THE BASELINE ISSUE
A position paper
By:
Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV
INTRODUCTION
Last August 2007, this author filed Senate Bill No. 1467 entitled “An Act Defining the
Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446.” or otherwise known as
the “Archipelagic Baselines Law of the Philippines.” The bill was the result of a series of
consultations primarily with former Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani, who first pushed for
the Baselines bill way back in 1993. It basically defines the archipelagic baselines to
include the Scarborough Shoal and designates the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) as a
“regime of islands.” To further facilitate the passing of the bill, the technical details
provided by the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) as
enumerated in House Bill No. 1202 filed by Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco as well as
its other provisions were adopted in toto. Congress, however, filed HB 3216 that
substituted for HB 1202.
Recently, controversies arose with the discovery of the particulars of the Joint Marine
Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) being conducted by RP, China and Vietnam within the
waters off Palawan. Thereafter, Malacanang pressured Congress to revert HB 3216 back
to the Committee on Foreign Relations ostensibly to push for certain amendments. These
two seemingly unrelated events inevitably pushed the baselines issue at the top of the
national policy agenda. Given this context, now is the best time for us to finally resolve
this issue.
This paper intends to explain and justify the position adopted in SB 1467 and
differentiate it with the other options, as well as to clarify other closely related subjects
surrounding the baseline issue.
PD 1599, TREATY OF PARIS and UNCLOS
The first time the author studied the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) agreement was in 1994 as part of a course in International Law given to
graduating cadets of the Philippine Military Academy who intend to join the Philippine
Navy. The course focused on the UNCLOS provisions particularly: the archipelagic
doctrine; the coastal state’s rights and duties within the territorial sea, contiguous zone
and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ); the right of innocent passage; the doctrine of hot
pursuit; and other provisions concerning enforcement of maritime laws.
After graduating, however, the new Navy officers were surprised to find out that the
NAMRIA-supplied nautical charts used aboard Philippine Navy ships defined the
territorial limits of the country as those stated in the Treaty of Paris plus the attached KIG
borders defined by PD 1596, and not the UNCLOS definitions as taught to them at PMA.
To be fair, NAMRIA has no other basis than the Treaty of Paris because our country,
precisely, has yet to pass a new baselines law that would amend the pre-UNCLOS
baseline law, the RA 5446, which is not compliant with the UNCLOS criteria. To
complicate matters, the Navy uses PD 1599, a pre-UNCLOS unilateral declaration of our
country’s EEZ, as a mandate to enforce maritime laws in these areas. As a consequence,
the author remembers that when their ship patrolled as far east as the Anson Shoal in the
Pacific, they used the Treaty of Paris as reference. And when they patrolled as far west as
the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, they used PD 1599. In short, as of the
moment, we have two sets of boundaries (PD 1599 and Treaty of Paris with PD 1596)
and we will yet define another one (UNCLOS).
1. PD 1599, as mentioned above, is a unilateral declaration by the Philippines of its
EEZ as measured from the baselines as defined by RA 5446. It was signed by
then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos on 11 June 1978.
2. The Treaty of Paris is a peace treaty forged between the US and Spain in 10
December 1898. It detailed, among others, the territorial limits of the Philippine
archipelago as being ceded by Spain to the US. These same limits were then used
to define our national territory when we eventually gained indepedence from the
US in 1946.
3. The UNCLOS, formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea or UNCLOS III and also called the Law of the Sea Convention,
refers to the international agreement that came out of the UN conferences from
1973 to 1982. The agreement consists of 320 articles and 9 annexes. To date, 155
countries have already ratified the UNCLOS and it officially came into force in
16 November 1994. The Philippines became the 11th country to ratify UNCLOS
on 08 May 1984. It defines, among others, the limits of the territorial sea,
contiguous zone and the EEZ of a coastal or archipelagic State.
Each of the above reference options has its own strengths and weaknesses, but if we are
to consider both the validity in International Law and the area covered, the UNCLOS
option is superior to the other two.
PD 1599, while almost as vast as the UNCLOS option in terms of area, has practically no
binding effect in International Law by virtue of its being a unilateral declaration in the
pre-UNCLOS era. Moreover, since we have ratified UNCLOS and, therefore, agreed to
its provisions, we are obliged to rescind PD 1599.
The Treaty of Paris, meanwhile, may still have a binding effect in International Law,
notwithstanding the UNCLOS ratification. However, its total area covered is significantly
smaller because it cannot avail of the EEZ provisions of the UNCLOS.
As to the legal alternative of retaining the Treaty of Paris while availing of the UNCLOS
option, we, as a self-respecting people living within a community of nations, should not
have two sets of boundaries that we can use for our own convenience. It is simply not
fair; it is simply not right. Therefore, it is in our country’s best interest to adopt solely
the UNCLOS option.
THE BASELINE METHODS
Baselines are reference lines drawn by a coastal or archipelagic State using different
methods as discussed below. They are used to measure the breadth of the territorial sea
(12nm), contiguous zone (24 nm), EEZ (200nm) and continental shelf (up to 350nm).
Also, the waters enclosed by the baselines are called archipelagic waters over which an
archipelagic State exercises sovereignty.
According to the UNCLOS, there are three methods that can be employed in determining
a State’s baselines, namely:
1. Normal Baseline, according to Art. 5, “is the low-water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”
2. Straight Baseline, according to Art. 7, can be employed if ever “the coastlines are
indented and cut into or there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its
immediate vicinity.”
3. Archipelagic Baseline, according to Art. 47, is a method of “joining the outermost
points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of an archipelago provided that
within such baselines are included the main island and an area in which the ratio
of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1:1 and
9:1.”
Of the three methods, the archipelagic baselines method is most applicable and
advantageous to an archipelago such as ours. Otherwise, to use either the Normal or
Straight baseline methods, which are primarily designed for coastal States, would
effectively waive our status as an archipelagic State and lose much of the archipelagic
waters as defined above.
THE BASELINE OPTIONS
NAMRIA has prepared the following baseline options to cater to the varying political
persuasions of the policymakers:
1. OPTION 1: The main archipelago and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by the
baselines while KIG is classified as regime of islands. This is the option adopted
by SB 1467.
2. OPTION 2: Only the main archipelago is enclosed by the baselines while KIG
and Scarborough Shoal are classified as regime of islands. This is the official
position of Malacanang through recent pronouncements and the DFA position
paper written on 02 Aug 2005.
3. OPTION 3: The main archipelago and KIG are enclosed by the baselines while
Scarborough Shoal is classified as regime of islands.
4. OPTION 4: The main archipelago, KIG and Scarborough Shoal are enclosed by
the baselines. This is the option adopted by HB 3216.
To have a better view of the differences between the baseline options, the table below
(which includes RA 5446) was lifted from the briefing documents prepared by NAMRIA.
THE BASELINE OPTIONS
FEATURES
Baseline enclosure
No. of baselines
No. of long baseline
(100-125nm)
No. of basepoints
occupied by other
claimants
Area of archipelagic
waters*
Area from baselines
to EEZ limit**
Total area of archi
waters and EEZ
Area under regime
of islands
Add’l requirement
OPTION 1
(SB 1467)
Main
Archipelago &
Scarborough
OPTION 2
(Malacanang)
Main
Archipelago only
135
4
101
3
134
4
OPTION 4
(HB 3216)
Main
Archipelago,
Scarborough &
KIG
135
4
0
0
7
7
0
172,109 sq nm
171,146 sq nm
212,181 sq nm
210,443 sq nm
166,858sqnm
498,870 sq nm
485,310 sq nm
468,250 sq nm
468,250 sq nm
413,080sqnm
670,979 sq nm
656,456 sq nm
680,428 sq nm
691,233 sq nm
579,938sqnm
KIG
KIG &
Scarborough
Designation of
sealanes
Scarborough
None
None
Designation of
sealanes &
construction of
lighthouse at
Sabina Shoal
Designation of
sealanes &
construction of
lighthouse at
Sabina Shoal
Designation of
sealanes
OPTION 3
Main
Archipelago &
KIG
RA 5446
Main
Archipelago
only
80
1>125nm
* Enclosed by the baselines
** Approximate median line applied and KIG unilaterally drawn based on PD 1596
RA 5446: There are a few weaknesses in RA 5446. One, it violates para 2 of Art. 47 of
UNCLOS where it states: “The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles except that up to 3 percent of the total number of baselines enclosing the
archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum of 125 nautical miles.” As we can
see from the table, RA 5446 has one baseline that exceeds the 125nm limit for long
baselines.
Another weakness of RA 5446 is: it does not optimize the area of the EEZ since it
excluded both Scaborough Shoal and KIG from the baselines and both were not
designated as regime of islands.
OPTION 1/ SB 1467: The main strength of this option is that it maximized the area by
including Scarborough Shoal without violating the archipelagic baselines provisions by
classifying KIG as regime of islands. It is, therefore, UNCLOS compliant.
However, there are some misconceptions regarding the label “regime of islands” that it
supposedly weakens our claim or reduces our sovereignty over the areas labeled as such.
On the contrary, “regime of islands” is defined in Art. 121 as: 1) island/s that is naturally
formed, surrounded by water and is above water at high tide; and 2) it shall have its own
12nm territorial sea, 24nm contiguous zone, 200nm EEZ and continental shelf. In other
words, islands classified as regime of islands are treated the exact same way as other
land territory. The only possible reason that coastal States would be forced to classify
their territory as a regime of islands is because such territory is impossible to enclose
within the baselines without violating other UNCLOS provisions. The Falkland island
group is one example. Since the UK is at the other end of the Atlantic which made it
impossible to include Falkland in its own baseline, it has no choice but to classify
Falkland as a regime of islands. The US (if ever it ratifies UNCLOS) would probably
classify Hawaii as a regime of islands by virtue of its distance from the mainland.
The Scarborough Shoal was included in the baselines primarily because its distance from
Luzon is less than the 125nm limit. With this, our country stands to gain approximately
14,500sq nm of EEZ and continental shelf. Another reason for its inclusion is that
Scarborough Shoal is basically a rock and according to para 3 of Art. 121, the regime of
islands definition has an exception and that is: “Rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf.” Therefore, while it is advantageous for us to designate KIG as a
regime of islands, we would be depriving ourselves of the EEZ and continental shelf of
Scarborough Shoal if it would be designated as a regime of islands.
Of course, China is expected to protest the inclusion of Scarborough Shoal within our
baselines. Probably, it may even be the reason why Malacanang pressured Congress to
freeze legislative action on HB 3216. But if we truly believe that our claim over
Scarborough Shoal is legitimate then we have every right to enclose it within our
baselines. This does not mean, though, that we are provoking China into a war because,
according to Art. 279, State Parties to the UNCLOS are obliged to settle any dispute by
peaceful means.
OPTION 2/MALACANANG OPTION: The main weakness of this option is, while it
is UNCLOS compliant, it failed to protect the interest of our country by not including
Scarborough Shoal in the baselines when there is no hindrance to do so. True, this option
designates Scarborough as a regime of islands but, as discussed above, a rock formation
is not entitled to an EEZ and continental shelf when labeled as such. Even if it will still
have its own territorial sea and contiguous zone, these would have no effect in terms of
additional area since the EEZ measured from west coast of Luzon will extend over these
zones.
OPTION 3: There are several weaknesses with this option. Aside from those mentioned
in Option 2 with the designation of Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands, this option is
also not UNCLOS compliant for including KIG in the baselines. This will be discussed
extensively below since Option 4 also included KIG in the baselines.
OPTION 4/HB 3216: At first glance, this may seem to be the best option. However, it
violated para 4 of Art. 47 which states: “Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from
low-tide elevations, unless a lighthouse or similar installations which are permanently
above sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation is situated wholly
or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the nearest
island.” Based on the table above and HB 3216 itself, Sabina Shoal and Iroquois Reef are
low-tide elevations. A low-tide elevation, according to Art. 13, “is a naturally formed
area of land which is surrounded by and above water at low-tide but submerged at high
tide.” Hence, we still need to construct a lighthouse each on these areas so that they can
qualify as basepoints. Even this measure, however, is no longer possible because of the
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” which was signed by the
ASEAN members and China in 2002. In the declaration, we agreed “to exercise selfrestraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect
peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the
presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their
differences in a constructive manner.” Both Sabina Shoal and Iroquois Reef are presently
uninhabited but are being claimed by RP, China and Vietnam.
Another major defect of Option 4/HB3216 is, as we can see from the table, seven of the
designated basepoints are islands presently occupied by other countries. According to the
Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly Isands, these are: Kalantiaw Cay (Vietnam); Paredes
Reef (Vietnam); Kagitingan Reef (China); Mariveles Reef (Malaysia); Pugad Is.
(Vietnam); Kanluran Reef (Vietnam) and Investigator Reef (being claimed by China). To
insist on using these islands/reefs as basepoints is in contravention of the 2002 ASEANChina Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and may cause
outrage among affected States. Designating basepoints on uninhabited, though contested
areas such as Scarborough Shoal can be defended legally and politically. But to place
basepoints on foreign-occupied territory, no matter how strong our claim, is an act of
aggression.
If the proponents of Option 4/HB 3216 have not yet realized this, then the information
provided by this paper, hopefully, will make them reconsider.
In view of the discussions above, the best option to adopt is Option 1 as stated in SB
1467.
The SPRATLY ISSUE
As explained above, the passing of SB 1467 will not weaken our claim over the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) or what is internationally known as the Spratlys. Still, the fact
remains that, we are only one of many claimants in that group of islands. Of these, only
Brunei has not physically occupied its claimed territory. According to the Digital
Gazetteer of the Spratly Islands (it admits the reports are varying), Vietnam has occupied
25 islands; China, 13; RP, 8; Malaysia, 5; and Taiwan, 1.
With this situation, it is impossible to expect a scenario where all these countries will just
suddenly pack up and go home. On the contrary, we should even expect some of these
claimants to assert their presence more in the coming years to explore potential oil
deposits amidst the increasing demand and diminishing oil reserves elsewhere. In such a
scenario, skirmishes are not unlikely as our Navy ships and fishing boats are regularly
navigating these waters. In the meantime, nobody gets to benefit from whatever rich
natural resources the area has to offer.
There are several avenues enumerated in the UNCLOS as regards conflict settlement,
foremost of which is the mutual agreement of all claimant States. But after factoring in
the unpleasant experiences (including our own) of countries conducting joint
development agreements with China (Wain 2008), it may be best to strengthen ties within
the ASEAN first. This way, our collective position would be at parity with China in any
future agreement. This is the only peaceful way to resolve this issue.
The JMSU ISSUE
The Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) was initially entered into by RP and
China on 01 Sept 2004. Vietnam initially voiced concern as it was a violation of the
2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Wain 2008). But at
some point, Vietnam was won over when it was included in the project. Because of this,
it is now officially called a Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in
The Agreement Area in the South China Sea.
The JMSU agreement is highly flawed for the following reasons:
1. It smacks of bad faith on our part as it was forged without consulting with the other
members of the ASEAN while there was an existing status quo agreement among
them. (Wain 2008).
2. It excluded other claimant States like Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan.
3. It was grossly disadvantageous on our part because it included areas that were not
disputed.
4. Because some subject areas are solely ours, it violated certain provisions of Art.
XII of the 1987 Constitution relating to the exclusive use of our own marine
wealth or, if it is a joint exploration, the President’s obligation to submit such
agreement to Congress within 30 days.
5. We are not at parity with China in terms of the actual conduct of the exploration
since we are relegated to mere observers aboard their research vessels. Hence,
there can be no guarantees about the integrity of the research results.
The CONTINENTAL SHELF
According to para 1 of Art. 76 of the UNCLOS, “the continental shelf of a coastal State
comprises the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial
sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200nm from the baselines from which the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend
up to that distance.”
According to para 6 to 8 of Art. 76, a coastal State is allowed to claim the outer limits of
a continental shelf beyond the 200nm but not exceeding 350nm from the baselines as
long as the information on the said limits are submitted to the Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The CLCS would then make the recommendations to
the coastal State regarding the outer limits and the adoption of which would make it final
and binding.
Art. 4 of Annex II, on the other hand, states: “Where a coastal State intends to establish,
in accordance with Art. 76, the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200nm, it shall
submit particulars of such limits to the Commission along with supporting scientific and
technical data as soon as possible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force
of this Convention for that State.”
Since the UNCLOS officially entered into force 16 November 1994, supposedly, the tenyear deadline would have expired on 15 November 2004. However, because of the
difficulties encountered by developing countries in coming up with technical
requirements of Art. 4 of Annex II, a decision was made during the May 2001 Meeting of
State Parties to UNCLOS to extend the deadline to 12 May 2009. (Sands 2005: 5).
With this, our country has a little over a year to submit the particulars of our continental
shelf beyond the 200nm to the CLCS. Thus, it is imperative that all pertinent
institutions of government provide and extend all the necessary support to
NAMRIA to make sure that it accomplishes its mission on time.
To compound this deadline problem, we still do not have a new baselines law from which
to measure the outer limits of our continental shelf. While there is no deadline in the
submission of particulars for a State’s baselines, it is, however, the basis for measuring
all maritime regimes including the extended continental shelf (VERA Files 2008).
Therefore, we should pass the new baselines bill even way before the 12 May 2009
deadline to give NAMRIA ample time to adjust their data on our continental shelf,
assuming that it would have the necessary data by then.
The SABAH CLAIM
The approval of SB 1467 is without prejudice to our existing claim on Sabah. Although
the bill is not as explicit as Sec. 2 of RA 5446 where it mentioned that RP has dominion
and sovereignty over Sabah, still Sec. 5 of SB 1467 states that the baselines law shall be
without prejudice to other claims. To be sure, Article I of the 1987 Constitution has
already covered our claim over Sabah and other similarly situated territories and no law
can possibly override this Constitutional provision.
Having said that, the Sabah claim will always be a lingering issue for as long as we will
not be brave enough to confront it. Sadly, all the administrations since 1986 refused or
lacked the political will to resolve it.
As things stand, our country has a strong existing legitimate claim over Sabah, on behalf
of the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu. On the other hand, Malaysia had been in actual
possession and control over the island for more than a century now and, worse, the
inhabitants of Sabah have expressed their desire to remain under Malaysian rule. Hence,
it is very unlikely that Malaysia would give up its claim even with extreme pressure from
the international community.
Maintaining status quo may be the preferred option of our past and present National
leaders so as to avoid either being accused of selling-out our interests, or creating tension
in diplomatic ties with Malaysia. However, maintaining status quo is favorable to
Malaysia as they continue to possess, control and exploit Sabah. Moreover, as time
passes by that the issue is not resolved, the farther removed are we from the actual
circumstances on how Malaysia got to possess Sabah in the first place, which is essential
to proving our claim. And, of course, the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu are continuously
deprived of their inheritance.
War is definitely not an option not only because our armed forces are ill-equipped for
such an endeavor but, more importantly, because we, as a people, have not reached and is
nowhere near the level of nationalism and patriotism necessary for launching a
politically, socially and economically costly undertaking such as a full-scale war with
another country.
Pragmatically, therefore, the only option to resolve the Sabah issue is a compromise
settlement between RP, Malaysia and the heirs of the Sultanate of Sulu. The author
concedes, however, that even this option would not be easily accomplished but then
again, reasonable men will always reach a point of agreement.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Push for the passing of SB 1467 and its counterpart in Congress before May 2009
so that there will be a basis for measuring the outer limits of the territorial sea,
contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. More
importantly, so that our country can now officially claim the limits of our
National Territory that is consistent with the international covenant of UNCLOS.
2. Push for the submission of particulars of the outer limits of the continental shelf to
the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf before the 12 May
2009 deadline by supporting NAMRIA and other concerned agencies in their data
gathering.
3. On the assumption that recommendations 1 and 2 as stated above are achieved,
we should do the following:
A. Modernize our fishing methods and technologies;
B. Invest heavily on marine scientific research and exploration of the EEZ and
continental shelf;
C. Reach out to other claimant States of the contested territories in order to
settle disputes and come up with an agreement for joint exploration and
development so that all these States can finally benefit from the abundant
natural resources in these areas.
D. Comply with the other UNCLOS obligations of an archipelagic State.
4. Modernize the Navy and Coast Guard. Logically, the next step after having firmly
and clearly established our territory is to protect it. Aside from the basic demands
of naval defense, we should increase our capability for maritime law enforcement
operations.
5. Conduct a legislative inquiry on the Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine
Seismic Undertaking.
CONCLUSION
As shown in the discussions above, the baseline issue is quite technical and highly
complex because of the interplay with other equally important national security, economy
and foreign policy issues. But after carefully analyzing these issues separately, this paper
tried its best to come up with reasonable and feasible courses of action which, hopefully,
would be given due consideration. Still, everything starts when we finally make a stand,
as a Nation, by defining the limits of what is truly ours and what will be good for our
country now and in the generations to come.
REFERENCES
2008
VERA Files (Tordesillas, Ellen et.al.). “Arroyo neglect, government
infighting jeopardize RP’s territorial claim.” 24 March 2008. Downloaded
from www.ellentordesillas.com.
2008
Wain, Barry. “Manila’s Bungle in The South China Sea.” Far Eastern
Economic Review. January/February 2008.
2008
Digital Gazetteer of the Spratly
http://community.middlebury.edu.
2008
NAMRIA Nautical Chart No. 4723 (provisional copy). Philippines.
2007
Trillanes, Antonio IV F. Senate Bill No. 1467: An Act Defining the
Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446.
Senate of the Philippines.
2007
Cuenco, Antonio V. House Bill No. 1202: An Act Defining the
Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446.
Congress of the Philippines.
2007
Cuenco, Antonio V. et.al. House Bill No. 3216: An Act Defining the
Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippine Archipelago, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 3046 as Amended by Republic Act No. 5446.
Congress of the Philippines.
2005
Sands, Philippe. “Introductory Note on Issues Concerning
Rights/Obligations and Deadlines Under Part XI of UNCLOS in Relation
to the Extended Continental Shelf.” Written for the Meeting of
Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials. Ghana. 17-20
October 2005.
2005
Department of Foreign Affairs. Position Paper: “Determination of
Baselines.” 02 Aug 2005.
2005
“Joint Statement on the Signing of a Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine
Seismic Undertaking in the The Agreement Area in the South China Sea.”
Makati, Philippines. 14 March 2005. Downloaded from http://chinajapan21.org.
2004
NAMRIA Nautical Chart No. 4200. Philippines.
Islands.
Downloaded
from
2004
Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in Certain Areas in the
South China Sea By and between China National Offshore Oil Company
And Philippine National Oil Company. Beijing, China. 01 September
2004.
2002
“Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” Phnom
Penh, Cambodia. 04 November 2002.
1999
Zou, Keyuan. “Scarborough Reef: A New Flashpoint in Sino-Philippine
Relations?” International Boundaries Research Unit. Canada.
1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.
1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 10 December 1982.
1978
Presidential Decree No. 1596: Declaring Certain Area Part of the
Philippine Territory and Providing for their Government and
Administration. Philippines. 11 June 1978.
1978
Presidential Decree No. 1599: Establishing an Exclusive Economic Zone
and for Other Purposes. Philippines. 11 June 1978.
1968
Republic Act. No. 5446: An Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act.
No. 3046, Entitled “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea
of the Philippines.” Philippines. 18 September 1968.
1961
Republic Act No. 3046: An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial
Sea of the Philippines. Philippines. 17 June 1961.
1898
The Treaty of Paris. France. 10 December 1898.
*
Other presentation documents, tables, charts and illustrations provided by
NAMRIA.