Sociology of Sport Journal, 1999, 16.206-235
O 1999 Human Kinetics Publishers, Inc.
Justice Do It! The Nike Transnational Advocacy Network:
Organization, Collective Actions, and Outcomes
George H. Sage
University of Northern Colorado
The focus of this study is on the organizational dynamics, collective actions, and outcomes
of a transnational advocacy network that was formed to protest the labor practices of Nike's
sport shoe factories in Asia. Transnational advocacy networks arise and are sustained with
the intent of changing social conditions. The Nike transnational network sought to improve
the lives of workers in Nike factories in Asia so that they have jobs that pay a living wage,
have good working conditions, can organize on their own behalf, and are treated with dignity and respect. A broad theoretical perspective that emphasizes the determinant and interactive effects of the emergence, development, and accomplishments of the Nike transnational
network is employed.
Cette 6tude est centr6e sur les dynamiques organisationnelles, les actions collectives et les
aboutissants d'un r6seau activiste transnational form6 afin de protester contre les pratiques
industrielles des usines asiatiques de fabrication des chaussures Nike. Les r6seaux activistes
transnationaux sont Ctablis et maintenus dans le but de changer les conditions sociales. Le
r6seau transnational Nike a cherch6 am6liorer les vies des travailleurs et travailleuses
dans les usines Nike en Asie pour que leurs emplois rapportent un salaire suffisant, pour que
leurs conditions de travail soient bonnes, pour qu'ils et elles puissent se syndiquer et pour
qu'ils et elles soient trait& avec dignit6 et respect. Une perspective th6orique large est
employ6e. Celle-ci met l'accent sur les effets dkterminants et interactifs associBs B
Yemergence, au d6veloppement et aux succks du r6seau transnational Nike.
Public protest and collective actions are prominent features of the contemporary world order; much of it is a response to worker, consumer, environmental,
and human rights abuses and oppression. Such actions have helped shape views
about social change and human agency. They have, therefore, attracted considerable attention among scholars in the social sciences (Keck & Sikkink, 1998a;
McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998; Tarrow, 1994).
The focus of this study is on the organizational dynamics, collective actions,
and outcomes of a transnational advocacy network that has protested the labor
practices of Nike's sport shoe factories in Asia. Nike has been the world leader in
market share of the $12 billion a year sports footwear industry for over a decade.
The company was founded in 1964 by its current CEO Philip Knight, and Bill
Boweman, University of Oregon Track and Field coach, under the name Blue
Ribbon Sports. The corporate name was changed to Nike in 1971, and it became a
The author is Professor Emeritus in the Departments of Kinesiology and Sociology
at the University of Northern Colorado, Greeley, CO 80631.
Nike Transnational Advocacy
207
publicly traded company in 1980. Corporate headquarters are located in Beaverton,
Oregon. Although Nike is legally registered as an American corporation, none of
its footwear is currently manufactured within the U.S.; everything is subcontracted
out to suppliers, most of whom are Korean and Taiwanese manufacturers located
in the cheap labor countries of Asia. Thus, Nike does not own its own factories in
Asia; it contracts with these foreign manufacturers to make its sports footwear
(Ballinger, 1997; Katz, 1994; Strasser & Becklund, 1993).
For the past 10 years, reports by Nike workers, governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and individual observers have claimed that
wages and working conditions in Nike factories in all of these countries are unjust,
inhumane, and dangerous to the workers. Beginning in 1994, an international coalition of individuals and organizations began to form an advocacy network to protest Nike's labor practices and demand changes for its Asian workers. A transnational
advocacy network is a type of collective protest that is made up of individuals and
organizations engaged in an international process of exchanging information, testimony, and strategy about a grievance or claim, such as the laws and policies of a
nation state or the practices of a transnational corporation. Transnational advocacy
networks are communicative structures that are not bound by single organizational
structures; indeed, they are usually part of a dense matrix of organizations scattered throughout the world (Keck & Sikkink, 1998a). Networks of this type seek to
remedy specific grievances, advance certain claims, or demand rights on behalf of the
less powerful against the interests of the more powerful (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998).l
According to Keck and Sikkink (1998a), "Transnational advocacy networks
are proliferating, and their goal is to change the behavior of states and of international organizations" (p. 2). In just the past 20 years the peace, labor, human rights,
anti-nuclear, and environmental advocacy networks have mobilized large masses
of people throughout the world to demand, and win, important political and social
reforms (Costain & McFarland, 1998; Jasper, 1997;Meyer & Tarrow, 1998;Union
of InternationalAssociations, 1995). The Nike transnational advocacy network is
one of the most vigorous international collective actions of the past decade.
Factors in the Emergence and Development of the Nike
Transnational Advocacy Network
Several of the central concepts and theoretical insights employed in studies
of domestic social movements have utility for studying transnational advocacy
networks. Three of these that have arisen as central analytic foci in research on the
emergence and development of collective actions are: political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing (Keck & Sikkink, 1998a; McAdam,
McCarthy, & Zald, 1996).
Political Opportunity Structures
Political opportunity structures refers to changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a political system that either encourages or
discourages the formation of collective actions. Transnational advocacy networks
are conditioned by structural shifts in the political context in which they are formulated and maintained.
Political Economy and Globalization. Understanding the structures of political opportunity for the Nike network requires locating it within the political
economy of globalization, which involves the most fundamental redesign and centralization of the world's political and economic structure since the IndustrialRevolution. A key aspect of globalization is a capital system and division of labor known
as the "export processing system," which is dominated by transnational corporations. In this system, product research, development, and design take place in industrial developed countries, while the labor-intensive, assembly line phases of
product manufacture are relegated to Third World nations. The finished product is
then exported for distribution in developed countries of the world (Chase-Dunn,
1999; Dicken, 1998; Hoogvelt, 1997).
Export-processing manufacturing is a strategy used by transnational firms
to find cheap land and labor, a non-union workforce, relief from safety and environmental standards, and favorable tax abatements from both the host and foreign
governments. As export processing manufacturing has developed, transnational
corporationshave closed down factories in their own countries and exported work
to people in Third World countries throughout the world. One of the consequences
of this system is illustrated in the dramatic increase in revenues of transnational
corporations from Third World export processing subsidiaries. For example, in the
U.S., because imported manufactured goods has risen sharply in the past 25 years,
imported manufactured goods as a percent of U.S. manufacturing gross domestic
product (GDP) soared from 10% in 1970 to 55% in 1996. Consequently, over one
third of the earnings of the 200 largest U.S. transnational corporations are now
derived from their export processing operations (Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994a;Korten,
1995; Rodrik, 1997; Rothgeb, 1996; Wolman & Colamosca, 1997).
For workers and their communities in developed countries, the consequences
of export processing industrializationhave been grim: closed plants, unemployed
workers, a variety of physical and mental worker afflictions linked to the stress of
unemployment, and community disintegration (Bluestone & Harrison, 1992;
Dudley, 1997). In Third World countries, this system has provided employment
for many workers, but there have been adverse consequence as well: wages so low
that workers cannot provide for their basic needs, unjust and inhuman working
conditions, sexual exploitation, social disruption, and distorted economic development (Burbach, NGiiez, & Kagarlitsw, 1997; Greider, 1997; Howard, 1997;
Moody, 1997).
Export Processing Operations of Nike. Sporting goods manufacturing is
not dislocated from other forms of global capitalist production; indeed, it is one of
the most flourishing export processing industries. As Harvey and Houle (1994)
note: "The sporting goods manufacturing industry. ..is largely composed of multinational firms that not only aim at growing shares of a world market but also
adopt global strategies of production" (p. 346). Indeed, sporting goods manufacturers that produce all of their products domestically are now a minority because
many of them have "run away" to numerous low-wage export-processing countries across the world. Nowhere is this more tangible than in Asia where the products of hundreds of sporting goods corporations, including Nike's, are made in
various countries of Asia.
During the 1970s and early 1980s much of Nike footwear was made in
American factories located in New Hampshire and Maine. Export processing
Nike Transnational Advocacy
209
manufacturing of Nike sports footwear began in the late 1970s when the company
started contracting with manufacturers in South Korea and Taiwan to supply them
with the shoes they wanted made. As the Asian factories became more efficient
and profitable for Nike, its New England plants were closed in the mid-1980s.
Then, in the late 1980s a number of significant democratic reforms came to South
Korea and Taiwan; wages increased dramatically, and labor organizations gained
the right to form independent unions and to strike (Gibney, 1992; Hahm & Plein,
1997). Also, in 1988 both South Korea and Taiwan lost their access to U.S. markets under the General System of Preferences (GSP), which permits developing
countries to export goods to the U.S. without paying duties. Reeling under these
developments, Nike began enticing its Korean and Taiwanese suppliers to shift
their Nike footwear operations out of these two countries into politically autocratic, military-dominated countries like Indonesia, Thailand, China, and, in 1995,
Vietnam in a relentless drive for a favorable political climate and the lowest-cost
labor (Ballinger & Olsson, 1997; Brookes & Madden, 1995; Sklar, 1995; Strasser
& Becklund, 1993).
By 1992, of Nike's seven top suppliers of sport shoes, three were operating
in Indonesia, three were companies producing mainly in China, and one was a
Thai company (Clifford, 1992a, 1992b). The value of athletic footwear exports in
Indonesia rose from $4 million in 1988 to $1.5 billion in 1993 (Katz, 1994). By
1998 some 40% of all Nike shoe exports for the global market were produced in
Indonesia, with China and Vietnam the other major Asian Nike footwear manufacturing countries.
Reports on Nike f Footweur Factories
Nike has had between 350,000 and 530,000 workers making Nike products
in southeastAsia throughout the 1990s. Between 1991and 1998the factories which
produce Nike footwear in Indonesia, China, and Vietnam were investigated by a
number of academic, religious, labor, human rights, and development organizations from various countries. Although the length of time collecting data, expertise
of the investigators, and methodology of data collection varied considerably, the
investigations revealed similar patterns and conditions in Nike's Asian shoe factories. (See the appendix for a list of the most noted reports.)
To summarize the reports, approximately 75 to 80% of Nike workers were
women-mostly under the age of 24--who routinely put in 10- to 13-hour days, 6
days a week, with forced overtime two to three times per week. A typical worker
earned 13 to 20 cents (in U.S. dollars) an hour-between $1.60 and $2.20 per day,
which was below their "minimum physical needs" (MPN), the figure the governments used as a subsistence level for a single adult worker in these countries.
Several of the investigations found worker abuse was widespread in Nike factories. For example, Thuyen Nguyen, an American businessman who investigated
Nike's factories inVietnam in 1997, found workers earning 20 cents an hour, forced
into overtime, and subjected to extreme corporal punishment, including having
their mouths taped shut for stepping out of line and being forced to run in circles in
the sweltering sun (Associated Press, 1997a).2
Meanwhile, Nike reported record breaking revenues almost annually during
the 1990s; it reported revenues of $9.6 billion in 1998, and it spent $1.13 billion on
advertising alone (Nike Annual Report, 1998).The newest Nike Air Jordan sneaker,
the Foamposites, began selling in stores in November 1998 at a cost of about $140
to $150.
The reports on Nike's footwear factories uniformly found that the local laws
requiring industrial safety were almost useless in practice in all of these Asian
countries because Nike contractors simply ignored the rules and regulations set
out in the laws. Not surprisingly, the reports found that the results of cutting costs
on the safety and health of the (mostly) women workers have been frightful. According to several of the reports, Nike's record on workers' rights in these countries
has been deplorable as well. Independent unions have not been permitted in Nike
factories. When Nike workers have attempted even the most minimal organizing
on behalf of their rights, Nike's contractors have called in the police or the military
and workers were arrested and subjected to torture and beatings. Such conditions
existed because political officials in these countries were notoriously corrupt; they
could be paid off, and in turn, they made sure police and military units maintained
vigilance for signs of labor activism (Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 1997; Associated Press, 1997a; Brookes & Madden, 1995; Chan, 1997a, 1997%;Community
Aid Abroad, 1997; ESPN Sportszone, 1998; INGI Labour Working Group, 1991a,
1991b). A Stanford University professor who studied Nike's Indonesian factories
said: "Nike's got business in Indonesia because the workers are docile by virtue of
governmentrepression and they can't protest. The world that Nike and Philip Knight
represent is the opposite of human rights and civilized values" (Quoted in
Mohtashemi, 1997, p. 2).
Political Opportunities and the Emergence ofthe Nike Network
Inherent in the proposition that political opportunities are a crucial factor in
stimulating collective movements is the notion that most collective actions are
stimulated by changes in some aspect of a political system, making the established
political order more susceptible to challenge. Just as production of Nike footwear
began in Indonesia, China, and Thailand, these countries undertook wide-ranging
programs of economic reform in an effort to stimulate their new market-oriented
national economies that enabled export processing manufacturing to boom
(Agrawal, 1996a, 1996b;Weil, 1996). The main beneficiaries of the reforms were
transnational corporations, domestic business interests, and financial institutions,
but the reforms also facilitated opportunities for workers' struggles (Bresnan, 1993;
Hill, 1996). Incessant worker struggles took place first at the domestic level and
gradually at the international level.
Some of the reform legislation improved workers' wages and working conditions by mandating higher labor standards,mainly by relying on minimum wages
as a tool. In Indonesia, there was also legislation governing working conditions,
such as hours of work, rest periods, overtime, annual leave with pay, minimum age
of employment, and maternity leave for women. But these regulations were seldom enforced, especially in the export processing industries (Agrawal, 1996a;Hill,
1996; World Bank, 1994). Nevertheless, the legislative reforms created a framework for raising expectations among all workers, including those working in Nike
factories where the reforms facilitated opportunities for struggles against Nike's
labor practices (Aznam, 1992b).
Nike TransnationalAdvocacy
211
Other governmental actions nurtured the raised expectations and provided
political opportunities that laid the foundation for the formation of the Nike
transnational advocacy network. Beginning in late 1980s and early 1990s, the Indonesian government lifted an informal ban on strikes and eased its restrictions on
labor activism. Since activists often mobilize in response to political changes that
give them greater leverage, labor activists and non-government organizations
(NGOs) immediately sought to exploit the relaxed social control against labor
organization. Strikes, labor activism, and union organization quickly gained
momentum and became significant forces for ~ h a n g eDuring
.~
the early and mid1990s, strikes and protests became common in factories in Indonesia, China, and
Vietnam. For example, according to Indonesian government reports, "There were
some 190 strikes in 1992, up from 130 the year before and 60 in 1990" (Schwarz,
1994, p. 259). In Jakarta and Java alone there were 270 strikes in 1993 and 314 in
1994 (Abdullah & Etty, 1997; Kirshenbaum, 1996). A New York Times article in
the spring of 1992 claimed that in China "the Government was deeply worried by
a series of wildcat strikes and attacks on . . . factory managers" (Kristof, 1992, p.
D17). Weil(1996) claims there were 6,000 strikes reported in China in 1993 (see
also Asia Monitor Resource Center, 1997). In 1996, Schwarz (1996) reported that
"according to official figures, there have been over 200 strikes [in Vietnam] since
1990" (p. 63). Nike factories were the targets of widespread worker unrest in these
countries, and worker complaints, work stoppages, and strikes were frequent in
Nike factories.
As the series of government reforms in the late 1980s were enacted to make
Indonesia's economic climate more conducive to foreign investment and world
trade, an astonishing number of independent NGOs sprang up, and many were
active by the time Nike entered that country. Surprisingly, the government did not
try to suppress them the way it had labor unions and independent political parties
(Global Exchange, 1996). Many of the NGOs took up the workers' cause against
Nike. To try to bring pressure on their government and Nike from outside the
country, Indonesian NGOs used a common form of political opportunity creation
by developing strong links with international allies in Western countries to communicate the plight of Nike Asian workers. This strategy of seeking out international or foreign organizations to present domestic grievances and claims is often
helpful because it effectively transforms "the power relationships involved by shifting the political context" (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998, p. 221). Meyer & Tarrow (1998)
call this the "boomerang effect" because, when the domestic group links up with
international allies, the international groups then bring pressure on the target of the
domestic NGOs to change its practices or policies. For the less powerful domestic
actors, it provides "access, leverage, information, and material resources they could
not expect to have on their own" (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998, p. 221). Often they are
able to exert leverage over more powerful actors, mainly officials of states or
international organizations. Indonesian NGOs thus made a domestic issue international in scope. In doing this, they formed the beginnings of what became the Nike
transnational network.
Although none of the Asian countries where Nike footwear factories are
located has a fully independent and free press, in the case of Indonesia, governmental control of the media was liberalized in the late 1980s in an effort to attract
foreign investment and tourism, and to create a favorable world-wide image of an
open and free society.4 A Global Exchange (1996) report noted: "In the early 1990s
the Indonesian press enjoyed its greatest period of openness, with government
restrictions being applied less rigorously" @. 116). This political action created
structures of opportunity for widespread media dissemination about Nike's labor
practices.
Criticism of Nike's shoe factories in Indonesian became common in both
domestic and foreign media. In the spring of 1991, "Media Indonesia, a popular
daily newspaper, ran a very aggressive three-part series on the sport shoe factories"
(Ballinger & Olsson, 1997, p. 9). Many other articles appeared in the Indonesian
media about abusive behavior toward workers and calling on Nike to comply with
basic labor laws.
Internationally, articles appeared in the Asian Wall Street Journal, the Economist, The Far Eastern Economic Review,and numerous other international publications. Press for Change, a small human rights organization directed by Jeff
Ballinger, who spent several years in Indonesia gathering information about the
practices of Nike's contractors in Indonesia, ran ads in Boston, Los Angeles, and
Portland, Oregon describing the exploitative conditions in factories of Nike's contractors in ~ndonesia.One of the most disparaging media portrayals of Nike's labor
practices in Indonesia was CBS TV producer David Hawkins's program "Street
Shoes" in July 1993. For the piece, CBS reporters were shown speaking with workers who had been fued for protesting oppressive, inhumane treatment.
The domestic and international media coverage helped to increase Nike's
workers' knowledge about minimum wages and working conditions, and, with
government promises to send abusive factory managers to jail, workers stepped up
organized protests, work stoppages, and marches on government offices to demand redress of their wage and working condition complaints.
Political events in the U.S. contributed to the emergence of the Nike network. Following a 1995 international campaign focused on the sweatshop conditions under which many American corporations products were made, in mid-1996
public attention was drawn to TV talk show host Kathie Lee Gifford, her fashion
clothes line, and the sweatshop conditions under which the clothing was made.
Gifford at first claimed ignorance of how her line of clothing was made, then
expressed horror about what she learned, then announced that she would make
sure her line of clothes would not be made under sweatshop conditions (Cavanagh,
1997; Greenhouse, 1996; Strom, 1996; Thomas, 1996a, 1996b). Finally, she identified other celebrities, such as Michael Jordan, as people who ought to take responsibility for the Nike products they endorse.
Concurrent with the Kathie Lee Gifford disclosure, a flurry of newspaper
and magazine articles were published about wages and working conditions in foreign factories making products for American corporations and sold in the U.S.
Several of the maior TV networks broadcast stories about these factories and their
workers. Thus, th;: American public suddenly became aware that many of the products Americans purchase are made in sweatshops, sometimes with child labor.
President Clinton and members of Congress began to hear from their constituents.
Many inquired about what Congress was doing about domestic and foreign products made under sweatshop conditions, while others demanded that codes or laws
be implementedbarring imported products made with child labor or in sweatshops.
Nike Transnational Advocacy
213
In October 1996 the Clinton administration created a White House Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) to produce a set of guidelines for manufacturers and corporations that contract with them.5 One outcome of these events was that Nike activists found knowledgeable and sympathetic politicians and consumers as they began to mobilize into a dynamic advocacy network.
To sum up, political systems shape the prospects for collective actions and
the forms they take. A variety of political and economic initiativesin Asian countries
where Nike footwear was being made as well as in developed countries, especially
the U.S. where Nike is headquartered and where most Nike footwear is distributed
and sold, created opportunities that helped lay the foundation for the emergence
and development of the Nike transnational advocacy network.
Mobilizing Structures in Network Emergence and Development
The term mobilizing structures refers to collective avenues, "informal as
well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action"
(McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, p. 3). Organizing structures for transnational
advocacy networks typically emerge from and remain dependent upon established
organizations as a foundation for collective actions. The typical mobilization sequence is: New and established groups and organizations begin to create global
awareness about an issue. Their efforts intensify and unite as they define and identrFy the source of the grievances or claims. Campaigns are then organized to redress the issue and bring about social change.
Nike Network Organizational Structures. Between 1992 and 1995, as global consciousness and mobilization toward Nike's labor practices, and sweatshops
in Third World countries in general, gained worldwide attention, the Nike
transnational advocacy network formed and began to mobilize. It was started by
the Working Group on Nike, a coalition of disparate organizations, each with its
own maze of affiliates, members, friends, and a l l i e ~As
. ~ this coalition grew, it
became so dense and diverse, with so many interlocking links, that the organizational matrix became difficult to identify clearly. Figure 1 is an attempt to illustrate
the general types of organizations that became part of the Nike network.
Despite the enormous diversity of individuals and organizations that made
up the Nike network, there was a very rapid and nearly unanimous set of goalsdemands actually-that were agreed upon. They were: Nike should pay a living
wage based on an 8-hour day, end forced overtime, stop using child labor, provide
working conditions consistent with human dignity, permit independent unions and
collective bargaining, and permit independent monitoring of factories (Campaign
for Labor Rights, 1998d).
Through a loose system of networking, the Nike network connected a multitude of what Jasper (1997) calls "movement-carrier groups," mostly civil initiatives that organized campaigns to address the same problematic in all its diverse
aspects (see Table 1). The practice of campaigning by a network of organizations
is not new or unique to the Nike network; indeed, advocacy networks typically
organize around campaigns, which "are sets of strategically linked activities in
which members of a diffuse principled network develop explicit, visible ties and
mutually recognized roles toward a common goal (and generally against a common target)" (Keck & Sikkink, 1998b, p. 228).
Nike Transnational Advocacy
Network Organizations
Figure 1
- The variety of organizations composing the Nike network.
Table 1 Some of the Nike Campaigns: Supporting Organizations
Campaign for Labor Rights (U.S.)
Global Exchange (U.S.)
Development and Peace (U.S.)
Corporate Watch: Nike Campaign (U.S.)
Boycott Nike (U.S.)
Justice. Do It Nike! (U.S.)
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (U.S.)
International Labor Organization (U.S.)
Press for Change (U.S.)
Just Do It! Boycott Nike! (Canada)
Christian Aid (U.K.)
N i k e N o , I Don't Buy It! (Germany)
Clean Clothes Campaign (Nine European countries)
Vietnam Labor Watch (U.S., Vietnam)
Community Aid Abroad: Nike Watch Campaign (Australia)
Nike: Fair Play? (Netherlands)
The Ethical Shopper-Nike Campaign (New Zealand)
Let's Go Fair (Switzerland)
Nie Transnational Advocacy
215
Campaigns are usually directed by a core of experienced network actors
who mobilize others by connecting groups and organizations to each other, propose and prepare a variety of demonstrations, disruptions, leafletings, and so on,
and cany out public relations. This process, which Stone (1988) calls "strategic
portrayal" (p. 6), seeks to develop a common frame of meaning about the targeted
grievance or claim that it hopes will bring about procedural, substantive, and normative changes in the group, government, or organization of concern.
The emergence and development of the Nike network resembled a pattern
seen in other transnational networks. A network of groups and organizations began
to form and unite around the various reports of Nike's factories that documented
Nike's below subsistencewages, abysmal working conditions, employment of very
young girls, abuse of workers, and antiunion practices. All of these conditions
were highlighted to portray Nike as a repressive, abusive, unjust, and inhuman
corporation.This symbolic portrayal of Nike was a catalyst for the development of
a transnational advocacy network and various campaigns against Nike's labor
practices.
Modes of Collective Action and the Nike Network. Transaction advocacy
networks, like social movements, engage in various forms of collective actions to
express their grievances and make claims of different kinds to targeted individuals
and groups. Sociologist Charles Tilly (1986) has called these actions "repertoires
of contention" (p. 2). One of the main features of transnational advocacy networks
is their ability to combine a variety of repertories of contention. This flexibility
enables them to attract the participation of diverse coalitions of individuals and
organizations in their campaigns. Four of the mostly popular action repertoires
are: public communication of grievances, disruption, violence, and negotiation
and compromise. Although each has unique features, they can be combined in
different ways (Keck & Sikkink, 1998a; Tarrow, 1994).
CommunicativeActions in the Nike Network. Transforming grievances and
claims into collective actions is an exceedingly complex undertalung, and communication is the foundation upon which the success or failure of every transnational
advocacy network rests. Information ties network participants together as a collective identity with a sense of common purpose, especially activists, groups, and
organizations that may be geographically and (or) socially distant. Collecting
credible information and deploying it strategically to a wide audience is one of the
main roles of advocacy networks. Kirk and Sikkink (1998a) note: "At the core of
network activity is the production, exchange, and strategic use of information" (p. x).
The current cutting edge in communications is the Internet. It is a quantum
leap beyond previous forms of communication because it makes possible inexpensive sharing of information throughout the world, via print, audio, and visuals, in
seconds. The implications of the Internet as a mobilizing structure for collective
actions of all kinds is seemingly limitless.
Transnational advocacy networks have become skilled at using the Internet
to communicate their plans and strategies, as well as manage tactics associated
with their actions. Being able to transmit messages and images over the Internet to
millions of people across the world, persuading Internet audiences to take sympathetic notice of certain claims, has made it "possible to create and build advocacy
networks without incurring the cost of constructing massive organizational structures" (Tarrow, 1994, p. 143). This means of communication is all the more
effective because it is able to bypass governmental laws and domestic media
sources that could screen, repress, and censure communication unflattering to
powerful elites.
The Nike transnational advocacy network was fundamentallybased upon an
Internet communication network at infra- and transnational levels that was independent of national organizations and policies. Both the broad social composition
of the Nike advocacy network and its repertoire of collective actions were the
products of the Internet, and the deliberate diffusion of information and opinion that it allowed put the Nike network on the cutting edge of information
exchange.
Literally dozens of Web sites connected the various Nike network organizations and served to inform the general public about the Nike campaigns. There was
also a dense linkage between the various Nike network Web sites. Collectively,
they provided information about Nike's labor practices, Nike's responses to the
network, news about published and broadcast pieces about Nike, news about past
and future Nike network campaigns, and so forth.
Advocacy networks are particularly vigilant to opening and maintaining information avenues to the mass media and influential policy makers. In addition to
their informational activities via the Internet, Nike network organizations endeavored to attract media attention in their efforts to reach as broad an audience as
possible. To do this, network activists cultivated credibility with the media through
their reports, while packaging their information in a timely and dramatic way to
draw media attention (Keck & Sikkink, 1998b). The results were quite successful.
Both print- and electronically-based mass media played significant roles in Nike
network information politics.
Numerous articles about Nike's Asian footwear production operations appeared in newspapers across the world. To use one example, The New York Times
reporter Bob Herbert (1997a, 1997b) published several columns on the topic of
Nike labor practices in Asia (see also Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994b; Clifford, 1996).
The most popular weekly magazines worldwide reported on this subject. The
human rights group Press for Change, directed by Jeff Ballinger, circulated
five newsletters between 1995 and 1997 to help build international pressure
on Nike.
Rvo American television networks produced and broadcast documentaries
detailing Nike worker abuses. The CBS program 48 Hours produced two hourlong programs, one in 1993 and one in 1996, about Nike factories. In April 1998
ESPN's Outside the Lines ran an hour-long documentary titled Made in Vietnam:
The Sneaker Controversy that showed unsafe and abusive working conditions inside Nike factories in Vietnam (Boycott Nike, 1998; ESPN Sportszone, 1998).
Michael Moore made a documentary film, The Big One, that had an interview with
Nike CEO Philip Knight, in which Knight unwittingly revealed how ndive as well
as callused he was about Asian workers who made Nike footwear.
Disruption and the Nike Network Campaigns. Disruption is any action that
interrupts or impedes movement or procedure, or confuses or disorders another
person. This form of collective action can take many forms, such as distribution of
leaflets, letter writing campaigns, demonstrations, sit-ins, even organizing strikes.
These arejust a few of the more frequently used techniques. Disruptive actions are
the source of much of the innovation in the repertoires of contention of advocacy
network participants.
Nike Transnational Advocacy
217
To gain attention and attract a following to its grievances, the Nike network
used disruptive techniques extensively. Three Nike International Mobilization Days
(October l8,1997,April18,1998, October 17,1998) were organizedin support of
the rights of Nike's Asian production workers. At the first International Mobilization Day, there were protests in at least 13countries of the world. In the U.S. alone
there were protests in more than 50 cities and in at least 28 states. At the second
Mobilization Day, April 18,1998, the Campaign for Labor Rights reported events in
approximately 50 communities in the U.S. and 15 communities in Canada. Several
other countriesof the world reported Nike events (Campaignfor Labor Rights, 1998e).
Other notable disruptiveactions: February 1997--Global Exchange, UNl'IE,
and the San Francisco Labor Council picketed outside the Nike Town store in San
Francisco the first day the mega-store was open to the public. May Day 1997-the
Campaign Justice: Do It Nike brought out hundreds of protesters at the Portland,
Oregon Nike Town. Few customers were able to get into the store to shop during
the event. Nike campaigns collected old Nike shoes and returned them to Nike
Town stores. There have been street and shopping mall demonstrations. Several
schools and community programs refused Nike's offer to contributemoney to their
sport programs.
These are only a small sampling of the hundreds of local, national, and international protests organized by Nike campaigns throughout the world. The number
and varieties of disruption were really quite incredible.
Nike network leaders pressured not only Nike to change its labor practices
but also governmental officials to develop policies and practices to censure and
(or) castigate Nike. They were successful in several ways. For example, Congressman Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur (D-Ohio)
announced they and 51 co-signers from the U.S. House of Representatives
had sent a letter addressed to Nike CEO and President Philip Knight asking
Nike to address the problems created by its "ruthless exploitation of hundreds
of thousands of Third World workers" (Associated Press, 1997b, p. 11A; see
also Press for Change, 1998a).
Meanwhile, disruptive actions by Nike workers in Asia have provided a form
of support and unity to the Nike network. As noted in an earlier section, there have
been numerous worker walkouts and strikes at Nike's Asian plants throughout the
1990s. In September 1992, for instance, 6,500 workers at the Sung Hwa Dunia
factory in Indonesia started a one-day strike, demanding better wages and working
conditions. In April 1997 some 5,000 Indonesian Nike workers walked out and
shut down a factory. During the same month, 1,300 Vietnamese Nike workers
went on strike seeking a wage increase, relief from illegal overtime, and compensation for working with hazardous materials (Campaign for Labor Rights, 1997;
Kirshenbaum, 1996; Kotarumalos, 1997)
Violence and the Nike Network. Although violent collective actions are
part of many collective movements, this form of action usually has mixed results.
When it is initiated by the movement actors, it often brings swift repressive actions
by law enforcement and military authorities. Resorting to violence also frequently
alienates public sentiment and support for the targeted group, government, or organization. On the other hand, when violence is initiated by the target of the network-and (or) by law enforcement authorities-against the advocacy network,
this often turns public sentiment in favor of the network.
Individuals and organizations that made up the Nike network did not advocate nor did they deliberately encouraged violence. Indeed, the Nike network publicly made clear its intention to achieve its goals without resorting to violence.
Nevertheless,there were some confrontationswhen Nike protesters took their protest
to stores and malls in which Nike products were sold, which resulted in minor
skirmishes. Consequently, at each of the three Intemational Mobilization Days a
few protesters were arrested in several locations.
The most noted case of violence by Nike campaign protesters took place at a
sporting goods store in Eugene, Oregon on October 17, 1998, during the third
Nike Intemational Mobilization Day. After some speech-making and leafleting
against Nike labor practices in Asian footwear factories, a group of about 60 protesters took to the streets in violation of the municipal parade ordinance. The group
proceeded to the new Nike Town store in Eugene. The Nike swoosh prop was
destroyed and the group pulled down a fence surrounding the site of the new store.
Several protesters entered the store where they pulled merchandise off of shelves
and vandalized displays. Fireworks were ignited, and an entire rack of clothes was
dumped off a balcony into a fountain below. As could be expected, law enforcement officers responded in riot gear and carrying pepper spray. No arrests were
made at the time of the incident, but many of the protesters were photographed
(Campaign for Labor Rights, 1998f).
Institutionalized Negotiation and Compromise and the Nike Network. Both
collective actors and the targets of collective actions are sometimes willing to negotiate and compromise. This occurs typically when either or both sides believe
that a clear-cut victory is not possible or when one side believes that the other side
is gaining a compelling advantage. Negotiation and bargaining were minimal because the Nike network was unwilling to compromise on its demands, and Nike
consistently denied the allegations and portrayals about its Asian factories.
Framing by the Nike Network
Mediating between the structural factors of political opportunity and mobilizing structures is an essential interpretative process in the political strategy of
advocacy networking that involves constructing cognitive frames. Jaspers (1997)
has recently argued that motivations to action, to protest, is grounded in ideas and
cultural constructions (framing being an example) as well as structures.Advocacy
networking framing involves strategic efforts by activists and organizations to
construct specific meanings and shape shared understandings in an effort to crystallize the targeted grievance or claim, thus legitimating the cause for the collective action and building public support for it. According to Keck and Sikkink
(1998b), a central purpose of framing work is constructing grievances in frames
that identifl the injustice, ascribe responsibility for it, and propose remedies for it.
When this is done effectively, framing makes the issue comprehensible to audiences, thus molding public opinion and justifying collective action. David Snow
and his collaborators call this "fi-aming work" (Snow, Rochford,Worden, & Benford,
1986; Snow & Benford, 1988,1992).
Networks communicate grievances and claims about an issue by using language that highlights, dramatizes, and draws attention to injustices, abuses, brutality,
and inhumanity of the targeted group or organization. Strategic framing by the
Nike Transnational Advocacy
219
Nike transnational advocacy network emphasized Nike's labor practices and its
corporate arrogance. In the former, below subsistence wages, employment of
underage girls, abusive working conditions, and violence against union organization
were showcased. As for Nike's corporate arrogance, a theme running throughout
the strategicframing portrayed Nike as a pompous, uncaring, and duplicitous company, pandering to superstar athletes through large endorsement fees while its Asian
workers were being exploited.
Nike's presumptuous slogan "Just Do It" was reframed with Nike network
slogans that at once ridiculed the Nike slogan while communicating the network's
message. Some of the reframings were: "Justice: Do It, Nike," "Just Do It, Boycott
Nike," "Just Don't Do It," "Nike Nein Ich Kaufe Es Nicht!" ("Nike-No, I Don't
Buy It!"), and "Nike-Fair Play?'
One of the ways advocacy networks actively seek to bring issues to the
public's attention is by both framing them in ways that evoke sympathy for the
victims and anger and hostility toward the targeted offender. Testimonial stories
by people whose lives have been affected by the abuses being protested are often
employed by collective actors. The stories serve two functions: First, they dramatize the situations of the victims, turning the cold facts and figures into human
lives, which tends to engender empathy for the victims and resentment toward the
target of the network. Second, the stories demonstrate the credibility of the advocacy network and the need for its support. One example of this technique is the
sponsorship of tours of victims, survivors, or leaders associated with the grievance
or claim. Such tours help demonstrate the connection between the affected individuals or group and the advocacy network on whose behalf they are making claims.
Through these individual cases, network activists motivate people to seek relief
from the claimed grievances (Keck & Sikkink, 1998b).
As part of the Nike network's campaigning, in May 1996, Global Exchange
and Press for Change combined efforts to bring Cicih Sukaesih,a former Indonesian
Nike worker, to North America for a 3-week tour. At each city, Cicih described wages
and working conditions in the factory where she had worked (Kirshenbaum, 1996).
Nike's Response to Reports About Its Asia Footwear Factories
Nike's initial response to the reports (listed in the appendix) was to claim
that Nike was just a buyer; that is, it merely contracted with Korean and Taiwan
suppliers who actually manufactured the shoes, and therefore Nike could not control what goes on in the factories. Nike's vice-president for production argued:
"We don't pay anybody at the factories and we don't set policy within the factories; it is their business to run" (quoted in Katz, 1994, p. 191). One of Nike's
managers in Jakarta said, "It's not within our scope to investigate [allegations of
labor violations]" (Quoted in Schwarz, 1991b, p. 16).
Another response frequently expressed by Nike management was articulated by a Nike public relations officer who said: "In a country where the population is increasing by 2.5 million per year [referring to Indonesia], with 40% unemployment, it is better to work in a shoe factory than not have a job" (Kidd, 1993).
Such a statement implied that, because Nike supplied jobs to a country's workers,
it should not be held accountable for workers' wages, working conditions, safety,
and health.
But beyond those types of responses, throughout the 1990s Nike management did respond to criticism of its contractors' factories with a number of initiatives. In 1992 Nike developed a Code of Conduct and Memorandum of Understanding for its contractors as a response to the mounting critical reports of its
Asian footwear factories. Unfortunately for Nike workers, several of the reports
listed in the appendix found (a) that many Nike workers did not even know about
the Code, and (b) the Code was flagrantly violated by Nike's contractors. Various
investigations of the company's factories and interviews with its workers suggest
that the Code was mostly an instrument of damage control rather than a binding
force for labor reform in Nike factories?
In 1994, Nike produced a filmed program as a rebuttal to a 1993 CBS program segment of Street Shoes, a highly critical portrayal of Nike's Asian footwear
factories. The Nike film was sent out to news organizations; it was a collage of
interviews with Nike CEO Philip Knight and Indonesian workers reporting that
they were being paid appropriately.That same year, Nike made a Production ]Primer
addressing many of the criticisms that had been raised about the company's Asian
factories. The Primer emphasized the generous benefits the workers received, and
it claimed compliance with worker-protection provisions by its contractors.
Although not officially commissioned by Nike, a book titled Just Do It: The
Nike Spirit in the Colporate World (Katz, 1994)8published in 1994 was timely
from Nike's standpoint. It was so laudatory of Nike and its corporate culture that it
can be read, and used, as a Nike response to its critics. (Katz has steadfastly maintained he was under no pressure from Nike to portray the firm favorably.) As for
Nike's footwear factories in Asia, while Katz emphasized that they were not pleasant places to work, he implied that they were not as bad as the various reports
claimed. But Katz seemed to have no first-hand knowledge about them. He states
that he "spent many months of observation and travel" (p. x) while writing the
book, but he describes nothing about any systematic investigationshe made of Nike
factories in Asia. Apparently he never actually observed or investigated Nike factories in Indonesia or China. (Nike had not begun production in Vietnam at that time.)
Also in 1994 Nike hired the accounting firm Ernst &Young to conduct audits of labor and environmentalconditions inside its contractors' factories to determine whether the factories were in compliance with Nike's corporate code of conduct. All Ernst & Young reports were prepared and paid for by Nike, so they were
confidential. However, in 1997 the Ernst &Young report on a Nike factory in Vietnam was leaked to the Transnational Resource and Action Center (TRAC), a San
Francisco-based organization that monitors the operations of U.S. corporations
abroad. In the report, Ernst &Young declared that Nike was in compliance with its
code of conduct. However, it also documented numerous violations of labor laws
on maximum working hours, inadequate safety equipment and training, and a series of hazardous and abusive working conditions inside the plants, including worker
exposure to hazardous chemicals (Greenhouse, 1997a, 1997b; O'Rourke, 1997)
Between 1994 and 1997, as the Nike network established itself as a serious
force for labor reform and gained worldwide support, increasing pressure was applied to the company because the Nike network succeeded in linking Nike factories with sweatshop abuses. In response to the Nike network campaigns, in February 1997 Nike commissioned former United Nation Ambassador Andrew Young
Nike Transnational Advocacy
221
and his Atlanta-based GoodWorks International company to go to Asia and investigate its factory operations in Indonesia, China, and Vietnam. Young made a 2week tour of those three countries, spending 3 to 4 days in each country and devoting 3 to 4 hours in each factory. His inspections were pre-announced. Since
he did not speak the language of the workers, he relied almost exclusively on
translators employed by the Nike factories, and discussions with workers were
conducted on the factory premises; furthermore, he was not allowed to talk to
workers in private.
In June 1997 GoodWorks released the results of its review of Nike factories
in those three countries.Young declared: "What we saw overwhelmingly was good"
(GoodWorks International, 1997, np). His overall finding declared that Nike factories were "clean, organized, adequately ventilated and well lit. . . . I found no
evidence of. . . abuse or mistreatment of workers. . . .Nike is doing a good job in
the application of its Code of Conduct, but Nike can and should do better"
(GoodWorks International, 1997, np). He was silent on the issue of health and
safety and about the use of hazardous chemicals, and he made no mention of corporal punishment, except to acknowledge "there have been problems." Young totally avoided the most obvious and controversial issue-whether Nike paid its
workers fair wages--claiming that it was beyond the "technical capacity" of his
investigation (Canedy, 1997; Neuborne, 199713).
Young's report came under scathingcriticismfrom international human rights,
labor, and religious organizations, as well as a number of journalists. Criticism
centered around the brevity of time spent collecting data, dependence on translators supplied by Nike officials, inadequacy of worker interview protocols, misrepresentation of NGOs with whom GoodWorks International met, and the report's
silence on wages (Clean Clothes Campaign, 1997; Glass, 1997; Herbert, 1997b;
Himelstein, 1997).
On October 16, 1997,just days before the first Nike network International
Mobilization Day, Nike released a summary of a study of its Asian factories conducted as a class project by a group of MBA students at the Amos Tuck School of
Business at Dartmouth College (Calzini, Odden, Tsai, Huffman, & Tran, 1997).
Expenses to carry out the study were paid for by Nike. Nike used the summary to
support its claim that it was providing highly desired, good-paying jobs in Vietnam. According to the summary, Nike factory wages are more than adequate and
provided workers with considerable discretionary income after paying for necessities. But only the summary of the study was released on October 16; Nike didn't
release the full study to the public until 2 months later. Given the unusual circumstances under which the study was done-business school students, paid for by
Nike, and an effort made to make only the summary public-when the full Tuck
study was released, it was critically analyzed by several individuals and organizations. For example, TRAC's review of the actual data collected by the Tuck team
led to significantly different conclusions than those presented in the study,
conclusions that were much less complimentary about Nike labor practices. Other
analysts found the methodology of the study to be woefully inadequate and questioned the credibility of a study done by students untrained for this type of research
and paid for by the company that was the subject of the study (Campaign for Labor
Rights, 1998a, 1998~).
Why Is Nike Being Singled Out?
One form of response by Nike to the Nike advocacy network was persistent,
and because of the question it raised, it deserves a separate section. The question it
raised was: Why is Nike being singled out when the Asia productive operations of
other sports footwear and apparel manufacturers in Asia are very similar to Nike's?
Nike public relations spokesperson, Dusty Kidd, posed the question this way: "Why
. . . are we the sole target of all this interest [in foreign sport footwear production
operations]?'(Kidd, 1993) The Nike network answered this question in several
ways. First, it pointed out that Nike was the industry leader in moving its production jobs overseas, and complaints about its labor practices were the first to surface
in the Asian sports footwear industry. Second, it argued that Nike was far and
away the market leader in the sports footwear industry, with a 40% share of the
market ($9.6 billion in revenue in 1998). As the "marquee firm" in the sports footwear and apparel industry, other firms in the industry looked to Nike for leadership. Even Nike CEO Philip Knight acknowledged: "Our competitorsjust follow
our l e a d (Katz, 1994, p. ix). A basic principle of labor collective actions is to go
after the market leader. The Nike network thus used Nike as a "pressure point" in
an attempt to influence the whole industry. There was reason to believe that when
Nike agreed to the demands of this advocacy network, the other companies in that
industry would swiftly follow (Brookes & Madden, 1995;Community Aid Abroad,
1996; Enloe, 1995; Joseph, 1996).As Max White, American human rights activist
and founder of a Nike campaign called "Justice. Do It Nike," put it: "Nike is . . .
the largest company [in the sport shoes industry] and has set the precedent for. . .
[the] race to the bottom. If Nike reforms, they will trumpet the change and other
manufacturers will have to follow" (quoted in "Clean Clothes," 1998).
A third reason that Nike was being targeted was what many of the Nike
network organizations and supportivejournalists considered an arrogance and hypocrisy existing in Nike's management and corporate culture. For example, CEO
Phil Knight was viewed as contemptuous, insensitive, and iconoclastic in his public actions (Randall, 1996). Ballinger and Olsson (1997) remarked, "The company
and its founder have always had a reputation for being aggressive and unconventional, the 'bad boys' of the shoe industry, built on an irreverence for the sporting
establishment and for any authority which might cramp the individual's style" (p.
56). Nike's advertising seemed to take pride in communicating a "cool," in-yourface hipness and a win-at-all-cost image. For instance, Nike's commercial during
1996Atlanta Olympic Games argued: "You don't win a silver medal, you lose gold."
The Nike network was especially critical of what it considered the hypocrisy
of Nike's responses to the numerous reports about conditions in its footwear
factories. Several of Nike's advertisements and posters were seen as contradictory
and hypocritical as well. For example, its ad "If You Let Me Play" (see Table 2)
conveyed support for the empowerment of females through sport, but Nike had
employed girls as young as 14years old in their Asian factories-girls who worked
10-13 hours daily and who were subjected to corporal punishment and sexual
harassment. The ad image of female power through play was created to sell shoes;
meanwhile, disempowered females were making them (Cole & Hribar, 1995;Lucas,
1996)? In another example, Nike circulated a poster that proclaimed, "Go AheadDemand a Raise. You Have Nothing to Lose." But, while Nike CEO Phil Knight
Nike TransnationalAdvocacy
223
Table 2 NIKE Advertisementmoster: "If You Let Me Play"
"If you let me play
I will like myself more
I will have more
self-confidence
I will suffer less
depression
I will be 60% less likely to
get breast cancer
I will be more likely to
leave a man who beats me
I will be less likely to get
pregnant before I want to
I will learn what it means
to be strong
If you let me play sports."
Reproduced with permission of Nike, Lnc.
became one of the 10 wealthiest men in the U.S. from Nike's profits, numerous
investigations of Nike's Asian factories found that his company didn't pay Asian
factory workers a living wage, and in cases where Nike factory workers made
wage demands, they had been beaten and fired. At the same time, Nike paid enormous endorsement fees to professional athletes throughout the 1990s.
The Cycle of Protest for the Nike Network
Transnational advocacy networks, like other forms of collective action, and
various types of social processes in general, tend to have a beginning, a middle
period, and an end, or closure. Of course, in a real-life setting the sequence is not
as neatly packaged as this account might imply. But researchers of collective movements have often described a sequence of beginning, peaking, and decline. Sidney
Tarrow (1983, 1989, 1994) has depicted this sequence of collective actions as a
cycle of protest. By the term cycle of protest, Tarrow (1994) refers "to a phase of
heightened conflict and contention . . . that includes a rapid diffusion of collective
action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened pace . . . in the
forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination
or organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified interaction between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression, and
sometimes revolution" (p. 153).
The protest against Nike's Asian footwear production operations began to
form in the early 1990s, shortly after Nike contractors shifted their operations
from Korea and Taiwan and into Indonesia, China, and Thailand. It was the political and economic reforms in the former two countries and quite different political
and economic reforms in the latter countries that created opportunitiesfor the shift
in operations. The political and economic changes in the latter countries stimu-
lated foreign investment in export processing manufacturing, such as Nike's sports
footwear operations, but they also provided opportunities for worker and human
rights struggles.
Collective actions that started what ultimately became the Nike network actually began with the workers in Nike's Asian factories. They initiated the struggle
against the low wages, unsafe and unhealthy working conditions,and abusive treatment in the factories. Worker complaints escalated to work stoppages and then to
strikes against Nike contractors. Worker claims resonated with domestic NGOs
who joined the struggle. As they mobilized, they made contact with NGOs and
governments throughout the world, thus diffusing and strengtheningthe collective
action of the advocacy network that was mobilizing against Nike. By 1996,
heightened conflict in Nike factories in Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, a worldwide geographical extension of mobilization and organization, and Nike network
campaigns devoted to making the public aware of the company's labor practices,
all contributed to producing new or transformed symbols, frames of meaning, and
a discourse to legitimate the Nike transnational advocacy network. Over the next 3
years, the Nike network reached a peak of actions and influence. Through its
various campaigns, it linked the actions of disparate groups and organizations
and engaged in an incredible variety of innovative repertoires of contention
to win public sympathy for the workers and support for the Nike network's
mission.
By the end of 1998, Nike had undertaken a number of initiatives to directly
address the demands of the Nike network. Public announcements made by Nike
about changes it proposed to make in its Asian factories did not, of course, bring
an end to the Nike network. Individuals and organizations that were part of the
Nike network responded to the announced Nike initiatives in two ways. First, they
expressed gratification that some of their demands on behalf of Nike's Asian workers
were actually being achieved. Second, they articulated a sense of skepticism about
whether the promises made by Nike through its initiatives would actually be fully
implemented. Further, many of the organizations that were part of the Nike network pledged to press Nike to adapt all of the network's demands. They also vowed
to monitor Nike's labor practices to make sure Nike delivered on the promises
made in its initiatives. Indeed, the ApriVMay 1999 newsletter of the Campaign for
Labor Rights evaluated the progress Nike had been making and judged Nike "still
failing" on several of the demands the Nike network had made (Campaign for
Labor Rights, 1999a). Thus, while closure had not yet come to the Nike network
by mid-1999, many of the organizations that made up the Nike network had shifted
their primary efforts to other campaigns. Much less communication was taking
place on the Internet about Nike's labor problems and about the Nike campaigns'
collective actions. Mass media interest had also begun to dwindle.
It was not just the new Nike initiatives that slowed the momentum of the
Nike network by 1998. Just as political and economic forces were influential in the
rise and mobilization stages of the Nike network, political and economic crises in
Asian countries where Nike footwear was made muted the struggles against Nike.
Financial troubles throughout Asia, and the overthrow of President Suharto in Indonesia, shifted concerns for workers from wages, working conditions, and freedom to organize to coping with rapid inflation and massive worker layoffs (Press
for Change, 1998b).
Nike TransnationalAdvocacy
225
Outcomes of the Nike Transnational Advocacy Network
The Nike network is still underway, so any attempt to assess its ultimate
outcomes is premature at this time (August 1999), but its worldwide collective
actions and campaigns have already led to a number of potential benefits, not only
for Nike workers but for workers throughout the Third World.
The Nike campaigns have been instrumental in influencing governmental
policies in several foreign countries-for example, in the establishment of or increases in minimum wages, working conditions standards, and limitationson hours
of work. Several governmentshave adopted new public policies that give workers
more opportunities to seek recourse against exploitative and abusive conditions
(e-g., legislation permitting union organization).Although Nike management may
deny that the Nike network has had any effect on government policies, there is
good evidence that the new legislative policies would not have been enacted without the pressure of the Nike campaigns.
Under pressure from the Nike network for its labor practices, Nike joined
the White House Apparel Industry Partnership created soon after the Kathie Lee
GifFord sweatshopincident became a household issue in the summer of 1996(Greenhouse, 1996; Strom, 1996; Thomas, 1996a, 1996b). The Partnership, included a
host of companies (e.g., Nike, Reebok, Liz Claiborne), two labor unions (the Union
of Needle-Trades, Industrial and Textile Employees [UNITE] and the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union), and several human rights groups. In April 1997
the Partnership reached an agreement that established standardsfor labor practices
in the garment industry. Nike signed the agreement.
Collegiate licensing is a $2.5 billion a year business. Colleges and universities sell companies the right to put their school logo on clothing and other paraphernalia made by the companies; they also contract to wear uniforms and equipment which display corporate logos on the college and university athletic team
uniforms and equipment. Such contracts are lucrative to Nike and other sporting
goods companies through sales and advertising.The Nike network was instrumental in bringing their message about Nike's Asian factories to many American university campuses. Students organized and campaigned in a variety of ways in support of the Nike network (Ervin, 1998; Just Don't Do It, 1998).
In the spring of 1998, one of those campus groups-Students Against
Sweatshops-at Duke University announced it had been successful at securing the University's approval of a Code of Conduct for all licensees, including Nike, who make goods that carry the Duke name or logos. The code required
that certain wage and working conditions be met by all manufacturers making
products bearing the University's name, logos, and trademarks. Finally, the code
required that all Duke licensees provide the university with a list of factories that
produce Duke apparel so the University could, if it wished, have those factories
monitored. The Duke University code was designed to force companies to be accountable for the labor conditions under which the University's products are
manufactured. If contractors are found in persistent violation of the code, Duke
can terminate their contract with the licensees (Campaign for Labor Rights,
1998b; Marklein, 1998).
Inspired by the work of the Nike network campaigns, the success of the
students at Duke University, and funding from UNITE, the United StudentsAgainst
Sweatshops was founded in the summer of 1998, and by the summer of 1999more
then 60 college campuses around the country had member chapters. Students at
many colleges and universities were successful at having anti-sweatshop codes
and institutional policies adopted. Some required sustained confrontations with
university administratorsbefore the students prevailed. At the University of Michigan students staged a 3-day sit-in at the president's off~ceto achieve their objective; the president's office at Georgetown University was occupied before an agreement was reached. Demonstrations, sit-ins, and rallies took place on dozens of
other campuses in the spring of 1999 (Briefs, 1999; Campaign for Labor Rights,
1999b, 1999~).
The Nike network succeeded in damaging the Nike name and reputation for
millions of people throughout the world. For many, the Nike swoosh became associated with sweatshops and the oppression of workers. Indeed, Nike CEO Philip
Knight admitted this in a speech he gave in May 1998. This became so obvious to
Nike that in mid-1998, Nike adopted a new advertising strategy in which the swoosh
symbol was toned down, even eliminated from some products. It was removed
from the corporate letterhead and replaced with an understated, lower case "nike"
(McCall, 1998).
It seems likely that the Nike network campaigns played a role in the decline
in Nike's earnings by 1998. However, the disastrous collapse of several Asian
economies must be taken into consideration when discussing revenues of
transnational corporations between 1997 and 1998 (Chowdhury & Paul, 1997;
Fox, 1998; "The Asian financial crisis," 1998). Nike had a 49% decline in its 1998
fiscal net income compared to 1997. Nike lost $68 million the last quarter (MayAugust 1998), the first time in 13 years the company had a quarterly loss. In the
first quarter of 1999 (June-August 1998)revenue fell 9%, and net income dropped
35%. Although there is good reason to believe that the campaigns of the Nike
network began to adversely affect Nike's revenues by late 1997, its exact effects
are conflated with the Asian economic crisis.
As is evident by Nike responses to the reports and campaigns of the Nike
network that were described in an earlier section, most of the company's responses
were of two mains types. In the first type, Nike either denied that it could control
its contractors' labor practices, or it claimed that the wages and factory conditions
reported by the various organizations that investigated Nike factories were inaccurate. The second response strategy was to pay for investigations of its factories in
order to refute the claims of its critics. But on May 12, 1998, Nike CEO Philip
Knight announced plans for a substantiallynew course for the company. Speaking
before the National Press Club luncheon in Washington, D.C., Knight made public
"New labor Initiatives," Nike's plans for significant reforms in its labor practices
(Nike Annual Report, 1998).
The most significant of the new initiatives were: (a) Nike was increasing the
minimum age of footwear factory workers to 18 and the minimum age for all other
light-manufacturingworkers (apparel, accessories, equipment) to 16; (b) Nike was
adopting U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) indoor air
quality standards for all footwear factories; (c) Nike was expanding education
programs for workers in all Nike footwear factories, increasing support of its current micro-enterprise loan program to 1,000 families each in Vietnam, Indonesia,
Pakistan, and Thailand, and funding university research and open forums to explore
Nike Transnational Advocacy
227
issues related to global manufacturing; and (d) Nike was expanding its current
monitoring program to include NGOs, foundations, and educational institutions
and making public summaries of the findings (Cushman, 1998; Nike Annual Report, 1998).
Knight acknowledged in his National Press Club speech that "the Nike product
has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime and arbitrary abuse."
He also said, "I truly believe that the American consumer does not want to buy
products made in abusive conditions" (quoted in Cushman, 1998, p. Dl; see also
Global Exchange, 1998a).
These substantive initiatives were seen by the Nike network as a direct result of its Cyear campaign to bring Nike labor practices to the awareness of world
consumers. Most of the initiatives addressed specific issues that had been fundamental demands of the Nike network. However, Nike still had not committed to
paying a living- wage for a normal work week. This was a fundamental demand of
the ~ i k network
e
since its beginning, and many of the network organizations
pledged to remain active against Nike until it commits to this issue.
In the months following Knight's National Press Club speech, other positive
steps were taken by the company. Maria Eitel was appointed a vice president for
corporate responsibility. She told shareholders at the Nike annual meeting that
Nike will have an independent monitoring program in place for its factories by the
end of the year. In mid-October 1998,Nike announced that it was raising wages of
its Indonesian workers by 25%, under the threat of a National Livable Wage Campaign for the Holiday Season that was being organized by various Nike campaigns
to coincide with the holiday season (Global Exchange, 1998b).
Without the pressure by the various campaigns that were part of the Nike
transnational advocacy network, it is unlikely that these steps would have been
taken by Nike. The "new labor initiatives" and the changes in Nike's policies described above all took place after the Nike campaigns gained international attention and brought worldwide public pressure to bear on Nike.
-
Concluding Comments
This study has focused on the organizational dynamics, collective actions,
and outcomes of the Nike transnational advocacy network. Transnational advocacy networks arise and are sustained with the intent of changing social conditions. The Nike network sought to improve the lives of workers in Nike factories
in Asia by creating new standards for the workplace: a living wage, good working
conditions, independent labor organizing, and employer-employee relations based
on dignity and respect. A broad theoretical perspective emphasized the determinant and interactive effects of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and
framing on the emergence,development, and accomplishmentsof the Nike network.
The accomplishments of the Nike network demonstrate how an advocacy
network can define an issue-basic human labor rights-and organize against labor
exploitation by a transnational corporation. It illustrates how political opportunity
structures, mobilizing structures, and framing methods all interact in the creation
of an advocacy network, help set its agendas, attract allies to its cause, and bridge
cultural differences. These interactions ultimately influenced the discursive positions of the network's campaigns, government policies, and a transnational
Sage
228
corporation's practices. In this case, the Nike network "resonated across significant cultural and experientialbarriers" in its struggles to achieve its goals (Keck &
Sikkink, 1998b, p. 230).
The consequences of the victories won by the Nike network should be encouraging to individuals and organizations struggling for human rights and social
justice. They demonstrate what can be achieved even when the opposing force is
enormously powerful. It is true that recent promises of change by Nike have not
redressed all of the claims against the corporation, but they show that popular
struggles can improve the plight of workers who labor under oppressive and unjust conditions in the global economy. Labor activist Kim Moody (1997) has argued articulately that alternativesto labor oppression and economic injustice "are
not usually waiting passively for those of good heart; they must be carved out of
the situation. . . . The greater the struggle, the greater the alternatives" (p. 293).
Philosopher Ernst Fischer (1996) expressed a similar and equally poignant notion.
He maintains that humans, "though they are formed by circumstances, are at the
same time capable of changing circumstances. . . . The humanization of society is
not a natural process but presupposes human beings . . . capable of transcending
given circumstances" (p. 152).
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Notes
'Currently, there is a great deal of debate and controversy over the use of the terms
transnational advocacy network and transnational social movement. (See Keck & Sikkink,
1998a; Smith, Chatfield, & Pagnucco, 1997, for descriptions of these two terms.) The term
transnational advocacy network seemed to me to be the most appropriate term for the col-
lective actions against Nike's labor practices in Asia.
2A sad irony occurred on International Women's Day in 1997 (March 8th): Fifty-six
Vietnamese women were forced to run around the Nike factory in the Dong Nai province
because they did not wear regulation shoes. A dozen of the women collapsed from heat and
exhaustion (Herbert, 1997a; Lin, 1998).
3Eventhe Indonesian Manpower Minister, Cosmas Baturbara, encouraged labor leaders to be more courageous in struggling for workers' interests (Aznam, 1992b).
$To attract tourists, Indonesia held a "Visit Indonesia Year" in 1991, which earned
the country $2.47 billion in foreign exchange (Aznam, 1992a).
51nApril 1997, the partnership released a "Workplace Code of Conduct" and "Principles of Monitoring." Criticism of them was widespread. Negotiations dragged on for 18.5
months. Finally, on November 4, 1998, a subset of the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP,
the White House task force on garment sweatshop issues) released its "Preliminary Agreement." Nike was one of those who signed onto the agreement.
6Pressfor Change, a human rights organization founded by Jeff Ballinger, who lived
in Indonesia from 1988 to 1992 and monitored Nike factories since Nike began production
in that country, was particularly instrumental in helping build the international network
against Nike's labor practices. Shaw (1999) describes Jeff Ballinger's contributions to the
Nike network in some detail.
'In March 1997, Nike introduced a new Code of Conduct. It contained some new
provisions on limitations on hours for workers and promises to seek partners to share its
commitment to improve labor practices. Responses from the Nike network argued that,
while promising, it still didn't address many of the network's demands.
8Katz (1993) also published an article in Sports Illustrated that covered much of the
same material that was in his book.
9Acoalition of women's groups claimed Nike was hypocritical for its ads suggesting
that females will be empowered in various ways if they are allowed to play sports, while
Asian females making Nike shoes "often suffer from inadequate wages, corporal punishment, forced overtime andlor sexual harassment" (Greenhouse, 1997a p. 15).
Appendix
Reports About Nike Footwear Factories in Southeast Asia
1991-Asian American Free Labour Institute (AAFLI) and the Institut Teknologi
Bandung (ITB) (Schwarz, 199lb);
1991-International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INGI) Labour Working Group
(INGI Labour Working Group, 1991a, 1991b);
1993--CBS news magazine Street Stones broadcasts hour-long program about
Nike Asian workers (July 2, 1993);
1995-Christian Aid, "The Globe-Trotting Sport Shoe," report on Nike factories
(Brookes & Madden, 1995);
1996--CBS News 48 Hours program, "The Nike Story in Vietnam" (October 17,
1996);
1996-Indonesia Sport Shoe Workers Council Survey (Indonesian Sportshoes
Monitoring Group, 1997);
1996-Community Aid Abroad, Australia, "Sweating for Nike: A Report" (Community Aid Abroad, 1996);
Nike Transnational Advocacy
235
1997-Anita Chan, sociologist at the Australian National University and the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (Chan, 1997a, 1997b);
1997-Vietnam Labor Watch, Report by Thuyen Nguyen, Vietnamese-American
businessman (Associated Press, 1997a; Boycott Nike, 1997; Greenhouse,
1997b);
1997-Peter Hancock, Australian academic, Report on Nike's shoe factories in
Indonesia (Community Aid Abroad, 1997);
1997-Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee and Asian Monitor Resource
Centre (Asia Monitor Resource Centre, 1997; Knickerbocker, 1997);
1997-Dara O'Rourke, a research associate at the Transnational Resource and
Action Center (TRAC) and a consultant to the United National Industrial
Development Organization (UNIDO) (Greenhouse, 1997b; TRAC Nike
Report, 1997);
1997--Global Exchange, Report on human rights in Indonesia (Global Exchange,
1997);
1998-Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (Community Aid Abroad,
1998);
1998-ESPN hour-long broadcast, "Made in Vietnam: The American Sneaker
Controversy" (ESPN Sportszone, 1998);
1991-1998-Reports about Nike's footwear production practices were published
in articles written by journalists and free-lance writers based in Asia, for
example, Far Eastern Economic Review (Clifford, 1992a, 1992b;Schwarz,
199la, 1991b) and Harper's Magazine (Ballinger, 1992).