University of Utah
Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senate's Use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary
Author(s): Lauren Cohen Bell
Source: Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), pp. 589-608
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of the University of Utah
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SenatorialDiscourtesy:
The Senate'sUse of Delay to
Shape the FederalJudiciary
LAUREN COHEN
COLLEGE
BELL, RANDOLPH-MVIACON
havelongrecognizedthatdelayingtacticsarepowerful
tools
Legislators
forpreventing
thepassageoflaws theydeemunsatisfactory.
Becausethe
U.S. Congresshas severaldeadlinesbuiltintoitssession,whencommittee chairmenor individualmembersdelaytheschedulingof hearings,
orexecutive
itcan havea devastating
businessmeetings,
effect
markups,
on pendinglegislation.The tacticof delayis now beingused by the
SenateJudiciary
Committee
and individualsenatorstostallconfirmation
ofthePresident's
Since1996,theaveragelengthof
judicialnominations.
timebetweenan individual's
nomination
to serveas a federal
judge and
the timethathe or she is confirmed
has increaseddramatically
At the
sametime,somenominations
stillproceedveryquicklythrough
theconfirmation
process.Thisarticleexploresthequestionofwhysomenominees are subjectedto lengthydelays,while othersmove throughthe
Senateconfirmation
it explores
processin a matterofdays.Specifically,
theimpactofdividedgovernment,
institutional
ofthePresident,
strength
and themajority
partyin theSenate,thepositiontowhichan individual
has been nominated,and a numberof nominee-specific
variablesto
assess theimpactthatthesehave on thelengthof timea nomineewill
waitforconfirmation.
Everyyear,thePresidentnominatesand theSenateconfirmsthousandsofindividuals to posts in theexecutivebranchand the federaljudiciary.The vastmajority
of appointmentsto thesehighpositionsof the federalgovernmentare routine,and
the conventionalwisdom on the appointmentprocesssuggeststhatthe Senateacts
NOTE: The authorwishesto thanktheDepartment
ofPoliticalScienceat Randolph-Macon
College
foritsfinancial
theauthorthankstheminority
ofthe
staff
supportofthisproject.Further,
SenateJudiciary
forcontinuing
Committee
assistance
withthis,and other,projects.KevinM.
Scott'sassistanceon thisprojectwas invaluable.
Political
Research
Vol.55, No. 3 (September
2002): pp. 589-607
Quarterly,
589
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Political
Research
Quarterly
onpresidential
selections.'
Since1931,over97 percent
of
stamp"
onlyas a "rubber
nominees
foralloffices
havebeenconfirmed
presidential
bytheSenate.2
nominees
areconfirmed,
Despitethefactthatmostpresidential
eventually
scholars'
focusonconfirmation
outcomes
masksa morecomplicated
relationship
thePresident
andtheSenate.Although
between
theWhiteHousetakesgreat
thatarebothqualified
and"confirmable,"
theSenate
painstoselectnominees
to
of
a
consideration
nomination
or
to
exercise
its
constitutional
mayopt delay
to refuse
to consentto a nomination.
As Fenno(1959: 55) notes:
authority
in
the
President
does
the
operate
appointment
processwitha free
"Although
oftheUnitedStatesSenate."
hand,he doesso at thesufferance
Nearly
perfect
confirmation
ratesforpresidential
nominees
tellus nothing
abouttheprocess
of
the
President's
choices.
These
rates
do
not
those
nomidifferentiate
confirming
ina dayfrom
thoseconfirmed
ina month
neesthatwereconfirmed
from
those
a yearormore.Nordo rawconfirmation
ratessuggest
confirmed
after
thecharthatmight
causenominees'
confirmation
tovary.
acteristics
processes
the
of
the
Thisarticle
use
Senate
thejudicialcondelayby
explores
during
In
firmation
it
to
contribute
to
the
process. particular,attempts
bodyofscholarin
the
on
that
has
to
confirmation
detail.
ship
process
Building
begun explore
work
and
and
Fleisher
(1999);
Krutz,
Bond,
previous
byMcCarty Razaghian
andHolmes(1997);andMackenzie
considers
(1998);Hartley
(1996),thisstudy
ofsenatorial
on
the
confirmation
forArtithecausesandimpacts
delay
process
itteststhefollowing
cleIIIjudges.Inparticular,
hypotheses:
in periodsofdividedcontrol
oftheWhiteHouse
1. Delayswillbe longer
ofunified
andtheSenatethaninperiods
control;
forthePresident
is low3
2. Delayswillbe longer
whensenatorial
support
intheSenatehasa smaller
whenthemajority
3. Delayswillbe longer
party
ofseats.
number
hasbeennominated
toanappelwhenthenominee
4. Delayswillbelonger
hasbeennominated
fora federal
thanwhenthenominee
latejudgeship
trialcourt
judgeship;
ofthe
5. Delayswillbe longerfor"orphan"
nominees
thanfornominees
senators.
sameparty
as their
home-state
without
a committee
than
fornominees
6. Delayswillbelonger
"champion"
on theJudiciary
Committee.
senator
fornominees
witha home-state
1 For
Machine,"publishedbyCommonCause in 1977.
example,see "TheSenateRubberstamp
The Twentieth
Fund 1996.
Century
oftheimpactoflow levelsofpresidential
supportwithintheSenateon Senate
3 Foran explanation
see McCartyand Razaghian(1999).
confirmation
activity,
2
590
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Senatorial
Discourtesy
whenoutsideorganizations
7. Delayswillbe longer
(i.e.,interest
groups)
takea position
on thenomination
thanwhenthere
is no organizational
inthenominee.
interest
8. Delayswillbe longer
election
nonyearsthanduring
during
presidential
election
years.
forwomenandminority
9. Delayswillbe longer
nominees
thanforwhite,
malenominees.
After
outsomeimportant
onjudicialconfirmations
and
setting
background
for
theoretical
these
offering
justification each of thepreceding
hypotheses,
from
aretested
made
1,242judicialnominations
hypotheses
usingdatagathered
between
1979and1998usinga coxproportional
hazards
model.Thismethodfortheanalysis
ofphenomena
whentheamount
of
ologyis themostappropriate
timeelapsedis thedependent
variable.
THE CONFIRMATIONPROCESS
Sincethelate1980s,senators
haveincreased
theirscrutiny
ofpresidential
nominees
toa widerangeofoffices
ofa presumption
1996).Instead
(Mackenzie
ofconfirmation
forpresidential
nominees
of
(orattheveryleast,a presumption
on
of
the
the
in
the
1980s
senators
to
assert
Senate),
expediency
part
began
in theappointment
themselves
as co-equalpartners
to the
process.Reactions
scandal
and
of
misused
combined
with
Watergate
perceptions
presidential
power
in
internal
Senate
and
rules
the
role
of
the
mass
media
to
foster
conflict
changes
between
thePresident
andtheSenateovernominations.
thepresence
Moreover,
ofdivided
and
the
between
President
andmany
government divergent
ideologies
senators
exacerbated
theseconflicts.
Theresult
ofthecombination
ofthesefactors
tobe,an
was,andcontinues
intheamount
increase
oftimethatmany
nominees
waitfora confirmation
voteas
wellas anincrease
inthenumber
ofnominees
the
Senate.
For
rejected
by
example,
in1977,1981,and1993(allinauguration
where
thePresident
andtheSenate
years
shared
thesameparty
theaverage
ofdaysittooktoconfirm
number
the
affiliation),
President's
initial
cabinet
choices
waslessthan5. Incontrast,
in 1985and1989withdivided
tookanaverage
of20 daystoconfirm
inaugural
years
government-it
thePresident's
initial
In 1997,themostrecent
cabinet
choices.
inaugural
yearin
which
thetwoparties
control
of
the
White
House
andtheSenate,
ittooknearly
split
40 days,
onaverage,
toconfirm
Asimilar
thePresident's
exists
with
pattern
cabinet.4
to
the
number
of
nominees
to
the
Senate.
regard
majorpositions
rejected
by
Between
the99thand105thcongresses,
in periods
ofunified
party
government,
Record,
yearsindicated.
4 Congressional
591
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Political
Research
Quarterly
ofnominees
tomajor
fewer
than15percent
(cabinet,
sub-cabinet,
positions
judicial,
were
the
whileinperiandambassadorial
nominees,
Senate,
primarily) rejected
by
odsofdivided
withtheexception
ofthe101stCongress,
thepercentgovernment,
In
the
ofnomof
nominees
was
the
104th
age
rejected higher.
Congress, percentage
the
reached
40
ineestomajorpositions
Senate
rejected
by
nearly percent.5
Thetrend
toward
increased
ratesis slightly
morecomdelayandrejection
at
nominees
nominees
do not
when
Judicial
looking judicial
exclusively
plex
of
Howfollow
thesamepattern
as thebroader
category majorappointments.
for
nominees
do
seem
to
confirmation
increase
ever,
during
peridelays judicial
ofthepresratesvaryregardless
odsofdivided
rejection
government,
although
since1995,theaverage
enceor absenceof dividedgovernment.
Moreover,
dramatinumber
ofdaysbetween
nomination
andconfirmation
hasincreased
for
a
waitbetween
200 and300 days
confirmation
callyToday,
manynominees
ofthis
number
waitsfor18months
ormore.Theremainder
vote.Anincreasing
forwhythisis thecase.
is devoted
toanexplanation
article
THE UNIQUE NATURE OF JUDICIAL CONFIRMATIONS
Scoresof previousstudieshave exploredthe confirmation
processfor
etal.
Courtjustices(forexample,
Baum1995;Maltese1995;Overby
Supreme
1991). Fewerstudieshavefocusedon the
1994;Abraham
1994; Silverstein
inlargepartbecauseoftheperception
thatnearly
alllower,
lowerfederal
courts,
Aspreviously
courtnominees
areconfirmed.
federal
noted,however,
highrates
ofthecomplex
oftheconfirmation
ofconfirmation
reveallittle
nature
process.
scholars
haveonly
andinpartbecauseofsuchhighconfirmation
rates,
Further,
in Senatebehavior.
Several
and explainvariations
begunto identify
recently
and
and
recentstudies,including
(1999),
Krutz,
Bond,
McCarty Razaghian
andHolmes(1997)haveexplored
Fleisher
(1998),Cohen(1998),andHartley
butonlyone
Senatescrutiny
ofpresidential
thataffect
thefactors
nominees,
of
None
an
the
and
Holmes
1997)
provides
approaches question delay.
(Hartley
confirmed
some
nominations
are
for
judicial
rapidly,
adequateexplanation why
foryearsandyears.
whileothers
languish
withtheexploration
tothisquestion
oftheuniquenature
Theanswer
begins
theWhiteHouseand the
Therelationship
between
ofjudicialappointments.
thanwhentheappointment
nevermorecomplicated
Senateis perhaps
being
Theconfirmation
III federal
madeis to oneoftheArticle
processfor
courts.6
Record/Resumes
Activity,
yearsindicated.
ofCongressional
5 Congressional
specifiedin ArticleIII of theUnitedStates
6 An ArticleIII judgeshipis one thatmeetsthecriteria
Constitution.
to Rutkus(1991, 1): "the'Article
III courts'consistoftheU.S. Courtsof
According
Trade,and theU.S. DistrictCourtsin the50 States,the
Appeals,theU.S. CourtofInternational
District
ofColumbia,and PuertoRico."
592
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Senatorial
Discourtesy
thantheconfirmation
ArticleIII federal
different
process
judgesis substantively
forotherhigh-level
federalnominees.Thisis truefortworeasons.First,Article
III judgesservelifetime
terms.Forthisreason,theSenateoftenscrutinizes
judithanitdoes nomineesto otherpositionsin thefedcialnomineesmorecarefully
to thePresident
eralgovernment.
at a
Judicialnomineesarerejectedor returned
fivetimestherejection/return
rateofall nominees.7
rateofapproximately
differThe confirmation
processforjudicialnomineesalso is substantively
for
executive
branch
nominees
because
the
ent thantheconfirmation
process
ofjudibearssoleresponsibility
fortheconfirmation
SenateJudiciary
Committee
whereasconfirmations
ofexecutive
branchofficials
aredistributed
cialnominees,
theentirety
oftheSenate'scommittee
moreevenlythroughout
Thus,the
system.
the
brunt
of
the
for
and
Committee
bears
burden
Judiciary
researching investithese
nominees
the
decision
to
hold
or tobringnomineesto
and
hearings
gating
withthechairman
ofthecommittee.8
a votein executivesessionrestssingularly
Atthesametime,becausealljudicialnomineesmustpassthrough
theSenate
whose
Committee,
Judiciary
membership
duringanygivenCongress(and even
fromCongressto Congress)does notchangemuch,we wouldexpectthatmost
similarconfirmation
Thisexpecexperiences.
judicialnomineeswouldexperience
eitherwithinsinglecongresses
or overtime.In the
tationis not met,however,
RichardPaez'snomination
to theNinthCircuitCourtofAppeals
106thCongress,
was confirmed
morethanfouryearsafterthedate of his originalnomination,
whileTedStewart's
nomination
tothefederal
district
courtinUtahwas confirmed
in lessthanone week'stime.Clearly,
someindividuals
farefarbetterthanothers.
Thenextsectionoffers
sometheoretical
forwhythisis thecase.
explanations
THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
As was notedabove,thereis a widerangeoffactors
thataffects
Senateconofjudicialnominees.Thesefactors
sideration
includeinstitutional
normsin the
andnominee-specific
thepositionto
Senate,politicalfactors,
variables,
including
whichan individualhas beennominated
and thenominee's
raceand gender.
Senatorshave both personaland institutional
reasonsforacquiescingto
Presidents
forconfronting
overtheirjudicialnominaPresidents
or,conversely,
tions.Mostsenatorsapproachjudicialnominations
fromone oftwoperspectives.
Some senatorsbelievethatthe powerto appointfederaljudges is a privilege
tothePresident
ofhiselection
andthathischoicestofillvacancies
granted
byvirtue
nomineesareroutinely
confirmed
(3 percentarenotconfirmed).
7 Overall,97 percentofpresidential
Forjudicialnominees,thepercentage
confirmed
is roughly85 percent(15 percentare notconSee Cohen(1999).
firmed).
branchnominations
arereferred
to thecommittee
thathasjurisdiction
overthefederal
8 Executive
board,or program.
agency,
regulatory
593
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Research
Political
Quarterly
ofconfirmation.
on thefederal
benchshouldenjoya presumption
Senatorswho
takethisapproachwilldelayor rejectnomineesonlywhenegregious
character
flawsareapparent.Othersenatorstakea different
orexperiential
viewofjudicial
confirmations.
TheybelievethattheConstitution
requirestheequalparticipation
oftheSenatein theappointment
ofelectoraloutcomes.They
process,regardless
are cautiousin theirconfirmation
to thePresidecisions,applygreater
scrutiny
dent'sjudicialnominees,and maybe morelikelyto delayor denyconfirmation
to nomineesthatmaybe onlymarginally
unacceptable.
has directedthejudicialconthenormofsenatorial
Institutionally,
courtesy
from
the
of
firmation
the
process
republic.Thisis especiallytruefor
beginning
nomineesto thefederaldistrict
whose
confirmation
is oftena foregone
courts,
As Carpand Stidham(1998: 229)
conclusionfromthemomentofnomination.
note: "The hearingsfordistrictcourtappointments
are largelyperfunctory,
norm
becausethe
ofsenatorial
and purposes,deterhas,forall intents
courtesy
minedwhether
thecandidatewillpass senatorial
muster."
whichis also knownas the "blue slip" process,may
Senatorialcourtesy,
a nomineeregardless
ofthepositiontowhichhe
oradversely
affect
eitherbenefit
ofthehomestatesenaor she is nominated,
dependingon thepartyaffiliation
ofthepartyaffiliations
betweenthehome-state
senators,and thecongruence
home-state
senSenatorsoftenwilldeferto thenominee's
torsand thePresident.
thenominee.9Further,
senatorsrarely
atorsforcues aboutwhetherto confirm
to theirfellowsenators
holdup nomineesthatcolleaguessupportoutofcourtesy
thatno senatorwillholdup theirnom(and,ofcourse,withtheunderstanding
ineeat a laterdate).
senatorsarefrom
Nomineesarelikelyto farelesswellwhenthehome-state
Theseso-calledorphannominees'ohaveno
theoppositepartyofthePresident.
Evenworse,
home-state
senatorwho is willingto push fortheirconfirmation.
to
endorse
their
nominations.
home-state
senators
refuse
nominees'
may
orphan
Whenthishappens,thenormsofsenatorial
usuallyrequiretheSenate
courtesy
statesthatthelengthoftime
The orphanhypothesis
to withholdconfirmation.
Committee's
blue slipsreadas follows:
SO'Brien (1988: 71) notesthattheJudiciary
Dear Senator
conWill you kindlygiveme, fortheuse of the Committee,
youropinionand information
and nameofformer
of [name,district,
judge]?UnderruleoftheComcerningthenomination
unlessa replyis receivedfromyouwithina weekfromthisdate,itwillbe assumedthat
mittee,
youhaveno objectionto thenominee.
Respectfully,
[Signature]
Committee
SenateJudiciary
Chairman,
10 The term
a
by MichaelSchattman,
orphannomineewas firstbroughtto theauthor'sattention
his nomination
aftera lengthy
confirClintonnomineeto a federaldistrict
courtwho withdrew
mationbattle.
594
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Senatorial
Discourtesy
orphannomineeswillbe greaterthanthetimeneededto
necessaryto confirm
senatorwithcongruent
confirmnomineeswho have at least one home-state
that
of
the
President.
In
the
affiliation
to
contrast,
championhypothesis
party
senatorsitson theJudiciary
thetime
statesthatwhena home-state
Committee,
willbe less forthosenomineesthanfor
and confirmation
betweennomination
nomineeswho do nothavea home-state
senatoron theCommittee.
In additionto institutional
also willaffect
factors,
politicalfactors
senators'
toward
nominations.
Senators
are
more
disposition
judicial
likelytoproceedcaudefinedin thiscase as controlofthe
tiouslyin periodsofdividedgovernment,
and
the
Senate
Presidency
by competingpoliticalparties.Segal and Spaeth
(1993) found,forexample,thatthepresenceofdividedgovernment
significantly
affectsthe likelihoodof confirmation
fornomineesto the SupremeCourt.
to CRS specialistRogerGarcia:"Dividedgovernment
createsproblems
According
fornominees.[Senators]won'tbe as docile about acceptingthe president's
choices."" In periodsof dividedgovernment,
thereis a greater
likelihoodthat
to
the
nominees
federal
will
subscribe
to
presidential
policyorpartisan
judiciary
fromthoseofa majority
viewsthatdiffer
ofmembersoftheSenate.The divided
is oftheoppositeparty
hypothesis
government
suggeststhatwhenthePresident
fromthemajority
in theSenate,thelengthoftimebetweennomination
and conofhisjudicialnomineeswillbe greater.
firmation
Otherpoliticalfactors
mayalso affect
delaysin theconfirmation
process.For
the
example,we wouldexpectthatevenduringperiodsofunifiedgovernment,
ofsenatorial
shouldinversely
affect
thelength
strength
supportforthePresident
of timebetweennomination
and confirmation
(McCartyand Razaghian1999).
Previousresearchhas determined
thatas senatorialsupportforthe President
to confirmthe President's
nominees.
increases,senatorsvote morefrequently
This senatorialsupporthypothesis
suggeststhatas supportforthe President
increasesin theSenate,thelengthoftimebetweennomination
and confirmation
shoulddecrease.Likewise,themajority
numberhypothesis
suggeststhatas the
numberofSenateseatsheldby themajority
partyincreases,thedelaybetween
is likelyto decrease.When the majorityparty
nominationand confirmation
of60 seats,theminority
approachesa "filibuster-proof'
majority
partylosesthe
to use a primary
opportunity
delayingtactic.
evidencesuggests
Additional
thattheSenatetypically
slowsitsrateand pace
ofconfirmations
electionyears(Administrative
Officeofthe
duringpresidential
U.S. Courts1997). Thisis especiallytrueduringperiodsofdividedgovernment,
whensenatorsin themajority
willchangeparpartywaitto see ifthePresidency
ties.Thus, the election
election
yearhypothesis
suggeststhatin a presidential
and confirmation
forthePresident's
year,thelengthoftimebetweennomination
nomineeswillincrease.
interview
1997.
11 Author's
595
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Political
Research
Quarterly
interest
alsoaffects
theSenate's
ofjudiFinally,
groupparticipation
handling
Without
to
cialconfirmations.
interest
senators
would
be
groups placate,
likely
theWhiteHouseoverconfirmation
ofitsnominees,
lesswilling
toconfront
and
andWright
research
Caldeira
(forexample,
1998,Sinclair
1998,and
previous
are
Binder
and Smith1997)indicates
thatinterest
determigroups important
outcomes.
Interest
have
nantsoflegislative
extended
their
lobgroups
recently
to
and
efforts
the
Senate's
confirmation
exacerbate
process, may
bying
existing
intheconfirmation
toeducateandmobilize
tensions
Withtheir
process.
ability
thegrassroots,
interest
constituents
awareofimpendgroups
maymakesenators'
confirmation
decisions.
PACs
use
their
roletoproing
campaign-financing
may
videfinancial
incentives
tosenators
whoactonconfirmation
inthewaydesired.
thatas interest
influence
Thus,theorganizational
suggests
groups
hypothesis
inconfirmations,
thelength
oftimebetween
becomeinvolved
nomination
and
willincrease.
confirmation
theSenate's
factors
alsomayaffect
ofa nomidisposition
Nominee-specific
courts.For example,
are
nationforthefederal
appellatecourtnominations
tobe moresignificant,
arejustonestepbelow
as thesecourts
widely
perceived
as previously
courtappointments
theSupreme
Court.Moreover,
noted,district
In addition,
nominees
to
bynormsofsenatorial
courtesy
usuallyaregoverned
toregional
The
theappellate
courts
areinlineforwhatamount
appointments.
thenumber
ofsenators
who
nature
oftheseappointments
increases
multi-state
intheconfirmation
interest
ofthenominees
havea vested
(Baum1995).AsCarp
. . . thecomandStidham
(1998:229) explain:
"[F]orappealscourtnominees
the
is
a
serious
mittee
Thus,
hypothesis
suggests
hearing
proceeding."
position
toan appellate
courtshouldtakea longer
thata nomination
periodoftimeto
toa federal
trialcourt.
confirm
thanshoulda nomination
of
nominees
the
characteristics
individual
affect
Finally, descriptive
senators'
from
Anecdotal
evidence
the
104th
and105th
toward
confirmation.
dispositions
their
ofjudicialnominees
canaffect
thattheraceandgender
suggests
congresses
In
evidence
that
women
and
the
confirmation
suggests
processes. general,
than
male
wait
for
confirmation
do
their
counnominees
white,
minority
longer
thatminorities
andwomen
Theraceand gender
terparts.
hypotheses
suggest
willwaitlonger
thanwhite,
male
tothelowerfederal
courts
whoarenominated
forconfirmation.
nominees
DATA AND METHODS
In orderto testthepreceding
datawerecollectedon 1,242judihypotheses,
in 1979 and endingin 1998.
cialnomineesforthetwenty-year
periodbeginning
records
ofjudicialconfirmation
The year1979 marksthefirst
that
detailed
year
and
thusprovidesa good
the
Senate
Committee
were
hearings
Judiciary
keptby
collection
ends
in 1998, with the
for
this
The
data
date
starting
analysis.
596
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Senatorial
Discourtesy
ofthe105thcongress,
thelastcongress
forwhichconfirmation
conclusion
data
thisperiodarecolis complete.12
Dataoneachjudicialnomination
madeduring
oftheUnitedStatesSenate
andExecutive
lectedfromtheLegislative
Calendar
from
thehearing
foreachnominee
onJudiciary,
about
Committee
transcripts
Service
The
washeld,andfrom
Research
whoma hearing
Congressional
reports.
in
is
this
which
the
variable
analysis confirmation
dependent
represents
period,
ofdaysfrom
nomination
to
confirmation
the
full
totalnumber
by
presidential
ofdaysbetween
Thisnumber
wascalculated
thenumber
the
Senate.
bycounting
nomination
dateandtheconfirmation
date.'3
inthismodelcapture
tested
theimpact
oftheindependent
variables
Several
on
of
time
the
ofpolitical
orinstitutional
the
amount
confirmation
phenomena
is a dichotomous
witha valueof1
takes.Dividedgovernment
variable
process
arecontrolled
andwitha
whentheSenateandPresident
byopposing
parties
valueof0 whenpartisan
control
iscongruent.
is
a
Senatorial
support continuous
whosevaluesrepresent
the100senators
variable
minusthefrequency
ofpresiIn
of
dential
the
Senate.
this
is
a
measure
Senate
effect, actually
support
by
oppositiontothePresident.
Thesedataaretakenfrom
index
Quarterly's
Congressional
for
in
ofpresidential
scores
the
indicated
the
When
support
years
analysis.
govis divided,
ernment
theexpectation
is thatthelength
oftimebetween
nominawillbe greater.
tionandconfirmation
oftimeshouldincrease
as
Similarly,
length
levelsofsenatorial
to thePresident
increase.
Confirmations
should
opposition
whentheSenate's
forthePresident
takelonger
levelsofsupport
arelow.Majoris a continues
variable
whosevaluesrepresent
theactualnumber
of
itynumber
intheSenateduring
seatsheldbythemajority
a specific
Election
party
congress.
where0 represents
a non-presidential-election
variable,
yearis a dichotomous
a presidential
election
year.Asstatedabove,theconfirmayearand 1 indicates
tionprocess
shouldslowduring
election
presidential
years.
theinterest
variable
alsois dichotomous,
withthevalue0 indiFinally,
group
in theconfirmation
catingthatno interest
groupsparticipated
processandthe
value1 indicating
thatat leastoneinterest
or submitted
letters
grouptestified
thenominee
theconfirmation
regarding
during
process.'4
In addition
totheindependent
variables
thatarepolitical
orinstitutional
in
several
variables
thatareconsidered
measure
characteristics
nature,
independent
thatarespecific
to thenominees
themselves.
Position
theArticle
III
represents
12 The SenateCommittee
on
has yetto publishall hearingtranscripts
fornomineesconJudiciary
sideredduringthe 106thCongress.
13 The dataarenotcorrected
forextendedSenaterecesses,perthemethodused bytheAdministrativeOfficeofUnitedStatesCourts.
14 The number
ofgroupsand direction
oftheirparticipation
is notlikelyto affect
theconfirmation
thatthedirection
ofinterest
Indeed,previousworkhas demonstrated
periodsignificantly.
group
has onlya slightimpacton confirmation
outcomes(see Cohen 1999).
participation
597
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Research
Political
Quarterly
courtto whichan individualhas been nominated-district,
circuit,or InternationalTrade.The expectation
is thatthelengthoftimebetweennomination
and
willvarywiththeposition.Thatis, themoreimportant
confirmation
thepositionis perceivedto be, thelongera nominee'sconfirmation
periodshouldbe.
to
nominees
the
circuit
courts
of
should
take
Thus,
appeals
longerto confirm
of
thannomineesto theCourt International
Trade.
The orphanvariableis a dichotomous
variable,wherea valueof0 indicates
senatortoadvocateforconthata nomineedoesnothaveatleastone home-state
firmation
and a valueof 1 indicatesthatat leastone home-state
senatoris from
thesamepartyas thePresident.
Circuitcourtnomineesarecoded 0, sincethey
witha singlestate,and thusdo nothavehome-state
senators
arenotidentified
in thesamewaythatdistrict
courtnomineesdo. It is expectedthatthelengthof
withthepresenceor
to confirmation
willvaryinversely
timefromnomination
variableis a Likert-scaled
absenceofhome-state
variable,
support.The champion
to 4 (the
withvaluesrangingfrom0 (no home-state
senatoron thecommittee)
is
chairman's
homestate).Again,theexpectation
nomineeis fromthecommittee
withthestrength
of
thatthelengthoftheconfirmation
periodwillvaryinversely
senators.
committee
supportfromhome-state
to be a minority
nomineeiftheAlliancefor
a nomineeis considered
Finally,
himorheras
thattracks
identifies
Justice(an organization
judicialnominations)
of
the
of
one
a
member
African-American,
following
minority
groups:
being
or Hispanic.Becauseof the
Arab-American,
Native-American,
Asian-American,
in
of
minorities
the
low
numbers
populationoffederal
judicialnomirelatively
where0 indicatesthata nomineeis whiteand
nees,thevariableis dichotomous,
female
1 indicatesthata nomineeis a memberof a minority
group.Similarly,
in
If
and
are
coded
0
the
variable.
nominees
are
coded
males
gender
judicial
1
nomineesshouldtake
theanecdotalevidenceis reliable,womenand minority
thantheirwhite,malecounterparts.
longerto confirm
to a longerperiod
thatcontribute
Becausethisanalysisconsidersthefactors
theappropriate
research
methodand confirmation,
oftimebetweennomination
which
is
similar
to the
This
survival
is
methodological
approach,
analysis.
ology
"life
for
life
a
use
to
that
actuaries
predicts
expectancy"
predict expectancy,
process
variablesthatareactingon
a dependent
variableon thebasisoftheindependent
a Cox proportional
hazardsmodelis used to conit.In thecase ofthisanalysis,
fornominations
to thelower
siderthefactors
thatincreasethe"lifeexpectancy"
morecommon,methodological
toother,
federal
courts.Thismethodis preferable
LeastSquaresregression,
and to othersurvival
approaches,includingOrdinary
of
OLS
treats
censoredcases (in
for
number
reasons.
a
First,
analysistechniques
as thesameas uncensored
thisanalysis,
thosenomineeswho arenotconfirmed)
In addition,theCox regression
model
ones(thosenomineeswhoareconfirmed).
and
no pre-specified
as itrequires
is a better
choicemethodologically,
distribution,
ofmultipleco-variates.
thesimultaneous
becauseitpermits
comparison
598
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Senatorial
Discourtesy
willbe conin thisanalysisis thatallnominations
Theassumption
eventually
"fails."
thenomination
areconfirmed,
andwhennominations
firmed,
Specifically,
themodelmeasuresthelikelihoodofa nomination
beingconfirmed
giventhatit
has survivedto a particular
pointin theanalysis.The dependentvariableis the
dateandthenominee's
amountoftime(innumberofdays)betweena nomination
of
the
date.
Cases
out
confirmation
analysisoncethe"termidrop
corresponding
nal event"has beenreached(in thiscase,oncetheyhavebeenconfirmed).'5
theresultsoftheSPSS Cox Regression
analysiswerelargelyas the
Although
severalotherdesirSPSS is limitedin itscapacityto generate
theoriessuggested,
For example,thebaselinehazardrate(thatis, thelikelihoodthat
able statistics.
occurgiventhata nomineehas survivedto a givenpointwhenall
confirmations
are controlled
co-variates
for)can noteasilybe derivedusingSPSS,whichcalsurvivalrate.Forthatreason,themodelwas respecculatesonlythecumulative
ifiedusingStata6.0's Weibullregression
procedure.As expected,theresultsof
different
thantheanalysisperformed
thenew analysiswerenotsignificantly
by
withMcCarty
and
Weibull
is consistent
The
use
of
both
Cox
SPSS.
regression
of executive
and Razaghian's(1999) approachto analyzingthe confirmation
branchnominees,and providesa checkon thestatistical
analysis.
ANALYSISAND RESULTS
in Table 1. Overall,theCox RegresThe resultsoftheanalysisarereported
themodelindisionmodelis overwhelmingly
significant
(p < .001).16 Further,
advancedabove.Theprescatessubstantial
supportforseveralofthehypotheses
ence of divided government
stronglyaffectsthe lengthof time between
nomination
and confirmation,
withthelengthoftimeelapsedincreasing
when
has been
is divided.Thiswas expected,sincedividedgovernment
government
linkedto legislative
and othercongressional
maladies(Ginsburgand
"gridlock"
to the
Shefter1990). Becausedividedgovernment
provedto be so significant
In theremainder
ofthissecmodel,I re-rantheanalysisto controlforitseffects.
bothoverallfindings,
as wellas theresultsfromtheanalyseswhere
tion,I present
had beeneliminated
as an explanatory
variable.Thesecomdividedgovernment
parisonscan also be foundin Table1.
model.Indeed,ithasbeensug15 Senaterecessesmaypose a specialproblemfortheCox regression
16
gestedthatthismighthave an impacton thebaselinehazardscalculatedin theCox regression
analysis.However,itshouldbe notedthatitis stillpossiblefornomineesto be withdrawn
during
extendedSenaterecesses(indeed,thiswas thecase forseveralReagannominees).Moreover,
while
itwouldnotbe possibleforan individualto be votedon bytheSenateduringa recess,decisions
to delayand/orrejectmaystillbe madeduringa recess.Therefore,
thebaselinehazardratecalculatedby theCox regression
modelshouldnotbe dramatically
affected
of
by theemployment
thismethodofcalculating
thenumberofdaysbetweennomination
and confirmation.
Likelihoodratio:561.928 (14 df).
599
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TABLE 1
Cox REGRESSIONRESULTS:LENGTHOF CONFIRMATIONPERIOD, NOMINATIONSTO THE L
CONTROLLINGFOR DIVIDED GOVERNMENT,1979-1998.
UnifiedGovernment
Standard
Error
Coefficient
-.231****
.003
.002
.022
.011
.101
-.007
.013**
.462***
-.366
-.009
.317***
.109
.428
.145
.135
.122
-.038
.237
-.006
.037
-2.791****
-2.628****
-3.681****
-2.624****
-.086
.013
.532
.553
.792
.543
.114
.133
Coefficient
O
DIVIDED GOVERNMENT
PERCENTAGEOF SEATSHELD BY MAJORITY
OPPOSITIONTO THE PRESIDENT
SENATORIAL
PRESIDENTIALELECTIONYEAR
POSITION
CourtNominee
District
CircuitCourtNominee
INTERESTGROUPPARTICIPATION
ORPHANNOMINEE
COMMITTEECHAMPION
JUDICIARY
1 HomeStateSenator(Minority)
1 Minority/1
HomeStateSenator
Majority
1 HomeStateSenator(Majority)
fromHome State
Committee
Chairman
FEMALENOMINEE
RACIALMINORITY
LikelihoodRatio(df)
N
DividedGovern
246.132 (13)****
671
*p < .05, **p < .01, *** p< .005, ****p< .001
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St
-1.495***
-1.534***
-1.538***
.236*
.395**
43.186 (12)**
569
Senatorial
Discourtesy
GRAPHI
EFFECT OF DIVIDED GOVERNMENTON BASELINEHAZARDFUNCTION
-divgov = 1
divgov= 0
.04
0
o
=
.02
N
0
I
0
I
200
I
.400
AnalysisTime
I
600
I
800
in baselinehazardsforconfirmation
GraphI depictsthedifferences
during
of
divided
and
unified
Itis clearthatthepresence
periods
government
government.
ofdividedgovemment-represented
lineon thegraph-significantly
bythebottom
reducestheconditional
of
confirmed
(thehazardrate)giventhat
probability being
a nomineehaswaiteda certain
of
time.
When
is divided,nomperiod
government
ineesarelesslikelyto "fail"--that
are
less
to
be
confirmed.
is,they
likely
Table 1 indicatesthatthenumberofseatsheldbythemajority
partyin the
Senatestrongly
affects
thelengthoftimebetweennomination
and confirmation.
In thiscase, largernumbersofseatsheld by themajority
partyresultin lesser
and confirmation,
whichis as predicted.This may
delaysbetweennomination
reflect
therealitythatin theSenate,thecloserthemajority
partyis to 60 seats
theeasieritis toactexpeditiously
sincefilibusters
becomelessattractive
options
as delayingtacticsto members
oftheminority
partyHowever,duringperiodsof
dividedgovernment,
thepercentage
ofseatsheldbythemajority
partydoes not
havea statistically
effect
on
confirmation
significant
delays.Thisis an interesting
and one thatshouldbe exploredin moredetailthrough
future
research.
finding,
Otherpoliticalfactors
are also significant
undercertaincircumstances.
For
of
divided
in
increases
senatorial
example,duringperiods
government,
oppositionto thePresident
resultin statistically
increasesin thelengthof
significant
601
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Political
Research
Quarterly
and confirmation.
acrosstheentireperiodof
timebetweennomination
However,
and
of
unified
senatorial
government,
oppositionto the
study
duringperiods
President
does notproducestatistically
significant
delays.
Threeadditionalpoliticalfactors
werealso foundto affect
thelengthoftime
and confirmation.
betweennomination
(that
First,thepresenceofa "champion"
is, a home-statesenator)on the SenateJudiciaryCommitteesubstantially
This is true
decreasesthe lengthof timea nomineewaitsforconfirmation.
or majority
whetherthe championis a memberof the minority
partyin the
ofthepresenceor absenceofdividedgovSenate,and it is also trueregardless
ernment.Not surprisingly,
supportfora nomineewithinthe SenateJudiciary
to scheduleconfirmation
Committee
(whichhas theauthority
hearingsand to
Thisfindpass on nomineesto thefullSenate)leadstomorerapidconfirmation.
thatthepresenceofa Senatechampionmight
becauseitsuggests
ingis important
on thelengthoftimebetweennomtheimpactofdividedgovernment
mitigate
inationand confirmation.
variables
wereaffected
Otherpolitical
bythepresenceofdividedgovernment.
electionyeardoes nothavea statistiForexample,thepresenceofa presidential
impacton confirmation
delayeitheracrosstheperiodofstudyor
callysignificant
However,duringperiodsofdividedgovduringperiodsofunifiedgovernment.
in highly
confirmation
electionresults
a loomingpresidential
ernment,
significant
confirmation
watchers
have
nominees
and
long
complained
Although
delays.
whereconfirmations
takelonger,
orgrindto a
aboutan "election-year
slowdown,"
election
oftheimpactofpresidential
ourunderstanding
refines
halt,thisfinding
election
the
of
a
it
is
the
on
during
juxtaposition presidential
process.Clearly,
years
in significant
thatresults
a periodofdividedgovernment
delays.
in theconfirmation
Interest
processalso appearsto be
groupparticipation
or
absence
of
divided
the
affected
Overall,and during
government.
presence
by
in
interest
of
unified
polgroupparticipation confirmation
government,
periods
withpreviousresearch
Thisis consistent
iticsincreasesthewaitforconfirmation.
in thearea(Cohen 1998, 1999; Shogan1996) thatindicatesthatinterest
group
nominees,
maylead senatorsto takea secondlook at presidential
participation
and conwhich,in turn,maylead toan increasein thetimebetweennomination
interest
firmation.
However,duringperiodsofdividedgovernment,
groupparon confirmation
effect
does nothavea statistically
delays.
significant
ticipation
thedurationof theconfirmation
variablesalso affect
The twodemographic
In general,women
process,subjectagainto theimpactof dividedgovernment.
thando male
nomineesdo notappeartowaitsubstantially
longerforconfirmation
Overall,andduringperinominees,
exceptduringperiodsofdividedgovernment.
oftheconfirmation
theduration
ods ofdividedgovernment,
processforminority
nominees.
oftheprocessfornon-minority
nomineesis longerthantheduration
ofthepresence
Twovariablesneverachievestatistical
regardless
significance,
advancedabove,
to thehypotheses
or absenceofdividedgovernment.
Contrary
602
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Senatorial
Discourtesy
-
GRAPH11
CONFIRMATION
OUTCOME, BY NUMBEROF DAYS PENDINGBEFORETHE SENATE
vCD
.8
E
0
CD
CD
.6
.4
.2
0.00
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
and Confirmation
Days BetweenNomination
and to previousresearchon lowerfederalcourtconfirmations,
thepositionto
whichan individualis nominateddoes notappearto havea statistically
significantimpacton theamountoftimehe or she waitstobe confirmed.
The second
variablethatdid notachievesignificance
was theorphanvariable.The orphan
that
nominees
without
a home-state
senatorto push for
hypothesis
suggested
theirconfirmation
arelesslikelytobe confirmed.
WhiletheCox regression
coefficientis in the expecteddirection,
thereis no evidenceof a systematic
link
betweenorphannomineesand confirmation
delays.
A LINK TO CONFIRMATIONOUTCOMES
theprimary
focusofthisarticleis notconfirmation
outcomes,the
Although
that
confirmation
finding
delaysareaffected
bybothpoliticaland nominee-specificcircumstances
thereis a pivotalmomentafter
begsthequestionofwhether
whichnominees'chancesofbeingconfirmed
diminishsignificantly
After
all,on
thedaythata nomination
is made,thenominee,at leastin theory,
has a significantchanceofbeingconfirmed.
theresultsof thesurvival
GraphII illustrates
603
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Political
Research
Quarterly
outcome.While theredoes not
analysisof lengthof timeand confirmation
appearto be a "dropdead"numberofdaysafterwhichnomineesno longerwill
it is clearthatnomineeswho arenotconfirmed
be confirmed,
quickly-within
lesslikelihoodofbeingconfirmed
at all.
about90 days-face substantially
CONCLUSIONS
This articlehas attempted
to contribute
to an understanding
of theinfluenceson thelengthoftimea nomineeto thelowerfederalcourtswaitsforconfirmation.
The approachto studyingthe confirmation
processutilizedin this
confirmation
outcomes,focusing
analysisis novelin thatit underemphasizes
nomination
insteadon thedurationoftheperiodoftimebetweena President's
This is a significant
because
and theSenate'sconfirmation.
pointof departure,
a focuson confirmation
outcomeshas been
withonlya handfulofexceptions,
nominations
to thefederalcourts.
thestandardmethodofanalyzing
presidential
The analysisabove indicatesthatthereis a rangeof factorsthataffects
whethera nomineeis confirmed
quicklyor waitsa lengthy
periodof timefor
The impactof manyof thesefactorsappearsto dependon the
confirmation.
For example,thenumberofseats
presenceor absenceof dividedgovernment.
held by the majorityparty,the level of supportforthe Presidentwithinthe
raceand genderall affect
and a nominee's
election,
Senate,a loomingpresidential
buttheeffects
arenotcontheamountoftimea nomineewaitsforconfirmation,
The presenceor absenceof
sistentacrossbothunifiedand dividedgovernment.
on confireffect
is theonlyvariablewitha consistent
a committee
"champion"
mationdelays.The presenceofanychampionat all on theSenatejudiciarycomand sigofthemajority
mittee,
partystatusofthechampion,strongly
regardless
confirmation
reduces
delay.
nificantly
withpreviousresearchon thedeterare consistent
Manyof thesefindings
branchofficials
but theyalso
for
executive
minantsof confirmation
delays
in
of
the
nature
of
on
research
judicialbranch
unique
light
expand previous
on
adds
data
interest
In
this
research
addition,
group
important
appointments.
characteristics
to
nominees'
and
previousdiscussionsof
descriptive
participation
behavior.
theSenate'sconfirmation
thrustof
outcomeswas not theprimary
Althoughexplainingconfirmation
ofdelays
abouttheeffect
itis also possibletodrawsomeconclusions
thisproject,
The
above
on
confirmation
outcomes.
in the confirmation
analysis
process
for
the
less
a
nominee
waits
indicates
that
the
confirmation,
likely
longer
clearly
Thisis not to say thata nomineethatwaitsfora
he or she is to be confirmed.
be confirmed
bytheSenate,butthedatasugyearormorewouldnoteventually
to be rejected.
gestthatsuchnomineesarelikelyultimately
ofnomin thisarticleindicatethatthevastmajority
The findings
presented
and thatmostnomineeswaitless
inationsto thefederal
judiciaryareconfirmed,
604
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Senatorial
Discourtesy
in a smallnumberofcases,andseemingly
thana yearforconfirmation.
However,
tried
and truedelayingtacticsto withhold
is
the
Senate
applying
increasingly,
on nominees,in somecases lettingthemwaitforup to twoyears
confirmation
further
thesefindings
forconfirmation.
suggestthatthereis little
Unfortunately,
Nomineescan
thatindividualnomineescan do to ensurean easyconfirmation.
than
can
for
the
President
no morecontrolsenatorial
they controlpersupport
institutional
sonalraceor gender.Dividedgovernment,
norms,politicalcircumin
are significant
of
the
nominees
characteristics
and
the
stances,
descriptive
for
the
to
act.
will
wait
Senate
of
a
nominee
time
the
determining length
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