Review: [untitled]
Author(s): John Markoff
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 95, No. 1 (Jul., 1989), pp. 220-222
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780430 .
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AmericanJournalof Sociology
systematic
way since 1944by class oforiginand byelitepolicyat thetime
of a cohort'sarrivalat adulthood.
Ethnographicdetailfromthefieldstudiescomplements
thetheoretical
and empiricalwork. The authorsshow, forexample,how the "square
house" serves as a symbolof success forthe agriculturalentrepreneurs.
These houses become a tangiblesign of the possibilitiesof the second
hierarchyin ruralHungary.
For all ofitsvirtues,thebook is notwell organized.This is a pitysince
it shouldhave manyreaders.The authorswould have been well advised
to includean introductory
chapterfornonspecialistson the structureof
ruralsocietyin Hungary,bothpre-and post-1944.Althoughthestatistical analysesare elegantlydesigned,the discussionof the analysessometimesslips into an unappealing"techspeak"and at othertimesinto the
eccentricity
of a presentationof a sort of horse race among variables.
Many of the tables could have been reservedforan appendix.
But it is the excellenceof the book thatshouldbe emphasized.It is a
measureofthebook's powerthatit notonlytellsus about socialistentrepreneursbut also providesan interesting
on
lookingglass forreflections
theoriginsof agriculturalcapitalismin theWest and even on thecurrent
class structures
of Westernsocieites.
It is worthmentioningthat Szelenyiconcludeswitha brief,thoughtprovokingreconsideration
ofhis book withGeorgeKonradon intellectuals in socialistsocieties.Withtheriseofthesecondeconomy,intellectuals
are, in Szelenyi'sview, apparentlynow stalled on theirroad to class
power.Indeed, Szelenyilooksforwardnotto rulebyreforming
intellectuals but to contentionbetweenthe leadersof the commandeconomyand
leadersof the emergingmarketeconomy,withsome increasingfreedom
and opportunity
forthosewho can playone kindofmasteroffagainstthe
other.And so a book thatbeginswiththe(qualified)celebrationofentrepreneurshipends with the discoveryof another venerable Western
theme-the virtuesof plural centersof power.
Of Rule and Revenue. By MargaretLevi. Berkeleyand Los Angeles:
Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1988. Pp. x+253. $35.00.
JohnMarkoff
UniversityofPittsburgh
Despite the frequencywith which social scientistsclaim to be studying
"the state" these days, taxationremainsremarkablyunderstudied.The
distribution
of resourcesby governments
in theformofwelfarehas been
the subject of a greatdeal of research,the extractionof resourcesmuch
less so. Yet taxationsystemsimpingeon many of the same issues: the
developmentof governingstructures,
class relations,conceptionsof citizenship, the interactionof governorsand governed.Gabriel Ardant's
220
Book Reviews
kaleidoscopicworkhas stoodforsometimein splendidisolation.(Aretax
codes drearierto read throughthan welfarestatutes?)
In the past few years,thereare some indicationsof discoveryof this
vitalbut unknownterritory,
and MargaretLevi's OfRule and Revenueis
partof thisnew interest.This studyhas a centralthesis,arguedthrough
an examinationof case studiesas farremovedin timeas thetax farming
oftheRoman Republicand theincometax of20th-century
Australia,but
it also presentsitselfmoregenerallyas an advertisement
forthemodelsof
rationalchoicetheauthorfavors.Levi asks us to considerrulerswho "are
predatoryin thattheytryto extractas muchrevenueas theycan fromthe
rulersmust deal with the
population"(p. 3). Her revenue-maximizing
costsof enforcing
and monitoring
compliance.The ruleruses agentswho
may cheat or shirk.Taxpayers may be morewillingto pay if theyfeel
they are contributingto a public good but are always leeryof being
suckerswho bear the coststhatothersevade.
Levi explorestaxationas a problemof collectiveaction.Taxation systems appear as continuouslyrenegotiateddeals betweenrulers,agents,
and taxpayers.One criticalvariable is the relativebargainingpowerof
actors:a feudal lord with a privatearmyand an impregnablecastle is
hardto collectfrom.A secondis thecostofmeasurement.
If theeconomy
does not make much use of money,the centralbureaucracydoes not
reachbelow county-sizeunits,and thepeasantscannotfillout forms(but
can hide theirpigs),an incometax is notto be expected.A thirdelement
is the ruler'stime orientation:those with long time horizonsfavortax
practicesthatwill not kill the goose thatlays the goldenegg, but those
underpressure(usuallythemilitary)tryto take what theycan gettoday.
Perhaps the most inventiveconceptLevi deploysis "quasi-voluntary
compliance."Some citizensmaybe willingto pay ("voluntarily")
forwhat
theysee as a serviceof the ruler,but only so long as all pay since the
spectacleof freeridersmakes volunteersfeel like fools. To obtain the
willingassentof some, then,the statecoercesothers.
The case studies show that it is possible to employthis conceptual
apparatus to reveal interestingthings about differencesamong and
changeswithinsystemsof taxation.By virtueof its conceptualclarity,
thisbook is likelyto influencethetermsofdiscourseoffutureresearch.I
would like,therefore,
to commenton someofthelimitsofthisdiscourse.
Levi sees ideologicalcommitment
as a motivationto complyor avoid.
Lying"outsidethemodelof rationalchoice,"as she putsit, such a "nonrational,irrational,or imperfectly
rational"(p. 50) elementis treatedas
exogenousto her model. Ideational matters,however,seem part and
parcel of her own centralconcepts. Free riders,for example, play a
criticalrole in her analysis.But theidentification
and even theexistence
of freeridersmay be contestedterrain.Who is supposedto pay, what is
regardedas a benefit,and whatis regardedas paymentare questionsthat
may be differentially
perceived,subject to conflicting
judgments,and
foughtover by propagandists.If noblesare exemptfrompayment,have
221
AmericanJournalof Sociology
to war? If a churchdoes not
theyfilledtheirpublicdutiesby contributing
taxes,is thestatefailingin itsdutiesto compelpayment,or is
pay property
ofsociallife?Levi's
itsdutiesto supportthereligiousgrounding
it fulfilling
stimulatingbook leaves such issues forsomeoneelse and takes as given
such a sentimentas "all shouldpay": theproblemis that"all" and "pay"
Levi showsthattheeconand redefinition.
are subjectto social definition
omist'stool kitneeds to be modifiedin thedirectionofgreaterrealismby
politicalconsiderations.In thiscase it strikesme thatattenintroducing
tionto politicalcultureis an essentialdirectionforstillgreaterrealism.I
discussionoftheboundariesofhermodels
hope thatLevi's worktriggers
ratherthan merelyinspirestheprobablyinevitableapplicationsto other
cases.
The Social OriginsofPoliticalRegionalism:France,1849-1981. By Wilof CaliforniaPress,
liam Brustein.Berkeleyand Los Angeles:University
1988. Pp. xiv+243. $28.00.
JohnMarkoff
UniversityofPittsburgh
WilliamBrustein'sworkdeals withthe problemof regionalcontinuities
in politicalallegiance,an importanttopicforhistoricalsociologyas well
as a classic themeof Frenchhistory.Since his argumentin The Social
Originsof Political Regionalismon the rootsof the distinctivepolitical
colorationsof westernand MediterraneanFrance differsfromsome recent lines of argument,it should excitemuch interest.One of the most
of westernconservatism,
forexample,has it
noteworthy
interpretations
thatdivided
thattheconflictofthe 1790swas so intensethatcommunities
thenhave remaineddivided;in short,muchofwesternFrancewas frozen
into a traditionof supportingthe politicalRight.As forthe Mediterraaroundthemidarguedthatpoliticalconflicts
nean south,it is currently
dle of the 19th centurylocked many localitiesinto a sort of reflexive
leftism.
Brusteinis skepticalofexplanationsgroundedin regionalpoliticalcultures.He contendsthatpersistenceofvotingpatternscan be explainedby
enduringconstellationsof materialintereststhat supportRightor Left
allegiances. The varyingsocial structuresof the countrysideled cultivatorsin differentregions to understandtheir interestsdifferently.
WesternFrance, with its highlevels of tenancy,dispersedsettlements,
landholdisolationfromthetowns,and politicallyactiveclass ofwell-off
ers, was a settingin whicha stratumof patronscontrolledthe resources
vital to a dependentruralclientele.This clientelecould see thatitsinterests were bound up withthe local upper strataand voted forthe Right
even when the secretballot freedthemfromelitecoercion.Contrasting
modelsof thestructureof peasant interestexplainthepoliticalchoicesof
otherregions.
222