist oftheanalysedcompaniesandthenumberofdocumentsforeachandb)detailsfor allanalyseddocumentsandtheirsources. TheSpyFilesarenotcoveringallEuropeansurveillancetechnologyproducers,they providehowevercomprehensiveaccesstoasamplethatislargeenoughforconduct‐ ing a document analysis that can give a picture of the type of Internet surveillance technologiesthatareproducedinEuropeandtheself‐understandingsofthecompa‐ nies that create these technologies. Data about Internet surveillance technologies is not easy to obtain. On many company websites, no detailed information about the producedtechnologiesissupplied.Thesamplingprocessmustthereforeinthecase ofananalysisofInternetsurveillancetechnologiesbebasedonconveniencesampling that is “relying on available subjects” (Babbie 2010, 192). So the 89 analysed files were gathered basedon convenience sampling and constitutea corpus that is large enoughforobtaininganimpressionofhowtheEuropeanInternetsurveillancetech‐ nologyindustrylookslike. Foreachcompany,wehaveconductedadocumentanalysisoftheavailablefiles.It focusedonthethreefollowingaspects: 1) DescriptionanduseofInternetsurveillancetechnologiesthatareproducedand sold. 2) Theself‐descriptionofthecompany. 3) TheexplanationoftherelevanceofInternetsurveillance,i.e.whythecompany thinksitisimportantthatitproducesandsellssuchtechnologies. 4) Adocumentationofwhatthecompanysaysaboutproblemsandprivacyviola‐ tionsarisinginthecontextofInternetsurveillance. The following table gives an overview of the companies that were included in the analysis. ID Country Companyname NumberoffilesinSpyFiles 1 CzechRe‐ Inveatech 1 public 2 France Qosmos 6 3 France Thales 5 4 France Aqsacom 6 5 France Alcatel‐Lucent 3 6 France Amesys(Bull) 18 7 Germany Elaman 12 8 Germany Datakom 3 9 Germany Trovicor 1 The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 10 Germany Digitask 5 11 Germany Ipoque 6 12 Germany UtimacoSafeware 4 13 Hungary NETI 1 14 Italy AreaSpa 0 15 Italy Innova 1 16 Italy IPS 3 17 Netherlands Group2000 8 18 Netherlands PineDigitalSecurity 1 19 UK GammaGroup 1 20 UK TelesoftTechnologies 4 Table1:Alistofthecompaniesincludedintheanalysis Thefollowingtablegivesanoverviewoftheanalyseddocuments,includingtheirID intheWikiLeaksSpyFilesarchive. Internal ID 1 2_1 WikiLeaksID(SpyFiles archive)/source 190 37 Company DocumentDescription Inveatech Qosmos 2_2 50 Qosmos 2_3 58 Qosmos 2_4 67 Qosmos 2_5 77 Qosmos 2_6 Qosmos 3_1 Datasource:downloadfrom http://www.qosmos.com/ 17 ProductsheetLawfulInterceptionSystem Presentation“ixDP–InformationeXtraction trhoughDeepPacketInspection.Layer7 IdentityManagementforLawfulIntercep‐ tion”.PatrickPail.October1st,2008. Presentation“EnablingTrueNetworkIntel‐ ligenceEverywhere.ManagingVirtualIdenti‐ tiesAcrossIPNetworks”.Jean‐PhilippeLion. ISSPrague,June2009. Presentation“Interceptionat100Gbpsand more”.JeromeTollet.October2011. Presentation“DealingwithaneverChanging SeaofApplicationProtocols”.KurtNeumann. October2011. Presentation“BoostingMonitoringCenters withIPMetadata”.JeromeTollet.October 2011 QosmosixEngineproductsheet 3_2 40 Thales 3_3 Datasource:downloadfrom http://www.thalesgroup.co m Datasource:downloadfrom http://www.thalesgroup.co m Datasource:downloadfrom Thales 3_4 3_5 Thales Presentation“IPTr@pper”.Jean‐Philippe Lelievre.ISSDubai2007 Presentation“NewSolutionsforMassive Monitoring”.Jean‐PhilippeLelievre.ISS WorldEurope.Prague.October3rd,2008 Thales:C4ISRProductsandSolutionsfor Defence&Security2011. Thales Thales:IntegratedSecuritySolutions Thales ThalesCorporateResponsibilityReport2010 The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 4_1 http://www.thalesgroup.co m 42 Aqsacom 4_2 78 Aqsacom 4_3 79 Aqsacom 4_4 199 Aqsacom 4_5 200 Aqsacom 4_6 Datasource:downloadfrom: Aqsacom http://www.aqsacom.com/ 81 Alcatel‐Lucent 5_1 5_2 6_1 Datasource:downloadfrom: Alcatel‐Lucent http://www.alcatel‐ lucent.com Datasource:downloadfrom: Alcatel‐Lucent http://www.alcatel‐ lucent.com 21 Amesys 6_2 6_3 6_4 6_5 6_6 6_7 92 93 94 95 96 97 Amesys Amesys Amesys Amesys Amesys Amesys 6_8 6_9 6_10 6_11 98 99 100 101 Amesys Amesys Amesys Amesys 6_12 102 Amesys 6_13 103 Amesys 6_14 104 Amesys 6_15 105 Amesys 6_16 106 Amesys 6_17 6_18 107 185 Amesys Amesys 7_1 7_2 7_3 124 124 124 Elaman Elaman Elaman 5_3 Presentation“Convergence–LIandDR.A StrategicConcept”,AlanDubberley,ISS World2009,Prague. Aqsacom:LawfulInterceptionisOurBusi‐ ness Standards‐basedlawfulinterceptionfrom Aqsacom AqsacomWhitePaper:TheUSAPatriotAct: ImplicationsforLawfulInterception AqsacomWhitePaper:LawfulInterception forIPNetworks ADRIS:TheAqsacomDataRetentionIntelli‐ genceSystem Alcatel‐Lucent1357ULISUnifiedLawful InterceptionSuite(versionfrom2008) Alcatel‐Lucent1357ULISUnifiedLawful InterceptionSuite(versionfromMarch 2010) Alcatel‐LucentCorporateResponsibility 2010Report Presentation“FromLawfultoMassiveInter‐ ception:AggregationofSources” GraphinHQ1‐Annakoa casperTSystemPresentation Caspter‐TWiFiNetworkInterception Amesys– CriticalSystemArchitect CryptowallMailProtect CryptowallPC‐ProtectProfessionalEd.(Mul‐ ti‐Volumes) Dumb‐OE‐mailInterceptor EagleGlintOperatorManual EagleGlintOperatorManual SMINT– TacticalInterceptionBasedonEA‐ GLECoreTechnology GLINT– StrategicNationwideInterception BasedonEAGLECoreTechnology NetTap@ADSL.PassiveNon‐IntrusiveADSL TappingProbeonAAnalogLine NetTap@ADSL.SondePassive D’InterceptionADSLSurLigneAnalogique HomelandSecurityProgram:TechnicalSpec‐ ification.PublicSafetySystemsandPassport NetworkoftheGreatLibyanArabJamahiriya RHFVMEWB.WideBandHFVMEReception Unit RHFVME‐TA.1.5–30MHzReceiver AmesysComint&LawfulInterceptionSolu‐ tions ElamanCompanyInformation CommunicationsMonitoring,October2007 TSCM– GovernmentTechnicalSurveillance CounterMeasureSolutions The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 7_4 124 Elaman 7_5 7_6 124 124 Elaman Elaman 7_7 7_8 7_9 124 124 124 Elaman Elaman Elaman 7_10 7_11 7_12 186 187 188 Elaman Elaman Elaman 8_1 44 Datakom 8_2 Datakom 10_1 Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.datakom.de Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.datakom.de Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.trovicor.com 24 10_2 25 Digitask 10_3 45 Digitask 10_4 46 Digitask 10_5 Datasource:WikiLeaks: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/S kype_and_SSL_Interception_l etters_‐_Bavaria_‐_Digitask 191 Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.ipoque.com Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.ipoque.com/ Datasource:download from: http://www.ipoque.com/ Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.ipoque.com/ Digitask 8_3 9 11_1 11_2 11_3 11_4 11_5 Datakom Trovicor Ipoque Ipoque trovicor:CodeofBusinessConduct,2010‐09‐ 13 MichaelThomas,presentation“RemoteFo‐ rensicSoftware” ThomasKröckel, presentation“FutureChal‐ lengesintheLawfulInterceptionofIPbased Telecommunication” TobiasHain,presentation“Challengesin InterceptingWiFi” MichaelThomas,presentation“RemoteFo‐ rensicSoftware” Digitask:LeistungsbeschreibungfürBayer‐ ischesStaatsministeriumderustiz(Digitask: productdescriptionfortheBavarianState MinistryofJustice) SupportedProtocolsandApplications DataSheet:DPXNetworkProbe Ipoque DataSheet:NetReporter Ipoque DataSheet:PACE(Protocol&Application ClassificationEngine) KlausMochalskiandHendrikSchulze,White Paper“DeepPacketInspection.Technology, Applications&NetNeutrality”. KlausMochalski,HendrikSchulzeandFrank Stummer,WhitePaper“CopyrightProtection intheInternet” DirkSchrader,presentation“WhatLICan LearnfromAnti‐SPAM,Anti‐Virus,IDS/IPS, andDPITechnologies” MartinStange,presentation“BuildingBlocks ofaCarrierGradeDataRetentionSolution” UtimacoLIMS:LawfulInterceptionofTele‐ Digitask Ipoque 11_6 Datasource:downloadfrom: Ipoque http://www.ipoque.com/ 12_1 53 12_2 54 12_3 CS‐2000HighEnd.HighPerformanceNet‐ workPlatform P2PTrafficFilter PoseidonFlyer.PortableIPMonitoringSys‐ tem PortableModemInterception.MuninPOTS PortableModemInterception.MuninPOTS POSEIDON.IMC–InternetMonitoringCenter InternetProtocol(IP) ElamanNewsletter01/2011 Elaman– TheBridgetoTrustandSecurity ElamanCommunicationsMonitoringSolu‐ tions ThomasFischer,Presentation“Oneis Enough…CombiningLawfulInterception, Mediation&DataRetentioninIP‐Networks”. ISSPrague.June3‐5,2009. Service&Qualität.Mess‐Dienstleistungs‐ Portfolio. ICC‐Services UtimacoSafe‐ ware UtimacoSafe‐ ware Datasource:downloadfrom: UtimacoSafe‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 12_4 http://lims.utimaco.com ware Datasource:downloadfrom: UtimacoSafe‐ http://lims.utimaco.com ware 13 32 NETI 15 16_1 16_2 16_3 17_1 17_2 205 144 145 146 29 30 Innova IPS IPS IPS Group2000 Group2000 17_3 17_4 48 Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.group2000.eu Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.group2000.eu Datasource:downloadfrom: http://www.group2000.eu Group2000 Group2000 17_5 17_6 17_7 17_8 18 19 20_1 20_2 20_3 20_4 Group2000 Group2000 Datasource:downloadfrom: Group2000 http://www.group2000.eu Datasource:downloadfrom: Group2000 http://www.group2000.eu 35 PineDigital Security Datasource:downloadfrom: GammaGroup http://projects.wsj.com/sur veillance‐catalog 16 TelesoftTech‐ nologies 39 TelesoftTech‐ nologies 208 TelesoftTech‐ nologies Datasource:downloadfrom: TelesoftTech‐ http://ww.telesoft‐ nologies technologies.com communicationServices UtimacoLIMS:LawfulInterceptioninthe DigitalAge:VitalElementsofanEffective Solution ZoltánPellerandZsoltKöhalmi,presentation “DatainaHaystack.MonitoringSystems withAdvancedWorkflowManagement” InnovaInvestigationInstruments IPSVisionaryIntelligence IPSGENESIMonitoringCentre IPSVisionaryIntelligence DataRetentionChallenges LIMA LawfulInterception:LawfulIntercep‐ tionintheEvolvingWorldofTelecom LawfulInterception:TheBiggerPicture NetworkForensics:LawfulInterceptionfor Broadband NetworkForensics:LIMADRSDataReten‐ tion LIMAManagementSystem:TheComplete ManagementSolutionforLawfulIntercep‐ tion NetworkForensics:LIMADPIMonitor SupportedProtocolsandApplications ETSI’sIPHandoverStandards FinFisher:GovernmentalITIntrusionand RemoteMonitoringSolutions KeithDriver,presentation“IntelligentProb‐ ingforIntelligenceandLIApplications” KeithDriver,presentation“RealTimeInter‐ ceptfromPacketNetworks,Challengesand Solutions” HINTONetworkIndependentCDRApplica‐ tionNote WhitePaper“UsingHardwareAccelerated 10‐40Gb/sPacketAnalysisinIMSPolicy Applications” Table2:Alistofthe89filesincludedintheanalysis Afirstviewofthematerialshowedthatoneparticularlyimportantterminthecon‐ textofInternetsurveillanceisDeepPacketInspection(DPI),whichisanInternetsur‐ veillancetechnology.Inordertounderstandwhatitis,weneedtounderstandwhat theOpen‐SystemsInterconnection(OSI)Modelis.Forthetransmissionofdatawithin andacrosscomputernetworks,communicationstandardsareneeded.Computer networksconsistofsoftwareapplications,computers,andnetworkarchitecture.The communicationprocesscanbemodelledwiththehelpofthreelayers: The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 1)Thenetworklayer“isconcernedwiththeexchangeofdatabetweenacomputer andthenetworktowhichitisattached”(Stallings1995,490) 2)Thetransportlayerislogicthatassures“thatallthedataarriveatthedestination applicationandthatthedataarriveinthesameorderinwhichtheyweresent” (Stallings1995,490f) 3)Theapplicationlayer“containsthelogicneededtosupportthevarioususerappli‐ cations.Foreachdifferenttypeofapplication,suchasfiletransfer,aseparatemodule isneededthatispeculiartothatapplication”(Stallings1995,491). One standard model of computernetwork data transmission is theOpen‐Systems Interconnection(OSI)Model.Itconsistsofsevenlevels. 7Application Thislayerprovidesaccessofapplicationsto Application layer thenetwork.Thesoftwareapplicationsre‐ sideatthislevel,suchasbrowsers,e‐mail programmes,FTPclients,chatsoftware, voiceoverIPsoftware,filesharingsoftware, etc. 6Presentation Heretheformatoftheexchangeddataisde‐ layer fined.Dataaretransformed,forexample compressedorencrypted.Itensuresthatthe formatoftransmittedfilesasunderstood acrossdifferentsystems‐ 5Sessionlayer Thislayerorganizesthecommunicationbe‐ tweentwoapplicationsondifferentma‐ chinesintheformofsessionsthatdefinee.g. whenonesidetransmitsandavoidscommu‐ nicationproblemsoftheapplications. 4Transport Thislayerreceivesdatafromtheapplication Host‐to‐ host/Transport layer layer,segmentsandreassemblesthedata flowintosmallerunits.Thisisnecessarybe‐ (TCP) causefilesareoftentoolargetobetransmit‐ tedatonceoveranetwork.Thetransmission isorganisedinseveralsequentialsteps. Internet(IP) 3Networklayer Thislayerisresponsibleforfindinganddi‐ rectingthewaythatdatapacketstakeacross variousnetworksinordertocorrectlyarrive atthedestinationnetworkandcomputer (routing).Itsendsthedatapacketsfrom networktonetworkbyfindingawaysothat thedataistransportedfromthesourcenet‐ worktothedestinationnetwork. 2Datalinklayer Thislayersecuresthereliabletransferof Networkaccess The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 dataacrossnetworks.Itbreaksthedata streamintoblocksofdata(so‐calledframes), calculatesandaddschecksumstotheblocks thatarecheckedinthedestinationandrout‐ ingnetworksinordertoguaranteeerror‐ freetransmission. Physical 1Physicallayer Thislayertakescareofthetransmissionof databitsovernetworkcables,wirelesscon‐ nections,etc.Onefindscables,plugconnect‐ ors,electronicimpulses,etconthislevel. Table3:ThelayersoftheOSIReferenceModelandtheTCP/IPProtocol(source: Stallings1995,2006;Comer2004) In Internet communication, the OSI Reference Model is translated into the TCP/IP Protocol that consists of five layers. Each device (like a computer or a printer) in a networkconnectedtotheInternethasaspecificIPaddress,whichisaunique32bit long identifier (such as 170.12.252.3). In order for data to be transmitted over the Internet, a source and destination IP address are needed. If a user for example searches for data on Google, he enters search keyword into the Google search box. Thisisattheapplicationlevel. At the TCP level, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) takes the data, adds a communicationportnumber(anaddress,bywhichtheapplicationisaddressed)and breaksthedataintopackets.TCPidentifiesports,the sequence numberofa packet andachecksum.TCPprovidesareliabletransportservice.“AfterrequestingTCPto establishaconnection,anapplicationprogramcanusetheconnectiontosendorre‐ ceive data: TCP guarantees to deliver the data in order without duplication. Finally, whenthetwoapplicationsfinishusingaconnection,theyrequestthattheconnection be terminated. TCP onone computer communicates with TCP on another computer byexchangingmessages.AllmessagesfromoneTCPtoanotherusetheTCPsegment format, including messages that carry data, acknowledgements, and window adver‐ tisements, or message used to establish and terminate a connection” (Comer 2004, 386). AttheIPlevel,theIPaddressofthedestinationisdeterminedaswellastherouting overtheInternetaredetermined.TheInternetProtocol(IP)“specifiesaddressing:IP divides each Internet address into a two‐level hierarchy: the prefix of an address identifiesthenetworktowhichthecomputerattaches,andthesuffixidentifiesaspe‐ cific computer on the network” (Comer 2004, 301). At the lower levels, the data is transmitted.ThedataisroutedoverthevariousroutersoftheInternetuntilitfinally arrives in our example in Google’s network, where it is treated in the opposite se‐ quence(fromthelowest leveltothe highest layer)so thatdata thatanswerstothe searchqueryisgeneratedthatisthaninthesamewaysentbacktotheuser,whore‐ questedtheinformation. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Payload TCPHeader IPHeader Sourceport SourceIP Applicationdata:emailtext,URL, DestinationIP websitecontent,chatmessage,vid‐ Destinationport Sequencenumber Totallength eocontent,imagecontent,etc. Applicationheader:application programmeversion,emailaddress sender/receiver,etc DefinedatTCP/IPlayer5(OSIlay‐ DefinedatTCP/IP DefinedatTCP/IPlay‐ ers5,6,7 layer4 er3 Table4:ATCP/IPpacket Table4showsthestructureofaTCP/IPpacketthatistransmittedovertheInternet. A packet is a “small, self‐contained parcel of data sent across a computer network. Eachpacketcontainsaheaderthatidentifiesthesenderandrecipient,andapayload areathatcontainsthedatabeingsent”(Comer2004,666).Thepayloadis“thedata beingcarriedinapacket”(Comer2004,667),theheadercontainsdatalikethenet‐ workaddressofsourceanddestination.IntheTCP/IPprotocolthattheInternetuses, the packet is called an IP datagram. It consists of “a header that identifies both the senderandreceiverandapayloadareathatcontainsthedatabeingcarried”(Comer 2004,658). “Deep packet inspection is the collection, observation, analysis, and/or storage of data related to an application that is found in Internet packets above OSI layer 3” (Cooper 2011, 145). Deep Packet Inspection technologies “are capable of analysing the actual content of the traffic that is flowing” (Jason 2011, 118). “DPI allows net‐ workoperatorstoscanthepayloadofIPpacketsaswellastheheader.[…]Itenables thenetworkoperatortoanalyzethedatagramspassingthroughthenetworkinreal‐ time and discriminate among them according to their payload” (Bendrath and Mueller2011,1144).“DeepPacketInspection(‘DPI’)isacomputernetworkfiltering techniquethatinvolvestheinspectionofthecontentsofpacketsastheyaretransmit‐ tedacrossthenetwork.DPIissometimesreferredtoas‘completepacketinspection’” (EPIC,DeepPacketInspectionandPrivacy.http://epic.org/privacy/dpi/) Parsons (2008) distinguishes between Shallow Packet Inspection, Medium Packet InspectionandDeepPacketInspectiontechnologies.ShallowPacketInspection(SPI) technologies “examine the packet’s header information” (Parsons 2008, 6; see also Daly 2010), the inspect data at the OSI layers 1‐3. Examples are firewalls that scan source and destination IP addresses that aredefined at layer 3 of the OSI (network layer) and TCP/IP (Internet/IP level) models. They can block data that comes from certainIPaddresses(whicharee.g.consideredasdistributingspamorviruses).Me‐ dium Packet Inspection (MPI) technologies can analyse data on the OSI layers 1‐6. This includes the presentation layer of the OSI model, at which file formats are de‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 fined.MPItechnologiescane.g.blockcertainfiletypesorbeusedfornetworkman‐ agement (prioritization of the transmission of certain file types). “MPI technologies canprioritizesomepacketsoverothersbyexaminingtheapplicationcommandsthat arelocatedwithintheapplicationlayerandthefileformatsinthepresentationlayer” (Parsons 2008, 8). Parsons defines Deep Packet Inspection technologies as surveil‐ lancemethodsthatcan“identifytheoriginandcontentofeachpacketofdata”(Par‐ sons 2008, 8). They can monitor data at the OSI layers 1‐7. Deep packet inspection (DPI) surveillance technologies are communications surveillance tools that are able tomonitorthetrafficofnetworkdatathatissentovertheInternetatallsevenlayers of the OSI Reference Model of Internet communication, which includes the surveil‐ lanceofcontentdata. 2.2. The Analysed Companies’ Internet Surveillance Technologies AnnexAprovidesamoredetailedanalysisof20EuropeansecuritytechnologiesIn‐ ternet surveillance technologies. For each company in the sample, the following in‐ formationisoutlined: *Placeofbusiness *Website *Self‐descriptionofthecompany’sactivities * Analysis: this section of each security company’s discussion gives an overview of which Internet surveillance technologies the specific company creates and how it views the usefulness and purpose of these technologies according to public state‐ ments(website,pressreleases,newsarticles). Theanalysedsecuritycompaniesarethefollowingones: 1.Inveatech 2.Qosmos 3.Thales 4.AQSACOM 5.Alcatel‐Lucent 6.Amesys 7.Elaman 8.Datakom 9.trovicor 10.Digitask 11.ipoque 12.Utimaco 13.NETI 14.AreaSpa 15.Innova 16.IPS 17.Group2000 The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 18.PineDigitalSecurity 19.GammGroup 20.TelesoftTechnologies 2.3. Assessment of Deep Packet Inspection Internet Surveillance DPIisarelativelynewandnotmuchanalysedtopicinthesocialsciences.Atitle searchforDPIOR“deeppacket”intheSocialSciencesCitationIndex(conductedon February17,2011)produced9results,ofwhichonly2werereallyaboutDPI.Asimi‐ larsearchinthedatabaseCommunicationsandMassMediaComplete(conductedon February17,2011)brought10results,ofwhich3focusedonDPI. BendrathandMueller(2011)listsevenareas,whereDPIaffectssociety:network security (viruses, Trojans, worms, etc), bandwidth management, governmental sur‐ veillance,contentregulation(blocking,censorship),copyrightenforcement(fileshar‐ ing),adinjection. ForassessingtheimpactofDPI,theUppsalaUniversityresearchteamconducteda searchforacademicarticles,techreports,andassessments.Weanalysedthesedocu‐ ments.Theresultscanbesummarizedintheformofseveralimpactdimensions. 1.PotentialadvantagesofDPI 2.Netneutrality 3.ThepowerofInternetServiceProviders(ISPs)forunderminingusers’trust 4.PotentialfunctioncreepofDPIsurveillance 5.Targetedadvertising 6.Thesurveillanceoffilesharers 7.Politicalrepressionandsocialdiscrimination 2.3.1. Potential Advantages of DPI Cooper(2011,144)arguesthattheanalysisofInternetpacketsatTCP/IPlayer3 (destinationandsourceIPaddresses)hasalwaysbeenusedbyISPs“toroutepackets totheirdestinations,andthusitwouldbedifficulttoarguethattheircontinueduse creates some new privacy risk”. Privacy problems could be related to payload data (TCP/IP layer 5). “Payloads often contain application headers, and many of these headers – such as the HTTP version type and content encodings cited earlier – are fairlyinnocuousfromaprivacyperspective.However,otherkindsofheaderscanre‐ veal much more sensitive information about a person’s Internet activities, such as URLs,emailrecipientaddresses,usernames,addresses,andmanyotherkindsofda‐ ta”(Cooper2011,144). TheadvantagesthataregenerallymentionedonthesideofISPsaretheopportuni‐ tiesforbandwidthmanagementandthecreationofpersonalizedfor‐profitservices: “ISPs, meanwhile, see promising opportunities of many kinds in the growth of DPI. Thetechnologycanprovidethemwithapowerfultooltoaddressconstantlyevolving challenges in managing network congestion and security threats. It can provide in‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 sightintohowtheirnetworksarebeingused,allowingthemtomakemoreinformed decisionsaboutnetwork upgradesandarchitecture.And perhapsmostimportantly, DPIisamongasetoftoolsthatcanprovideIPSwithnewrevenuestreams,whether by funnelling data about users to advertisers, selling expedited delivery to content providers,orlevyingextrafeesonheavynetworkusers”(Cooper2011,140).“Inter‐ nettraffichasincreasinglyinvolvedsuchdata‐richapplicationsasvoiceandstream‐ ingvideo.Notonlyarethesequitedemandingofbandwidth,thesetypesofcommuni‐ cations do not function well if subject to delays. One way carriers seek to solve the problemisbyexaminingpacketsanddeterminingtrafficpriorities;DPIwouldallow thecarrierstodoso”(Landau2010,141). ipoquestressesinawhitepaper(#11_5)thatDPIisusedfordifferentpurposes,in‐ cludingspamfilters,virusfiltersaswellasbandwidthandnetworkmanagementthat makesefficientuseofnetworksbyprioritizingthetransmissionofdifferentfiletypes. Different protocols and different applications make different use of the Internet. So e.g.VoIP(suchasSkype)hasalowuseofthenetwork,whereasfilesharinginpeer‐ to‐peernetworksmakesheavyuseoftheInternet. 2.3.2. Net Neutrality ThemediareformgroupFreePressdefinesnetneutralityastheprinciple“thatInter‐ net service providers may not discriminate between different kinds of content and applications online. It guarantees a level playing field for all websites and Internet technologies“ (http://www.savetheinternet.com/faq). “During the explosive rise of the Internet, one fundamental principle governed: All users and all content were treatedalike.Thephysicalnetworkofcablesandroutersdidnotknoworcareabout the user or the content. The principle of non‐discrimination, or ‘Net Neutrality’, al‐ lowed users to travel anywhere on the Internet, free from interference” (Riley and Scott2009,3).”TheconnectionbetweenDPIandnetneutralitybecameclearin2007, when it was made public that Comcast used a SandVine DPI monitoring systems to disrupt peer‐to‐peer traffic, which resulted in a lawsuit before theUS Federal Com‐ municationCommission(FCC)”(BendrathandMueller2011).“IntheUSA,thecable operatorComcastbegantoblockpeer‐to‐peer(P2P)datatransfersforitsusersusing DPI.ThisresultedintheFederalCommunicationsCommission(FCC)orderingCom‐ cast to ‘end discriminatory network management practices’, since it had ‘unduly in‐ terferedwithInternetusers’righttoaccessthelawfulInternetcontentandtousethe applicationsoftheirchoice’”(Daly2010). The FCC says that “reasonable network management”, which is network manage‐ mentthatis“tailoredtoachievingalegitimatenetworkmanagementpurpose“(FCC 2010, 48)and forwhichDPImaybeused, isnoproblem.Unreasonablediscrimina‐ tion of users that violates net neutrality would e.g. be the discrimination of certain applications(suchasVoIP),hinderinguserstoaccesscertaincontent,servicesorap‐ plications, or the slow down of a service or website that a ISP disagrees with (FCC 2010,42).TheFCC(2010,43)alsosaysthat“payforpriority”islikelytoviolatenet neutrality. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 One argument advanced by Free Press, the Consumer Federation of America and theConsumersUnion(2006)isthatgivingupnetneutralitywouldgiveInternetser‐ vice providers a lot of power and would discriminate certain services so that their ownfavouredcontentandapplications(thattheyeitherprovidethemselvesoroffer inco‐operationwithspecificmediacontentproviders)wouldbeadvantagedandoth‐ ers disadvantaged.Thiscanespeciallybecomea problemifthenetworkprovideris alsoacontentproviderorhascollaborationwithacontentprovider.Asecondwarn‐ ing by Free Press, the Consumer Federation of America and the Consumers Union (2006)isthatatieredInternetisastratifiedsystem,inwhichrichplayers(likebig companies)useafastInternetandeverydaypeople,whodonothavesomuchmoney, a slow Internet. “Indeed, corporate control over what information users create, dis‐ seminate and receive could also entail access to content or programmes which are notcommerciallylucrativeisrestrictedonlytothosewillingtopaymoretotheISPto accessit,ornotavailableatall”(Daly2010). LawrenceLessigandRobertW.McChesneyarguethatthenetneutralitydebateisa discussionaboutthefundamentalqualitiesoftheInternet:“Willwereinstatenetneu‐ tralityandkeeptheInternetfree?Orwillweletitdieatthehandsofnetworkowners itchingtobecomecontentgatekeepers?[…]Thecurrentlegislation,backedbycom‐ paniessuchasAT&T,VerizonandComcast,wouldallowthefirmstocreatedifferent tiersofonlineservice.Theywouldbeabletosellaccesstotheexpresslanetodeep‐ pocketedcorporationsandrelegateeveryoneelsetothedigitalequivalentofawind‐ ing dirt road. Worse still, these gatekeepers would determine who gets premium treatmentandwhodoesn’t”(LawrenceLessigandRobertW.McChesney,NoTollson theInternet.TheWashingtonPost.June8,2006). AtieredInternetmonitoredwiththehelpofDPIcouldalsoresultin“anencryption armsraceinwhichdisfavouredapplicationswouldencryptalltraffictoevadeidenti‐ ficationbyDPI.Suchanoutcomewouldrenderthecongestion‐reductionpurposeof DPIineffective”(RileyandScott2009,8) 2.3.3. The Power of ISPs for Undermining Users’ Trust Heavy use of DPI by ISPs may undermine trust that users have in the network and ISPsandthiscanresultinself‐censorshipandinhibitionofusers(Cooper2011,147). InternetusershavetotrusttheirISPmorethanGoogleorFacebookoranotherweb platformbecausetheirwholetrafficpassesthroughtheISP’sservers.Neither“Google noranyotherserviceproviderisascapableasanISPofcomprehensivelymonitoring theentiretyofeachindividualsubscriber’sonlineactivities.Everyoneofasubscrib‐ er’spackets,bothsentandreceived,mustpassthroughtheISP’sfacilities.Whatsepa‐ ratesISPsfromotherserviceprovidersisthepotentialfortheirgazeovertheirsub‐ scribers to be omniscient” (Cooper 2011, 147). ISPs have with the help of DPI the powertomonitortheentireInternetusageofsubscribers.Thediscussionsaboutthe useofDPIforthatwerepresentedinthisreporthavefrequentlyinvolveddiscussions The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 about the role of ISPs, which shows that they are crucial actors in Internet surveil‐ lanceandthattheyholdhighpowerinimplementingorpreventingInternetsurveil‐ lance. They hold the power to potentially build a total Internet surveillance system. Encryptioncanmakethismoredifficult,butthequestionisifuserscanbeexpected touseencryptionforalloforlargepartsoftheirInternetuseandifprivacyprotec‐ tionshouldbeadefaultoptionguaranteedbytheISPoranon‐defaultoptionthatcan only be achieved by special actions on behalf of the users. Heavy use of encryption canalsoslowdownthespeedofcomputernetworks. ParsonswarnsthatwiththehelpofDPIitis“possibletoconstructvastsocialnet‐ workmaps”(Parsons2008,12)becausethetechnologyallowstoidentifythesource anddestination(e.g.email‐addressesorusernamesonsocialmedialikeFacebookor Twitter)aswellasthecontentofeachonlinecommunication. BendrathandMueller(2012,1148)makeananalogybetweenanISPandapostal worker inorderto show how DPI can potentially result in privacy violations: “Now imagineapostalworkerwho[…] *Opensupallpacketsandletters; *Readsthecontent; *Checksitagainstdatabasesofillegalmaterialandwhenfindingamatchsendsa copytothepoliceauthorities; *Destroysletterswithprohibitedorimmoralcontent; *Sendspackagesforitsownmail‐orderservicestoaveryfastdeliverytruck,while theonesfromcompetitorsgotoaslow,cheapsub‐contractor. Imaginealsothatthepostalworkercoulddothiswithoutdelayingordamagingthe packetsandletterscomparedtohis(former,nowfired)daydreamingcolleague.This iswhatDPItechnologyiscapableof.[…]Suchapostalsystem[…]invadestheprivacy ofcommunicationsandintroducesopportunitiesforregulationandcensorshipwhole increasingthefeasibilityofimposingintermediaryresponsibilityonIPSs”. “DPIisalettercarrierwhoreadsallyourmail,listenstoallyourcalls,followsyou asyoubrowsedowntownandinthemal,notesyourpurchases,listensinasyouask questionsoftheresearchlibrarian,andwatchesoveryourshoulderasyoureadthe daily paper – and then correlates all that information in real time” (Landau 2010, 220). The question that arises is if such data processing is “adequate, relevant and not exces‐ sive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed” (European Union Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data 95/46/EC, article 6 (c) ). 2.3.4. Potential Function Creep of DPI Surveillance ThenotionofthesurveillancecreepwasintroducedbyGaryMarx:“Aspowerfulnew surveillancetacticsaredeveloped,therangeoftheirlegitimateandillegitimateuseis likelytospread.Wherethereisaway,thereisoftenawill.Thereisthedangerofan The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 almostimperceptiblesurveillancecreep.[…]Thenewformsofsocialcontroltendto besubtle,invisible,scattered,andinvoluntary.Theyareoftennotdefinedassurveil‐ lance, and many people, especially those born after 1960, are barely conscious of them” (Marx 1988, 2f). Surveillance creep is “the expansion into new domains of software or a surveillance system, and the ways that new functions are constantly foundforsurveillancetechnologiesandpractices”(Lyon2007,201).“Personaldata, collectedandusedforone purposeandtofulfilone functionoften migratetoother onesthatextendandintensifysurveillanceandinvasionsofprivacybeyondwhatwas originally understood and considered socially, ethically and legally acceptable. […] Functioncreepusuallyhappensquietly,unobtrusively,asabitofadministrativecon‐ venience”(SurveillanceStudiesNetwork2010,9). DPI usage for one purpose (such as network management or spam filtering) may creeptoother,moreprivacy‐sensitiveactivities(suchastargetedadvertisingorcon‐ tentmonitoringforpoliticalpurposesorlawenforcement,violationofnetneutrality, etc). “Another distinguishing feature of ISPs’ use of DPI is the potential for mission creep: having DPI equipment that was installed for one purpose used for multiple newpurposesovertime”(Cooper2001,148f).AnimportantaspecthereisthatDPI canbeemployed“mostlyinvisiblyonthenetwork”(Cooper2001,149),therebyena‐ blinginvisiblesurveillancecreep. 2.3.5. Targeted Advertising Targeted advertising (also called targeted tracking, personalized advertising or be‐ haviouraladvertising)meansthat“marketingormediafirmsfollowactualorpoten‐ tial customers’ marketing and/or media activities to learn the consumers’ interests andtodecidewhatmaterialstoofferthem”(Turow2008,180). “Web‐basedadvertisingcompanieshaveformanyyearsusedweb‐basedtechnolo‐ gies (such as cookies) to track the sites that users visit, allowing the companies to compileprofilesofusers’behaviourforadvertisingpurposes.DPIcreatesthatsame possibility for ISPs by allowing them to identify the websites that their subscribers are visiting, the content of those sites, and the other kinds of applications and data that subscribers are using. ISPs or their advertising partners can extract this infor‐ mationfromindividualpacketsandcompileitintoprofilesthatcanlaterbeusedto showtargetedadstosubscribersastheysurftheweb”(Cooper2011,151). OnFacebook,targetedadvertisingisthestandardoptionandthereisnoopt‐into thistypeofadvertising.Thiscircumstancewaspartof22complaintsthattheinitia‐ tive“EuropeversusFacebook”filedagainstFacebook.AsFacebookEuropeislocated inIreland,theIrishdataprotectionauthoritiesareinchargeofsuchclaims.Afterau‐ diting Facebook, the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland (2011) published an auditreport.ItwrotethatFacebookneedstoimplement“anenhancedabilityforus‐ ers to make their own informed choices based on the available information” (42). “Fromtheprivacyperspectivethereforeitwouldbeafarbetterpositionforusersif therewerenodefaultsettingsuponsign‐up.Auserthenwouldbeaskedviaaprocess The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 what their broad preferences are with settings that reflect such broad preferences and a consequent ability for theuser to refine those settings all of which should be available from one place” (40). “There are limits to the extent to which user‐ generated personal data can be used for targeted advertising. Facebook must be transparentwithusersastohowtheyaretargetedbyadvertisers”(60). TheDataProtectionCommissionerofIreland’sreportmadeclearthattargetedad‐ vertising is not unproblematic in respect to privacy violations and that special pre‐ cautionsneedtobetakeninordertoprotectconsumerprivacyontheInternet. Facebookhasthemeansforconductingsurveillanceofpartsofusers’onlineactivi‐ ties.GiventhatISPs’employmentofDPIfortargetedadvertisinghasthepotentialto use all user data (headers/connection and content data), one can imagine that DPI‐ based targeted advertising can intensify the potential problems and discussions aboutonlinedataprotectionviolations. In2008,therewerereportsthattheUScompanyPhormhad“dealssignedbyBT, VirginMediaandCarphoneWarehousetoreportyourbrowsinghabitstoPhorm”and to implement a behavioural ad targeting system (The Register, The Phorm Files. All YerDataPimpingNewsinOnePlace.February29,2008. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/02/29/phorm_roundup). In April 2008, the British Information Commissioner’s Office issued a statement saying that Phorm’s DPI‐basedadvertisingsystemWebwiseneedstobeimplementedasopt‐insystemin ordertocomplytoBritishcommunicationsregulations:“Phormhasdevelopedasys‐ temwhere,withthecooperationofanindividual’sISPtheycanprofiletheaddresses and certain content of websites visited by users and then use that information to match that user against predefined broad advertising categories. […]When a user visits a website that has an agreement with Phorm their user ID is recognised and PhormwillusethebroadadvertisingcategoriesassociatedwiththatIDtoenablerel‐ evantadvertisingchanneltobeshownonthewebsite.[…]Regulation7ofPECR[Pri‐ vacyandElectronicCommunicationsRegulations]willrequiretheISPtogetthecon‐ sentofuserstotheuseoftheirtrafficdataforanyvalueaddedservices.Thisstrongly supportstheviewthatPhormproductswillhavetooperateonanoptinbasistouse trafficdataaspartoftheprocessofreturningrelevanttargetedmarketingtointernet users” (http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080422094853/http://ico.gov.uk/Home /about_us/news_and_views/current_topics/phorm_webwise_and_oie.aspx). InalettertotheBritishInformationCommissioner,theFoundationforInformation PolicyResearch(FIPR)warnedaboutpotentialprivacyviolationsofPhorm’ssystem: “TheprovisionofthisservicedependsonclassifyingInternetuserstoenableadver‐ tisingtobetargetedontheirinterests.Theirinterestsaretobeascertainedforthis purposebyscanningandanalysingthecontentoftrafficbetweenusersandtheweb‐ sitestheyvisit.ThisactivityinvolvestheprocessingofpersonaldataaboutInternet users. That data may include sensitive personal data, because it will include the searchtermsenteredbyusersintosearchengines,andthesecaneasilyrevealinfor‐ mation about such matters as political opinions, sexual proclivities, religious views, The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 andhealth.[...]Classificationbyscanninginthiswayseemstoustobehighlyintru‐ sive.Wethinkthatitshould notbeundertakenwithoutexplicitconsentfromusers who have been given particularly clear information about what is liable to be scanned.Usersshouldhavetooptintosuchasystem,notmerelybegivenanoppor‐ tunity to opt out. We believe this is also required under European data protection law;failuretoestablishaclearandtransparent’opt‐in’systemislikelytorenderthe entire process illegal and open to challenge in UK and European courts“ (http://www.fipr.org/080317icoletter.html). TheinventoroftheWorldWideWeb,TimBerners‐Lee,expressedhisoppositionto Phorm’sDPI‐basedtargetedadvertisingsystem:“TheaccessbyanISPofinformation withinaninternetpacket,otherthanthatinformationusedforrouting,isequivalent to wiretapping a phone or opening sealed postal mail. The URLs which people use revealahugeamountabouttheirlives,loves,hates,andfears.Thisisextremelysensi‐ tivematerial.Peopleusethewebincrisis,whenwonderingwhethertheyhaveSTDs, orcancer,whenwonderingwhethertheyarehomosexualandwhethertotalkabout it,todiscusspoliticalviewswhichmaybeabhorrent,andsoon.[…]Thepowerofthis information is so great that the commercial incentive for companies or individuals misuseitwillbehuge,soitisessentialtohaveabsoluteclaritythatitisillegal.Theact ofreading,liketheactofwriting,isapure,fundamental,humanact.Itmustbeavail‐ able without interference or spying” (Berners‐Lee, Tim. 2009. No Snooping. http://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/NoSnooping.html). BecauseofthePhormcase,theEuropeanCommissionopenedaninfringementpro‐ ceedingagainsttheUKinordertoseeiftheUKhascorrectlyimplementedtheEU’s ePrivacy and data protection rules. “Since April 2008, the Commission has received severalquestionsfromUKcitizensandUKMembersoftheEuropeanParliamentcon‐ cerned about the use of a behavioural advertising technology known as ‘Phorm’ by InternetServiceProvidersintheUK.Phormtechnologyworksbyconstantlyanalys‐ ing customers' web surfing to determine users' interests and then deliver targeted advertisingtouserswhentheyvisitcertainwebsites.InApril2008,theUKfixedop‐ erator, BT, admitted that it had tested Phorm in 2006 and 2007 without informing customers involved in the trial. BT carried out a new, invitation‐based, trial of the technologyinOctober‐December2008.BT’strialsresultedinanumberofcomplaints to the UK data protection authority – the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) andtotheUKpolice.[...]theCommissionhasconcernsthattherearestructuralprob‐ lems in the way the UK has implemented EU rules ensuring the confidentiality of communications. [...]Under UK law, which is enforced by the UK police, it is an of‐ fence tounlawfully intercept communications. However, the scopeof this offence is limited to ‘intentional’ interception only. Moreover, according to this law, intercep‐ tionisalsoconsideredtobelawfulwhentheinterceptorhas‘reasonablegroundsfor believing’ that consent to interception has been given. The Commission is also con‐ cerned that the UK does not have an independent national supervisory authority dealingwithsuchinterceptions.[...]TheEUDirectiveonprivacyandelectroniccom‐ municationsrequiresEUMemberStatestoensureconfidentialityofthecommunica‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 tions and related traffic data by prohibiting unlawful interception and surveillance unless the users concerned have consented (Article 5(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC). The EU Data Protection Directive specifies that user consent must be ‘freely given specific and informed’ (Article 2(h) of Directive 95/46/EC). Moreover, Article 24 of theDataProtectionDirectiverequiresMemberStatestoestablishappropriatesanc‐ tionsincaseofinfringementsandArticle28saysthatindependentauthoritiesmust bechargedwithsupervisingimplementation.TheseprovisionsoftheDataProtection Directive also apply in the area of confidentiality of communications” (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/570). In autumn 2010,theEuropeanCommissiondecidedtotakethiscasetotheCourtofJusticeofthe EU (Brand Republic News Releases, EU to Take UK to Court over Internet Privacy Rules.October4,2010). A Phorm‐initiated privacy impact assessment of Webwise concluded that infor‐ mation systems require informed consent, but confirmed that although Phorm was workingonrespectingusers’privacy,itwouldnotintendtoimplementanopt‐insys‐ tem because “the market default for cookie‐based consent systems is opt‐out” and that“userswillbegivenpropernotice”(80/20Thinking,PrivacyImpactAssessment forPhorm.http://www.phorm.com/assets/reports/Phorm_PIA_Final.pdf,19). AndrewMcStay(2011)interpretsPhorm’sWebwiseasthethirdtypeofonlinebe‐ haviouraladvertising.Inthefirstform,awebplatformcollectsuserdataonitsown site in order to target ads. In the second form, a second party runs an advertising network (such as DoubleClick) that collects and networks data from different web‐ sitesinordertotargetads.Inthethirdform,deep‐packetinspection“scanspacketsof datathatpassesthroughthegateway[ofanISP]andmarriessuitabledatawithrele‐ vantadvertising”(McStay2011,312). “Google may track your searches, your travel (Google Maps), and your appoint‐ ments(GoogleCalendar),butthecompany’sabilitytodosoislimitedbythenumber ofdifferentGoogleservicesofwhichyouavailyourself.IfyouobjecttoGoogle’spri‐ vacypolicies,youcanchoosetouseotherservices.Bycontrast,yourISPknowseve‐ rythingyoudoonline.[…]AsingleISPwillknowwhatyouarebrowsing,whatyour emailsays,VoIP,andsoon.Inamatterofdays,possiblyevenhours,anISPusingDPI candeveloparemarkablydetaileddossieronaperson”(Landau2010,220). Whereas targeted advertising on Facebook, Google, or DoubleClick can only be basedonpartsofthewebusageofauser,theprofilingusedindeeppackettargeted advertisinghasthepotentialtobebasedonatotalInternetsurveillancesystemthat scans,filters,andanalysestheentireInternetdatatrafficandcontentofauser.Deep‐ packetinspectiontargetedadvertisingthereforehasthepotentialtobeatotalInter‐ netsurveillancesystem.ThemaincriticismsofDPI‐basedtargetedadvertisingisthat users’consensusneedstobeobtainedtosuchwide‐reachingdataprocessing(opt‐in insteadofopt‐out),thatsensitivedatamightbeanalysedandmisused,andthatthere maybeasurveillancefunctioncreepwithunintendedconsequences. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 2.3.6. The Surveillance of File Sharers DPI can be used for detecting or blocking illegal file sharing (see the discussion in #11_6).“Since2004,theEuropeanmusicindustryhastriedtousethecourtstoforce ISPstosetupfilteringtechnologythatwoulddetectandblockcopyrightedmusicau‐ tomatically.[…]TheDPIproductsofonecompany,AudibleMagic,werepromotedby the music industry as a suitable solution to the problem” (Bendrath and Mueller 2011,1154). TheBelgianmusicindustryassociationSABAM(Sociétéd’AuteursBelge–Belgische AuteursMaatschappij)suedtheISPScarletandrequestedthatitinstallsAudibleMag‐ ic for copyright surveillance (Bendrath and Mueller 2011). In Ireland, EMI, Sony, Warner and Universal wanted to require Eircome to implement a similar system (ibid).SABAMalsowantedtorequiretheBelgiansocialnetworkingsiteNetlogtoin‐ stallfilteringsystemsthatpreventcopyrightviolations.IntheScarletvs.SABAMcase, in 2011 the “European Court of Justice has ruled that content owners cannot force Internetserviceproviderstoengageinlargescalefilteringandblockingofcopyright‐ infringing material online. […] It argued that blocking general access to P2P sites wouldbeunfaironaprovider,affectingitsfreedomtoconductbusinessandrequir‐ ing the ISP to ‘install a complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its own expense’.ThecourtalsosaidthatafilterwouldinfringeupontherightsInternetus‐ ers have to privacy and information protection” (Wired Magazine Online, EU Court Rules that Content Owners Can’t Force Web Filters on ISPs. November 24, 2011. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2011‐11/24/eu‐rules‐on‐filtering). IntheNetlogvs.SABAMcase,theEuropeanCourtofJusticeconfirmedtheScarlet rule:“Netlogprotestedathavingtoinstallandmaintainacostlycomputersystemat itsownexpenseforthebenefitofanotherindustryentirely,andtookthecasetothe European Court of Justice, which said ‘such an injunction would result in a serious infringement of Netlog's freedom to conduct its business’. However, that wasn't the onlyissuethatthecourttookwithSABAM'sdemands.Itadded:‘Thefilteringsystem mayalso infringethefundamentalrightsof its service users–namelytheir rightto protectionoftheirpersonaldataandtheirfreedomtoreceiveorimpartinformation’. Thecourt'sconclusion?‘Inadoptinganinjunctionrequiringthehostingservicepro‐ vidertoinstallsuchafilteringsystem,thenationalcourtwouldnotberespectingthe requirementthatafairbalancebestruckbetweentherighttointellectualproperty, ontheonehand,andthefreedomtoconductbusiness,therighttoprotectionofper‐ sonal data and the freedom to receive or impart information, on the other’” (Wired MagazineOnline,SocialNetworksDon’tHavetoPoliceCopyright,RulesEU.February 16, 2012. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012‐02/16/eu‐social‐networks‐ copyright). In2009,theBritishISPVirginMediaannouncedtheuseof“deeppacketinspection withthecontroversialDeticaCViewtechnology,whichwillascertainlevelsofillegal musicfilesharingacrosstheVirginnetwork.ThetrialwillseeVirginmonitoring40 The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 percentofitscustomers,butnoneofthesecustomerswillbeinformedwhetherthey are being checked out. Virgin insist that any data accumulated will be anonymous. Thetechnology usedis calledCView,createdbyacompanycalledDeticaandbased onthesametechnologythatpoweredthecontroversialPhorm.CViewlooksatWeb traffic,spotspeer‐to‐peerpackets,andtakesalookinside.Itthencollectsdataifthe files being shared are considered to be infringing copyright, based on information from record companies” (CNET UK, Virgin Media and CView to Rifle Through Your Packets. November 27, 2009. http://crave.cnet.co.uk/software/virgin‐media‐and‐ cview‐to‐rifle‐through‐your‐packets‐49304424). Privacy International argues that this case constitutes privacy violations and is based on the assumption that Virgin subscribersarecriminals,whichwouldreversethepresumptionofinnocence: “Under the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations (PECR)andtheRegulationofInvestigatoryPowersAct(RIPA)aswellastheEurope‐ an ePrivacy Directive, that interception and processing of communications requires eitherexplicitinformedconsentfromallpartiesorawarrant.[…]Wearefurthercon‐ cernedthatsuchasystemgeneratesaparadigmshiftwithregardstothebalanceof justice. Virgin Media’s plans assume that all consumers are guilty of copyright in‐ fringement until their communications data proves otherwise – whereas the onus shouldbeontheinjuredpartiestoprovidetheirownevidencethataninfringement hasoccurred”(PrivacyInternational,PIWarnsthatNewISPInterceptionPlansWillBe Illegal. November 26, 2009.https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/pi‐warns‐ new‐isp‐interception‐plans‐will‐be‐illegal).Inearly 2010,theEuropeanCommission announced that it would closely monitor Virgin Media’s planned trial, later in the sameyearVirginMediaannouncedthatitputitsplansonhold(ZDNetUK,VirginMe‐ dia Puts CView Packet Sniffing Trial on Hold. September 30, 2010. http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/security‐threats/2010/09/30/virgin‐media‐puts‐ cview‐packet‐sniffing‐trial‐on‐hold‐40090353/) Since 2007, Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zea‐ land, South Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, and the USA haveengagedinnegotiationaboutanAnti‐CounterfeitingTradeAgreement(ACTA). TheElectronicFrontierFoundationarguesthatitwasplannedtocreateanewlegal regimesthatencourages“InternetServiceProviders[…]toidentifyandremovealleg‐ edly infringing material from the Internet”, “mandatory network‐level filtering by InternetServiceProviders”,andarulethatISPshave“toterminatecitizens’Internet connection on repeat allegation of copyright infringement” (Electronic Frontier Foundation, Anti‐Counterfeiting Trade Agreement. What is ACTA? https://www.eff.org/issues/acta). DPI could be usedfordetermining, who infringes copyrightsontheInternetbysharing.Tousetheanalogyofaletter,suchprovisions wouldmeanthatthepostofficeopensallletterstodeterminetheircontent,keepsa recordofthemandinthecasethatindividualsororganisationsthreetimessendun‐ desirablecontentbansthemfromfurtheruseofthepostalserviceandthereforefrom afundamentalmeansofhumancommunication. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 ThediscussedexamplesshowthatthereareDPItechnologies,suchasAudibleMag‐ icandCView,thatcanbeusedbyISPstomonitortheInternetsothatillegalfileshar‐ ing is detected. There are examples, where the content industry has tried to legally enforce the use of these Internet surveillance technologies by ISPs. The European CourtofJusticehasruledthatsuchmeasuresviolateInternetusers’righttoprivacy andinformationprotectionandISPs’freedomtoconductbusiness.Anadditionalar‐ gumentwasthattheautomaticsurveillanceoftrafficbyISPinordertodetectillegal filesharingwouldreversethepresumptionofinnocenceandassumethatallInternet usersarecriminals. 2.3.7. Political Repression, Social Discrimination and the Export of Internet Surveillance Technologies DPIcanbeusedforthemonitoringofspecificusersoralargenumberofusersinor‐ der to find out with whom they communicate about what, including the content of communicationandthefilteringofcontentforkeywords.Itisnotexactlyknownhow China’s “Great Firewall” that filters and allows to censor Internet content, exactly works.Someobserverssaythatit“isbelievedalsotoinvolvedeeppacketinspection. ButChinaappearstobedevelopingthiscapabilityinamoredecentralizedmanner,at thelevelofitsInternetserviceprovidersratherthanthroughasinglehub,according toexperts”(WallStreetJournalOnline,Iran’sWebSpyingAidedbyWesternTechnol‐ ogy.June22,2009,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124562668777335653.html). Annex A shows that security companies tend to argue that DPI can help fighting crime(suchaschildpornographyorillegalfilesharing)andterrorism.FromaEuro‐ peandataprotectionperspective,someproblemsmayhoweverarise.Collectionand automaticanalysisofcontentdatawiththehelpofDPImaycontainthefiltering,stor‐ ageandanalysisofsensitivedata.TheEuropeanDataProtectionDirectivesaysthat “MemberStatesshallprohibittheprocessingofpersonaldatarevealingracialoreth‐ nicorigin,politicalopinions,religiousorphilosophicalbeliefs,trade‐unionmember‐ ship, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life” (European Union Di‐ rectiveontheProtectionofIndividualswithRegardtotheProcessingofPersonalData andontheFreeMovementofSuchData,article8). TheEUhasintheProposaloftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilonthePro‐ tectionofIndividualswithRegardtothe Processingof PersonalDataand on theFree MovementofSuchData(GeneralDataProtectionRegulation)suggestedtoamendthis passage: “The processing of personal data, revealing race or ethnic origin, political opinions,religionorbeliefs, trade‐union membership,andtheprocessingofgenetic dataordataconcerninghealthorsexlifeorcriminalconvictionsorrelatedsecurity measuresshallbeprohibited”(article9). Inbothcasesarepoliticalopinionsconsideredassensitivedata.Algorithmicanaly‐ sis and collection can semantically not perfectly distinguish between sensitive and non‐sensitivedata.TheuseofDPIfortargetedadvertisingandbygovernmentsfaces theriskthatsensitivedataofusersarebeingmonitored.Theexamplesabouttheal‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 legedsurveillanceofpoliticaloppositiondocumentedinthisreportshowthatthereis the risk that the processing and analysis of sensitive content results in political re‐ pression or social discrimination of certain groups. The claim that DPI surveillance can help fighting crime and terrorism needs therefore to be complemented by the warningthatDPIInternetsurveillanceatthecontentlevelofInternetdata(theappli‐ cationlevelintheTCI/IPlayermodel)canbringaboutprivacyviolationsandthepro‐ cessingofsensitivedataandtherebyresultinrepressionagainstanddiscrimination ofcertaingroupsinsociety. AnnexAshowsthattherehavebeencases,wherenewsmediareportedthatEuro‐ pean security technologies exported communications surveillance technologies to countries,wheretheywereusedforthemonitoringofandrepressionagainstpoliti‐ cal opponents. The examples concern the following European security companies: Area Spa (Italy), Qosmos (France), Utimaco (Germany), Amesys (France), trovicor (Germany),NokiaSiemensNetworks(Finland).GammaGroup(UK). 2.3.7.1. Area Spa (Italy), Qosmos (France), Utimaco (Germany) InNovember2011,therewerenewsreportsthattheItalianfirmAreaSpaequipped theSyrianintelligencewithsurveillancetechnologies(project“Asfador”)thatcanbe usedformonitoringthepoliticalopponentsofBasharal‐Assad’sgovernment.Inthis project,alsotechnologiesbyQosmos(France)andUtimaco(Germany)seemaccord‐ ingtonewsreportstohavebeenused:“AreaisusingequipmentfromAmericanand European companies, according to blueprints and other documents obtained by Bloomberg News and the person familiar with the job. The project includes Sunnyvale, California‐based NetApp Inc. (NTAP) storage hardware and software for archivinge‐mails;probestoscanSyria’scommunicationsnetworkfromParis‐based Qosmos SA; and gear from Germany’s Utimaco Safeware AG (USA) that connects tapped telecom lines to Area’s monitoring‐center computers” (Bloomberg, Syria Crackdown Gets Italy Firm’s Aid With U.S.‐Europe Spy Gear. November 4, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐11‐03/syria‐crackdown‐gets‐italy‐firm‐s‐ aid‐with‐u‐s‐europe‐spy‐gear.html). “Whenthesystemiscomplete,Syriansecurityagentswillbeabletofollowtargets on flat‐screen workstations that display communications and Web use in near‐real timealongsidegraphicsthatmapcitizens’networksofelectroniccontacts,according to the documents and two people familiar with the plans. Such a system is custom‐ made for repression, says Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Washington‐ based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which promotes tighter sanctions againstSyria.’AnycompanysellingmonitoringsurveillancetechnologytotheAssad regimeiscomplicitinhumanrightscrimes,’hesays.[…]WhenBloombergNewscon‐ tactedQosmos,CEOThibautBechetoillesaidhewouldpulloutoftheproject.‘Itwas not right to keep supporting this regime,’ he says. The company’s board decided aboutfourweeksagotoexitandisstillfiguringouthowtounwinditsinvolvement, The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 hesays.Thecompany’sdeep‐packetinspectionprobescanpeerintoe‐mailandre‐ constructeverythingthathappensonanInternetuser’sscreen,saysQosmos’shead ofmarketing,ErikLarsson”(ibid.). “The Syrian secret service appears to be monitoring the country's protest move‐ mentusingtechnologyfromtheGermanfirmUtimaco,basedinOberursel,asuburb ofFrankfurt.ContactedbySpiegelreportersonFriday,thecompanysaidithadsold noproductsdirectlytoSyrianTelecom,theregime‐ownedtelecommunicationspro‐ vider. The company had instead delivered products to the Italian firm Area, with which is has conducted business for years. The company said it could not confirm whetherAreahadthenresoldgoodstoSyriandictatorBasharAssad’sregime”(Spie‐ gelOnlineInternational,IsSyriaMonitoringProtesterswithGermanTechnology?No‐ vember8,2011). SothereweremediareportsthatsaidthatAreaSpastartedinstallingInternetsur‐ veillancetechnologiesinSyria,acountrywherehundredsofmembersofthepolitical opposition have been killed by the government that tries to repress protests that startedinJanuary2011.“EmployeesofAreaSpA,asurveillancecompanybasedout‐ sideMilan,areinstallingthesystemunderthedirectionofSyrianintelligenceagents, who'vepushedtheItalianstofinish,sayingtheyurgentlyneedtotrackpeople,aper‐ sonfamiliarwiththeprojectsays.TheAreaemployeeshaveflownintoDamascusin shiftsthisyearastheviolencehasescalated,saystheperson,whohasworkedonthe systemforArea.[…]AreaisusingequipmentfromU.S.andEuropeancompanies,ac‐ cording to blueprints and other documents obtained by Bloomberg and the person familiarwiththejob.TheprojectincludesSunnyvale,Calif.‐basedNetAppInc.storage hardwareandsoftwareforarchivinge‐mails;probestoscanSyria'scommunications networkfromParisbasedQosmosSA;andgearfromGermany'sUtimacoSafewareAG thatconnectstappedtelecomlinestoArea'smonitoring‐centrecomputers.[…]When the system is complete, Syrian security agents will be able to follow targets on flat‐ screen workstations that display communications and web use in near‐real time alongside graphics that map citizens' networks of electronic contacts, according to thedocumentsandtwopeoplefamiliarwiththeplans.Suchasystemiscustommade for repression, says Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Washington based Foundationfor Defenseof Democracies[…]Area,aprivatelyheldcompanythatgot itsstartin1996furnishingphonetapstoItalianlawenforcement,hascodenamedthe system‘Asfador,’anodtoaMr.Asfadorwhocold‐calledthecompanyin2008asking ittobidonthedeal,accordingtoonepersonknowledgeableabouttheproject”(The Calgary Herald, Italian Firm Helping Syria Spy on E‐Mails. System Made for Repres‐ sion,saysThink‐Tank.November5,2011). According to media reports, “Area chief executive Andrea Formenti says he can't discussspecificclientsorcontracts,andthatthecompanyfollowsalllawsandexport regulations”(ibid.).Later,Area’sCEOwasquotedinthepresssayingthatthesurveil‐ lanceprojecthasnotbeenactivated:“Inresponse,AreaSpA'sCEO,AndreaFormenti, wasquotedinItaly'sCorrieredellaSeranewspaperthismonthannouncingthathis companyhadnoemployeesinSyriaandthattheprojecthadnotmadeanyprogress The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 in the last two months. […] ‘The interception system has never been activated and cannot be under current circumstances. There has been no repression carried out thankstoourequipment,’FormentitoldCorrieredellaSera”(CNNOnline,Cyberwar ExplodesinSyria.November20,2011). “’WehaveacontractinplacewithSyria,thistrue;buteverythinghasbeenhalted fortwomonths,andtherearenoneofourtechniciansinDamascus.’Afterfivedaysof silence, there is a statement by Andrea Formenti, chairman of Area SpA, the Italian softwarehousethathasbecomeaninternationalcasebecauseitisinstallinganinter‐ ceptsystemofInternettrafficonbehalfof[SyrianPresident]BasharAssad’sregime. Formenti, 42, explains his having ‘landed’ in Syria: ‘We won a international bidding contest in 2008, outbidding 4 European countries, and other non‐European compa‐ nies.Asinterlocutors,wehaveneverhadpeopleeitherinthemilitaryorintheintel‐ ligenceservices,butofthelocaltelephoneprovider.’Area'schairmanstatedthatthe contractwasworth13millioneuros,butdeniedcurrentlyhavingpersonnelatwork intheMiddleEastcountry.‘Fortwomonthseverythinghasbeenhalted,andIwould like to point out that the eavesdropping system has never been operated, and as thingsnowstand,itneverwill.’Thefutureisuncertain:‘Wehavecontractualagree‐ mentsthatareverybinding,andwhich,ifnothonoured,wouldforceustopayhefty penalties.Ontheotherhand,wearefollowingthesituationinSyriaasitevolves.We wantnopartofbeingaccomplicestorepression.Wehopetherewillbesomeformof interventionbytheinternationalauthoritiestosortthingsout.’Yesterday,aprotest washeldinfrontofAreaheadquartersbyanti‐AssadrepresentativeswholiveinIta‐ ly. Beside them were activists of the Italian Pirates Party” (BBC Monitoring Europe, Italian Software Company Denies Complicity in Syrian President’s Repression. No‐ vember9,2011). AreaSpaisproducingandsellingMonitoringCentres.Ithasobtainedacontractfor implementing anInternet surveillance system in Syria. The company has reacted to allegationsaftertheyweremadepublicbythemedia,sayingthatthesystemhasnev‐ er been activated. The case is an example of how first surveillance technologies are sold to countries or organisations that are considered problematic by human rights groupsandonlyafterinformationaboutithasbeenmadepublicdocompaniesreact totheallegations.Thequestionthatarisesiswhathappensinthosecases,wherecivil societywatchdogorganizationsdonotfindoutabouttheexistenceofspecificcasesor donothavetheresourcestoengageininquiries. change.org gathered 20 000 signatures for a petition against the project (change.org,HowWeWon,December1,2011. http://www.change.org/petitions/demand‐us‐and‐european‐cos‐stop‐supporting‐ deadly‐syria‐net‐surveillance).ItwasinitiatedbytheInternetfreedomgroupAccess and the Syrian blogger Anas Qtiesh. Area SpA withdrew from the project. Also Qos‐ mos withdrew its technology supply and released a news statement about this cir‐ cumstance. Qosmosreactedtothemedia’scharges:“Qosmostechnologycomponentsaresold to third‐party software vendors to improve performance in a wide variety of tele‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 communications, network infrastructure and cyber security applications. We share the concern about the potential for misuse of surveillance applications. As a result, Qosmos withdrew from the Syrian ‘Asfador’ project – a decision made prior to the systembeingfinalizedandpriortotheinitialstoryreportedbyBloombergon3No‐ vember.Qosmoswillneithersupplynorsupportitstechnologytothosewhosellto authoritarianregimes.Qosmosisfullycompliantinadheringtoalllawsrelatedtothe saleanduseofitstechnology.AlthoughtheuseofLawfulInterception(LI)solutions bytelecommunicationscompaniesismandatedthroughouttheEU,USandmostoth‐ ercountriesworldwidetocollectcommunicationsinaccordancewithlocallaws,re‐ centpoliticaleventshaveshownthatfurtherregulationofLI,includingmorerestric‐ tivelegislation,isrequiredtopreventabuse”(Qosmos,QosmosStatementaboutRe‐ cent Media Reporting. November 22, 2011. http://www.qosmos.com/news‐ events/qosmos‐statement‐about‐recent‐media‐reporting). Also the Germany company Utimaco reacted to the media reports: “It is thought thatGermansurveillancetechnologyhasalsobeendeliveredtoSyria,aspartofasur‐ veillancesystemmadebytheItalianfirmArea.Foryears,theItalianshaveusedspe‐ cializedsoftwarebytheGermanfirmUtimacointheirsystems.ButasUtimacosenior executiveMaltePollmanninsists,Areaonlybuiltatestversion,andtheItalianshave justcancelledtheentireproject.‘Oursoftwarewasnotused,’saysPollmann”(Spiegel Online International, Western Surveillance Technology in the Hands of Despots. De‐ cember 8, 2011). In a statement on its website, Utimaco declared: “Utimaco and its majorityshareholder,Sophos,haverecentlybeenincludedinmediareportsaboutan ItalianOEMreseller(AreaS.p.A.)allegedlysellingUtimaco’sLIMStechnologytoSyria. Wetakeglobaltradecomplianceveryseriouslyandrequireallofourpartnerstoad‐ heretotheGerman,EuropeanUnion(EU)exportregulationsandUnitedNationsem‐ bargolists.Wearethoroughlyinvestigatingthematterandhavestoppedanyfurther activities with Area until we receive full clarification from them” (http://lims.utimaco.com/en/company/newsevents/statement‐on‐recent‐media‐ reports‐from‐utimaco‐safeware‐ag/). Theexportofsurveillancetechnologywasinthiscircumstanceonlypreventedbe‐ causecriticaljournalistsandcivilsocietysteppedin.Theinvolvedcompaniesseemed to have at first had no scruples about the possible use of their technologies for the monitoringofpoliticalopposition,whichshowsthatitisdifficultifcivilsocietyhasto taketheroleofawatchdogthattriestocorrectandstopcompaniesbehaviourafterit has actually happened or started. Civil society tends to have limited resources and onecanaskwhathappensinthosecasesthatremainunknown.Ifcivilsocietyandthe media had not created pressure (e.g. because of lack of knowledge, resources, em‐ ployees,etc),onecanimaginethatproject“Asfador”wouldhavebeenimplemented andresultedinhumansbeingtorturedandkilledfortheirpoliticalbelieveswiththe helpofEuropeansurveillancetechnologies. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 2.3.7.2. Amesys (France) In August 2011, the Wall Street Journal wrote that the Amesys sold deep packet in‐ spectiontechnologiestoLibya,where,accordingtotheWallStreetJournal,Gaddafi’s regimeusedtheminanInternetspyingcentreinTripolitomonitortheInternetus‐ ageofLibyancitizensandpoliticalopponents(WallStreetJournalOnline,Firmsaided Libyanspies.Firstlookinsidesecurityunitshowshowcitizensweretracked.August 30,2011).TheInternationalFederationforHumanRightsandtheLiguedesDroitsde l'HommeetduCitoyenfiledcriminalchargesagainstAmesys(FIDH,FIDHandLDHfile acomplaintconcerningtheresponsibilityofthecompanyAMESYSinrelationtoacts oftorture.October19,2011): “On the ground floor of a six‐story building here, agents working for Moammar Gadhafi sat in an open room, spying on emails and chat messages with the help of technologyLibyaacquiredfromtheWest.Therecentlyabandonedroomislinedwith posters and English‐language training manuals stamped with the name Amesys, a unitofFrenchtechnologyfirmBullSA,whichinstalledthemonitoringcenter.Awarn‐ ingbythedoorbearstheAmesyslogo.Thesignreads:‘Helpkeepourclassifiedbusi‐ ness secret. Don't discuss classified information out of the HQ’. The room, explored Monday by The Wall Street Journal, provides clear new evidence of foreign compa‐ nies' cooperation in the repression of Libyans under Col. Gadhafi's almost 42‐year rule.ThesurveillancefilesfoundhereincludeemailswrittenasrecentlyasFebruary, aftertheLibyanuprisinghadbegun.[…]Thiskindofspyingbecameatoppriorityfor Libya as the region's Arab Spring revolutions blossomed in recent months. […] The TripoliInternetmonitoringcenterwasamajorpartofabroadsurveillanceapparatus builtbyCol.Gadhafitokeeptabsonhisenemies.Amesysin2009equippedthecenter with ‘deep packet inspection’ technology, one of the most intrusive techniques for snoopingonpeople'sonline activities, accordingtopeoplefamiliar withthematter. […]Gadhafi'sregimehadbecomemoreattunedtothedangersposedbyInternetac‐ tivism, even though the nation had only about 100,000 Internet subscriptions in a populationof6.6million.TheEaglesystemallowsagentstoobservenetworktraffic andpeerintopeople'semails,amongotherthings.Intheroom,oneEnglish‐language postersays:’WhereasmanyInternetinterceptionsystemscarryoutbasicfilteringon IPaddressandextractonlythosecommunicationsfromtheglobalflow(LawfulInter‐ ception), EAGLE Interception system analyses and stores all the communications from the monitored link (Massive interception)’. [...] In a basement storage room, dossiers of Libyans' online activities are lined up in floor‐to‐ceiling filing shelves” (Wall Street Journal Online, Firms aided Libyan spies. First look inside security unit showshowcitizensweretracked.August30,2011). Peter Bouckaert, Human RightsWatch's emergencies director, expressed thecon‐ cern that Western companies and governments take actions to destroy evidence of theirsupportofGaddafiandthesurveillanceofthepoliticaloppositioninLibya(The Times,WesttriestocoverupLibyadeals:Theraceisontoseekoutanddestroyany incriminatingevidence.October7,2011). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Inapressrelease,Amesysdisputedtheclaimthatitinstalledasurveillancesystem inLibyaandannouncedthatitreservestherighttofilesuitagainstthosewhomake suchclaims: “AmesyssignedacontractwiththeLibyanauthoritiesin2007.Therelevanthard‐ warewasdeliveredin2008.Thecontractwasrelatedtothemakingavailableofanal‐ ysishardwareconcerningasmallfractionoftheInternetlinesinstalledatthattime(a fewthousand). ThisdidnotincludeeitherInternetcommunicationsviasatellite(as usedinInternetcafes),encrypteddatasuchasSkype‐typecommunications,orfilter‐ ingofWebsites.Inaddition,thehardwareuseddidnotallowforthemonitoringof eitherfixedormobiletelephonelines. Thecontractwasconcludedatatimewhentheinternationalcommunitywasinthe processofdiplomaticrapprochementwithLibya,whichwaslookingtofightagainst terrorismandactsperpetratedbyAlQaeda(2007wastheyearinwhichtheBulgari‐ annurseswerereleased).(InDecember2007MuammarGadhafimadeanofficialvisit to France; in July 2009 Muammar Gadhafi met with Barack Obama in Italy). All Amesys' business dealings comply rigorously with the legal and regulatory re‐ quirementssetoutininternational,EuropeanandFrenchconventions.Amesysdoes notoperateanytelephoneorInternetmonitoringcenters,anywhereworldwide.[...] Amesysreservesitsrightsinrelationtoanyinfringementthatmayaffectitsimageor reputation” (Amesys,Pressrelease.September1,2011. http://www.wcm.bull.com/internet/pr/new_rend.jsp?DocId=673289&lang=en). Sotherearetwodifferentstories:Ontheonehandjournalistsandhumanrightsac‐ tivistswhosaythattheydiscoveredaLibyanmonitoringcentreandthat“Amesysin 2009 equipped the center with ‘deep packet inspection’ technology”. On the other handAmesysthatsaysthatitdoesnotoperatesuchcentres.Andthereisadocument releasedbyWikiLeaks(#5_15)thatifauthenticseemstosuggestbusinessrelations betweeni2eandLibya. 2.3.7.3. trovicor (Germany) and Nokia Siemens Networks (Finland) InApril2009,theWashingtonTimesreportedthatNokiaSiemenssoldaMonitoring CentretoIran: “Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN), a joint venture between the Finnish cell‐phone giantNokiaandGermanpowerhouseSiemens,deliveredwhatisknownasamonitor‐ ing center to Irantelecom, Iran's state‐owned telephone company. A spokesman for NSN said the serverswere soldfor “lawful intercept functionality,” a technical term used by the cell‐phone industry to refer to law enforcement's ability to tap phones, reade‐mailsandsurveilelectronicdataoncommunicationsnetworks.InIran,acoun‐ trythatfrequentlyjailsdissidentsandwhereregimeopponentsrelyheavilyonWeb‐ based communication with the outside world, a monitoring center that can archive theseinterceptscouldprovideavaluabletooltointensifyrepression.LilyMazaheri,a The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 humanrightsandimmigrationlawyerwhorepresentshigh‐profileIraniandissidents, said shehad suspected that thegovernment had increased its capability to monitor its perceived enemies. Recently, one of her clients was arrested because of instant messaginghehadparticipatedinwithMs.Mazaheri,shesaid.’Hetoldmehehadre‐ ceivedacallfromtheMinistryofIntelligence,andthisguywhenhewenttotheinter‐ rogation,theyputinfrontofhimprintedcopiesofhischatswithme.Hesaidhewas dumbfounded,andhewassenttoprison.’[…]HadiGhaemi,spokesmanfortheInter‐ national Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, said 12 women´s rights activists were arrested latelastmonthataprivatemeetingtocelebratethePersianNewYear.He said the raid suggested the state had access to private communications. ’ThisisanabsolutethreattotheprivacyofallIranianactivists.Itputsthemindanger ofbeingconstantlymonitoredbytheintelligenceservices,somethingthatweknowis alreadyhappening,’Mr.Ghaemisaid“(WashingtonTimes,FedContractor,CellPhone MakerSoldSpySystemtoIran.April13,2009). TheIranianjournalistIsaSaharkhizwasjailedforthreeyears“onchargesofinsult‐ ing Iran's supreme leader and spreading propaganda against the regime. […] Last month,SaharkhizfiledalawsuitagainstNokiaSiemens,accusingthecompanyofde‐ liveringsurveillanceequipmenttoIranthathelpedtheauthoritiestracehiswherea‐ boutsthroughhiscellphone”(BBCMonitoringWorldMedia,ProminentIranianJour‐ nalistJailedforThreeYears.September30,2010). Nokia Siemens commented on media reports: (ARD Tagesthemen, Siemens‐Nokia ÜberwachungstechnikimIran.June24,2009. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JbydEFBx5E).“Thesystemcanonlyrecord,it cannot identify anybody” (Stefan Zuber)1. The journalist Erich Möchel in contrast said: “One can geographically locate with these monitoring centres, where persons are, one can create their communication profile, with whom they communicate. Groups can be investigated”2 (ibid). A product specification of the Nokia Siemens MonitoringCenter(providedinoneofElaman’sbrochures)explainsthatitsupports the “fully automatic recording of all data concerning all activities of the target” and makes“nationwidemonitoringpossible”(#7_2).Sotherelevantaspectisnotthatit does not censor the Internet, but rather that Nokia Siemens’ Monitoring Center can monitortheactivitiesandcommunicationsofpoliticalactivists. AformeremployeeofNokiaSiemensreportedthathewaspartoftheinstallationof aMonitoringCentreinIran(ZDFFrontal21,Nokia‐Siemens‐NetworksimIran.Janu‐ ary 26, 2010. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oHqyKYa6Ffw). Siemens Board MemberJoeKaesersaid:“ThereistodaynoreasonforustoassumethatNSNhasact‐ 1 ”DasSystemkannnuraufzeichnen,eskannniemandenidentifizieren.Esistnichtgeeignet,umZensur zuüben”. 2 “Es können mit diesen Monitoring Centern Personen geographisch bestimmt werden, wo sie sind, es kann ihr Kommunikationsprofil erstellt werden, mit wem sie kommunizieren. Es können Gruppen ausgeforscht warden”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 ed unlawfully or unorderly”3. In the same report, the two Iranian political activists Poojan Mahmudian and Kianoosh Sanjari reported that they were imprisoned and thattheircommunicationsweremonitored(ibid.). InitsCorporateResponsibilityReport2009,NokiaSiemens’CEORajeevSuriwrote: “Over the past year we have seen allegations that telecommunications technology, includingthatprovidedby NokiaSiemensNetworks,hasbeenusedtosuppresshu‐ manrightsinsteadofenhancingthem.Thisis notasimpleissueastechnologythatis designed to benefit society can be used for other purposes and, of course, govern‐ mentscanchangeovertime”(NokiaSiemensNetworks2009,4).Thisstatementim‐ plies that a Monitoring Center isdesignedfor benefiting society and that its use for repressionofpoliticalopponentsisanunintendedside‐effect.Thequestionisifthe purposeoftheuseofsuchatechnologyforrepressionisnotforeseeableifacompany entersabusinessdealwithIran. InastatementissuedinJune2009,NokiaSiemensarguedthatthesurveillancecen‐ treitdeliveredtoIranhad“thecapabilitytoconductvoicemonitoringoflocalcallson itsfixedandmobilenetwork”andthatitcouldnot“providedatamonitoring,internet monitoring,deeppacketinspection,internationalcallmonitoringorspeechrecogni‐ tion”(NokiaSiemensNetworks,ProvisionofLawfulInterceptCapacityinIran.June 22, 2009. http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/news‐events/press‐room/press‐ releases/provision‐of‐lawful‐intercept‐capability‐in‐iran). It also said in the same statement that Nokia Siemens Networks’ Intelligence Solutions was sold to Persua GmbH on March 31st, 2009 (ibid), which now operates it under the name Trovicor GmbH(SpiegelOnlineInternational,WesternSurveillanceTechnologyintheHandsof Despots. December 8, 2011). In August 2011, Bloomberg reported that the impris‐ onedhumanrightsactivistsAbdulGhaniAlKhanjarwastorturedinaBahrainiprison andthattheofficialspossessedtranscriptsofhiscommunications.Accordingtotwo people associated with Trovicor, the company provided surveillance technology to Bahrain (Bloomberg, Torture in Bahrain Becomes Routine With Help From Nokia Siemens. August 23, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐08‐22/torture‐ in‐bahrain‐becomes‐routine‐with‐help‐from‐nokia‐siemens‐networking.html). “Trovicor equipment plays a surveillance role in at least 12 Middle Eastern and North African nations, according to the two people familiar with the installations. […] Al Khanjar says the first of his communications used in the interrogations was interceptedinJune2009.Atthattime,theNokiaSiemensfamilyofrelatedcompanies was the only known supplier and maintainer of monitoring centers to Bahrain, the two people familiar with the installations say. The clusters of computers required constantupgradesbythecompanies,theysay”(ibid.). InApril2012,GermanmediapublishedallegationsthatNokiaSiemensalsosoldits Monitoring Centre to Syria. “German industrial giant Siemens sold network surveil‐ lancetechnologytotheSyrianregime in2000,public broadcasterARDreportedon 3 “Es gibt heute für uns keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass NSN sich rechtswidrig oder nicht ordnungsmässig verhalten hat”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Tuesdaynight.Accordingtotheirnewsshow‘Fakt’,aproductcalledthe‘Monitoring Center’ was delivered to Syrian mobile communications company Syriatel. Nokia Siemens Networks confirmed the delivery, they reported. The corresponding busi‐ ness division at Siemens became the new joint venture Nokia Siemens Networks in 2007. The following year, that company signed a contract with Syrian landline pro‐ vider STE, a deal that also included the ‘Monitoring Center’. These contracts were then transferred in March 2009 to the Nokia Siemens Networks spin‐off company Trovicor,whichtookoverthe‘VoiceandDataRecording’division,ARDreported,cit‐ ingdocumentstheyhadobtained. TheMunich‐basedcompanyTrovicor,whichbelongstoafinancialinvestortoday, declined to comment on the issue, ‘Fakt’ reported. But a human rights activist from AmnestyInternationaltoldtheshowthatthesystematiconlinesurveillancebySyrian security forceswaslikely playingaroleinthecapture ofoppositionmembers,who facetortureaftertheirarrest.[…]InternetfreedomactivistandPiratePartymember Stephan Urbach criticized the export of surveillance technology from Germany. ‘We need a broader debate about the ethical responsibility of companies’, he said in a statement.‘TheGermangovernmenthascompletelymissedthisdebate,particularly inthewakeofrevelationsaboutsuchfilteringandsurveillancesystems’.Ifitbecomes unambiguouslyclearthatGermancompanieshavedeliveredsurveillancetechnology to totalitarian states, Berlin must ‘swiftly correct this failure’, he added” (Spiegel OnlineInternational,MonitoringtheOpposition:SiemensAllegedlySoldSurveillance GeartoSyria.April11th,2012. http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,826860,00.html). Fakt interviewed a Syrian activist who fled to Germany. He said: “I provided YouTube videos of demonstrations. When I was arrested, my exact behaviour was readtomefromthefiles.EverysinglestepI'vetakenontheInternetwasheldaganist tomewhileIwasbeaten”4(FAKT,SyrienüberwachtmitSiemens‐Technik.April10, 2012.http://www.mdr.de/fakt/siemens106.html). If these reports are true, then it means that Nokia Siemens first sold Monitoring CentrestoIranandSyria,thensolditssurveillancebusinessunittoanothercompany that renamed the business unit to trovicor and continued selling the technology to countriesthatusethemfortracking,imprisoningandtorturingpoliticalactivists. Erich Möchel, the first journalist who reported about Nokia Siemens relations to Iran,commentsonthe saleofthesurveillanceunittoasmallercompanythatthere wasnoconcernabouthumanrights,butonlyaconcernaboutimagedamage,andthat thebusinesswith surveillancecontinues:"Meanwhilepredominates the insightthat thecollateraldamageforcompanypolicyprobablywillbemuchsmalleriftheseMon‐ itoringCenters[...]areoutsourcedtospecialistcompaniesandoneselfprepareseve‐ 4 TranslationfromGerman.“IchstellteYouTubeVideosvonDemonstrationenbereit.Alsichdanach verhaftetwurde,wurdemirmeinegenaueVorgehensweiseausdenAktenvorgelesen.Jedereinzelne Schritt,denichimInternetunternommenhabe,wurdemirvorgehalten,währendichgeschlagen wurde”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 rythingtechnicallysothatthisforeignequipmentsuppliedbythirdpartiescanwith‐ outproblembedockedtoone’sowntelephonenetworks.[...]Itispuremarketpoli‐ tics,nothingelse.Ithasnothingtodowithhumanrights,butonlywiththefactthat one does not want to dirty one’s own hands. So one sends ahead somebody else – companiesthatdonotcarebecausetheycomefromthisarea.[...]Ifyouselltoastate acompleteGSMnetworkfamily,thenthisreallycostsmoney.That'salotofrevenue. Well,nowonesaysstopthat,oneletsotherstakecareofit,theMonitoringCentres, andonerathermakesthebigbusinessandnotthesmallbusinessbecausebothget togetherbadly[...]Nokiahassufferedahugereputationaldamagebytherevelations inIran.[...]Forthisreasononehasretreatedandsaid:Theimagelossislargerthan theexpectedprofitwhenwecarryonfurtherthisway,sowestopit.That’sbasicallya verywisebusinesspolicydecision"(NDR.ZAPP:InterviewmitErichMöchel.Decem‐ ber7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/moechel103.html)6. Möchelintheinterviewpointedoutthatpublicpressure(bythemediaandcivilso‐ ciety)ononecompanydoesnotautomaticallystopunethicalbusinesspractices,but canresultinthesellingofbusinessunitstoothercompaniesthatengageincompara‐ blepractices. NewsreportshavearguedthatMonitoringCentresproducedbyNokiaSiemensand trovicorwereusedtorepresstheIranianandBahrainianopposition,peoplelikethe 5 “Inzwischen überwiegt die Einsicht, dass der Kollateralschaden für die Firmenpolitik wohl wesentlich ge‐ ringer sein wird, wenn man diese Monitoring Centres […] an Spezialfirmen auslagert und man selbst berei‐ tet eigentlich nur alles dazu vor technisch, dass dieses fremde Equipment (von Dritten zugelieferte) prob‐ lemlos an die eigenen Telefonienetze andockbar ist. […] Es ist reine Marktpolitik, sonst nichts. Es hat nichts mit Menschenrechten zu tun, sondern nur damit, dass man sich selbst nicht anpatzen will damit. Sondern da schickt man jemanden anderen vor – Firmen, denen es egal ist, denn sie kommen aus dem Bereich. […] Wenn man an einen Staat ein Netz aus der kompletten GSM Familie verkauft, das kostet so richtig Geld. Das ist viel Umsatz. Naja, jetzt sagt man halt, man überlässt das anderen, die Monitoring Centres, und wir ma‐ chen lieber das große Geschäft und das kleine Geschäft nicht, denn beide Geschäfte zusammen vertragen sich schlecht. […] Nokia hat einen immensen Imageschaden durch das Auffliegen im Iran davongetragen. […] Aus diesem Grund hat man sich zurückgezogen und hat gesagt: Der Imageschaden ist grösser als der zu erwartende Gewinn, wenn wir das weiter betreiben, also hören wir auf damit. Eine sehr kluge geschäftspo‐ litische Entscheidung im Grunde ”. 6 “Inzwischen überwiegt die Einsicht, dass der Kollateralschaden für die Firmenpolitik wohl wesentlich ge‐ ringer sein wird, wenn man diese Monitoring Centres […] an Spezialfirmen auslagert und man selbst berei‐ tet eigentlich nur alles dazu vor technisch, dass dieses fremde Equipment (von Dritten zugelieferte) prob‐ lemlos an die eigenen Telefonienetze andockbar ist. […] Es ist reine Marktpolitik, sonst nichts. Es hat nichts mit Menschenrechten zu tun, sondern nur damit, dass man sich selbst nicht anpatzen will damit. Sondern da schickt man jemanden anderen vor – Firmen, denen es egal ist, denn sie kommen aus dem Bereich. […] Wenn man an einen Staat ein Netz aus der kompletten GSM Familie verkauft, das kostet so richtig Geld. Das ist viel Umsatz. Naja, jetzt sagt man halt, man überlässt das anderen, die Monitoring Centres, und wir ma‐ chen lieber das große Geschäft und das kleine Geschäft nicht, denn beide Geschäfte zusammen vertragen sich schlecht. […] Nokia hat einen immensen Imageschaden durch das Auffliegen im Iran davongetragen. […] Aus diesem Grund hat man sich zurückgezogen und hat gesagt: Der Imageschaden ist grösser als der zu erwartende Gewinn, wenn wir das weiter betreiben, also hören wir auf damit. Eine sehr kluge geschäftspo‐ litische Entscheidung im Grunde ”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 journalist Isa Saharkhiz and the political activists Poojan Mahmudian and Kianoosh Sanjari in Iran or the Bahraini human rights activist Abdul Ghani Al Khanjar. There aredifferingreportsandviewsaboutwhattechnicalcapacitiesthecommunications surveillancetechnologiesexportedtoIranandBahrainactuallyhad.Soalthoughthe business practices are not entirely clear, it seems to be the case the companies like trovicor and Nokia Siemens produced or have produced surveillance technologies that are capable of intercepting the communications content of different forms of communication (Internet, fixed line telephony, mobile phone communication, etc) andthatsuchtechnologiescaninpoliticalcontextsbeusedforrepressionagainstthe politicalopposition. OnOctober25th,2010,theEUupdateditsexportrestrictionstoIranthatwereis‐ sued in 2007. The restriction includes an explicit restriction “on trade in dual‐use goodsandtechnology,aswellasequipmentwhichmightbeusedforinternalrepres‐ sion”(EURegulationNo.961/2010of25October2010onRestrictiveMeasuresagainst Iran).ThismeansthatexportsofInternetandphonesurveillancetechnologieshave beenlegalpriortothisrestriction.InMarch2012,theEUupdatedthisregulationsay‐ ingthatequipmentthatcanbeusedforInternetandphonesurveillanceandinternal repressionshallnotbeexportedfromtheEUtoIran(EURegulationNo.267/2012of 23 March 2012 concerning Restrictive Measures against Iran). The EU’s export re‐ strictionsofthatwerepassedonNovember16th,2011applyforequipmentthatcan be used “in connection with a violation of human rights, democratic principles or freedomofspeechasdefinedbytheCharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropean Union,byusinginterceptiontechnologiesanddigitaldatatransferdevicesformoni‐ toring mobile phones and text messages and targeted surveillance of Internet use (e.g. via Monitoring Centres and Lawful Interception Gateways)” (EU Regulation No. 1232/2011oftheEuropeanParliamentandtheEuropeanCouncil).Therestrictionap‐ pliesonlyforthefollowingcountries:Argentina,China(includingHongKongandMa‐ cao), Croatia, India, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and Ukraine (ibid.). Thismeansthatexportofcommunicationssurveillancetechnologytoacountrylike Bahrain is still legal, whereas it is now illegal to export similar technologies (like MonitoringCentres)toIran.Soiftheclaimsthattrovicorexportedcommunications surveillance tools to Bahrain were true, then it would definitely be the case that “trovicorcomplieswithallexportandcustomscontrolsinallregionswherebusiness is conducted” (#9, 7). The question that can however be posed is not only if legal standards have been respected or if fundamental ethical principles are respected (such as the human right of freedom of assembly and expression) and if trovicor’s businesspracticesrespecttheethicalgoalthatithassetitselfinitsCodeofBusiness Conduct(#9)andthatisnotprimarilyalegalgoal,namelythat“trovicor’sbusiness ethics goal is, as an industry leader, to be among the world’s best in corporate re‐ sponsibility,corporategovernance,promotingfaircompetition,adaptinternationally recognized standards whenever feasible, and practicing good corporate citizenship whereveritdoesbusiness”(#9,4). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Being asked if trovicor exported communications surveillance technology to Bah‐ rain,trovicorofficials“wereonlywillingtostatethattheycouldnotpubliclydiscuss customersandthedetailsofagreements”(SpiegelOnlineInternational,WesternSur‐ veillanceTechnologyintheHandsofDespots.December8,2011)and“BirgittFisch‐ er‐Harrow, Trovicor’s head of marketing communications, said Trovicor’s contracts preventitfromdisclosingitscustomersorthecountrieswhereitdoesbusiness.She declinedtocommentfurther”(ArabianBusiness,WesternSpyToolsAidinCrackdown on Arab Dissent. August 28, 2011). That businesses refuse to comment on their ex‐ portsshowsthatunderthecurrentlegalcircumstancesintheEUitisdifficulttoob‐ taintransparencyaboutwhichsurveillancetechnologieshavebeenexportedandsold towhichcountriesandorganizationsbyEuropeansecuritycompanies. Insomeofthecasespresentedthusfar,companiesengagingintheexportofcom‐ munications surveillance withdrew their projects or plans only after the media and civilsocietycriticizedthempublicly,inothercasescompaniesdeclinedtocomment. Thisshowsthecircumstancethatthereisalackoftransparencyofthebusinessprac‐ ticesofsecuritycompanies. 2.3.7.4. Gamma Group (UK) Gamma’sFinFisherisaso‐called“Trojanhorse”,asoftwarethatonceinstalledallows theintruderremoteaccess.FinFishercaninfectcomputers,mobilephones,localnet‐ works and ISP networks and extract data from these systems (#7_10, 4‐10). The product and training was advertised in Eleman’s Communications Monitoring cata‐ logue from October 2007 (#7_2). FinFisher can e.g. be tarned as a software update thatissenttoacomputerormobilephone(NDR.ZAPP:GermanySpywareforDicta‐ tors.December7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/zapp4923.html). “FinFisher is the leading offensive IT Intrusion program through which Gamma provides complementary solutions, products and advanced training capabilities to Government end‐users who are seeking world class offensive techniques for infor‐ mationgatheringfromsuspectsandtargets”(#19). Accordingtomediareports,GammaofferedtosellitsFinSpysoftwaretoEgyptian securityauthorities(EUobserver.com,EUcompaniesbannedfromsellingspywareto repressive regimes. October 11, 2011). “Egyptian anti‐regime activists found a star‐ tlingdocumentlastmonthduringaraidinsidetheheadquartersofthecountry'sstate securityservice:ABritishcompanyofferedtosellaprogramthatsecurityexpertssay couldinfectdissidents'computersandgainaccesstotheiremailandothercommuni‐ cations. […] Amid the scattered papers, interrogation devices and random furniture foundduringtheraid,theactivistsuncoveredaproposedcontractdatedJune29from theBritishcompanyGammaInternationalthatpromisedtoprovideaccesstoGmail, Skype,HotmailandYahooconversationsandexchangesoncomputerstargetedbythe InteriorMinistryofoustedPresidentHosniMubarak.TheproposalfromGammaIn‐ ternationalwaspostedonlinebyCairophysicianMostafaHussein,abloggerwhowas The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 amongtheactivistswhoseizedtheministry'sdocuments.‘Itisimportantevidenceof theintentofthestatesecurityandinvestigationdivisionnottorespectourprivacy,’ Mr.Husseinsaid.‘Thisproposalwassenttoanotoriousdepartmentknownfortor‐ ture,spyingoncitizenstohelpMubarak'sregime,’Mr.Husseinsaid,referringtothe State Security Investigations Service. ‘The company Gamma, I consider them to be partnersinthecrimeoftryingtoinvadeourprivacyandarrestactivists’”(Washing‐ ton Times, British Firm Offered Spy Software to Egypt: Activists Say They Were the Targets.April26,2011). AlsotheGermanregionalpublicserviceTVstationNDRreportedaboutasecretof‐ ferofGammatotheEgyptianstatefortheFinFishertechnology(NDR.ZAPP:Germa‐ nySpywareforDictators.December7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/zapp4923.html). The Egyptian blogger Mostafa Hussein, who discovered the documents, argued in theNDRreportthatthissoftwareis“exactlylikeweapons”(ibid.).TheEgyptianIn‐ ternetactivistIsraaAbdelFattahwasinterviewed,sayingthatthissoftwareis“help‐ ingthedictators[…]to[…]attacktheactivism”(ibid.).HerownInternetcommunica‐ tionwassurveilledbytheEgyptiangovernment.Shesaidthatsurveillancecompanies “only think about money” (ibid.). NDR also describes Gamma’s attempts to sell sur‐ veillance technologiestoTurkmenistanandOman(ibid.).The AustrianIT journalist ErichMöchelsaidthatsurveillancetechnologycompaniesencourage“repressionand torture”(ibid.). Gamma reacted to the accusations partly by refusing to comment and partly by denyingthem:“PeterLloyd,anattorneyforGammaInternational,toldTheWashing‐ tonTimesthatthecompanyneversoldtheFinFishersoftwaretotheEgyptiansecuri‐ ty ministry. But the lawyer declined to answer questions about the company's mal‐ waredivision,orthedetailedproposalfoundintheEgyptianministry.‘Gammacom‐ pliesinallits dealingswithallapplicableU.K.lawsandregulations,’Mr.Lloydsaid. ‘Gamma did not supply to Egypt but in any event it would not be appropriate for Gamma to make public details of its transactions with any customer’ ” (Washington Times,BritishFirmOfferedSpySoftwaretoEgypt:ActivistsSayTheyWeretheTar‐ gets.April26,2011). Gammaexplainstheneedofsurveillancetechnologiesbythreatstonationalsecuri‐ ty.TheEgyptianrevolutioncertainlywasathreattothenationalsecurityoftheold Mubarak regime. The question that arises is if a government that is questioned in mass demonstrations by its own population has the moral right to defend national securitywiththehelpofsurveillancetechnologiesthatareusedtospyon,imprison, torture or kill opponents. On the one hand there are claims that Gamma offered to supply Internet surveillance technologies to Egypt, on the other hand the company hasdeniedthis.FinFisherdefinitelyisatechnologythathasthepotentialtobeused forthesurveillanceofandrepressionagainstpoliticalopponents. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 2.3.7.5. A Problem Not Limited to Internet Surveillance: The Export of Mobile Phone Surveillance Technology Discussions about the Swedish company Ericsson’s business relations to Iran showsthatnotonlytheexportofDPIInternetsurveillancetechnologyiscontrover‐ sial,butthatthesametopicextendsintotherealmofmobilephonenetworks. OnOctober30,2011,Bloombergpublishedanarticletitled “Iranian PoliceSeizing Dissidents Get Aid Of Western Companies” (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐ 10‐31/iranian‐police‐seizing‐dissidents‐get‐aid‐of‐western‐companies.html) as part of their Wired for Repression article series on “Surveillance Tech & Repressive Re‐ gimes” (http://topics.bloomberg.com/wired‐for‐repression). The Bloomberg article saysjournalistSaeidPourheydarwasimprisonedbyIranianpolicein2010.Hewas “held in Evin Prison for weeks following his arrest early last year for protesting, he says, he learned that he was not only fighting the regime, but also companies that armed Tehran with technology to monitor dissidents like him” (ibid). Pourheydar informsthesourcesthathismobiledevicewasintercepted,stating“thepowerofthis enemy became clear as intelligence officers brandished transcripts of his mobile phone calls, e‐mails and text messages during his detention. About half thepolitical prisonershemetinjailtoldhimpolicehadtrackedtheircommunicationsandmove‐ mentsthroughtheircellphones”(ibid.).Followingtheincident,Pourheydarisquot‐ ed:“Thisisacommerceofdeathforthecompaniesthatplacethistechnologyinthe hands of dictatorships” (http://www.insideofiran.org/en/human‐rights/3042‐ iranian‐police‐seizing‐dissidents‐get‐aid‐of‐western‐companies.html). The Swedish company Ericsson “confirmed that in the fourth quarter of 2009 it soldamobile‐positioningcenterforcustomerbillingpurposestoMTNIrancellTele‐ communications Services Co” (ibid). The Serving Mobile Positioning Centre is a “box thatcancalculateaperson’slocationandlogsthedata”(ibid.).Thearticleclaimsan unnamedformeremployeeofEricssonwas“urgentlycalledintofixthesysteminlate 2009sayshewastoldthatIranianintelligenceofficerswereattemptingtopinpoint thelocation ofsomeoneinthe Zahedanarea ofsoutheastIran” (ibid.).Accordingto Bloomberg,Ericsson“decidedin October2010itwouldnolongersellanyproducts into Iran due to recent efforts to tighten sanctions.” (ibid.). The article claims that formerEricssonemployeeSaiviahsFahimiwasarrestedinDecember2009byIranian police based on interception of his mobile text messages, allegedly using Ericsson technology. The article claims Fahimi was familiar with how the technology can work, stating “I worked on the technology and I was a victim of the technology, as well,”and:“Theycanmonitorwhoevertheywant,fortheirpurposes,notfortheben‐ efitofsocietyandpeople”(ibid). InanarticlepublishedbyInsideofIran,Iranianwomen’srightsactivistMansoureh ShojaeeclaimsshewasdetainedandinterrogatedatthesameprisonPourheydarwas detainedat.Sheclaimsthepolicehaddetailsofherphoneactivity,stating,“mymo‐ bile phone was my enemy, my laptop was my enemy, my landline was my enemy” (http://www.insideofiran.org/en/human‐rights/3042‐iranian‐police‐seizing‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 dissidents‐get‐aid‐of‐western‐companies.html).In2010,TheSwedishWirepublished: “Sweden’s Ericsson accused of monitoring in Iran” based on a statement by Nobel PeacePrizeLaureateShirinEbadithatEricssonisselling“softwarethatalloweditto monitortextmessagesandmobilephonecalls” (http://www.swedishwire.com/business/7325‐swedens‐ericsson‐accused‐of‐ monitoring‐in‐iran). OnNovember11,2011TheLocal,aSwedishonlinenewswebsitepublishedanar‐ ticletitled“EricssonRejectsClaimsofAidingIran”(TheLocal, http://www.thelocal.se/37098/20111101/). According to The Local, Ericsson’s Fredrik Hallston rejected claims published in a Bloomberg article that they were providingIranwith“technologycapableoftracking dissidents throughtheirmobile phoneactivity”,statingthatwhatEricssonreallysoldwasa“locationbasedcharging” systemthatallowedmobileoperatorIrancelltochargetherighttariffsbasedonthe callerslocation,claimingthatthetechnologyisunabletotrackthecallerslocationin real time. Hallston defends Ericsson’s business relations by adding: “It is in every‐ one’s interest that you call in and out of the country” (ibid). In 2006, Cellular News (CN, http://www.cellular‐news.com/story/16540.php) published an article about Ericsson and British operated Vodafone’s involvement in the illegal surveillance of the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis. The British mobile operator Vodafone allegedly used technology equipment built by Ericsson to illegally wiretap “senior militaryofficers,humanrightsactivists,journalists,Arabbusinessmenandamobile phoneusedbytheU.S.Embassy,accordingtoalistofnumbersgiventoparliamentby Vodafone”(ibid).Accordingtothearticle:“Theroguewiretapprogramhijackedthe Ericssonsoftwaretodivertcallstomobilephonesusinghard‐to‐tracetopupservices, officialssaid”(ibid).TheCEOofEricsson’sGreecedivisionBillZoukiclaimsthatVo‐ dafonewasinformedandresponsibleforthelegaluseofthesoftware,althoughVoda‐ fonedeniestheseclaims.InJanuary2012,Crikey.com,wrote:“Ericssonhasalsobeen accusedofsellingsurveillancetechnologytoIranandEricssonequipmentisusedby thesavageBelarussiandictatorshipofAlexanderLukashenkotowiretapopponents” (http://www.crikey.com.au/2012/01/10/tracking‐the‐trackers‐the‐cyber‐snoops‐ working‐in‐australia/). The example shows that discussions about the export of communication surveil‐ lancetechnologyarenotonlylimitedtocomputingandtheInternet,butalsoaffects therealmofmobilephonesurveillance.Supplyofcommunicationssurveillancetech‐ nologiesseemstobeinherentlyconnectedtopossibleabuse. 2.3.8. Summary of the Main Findings about European DPI Surveillance Technologies 2.3.8.1. The Technological Set-Up of Internet Surveillance TheUppsalaUniversityresearchteamanalysedsampleofdocumentsthatdescribes The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 theuseofInternetsurveillancetechnologiesthatareproducedandsoldbyEuropean companies.ThequestionwastofindoutwhatkindsofInternetsurveillancetechnol‐ ogiesareavailable. ThereisavarietyofInternetsurveillancetechnologiesavailableontheEuropean securitytechnologymarketthatusesDeepPacketInspection(DPI).Someofthemare thefollowingones: *AlcatelLucent1357ULIS–UnifiedLawfulInterceptionSites(Alcatel‐Lucent) *ALIS‐AqsacomLawfulInterceptionSystem(Aqsacom) *BONGOMonitoringCentre(NETI) *CS‐2000,POSEIDON,MuninPOTS(Elaman) *DigiBase,DigiNet(Digitask) *EAGLE(Amesys) *EVELawfulInterceptionSolution(PineDigitalSecurity) *GENESIMonitoringCentre,GENESINetworkInterceptionPlatform(IPS) *TargetProfiling(IPS) *iXEngine,ixMachine(Qosmos) *LawfulInterceptionMediationArchitecture(LIMA),LIMADPIMonitor,LIMAMan‐ agementSystem(Group2000) *LISystem(Inveatech) *MCRSystemMonitoringCentre(AreaSpa), *NetSpyder,IPTr@pper(Thales) *PRXTrafficManager,NetReporter,DPXNetworkProbe,PACE(ipoque), *SIP&GTPProbe(TelesoftTechnologies) *trovicorMonitoringCenter(trovicor),formerly:NokiaSiemensMonitoringCenter (NokiaSiemensNetworks) *UtimacoLawfulInterceptionManagementSystem(LIMS)(Utimaco) Suchsystemsaretypicallycoupledtomonitoringcentresthatareabletoscandif‐ ferenttypesofcommunicationnetworks(e.g.theInternet,fixedlinetelephony,mo‐ biletelephony).DeepPacketInternetsurveillanceisfacingthechallengethatInternet protocolsarechangingandthatfiltering,decodingandanalysisofdifferentprotocols (suchase‐mail,webmail,VoIp,chat,http,FTP,etc)isneededinordertothoroughly monitorInternettraffic. ForthepurposeofInternetsurveillance,notonlyDPItechnologiesareavailableon theEuropeansecuritymarket,butalsoTrojanhorses.Twoexamplesare: *RemoteForensicSoftware(Digitask) *FinFisher(GammaGroup) Trojan horses are software programmes that are disguised as other programmes andonceinstalledonacomputercollectdataaboutusersthataresecretlytransmit‐ ted to the monitoring party. The use of such communication surveillance tools has beenconsideredinlawenforcementincases,wheresubjectsuseSkypeorencrypted e‐mailcommunication.Digitask’sRemoteForensicSoftwarehasinGermanyresulted in an intense public debate about the constitutionality and ethical desirability of online investigations in the debate about the “Bundestrojaner” (”Federal Trojan”). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Gamma Group’s FinFisher has gained public attention when news reports claimed thatthecompanyhadofferedthetechnologytoEgyptiansecurityauthorities. 2.3.8.2. The Self-Understanding of European Internet Surveillance Technology Producers TheUppsalaUniversityresearchteamalsostudiedtheself‐descriptionoftheana‐ lysedcompaniesandhowtheyexplaintherelevanceofInternetsurveillance,i.e.why thecompanythinksitisimportantthatitproducesandsellssuchtechnologies.The questionwashowthesellingofthesetechnologieswasjustified.Atypicalexplanation whyEuropeancompaniessellInternetsurveillancetechnologiesisthatcriminalsand terroristsusetheInternetandthatInternetsurveillancecanpreventandpolicecrime andterrorism. InveatechsaysthatInternetsurveillanceisnecessaryto“beabletoguaranteepub‐ licsafety”(#1).Thalesarguesthat“terrorismandcybercrimeareontherise”(#3_4, 3).Aqsacomsaysthatthereisa“darksidetotheInternet’spower–namelytheInter‐ net’sexploitationbycriminalsandterrorists”(#4_5,3).AmesysarguesthatInternet surveillanceisneededinorder“reducecrimelevels,protectfromterrorismthreats, andidentifynewincomingsecuritydanger[s]”(#6_1).ElamanpointsoutthatInter‐ netsurveillanceisneeded“forinvestigatingandprosecutingcriminalactivitiesand terrorism”(#7_10,11).trovicorsays:“Whenitcomestofightingcrimeandthwarting terroristattacks,lawenforcementandgovernmentsecurityagenciesneedtheright communicationtoolstogetresults”(http://www.trovicor.com/en/business‐ sections/lawful‐interception.html).Utimacowritesthatthereisa“broadavailability ofcommunicationoptionsandtherelativeeasewithwhichcriminalnetworksand terroristgroupscanexchangeinformation”(#12_4,5).IPSstates:“Criminalorganiza‐ tionsexploittheseapplicationstakingadvantageoftheanonymitygrantedbythe Internet.SocialNetworksmonitoringorWebMailsinterceptioncangathertheintel‐ ligencehelpingtoidentifypeopleinvolvedincriminalactivities”(http://www.resi‐ group.eu/ips/?page_id=210&lang=en).TheGammaGroupholds:“Theincreaseof cybercrimeboththroughterrorism,intimidationandindustrialespionagearecon‐ stantlyontherise,andillegalactivitiesareaidedbyavailabletechnologies”(#19). Theseopinionscanbeconsideredasbeingexpressionsofaspecificworldviewon theroleofcrimeinsocietythathasbysomescholarsbeencharacterisedasconserva‐ tive ideology of crime (Hall et al. 1978, Jewkes 2011). It is based on law and order politicsandtheassumptionthatsurveillancetechnologiesshouldbeheavilyusedand canpreventcrimeandterrorism.It“emphasizesdeterrenceandrepressionandvoic‐ es support for more police, more prisons and a tougher criminal justice system” (Jewkes2011,62).Policingcrimeandterrorcaninsuchasituationeasilyturnover intopolicingthepoor,theunemployed,minorities,peopleofcolour,andcivilsociety. Thenewsurveillanceofthe21stcenturynotonlytacklescriminalsandterrorists,but erectsavisibilityofeveryoneandeverythingthatalsoallows(actuallyorpotentially) thecontrolofpoliticalprotests(thatareontheriseinsituationsofcrisis),whichun‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 dercutstheliberalvaluesoffreedomofspeechandassemblyandtherebyshowshow modernsocietytodayisrunningtheriskofcontradictingitsownvalues,onwhichit wasbuilt. Theidentifiedtechnologyfetishismofthesecurityindustryisgroundedinastrong belief in the power of technology that is conceived as being independent of society. Societalphenomena(crime,terror,crises,politicaltransformations)aremistakento be caused and controllable by technology. But societal phenomena merely express themselvesincommunicativeandtechnologicalspaces,theyarenotcausedbythem. Technological determinism inscribes power into technology, it reduces power to a technologically manageable phenomenon and thereby neglects the interaction of technology and society. Technological determinism sees technology as developing independently from society, but as inducing certain societal effects with necessity (Kling, Rosenbaum and Sawyer 2005, 13, 188; Lister et al. 2003, 391; Shade 2003). Technologicaldeterminismassumesthat“technologieschange,eitherbecauseofsci‐ entificadvanceorfollowingalogicoftheirown;and[that]theythenhaveeffectson society” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999a, 3). It is based on “a simple cause‐and‐ effect‐sequence” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999b, xiv). “Such determinism treats technology as both panacea and scapegoat” (Shade 2003, 433). The identified worldviewofthesecurityindustrylooksforsecuritybyalgorithmsinaworldofhigh insecurity.Itadvancesafethishismoftechnology–thebeliefthatcrimeandterror‐ ismcanbecontrolledbytechnology.Technologyisseenaspromisinganeasyfixto complexsocietalproblems. Halletal.(1978)arguethatthelaw&order‐worldviewhasbeenconnectedtothe riseofneo‐liberaleconomies.Sowhereasthisworldviewseestheneedforastrong stateintheareaofpolicing,itadvocatesliberalization,privatization,andderegulation intheeconomy.Neoliberalismaimsatasocietythatisorientedonthe“multiplicity anddifferentiationofenterprises”atalllevelsofsociety(149).Itisinfavourofthe “formalizationofsocietyonthemodeloftheenterprise”(Foucault2008,160).Itad‐ vocatestheideathatthehumanisahomooeconomicus–an“entrepreneurofhimself” (226).Thismodelstandsforthe“economizationoftheentiresocialfield”(242)and thecreationofan“enterprisesociety”(242).Theinvolvementofthesecurityindustry in the production of communications surveillance technology that is used by state actors is characteristic for this new mode of governance – policing is turned into a profitable business, companies make profit from surveillance technologies that are soldtostateactors. 2.3.8.3. The European Internet Surveillance Industry’s Expressed Views towards Privacy Aspects of Internet Surveillance TheUppsalaUniversityresearchteamalsodocumentedwhattheanalysedcompanies saidaboutproblemsandprivacyviolationsarisinginthecontextofInternetsurveil‐ lance.Inthosecases,wheretherewaspubliccriticismofthecompanies,wealsoana‐ lysedhowthecompaniesreactedtocriticisminpublicstatements. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Thequestionofreactiontopubliccriticismwasespeciallyrelevantinanumberof analysedcases,wheretherewerepublicchargespublishedinmassmediathatEuro‐ pean security companies exported or planned to export Internet surveillance tech‐ nologies to undemocratic regimes. Such claims could be found in respect to the fol‐ lowingcountries(seethedetaileddiscussionsinsection2.1.3.7.andannexA): *Bahrain:trovicor *Egypt:GammaGroup *Iran:NokiaSiemensNetworks(cellphonenetworks) *Libya:i2eTechnologies(thatafterafusionwithArtwarelaterbecameAmesys) *Syria:Asfadorproject(AreaSpa,Qosmos,Utimaco),NokiaSiemensNetworks ArangeofpositioningtowardsprivacyquestionsofInternetsurveillancecouldbe foundintheanalysis,rangingfromnomentioningontheonesidetothediscussionof advantagesofDPIontheotherside.Sixpositionscouldbeidentified. a)NodiscussionofprivacyaspectsofInternetsurveillance Privacy aspects were often not mentioned in the analysed documents and on the analysedwebsites(e.g.Inveatech,Aqsacom,Datakom,NETI). b)Nocommenting Somecompaniesrespondedtochargesbyrefusingtocommentandwiththerefer‐ ence to trade secrets and customer protection. For example, being asked if trovicor exportedcommunicationssurveillancetechnologytoBahrain,trovicorofficials“were onlywillingtostatethattheycouldnotpubliclydiscusscustomersandthedetailsof agreements” (Spiegel Online International, Western Surveillance Technology in the HandsofDespots.December8,2011).Facingallegationsthatitplannedtoexportthe FinFisherInternetsurveillancetechnologytoEgypt,anattorneyoftheGammaGroup saidthat“GammadidnotsupplytoEgyptbutinanyeventitwouldnotbeappropri‐ ate for Gamma to make public details of its transactions with any customer” (The Washington Times, British Firm Offered Spy Software to Egypt: Activists Say They WeretheTargets.April26,2011). c)Statementsastheresultofpublicpressure(media,civilsociety) Insomeanalysedcases,publicpressure(media,civilsociety)createdcompanyre‐ actionstoclaimsthattherewereplansofsellingsurveillancetechnologiestoregimes thatrepresspoliticalopposition. Oneanalysedcompanysaidthatamistakewasmadeandthattheywouldpullout oftheproject(Qosmos).Theexportofsurveillancetechnologyseemsinthiscircum‐ stancetohavebeenpreventedbecausecriticaljournalistsandcivilsocietysteppedin. Civil society tends to have limited resources and one can ask what will happen in thosecasesthatremainunknown. NewsreportshavearguedthatMonitoringCentresproducedbyNokiaSiemensand trovicorwereusedtorepresstheIranianandBahrainianopposition,peoplelikethe The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 journalist Isa Saharkhiz and the political activists Poojan Mahmudian and Kianoosh Sanjari in Iran or the Bahraini human rights activist Abdul Ghani Al Khanjar. After media reports and heavy public criticism, Nokia Siemens Networks admitted that a surveillancesystemforlocalphonenetworkswasimplementedinIran,butsaidthat ithadalreadysolditsintelligencebusinessinMarch2009. Inautumn2011,chargesemergedthatclaimedthatthefollow‐upcompanytrovi‐ cor sold a monitoring centre to Bahrain, where according to media reports it was usedforsurveillingpoliticalopponents.InvestigativejournalistErichMöchelpointed out that public pressure (by the media and civil society) on one company does not automaticallystopunethicalbusinesspractices,butcanresultinthesellingofbusi‐ nessunitstoothercompaniesthatengageincomparablepractices:"Meanwhilepre‐ dominatestheinsightthatthecollateraldamageforcompanypolicyprobablywillbe muchsmalleriftheseMonitoringCenters[...]areoutsourcedtospecialistcompanies andoneselfprepareseverythingtechnicallysothatthisforeignequipmentsupplied bythirdpartiescanwithoutproblembedockedtoone’sowntelephonenetworks.[...] It is pure market politics, nothing else. It has nothing to do with human rights, but onlywiththefactthatonedoesnotwanttodirtyone’sownhands”(NDR.ZAPP:In‐ terviewmitErichMöchel.December7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/moechel103.html). Inautumn2011,thereweremediachargesthattheItaliansecuritycompanyArea Spa sold monitoring centres to Syria, where heavy protests by the opposition have questionedAssad’sregimesinceJanuary2011andmanyprotestorshavebeenkilled. Area Spa’s CEO confirmed that a contract with Syria was in place and said that the interception system was never activated. The German company Utimaco reacted to theclaimthatAreaSpa’splannedprojectincludedUtimaco’sLIMStechnologybysay‐ ingthatactivitieswithAreaSpahavebeenstopped. In one case, there was a denial of the charges that were made by the public (Amesys). d)Approvalofthesurveillanceofthecommunicationofthepoliticalopposition Inasinglecase,wefoundaformulationthatjustifiedthesurveillanceofthecom‐ municationofpoliticalopponents.Onecompany(ElamanfromGermany)wrotethat withcommunicationssurveillance“governmentscanidentifyanindividual’slocation, theirassociatesandmembersofagroup,suchaspoliticalopponents”(#7_12,17). A document that presents Elaman’s “Communications Monitoring Solutions” (#7_12) for the surveillance of phone networks, satellite communication, SMS, the Internet, and Radio Frequency Monitoring (RFM), and various other tools (such as FinFisher and speech identification software) specifies one task of data retention technologiesinthefollowingway:“Inthefieldoftelecommunications,dataretention generallyreferstothestorageofcallrelatedinformation(numbers,date,time,posi‐ tion,etc.)oftelephonyandinternettraffic.Thestoreddataisusuallytelephonecalls madeandreceived,emailssentandreceived,web‐sitesvisitedandlocationdata.The primaryobjectiveindataretentionistrafficanalysisandmasssurveillance.Byana‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 lysingtheretaineddata,governmentscanidentifyanindividual’slocation,theirasso‐ ciates and members of a group, such as political opponents” (#7_12, 17; emphasis added). Elaman advertises its surveillance products and services as well as surveillance technologies by other companies as means for fighting terrorism and crime. The technologies described in this section can be classified as Deep Packet Inspection Technologies,theyallowtomonitorthecontentofInternetcommunicationandother formsofcommunication.Intheanalyseddocuments,wecouldnotfindanycomments about privacy violation concerns and the limitation of human rights that may arise from the use of DPI Internet surveillance and related forms of surveillance. In con‐ trast, as shown, Elaman says that data retention can help governments to identify “members of a group, such as political opponents” (#7_12, 17). The question that ariseshereisifthisformulationquestionsthe“righttofreedomofpeacefulassembly andtofreedomofassociation”thatisdefinedinarticle11oftheEuropeanConven‐ tion of Human Rights and in article 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedomofassociationatalllevels,particularinpolitical,tradeunionandcivicmat‐ ters,whichimpliestherightofeveryonetoformandjointradeunionsfortheprotec‐ tion of his or her interests”). The European Convention of Human Right allows re‐ strictingthisfreedomifitis“necessaryinademocraticsocietyintheinterestsofna‐ tionalsecurityorpublicsafety,forthepreventionofdisorderorcrime,fortheprotec‐ tion of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Elaman’s formulation may however imply that it wants to enable governments in generaltomonitorthemembershipofpoliticalgroups,whichmaylimittherightto freedom of political assembly and also raises the question if the formulation disre‐ spects theEU’sDataProtectionDirective (95/46/EC)thatprohibits“the processing ofpersonaldatarevealingracialorethnicorigin,politicalopinions,religiousorphilo‐ sophical beliefs, trade‐union membership, and the processing of data concerning healthorsexlife”(article8). e)Proactiveaddressingofthedangersofsecuritytechnologyexports Thales, a company against which no charges were made in the mass media, in its 2010 Corporate Responsibility Report (#3_5) addressed the issue of the export of security technologies. It writes that it respect export controls because profitability canotherwisebeharmedbynegativenewsreporting.Thalessaysthatitrespects“ob‐ tainingexportlicencesfromvariousnationalauthorities”because“breachingexport controls can have serious consequences fora company. Depending on the nature of the violation, sanctions can include heavy fines, imprisonment of company officials and prohibition of future exports or imports by the company” (#3_5, p. 18). f)PresentationofadvantagesofDPI Some companies stressed in discussion of advantages and disadvantages of DPI that there are big advantages. For example, ipoque mentioned that DPI is used in The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 networkandbandwidthmanagementandthefilteringofspame‐mailsandcomputer viruses.TelesoftTechnologiessaysthatDPIisneededfornetworkmanagementand thatitcancreatenewpersonalizedcontentserviceswithpayment. 3. Conclusion: DPI Internet Surveillance Deeppacketinspection(DPI)surveillancetechnologiesarecommunicationssurveil‐ lancetoolsthatareabletomonitorthetrafficofnetworkdatathatissentoverthe InternetatallsevenlayersoftheOSIReferenceModelofInternetcommunication, whichincludesthesurveillanceofcontentdata. TheconductedanalysisofDeepPacketInspection(DPI)Internetsurveillance showsthatthereisavarietyofpotentialimpactsofthistechnology. * Potential advantages of DPI Internet monitoring mentioned in the literature in‐ clude bandwidth management by network providers in order to optimize the net‐ worktransmissionspeedandtheuseforspamfiltersandvirusfilters. *Violationofnetneutrality:DPIusebyInternetServiceProviders(ISPs)canresult inaviolationofnetneutralityandasaconsequencethecreationofatieredInternet thatdisadvantagescertainusersandapplicationtypesinthetransmissionprocess,is controlledbybigcompaniesandhasslowconnectionspeedifalotofusersasacon‐ sequenceofDPIsurveillancestartusingencryptionthatcannotbemonitored,which increasesbandwidth.Ifencryption(e.g.bytheuseofTor)asaresultofDPIbecame more common, then those users not familiar with its use as a result of information inequality would be subject to surveillance, whereas more skilled users would not (Lace2010,222). *TotalInternetsurveillance:ThereareconcernsthatDPIInternetsurveillancecan result inthe emergence of atotalor relatively total Internet surveillance system, in whichall,mostoralotofausers’Internetactivitiesaremonitoredandmapsofsocial connections are created. The question that arises is if such data processing is “ade‐ quate,relevantandnotexcessiveinrelationtothepurposesforwhichtheyarecol‐ lected and/or further processed” (European Union Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC,article6(c)). *Surveillancecreep:DPIusagefor onepurpose(suchasnetworkmanagementor spamfiltering)maycreeptoother,moreprivacy‐sensitiveandcontroversialpurpos‐ es(suchastargeted advertisingorcontent monitoringforpolitical purposesorlaw enforcement,violationofnetneutrality,etc). * Targeted advertising: DPI surveillance can enable targeted online advertising at thelevelofISPsthatisbasedontheanalysisofthecontentofallorlargepartsofthe transmitteddataofusers.Theconcernsofprivacyadvocatesarethatsuchdatapro‐ cessingisdisproportionate,thatusers’consensusneedstobeobtainedtosuchwide‐ reachingdataprocessing(opt‐ininsteadofopt‐out),thatsensitivedatamightbeana‐ lysed and misused, and that there may be a surveillance function creep with unin‐ tendedconsequences. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 *Surveillanceoffilesharers:TheuseofDPIsurveillancefordetectingandblocking filesharingcan,asruledbytheEuropeanCourtofJustice,violateusers’information freedomandprivacyrights.Itcanalsoreversethepresumptionofinnocenceandad‐ vancetheassumptionthatallInternetusersarecriminalsunlesstheyprovetheop‐ posite. *Politicalrepressionandsocialdiscrimination:TheuseofDPIfortargetedadvertis‐ ingandbygovernmentsfacestheriskthatsensitivedataofusersaremonitored.The examplesoftheallegedsurveillanceofpoliticaloppositiondocumentedinthisreport show that there is the risk that the processing and analysis of sensitive content re‐ sultsinpoliticalrepressionorsocialdiscriminationofcertaingroups. ThereisavarietyofInternetsurveillancetechnologiesavailableontheEuropean securitytechnologymarketthatusesDeepPacketInspection(DPI). AtypicalexplanationgivenbyEuropeansecuritycompanieswhytheysellInternet surveillance technologies is that criminals and terrorists use the Internet and that Internet surveillance can prevent and police crime and terrorism. This worldview was characterised as a conservative ideology of crime that believes in law & order politicsandthetechnologicaldeterministicviewthattherearetechnologicalfixesto societalproblems. WefoundpublicchargespublishedinthemassmediathatEuropeansecurity companiesexportedorplannedtoexportInternetsurveillancetechnologiesto undemocraticregimes.Suchclaimscouldbefoundinrespecttothefollowingcoun‐ tries: *Bahrain:trovicor *Egypt:GammaGroup *Iran:NokiaSiemensNetworks(cellphonenetworks) *Libya:i2eTechnologies(thatafterafusionwithArtwarelaterbecameAmesys) *Syria:Asfadorproject(AreaSpa,Qosmos,Utimaco),NokiaSiemensNetworks Assurveillancetechnologyproducersarenotcompliedtoreleasetheircustomers andsalespublicly,dataaboutwhatthesecompaniesaredoing,islikelytobeincom‐ pletebecausethecompaniesthemselvesoftentreatitasasecret.TheSpyFilesmake available some of this data. In the end, it is often not clear, which communications surveillancetechnologiesaresoldbywhichcompaniestowhom.Notmuchisknown aboutitandonlysurfacesoccasionallyastheresultofinvestigativejournalism. Whatcouldgenerallybeobservedisthatsomecompaniesarguedthattheycouldn’t commentonanycustomersbecausetheyhadtoprotectthelatter’sinterests.Inother cases,companiesreactedtothechargesaftertheybecamepublic.Insomecases,se‐ curity companies argued that they had stopped the criticized projects or that they soldtheircommunicationssurveillancebusinessunits.Ageneralphenomenonthat could be observed is that alleged details only became public with the help of civilsocietyandjournalists.Thequestionarisesiftherearecasesthatareunknown to the public. Public criticism does not automatically stop the recurrence of public charges, which is shown by the claims against Nokia Siemens and trovicor: Nokia The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Siemenssolditscommunicationsurveillancebusinessaftermediachargesthatitex‐ portedcommunicationssurveillancetechnologiestoIranandsometimelatercompa‐ rablechargesemergedagainstthefollow‐upcompanytrovicorinrespecttoBahrain. Overall, not much is known about the selling and export of communications surveillancetechnologies.Thereisalackoftransparencyandaccountability.In thosecases,wherechargesemerge,itremainsoftenunclearwhatexactlyhap‐ pened.Therelativefrequencyofsuchchargescouldbeanindicationthatgood business practices are not always voluntary achieved in the security industry and that an industry that sells technologies that can seriously harm human livesneedsmorepublictransparencyofitssalesthanotherindustries. TheDutchMEPMarietjeSchaakecommentedinthiscontextinOctober2011that sheperceivedalackoftransparencyintheEuropeansecurityindustry:"Weneedto askformoretransparencyfromcompanies beforetheyactuallysell thesetechnolo‐ gies. It's not about sanctions and trade restrictions, it's about making sure the new technologies are not systematically used to repress citizens" (EUobserver.com, EU CompaniesBannedfromSellingSpywaretoRepressiveRegimes.October11,2011). Surveillance Studies scholar David Lyon defines transparency as the “quality of ‘seeingthrough’”andarguesthat“thepublicshouldhaveaccesstoinformationabout the modes and purposes of surveillance” (Lyon 2007, 181). Transparency would be “vitalforahealthydemocracyandforhumanrights”(Lyon2007,182). AquestionthatEuropeanpolicymakersmayfindimportantisiftransparen‐ cyofthesalesofcommunicationssurveillancetechnologiesofEuropeansecuri‐ tycompaniesshouldbecreatedandhowthiscouldpracticallybeimplemented. Thereare“surveillancetradeshow[s]knowntoindustryinsidersas‘TheWiretap‐ pers’Ball’”(PrivacyInternational,SurveillanceWho’sWho, https://www.privacyinternational.org/big‐brother‐incorporated/countries). Ex‐ amplesareISS(IntelligenceSupportSystems)WorldandMiliPol–WorldwideExhibi‐ tionofInternalStateSecurity.PrivacyInternationalincollaborationwiththeBureau ofInvestigative Journalism publishedalistofattendingorganisations.“ISSWorld is attended by brutal dictatorships and Western democracies alike. Governments and companiesfromallovertheworldmeet,mingle,buyandsell”(ibid.). Surveillancetechnologyfairsareoftennotaccessibleforthegeneralpublic.AtISS WorldthattookplaceonFebruary13‐15,2012,inDubai,“programsarebyinvitation only. Telecommunication service providers, government employees, LEA's and ven‐ dors with LI, Network, Security or investigative products and services are invited” (http://www.issworldtraining.com/ISS_MEA/register.cfm). The registration lists as different participant categories telecommunications service providers, government orprivatesectorinvestigators,lawenforcement,DepartmentofHomelandSecurity, Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, surveillance technology vendors. The next Milipol event that will take place in Paris 2013 is by invitation only. The event’swebsitesaysthatit“isreservedfortheprofessionalsofthesecurityindustry. Access is only available with an official invitation cardor with an electronic badge. Proof of identity will be requested together with the badge” The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 (http://en.milipol.com/To‐visit‐Milipol‐expo/Useful‐information). The access re‐ strictionstosucheventsimplythatitishardforcriticalcitizensorinvestigativejour‐ naliststogainaccess.Thesecrecysurroundingsucheventsaddstothelackoftrans‐ parencyofthesecurityindustry. TheOfficeofthePrivacyCommissionerofCanadapublishedaprivacyreviewofDPI (OfficeofthePrivacyCommissionerofCanada,ReviewoftheInternetTrafficManage‐ ment Practices of Internet Service Providers. February 18, 2009. http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/sub_crtc_090728_e.cfm). It argues that one ofthereasons“DPItechnologiesraiseprivacyconcernsisbecauseitcaninvolvethe inspectionofinformationcontentsentfromend‐usertoend‐user,thusenablingthird parties to draw inferences about users’ personal lives, interests and activities. DPI devices have the ability to look at Layer 2 (link layer) through Layer 7 (application layer)oftheOpenSystemsInterconnection(OSI)Model.DPIdevicescan,therefore, examine headers and data protocol structures as well as the actual payload of the message.Inotherwords,DPItechnologycanlookintothecontentofamessagesent overtheInternet.Touseareal‐worldexample,usingDPIisakintoathirdartyopen‐ ing an envelope sent by surface mail, and reading its contents before it reaches its intendeddestination”.TheOfficeconcludesthat“theexaminationofcontent”withthe helpofDPI“mayconstituteanunreasonableinvasionofanindividual’sprivacy”and that the “prospectiveuses o DPI technology raise serious concernsabout individual privacy”. Privacy International believes that “online behavioural advertising for onlinecommercialadvertisingusingthetechnologyofDeepPacketInspection(DPI) isadangerousandpotentiallyunlawfultechniquethatisfraughtwithunethicalprac‐ tice” (Privacy International, Online Behavioural Targeted Advertising – Privacy Inter‐ national’sPosition.April19,2009. https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/online‐behavioural‐targeted‐ advertising‐%E2%80%93‐privacy‐international%E2%80%99s‐position). Cooper (2011) argues that attempts for mitigating privacy risks of DPI can be to limitthedepthandbreadthofinspectionaswellasdisclosingthepresenceandpur‐ posesofDPI.Discussions aboutDPI show thatprivacyproblemscanespecially arise if the content of communications that may include sensitive data is ana‐ lysedforvariouspurposes.Policymakersmaywanttothinkaboutlegallylimit‐ ingthedepthofInternetsurveillancesothatcommunicationscontentsurveil‐ lanceisnotlegallypossible. Oneargumentagainstlegallylimitingthealloweddepthofpacketinspectioncanbe thatvirusscanning,spammailfilteringandbandwidthmanagementonthesideofthe ISPcanrequireunlimitedDPI.Atthesametimethereishoweverthedangerthatle‐ gallyunregulatedDPIresultsinaninvisiblesurveillancecreep,inwhichthelimited usefor one purpose is extended to other uses that canhave negative consequences fortheusers.Formanagingthebandwidthinanetwork,itmaybenecessarytoana‐ lysethefiletype,butitisnotnecessarytoanalysethefullcontentofpackets.Imple‐ mentingvirusscanningandspammailattheISPlevelentailstheriskofinvisiblesur‐ veillancecreep.Awaytomitigatethisriskistoimplementthesefunctionsnotauto‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 maticallyinanetwork, buttogivethesubscribers/usersthepossibilitytoopt‐into network‐widescanningofcertaindatatypes(e.g.e‐mails)forlimitedpurposessuch asdetectingspammailandviruses. TechnologyanalystEvgenyMorozovarguesthatin“additiontotherosynarrative celebratinghowFacebookandTwitterhaveenabledfreedommovementsaroundthe world,weneedtoconfrontamoresinistertale:howgreedycompanies,fosteredby Western governments for domestic surveillance needs, have helped suppress them. […]Theobviousresponseistobantheexportofsuchtechnologiestorepressivegov‐ ernments. But as long as Western states continue using monitoring technologies themselves, sanctions won’t completely eliminate the problem – the supply will al‐ waysfindawaytomeetthedemand”(Morozov,Evgeny.Politicalrepression2.0.New YorkTimes.September1,2011). Morozovwarnsthatifthereisademandbylawenforcementandcompanies for communications surveillance tools, misuse is hard to control and that ex‐ portbansaloneareunlikelytoeliminatetheproblemoftechnology‐enhanced humanrightsviolationsbecausetheuseofcommunicationsurveillanceagainst politicalopponentsandcivilsocietycaninprincipleemergeinmanydifferent contexts.Politicaleventsaredynamic,thepoliticalsituationcanchangequickly inacountry,whereaspassinglawsandregulationsismoretime‐consuming.An exportbanofDPIcommunicationssurveillanceforcertaincountries(asforArgenti‐ na,China,Croatia,India,Russia,SouthAfrica,SouthKorea,Turkey,andtheUkrainein the EU) is facing the problem of the dynamics of political events. The charges that NokiaSiemensexportedcommunicationsurveillancetechnologytoIranandthefol‐ low‐up company trovicor to Bahrain show this problem. If the latter is true, then it certainly was not illegal because Bahrain is not included in the list of countries, to whichtheEUbanstheexportofcommunicationsmonitoringdevices.Theproblem is that human rights violations are quite unpredictable and that technologies that can support such violations require special control, transparency and regulation. Ontheonehand,thereareICTcompaniesthatproduceandsellcommunications surveillancetechnologies.Discussionsrelatingtoprivacyviolationsandothercon‐ cernscausedbysuchtechnologiesontheotherhandmostlycomefromcivilsociety organisationsthatnormallytendtoneitherautomaticallyhavealotofmoneyand resourcesnoralotofpoliticalinfluence.Itisthereforemuchmoredifficultforcivil societytomakeisvoiceheardinthepublicspherethanitisforcompaniesandgov‐ ernments.InrelationtoDPI,thereisanumberofactivecivilsocietygroups,suchas e.g. NoDPI(https://nodpi.org), OpenRightsGroup(http://www.openrightsgroup.org/), AntiPhorm(http://www.antiphorm.co.uk), BadPhorm–WhenGoodISPsGoBad!(http://www.badphorm.co.uk), DenyPhormBlog(http://denyphorm.blogspot.com), Dephormation(https://www.dephormation.org.uk), The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 InPhormationDesk(http://www.inphormationdesk.org), PhormWatch(http://phormwatch.blogspot.com). Civilsocietygroupsthatwarnaboutactualorpotentialimpactsofnewtech‐ nologies such as DPI are vital for a vivid democracy. Therefore hearing their voices and their visibility are of crucial importance and it is a task for politi‐ cianstothinkabouthowtheroleofcivilsocietyinpoliticallyassessingtheim‐ plicationsofsurveillancetechnologiescanbeadvancedsothatthereisnodomi‐ nanceofinterestsbyindustry,governmentandlawenforcement. DPIis astronglycontroversialtechnologythatis enmeshedintovariousinterests bygovernments,corporationsandcivilsociety.GovernmentshavebeenusingDPIfor repressingcitizens, law enforcement has been using it for surveillance of suspected criminals and terrorists, in the EU political representatives have also shown some concern about the potential and actual problems of DPI. DPI technologies are pro‐ ducedandsoldbycompaniesthatstriveforprofitsinthesecuritybusiness.Themar‐ ket for communications surveillance technologies seems to be highly intransparent and has been involved in controversies about human‐rights violations‐implicating exports,theviolationofnetneutralityandthecreationofanunequaltieredInternet byDPI‐basedInternetservices,theprivacyimplicationsofDPIbasedtargetedadver‐ tising, and the limitation of users’ privacy rights and information freedom by DPI‐ basedsurveillanceoftheInternetinordertopreventfilesharing.DPIisahighlycon‐ troversialnewsurveillancetechnologythathasalotofsocietalimplicationsthatneed tobecarefullyconsidered. ThediscussionofDPIInternetsurveillanceontheonehandbringsupprivacycon‐ cernsandontheotherhandbroadersocietalissuesrelatingtopowerstructures.The dangeroflarge‐scaleandin‐depthInternetsurveillancepointstowardspotentialvio‐ lations of the collection limitation and data minimization principles (data collection should be limited to that which is necessary for the specified purpose and should notbeexcessive).ThedangerofsurveillancecreepinthecontextofDPIisanexpres‐ sionofpotentialviolationsofthepurposefuldataprocessionprinciple(thepurpose of data processing should be specified and data collection should be limited to this purpose). These principles are so‐called fair information principles that are part of data protection legislation and discussions about privacy rights (Bennett and Raab 2006,12;InformationandPrivacyCommissionerofOntario2009). Violations of net‐neutrality that can arise from DPI could create a tiered Internet that is controlled by large media companies and slower for certain groups of users (e.g. those who pay less for Internet access). This is an issue that goes beyond con‐ cerns for privacy rights. It has to do with information inequality and is a matter of justice,inclusion/exclusion,andthecentralisationofpower.Thetopicofimplement‐ ing targeted advertising at the Internet Service Provider level with the help of DPI relatesontheonehandtoprivacyissues(consensustosuchdataprocessing,surveil‐ lanceofsensitivedata),ontheotherhandalsotothemorepolitical‐economicques‐ tionifanInternetthatisheavilybasedonadvertisingcultureisdesirable.Theissue ofconductingsurveillanceandpolicingoffilesharerswiththehelpofDPIhastodo The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 with questions of freedom and democracy, namely if there should be free access to cultural goods and if policing and surveillance of the Internet results ina culture of suspicionandpolicepowerthatnegativelyimpactsdemocracy. Last,butnotleast,wehaveseenthatDPIInternetsurveillanceandcommunications surveillanceingeneralhavebeenusedformonitoringandrepressingmembersofthe politicaloppositioninvariouscountries.Thisquestionisnotsimplyaprivacyissue,it ratherrelatestotheviolationofpoliticalfreedoms(thefreedomofassembly,associa‐ tion,opinion,expression),theviolationofhumandignity,theviolationoftherightto life, and the violation of the prohibition of torture andinhuman or degradingtreat‐ ment. DPI here relates to issues of democracy and human rights. The violation of theserightsbymonitoringandrepressingpoliticalopponentswiththehelpofcom‐ municationssurveillanceisnotonlyademocraticandpoliticalissue–itisalsoapo‐ litical economic issue. We have seen that Western companies exported communica‐ tions surveillance technologies to countries, where they were used for political re‐ pressionhave.Theviolationofcivilrightsisinthesecontextsthereforeconnectedto the profits of what Ben Hayes (2009, 2010) terms the European security‐industrial complex.Hearguesthatthereare“closebondbetweencorporateandpoliticalelites inthehomeland‐securitysector”andthatonanideologicallevelonefinds“theinher‐ ently neoconservative appeal to the defence of the homeland” (Hayes 2010, 148). “Neoconideologyiscentreduponthe‘righttolimitlessprofit‐making’,whichisatthe very heart of the EU’s desire to create a lucrative Homeland Security industry. The EU’ssecuritypoliciesarepremisedontheneoconphilosophyofglobalpolicingand intervention in failed states to both pre‐empt ‘threats’ to security and further the spread of the free market and western‐style democracy around the world” (Hayes 2009,7).Thesecurity‐industrialcomplexontheonehandwantstomakeabusiness out of developing military and surveillance technologies and on the other hand ad‐ vancesthelarge‐scaleapplicationofsurveillancetechnologiesandthebeliefinman‐ agingcrime,terrorismandcrisesbytechnologicalmeans.DPIInternetsurveillanceis part of this political‐economic complex that combines profit interests, a culture of fearandsecurityconcerns,andsurveillancetechnologies. TheexampleofDPIInternetsurveillanceshowsthatforunderstandingnewsur‐ veillance technologies, we do not only need privacy and data protection as‐ sessments, but broader societal impact assessments that are guided by ethics and connected to the analysis of power structures in society. ICTs and society mutuallyshapeeachotherandarebothconditionedbypowerandpoliticaleconomy (Fuchs2008).CharlesRaabandDavidWright(2012,382)argueinthiscontextthat the analysis of surveillance technologies should focus on “wider impacts, and ulti‐ mately impacts on society as a whole”. Works by David Wright and Emilio Mordini (2012) and David Wright (2011) suggest a Privacy and Ethical Impact Assessment FrameworkforICTs.“Privacyanddataprotectionraiseethicalissues,althoughethi‐ calimpactassessmentaddressesissuesbeyondsimplythoseofprivacyanddatapro‐ tection”(Wright2011,224). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Therehavebeenvaluableattemptsthathavetriedtoestablishethicalandsocietal impactassessmentprinciplesandframeworksforICTs.Onlysomecanbementioned here.TheSocietalImpactExpertWorkingGrouparguesthattheanalysisofsecurity technologiesshouldbeconnectedtotheanalysisofcitizen’srights,societalrelevance and benefits, necessity and proportionality of security technologies in a democratic society, civil liberties, and research ethics (Centre for Irish and European Security 2012).Itsuggeststhatsecurityresearchprojectsshouldhaveindependentpartsthat discussethicalandsocietalimplications. JacquesBerleur(1999)arguesthatICTsliketheInternetareethicallyrelatedtois‐ sueslikedemocracy,protectionofthecommongood,universalservice,humandigni‐ ty, protection of minors, crime against humanity, justice, social exclusion, human rights,freespeechandcensorship,qualityoflife,righttoinformationandtranspar‐ ency,personalqualities,non‐abuseofpower,respectforculturaldifferences,freedom ofchoice. Scholars in the EU FP7 project “ETICA ‐ Ethical Issues of Emerging ICT Applica‐ tions” (http://ethics.ccsr.cse.dmu.ac.uk/etica) have argued that the assessment of emerging information technologies should be connected to topics like power rela‐ tionships, sustainability, gender biases, responsibility, human dignity, freedom, au‐ tonomy,privacy,dataprotection,surveillance,justice,equality,solidarity,autonomy, consumer protection, cultural diversity, environmental protection, animal welfare, health, safety, equal access, health care, human rights, ownership, social inclusion, non‐discrimination,participation,accesstothelabourmarket,security,proportional‐ ity, the precautionary principle, transparency, governance, global justice, integrity, welfare, human life, democracy and participation (Nagenborg and Capurro 2010, Stahl2011,StengelandNagenborg2010)‐ Wright(2011)andWright/Mordini(2012)suggestaframeworkfortheethicaland societalimpactassessmentofICTsthatisbasedonethicalprincipleslikedignity,in‐ formed consent, nonmaleficence, safety, solidarity, inclusion, human contact, non‐ discrimination, beneficence, universal service, accessibility, value sensitive design, sustainability, distributive justice, equality, fairness, social justice privacy, and data protection. Thesediscussionsandtheassessmentofnewsurveillancetechnologiesconducted inthischaptershowthatsecuritytechnologiesdonotonlyhaveimpactsonprivacy and individuals, they have impacts on society at large. Contemporary societies are fundamentallystructuredbypowerasymmetries.ItisthereforeimportantthatICTs andsecuritytechnologiesareassessedinthecontextofquestionsthatrelatetosocie‐ ty,power,democracy,justice,freedom,andpoliticaleconomy.Fordoingthis,ethical assessment frameworks, guidelines, principles, systematic models and typologies of ICT ethics that are grounded in social theory and social philosophy are needed. Wright(2011,224)concludesthat“therewouldseemtobevalueinfurtherresearch exploringthepossibilityofdevelopingintegratedprivacyand ethicalimpactassess‐ ment”(Wright2011,224).JacquesBerleurandMaried’Udekem‐Gevers(2001)write aboutthelong‐standingdifficultiesintryingtoestablishgeneralethicalguidelinesin The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 theInternationalFederationforInformationProcessing(IFIP).Althoughtherewere significantattemptsandlongdebatesintheIFIP,argumentshaveprevailedthathold thatcomputerethicscanandshouldnotbeuniversalizedandintegrated.Approaches forestablishingintegratedandunifiedguidelines,frameworksandprinciplesforeth‐ icalandsocietalimpactassessmentsofICTsandsecuritytechnologiesaredefinitely needed,butmuchworkonthistopicremainstobedone,whichrequiresresources, projectsandpossibilitiesforconductingthisimportantwork. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Annex A: An Analysis of the Internet Surveillance Technologies Produced by a Sample of European Security Companies 1.Inveatech Placeofbusiness:Brno,CzechRepublic Website:http://www.invea‐tech.com/ Self‐description: “INVEA‐TECHisanuniversityspin‐offcompanydevotedtothedevelopmentofstate‐ of‐the‐art solutions for high‐speed network applications. […]The main focus of IN‐ VEA‐TECHistouseprogrammablehardware(FPGAtechnology)intheareaofsecuri‐ ty and monitoring of high‐speed network applications. The target technologies are Gigabit and 10 gigabit Ethernet” (http://www.invea‐tech.com/company/about‐us). Analysis Inveatch’sLI(LawfulInterceptionSystem)isanInternetsurveillancetechnologythat isinstalledonthecomputersystemofanInternetServiceProvider(ISP)andallows the police or secret service to monitor the traffic over a web interface. It is a Deep PacketInspection(DPI)technology. InveatechdescribestheusefulnessandtasksofLISysteminthefollowingwords: “Widespreadinformationtechnologiesprovidefastanddynamiccommunicationme‐ dia even for criminals and terrorists. To be able to guarantee public safety, law en‐ forcementagencies(LEAs)needtoidentify,interceptandanalysethecontentofthe malicious communication. INVEA‐TECH provides law enforcement and government agencieswiththestateofthearttechnologytosolvethekeypartoftheinvestigation process. INVEA‐TECH LI System is the idea instrument for collecting evidence from wiredIP‐basednetworks”(#1). Theusefulnessofthesystemisintheanalyseddocumentsjustifiedwiththepoten‐ tialuseoftheInternetbyterroristsandcriminals,whichisseeninordertoguarantee publicsafety.Privacyaspectsandconcernsaboutthesurveillanceofcitizensandpo‐ liticaloppositionwiththehelpofLISystemarenotmentionedintheanalysedmate‐ rial. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 2.Qosmos Placeofbusiness:Paris,France(also:Bethesda,MD,USA;Singapore) Website:http://www.qosmos.com/ Self‐description: “QosmossellsNetworkIntelligence/DPItechnologythatidentifiesandanalyzesdata as it crosses networks. Qosmos advanced technology goes deeper than mere data classification – it recognizes thousands of protocols and traffic metadata at multi‐ Gbpsthroughputstobuildthemostaccuratepictureofnetworkactivityinrealtime. […]Networksarethecommonsourceofdata–andsometimestheonlysourceofdata –intoday’senvironment.Directvisibilityintonetworkactivityprovidesthetruepic‐ tureofdatausage,purposeandvalue.Itiscriticaltoidentifyabnormalbehaviorand defend against potential cyber attacks, provide a means of data retention to ensure compliance and provide audit trails and analyze performance to manage Quality of Service, for just a few examples” (http://www.qosmos.com/about‐us/corporate‐ overview). Analysis Qosmos produces the Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) software iXEngine. “The latest version provides advanced Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and metadata extraction featuresthatdelivercompletevisibilityintonetworktrafficinrealtime,enablingde‐ veloperstoinjectapplication‐levelinsightintopolicyandtrafficmanagement,charg‐ ing, Quality of Service (QoS), subscriber analytics and other solutions” (http://www.qosmos.com/news‐events/enhancements‐qosmos‐ixengine‐sdk‐ enable‐smarter‐mobile‐network‐solutions‐through‐network). According to the Qos‐ mosiXEngineproductsheet,thesoftwaregoesbeyond “traditionalDPO”byalsoal‐ lowingto“extractprotocolandapplicationmetadata,enabling detailedunderstand‐ ingofnetworktransactionsuptotheapplicationlevel”(#2_6).Qosmossaysthatthe software has “triple R” qualities (resilience, robustness, reliability) and can thereby functionunderextraordinarycircumstances(suchasincompletetrafficordenial‐of‐ service attacks). It can monitor, extract and analyse data that are transmitted over variousInternetprotocols.ItconductsDPIandextractsmetadataandcontent(#2_1). Qosmos argues that it is a new challenge for law enforcement agencies that “the samepersoncancommunicateinseveralways”(differentemailaccounts,socialme‐ diaprofiles,VoiceoverIPsuchasSkype,FTP,websites,etc).Itstechnologieswould provideasurveillancesolutionthatidentifies“usersandintercept[s]alltypeofcom‐ municationinitiatedbythesameuserwhenatriggersuchas‘userlogin’isdetected” (#2_1). Qosmos’ surveillance technology allows to monitor all communication on a devicethatisidentifiede.g.byanIPaddress(InternetProtocoladdress,identifiesa specificcomputerinacomputernetwork)auser’sMACaddress(MediaAccessCon‐ troladdress,anaddressofthehardwarecardthatconnectsacomputertoanetwork), oranIMSI(InternationalMobileSubscriberIdentity,anumberthatuniquelyidenti‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 fiesamobilephone).Themonitoredapplicationscanallbeviewedoveronewebap‐ plication (#2_1). The software is installed on the broadband remote access server (BRAS) of an Internet service provider and/or the gateway GPRS support node (GGSN) of a mobile phone network provider (#2_1). Qosmos also sells ixMachine, which are “information extraction machines” that “extract extremely fine‐grained informationfromthenetwork”onwhichtheyareinstalled(#2_2). Qosmos argues that a big challenge for surveillance is the “exponential growth of throughput”(#2_3),i.e.thegrowthofdatathatistransportedovertheInternet.The solutionthatQosmosoffersistonotanalysealldataflows,butonlyfocuson“relevant flows”inorderto“optimizeDPIusage”(#2_4).Itadvertisesitstechnologiesbysaying itcanequip“monitoringcentres”withsurveillancetechnologiesandcanreducethe datavolumeofsurveillance(“reduceby90%thedatavolumemanagedbythemoni‐ toringcenter”)(#2_5).Qosmosalsosaysthata“limitednumberofLEA[lawenforce‐ ment]agents”requiresthe“needtoautomateinvestigationtasks”andthatitsprod‐ uctsprovidesuchfeatures(#2_5). Data is transported in the form of packets of certain sizes over the Internet. The transferofane‐mailorafileistherebyconnectedinseveralstepsandthetransferred packetsareassembledtogethertoformawhole.DeepPacketInspection(DPI)tech‐ nologiesmonitorthepacketsthatarecomingintogateways,analyse,classifythedata, extractpartsare all ofit, andmakethem visibleto the surveillors.“Deeppacket in‐ spection(DPI)isaformoffilteringusedtoinspectdatapacketssentfromonecom‐ puter to another over a network. […] The effective use of DPI enables its users to track down, identify, categorize, reroute or stop packets with undesirable code or data.[…]DPIisnormallymoreeffectivethantypicalpacketfiltering,whichinspects only the packet headers. DPI inspects the packet's data part (and sometimes the packet header) when it goes over an inspection point, attempting to find protocol noncompliance, intrusions, spam, viruses or other predefined factors to determine whetherthepacketcanpassorwhetheritmustbedirectedtoanotherlocation.[…] Deeppacketinspectionisalsoknownascompletepacketinspectionandinformation extraction. […] DPI is being used by governments to monitor and protect territorial cyber boundaries. DPI has also been used to inspect user activities, to maintain the security of big local and wide area networks, and to block malware and suspicious software.Inaddition,serviceprovidersmakeuseofDPItokeeptrackofcustomers' Web‐browsinghabits.Thesecustomerdetailsarethenusedbycompaniesfocusedon targeted advertising” (Techopedia. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), http://www.techopedia.com/definition/24973/deep‐packet‐inspection‐dpi; for a technicalcharacterizationofDPIsee:Ramos2007). Intheanalyseddocuments,Qosmosgivesnospecificjustificationfortheneedofits technology beyond saying that it is “critical to identify abnormal behavior” (self‐ definition)anddoesnotpointoutpotentialprivacyproblems,suchasthetargetingof politicaloppositionbysurveillance,ofDPIsurveillance. In November 2011, there were news reports that the Italian firm Area Spa equipped the Syrian intelligence with surveillance technologies (project “Asfador”) The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 thatcanbeusedformonitoringthepoliticalopponentsofBasharal‐Assad’sgovern‐ ment.Inthisproject,alsotechnologiesbyQosmosseemaccordingtonewsreportsto havebeenused:“AreaisusingequipmentfromAmericanandEuropeancompanies, according to blueprints and other documents obtained by Bloomberg Newsand the personfamiliarwiththejob.TheprojectincludesSunnyvale,California‐basedNetApp Inc.(NTAP)storagehardwareandsoftwareforarchivinge‐mails;probestoscanSyr‐ ia’scommunicationsnetworkfromParis‐basedQosmosSA;andgearfromGermany’s UtimacoSafewareAG(USA)thatconnectstappedtelecomlinestoArea’smonitoring‐ center computers” (Bloomberg, Syria Crackdown Gets Italy Firm’s Aid With U.S.‐ Europe Spy Gear. November 4, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐11‐ 03/syria‐crackdown‐gets‐italy‐firm‐s‐aid‐with‐u‐s‐europe‐spy‐gear.html). “Whenthesystemiscomplete,Syriansecurityagentswillbeabletofollowtargets on flat‐screen workstations that display communications and Web use in near‐real timealongsidegraphicsthatmapcitizens’networksofelectroniccontacts,according to the documents and two people familiar with the plans. Such a system is custom‐ made for repression, says Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Washington‐ based Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which promotes tighter sanctions againstSyria.’AnycompanysellingmonitoringsurveillancetechnologytotheAssad regimeiscomplicitinhumanrightscrimes,’hesays.[…]WhenBloombergNewscon‐ tactedQosmos,CEOThibautBechetoillesaidhewouldpulloutoftheproject.‘Itwas not right to keep supporting this regime,’ he says. The company’s board decided aboutfourweeksagotoexitandisstillfiguringouthowtounwinditsinvolvement, hesays.Thecompany’sdeep‐packetinspectionprobescanpeerintoe‐mailandre‐ constructeverythingthathappensonanInternetuser’sscreen,saysQosmos’shead ofmarketing,ErikLarsson”(ibid.). change.org gathered 20 000 signatures for a petition against the project (change.org,HowWeWon,December1,2011. http://www.change.org/petitions/demand‐us‐and‐european‐cos‐stop‐supporting‐ deadly‐syria‐net‐surveillance).ItwasinitiatedbytheInternetfreedomgroupAccess and the Syrian blogger Anas Qtiesh. Area SpA withdrew from the project. Also Qos‐ mos withdrew its technology supply and released a news statement about this cir‐ cumstance. “Qosmos technology components are sold to third‐party software vendors to im‐ proveperformanceinawidevarietyoftelecommunications,networkinfrastructure andcybersecurityapplications.Wesharetheconcernaboutthepotentialformisuse ofsurveillanceapplications.Asaresult,QosmoswithdrewfromtheSyrian‘Asfador’ project–adecisionmadepriortothesystembeingfinalizedandpriortotheinitial storyreportedbyBloombergon3November.Qosmoswillneithersupplynorsupport itstechnologytothosewhoselltoauthoritarianregimes.Qosmosisfullycompliantin adheringtoalllawsrelatedtothesaleanduseofitstechnology.Althoughtheuseof Lawful Interception (LI) solutions by telecommunications companies is mandated throughout the EU, US and most other countries worldwide to collect communica‐ tions in accordance with local laws, recent political events have shown that further The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 regulationofLI,includingmorerestrictivelegislation,isrequiredtopreventabuse” (Qosmos, Qosmos Statement about Recent Media Reporting. November 22, 2011. http://www.qosmos.com/news‐events/qosmos‐statement‐about‐recent‐media‐ reporting). Theexportofsurveillancetechnologywasinthiscircumstanceonlypreventedbe‐ causecriticaljournalistsandcivilsocietysteppedin.Theinvolvedcompanies,includ‐ ing Qosmos, seemed to have at first had no scruples about the possible use of their technologiesforthemonitoringofpoliticalopposition,whichshowsthatitisdifficult ifcivilsocietyhastotaketheroleofawatchdogthattriestocorrectandstopcompa‐ nies behaviour after it has actually happened or started. Civil society tends to have limitedresourcesandonecanaskwhathappensinthosecasesthatremainunknown. If civil society and the media had not created pressure (e.g. because of lack of knowledge,resources,employees,etc),onecanimaginethatproject“Asfador”would have been implemented and resulted in humans being tortured and killed for their political believes with the help of European surveillance technologies. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 3.Thales Placeofbusiness:Neuilly‐sur‐Seine,France Website:http://www.thalesgroup.com Self‐description: “Withoperationsin50countriesand68,000employees,Thalesisaworldleaderin mission‐critical information systems for defence and security, aerospace and trans‐ portation.Buildingonitsexpertiseinthemostsophisticatedtechnologiesandlarge‐ scalesoftwaresystems,Thalesissteppinguptothesecuritychallengesofitscustom‐ ers in an increasingly complex world. With its global network of 22,500 high‐level researchers, Thales has earned particular recognition for its ability to develop and deploy dual civil and military technologies. Leveraging its international operations andspanningtheentirevaluechainfromequipmenttosystemsandservices,Thales isplayingapivotalroleinmakingtheworldasaferplace” (http://www.thalesgroup.com/AboutUs.aspx). “The emergence of new types of threats – from terrorism and organised crime to drugtrafficking,massimmigrationandcyberattacks–meansthatdefenceorganisa‐ tions alone are not fully equipped to contend with the changing risks. Safety and security requirements now transpiring at the national, European and in‐ ternationallevelsreflecttheexpectationsanddemandsofthe world'scitizens.Ana‐ lysingandaddressingtherisksinvolvedcallsforexpertisethatencompassesrigorous methods,proventechnologicalcapabilityandtheappropriateorganisationalandhu‐ manresources. Thisconvergencebetweendefenceandsecurityhaspromptedtheneedfornewso‐ lutionsandtechnologiesthatenableorganisationstoshareexistinginformationand communication systems whilst also ensuring the traceability of individuals and the protectionofnetworksandinfrastructures. Thalesinvestsasignificantshare(18%)ofitsrevenuesbackintoinnovation.Com‐ binedwiththecompany'ssolidskillsandexperienceinsecuritysystems,whichtoday accountfor25%ofturnover,thisputsThalesinauniquepositionforaddressingthe requirements of public authorities by developing surveillance and intelligence sys‐ tems,identitysystems,etc.,andforcontributingtothedependabilityandsecurityof large‐scalecriticalinfrastructuresuchasrailways,energysupplynetworks,sensitive sitesandbankinformationsystems” (http://www.thalesgroup.com/Markets/Security/What_we_do/). Analysis Initsproductcatalogue2011(#3_3),ThalesofferstwoInternetsurveillancesystems: NetSpyderandIPTr@pper.NetSpyderisanInternetsurveillancesystemthatisun‐ detectable and automatically classifies and decodes accessed web pages, e‐mails, web‐mailaccess,chatuse,webcamuse,filetransfer,voiceoverIP(VoIP,e.g.Skype) onthecomputersofanInternetServiceProvider(#3_3,page179).IPTr@pperisa The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 hardwaredevicethatisconnectedtoaLocalAreaNetwork(LAN)orInternethostor router.Itscansthetrafficandcananalysee‐mails,webaccess,chat,filetransfer,voice over IP, and online video access (#3_1; #3_3, page 180). Both Internet surveillance technologiescanbeusedasstandalonetoolsorintegratedintotheSpyderMonitoring centre(#3_3,page180).BothcanbeclassifiedasDeepPacketInspection(DPI)tech‐ nologies. Figure 1: Product description of Thales’ Net Spyder (data source: #3_3, page 179). Figure 2: Product description of Thales IP Tr@pper (data source: #3_3, page 180) Intheanalyseddocuments,potentialnegativeaspectsandprivacythreatsofInternet surveillance technologies are not mentioned. The world is presented as having be‐ come more insecure, which would require the employment of security and surveil‐ lancetechnologiesinordertokeep“populations,infrastructuresandinformationse‐ cure” (#3_4): “Today’s world is faced with multiple threats. Terrorism and cyber‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 crime are on the rise, and natural disasters and epidemics loom. […]Digital infor‐ mation is circulating at rates never seen before […] Many traditional borders have becomevirtual,asglobalisationisthenorm.Inthiscontext,physicalandcybersecuri‐ tyareessentialtoprotectalltypesofassets–people,infrastructuresanddata”(#3_4, 3).“State‐of‐the‐artcommunicationsandsurveillancesystemsareessentialforeffec‐ tiveearlywarning,crisismanagement,nationaldefenceandtheprotectionofcovert operations”(#3_4,6).Producingandsellingsurveillancetechnologiesisjustifiedwith referencetotheneedtokeepsocietysecureandtheideathatweliveinarisksociety thatisfacingthreatsliketerrorismandcybercrime. In its 2010 Corporate Responsibility Report (#3_5), Thales says that one of its “principlesisresponsibility”isthat“businessesshouldsupportandrespectthepro‐ tection of internationally proclaimed human rights and make sure that theyare not complicitinhumanrightsabuses”(#3_5,p.4).Italsoaddressesthetopicoftheex‐ port ofweaponsandsecuritytechnologies(#3_5,pp.18‐19),saying thatitrespects “obtainingexportlicencesfromvariousnationalauthorities”because“breachingex‐ portcontrolscanhaveseriousconsequencesforacompany.Dependingonthenature oftheviolation,sanctionscanincludeheavyfines,imprisonmentofcompanyofficials andprohibitionoffutureexportsorimportsbythecompany”(#3_5,p.18).Whatis significant in this passage is that it is not mentioned that security technologies can harmtheprivacyandhumanrightsofindividuals,butthatratherthefocusisentirely on business interests and concerns about consequences that can negatively impact businessperformance. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 4.AQSACOM Placeofbusiness:UlisLes,France Website:http://www.aqsacomna.com Self‐description: “AqsacomdevelopsandmarketsrealtimeLawfulInterception,DataRetention,Mobil‐ ityTrackingandSurveillancesolutions.Withitscorebusinessfocusedonlawfulin‐ terceptionandrelated applications for over14 years, Aqsacom provides end‐to‐end turnkey solutions for fulfilling lawful interception and data retentionrequirements anywhere in the world, especially over highly heterogeneous networking and ser‐ vicesenvironments” (http://www.aqsacomna.com/us/index.cfm?vSectionCode=ABOUTUS). Analysis Aqsacom argues that with “the popular acceptance of the Internet as a communica‐ tionsmedium,therealsocomesadarksidetotheInternet’spower–namelytheIn‐ ternet’sexploitationbycriminalsandterrorists”(#4_5,3). Aqsacomsaysthatdatashouldbecapturedandstoredwiththehelpoftheirtech‐ nologiesformultiplepurposes:immediateactioninmattersoflifeanddeathandon‐ going investigations, for possible investigations in the future (#4_1, 10). It refers to the EU’s Data Retention Directive and says that technologies are needed that allow that“datawillbestoredbetween6monthsandupto3years”andthatthe“storing principlesmustalloweffectivemining”(#4_1,14).Lawenforcementagencieswould “needALLhighprioritydata”thatisrelatingtoongoinginvestigationsand“peopleon ‘highinterest’list”(#4_1,15).Butalsolowerprioritydatawouldbeneededinorder toconduct“generalanalysislookingfor‘fits’againstdefinedcriminalprofiles”andfor “potentiallateruse if‘new’ areasorpeopleofinterest areidentified”(#4_1,16).So AqsacomissuggestingtechnologiesthatareusedforstoringalotofdataaboutInter‐ netusageaboutsuspiciouspeopleandthemassofusersatlargesothatdataanalysis and data mining can be conducted based on these data for criminal investigation. Aqsacom’s surveillance systems enable “extraction of call information and content fromthenetworkentities(voiceorIPnetworkequipment)andb)managementofthe dataforeffectivedeliverytothelawenforcementagencies”(#4_2).Thecompanyex‐ plainsthatitssurveillancetechnologiescanoperateatallsevenlayersoftheOSIRef‐ erenceModel,whichmeansthattheycanalsoconductthe“directextractionofinter‐ ceptedcontent”(#4_5,11).ThismeansthatAqsacom’ssurveillancetechnologiescan beclassifiedasDeepPacketInspectionInternetsurveillancetechnologies.Itprovides twosurveillancesystems: ALIS(AqsacomLawfulInterceptionSystem) ADRIS(AqsacomDataRetentionIntelligenceSystem) The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 ALISisasystemforthesurveillanceof“massive‐scalepublicIPnetworks”(#4_2). ItinterceptstheIPaddressofspecificusersandthen“routesasecurereplicationof allincoming/outgoingIPtraffictothelawenforcementagencyforanalysis”(#4_2). Thesurveilloraccessesthedata“throughaneasy‐to‐use,commonuserinterface” (#4_3).“ALIS’friendlygraphicaluserinterfaceallowsfortheeasyautomationof manyoperationalinterceptiontasks,suchastheautomatictriggeringorstoppingof aninterceptionoperationatpredefineddatesandtimes”(#4_5,34).ALIScanalsobe usedforthesurveillanceofvoiceoverIPdata(e.g.Skype). ADRISisadatastoragesystemthatcanbeusedfordataretentionbyInternetSer‐ viceProviders(ISPs)andalsoenablesthetransportofretaineddatatolawenforce‐ mentagencies.“TheADRISCollection&StorageModuleisresponsibleforthecollec‐ tionofretaineddata.Thismodulecanimporttransactionaldatafromlegacyplat‐ forms(e.g.,billingsystems)fornonreal‐timeDataRetention;however,amoredy‐ namic,future‐proofapplicationofthismoduleisinthereal‐timecollectionoflive eventdatafromswitches,routers,probes,applicationsservers,andothernetwork components.Oncecollected,thedataaretransformedon‐the‐fly(forreal‐timeData Retention)intoaninternalrepresentationbytheDataCollectionMediationFunction, thensenttotheDataRetentionRepository(alargescalestoragesystem).TheADRIS ConsultationModulesupportsthequeryingofretaineddatathatarestoredinthe Repository.ThismodulecontainstheRetainedDataRetrievalFunction,whichsup‐ portstheHandoverInterface(HI)withLawEnforcementAgenciestoensureastand‐ ards‐compliantandsecuremeansofrequestingandobtainingtheretaineddata.The AdministrationModuleprovisionsADRIS’communicationswiththerequiredLaw EnforcementAgencies.ThismodulealsoinstructstheDataCollectionMediation Functionandnetworkelementsonwhatdataaretobecollected,whilemonitoring thedatacollectionanddeliveryoperations”(#4_6). AqsacomproducesInternetsurveillancetechnologiesthatcanbeclassifiedas DeepPacketInspectiontechnologies.Italsoproducesstoragetechnologiesfordata retention.Itjustifiestheproductionofthesetechnologiesbydescribingathreatof terroristandcriminaluseoftheInternet.Itsaysthatitisexport‐oriented,butonits websitewecouldfindnodetailedinformationaboutwhichinstitutionsinmorethan 30countriesareAqsacom’scustomersandwhichtechnologiestheyhaveboughtfor whichpurposes. Aqsacomdoesnotspecifytowhichcountriesitexactlyhasexportedsurveillance technologies.Itmentionsthatithascustomersfromover30countries.AQSACOM's diversifiedcustomerportfolioincludesclientsfrommorethan30countries,covering geographicalareasasdiverseasCentralandEasternEurope,Asia‐Pacific,Africaand theMiddle‐East. Aqsacomsaysthat“duetothenatureofLI[lawfulinterception],securitymustbe taken very seriously to preserve the privacy of the target and the confidentiality of theinvestigation”(#4_3).Aqsacomwantstoensureitscustomersthatitssystemsare securesothat“noconfidentialinformationcanbeextractedfromthemediationman‐ agementplatformoritscomponents”(#4_3)byunauthorizedparties.Aqsacomdoes The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 notaddressconcernsabouttheuseofDPIforpoliticalrepressionandthecreationof a society, in which everyone is seen as a potential criminal and terrorist, which re‐ verses and practically abolishes the presumption of innocence and installs a large‐ scalesurveillanceofpersonaldata.Aqsacomhasnotaddressedcriticalquestionsthat relatetoprivacyviolationsofcitizensintheanalyseddocuments. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 5.Alcatel‐Lucent Placeofbusiness:Paris,France Website:http://www.alcatel‐lucent.com Self‐description: “The long‐trusted partner of service providers, enterprises, strategic industries and governmentsaroundtheworld,Alcatel‐Lucentisaleaderinmobile,fixed,IPandOp‐ ticstechnologies,andapioneerinapplicationsandservices.Alcatel‐Lucentincludes BellLabs,oneoftheworld’sforemostcentresofresearchandinnovationincommu‐ nications technology. With operations in more than 130 countries and one of the most experienced global services organizations in the industry, Alcatel‐Lucent is a localpartnerwithglobalreach.TheCompanyachievedrevenuesofEuro16billionin 2010andisincorporatedinFranceandheadquarteredinParis“(http://www.alcatel‐ lucent.com/wps/portal/aboutus). Analysis Alcatel‐Lucent is a global telecommunications company. One of the technologies it produces and sells is Alcatel Lucent 1357 ULIS – Unified Lawful Interception Sites (#5_1, #5_2).Itarguesthat the“convergenceofvoiceanddata”(#5_2,2)hasmade surveillanceadifficultchallengeandthatULIS1357providesasolution.Thespecific characteristic of this technology is that it can be used both for the monitoring of phone networks and the Internet, it is an integrated communication surveillance technology. The system “internal intercept function” allows “the intercept‐related informationandcontentsofcommunications”(#5_1,4).Thismeansthatthetechnol‐ ogy can monitor Internet content, which makes it a Deep Packet Inspection surveil‐ lance tool. The system’s “administration function” “delivers the data and content to theLEA”(lawenforcementagency,#5_2,4). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Figure3:Altacel‐Lucent’s1357ULIS(datasource:#5_2) Alcatel‐Lucentsaysthatthe1357ULISsystemhasbeen“deployedinmorethan70 countries”(#5_2,7;#5_1,6),butdoesnotspecifywhichcountriestheseare.Alcatel‐ Lucentsaysthatitis“alongtermleaderintheMiddleEast,headquarteredinEgypt withlocalpresencein19countries”,includingbesidesEgypte.g.Bahrain,Iran,and Syria(documentAlctael‐LucentintheMiddleEast,http://www.alcatel‐ lucent.com/wps/DocumentStreamerServ‐ let?LMSG_CABINET=Docs_and_Resource_Ctr&LMSG_CONTENT_FILE=Corp_Governan ce_Docs/Midle_East‐RU_PROFILE.pdf&lu_lang_code=en_WW).Alcatel‐Lucentalso signedcontractswithLibyaTelecomandTechnology(MaghrebConfidential.Alcatel‐ Lucent.May9,2008)andtheLibyanPostTelecommunications&InformationTech‐ nologyCompany(TelecomWorldwide.Alcatel‐Lucenttoprovidefibre‐opticbackbone networkcontractforLibya.July12,2007)forinstallingInternetnetworksinLibya. WecouldfindnoinformationonAlcatel‐Lucent’swebsitetowhichcountriesitex‐ portedits1357ULISsystem. Inits2010CorporateResponsibilityReport(#5_3),Alcatel‐Lucentdevotesoneof 108pagestothetopicofprivacy.Itsaysthatit“iscommittedtorespectingindividu‐ als’privacyrightsandexpectationsandtoprotectingthepersonaldataitcollects The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 fromunauthorizedaccess,use,retention/storageand/ordisclosure”(#5_3,23).The reportaddressesprivacyprotectionataverygenerallevel,nodiscussionofprivacy concernsaboutDeepPacketInspectionInternetsurveillancetechnologiessuchas 1357ULISisgiven.1357ULISisneithermentioned,norisitexplainedtowhichor‐ ganizations,institutionsandcountriessuchtechnologieshavebeensold. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 6.Amesys Placeofbusiness:LesMilles,France Website:http://www.amesys.fr Self‐description: “Amesysestuneentreprisefrançaise,leaderdanslaconceptionetl’intégrationdes systèmescritiquesdehautetechnologie.Grâceàsonexpertisecombinéede l’électroniqueetdel’informatique,Amesyss’adresseauxsecteursd’activitésstraté‐ giques“:"AmesysisaFrenchcompany,leaderinthedesignandintegrationofcritical systemsofhightechnology.Withitscombinedexpertiseinelectronicsandcompu‐ ting,Amesystargetsstrategicsectors” (http://www.amesys.fr/index.php/fr/amesys/qui‐sommes‐nous) “ActeurreconnudansledomainedelaDéfense,Amesysaconstruitsarenomméesur samaîtrisedestechnologiesmilitairesetsonexpertisetechniqueenmatièrede guerreélectronique” "Recognizedplayerinthefieldofdefense,Amesyshasbuiltitsreputationwithits expertiseinmilitarytechnologyandtechnicalexpertiseinelectronicwarfare” (http://www.amesys.fr/index.php/fr/secteurs‐dactivites/defense). In2010,theFrenchcompanyBullboughtAmesys. Analysis Amesysdistinguishestwotypesofsurveillancesystems:lawfulinterceptionandmas‐ siveinterception.“ThemaingoalofLawfulinterceptionistoanalyzeindeepthetraf‐ ficofpredefinedtargets.InLIsystems,allthetarget’strafficisduplicatedbytheSer‐ vice Provider (phone, mobile or Internet) and is sent to a centralized interception system. Then, the investigators analyze as deeply as possible all the traffic of each target”(#6_18,5). Massiveinterceptionallowsthesurveillanceof“billionsofcommunications”andto notonlyinterceptatarget’scommunication,butalso“toprovidetheadvancedtools needed to find potential new targets” (#6_18, 5). Such systems are able to “analyze thewholecountry’strafficinrealtime”andtostoreandarchivedata(#6_18,5).They allowthe“globalsearchandsurveillanceofallInternettraffic”(#6_1).Figure4visu‐ alizesthedifferencesbetweenthetwosurveillancesystems. Amesyssaysthatmassiveinterceptionisneeded“intheconstantstruggleagainst criminalsandterrorism”(#6_1)inorderto“reducecrimelevels,protectfromterror‐ ismthreats,andidentifynewincomingsecuritydanger[s]”(#6_1). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Figure 4: “Lawful interception” and “massive interception” (data source: 6_1). Amesys’ EAGLE surveillance system consists of a Captor collecting the data, a Data Centerthatclassifiesandstoresdata,theMonitoringCenterandSmartAnalysisTools (#6_18,6).AmesysdescribesEAGEasproviding“acentralizedpointofview”because itcan“aggregatedifferentsourcesofinformation”andallowsthesurveillanceofdif‐ ferent networks (such as the Internet, analogical phones, mobile phones, satellite phones) (#6_1, see also figure 5). With the help of software, the results of the con‐ ducted surveillance are displayed to controllers sitting in monitoring centres (#6_5, 7). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Figure5:Amesys’EAGLEsystem(datasource:#6_1) Amesys’notionofsurveillancesystemsthatbuildacentralpointofviewremindsof Foucault’snotionofsurveillanceaspanopticism.Surveillanceisbasedon“aprinciple ofcompulsoryvisibility”thatisexercisedthroughtheinvisibilityofdisciplinarypow‐ er(Foucault1977,187),it“mustseewithoutbeingseen”(171),is“capableofmaking allvisible,aslongasitcoulditselfremaininvisible”(214),itisa“systemofperma‐ nentregistration”(196)inwhich“alleventsarerecorded”(197),a“machinefordis‐ sociating the see/being seen dyad” (202). “One is totally seen, without ever seeing” (202).“Heisseen,buthedoesnotsee;heistheobjectofinformation,neverasubject incommunication“(200).“thepanopticmechanismbasicallyinvolvesputtingsome‐ one in the center – an eye, a gaze, a principle of surveillance – who will be able to makeitssovereigntyfunctionoveralltheindividuals[placed]withinthismachineof power.Tothatextentwecansaythatthepanopticonistheoldestdreamoftheoldest sovereign:Noneofmysubjectscanescapeandnoneoftheiractionsisunknownto me.Thecentralpointofthepanopticonstillfunctions,asitwere,asaperfectsover‐ eign“(Foucault2007,93f).BasedonFoucaultonecansaythatAmesysaimstobuild systems that perfect sovereigntyby making unknowns known to those who control thesystem. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Figure6showsamodeloftheEAGLEsurveillancesystem. Figure6:Amesys’EAGLEsystem TheEAGLEsystemprovides“tactical”tools(SMINT,SMAW)and“strategic”tools (GLINT,GLAW)(#6_1).ThetacticaltoolsareportableandcanbepluggedintoanIP networkforanalysingthecontentofanetwork(#6_5,10).Incontrast,the“massive systemisdesignedtoanswertotheneedofinterceptionandsurveillanceonascale ofnation”(#6_5,10). TheEAGLEGLINTsystemcanretrieve,storeandanalysedatacomingfrommore than300differentInternetprotocols(mail,webmail,VoIP,chat,http,searchengines, filetransfer)(#6_9,5f;#6_12).Amesyssaysthatisa“coretechnology”that“isde‐ signedtohelpLawEnforcementAgenciesandIntelligenceorganization[s]toreduce crimelevels,toprotectfromterrorismthreatsandtoidentifynewincomingsecurity danger[s]”(#6_9,4).ItisaDeepPacketInspectiontechnologythatcan“record,de‐ code,storeanddisplaytheinterceptednetworktraffic”(#6_12).“GLINTisasystem designedtomonitorandinterceptinrealtimeinformationon[a]veryhighdatarate network”(#6_12).GLINTisnotlimitedtoInternetsurveillance,butenablesalsothe surveillanceoffixedline‐,mobile‐andsatellitephonenetworks,andmicrowave transmission(#6_12). SMINTisaportableDeepPacketInspectionsurveillancetechnologythatis“plug‐ gabledirectly”toanIPnetwork,worksonthemostcommonprotocols,focusesonthe monitoringofIPtraffic,can“recorddaysoftraffic”,analysesurveillancedata(#6_11). “SMINTisatacticalsystemdesignedtorecord,store,analyseanddisplayinrealtime The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 information.Thissystemisabletomonitorawiderangeofprotocols,includingmail, voiceoverIP(VoIP),webmail,chat,webbrowsing…”(#6_11). i2eTechnologieswascreatedin1979andwasfusedin2007withArtwaretoform the company Amesys (http://www.crescendo‐industries.de/index.php?g=0&s=2). A document(#6_15)specifiesasurveillancesystemthati2eTechnologies,accordingto thedocument,plannedtodelivertoLibya.Thesystemsdescribedareabletomonitor phonenetworksandtheInternet.Thedocumentsaysthattherewasavisitofi2eto Libyaonthe10thand11thofMay,2006,andavisitofLibyanofficialstothecompa‐ ny’sFrenchoffices(#6_15,3).“Thisdocumentisourtechnicalspecificationforyour homelandsecurityproject.Itcoversallaspectsdiscussedbetweenthevariousteams ofexpertsfromyourorganisationandourcompany”(#6_15,3). Thedocumentamongotherthingsdescribesa“NetworkStreamAnalyser”that“is mainly designed to monitor all Internet traffic and intercept those mails that may content information relevant to the Public Safety System Organisation” (#6_15, 26). ThesystemcanmonitorvariousInternetprotocols(#6_15,27).Itallowse.g.thesur‐ veillance of e‐mail content, attachments, web sites browsed, chat messages, the searchforkeywordsincapturede‐mails,thecaptureoftrafficfromandtoanIPad‐ dress,themonitoringofspecifictelephonenumbers(#6_15,37).Thedocumentalso talksaboutthesetupofmonitoringcentres(seefigure7). Figure7:Monitoringcentres(datasource:#6_15,32). Figure 8 shows a model of the entire Internet surveillance system specified in the document. The document also specifies that 3 Libyan engineers should spend 2 monthsinParisinorder“toassistandhelptheArabisationandcustomizationofthe The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 system”,thattherewouldbea2weeklongtrainingandthat“twoi2eengineerswill be installed in Tripoli for the 6 first months to help the customer in any matter” (#6_15,43). Figure8:Internetsurveillancesystemplannedbyi2e(datasource:#5_15,42) The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Bull’sCEOPhilippeVannierdescribestheactivitiesofAmesys‐Bullintheareaofde‐ fence: “When it comes to defense of course one thinks of missiles, etc… But there’s another aspect of the defense landscape that’s all about controlling information, searchinginformation…sonaturallyyou’dtrytobeabletoanalyzeeverythingthat’s circulatingaroundthesecommunicationsnetworkswhetherit’svoicetraffic,images, dataandhere,withtheAmesys‐Bullcombinationwe’reofferingsometotallyunique tools” (subtitles taken from a French video by Bull: http://www.bull‐ world.com/c_TancXb_en_security). InAugust2011,theWallStreetJournalwrotethattheAmesyssolddeeppacketin‐ spectiontechnologiestoLibya,where,accordingtotheWallStreetJournal,Gaddafi’s regimeusedtheminanInternetspyingcentreinTripolitomonitortheInternetus‐ ageofLibyancitizensandpoliticalopponents(WallStreetJournalOnline,Firmsaided Libyanspies.Firstlookinsidesecurityunitshowshowcitizensweretracked.August 30,2011).TheInternationalFederationforHumanRightsandtheLiguedesDroitsde l'HommeetduCitoyenfiledcriminalchargesagainstAmesys(FIDH,FIDHandLDHfile acomplaintconcerningtheresponsibilityofthecompanyAMESYSinrelationtoacts oftorture.October19,2011): “On the ground floor of a six‐story building here, agents working for Moammar Gadhafi sat in an open room, spying on emails and chat messages with the help of technologyLibyaacquiredfromtheWest.Therecentlyabandonedroomislinedwith posters and English‐language training manuals stamped with the name Amesys, a unitofFrenchtechnologyfirmBullSA,whichinstalledthemonitoringcenter.Awarn‐ ingbythedoorbearstheAmesyslogo.Thesignreads:‘Helpkeepourclassifiedbusi‐ ness secret. Don't discuss classified information out of the HQ’. The room, explored Monday by The Wall Street Journal, provides clear new evidence of foreign compa‐ nies' cooperation in the repression of Libyans under Col. Gadhafi's almost 42‐year rule.ThesurveillancefilesfoundhereincludeemailswrittenasrecentlyasFebruary, aftertheLibyanuprisinghadbegun.[…] This kind of spying became a top priority for Libya as the region's Arab Spring revolutionsblossomedinrecentmonths.[…]TheTripoliInternetmonitoringcenter wasamajorpartofabroadsurveillanceapparatusbuiltbyCol.Gadhafitokeeptabs on his enemies. Amesys in 2009 equipped the center with ‘deep packet inspection’ technology,oneofthemostintrusivetechniquesforsnoopingonpeople'sonlineac‐ tivities,accordingtopeoplefamiliarwiththematter.[…] Gadhafi'sregimehadbecomemoreattunedtothedangersposedbyInternetactiv‐ ism,eventhoughthenationhadonlyabout100,000Internetsubscriptionsinapopu‐ lationof 6.6million. TheEaglesystemallowsagentstoobserve networktrafficand peer into people's emails, among other things. In the room, one English‐language postersays:’WhereasmanyInternetinterceptionsystemscarryoutbasicfilteringon IPaddressandextractonlythosecommunicationsfromtheglobalflow(LawfulInter‐ ception), EAGLE Interception system analyses and stores all the communications from the monitored link (Massive interception)’. [...] In a basement storage room, dossiers of Libyans' online activities are lined up in floor‐to‐ceiling filing shelves” The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 (Wall Street Journal Online, Firms aided Libyan spies. First look inside security unit showshowcitizensweretracked.August30,2011). Peter Bouckaert, Human RightsWatch's emergencies director, expressed thecon‐ cern that Western companies and governments take actions to destroy evidence of theirsupportofGaddafiandthesurveillanceofthepoliticaloppositioninLibya(The Times,WesttriestocoverupLibyadeals:Theraceisontoseekoutanddestroyany incriminatingevidence.October7,2011). Inapressrelease,Amesysdisputedtheclaimthatitinstalledasurveillancesystem inLibyaandannouncedthatitreservestherighttofilesuitagainstthosewhomake suchclaims: “AmesyssignedacontractwiththeLibyanauthoritiesin2007.Therelevanthard‐ warewasdeliveredin2008.Thecontractwasrelatedtothemakingavailableofanal‐ ysishardwareconcerningasmallfractionoftheInternetlinesinstalledatthattime(a fewthousand). ThisdidnotincludeeitherInternetcommunicationsviasatellite(as usedinInternetcafes),encrypteddatasuchasSkype‐typecommunications,orfilter‐ ingofWebsites.Inaddition,thehardwareuseddidnotallowforthemonitoringof eitherfixedormobiletelephonelines. Thecontractwasconcludedatatimewhentheinternationalcommunitywasinthe processofdiplomaticrapprochementwithLibya,whichwaslookingtofightagainst terrorismandactsperpetratedbyAlQaeda(2007wastheyearinwhichtheBulgari‐ annurseswerereleased).(InDecember2007MuammarGadhafimadeanofficialvisit to France; in July 2009 Muammar Gadhafi met with Barack Obama in Italy). All Amesys' business dealings comply rigorously with the legal and regulatory re‐ quirementssetoutininternational,EuropeanandFrenchconventions.Amesysdoes notoperateanytelephoneorInternetmonitoringcenters,anywhereworldwide.[...] Amesysreservesitsrightsinrelationtoanyinfringementthatmayaffectitsimageor reputation” (Amesys,Pressrelease.September1,2011. http://www.wcm.bull.com/internet/pr/new_rend.jsp?DocId=673289&lang=en). Sotherearetwodifferentstories:Ontheonehandjournalistsandhumanrightsac‐ tivistswhosaythattheydiscoveredaLibyanmonitoringcentreandthat“Amesysin 2009 equipped the center with ‘deep packet inspection’ technology”. On the other handAmesysthatsaysthatitdoesnotoperatesuchcentres.Andthereisadocument releasedbyWikiLeaks(#5_15)thatifauthenticseemstosuggestbusinessrelations betweeni2eandLibya. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 7.Elaman Placeofbusiness:Munich,Germany Website:http://www.elaman.de Self‐description: “ELAMAN, with its headquarters in Munich/Germany and its subsidiaries in Du‐ bai/United Arab Emirates and Malans /Switzerland, specializes in security require‐ mentsforgovernmentandlawenforcementworldwide.Ouraim is toprovidecom‐ prehensive security products and solutions, technical consultancy and services as well as professional training for our customers” (http://www.elaman.de/company‐ profile.php).Thecompanywasestablishedin2004(#7_2,1). Analysis Elaman justifies its production if surveillance technologies with the need to fight crimeandterrorism:Lawfulinterceptionisneeded“forinvestigatingandprosecuting criminalactivitiesandterrorism”(#7_10,11). OneoftheanalyseddocumentsisaproductspecificationoftheCS‐2000HighEnd (#7_4), a high performance network platform that has a Deep Packet processing module(DPPM)thatcan“detectandtrackupto1millionsimultaneousflows”(#7_4) and conduct “up to 5 gigabits per second L2‐7 inspection and analysis”. Other tech‐ nologiesadvertisedbyElamanincludeforexampleapeertopeer(p2p)trafficfilter (#7_5), the portable IP monitoring system Poseidon Flyer (#7_6), the portable mo‐ deminterceptionsystemMuninPOTS(#7_7),orthePOSEIDONInternetMonitoring Center(#7_9). “POSEIDONMobilisaportablesystemforrecording,reconstructionandevaluation ofIP‐dataandtheirapplications,e.g.email,web‐sessions,chat.[…]POSEIDONMobil consistsodthreefunctionalparts.Therecordingoftherawdata,pickedupfromdif‐ ferentkindsofcommunicationlines,thedatabasemanagementforinternalorganiza‐ tionalpurposesofthesedataandthereconstructionfunctiontoanalyzeandevaluate therecordedIP‐baseddata”(#7_6,2). MuninPOTSinterceptsInternetdatasentfrom onesource overamodem.Itis“a trueportablemodeminterceptsolutiontobeusedinoperations,wheredirectaccess tothetargetlinesisrequired.Thisunitcanbedeployedinthefieldclosetothetarget or installed on a permanent basis in a monitoring centre” (#7_7, 3). It can monitor datafromdifferentprotocols,suchaswebsites,e‐mailsandattachments,chat,VoIP, andfiletransfer,messengerservices. ThePOSEIDONInternetMonitoringCenter“isanequipmentforrecording,recon‐ struction and evaluation of IP‐Data, which are passively recorded from different communicationlines.Itreadsthedata,filtersthemaccordingtopredefinedfiltercri‐ teria[…],addsatimestamptothedata(NTP‐Server)andsavesthedatainrawformat The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 inadatabase.UsingtheAnalyzerUserInterfacethe datacan– evenonline– be re‐ constructedandevaluated”(#7_9).Figure9showsthatPoseidontypicallyprocesses InternetdatafromInternetServiceProviders(ISPs).POSEIDONcanmonitorcontent fromalotofdifferentprotocols,forexamplee‐mail,WWW(http,smtp),chat,FTP,or VoIP. Figure9:POSEIDONInternetMonitoringCenter(datasource:#7_9,3) The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 AdocumentthatpresentsElaman’s“CommunicationsMonitoringSolutions”(#7_12) for the surveillance of phone networks, satellite communication, SMS, the Internet, and Radio Frequency Monitoring (RFM), and various other tools (such as FinFisher andspeechidentificationsoftware)specifiesonetaskofdataretentiontechnologies in the following way: “In the field of telecommunications, data retention generally referstothestorageofcallrelatedinformation(numbers,date,time,position,etc.)of telephony and internet traffic. The stored data is usually telephone calls made and received,emailssentandreceived,web‐sitesvisitedandlocation data.Theprimary objectiveindataretentionistrafficanalysisandmasssurveillance.Byanalysingthe retaineddata,governmentscanidentifyanindividual’slocation,theirassociatesand membersofagroup,suchaspoliticalopponents”(#7_12,17;emphasisadded). Elaman advertises its surveillance products and services as well as surveillance technologies by other companies as means for fighting terrorism and crime. The technologies described in this section can be classified as Deep Packet Inspection Technologies,theyallowtomonitorthecontentofInternetcommunicationandother formsofcommunication.Intheanalyseddocuments,wecouldnotfindanycomments about privacy violation concerns and the limitation of human rights that may arise from the use of DPI Internet surveillance and related forms of surveillance. In con‐ trast, as shown, Elaman says that data retention can help governments to identify “members of a group, such as political opponents” (#7_12, 17). The question that ariseshereisifthisformulationquestionsthe“righttofreedomofpeacefulassembly andtofreedomofassociation”thatisdefinedinarticle11oftheEuropeanConven‐ tion of Human Rights and in article 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedomofassociationatalllevels,particularinpolitical,tradeunionandcivicmat‐ ters,whichimpliestherightofeveryonetoformandjointradeunionsfortheprotec‐ tion of his or her interests”). The European Convention of Human Right allows re‐ strictingthisfreedomifitis“necessaryinademocraticsocietyintheinterestsofna‐ tionalsecurityorpublicsafety,forthepreventionofdisorderorcrime,fortheprotec‐ tion of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Elaman’s formulation may however imply that it wants to enable governments in generaltomonitorthemembershipofpoliticalgroups,whichmaylimittherightto freedom of political assembly and also raises the question if the formulation disre‐ spects theEU’sDataProtectionDirective (95/46/EC)thatprohibits“the processing ofpersonaldatarevealingracialorethnicorigin,politicalopinions,religiousorphilo‐ sophical beliefs, trade‐union membership, and the processing of data concerning healthorsexlife”(article8). Elamanoffersinanewsletter(#7_10)seminarsfortheuseofGammaInternation‐ al’sFinFisherITintrusionsoftwareaswellasanintrusionportfolioofferedtogether byElamanandGamma.FinFisherisaso‐called“Trojanhorse”,asoftwarethatonce installed allows the intruder remote access. FinFisher can infect computers, mobile phones,localnetworksandISPnetworksandextractdatafromthesesystems(#7_10, 4‐10). The product and training for it was also advertised in Eleman’s Communica‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 tionsMonitoringcataloguefromOctober2007(#7_2).FinFishercane.g.betarnedas asoftwareupdatethatissenttoacomputerormobilephone(NDR.ZAPP:Germany SpywareforDictators.December7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/zapp4923.html). TheGermanregionalpublicserviceTVstationNDRreportedaboutasecretofferof the UK company Gamma to the Egyptian state for the FinFisher technology (NDR. ZAPP:GermanySpywareforDictators.December7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/zapp4923.html). The Egyptian blogger Mostafa Hussein, who discovered the documents, argued in theNDRreportthatthissoftwareis“exactlylikeweapons”(ibid.).TheEgyptianIn‐ ternetactivistIsraaAbdelFattahwasinterviewed,sayingthatthissoftwareis“help‐ ingthedictators[…]to[…]attacktheactivism”(ibid.).HerownInternetcommunica‐ tionwassurveilledbytheEgyptiangovernment.Shesaidthatsurveillancecompanies “only think about money” (ibid.). NDR also describes Gamma’s attempts to sell sur‐ veillance technologiestoTurkmenistanandOman(ibid.).The AustrianIT journalist ErichMöchelsaidthatsurveillancetechnologycompaniesencourage“repressionand torture”(ibid.).ElamandoesnotproduceFinFisher,itratheradvertisesthistechnol‐ ogyandseminarsforitsuse.TheNDRreportalsomentionedandproblematizedthe quotation by Elaman about the surveillance of political opponents (ibid). NDR con‐ cludedthat“criticalquestionsareevidentlyunwelcomeinthisindustry”(ibid.). Elaman also advertised the Nokia Siemens Monitoring Centre in one of its docu‐ ments(#7_2).TheAustrianjournalistErichMöchelreportedinApril2008that“with highlikelihoodaresurveillancesystemsdevelopedbySiemensMunichusedincoun‐ trieslikeChina,Iranandothertotalitarianstatesfortrackingdissidents,ethnicaland religious minorities”7 (Möchel, Erich. Datenjagd auf Dissidenten. April 7, 2008. http://www.fuzo‐archiv.at/artikel/268868v2/).AskedforacommentbytheAustri‐ an Broadcasting Company ORF that published Möchel’sreport, Nokia Siemens com‐ mented: “Following the wish of our customers, we unfortunately cannot disclose, whichorganisationshaveboughtoursolutions”8(ibid.). Elamanhasinadocumentexpressedthatsurveillancetechnologiescanbeusedfor identifyingpoliticalopponents.Politicalrealityshowsthatsome ofthetechnologies thatitadvertisedinitsdocumentshavebeenusedforthisverypurpose:Accordingto reports,Gamma’sFinFisherwasusedinEgypttomonitorthecommunicationsofpo‐ liticalactivistslikeIsraaAbdelFattah.Elamanhasinoneofitsdocumentsadvertised thecapacityofsurveillancetechnologyto“identifyanindividual’slocation,theiras‐ sociatesandmembersofagroup,suchaspoliticalopponents”(#7_12,17). 7 “MithoherWahrscheinlichkeitwerdenvonSiemensMünchenentwickelteÜberwachungssystemein LändernwieChina,demIranundanderentotalitärenStaatenzurVerfolgungvonDissidenten,ethni‐ schenundreligiösenMinderheiteneingesetzt”. 8 "DemWunschunsererKundenentsprechendkönnenwirleidernichtbekanntgeben,welcheOrgani‐ sationenunsereLösunggekaufthaben”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 8.Datakom Placeofbusiness:Ismaning,Germany Website:http://www.datakom.de/ Self‐description: “TheDATAKOMGmbHisaleadingtechnology‐integratorandserviceprovideronthe ICTmarket.Since1986offerwetrend‐settingtest‐,analysis‐,security‐andmanage‐ ment‐systems for all communications networks”9 (http://www.datakom.de/ueber‐ uns.html) “Monitoringmeansthepluggingofamonitoringprobetodatalinesforsurveillanceof the network. At line speed, the data are detected, decoded, stored and analysed ac‐ cordingtodifferentaspects(DeepPacketInspection,DPI)” (http://www.datakom.de/netzwerk‐analyse‐simulation/netzwerk‐ monitoring.html)10. Analysis Datakomsaysthatforlawfulinterception“everybitandbytehastobeanalyzed”in ordertocreate“Application/ContentAwareness”(#8_1).ItthereforepromotesDeep PacketInspection(DPI)technologiesthatcreate“TOTALvisbilityatnetworkspeed” (#8_1;seealsofigure10). Datakomprovidestheinstallationofsurveillancetechnologiesasaservicethatis primarilydirectedatcompaniesthatwanttomonitortheirinternalnetworks(#8_2). DatakomalsooperatesanInterceptionCentreinBremenandofferstotelecommuni‐ cationsoperatorstheservicetoroutelawenforcementrequestfortargetedsurveil‐ lanceoverthismonitoringcentre(#8_3). Datakom propagates the panoptic idea of “total visibility” of communication net‐ workswiththehelpofDPIsurveillancetechnologies.Wecouldintheanalyseddocu‐ mentsandonDatakom’swebsitenotfindanydiscussionofdataprotection,privacy andethicalproblemsthatmayariseduetoDPI. 9 “DieDATAKOMGmbHistführenderTechnologie‐IntegratorundServiceprovideramITK‐Markt.Seit 1986bietenwirrichtungsweisendeTest‐,Analyse‐,Sicherheits‐undManagementsystemefüralle Kommunikationsnetze”. 10 “MonitoringbedeutetdasAufschalteneinerMonitorprobeaufDatenleitungenzurÜberwachungdes Netzwerks.DieDatenwerdeninLeitungsgeschwindigkeiterfasst,decodiert,gespeichertundnach unterschiedlichenGesichtspunktenanalysiert(DeepPacketInspection,DPI)”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Figure10:Datakom’svisionoftotalvisbility(datasource:#8_1) The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 9.trovicor Placeofbusiness:Munich,Germany Website:http://www.trovicor.com/ Self‐description: “trovicorstandsforalmosttwodecadesofcustomer‐centricdevelopmentsproviding state‐of‐the‐art intelligence solutions. trovicor is an industry leader who pro‐ videsturnkey intelligence solutions. These solutions are based on our own state‐of‐ theartcoredevelopmentsintegratingbest‐in‐classthirdpartyproductsandourcus‐ tomer‐centricCareProgrammes. Atpresentweemploysome170expertsworldwide.OurheadquartersinMunichad‐ dress Europe, the Community of Independent States (CIS) and both Americas; our subsidiaries in Dubai and Islamabad cater for the Middle East and Africa; the Kuala LumpurofficefocusesonAsiaPacific. Based on our vast experiences our main business goal has always been to generate sustainablebenefitsforlawenforcementandgovernmentagencies.Inthecourseof developingmanyandvariedMonitoringCentersolutionsaswellasotherintelligence projects,wehavegainedanin‐depthexperienceoftheirrequirements“ (http://www.trovicor.com/en/about‐us/in‐brief.html). “Our vision: 'Being the leading solution provider for the intelligence community' ‐ reflectsourpassiontobuildasolutiondrivenandsustainablebusinessforasuccess‐ fulfuture. Our mission: 'Makingthe world a saferplace' ‐ expresses the understanding of our missionfortodayandtomorrow.Weareconvincedthatourexpertisehelpstomain‐ tainandenhancepre‐emptivesecurity,andthuscontributestothequalityofallpeo‐ ples’lives.[…] We don't justphilosophise about warnings like 'without security, there is no free‐ dom';together with ourpartners we can help to increase safety and security. Good governancehastotakeappropriateactionstomaketheworldasaferplaceforindi‐ viduals, families and nations. We believe that this is where true freedom begins“ (http://www.trovicor.com/en/about‐us/philosophy.html). Analysis OnMarch31st,2009,NokiaSiemensNetworkssolditsIntelligenceSolutionsbranch toPersuaGmbH(NokiaSiemensNetworks,ProvisionofLawfulInterceptCapacityin Iran. June 22, 2009. http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/news‐events/press‐ room/press‐releases/provision‐of‐lawful‐intercept‐capability‐in‐iran) that now op‐ erates it under the name trovicor GmbH (Spiegel Online International, Western Sur‐ veillanceTechnologyintheHandsofDespots.December8,2011).Wewilltherefore intheanalysisfocuspartlyonNokiaSiemensNetworks’surveillancetechnologies. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 trovicor justifies its business operations with the need to fight crime and terror‐ ism: “Never before has information been exchanged so fast and in so many ways. Needlesstosaythatcriminalsandterroristorganisationshavealsobeenfasttoreal‐ isethevastopportunitiespresentedbymoderntelecommunications.Whenitcomes to fighting crime and thwarting terrorist attacks, law enforcement and government securityagenciesneedtherightcommunicationtoolstogetresults” (http://www.trovicor.com/en/business‐sections/lawful‐interception.html). trovicor produces and sells a Monitoring Center (MC): “The trovicor Monitoring Center (MC) has been specifically developed to serve the complex needs of law en‐ forcement and national security agencies worldwide. It enables them to intercept, retain,analyse,investigateanddistributeinterceptedvoiceanddatacommunication aswellashistoricaldata.It’susagespansfrominterceptofcommunicationsinfixed andmobilenetworkstoNextGenerationNetworkingandInternet“ (http://www.trovicor.com/en/business‐sections/communication‐ monitoring.html). “Inordertodeliver,storeandanalysedata,suchastelephonenumbers,date,time, content etc. that were gained through the interception of telecommunication net‐ worksaMonitoringCenter(MC)isneeded.TheMonitoringCentercandecode,store, viewthedataandpreparethemfortherespectiveanalysis.Theinterfacetechnology used between the Monitoring Center and the telecommunication network is related toitsformat,e.g.PSTN,GSM,UMTS,CDMA,IP.Additionallythenetworkproviderde‐ fines the switch technology used (Nokia‐Siemens, Ericsson, Alcatel‐Lucent, Cisco, etc.)” (http://www.trovicor.com/en/business‐sections/lawful‐interception.html). Elaman’sCommunicationMonitoringproductcataloguefromOctober2007(#7_2) contains aproduct sheet of theNokia Siemens Monitoring Center. It is described as “makingtheworldsaferwithtrend‐settingintelligencesolutions”,“usingtelecommu‐ nicationstotargetterrorismandcrime”(#7_2).Thevisioncommunicatedis“thatour expertisewillenhancepeaceandtherebycontributetothequalityofpeoples’lives” (#7_2). This part of Elaman’s product catalogue holds the address and a copyright noticebyNokiaSiemensNetworks.TheNokiaSiemensMonitoringCentercaninter‐ cept data from mobile and fixed line phone networks and the Internet (#7_2). The taskfortheuseoftheMonitoringCenterwouldbeto“discoverhiddenpatternsand criminal structures, anticipate and prevent crimes”, “fighting crime and thwarting terroristattacks”because“criminalgroupsandterroristorganizationsalsohavebeen quicktorealizethevastopportunitiespresentedbymoderncommunications”(#7_2). AnothersystemadvertisedinElaman’sCommunication MonitoringcatalogueisSie‐ mens’IPInterceptionSystem–IPIS(#7_2)that“iscapableofinterceptingdatainthe Internet,inotherIPbasednetworksandVoIPinNextGenerationNetworks”(#7_2). IPdatacanbeextractedfromemail,theWWW,VoIP,andinstantmessaging(#7_2). InApril2009,theWashingtonTimesreportedthatNokiaSiemenssoldaMonitor‐ ingCentretoIran: The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 “Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN), a joint venture between the Finnish cell‐phone giantNokiaandGermanpowerhouseSiemens,deliveredwhatisknownasamonitor‐ ing center to Irantelecom, Iran's state‐owned telephone company. A spokesman for NSN said the servers were sold for ‘lawful intercept functionality,’ a technical term used by the cell‐phone industry to refer to law enforcement's ability to tap phones, read e‐mails and surveil electronic data on communications networks. In Iran, a country that frequently jails dissidents and where regime opponents rely heavily on Web‐based communication with the outside world, a monitoring center thatcanarchivetheseinterceptscouldprovideavaluabletooltointensifyrepression. Lily Mazaheri, a human rights and immigration lawyer who represents high‐profile Iraniandissidents,saidshehadsuspectedthatthegovernmenthadincreaseditsca‐ pabilitytomonitoritsperceivedenemies. Recently,oneofherclientswasarrestedbecauseofinstantmessaginghehadpar‐ ticipatedinwithMs.Mazaheri,shesaid.’Hetoldmehehadreceivedacallfromthe MinistryofIntelligence,andthisguywhenhewenttotheinterrogation,theyputin frontofhimprintedcopiesofhischatswithme.Hesaidhewasdumbfounded,andhe wassenttoprison.’ […]HadiGhaemi,spokesmanfortheInternationalCampaignforHumanRightsin Iran,said12women´srightsactivistswerearrestedlatelastmonthataprivatemeet‐ ingtocelebratethePersianNewYear.Hesaidtheraidsuggestedthestatehadaccess toprivatecommunications. ’This is an absolute threat to the privacy of all Iranian activists. It puts them in dangerofbeingconstantlymonitoredbytheintelligenceservices,somethingthatwe knowisalreadyhappening,’Mr.Ghaemisaid“(WashingtonTimes,FedContractor,Cell PhoneMakerSoldSpySystemtoIran.April13,2009). TheIranianjournalistIsaSaharkhizwasjailedforthreeyears“onchargesofinsult‐ ing Iran's supreme leader and spreading propaganda against the regime. […] Last month,SaharkhizfiledalawsuitagainstNokiaSiemens,accusingthecompanyofde‐ liveringsurveillanceequipmenttoIranthathelpedtheauthoritiestracehiswherea‐ boutsthroughhiscellphone”(BBCMonitoringWorldMedia,ProminentIranianJour‐ nalistJailedforThreeYears.September30,2010). Nokia Siemens commented on media reports: (ARD Tagesthemen, Siemens‐Nokia ÜberwachungstechnikimIran.June24,2009. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8JbydEFBx5E).“Thesystemcanonlyrecord,it cannot identify anybody” (Stefan Zuber)11. The journalist Erich Möchel in contrast said: “One can geographically locate with these monitoring centres, where persons are, one can create their communication profile, with whom they communicate. 11 ”DasSystemkannnuraufzeichnen,eskannniemandenidentifizieren.Esistnichtgeeignet,um Zensurzuüben”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Groups can be investigated”12 (ibid). A product specification of the Nokia Siemens MonitoringCenter(providedinoneofElaman’sbrochures)explainsthatitsupports the “fully automatic recording of all data concerning all activities of the target” and makes“nationwidemonitoringpossible”(#7_2).Sotherelevantaspectisnotthatit does not censor the Internet, but rather that Nokia Siemens’ Monitoring Center can monitortheactivitiesandcommunicationsofpoliticalactivists. AformeremployeeofNokiaSiemensreportedthathewaspartoftheinstallationof aMonitoringCentreinIran(ZDFFrontal21,Nokia‐Siemens‐NetworksimIran.Janu‐ ary 26, 2010. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oHqyKYa6Ffw). Siemens Board MemebrJoeKaesersaid:“ThereistodaynoreasonforustoassumethatNSNhasact‐ ed unlawfully or unorderly”13. In the same report, the two Iranianpolitical activists Poojan Mahmudian and Kianoosh Sanjari reported that they were imprisoned and thattheircommunicationsweremonitored(ibid.). InitsCorporateResponsibilityReport2009,NokiaSiemens’CEORajeevSuriwrote: “Over the past year we have seen allegations that telecommunications technology, includingthatprovidedby NokiaSiemensNetworks,hasbeenusedtosuppresshu‐ manrightsinsteadofenhancingthem.Thisis notasimpleissueastechnologythatis designed to benefit society can be used for other purposes and, of course, govern‐ mentscanchangeovertime”(NokiaSiemensNetworks2009,4).Thisstatementim‐ plies that a Monitoring Center isdesignedfor benefiting society and that its use for repressionofpoliticalopponentsisanunintendedside‐effect.Thequestionisifthe purposeoftheuseofsuchatechnologyforrepressionisnotforeseeableifacompany entersabusinessdealwithIran. InastatementissuedinJune2009,NokiaSiemensarguedthatthesurveillancecen‐ treitdeliveredtoIranhad“thecapabilitytoconductvoicemonitoringoflocalcallson itsfixedandmobilenetwork”andthatitcouldnot“providedatamonitoring,internet monitoring,deeppacketinspection,internationalcallmonitoringorspeechrecogni‐ tion”(NokiaSiemensNetworks,ProvisionofLawfulInterceptCapacityinIran.June 22, 2009. http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/news‐events/press‐room/press‐ releases/provision‐of‐lawful‐intercept‐capability‐in‐iran). It also said in the same statement that Nokia Siemens Networks’ Intelligence Solutions was sold to Persua GmbH on March 31st, 2009 (ibid), which now operates it under the name Trovicor GmbH(SpiegelOnlineInternational,WesternSurveillanceTechnologyintheHandsof Despots. December 8, 2011). In August 2011, Bloomberg reported that the impris‐ onedhumanrightsactivistsAbdulGhaniAlKhanjarwastorturedinaBahrainiprison andthattheofficialspossessedtranscriptsofhiscommunications.Accordingtotwo people associated with Trovicor, the company provided surveillance technology to 12 “Es können mit diesen Monitoring Centern Personen geographisch bestimmt werden, wo sie sind, es kann ihr Kommunikationsprofil erstellt werden, mit wem sie kommunizieren. Es können Gruppen ausgeforscht warden”. 13 “Es gibt heute für uns keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass NSN sich rechtswidrig oder nicht ordnungsmässig verhalten hat”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Bahrain (Bloomberg, Torture in Bahrain Becomes Routine With Help From Nokia Siemens. August 23, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐08‐22/torture‐ in‐bahrain‐becomes‐routine‐with‐help‐from‐nokia‐siemens‐networking.html). “Trovicor equipment plays a surveillance role in at least 12 Middle Eastern and North African nations, according to the two people familiar with the installations. […] Al Khanjar says the first of his communications used in the interrogations was interceptedinJune2009.Atthattime,theNokiaSiemensfamilyofrelatedcompanies was the only known supplier and maintainer of monitoring centers to Bahrain, the two people familiar with the installations say. The clusters of computers required constantupgradesbythecompanies,theysay”(ibid.). InApril2012,GermanmediapublishedallegationsthatNokiaSiemensalsosoldits Monitoring Centre to Syria. “German industrial giant Siemens sold network surveil‐ lancetechnologytotheSyrianregime in2000,public broadcasterARDreportedon Tuesdaynight.Accordingtotheirnewsshow‘Fakt’,aproductcalledthe‘Monitoring Center’ was delivered to Syrian mobile communications company Syriatel. Nokia SiemensNetworksconfirmedthedelivery,theyreported. The corresponding business division at Siemens became the new joint venture NokiaSiemensNetworksin2007.Thefollowingyear,thatcompanysignedacontract withSyrianlandlineproviderSTE,adealthatalsoincludedthe‘MonitoringCenter’. ThesecontractswerethentransferredinMarch2009totheNokiaSiemensNetworks spin‐offcompanyTrovicor,whichtookoverthe‘VoiceandDataRecording’division, ARDreported,citingdocumentstheyhadobtained. TheMunich‐basedcompanyTrovicor,whichbelongstoafinancialinvestortoday, declined to comment on the issue, ‘Fakt’ reported. But a human rights activist from AmnestyInternationaltoldtheshowthatthesystematiconlinesurveillancebySyrian security forceswaslikely playingaroleinthecapture ofoppositionmembers,who facetortureaftertheirarrest.[…] Internet freedom activist and Pirate Party member Stephan Urbach criticized the export of surveillance technology from Germany. ‘We need a broader debate about theethicalresponsibilityofcompanies’,hesaidinastatement.‘TheGermangovern‐ menthascompletelymissedthisdebate,particularlyinthewakeofrevelationsabout suchfilteringandsurveillancesystems’.IfitbecomesunambiguouslyclearthatGer‐ man companies have delivered surveillance technology to totalitarian states, Berlin must‘swiftlycorrectthisfailure’,headded”(SpiegelOnlineInternational,Monitoring the Opposition: Siemens Allegedly Sold Surveillance Gear to Syria. April 11th, 2012. http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,826860,00.html). Fakt interviewed a Syrian activist who fled to Germany. He said: “I provided YouTube videos of demonstrations. When I was arrested, my exact behaviour was readtomefromthefiles.EverysinglestepI'vetakenontheInternetwasheldaganist The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 tomewhileIwasbeaten”14(FAKT,SyrienüberwachtmitSiemens‐Technik.April10, 2012.http://www.mdr.de/fakt/siemens106.html). If these reports are true, then it means that Nokia Siemens first sold Monitoring CentrestoIranandSyria,thensolditssurveillancebusinessunittoanothercompany that renamed the business unit to trovicor and continued selling the technology to countriesthatusethemfortracking,imprisoningandtorturingpoliticalactivists. Erich Möchel, the first journalist who reported about Nokia Siemens relations to Iran,commentsonthe saleofthesurveillanceunittoasmallercompanythatthere wasnoconcernabouthumanrights,butonlyaconcernaboutimagedamage,andthat thebusinesswith surveillancecontinues:"Meanwhilepredominates the insightthat thecollateraldamageforcompanypolicyprobablywillbemuchsmalleriftheseMon‐ itoringCenters[...]areoutsourcedtospecialistcompaniesandoneselfprepareseve‐ rythingtechnicallysothatthisforeignequipmentsuppliedbythirdpartiescanwith‐ outproblembedockedtoone’sowntelephonenetworks.[...]Itispuremarketpoli‐ tics,nothingelse.Ithasnothingtodowithhumanrights,butonlywiththefactthat one does not want to dirty one’s own hands. So one sends ahead somebody else – companiesthatdonotcarebecausetheycomefromthisarea.[...]Ifyouselltoastate acompleteGSMnetworkfamily,thenthisreallycostsmoney.That'salotofrevenue. Well,nowonesaysstopthat,oneletsotherstakecareofit,theMonitoringCentres, andonerathermakesthebigbusinessandnotthesmallbusinessbecausebothget togetherbadly[...]Nokiahassufferedahugereputationaldamagebytherevelations inIran.[...]Forthisreasononehasretreatedandsaid:Theimagelossislargerthan theexpectedprofitwhenwecarryonfurtherthisway,sowestopit.That’sbasicallya verywisebusinesspolicydecision"(NDR.ZAPP:InterviewmitErichMöchel.Decem‐ ber7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/moechel103.html)15. Möchelintheinterviewpointedoutthatpublicpressure(bythemediaandcivilsoci‐ ety) on one company does not automatically stop unethical business practices, but 14 TranslationfromGerman.“IchstellteYouTubeVideosvonDemonstrationenbereit.Alsichdanach verhaftetwurde,wurdemirmeinegenaueVorgehensweiseausdenAktenvorgelesen.Jedereinzelne Schritt,denichimInternetunternommenhabe,wurdemirvorgehalten,währendichgeschlagen wurde”. 15 “Inzwischen überwiegt die Einsicht, dass der Kollateralschaden für die Firmenpolitik wohl wesentlich geringer sein wird, wenn man diese Monitoring Centres […] an Spezialfirmen auslagert und man selbst be‐ reitet eigentlich nur alles dazu vor technisch, dass dieses fremde Equipment (von Dritten zugelieferte) prob‐ lemlos an die eigenen Telefonienetze andockbar ist. […] Es ist reine Marktpolitik, sonst nichts. Es hat nichts mit Menschenrechten zu tun, sondern nur damit, dass man sich selbst nicht anpatzen will damit. Sondern da schickt man jemanden anderen vor – Firmen, denen es egal ist, denn sie kommen aus dem Bereich. […] Wenn man an einen Staat ein Netz aus der kompletten GSM Familie verkauft, das kostet so richtig Geld. Das ist viel Umsatz. Naja, jetzt sagt man halt, man überlässt das anderen, die Monitoring Centres, und wir ma‐ chen lieber das große Geschäft und das kleine Geschäft nicht, denn beide Geschäfte zusammen vertragen sich schlecht. […] Nokia hat einen immensen Imageschaden durch das Auffliegen im Iran davongetragen. […] Aus diesem Grund hat man sich zurückgezogen und hat gesagt: Der Imageschaden ist grösser als der zu erwartende Gewinn, wenn wir das weiter betreiben, also hören wir auf damit. Eine sehr kluge geschäftspo‐ litische Entscheidung im Grunde ”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 canresultinthesellingofbusinessunitstoothercompaniesthatengageincompara‐ blepractices. NewsreportshavearguedthatMonitoringCentresproducedbyNokiaSiemensand trovicorwereusedtorepresstheIranianandBahrainianopposition,peoplelikethe journalist Isa Saharkhiz and the political activists Poojan Mahmudian and Kianoosh Sanjari in Iran or the Bahraini human rights activist Abdul Ghani Al Khanjar. There aredifferingreportsandviewsaboutwhattechnicalcapacitiesthecommunications surveillancetechnologiesexportedtoIranandBahrainactuallyhad.Soalthoughthe business practices are not entirely clear, it seems to be the case the companies like trovicor and Nokia Siemens produced or have produced surveillance technologies that are capable of intercepting the communications content of different forms of communication (Internet, fixed line telephony, mobile phone communication, etc) andthatsuchtechnologiescaninpoliticalcontextsbeusedforrepressionagainstthe politicalopposition. OnOctober25th,2010,theEUupdateditsexportrestrictionstoIranthatwereis‐ sued in 2007. The restriction includes an explicit restriction “on trade in dual‐use goodsandtechnology,aswellasequipmentwhichmightbeusedforinternalrepres‐ sion”(EURegulationNo.961/2010of25October2010onRestrictiveMeasuresagainst Iran).ThismeansthatexportsofInternetandphonesurveillancetechnologieshave beenlegalpriortothisrestriction.TheEU’sexportrestrictionsofthatwerepassedon November16th,2011applyforequipmentthatcanbeused“inconnectionwithavio‐ lationofhumanrights,democraticprinciplesorfreedomofspeechasdefinedbythe CharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnion,byusinginterceptiontechnol‐ ogies and digital data transfer devices for monitoring mobile phones and text mes‐ sagesandtargetedsurveillanceofInternetuse(e.g.viaMonitoringCentresandLaw‐ fulInterceptionGateways)”(EURegulationNo.1232/2011oftheEuropeanParliament and the European Council). The restriction applies only for the following countries: Argentina,China(includingHongKongandMacao),Croatia,India,Russia,SouthAfri‐ ca,SouthKorea,Turkey,andUkraine(ibid.).Thismeansthatexportofcommunica‐ tionssurveillancetechnologytoacountrylikeBahrainisstilllegal,whereasitisnow illegaltoexportsimilartechnologies(likeMonitoringCentres)toIran.Soiftheclaims thattrovicorexportedcommunicationssurveillancetoolstoBahrainweretrue,then it would definitely be the case that “trovicor complies with all export and customs controls in all regions where business is conducted” (#9, 7). The question that can howeverbeposedisnotonlyiflegalstandardshavebeenrespectedoriffundamental ethicalprinciplesarerespected(suchasthehumanrightoffreedomofassemblyand expression)andiftrovicor’sbusinesspracticesrespecttheethicalgoalthatithasset itselfinitsCodeofBusinessConduct(#9)andthatisnotprimarilyalegalgoal,name‐ ly that “trovicor’s business ethics goal is, as an industry leader, to be among the world’s best in corporate responsibility, corporate governance, promoting fair com‐ petition, adapt internationally recognized standards whenever feasible, and practic‐ inggoodcorporatecitizenshipwhereveritdoesbusiness”(#9,4). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Being asked if trovicor exported communications surveillance technology to Bah‐ rain,trovicorofficials“wereonlywillingtostatethattheycouldnotpubliclydiscuss customersandthedetailsofagreements”(SpiegelOnlineInternational,WesternSur‐ veillanceTechnologyintheHandsofDespots.December8,2011)and“BirgittFisch‐ er‐Harrow, Trovicor’s head of marketing communications, said Trovicor’s contracts preventitfromdisclosingitscustomersorthecountrieswhereitdoesbusiness.She declinedtocommentfurther”(ArabianBusiness,WesternSpyToolsAidinCrackdown on Arab Dissent. August 28, 2011). That businesses refuse to comment on their ex‐ portsshowsthatunderthecurrentlegalcircumstancesintheEUitisdifficulttoob‐ taintransparencyaboutwhichsurveillancetechnologieshavebeenexportedandsold towhichcountriesandorganizationsbyEuropeansecuritycompanies. Insomeofthecasespresentedthusfar,companiesengagingintheexportofcom‐ munications surveillance withdrew their projects or plans only after the media and civilsocietycriticizedthempublicly,inothercasescompaniesdeclinedtocomment. Thisshowsthecircumstancethatthereisalackoftransparencyofthebusinessprac‐ ticesofsecuritycompanies. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 10.Digitask Placeofbusiness:Haiger,Germany Website:http://www.digitask.de Self‐description: “We are a leading company for the system‐integrating realization of data investiga‐ tion‐andassessmentsystemsintheareaoftelecommunications.Nationalandinter‐ nationalcompaniesandsecurityagenciesareamongourcustomers”16 (http://www.digitask.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=frontpage&Itemid=1 ). Analysis Digitask says that it is the “market leader for LI [lawful interception] in Germany” (#10_1,1).DigitaskarguesthatthereisdatathatmightgetlostinLI,suchasinstant messages,encryptedcommunication,WWWdatatransmittedoverthesecureproto‐ col https, encrypted e‐mail data (TLS, SSL), VPN connections, traffic encrypted with softwarelikeTororJAP,dataencryptedonharddisks,dataof“nomadictargets”that seekopenWLANs(#10_1).“Everythingmaybelost.Withafewhourseffort,today’s LIsystemscanbeturnedblindanddeaf”(#10_1,11).Asa solution,DigiTaksoffers “RemoteForensicSoftware”,whichis“stealthsoftwareinstalledon[the]computerof [the] target to overcome encryption, handle nomadic targets, monitor activity for criminal investigations [and] intelligence gathering” (#10_1, 12). This software is a so‐called Trojan horse that is secretly installed on a computer and gathers infor‐ mationabouttheuser’sactivitywithouthis/herknowledge.Accordingtoapresenta‐ tion,thesoftwarecanalsocollectaudiodata,screenshots,keylogs,registrysettings, andsearchforfiles(#10_1,13). Other products includes systems for the analysis of intercepted data (DigiBase, DigiNet)(#10_2).DigiNetcandecode“allstandardInternettrafficprotocols”(#10_2, 3;SUCHAS:HTTP,POP3,SMTP,IMAP,FTP,Telnet,VoIP,webmail,IRC,ICQ,MSN,etc, see: #10_2, 7) and provides the opportunity of “mass storage” of intercepted data (#10_2,4).Anotherproduct istheWiFi‐Catcher,a“modular unitforinterceptionof WLANtraffic”(#10_2,14).Digitask’sproductsalsoenable“deepviewintopacketsof intercepteddata”(#10_2,13).Itisamobilesystemthatcancapture,filterandvisual‐ izedatathatisobtainedfromaWiFihotspot(#10_3,11).It“canbeusedundercover onpublichotspotsbybringingjustasmallreceiverunitclosetothetargetandana‐ lyzingthetrafficfromthedistanceorwithbiggerdirectionalantennasfromthedis‐ tance”(#10_2,12). 16 “WirsindeinführendesUnternehmenfürdiesystemintegrierteRealisierungvonDatenerhebungs‐ undBewertungssystemenimBereichderTelekommunikation.FirmenundSicherheitsbehördenaus demIn‐undAuslandzählenzuunserenKunden”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 InJanuary2008,WikiLeakspublishedadocument(#10_5)that,ifauthentic,seems tobeanofferofDigitasktotheBavarianStateMinistryofJusticeforasoftwarethatis a “Skype capture unit” (#10_5). The German Internet portal Heise argued that the document“suggeststheuseofTrojanstowiretapInternetphonecallsonprivatePCs by the police”17 (Heise Online, Ein “Bayerntrojaner” zum Abhören von Internet‐ Telefonie?January24,2008).ThedevelopmentoftheRemoteForensicSoftwarewas in Germany publicly discussed in the context of the “Bundestro‐ janer”/”Staatstrojaner”‐debate(“federalTrojan”,“stateTrojan”)ifitisappropriateof aprivacyviolationifthepoliceusessoftwaresecretlyinstalledonsuspects’comput‐ ers in order to collect data (Heise Online, Einsatz des Staatstrojaners: Zwischen feh‐ lendem Rechtsrahmen und Verfassungswidrigkeit. October 11, 2011).The Austrian news magazine profil reported in October 2010 that one of Digitask’s lawyers con‐ firmedthatthecompanysolditsRemoteForensicSoftwarethatservesthepurposeof online investigations to Austrian authorities and that online investigation software hasbeenusedinAustriabythepolice(Profil,TrojanischeSitten.DerBundestrojaner wurde ohne rechtliche Grundlage eingesetzt. October 22, 2010). The German news magazineDerSpiegelreportedthatinoneofthecasesthesoftwaretransmittedSkype conversations and automatically taken pictures of the user to the police (Spiegel Online,Fahnder:MassiverEingriff.February28,2011). InGermany,theLawfortheDefenceagainstThreatsofInternationalTerrorismby the Federal Criminal Police Office (Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internatio‐ nalen Terrorismus durch das Bundeskriminalamt) allows the “covert use of technical means”18for“thedefenceoftheexistenceorsecurityofthestateoraperson’sbody, lifeorfreedomorthingsofsignificantvalue,whosepreservationisinthepublicin‐ terest, against an urgent threat”19 (Gesetz zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internatio‐ nalenTerrorismusdurchdasBundeskriminalamt,§20h).DerSpiegelarguedthatinone specific case where online investigation was used, there was no capital offence, but rather the suspicion of the illegal export of narcotic substances (Spiegel Online, Fahnder: Massiver Eingriff. February 28, 2011). In October 2011, Der Spiegel wrote that Digitask delivered its online investigation software to several German federal states and the Zollkriminalamt (Customs Criminological Office; Spiegel Online, Digi‐ task: Trojaner‐Hersteller beliefert etliche Behörden und Bundesländer. October 11, 2011).DerSpiegelreportedthatonlineinvestigationsoftwarewasusedmorethan50 17 “EinbislangunbestätigtesSchreibendesbayerischenJustizministeriums,dasderPiratenparteinach eigenen AngabenindieHändegeratenist,legtdenEinsatzvonTrojanernzumAbhörenvonInternet‐ TelefonatenaufprivatenPCsdurchdiePolizeinahe”. 18 “verdeckten Einsatz technischer Mittel” “Das Bundeskriminalamt kann zur Abwehr einer dringenden Gefahr für den Bestand oder die Sicher‐ heit des Staates oder für Leib, Leben oder Freiheit einer Person oder Sachen von bedeutendem Wert, deren Erhaltung im öffentlichen Interesse geboten ist, durch den verdeckten Einsatz technischer Mittel in oder aus Wohnungen 1. das nichtöffentlich gesprochene Wort einer Person abhören und aufzeichnen, […] 2. Lichtbilder und Bildaufzeichnungen über diese Person herstellen, wenn die Abwehr der Gefahr auf andere Weise aussichtslos oder wesentlich erschwert wäre”. 19 The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 times in Germany (Spiegel Online, Innere Sicherheit: Trojaner im Abo. October 17, 2011). The Chaos Computer Club analysed a used online investigation tool, about whichDigitasksaidthatitislikelythatitisoneofitsproductsandfoundthatbyre‐ mote control the software can activate the full functionality of searching, reading, writing and manipulating files (Spiegel Online, Staatstrojaner: Digitask wehrt sich gegenInkompetenz‐Vorwurf.October12,2011).TheGermanFederalConstitutional Court(Bundesverfassungsgericht)arguedthatextensivepartsofprivatelifecantake placeonlineorbestoredonacomputerandthatthisneedstobetakenintoaccount inthecaseofonlineinvestigations.InadecisionfromFebruary2008,itsaidthat“the secretinfiltrationofaninformationsystemthatallowsthesurveillanceofthesystem andreadingitsstoragemediaisonlyconstitutionallylegitimateifactualevidenceofa concrete danger for an outstandingly important legal interest are given”20 (Bun‐ desverfassungsgericht,LeitsätzezumUrteildesErstenSenatsvom27.Februar2008). This means that the use of online investigation tools that have the capability of not onlyinterceptingactualcommunication,butaccessingstoreddata,isunconstitutional accordingtoGermanlaw(SpiegelOnline,Schnüffel‐Software:BayernsInnenminister stoppt Trojaner‐Einsatz. October 11, 2011). In November 2011, the Bavarian Data ProtectionCommissionerThomasPetriannouncedtoinvestigateif22cases,inwhich online investigation software was used to monitor suspects, respected data protec‐ tion policies or not (Heise Online, Datenschützer prüft alle 22 Trojanereinsätze in Bayern.November24,2011). Digitaskproducestoolsthatallowinterceptingwirelessnetworks,thedeeppacket inspectionofInternetcontentandtheonlineinvestigationofactivitiesofusersbythe installationofaTrojanhorseontheircomputers.Thelatterkindoftoolshaveresult‐ edinaheavypublicdebateabouttheconstitutionalityof“stateTrojans”inGermany. Online investigation tools have especially in cases, where suspects encrypt their e‐ mailsoruseSkype,beenused.Theconstitutionalityofsuchtoolsandtheactualuse bythepoliceareheavilydisputedinGermany. 20 “DieheimlicheInfiltrationeinesinformationstechnischenSystems,mittelsdererdieNutzungdes SystemsüberwachtundseineSpeichermedienausgelesenwerdenkönnen,istverfassungsrechtlich nurzulässig,wenntatsächlicheAnhaltspunkteeinerkonkretenGefahrfüreinüberragendwichtiges Rechtsgutbestehen”. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 11.ipoque Placeofbusiness:Leipzig,Germany Website:http://www.ipoque.com/ Self‐description: “ipoqueprovidesnetworkintelligenceandpolicycontrolsolutionshelpingfixedand mobilebroadbandoperatorstobetterunderstandtrafficpatterns,monetizenewdata servicesandimprovethequalityofexperiencefortheirsubscribers.Ourapplication classification andanalysisengine enablesbandwidthand congestioncontrol,priori‐ tizedqualityofservicedeliveryanddetailednetworkvisibility.ipoquewasfounded in2005inLeipzig,Germany,andhasbecomeaRohde&Schwarzcompanyin2011. Over200broadbandoperatorcustomersinmorethan60countriesacrosstheglobe rely on ipoque's policy control solution to limit equipment and operating expendi‐ tures, increase profitability and maximize subscriber satisfaction. In addition, many network equipment providers use ipoque's deep packet inspection technology in theirnetworksecurity,WANoptimizationandnetworkmanagementproductstoana‐ lyzedatatrafficofhundredsofmillionsofInternetusers” (http://www.ipoque.com/en/company/company‐profile). Analysis ipoquesaysthatitis“theleadingEuropeanproviderofdeeppacketinspection(DPI) solutionsforInternettrafficmanagementandanalysis” (http://www.ipoque.com/en/company). It offers various DPI systems. PRX Traffic Manager“detectsapplicationswithacombinationoflayer‐7deeppacketinspection (DPI) and behavioral traffic analysis. All major protocols including peer‐to‐peer file sharing (P2P), instant messaging (IM), media streaming and Internet telephony (VoIP) are supported. The integrated quality of service (QoS) management allows prioritization,shapingandblockingofclassifiedtraffic” (http://www.ipoque.com/en/products/prx‐traffic‐manager). Itallows“toprioritize,shape,blockandlogtrafficofindividualapplicationseither in total or for individual users or user groups” and can “enforce legal file sharing” (ibid.),whichmeansthatitcandetectandblockillegalfilesharing. Net Reporter works based on PRX Traffic Manager and “collects, aggregates and stores“networkdatathatPRXTrafficManagerextractswiththehelpofDPIfroma network(#11_3).Italso“presentsthemviaitsWeb‐basedgraphicaluserinterface“ (ibid.).DPXNetworkProbe“isapassiveIPprobeforlawfulinterception,massinter‐ ceptionandnetworkmonitoring.Itusesipoque’sDeepPacketInspection(DPI)tech‐ nology to identify and filter network flows according to their application protocol. Target triggers comprise protocol‐specific filtering criteria including network ad‐ dresses, user names, protocol‐specific attributes and arbitrary content keywords“ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 (#11_2).Itsupportsalmost200differentprotocolsandenableskeywordsearchinall interceptedcontentinordertofilteroutcertainmessages(#11_2). PACE (Protocol & Application Classification Engine) “is a software library which detects and classifies protocols and applications from a network packet stream. It uses a wide range of deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies, including pattern matching,behavioral,statisticalandheuristicanalysis“(#11_4).ItprovidesDPItech‐ nologythat“isabletoidentifytheprotocolofnetworktrafficbasedonacombination ofdeeppacketinspection(DPI)andbehavioralanalysis”(#11_1). ipoque produces DPI technologies both for the commercial use (e.g. by Internet ServiceProviders)andtheusebylawenforcement.Ithasrealizedthatthereisacriti‐ caldebateaboutDPIandhasreactedtoitbypublishingthewhitepaper“DeepPacket Inspection:Technology,Applications&NetNeutrality”(#11_5).ipoquearguesinthis paper that also relatively accepted technologies such as spam and virus filters and firewallsuseDPI.ThecompanyespeciallydiscussestheuseofDPIfornetworkman‐ agementandconcernsaboutthescanningofcontent.Itsaysthat“DPIinbandwidth managementdoesnotreadallpackets”and“isnotautomaticallyaprivacyviolation” (#11_5,3).ipoquearguesthatDPIneedstobeusedbyISPinordertooptimizethe useofthenetwork.Differentprotocolsanddifferentapplicationsmakedifferentuse oftheInternet.Soe.g.VoIP(suchasSkype)hasalowuseofthenetwork,whereasfile sharinginpeer‐to‐peernetworksmakesheavyuseoftheInternet.ipoquearguesthat anadvantageofDPI‐basedbandwidthmanagementisthatit“canimprovetheaver‐ ageperformanceforInternetusers”(#11_5,5)by“assignmentofprioritiestodiffer‐ entapplication classes“, e.g. “giving voice traffic a higher priority than P2P“(#11_5, 7). ipoquedefinesnetneutralityastheprinciple“thatallIPpacketsshouldbetreated equallyonabesteffortbasis“(#11_5,6)andsaysthattodaynetneutralitydoesnot existbecause“lessthan20percentofnetworkusersgenerateover80percentofthe traffic“,whichwouldbeunfair(#11_5,6).ThemediareformgroupFreePressdefines netneutralityastheprinciple“thatInternetserviceprovidersmaynotdiscriminate betweendifferentkindsofcontentandapplicationsonline.Itguaranteesalevelplay‐ ingfieldforallwebsitesandInternettechnologies“ (http://www.savetheinternet.com/faq).TheUSFederalCommunicationCommis‐ sion (FCC) says that “reasonable network management”, which is network manage‐ mentthatis“tailoredtoachievingalegitimatenetworkmanagementpurpose“(FCC 2010, 48)and forwhichDPImaybeused, isnoproblem.Unreasonablediscrimina‐ tion of users that violates net neutrality would e.g. be the discrimination of certain applications(suchasVoIP),hinderinguserstoaccesscertaincontent,servicesorap‐ plications, or the slow down of a service or website that a ISP disagrees with (FCC 2010,42).TheFCC(2010,43)alsosaysthat“payforpriority”islikelytoviolatenet neutrality.ipoquesaysthatanadvantageofDPI‐basedbandwidthmanagement“can provideruserswithatailoredservice,including‘soft’QoS[qualityofservice]guaran‐ tees, at a higher or lower price, depending on the required service level; users that onlyuseWebande‐mailwouldgetalowerprice;everyonepaysonlyforwhatthey The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 use”(#11_5,5).MediareformgroupshavearguedthatthecreationofatieredInter‐ netisarisk. TheFCCandmediareformgroupstendtoagreewithipoque’sargumentthatnet‐ workmanagementbyISPscanhelpimprovingtheirservice,butatthesametimethey much warn against transforming DPI bandwidth management into a commodity by creatingatieredInternet,whereusershavetopayforpriority. Oneargumentadvanced by FreePress, theConsumer Federation of America and theConsumersUnion(2006)isthatgivingupnetneutralitywouldgiveInternetser‐ vice providers a lot of power and would discriminate certain services so that their ownfavouredcontentandapplications(thattheyeitherprovidethemselvesoroffer inco‐operationwithspecificmediacontentproviders)wouldbeadvantagedandoth‐ ersdisadvantaged:“FACT#2:Networkdiscriminationthrougha’tieredInternet’will severely curtail consumer choice, giving consumer control over the Internet to the networkowners.Theideaofadiscriminatoryor‘tiered’Internetisbasedonasimple concept:thenetworkownerintervenesbetweentheconsumerandthecontentpro‐ vidertochargefeesfordelivery.Undertheoldneutralityrules,thenetworkowners couldchargethecustomerforcommunicationsservices,andanyapplicationorcon‐ tentthatwouldworkwithinthatlevelofservicehadtobeallowedtoflow–noques‐ tions(oradditionalfees)asked.[...]WithoutNetworkNeutrality,thenetworkopera‐ torhastotalcontrol.Differentfeescanbechargedbasedonthetypeofservice(voice, videoordata);differentfeescanbechargedbasedonthetypeofprovider(individu‐ al,smallbusinessorbigbusiness);differentfeescanbechargedbasedontheaffilia‐ tionoftheproviderwiththenetworkoperator;differentfeescanbechargedtoguar‐ antee delivery at aparticular rate of speedor quality;differentfees can be charged basedonpoliticalaffiliationorthedayoftheweek.Infact,withoutneutralityrules, thenetworkownerscanchargewhatevertheywanttowhomevertheywantforany reasontheychoose.Theycancreate’fastlanes’and’slowlanes’anddecidewhogets tobeineach.ThereisnothingtostopAT&Tfrompushingcontentprovidersintoex‐ clusivedealsdeniedtoComcastorTimeWarnersubscribers.Thereisnothingtostop Verizonfrom slowingdownWebsitestheydislikeandspeedingupotherswithim‐ punity. [...] Network Neutrality keeps telephone companies off of consumers’ backs andoutofourwallets(FreePress,ConsumerFederationofAmericanandConsumers Union2006,9). AsecondwarningisthatatieredInternetisastratifiedsystem,inwhichrichplay‐ ers(likebigcompanies)useafastInternetandeverydaypeople,whodonothaveso much money, a slow Internet: “FACT #4: Network discrimination through a ’tiered Internet’ will fundamentally alter the consumer’s online experience by creating fast andslowlanesforInternetcontent.Theprocessofnetworkprioritizationisazero‐ sum game. The fact is that every time one Web site or service is sped up, another mustbesloweddown.Whowillbeintheslowlane?Anyonewithoutthecashorthe connectionstonegotiatefastlanedealswitheverynetworkoperatorinthecountry (each of which has their own regional fiefdoms). Basically, anyone that lacks deep pockets or high volume will be relegated to the slow lane, while the big corporate The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 Websiteswillgainpremiumtreatment,capturingalargerpercentageofusersbyvir‐ tueoftheirhigherqualityofservice“(FreePress,ConsumerFederationofAmerican andConsumersUnion2006,11). ipoqueargues:“DPIassuchhasnonegativeimpactononlineprivacy.Itis,again, only the applications that may have this impact. Prohibiting DPI as a technology wouldbejustasnaiveasprohibitingautomaticspeechrecognitionbecauseitcanbe usedtoeavesdroponconversationsbasedoncontent.AlthoughDPIcanbeusedasa basetechnologytolookatandevaluatetheactualcontentofanetworkcommunica‐ tion,thisgoesbeyondwhatweunderstandasDPIasitisusedbyInternetbandwidth management–theclassificationofnetworkprotocolsandapplications.Otherapplica‐ tionsofDPI,forinstancelawfulinterceptionandtargetedinjectionofadvertisements, doindeedgofurther,buttheyarebeyondthescopeofthispaper“(#11_5,7).ipoque initsdiscussionfocusesprimarilyontheissuesofnetneutralityandbandwidthman‐ agementwhendiscussingDPI,privacyconcernsabouttheuseofDPIinrelationtothe surveillance and repression of political opponents and targeted advertising are not discussed. Also the whole range of arguments in the net neutrality debate (for an overview see: Free Press, Consumer Federation of American and Consumers Union 2006)isnotdiscussed. In another white paper, titled “Copyright Protection in the Internet” (#11_6), ipoque discusses countermeasures against the “illegitimate sharing of copyright‐ protected material“ that “has a negative economical impact both on a national and international scale“ (#11_6, 1). The solutions that the authors find most feasible in‐ cludetheuseofDPIforblockingillegalsharing:“Newbusinessmodelsareinevitable. In the long run, this will make illegitimate sharing of copyright‐protected material through the Internet a lot less interesting. Until then, two of the discussed counter‐ measurespromisetobethemosteffectiveandviableones:hash‐baseddetectionof copyrightedfilesandthepreventionoftheirtransferinthenetwork;andtheactive monitoring combined with the prosecution of infringers“ (#11_6, 8). Hash‐based blocking“canbeimplementedusingcurrentlyavailabletrafficmanagementsystems based on deep packet inspection deployed at network access or peering points. [...] BlacklistingbasedonfilehashesorotherfileIDscanprovideaviablewaytoseverely limit the distribution of copyright‐protected content“ (#11_6, 5). ipoque on the one handmentionstechnicalsolutions,ontheotherhandsolutionsatthelevelofsociety. Thelatterincludethecultureflatrate,digitalrightsmanagement,andcheaperoffers (#11_6, 8). However, the solution suggested by some, such as the Pirate Party21, to 21 “Theofficialaimofthecopyrightsystemhasalwaysbeentofindabalanceinordertopromotecul‐ turebeingcreatedandspread.Todaythatbalancehasbeencompletelylost,toapointwherethecopy‐ rightlawsseverelyrestricttheverythingtheyaresupposedtopromote.ThePiratePartywantsto restorethebalanceinthecopyrightlegislation.Allnon‐commercialcopyinganduseshouldbecom‐ pletelyfree.Filesharingandp2pnetworkingshouldbeencouragedratherthancriminalized.Culture andknowledgearegoodthings,thatincreaseinvaluethemoretheyareshared.TheInternetcould becomethegreatestpubliclibraryevercreated.Themonopolyforthecopyrightholdertoexploitan aestheticworkcommerciallyshouldbelimitedtofiveyearsafterpublication.Today'scopyrightterms aresimplyabsurd.Nobodyneedstomakemoneyseventyyearsafterheisdead.Nofilmstudioorrec‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 decommodifydigitalcultureandlegalizefilesharingisnotatmentionedasanoption, whichshowsthatipoqueisthinkingonlyaboutacertainlimitedrangeofalternatives. ipoquesellsdeepinspectiontechnologies(DPI)fornetworkandbandwidthman‐ agement,commercialpurposesandlawenforcement.Itisawareofthecircumstance thatDPIisacontroversialtechnology.Theanalyseddocumentshavelimitedthedis‐ cussion of DPI to network neutrality, bandwidth management, and file sharing, whereas topics like the surveillance of political activists and targeted advertising haveratherbeenneglected.Theanalyseddiscussionsofnetneutralityandfileshar‐ ing have not engaged with the full range of criticisms made in the debate by media reformgroups. ordcompanybasesitsinvestmentdecisionsontheoff‐chancethattheproductwouldbeofinterestto anyoneahundredyearsinthefuture.Thecommerciallifeofculturalworksisstaggeringlyshortin today'sworld.Ifyouhaven'tmadeyourmoneybackinthefirstoneortwoyears,youneverwill.Afive yearscopyrighttermforcommercialuseismorethanenough.Non‐commercialuseshouldbefree fromdayone.WealsowantacompletebanonDRMtechnologies,andoncontractclausesthataimto restricttheconsumers'legalrightsinthisarea.Thereisnopointinrestoringbalanceandreasontothe legislation,ifatthesametimewecontinuetoallowthebigmediacompaniestobothwriteandenforce theirownarbitrarylaws”(http://www.piratpartiet.se/international/english). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 12.UtimacoSafeware Placeofbusiness:Aachen,Germany Website:http://lims.utimaco.com/en/home/ Self‐description: “Since1994Utimacohasbeenprovidinglawfulinterceptionsystemsformobileand fixednetworkoperatorsandInternetserviceproviders.TheUtimacoDataRetention SuitewasintroducedinresponsetotheEUdirective2006/24/ECandattherequest oftelecomcustomersforintegratedLIandDRsolutions.Withmorethan160installa‐ tionsin60countries,UtimacoisaleadingglobalsupplierintheLImarket.Since1994 Utimaco has been developing hardware based security solution. Today, Utimaco is oneoftheworld’sleadingmanufacturersofinnovativeandprofessionalsolutionsfor hardwaresecuritymoduletechnology” (http://lims.utimaco.com/en/company/about‐utimaco). Analysis Utimacoexplainstheneedforcommunicationssurveillancewiththeuseofcommuni‐ cationtechnologybycriminalsandterrorists:“Thisworldwideexplosionofcommu‐ nicationtechnologiescreatessignificantchallengesforlawenforcementagenciesand national security organizations responsible for battling various forms of crime and terrorism.Thesophisticationofcriminalenterprisesinexploitingemergingcommu‐ nicationchannelshasincreasedwiththerisingpopularityofthesechannels,posinga very real challenge to organizations responsible for protecting public safetyand re‐ ducingtheimpactofcrimeoncommunities.Giventhebroadavailabilityofcommuni‐ cation options and the relative ease with which criminal networks and terrorist groups can exchange information across these channels – by both data and voice communication–theimpetustointerceptillicitexchangesandtracktheoperations of criminal enterprises is strong and compelling“ (#12_4, 5). “Countries around the world have responded to the threats of terrorism and criminal activity by enacting legislationthatprovidesthelegalbasisforlawfulinterception“(#12_4,6). UtimacoDRSisadataretentionsystemthatcollectscommunicationdataandsub‐ scriberdata,retainsthem,allowsfastsearchindatarecordsand“automatesrequest processinganddeliversdatatoauthorizedagenciesbyfax,e‐mail,orsecureIPinter‐ faces”(#12_2).Thecompanyexplainstheneedfordataretentionbysayingthatitcan helptofightcrimeand terrorism:“Telecommunicationsdataretentionreferstothe processofstoringcalldetailrecordsandsubscriberdataforvarioustelecommunica‐ tions services for a period of months and years. […] Law enforcement agencies and intelligence services regard the access to retained telecom data as a pillar of crime investigation and the prevention of terrorism. Retained electronic data is regularly usedtoidentifyandtracesuspects,uncoverterrorists’socialnetworks,ortocollect admissible evidence for court proceedings. […] Many countries around the world havepassed laws to definetheauthorityofpoliceandintelligenceagenciesandthe The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 responsibility of service providers. In Europe, for instance, the EU directive 2006/24/ECwasintroducedinMarch2006asaresponsetothecoordinatedterror attacksinMadrid2004andLondon2005” (http://lims.utimaco.com/en/solutions/data‐retention‐suite). Ultimacoalsosells“lawfulinterceptionsolutions”thatmakeuseofDPI.“Utimaco Lawful Interception Management System (LIMS™) is a comprehensive solution that provides state‐of‐the‐art surveillance capabilities for fixed and mobile communica‐ tionnetworksandforvariouscommunicationservices,includingtelephony,messag‐ ingandIP‐basedserviceslikee‐mailandVoIP” (http://lims.utimaco.com/en/solutions/lawful‐interception‐management‐ solution/).Utimacoexplainstheneedforthistechnologybysayingthatitcanhelpto fight crime and prevent terrorism. “Lawful Interception (LI) is the legally approved surveillanceoftelecommunicationsservices.Ithasbecomeanimportanttoolforlaw enforcementandintelligenceagenciesaroundtheworldforinvestigatingandprose‐ cutingcriminalactivitiesandterrorism”(ibid.). “The main functions of any LI solution are to access Interception‐Related Infor‐ mation (IRI) andContent of Communication (CC)fromthe telecommunications net‐ workandtodelivertheinformationinastandardizedformatviathehandoverinter‐ facetooneormoremonitoringcentersoflawenforcementagencies“(12_3,3). “Citizens of many countries are rightfully wary of governments and law enforce‐ mentbodiesintrudingontheirprivateactivities.Becauseofthis,ethicalconcernsand essentialprivacyrightsmustbecentralconsiderationsinanylawfulinterceptionso‐ lution.[...]Adelicatebalanceexistsbetweenthecapabilitiesofthegovernmenttode‐ tectandpreventcrimeandterrorism–assupportedbythelawsandprevailingregu‐ lationsinacountry–andtheindividualrightsandprivacyconcernsofthecitizensof thatcountry.Aresponsible,ethicallygroundedlawfulinterceptionsolutionrecogniz‐ esthatthisbalancecanonlybeachievedbygivingequalweighttoboththelegalities ofthelawenforcementtasksathandandtheindividualrightsofthecitizens.Achiev‐ ingthisbalanceinasolutionrequirescarefulconsiderationofboththetechnological aspectsofthechallenge,aswellasthelegalandethicalissuesthatareintricatelyas‐ sociatedwiththemonitoringofanyformofcommunication“(#12_4,14). InNovember2011,therewerenewsreportsthattheItalianfirmAreaSpaplanned to equip the Syrian intelligence with surveillance technologies (project “Asfador”) thatcanbeusedformonitoringthepoliticalopponentsofBasharal‐Assad’sgovern‐ ment and that Utimaco was also involved. “Area is using equipment from American andEuropeancompanies,accordingtoblueprintsandotherdocumentsobtainedby Bloomberg News and the person familiar with the job. The project includes Sunnyvale, California‐based NetApp Inc. (NTAP) storage hardware and software for archivinge‐mails;probestoscanSyria’scommunicationsnetworkfromParis‐based Qosmos SA; and gear from Germany’s Utimaco Safeware AG (USA) that connects tapped telecom lines to Area’s monitoring‐center computers” (Bloomberg, Syria Crackdown Gets Italy Firm’s Aid With U.S.‐Europe Spy Gear. November 4, 2011. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011‐11‐03/syria‐crackdown‐gets‐italy‐firm‐s‐ aid‐with‐u‐s‐europe‐spy‐gear.html). “The Syrian secret service appears to be monitoring the country's protest move‐ mentusingtechnologyfromtheGermanfirmUtimaco,basedinOberursel,asuburb ofFrankfurt.ContactedbySpiegelreportersonFriday,thecompanysaidithadsold noproductsdirectlytoSyrianTelecom,theregime‐ownedtelecommunicationspro‐ vider. The company had instead delivered products to the Italian firm Area, with which is has conducted business for years. The company said it could not confirm whetherAreahadthenresoldgoodstoSyriandictatorBasharAssad’sregime”(Spie‐ gelOnlineInternational,IsSyriaMonitoringProtesterswithGermanTechnology?No‐ vember8,2011). Utimacoreactedtothemediareports:“ItisthoughtthatGermansurveillancetech‐ nologyhasalsobeendeliveredtoSyria,aspartofasurveillancesystemmadebythe ItalianfirmArea.Foryears,theItalianshaveusedspecializedsoftwarebytheGerman firm Utimaco in their systems. But as Utimaco senior executive Malte Pollmann in‐ sists,Areaonlybuiltatestversion,andtheItalianshavejustcancelledtheentirepro‐ ject.‘Oursoftwarewasnotused,’saysPollmann”(SpiegelOnlineInternational,West‐ ernSurveillanceTechnologyintheHandsofDespots.December8,2011).Inastate‐ ment on its website, Utimaco declared: “Utimaco and its majority shareholder, So‐ phos,haverecentlybeenincludedinmediareportsaboutanItalianOEMreseller(Ar‐ eaS.p.A.)allegedlysellingUtimaco’sLIMStechnology to Syria. Wetakeglobaltrade compliance very seriously and require all of our partners to adhere to the German, European Union (EU) export regulations and United Nations embargo lists. We are thoroughlyinvestigatingthematterandhavestoppedanyfurtheractivitieswithArea untilwereceivefullclarificationfromthem” (http://lims.utimaco.com/en/company/newsevents/statement‐on‐recent‐media‐ reports‐from‐utimaco‐safeware‐ag/). Utimaco’s Internet surveillance technologies support Deep Packet Inspection and canbeimplementedinawaythatallowsthesurveillanceofpoliticalopponents.Ina WhitePaper(#12_4),Utimacoshowssomeconcernsaboutprivacyaspects.Itseems to be aware of discussions of potential privacy violations by Internet surveillance technologies.Itdoeshowevernotaddressthepracticalproblemofhowexactlyone shouldpreventthatDPIisusedforviolatingtheprivacyofpoliticalactivists,consum‐ ers, and citizens. The plan of the export of DPI technology to Syria shows that this technology is difficult to control. Utimaco reacted to the media reports about Area Spa’s project by ending its business relations with this company. This move came howeveronlyaftercivilsocietypressure.Thequestioniswhatwouldhavehappened if no investigative journalists and activists had intervened. This problem is fortified bythecircumstancethattradedealsinthesecurityindustryhaveahighlevelofse‐ crecy.Thereishardlypublicaccountabilityandtransparencyofwhosellswhichsur‐ veillancetechnologiestowhom. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 13.NETI Placeofbusiness:Budapest,Hungary Website:http://www.neti.hu/ Self‐description: “NETIisapioneerinthedevelopmentofsystemsbasedoncustomdesignedapplica‐ tionssupportinganalyticsecuritysolutions.–Thesesystemsprovideourcustomers withrobustandefficienttoolsforthehandlingofmassivedataflowmonitoringin variousareas”(http://www.neti.com/en/services/services). Analysis NETIsaysthattheInternetisunpredictable,dynamicallygrowing,andbringsabout many new data types (#13, 4). This would pose challenges for law enforcement. A solutionwouldbeNETI’sBONGOmonitoringcentrethatis“fine‐tunedfortheneeds ofLaw‐EnforcementandNationalSecurityAgenciesaswellasTelecomandInternet ServiceProviders”(#13,11). BONGOisadvertisedas“MonitoringSolutionforEverydaySecurity” (http://www.neti.com/en/products/bongo).“Thesysteminheriteditsnamefrom theBongoantelope,theelusivekingoftheEquatorialRainForest,whofindshisway easily and undetected in the thickest of jungles, while can see and hear everything. Today’smonitoringtasksarenolesschallenging.Thesystemshavetobecapableof fastandreliablenavigation,selection,storageandpresentationofthevaluablepieces of information out of the massive and ever‐growing jungle of networks and data masses of the Twenty‐first Century” (ibid.). It “can intercept huge amount of data fromawidearrayoftelecomandIPnetworksandotherinformationsources.[…]The structure of BONGO can be realized on a single workstation, but it can unleash its greatpowerasalarge,orevennationalsystemwithhundredsofserversandopera‐ tors.[…]Thesystemisreadytohandlemassiveamountofdatainterceptedfromtele‐ comandIPsystems.Theeffectivehandlingofgreatmassesofdataisassuredbythe complexsetofbackgroundprocesseswithstrongsupportprovidedtotheoperators’ processingtasks”(ibid.).BONGOcanmonitorboththeInternetandphonenetworks. Itcanfilterdataaccordingto“phonenumber,IMEI,IMSI,radiusidentification,IPad‐ dress,e‐mailaddress,MACaddress,etc”(ibid). NETIproducesandsellsmonitoringcentresthatcaninterceptcontentofbothtele‐ communications and the Internet. The BONGO system is a deep packet inspection surveillancetechnology.Wecouldfindnodiscussionsofprivacyandotherconcerns aboutDPIintheanalyseddocumentsandonNETI’swebsite(accessedonFebruary5, 2012). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 14.AreaSpa Placeofbusiness:VizzolaTicino,Italy Website:http://www.area.it Self‐description: “From1996untiltoday,AREAhasconstantlypursuedtheobjectivesofcuttingedge technologyandqualitativeexcellenceintheLIsector.AsthefirstoperatorinItalyto introducea multi‐channelaudiodigitalrecordingsystem basedonstandardmarket components and featuring total accessibility through IP networks, the company is nowthenationalleaderinthissector,withover300installationsofitsMCRSystem aroundtheworld” (http://www.area.it/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://6fff78b6f13 c2127ce9b4fe3c17cf995) Analysis Areacommitsitselfformallytobothsurveillanceandtherespectofprivacy:“Intelli‐ gence is an extremely complex and delicate process, called upon to meet the new challengesintroducedbythegrowingtechnologicalcomplexityoftelecommunication systems and the need to guarantee the utmost protection and respect of privacy, while simultaneously offering concrete support in the analysis of data and infor‐ mation” (http://www.area.it/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://6fff78b6f13 c2127ce9b4fe3c17cf995). ThecompanyproducesandsellsMonitoringCentres:“MCRSystemsatisfiesallop‐ erationalandstrategicrequirementsofmonitoringactivities.TheMCRSystemoffers asingleintegratedplatformtocaptureandanalysedatacomingfromanytransmis‐ sionsourceandtoobtainacomprehensiveoverviewprovidingaddedvaluetoinves‐ tigative work. With its high scalability and customisation, MCR is able to transform any installation into a unique and valuable project. MCR complete systems are im‐ plementedthroughasolidnetworkingarchitecture,toallowthemaximumoperation efficiencyandsecurity.Thus,informationflowsmaybemonitoredonaglobalscale, maximisingLItimes,avoidinglossofinformationandneverendangeringthesafetyof thewholeprocess” (http://www.area.it/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://cbecc21b 801cae301af69b4db9e8c152).TheMCRsystemcancapturedata“fromnetworksand unconventionalsources”anditcanrecordandanalysethisdata (http://www.area.it/irj/portal/anonymous?NavigationTarget=navurl://cbecc21b 801cae301af69b4db9e8c152). MCR is a technology that can monitor different data sourcesandintercepttheircontent.ContentinterceptionisalsopossibleforInternet communication,whichmeansthatMCRisadeeppacketinspectionsurveillancetech‐ nology. In November 2011, there were media reports that said that Area Spa started in‐ stalling Internet surveillance technologies in Syria, a country where hundreds of The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 membersofthepoliticaloppositionhavebeenkilledbythegovernmentthattriesto repressproteststhatstartedinJanuary2011.“EmployeesofAreaSpA,asurveillance companybasedoutsideMilan,areinstallingthesystemunderthedirectionofSyrian intelligenceagents,who'vepushedtheItalianstofinish,sayingtheyurgentlyneedto trackpeople,apersonfamiliarwiththeprojectsays.TheAreaemployeeshaveflown intoDamascusinshiftsthisyearastheviolencehasescalated,saystheperson,who hasworkedonthesystemforArea.[…]AreaisusingequipmentfromU.S.andEuro‐ pean companies, according to blueprints and other documents obtained by Bloom‐ bergandthepersonfamiliarwiththejob.TheprojectincludesSunnyvale,Calif.‐based NetAppInc.storagehardwareandsoftwareforarchivinge‐mails;probestoscanSyr‐ ia'scommunicationsnetworkfromParisbasedQosmosSA;andgearfromGermany's UtimacoSafewareAGthatconnectstappedtelecomlinestoArea'smonitoring‐centre computers. […] When the system is complete, Syrian security agents will be able to followtargetsonflat‐screenworkstationsthatdisplaycommunicationsandwebuse in near‐real time alongside graphics that map citizens' networks of electronic con‐ tacts,accordingtothedocumentsandtwopeoplefamiliarwiththeplans.Suchasys‐ tem is custom made for repression, says Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the WashingtonbasedFoundationforDefenseofDemocracies[…]Area,aprivatelyheld companythatgotitsstartin1996furnishingphonetapstoItalianlawenforcement, hascodenamedthesystem‘Asfador,’anodtoaMr.Asfadorwhocold‐calledthecom‐ pany in 2008 asking it to bid on the deal, according to one person knowledgeable abouttheproject”(TheCalgaryHerald,ItalianFirmHelpingSyriaSpyonE‐Mails.Sys‐ temMadeforRepression,saysThink‐Tank.November5,2011). According to media reports, “Area chief executive Andrea Formenti says he can't discussspecificclientsorcontracts,andthatthecompanyfollowsalllawsandexport regulations”(ibid.).Later,Area’sCEOwasquotedinthepresssayingthatthesurveil‐ lanceprojecthasnotbeenactivated:“Inresponse,AreaSpA'sCEO,AndreaFormenti, wasquotedinItaly'sCorrieredellaSeranewspaperthismonthannouncingthathis companyhadnoemployeesinSyriaandthattheprojecthadnotmadeanyprogress in the last two months. […] ‘The interception system has never been activated and cannot be under current circumstances. There has been no repression carried out thankstoourequipment,’FormentitoldCorrieredellaSera”(CNNOnline,Cyberwar ExplodesinSyria.November20,2011). “’WehaveacontractinplacewithSyria,thistrue;buteverythinghasbeenhalted fortwomonths,andtherearenoneofourtechniciansinDamascus.’Afterfivedaysof silence, there is a statement by Andrea Formenti, chairman of Area SpA, the Italian softwarehousethathasbecomeaninternationalcasebecauseitisinstallinganinter‐ ceptsystemofInternettrafficonbehalfof[SyrianPresident]BasharAssad’sregime. Formenti, 42, explains his having ‘landed’ in Syria: ‘We won a international bidding contest in 2008, outbidding 4 European countries, and other non‐European compa‐ nies.Asinterlocutors,wehaveneverhadpeopleeitherinthemilitaryorintheintel‐ ligenceservices,butofthelocaltelephoneprovider.’Area'schairmanstatedthatthe contractwasworth13millioneuros,butdeniedcurrentlyhavingpersonnelatwork The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 intheMiddleEastcountry.‘Fortwomonthseverythinghasbeenhalted,andIwould like to point out that the eavesdropping system has never been operated, and as thingsnowstand,itneverwill.’Thefutureisuncertain:‘Wehavecontractualagree‐ mentsthatareverybinding,andwhich,ifnothonoured,wouldforceustopayhefty penalties.Ontheotherhand,wearefollowingthesituationinSyriaasitevolves.We wantnopartofbeingaccomplicestorepression.Wehopetherewillbesomeformof interventionbytheinternationalauthoritiestosortthingsout.’Yesterday,aprotest washeldinfrontofAreaheadquartersbyanti‐AssadrepresentativeswholiveinIta‐ ly. Beside them were activists of the Italian Pirates Party” (BBC Monitoring Europe, Italian Software Company Denies Complicity in Syrian President’s Repression. No‐ vember9,2011). AreaSpaisproducingandsellingMonitoringCentres.Ithasobtainedacontractfor implementing anInternet surveillance system in Syria. The company has reacted to allegationsaftertheyweremadepublicbythemedia,sayingthatthesystemhasnev‐ er been activated. The case is an example of how first surveillance technologies are sold to countries or organisations that are considered problematic by human rights groupsandonlyafterinformationaboutithasbeenmadepublicdocompaniesreact totheallegations.Thequestionthatarisesiswhathappensinthosecases,wherecivil societywatchdogorganizationsdonotfindoutabouttheexistenceofspecificcasesor donothavetheresourcestoengageininquiries. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 15.Innova Placeofbusiness:Trieste,Italy Website:http://www.innovatrieste.it Self‐description: “Innovaisatechnologybasedcompanythatmarketsintegratedinterceptionsystems forlawfulactivitiesandintelligenceoperations.[…].Thankstoadeepexpertisein telecommunicationappliedtosecuritysector,InnovaproductssupportPublicProse‐ cutor’sOfficesandLawEnforcementAgenciesinanytypeofmonitoringactivitywith advancedtechnologyfor: *fixedandmobiletelephoneinterception *wiredandwirelesscommunicationdecoding *mobiletargetstracking *highqualityaudiomonitoring *dataanalysisandinformationmanagement” (http://www.innovatrieste.it/eng/azienda.htm). Analysis Innova produces and sells surveillance technologies, including tools for monitoring theInternet.OneofthissystemsiscalledEGO.Itis“anadvancedinterceptionsystem, whichmanagestelephone,internetandaudiotargetsonthesameuser‐interfaceand caninterceptupto1000targetssimultaneously.[…]Egoenablestointercept,decode and restore on the same interface all types of IP communication, such as Video‐ communications, MMS, internet key, e‐mail and webmail, etc. […]A huge data base together with integrated advanced data analysis tools can be used to elaborate re‐ search activities, information matching operations (phone records, telephone calls, numbersetc),datacrosscomparisonsandforimmediatereportcreation”(#15).EGO isaflexible communicationssurveillancetechnologythatcanmonitordifferentnet‐ works(telephone,Internet,etc)andinspectthecontent.IntermsofInternetsurveil‐ lance,itcanbeclassifiedasadeeppacketinspectiontechnology. Innova explains the need of its Internet surveillance business by saying that the “developmentofIPnetworkandtheincreasinguseofinternet‐basedservicesledLaw Enforcement Agencies to new investigation needs and to theuse ofadvanced prod‐ uctsforIPcommunicationinterception”(#15).Wecouldfindnodiscussionofprivacy concerns of Internet surveillance in the analysed documents (#15, Innova website accessedonFebruary8,2012). The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 16.IPS Placeofbusiness:Aprilia,Italy Website:http://www.ips‐intelligence.com Self‐description: “IPSdesignsandmanufacturesproductsandsolutionsforthemostdiversifiedappli‐ cationsintheCommunicationSecurityandElectronicSurveillancedomains.[…]The CompanysolutionsportfolioincludesLawfulInterceptionandElectronicSurveillance systems, Monitoring Centre and special solutions for monitoring and intercepting Web2.0applications.[…]Ourvalues:…Tocarryoutanindustrialproject,bydevelop‐ ing innovative technologies, with the aim of strengthening the customer’s trust, thankstothecontinuousgrowthofthecompanyanditspeople,placinghonestyand reliability as fundamental values, beyond any business opportunities” (http://www.resi‐group.eu/ips/?page_id=2&lang=en). Analysis MonitoringCentresareoneofthetechnologiesthatIPSproducesandsells.“GENESI MonitoringCentreisaninnovativecentralizedsystem,supportingtheLawEnforce‐ ment Agencies investigations to manage in a unified manner audio, video and data interceptionaswellastelephoneCallDetailRecordsandLogFilesanalysis”(#16_1). It can “view in real time and off‐line data communications” (Fax, Sms, Videoconfer‐ ence, Internet, etc.)” (#16_1). GENESI’s Network Interception Platform “is a system withreal‐timemonitoringandinterceptingcapabilitiesforthetrafficbeinggenerated byIPnetworkusers”(#16_3).Itcan“monitorandinterceptInternettrafficdata[…] ofdifferenttypesofInternetContentandServices(i.e.e‐mailmessages,Webaccess‐ es, Chat sessions, etc.)” (#16_3). The system works with probes that are placed in specific networks and then intercept the traffic. Interception criteria include user names,theMACaddressofacomputer,IPaddresses,IPaddressranges,andthefilter‐ ingofcontentby“identifyingtheInternettrafficcontainingspecifictextstringswith‐ in the protocol header (i.e. URL, e‐mail account etc.) or the application content (i.e. keywords inside e‐mail messages or Web pages, etc.)” (#16_3). The GENESI system caninterceptcontentofInternetcommunicationandothernetworks.IntermsofIn‐ ternetsurveillanceitcanbeclassifiedasaDeepPacketInspectionsurveillancetech‐ nology. IPShasalsospecializedinprovidingweb2.0surveillancetechnologies:“Web2.0has broughttotheInternetusersalargesetofnewapplicationsincreasingthecommuni‐ cationandcollaborationcapabilitiesthusprovidinganewwayofinteracting,sharing informationandorganizingactivities.WebMails,SocialNetworksandBlogsarecur‐ rentlylargelyadoptedbycommonpeopleandcompaniesforcommunicationpurpos‐ es.Alsocriminalorganizationsexploittheseapplicationstakingadvantageofthean‐ The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 onymitygrantedbytheInternet.SocialNetworksmonitoringorWebMailsintercep‐ tioncangathertheintelligencehelpingtoidentifypeopleinvolvedincriminalactivi‐ ties,andtodetectrelevanteventsinadvance.IPSinnovativesolutionsareespecially designedtosupportthistasksbydeliveringanewlevelofintelligencecapability,in‐ cludingactiveandpassivenetworksystems,complementingtraditionalLawfulinter‐ ception infrastructure and analysis tools which can be even integrated in existing MonitoringCentres”(http://www.resi‐group.eu/ips/?page_id=210&lang=en). Target Profiling is a Facebook surveillance software that “allows you to analysing communications, klick in detail and make an analysis of relations of the people in‐ volved.[…]Theapplicationlistsalluserswhocomeintocontactwiththeusersinter‐ ceptedhighlightingthefollowingfeatures:profilephoto,nameassignedonFacebook, userIDFacebook[…],thenumberofmessagesexchangedwithotherregisteredus‐ ers”.Thesystemcanalsochartrelationshipsofmonitoredusersanddisplaythecon‐ tentofexchangedmessages”(#16_3). IPSexplainstheneedofitssurveillancetechnologiesbyarguingthat“TelecomOpera‐ tors as well as any Communication Service Provider have to support the investiga‐ tions needs of Law Enforcement Agencies” (http://www.resi‐ group.eu/ips/?page_id=32&lang=en).Initsself‐descriptionitsaysthatitsvaluesare beinganindustrialprojectthatsatisfiescustomersanddevelopsinnovativetechnolo‐ gies.Theidentifiedgoalsareeconomic,technological,andlawenforcementneeds.In theanalyseddocumentswecouldnotfindanengagementwithpotentialrisksofand privacyconcernsregardingInternetsurveillance. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 17.Group2000 Placeofbusiness:Almelo,TheNetherlands Website:http://www.group2000.eu Self‐description: “Group2000istheleadingandinnovativepartnerforNetworkForensics,Communi‐ cationServicesandICTServices.OurapproachandsolutionshelpTelecommunica‐ tionServiceOperators,Internetserviceproviders,Governments,industriesandbusi‐ nessServicestosolvecommunicationandsecurityissues“ (http://www.group2000.eu/en/g2k/about_group_2000). “NetworkForensicsfocusesoninterceptingdigitalcommunicationstosupportlegal and/orcriminalinvestigations.Group2000coverstheentirescope,includingtele‐ phonenetworksandtheinternetaaswellaswirelessvoiceanddatanetworks.We haveover15yearsofexperienceprovidingcarriergradesystemsthatenableourcli‐ entstopinpointthecommunicationstheyareafter−amidstthevastamountofdata traversingtoday'snetworks−andtheneasilytapin,withtheoptionofstoringinter‐ ceptedcontent”(http://www.group2000.eu/en/network_forensics). Analysis Group2000seesDataRetention,duetotheEU’sDataRetentionDirective,asoneim‐ portant challenge (#17_1). Data retention technologies must support the collection, preparation, storage, management, retrieval, hand‐over and destruction of data (#17_1).TheLIMADRSsystemisadataretentionsystemthatcollects“communica‐ tionsdata[...]andsubscriberdatafromanytelecommunicationsnetwork“,itretains “large amounts of data in a powerful and secure data warehouse“, provides “fast searchandanalyticsformillionsofdatarecords“automates“requestprocessingand deliversdatatoauthorizedagenciesbye‐mail,orsecureIPinterfaces“(#17_5). Lawful interception is considered as another challenge (#17_2, #17_3). Group 2000sellsthesystemtheLawfulInterceptionMediationArchitecture(LIMA,#17_4). The LIMA DPI Monitor (#17_7) “uses deep packet inspection (DPI) technology to classify network flows according to their application protocol. Based on user‐ definable rules, content and signalling data of these flows can be recorded and for‐ wardedtoexternaldevicessuchasmediationsystemsforfurtherprocessing.These rules comprise target information including IP addresses, user names, protocol‐ specific filtering criteria, and arbitrary content keywords. This combination of DPI andflexibletargetrulesdelivershighqualityinterceptionavoidingthecapturingofa largervolume ofunnecessarynetworktraffic“ (#17_7).Theintercepted data canbe managed with the help of the LIMA Management System (#17_6). Group 2000 also sellstechnologiesthatmakeuseofDPIforbandwidthmanagementbyInternetSer‐ viceProviders(#17_9,#17_10,#17_11). Group 2000 reacted with a press release to the publication of the WikiLeaks SpyFiles, in which it was mentioned as provider of communications surveillance The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 technologies. The company says that “Wikileaks Spy Files benefits Group 2000” be‐ causealthough“theexpertiseandtoolingfromGroup2000hasdrawnattentionfrom countrieslikeIranandSyria”,ManagingDirectorRichardCoppenssays:“weclearly rejectanyformofrelationwithsuchkindof‘customers’.Westrivetoopenness.Asa companywecomplywithLegislationanddorespecthumanrights.Oursolutionsare for instance deployed in Latin America to track down drug trafficking”. (http://www.group2000.eu/en/g2k/news/news_december/press_release/). “AccordingtoCoppenstheSpyFilesareincompleteandpoorlyjustified”(ibid.).As surveillance technology producers are not complied to release their customers and salespublicly,dataaboutwhatthesecompaniesaredoing,islikelytobeincomplete becausethecompaniesthemselvesoftentreatitasasecret.TheSpyFilesmakeavail‐ ablesomeofthisdata.Intheend,itisoftennotclear,whichcommunicationssurveil‐ lancetechnologiesaresoldbywhichcompaniestowhom.Notmuchisknownaboutit andonlysurfacesoccasionallyastheresultofinvestigativejournalism. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 18.PineDigitalSecurity Placeofbusiness:TheHague,TheNetherlands Website:https://www.pine.nl Self‐description: “Since 1997, Pine Digital Security takes care of (digital) availability and security for companiesandgovernmentagencies.Thespecificfocusonthetechnicalsideofcom‐ puter security is the driving force behind our security services” (https://www.pine.nl/over‐pine). Analysis PineDigitalSecurityproducesandsellstheEVELawfulInterceptionSolution.Itcan beused“fortheinterceptionofIPdata,(e‐)mailmessagesandVoiceoverIPtelepho‐ ny.OurcustomersareInternetServiceProviders(ISPs)andtelecommunicationcom‐ panies” (http://www.lawfulinterception.com). Pine provides a Deep Packet Inspec‐ tionInternetsurveillancetechnology(EVE).It saysthatthistechnologyis primarily sold to the communication industry. According to the company’s self‐presentation, governments or law enforcement are not important customers. On Pine’s websites (https://www.pine.nl,http://www.lawfulinterception.com),wecouldnotfindadis‐ cussionofpotentialrisksandprivacylimitationsofthecommercialuseofDPIsurveil‐ lance. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 19.GammaGroup Placeofbusiness:Andover,UK Website:https://www.gammagroup.com Self‐description: “GammaTSEisagovernmentcontractortoStateIntelligenceandLawEnforcement AgenciesforTurnkeySurveillanceProjectsproducinghighqualitySurveillanceVans andCarsandTechnicalSurveillanceEquipment” (https://www.gammagroup.com/gammatse.aspx). Analysis Gammaexplainsitsproductionandsellingofcommunicationssurveillancetechnolo‐ gieswiththreatstonationalsecurity.“Intoday’shigh‐techcyberenvironmentcom‐ puters,mobilephonesorPDAsarebeingusedtotransmitandsupplyinformation thatcouldpotentiallythreatennationalsecurity.Theincreaseofcybercrimeboth throughterrorism,intimidationandindustrialespionageareconstantlyontherise, andillegalactivitiesareaidedbyavailabletechnologies[…]Conventionalintercep‐ tiontechnologiescannolongercopewiththesechallenges.GovernmentAgencies requirenewmission‐criticalintelligencetechnologiestoenhanceexistingcapabilities which,todate,areinsufficientwithinmostgovernmentproductportfolios”(#19). Gamma’sFinFisherisaso‐called“Trojanhorse”,asoftwarethatonceinstalledal‐ lowstheintruderremoteaccess.FinFishercaninfectcomputers,mobilephones,local networksandISPnetworksandextractdatafromthesesystems(#7_10,4‐10).The productandtrainingwasadvertisedinEleman’sCommunicationsMonitoringcata‐ loguefromOctober2007(#7_2).FinFishercane.g.betarnedasasoftwareupdate thatissenttoacomputerormobilephone(NDR.ZAPP:GermanySpywareforDicta‐ tors.December7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/zapp4923.html).“FinFisher istheleadingoffensiveITIntrusionprogramthroughwhichGammaprovidescom‐ plementarysolutions,productsandadvancedtrainingcapabilitiestoGovernment end‐userswhoareseekingworldclassoffensivetechniquesforinformationgathering fromsuspectsandtargets”(#19). Accordingtomediareports,GammaofferedtosellitsFinSpysoftwaretoEgyptian securityauthorities(EUobserver.com,EUcompaniesbannedfromsellingspywareto repressiveregimes.October11,2011).“Egyptiananti‐regimeactivistsfoundastar‐ tlingdocumentlastmonthduringaraidinsidetheheadquartersofthecountry'sstate securityservice:ABritishcompanyofferedtosellaprogramthatsecurityexpertssay couldinfectdissidents'computersandgainaccesstotheiremailandothercommuni‐ cations.[…]Amidthescatteredpapers,interrogationdevicesandrandomfurniture foundduringtheraid,theactivistsuncoveredaproposedcontractdatedJune29from theBritishcompanyGammaInternationalthatpromisedtoprovideaccesstoGmail, Skype,HotmailandYahooconversationsandexchangesoncomputerstargetedbythe The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 InteriorMinistryofoustedPresidentHosniMubarak.TheproposalfromGammaIn‐ ternationalwaspostedonlinebyCairophysicianMostafaHussein,abloggerwhowas amongtheactivistswhoseizedtheministry'sdocuments.‘Itisimportantevidenceof theintentofthestatesecurityandinvestigationdivisionnottorespectourprivacy,’ Mr.Husseinsaid.‘Thisproposalwassenttoanotoriousdepartmentknownfortor‐ ture,spyingoncitizenstohelpMubarak'sregime,’Mr.Husseinsaid,referringtothe StateSecurityInvestigationsService.‘ThecompanyGamma,Iconsiderthemtobe partnersinthecrimeoftryingtoinvadeourprivacyandarrestactivists’”(Washing‐ tonTimes,BritishFirmOfferedSpySoftwaretoEgypt:ActivistsSayTheyWerethe Targets.April26,2011). AlsotheGermanregionalpublicserviceTVstationNDRreportedaboutasecretof‐ ferofGammatotheEgyptianstatefortheFinFishertechnology(NDR.ZAPP:Germa‐ nySpywareforDictators.December7,2011. http://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/zapp/media/zapp4923.html).TheEgyp‐ tianbloggerMostafaHussein,whodiscoveredthedocuments,arguedintheNDRre‐ portthatthissoftwareis“exactlylikeweapons”(ibid.).TheEgyptianInternetactivist IsraaAbdelFattahwasinterviewed,sayingthatthissoftwareis“helpingthedictators […]to[…]attacktheactivism”(ibid.).HerownInternetcommunicationwassur‐ veilledbytheEgyptiangovernment.Shesaidthatsurveillancecompanies“onlythink aboutmoney”(ibid.).NDRalsodescribesGamma’sattemptstosellsurveillancetech‐ nologiestoTurkmenistanandOman(ibid.).TheAustrianITjournalistErichMöchel saidthatsurveillancetechnologycompaniesencourage“repressionandtorture” (ibid.). Gammareactedtotheaccusationspartlybyrefusingtocommentandpartlyby denyingthem:“PeterLloyd,anattorneyforGammaInternational,toldTheWashing‐ tonTimesthatthecompanyneversoldtheFinFishersoftwaretotheEgyptiansecuri‐ tyministry.Butthelawyerdeclinedtoanswerquestionsaboutthecompany'smal‐ waredivision,orthedetailedproposalfoundintheEgyptianministry.‘Gammacom‐ pliesinallitsdealingswithallapplicableU.K.lawsandregulations,’Mr.Lloydsaid. ‘GammadidnotsupplytoEgyptbutinanyeventitwouldnotbeappropriatefor Gammatomakepublicdetailsofitstransactionswithanycustomer’”(Washington Times,BritishFirmOfferedSpySoftwaretoEgypt:ActivistsSayTheyWeretheTar‐ gets.April26,2011). Gammaexplainstheneedofsurveillancetechnologiesbythreatstonationalsecu‐ rity.TheEgyptianrevolutioncertainlywasathreattothenationalsecurityoftheold Mubarakregime.Thequestionthatarisesisifagovernmentthatisquestionedin massdemonstrationsbyitsownpopulationhasthemoralrighttodefendnational securitywiththehelpofsurveillancetechnologiesthatareusedtospyon,imprison, tortureorkillopponents.OntheonehandthereareclaimsthatGammaofferedto supplyInternetsurveillancetechnologiestoEgypt,ontheotherhandthecompany hasdeniedthis.FinFisherdefinitelyisatechnologythathasthepotentialtobeused forthesurveillanceofandrepressionagainstpoliticalopponents. The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 The Privacy & Security Research Paper Series, Issue # 1 20.TelesoftTechnologies Placeofbusiness:Blandford,UK Website:http://www.telesoft‐technologies.com/ Self‐description: “TelesoftTechnologiesisatrusted,leadingglobalsupplierofreliable,costeffective signaling,mediaandpacketprocessingsolutionstoserviceproviders,governments andOEMdevelopersworldwide”(https://www.gammagroup.com/gammatse.aspx). Analysis TelesoftTechnologiesarguesthatDPItechnologiesareneededbothforlawenforce‐ mentandcommercialpurposes:“Networkoperatorsandlawenforcementagencies needtheabilitytoidentify,sortandblockselectedpacketsinIPandconvergednet‐ works.Packetfilteringisalsobecomingthebasisofanewsetofrevenue‐generating applicationsasthedeploymentofnetworkpolicysolutionsaccelerates.Telesoft's rangeofpacketfilteringsolutionsperformcanbedeployedtoperformmonitoring, filteringandgroomingofpacketsacrossarangeofnetworkinterfaces” (http://www.telesoft‐technologies.com/products/packet‐filtering). Thecompanyofferspacketfilteringcardsaswellasprobesthatprovide“lawen‐ forcementandintelligenceagencieswithreal‐timeaccesstocontent”byusing“Ad‐ vancedDeepPacketInspectioncapabilities”that“enabletheidentificationofspecific communicationcontentatfullpacketratesfrommultiplexeddatastreams” (http://www.telesoft‐technologies.com/products/network‐monitoring‐security‐ control/deep‐packet‐inspection).“TheSIP&GTPProbesupportsDeepPacketInspec‐ tionfromLayers5to7,enablingdeliveryofspecifiedcontentforspecificsubscribers, basedonSIP‐URI,emailaddress,telephonenumber,MSISDNandIMEI,forexample” (ibid.). TelesoftTechnologiessaysthatDPIis“anessentialtoolforpreservingnetwork healthandintegrity“(20_4).Furthermoreitseeseconomicadvantagesforcompanies: “DPIisalsobeingdeployedtodeliverinnovative,revenue‐generatingpolicyservices. 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