Shapiro v. Thompson
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
was a Supreme Court decision that helped to
establish a fundamental "right to travel" in U.S.
law. Although the Constitution does not mention
the right to travel, it is implied by the other rights
given in the Constitution. (Although the right was
recognized under the Equal Protection clause in
this case, pre-Fourteenth Amendment, the right
to travel was understood as protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause (Article IV), as
a privilege of citizenship, and therefore might
have been applied to the states under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Amendment
XIV, as J. Stewart wanted.)
Shapiro v. Thompson
Supreme Court of the United States
Full case
name
Shapiro v. Thompson
Citations
394 U.S. 618
(http://supreme.justia.com/us/394/618/case.html)
(more)
394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600
Holding
Contents
1 Facts of the case
2 Case history
3 See also
4 External links
Facts of the case
The fundamental right to travel and the Equal protection clause
forbid a state from reserving welfare benefits only for persons
that have resided in the state for at least year.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black · William O. Douglas
John M. Harlan II · William J. Brennan, Jr.
Potter Stewart · Byron White
Abe Fortas · Thurgood Marshall
Case opinions
The Connecticut Welfare Department invoked
Brennan joined by Douglas, Fortas, Marshall,
Majority
Connecticut law denying an application for Aid to
White
Families with Dependent Children assistance to
Concurrence Stewart
appellee Vivian Marie Thompson, a 19-year-old
Warren joined by Black
Dissent
unwed mother of one child and pregnant with her
Harlan
second child, because she had changed her
Dissent
residence in June 1966 from Dorchester,
Laws applied
Massachusetts to Hartford, Connecticut, to live
U.S. Const. amends. I, XIV
with her mother. When her mother was no longer
able to support her, she and her infant son moved
to her own apartment in Hartford in August 1966. Thompson could not work or enter a work training program.
Her application for assistance, filed in August 1966, was denied in November solely on the ground that she had not
lived in the State for a year before her application was filed, a requirement under Connecticut law.
Case history
Thompson brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut where a three-judge panel,
one judge dissenting, declared the provision of Connecticut law unconstitutional, holding that the waiting-period
requirement is unconstitutional because it "has a chilling effect on the right to travel" and also holding that the
provision violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "because the denial of relief to those
resident in the State for less than a year is not based on any permissible purpose but is solely designed, as
'Connecticut states quite frankly,' 'to protect its fisc by discouraging entry of those who come needing relief'"
(decision of the Court).
This case examined laws that required a period of residence in a jurisdiction before welfare benefits would become
available to a new resident. The state asserted that its interest in requiring this waiting period was to deter needy
citizens from other states from coming to the state for the sole purpose of receiving superior welfare benefits. The
Court held that the purpose of inhibiting the migration of needy people was a constitutionally impermissible
objective. The state also argued that this requirement was an attempt to apportion services based on how much
residence have contributed (i.e. longer residence means more taxes paid) but such apportionment is not allowed
under the Equal protection clause.
The state asserted that the requirement served the states interest in efficient administration of welfare by providing
an objective test of residence, allowing for planning a budget, minimize fraud, and encourage entry into the
workforce before seeking welfare. Because the constitutional right to free movement between states was
implicated, the Court applied a standard of strict scrutiny and held none of these interests were sufficient to sustain
the waiting requirement. The Court held that there was no evidence that the requirement would make planning a
budget more predictable, and that if a waiting period encouraged new residents to enter the workforce it should
also be applied to current residents, and that the interest in deterring fraud and having an objective verification of
residence could be better served by less restrictive means (e.g. calling welfare recipients periodically).
Finally the Court rejected the argument that Congress had authorized the waiting period because Congress does
not have to power to authorize violations of the equal protection clause.
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justice Black, dissented. Congress has the power to authorize these restrictions
under the commerce clause. Under the commerce clause, Congress needs only a rational basis to a legitimate state
interest, not a necessary relation to a compelling interest.
Justice Harlan also dissented, arguing that the requirement of a compelling interest and necessary relationship
between the law and that interest serve as an example of intermediate scrutiny.
See also
List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 394
External links
Full text opinion from Findlaw.com (http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?
navby=CASE&court=US&vol=394&page=618)
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shapiro_v._Thompson"
Categories: United States Supreme Court cases | 1969 in United States case law
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