DE-MYTH-IFYING BEHAVIORISM 1
Running Head: DE-MYTH-IFYING BEHAVIORISM
De-myth-ifying Skinner’s Behaviorism
Applying Critical Consciousness to Understand Freedom in Radical Behaviorism
Cass Lowry
West Chester University
DE-MYTH-IFYING BEHAVIORISM 2
De-myth-ifying Skinner’s Behaviorism
Applying Critical Consciousness to Understand Freedom in Radical Behaviorism
The study of pigeons has had a profound impact upon society. Through studies of
operant conditioning in several animal species in the first half of the twentieth century, B.
F. Skinner outlined a theory of behaviorism in which he posited the irrelevance—and in
fact, the inexistence—of internal mental and emotional states as they relate to explaining
causation of human behavior; typically referred to as radical behaviorism, this theory
maintains that human action, and therefore society at large, can be controlled and
predicted when enough information is known about previous conditioning relating to
contingencies of behavior.
In my experience, when this theory, grounded in complex empirical studies, is first
encountered by students in prose form, the effect is largely negative. Students despair,
feeling that their sense of freedom, defined as personal choice, has been eradicated.
Behavior, it seems is caused by uncontrollable factors—genetic attributes and
environmental conditioning—rather than a sense of autonomous personal control. This
first response to the theory of Behaviorism has characterized every non-specialized class in
which I have personally been involved.
This unsettling, hopeless conclusion concerning the human experience is
unfounded. Such a reading of B. F. Skinner’s theories, though common, represents a
minimal understanding of his work. In such situations, Skinner’s behaviorism can be
framed as an oppressive myth which convinces students they are not free participants in
reality, merely unthinking cogs in a wheel. When understood through more familiar
vocabulary, however, the language of “reinforcement” and “contingences” can be seen to
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reserve as much space for human freedom as the words “reflection” and “thinking.”
Consciously recasting Skinner’s theory in more familiar terms of human reflections not
only remains true to his assertions, but also more importantly makes his ultimate
conclusions of the human condition understandable to students. Due to the frequent
misunderstandings of behaviorism’s complexity, such a recasting seems dire.
To accomplish this task, this paper will first expose how a basic understanding of
Skinner’s expository texts can be understood as an oppressive myth according to the
writings of Paulo Freire. Then, a more full investigation into Skinner’s consideration of
verbal behavior will be recast in terms of Freire’s conscientização, from here on translated
as “critical consciousness,” to express in humanistic terms Skinner’s conclusions on the
capacity of human freedom.
A MISUNDERSTANDING OF BEHAVIORISM AS AN OPPRESSIVE MYTH
To begin, I will provide a brief description of Skinner’s Behaviorism, as it is often
basically understood.
Behaviorism rests on the notion that human behavior, like animal behavior, is
determined by the reinforcers or punishers an organism perceives as contingent with its
behavior. A reinforcer is a consequence that promotes the likelihood of a given behavior,
while a punisher is a consequence that decreases the likelihood of a given behavior
(Skinner, 1971, pg 27, 62). To illustrate, imagine a dog being given a bone when he sits in
front of his owner’s feet; he is more likely to repeat this behavior (running to the door to sit
at the owner’s feet whenever she returns home) in the hope of receiving another treat, and
will begin to sit at his owner’s feet more frequently as more treats are given. In this
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example, “sitting at the owner’s feet” is the behavior being rewarded by the reinforcer of a
bone. Human behavior can be explained in the same manner: a child who has been hit for
talking back to his father will not only immediately cease that behavior, but will not contest
his father again in order to avoid the contingent punisher.
Before this explanation of behavior’s causality, Skinner posits that internal states
(emotions, desires, etc.) are irrelevant for explaining human behavior. It is cumbersome
and inaccurate to explain that the child stops talking because he is fearful of his father’s
control; it is correct to state that his “contestation” behavior ceased as a result of
anticipated punishments. Here, students will typically make a stand for human freedom by
positing the scenario that the child might continue disagreeing with his father in order to
stand up for his dignity. In such a case, Skinner would respond that the punisher, the
hitting, is not in this case sufficiently strong enough to eradicate the behavior the child
associates with a future reward, which might be a societal reward of his tenacity.
At this point, behaviorism becomes a slippery slope. It seems that every choice we
make is actually a result of a perceived reinforcement or punishment. From something as
abstract as martyrdom, the individual perceives a reward in the afterlife, or as mundane as
crossing a room, a concrete floor has always positively reinforced the behavior of walking
with stability, all choice can be explained away.
The resulting depressing perception is that humans are mere dependent pieces of a
complex causal mechanism; we react according to set laws of probability and causation, no
different than tossed dice, a muscular reflex, or a leaf in the wind. The psychological effect
of this understanding can be understood through Paulo Freire’s elucidation of an
oppressive myth. Freire wrote his most well known work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, to
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present a theoretical understanding of the disparate economic and social reality of Brazil in
the mid-twentieth century. In it, he outlines an oppressive paradigm as “[a]ny situation in
which ‘A’ objectively exploits ‘B’ or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation as a
responsible person” (1998, p. 37, emphasis added). The resulting situation, in which they
oppressed are convinced they have no free control upon the situation of their daily lives,
indeed the progression of history, results in dehumanization.
While Freire’s explanation is cast in terms of human relationships, the same
understanding of an oppressive myth can be used to understand students’ initial response
to Skinner’s behaviorism. When considering behaviorism as an explanation for human
action, students feel that they are no longer responsible persons. This does not result in
some sort of liberating anarchy, but rather, as Freire describes in the oppressive situation,
an “alienation” from reality; a feeling that we are obscurely “submerged in reality” so much
so we adopt a sense of fatalism towards the progression of time: “What can I do? I’m only a
peasant,” can easily be substituted with “what can I do? I am only a complex reaction”
(Freire, 1998, pp. 43-45).
This myth is destructive in the sense that it limits our perception of our control of
reality. As a myth, it functions as an uncontestable justification of an unchanging reality
(Freire, 1998). When we feel that we can no longer interact with the world around us in a
meaningful fashion, we are dehumanized. It is no wonder that the typical student reaction
to such a reading is depression and resignation.
But this is not an accurate reading of Skinner. Although Skinner seeks to replace our
common language of “desires” and “emotions,” with expressions of behavioristic causality,
his theories do not necessitate the destruction of human-generated, i.e. chosen, action.
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Humanity, as understood by Freire and by Skinner, consists in our ability to interact with
our environment. Interaction, as opposed to reaction, involves choice.
VERBAL BEHAVIOR AS SOCIAL AND PERSONAL CONDITIONING
Breaking the misrepresentation of Skinner’s behaviorist theory as an explanation of
humans merely as complex reactionary devices involves a closer examination of the
interaction between humans and their environment. Behaviorism depends on an
interaction between organisms and the world. The world’s reactions (used loosely) to the
organism are what reinforce and punish the organism’s behavior. However, in order to
supplant the dehumanization involved in the oppressive myth of behaviorism, humans
must be shown to initiate interaction with the world around them.
Skinner clearly asserts that humans can initiate interactions in their environment by
arranging contingencies of reinforcement. This means that humankind is not “a victim” its
environmental condition, but rather, is able to control its destiny because humans exist in
“an environment which is almost wholly of [their] own making” (Skinner, 1971, pp. 205206). This may come as a surprise to the student who believes that behaviorism
necessitates human disempowerment. To begin removing the misconception of
behaviorism as an oppressive myth, we must first understand the nature of this interaction
between humans and their environment.
Take the illustration of a teenager decorating her room. She has been conditioned to
associate certain environments with discomfort—cold, hard, harsh, dimly lit settings—and
certain environments with comfort—soft, warm colored, and well lit spaces. When
designing her room, she will therefore want to create a space that will positively reinforcer
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her with comfort in the future. Accordingly, she will lavishly decorate her room with pastel
colored wall hangings, multiple lamps, and cozy beanbag chairs. In this way, she is
organizing her environment to guarantee that it continuously reinforcers her according to
her desires.
Such purposeful interaction with the environment can be seen in much of human behavior.
From chosen social circles, to college majors, to designing cities, humans have learned to
craft their multiple environments to suit their contingent needs. This realization of
interaction, however, still does not necessitate human choice. The same continuous link of
reinforcing causation that negates human freedom of choice still lurks as a specter; the
teenager may have decorated her room as such because she has been reinforced in the past
to make such choices and is acting out of a behavioral compulsion for comfort, rather than
an active choice. Simply acknowledging humanity’s capability to mold their environment
does not prove that Skinner’s behaviorism allows room for human freedom. Even animals
such as birds are able to construct a reinforcing environment, a nest, due to instinct, not
rational choice.
A proof for freedom in behaviorism must lie in that which distinguishes humans
from animals: verbal behavior. Communication in all of its forms—speech, text,
nonverbal—is necessarily contained in a study of human behavior, and as such, Skinner
defines it within his system of behaviorism. He defines verbal behavior as “behavior
reinforced through the mediation of other persons,” meaning that my behavior of asking a
friend for a glass of water is reinforced because my friend hands me a glass of water
(Skinner, 1957, p. 2). Through use of verbal behavior, humans are able to non-physically
interact with their environment through other humans. This is, of course, a simple
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description for a very complex set of behaviors. Verbal behavior involves not only physical
distance, but also sometimes distance of time—the writing of books. Also, it describes a
complex set of contingencies; Skinner’s book, Verbal Behavior, still regarded in the field of
psychology as an informative application of theory (MacCorquodale, 1970; Palmer, 2006)
focuses on the classification of units of language, functions of grammar, and listener’s
reactions according to empirically derived behaviorist terminology, such as reinforcement
and contingencies. While an analysis of all of his conclusions is unnecessary for the
development of this argument, we must understand how Skinner observes verbal behavior
as a necessarily social reinforcement.
An analysis of verbal behavior outlines how humans do not only interact with their
environment, but also indirectly interact with the environment through verbal relations
with other humans. If a trustworthy acquaintance tells me not to visit Disney World during
August because of the unbearable heat, I will alter my behavior not because my direct
environment has reinforced or punished me, but because my acquaintance has represented
the contingences of the environment to me: I have been reinforced by following offered
advice in the past; this advice explains that Disney World in August will be accompanied by
heat; I anticipate being punished by the unpleasant heat if I visit Disney World in the
spring; therefore I do not engage in the behavior of visiting Disney World in the spring.
Such social interactions shape most of external human behavior. Besides
communicating with other humans in a speaker-listener relationship, however, humans
also have the curious ability to interact with themselves in a speaker-listener relationship.
Skinner describes both overt and covert personal verbal behavior as being a reflection of
social verbal behavior. What can be understood as a personal “pep-talk” whispered to
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oneself or a muttered list of directions to help one remember a procedure are typical overt
representations of this behavior. Skinner asserts that audible self talk and unconscious
reasoning represent the two poles of the continuum of over/covert self-talk (Skinner,
1957). Therefore an individual is able to reinforce his own behavior in the same manner
that other members of society can reinforce the individual. Skinner refers to this as “selfstrengthening.” The conclusion is that humans, separate from their environment in the
sense that they are operating internally, are able to reinforce, and therefore modfiy, their
behavior.
The question returns, does this capacity to self-modify behavior result in a sphere of
human freedom through choice? If so, the myth of behaviorism limiting humans to a
reactionary role in reality will finally drop away, leaving humanity in a free, but
interactional, relationship with reality. A reframing of behaviorism in accessible language
provides the answer.
A RE-FRAMING INTO FREIRE’S “WORDS”
Like Skinner, Freire argues that humanity, or the human condition, lies in a creative
interaction with reality. Also like Skinner, Freire relies on a linguistic understanding of this
interaction. But instead of using the language of behaviorism, Freire’s social theory
employs the language of “critical consciousness,” a more easily understandable lexicon that
assumes a rational consciousness. Due to the underlying similar belief that humankind
“name[s] the world, to change it,” if Freire’s formulation can be proven to be synonymous
with Skinner’s articulation of behaviorism, it can be used as a decoding tool to render the
conclusions of behaviorism clearly to the yearning student (Freire, 1998, p. 69). After all,
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Skinner himself asserts, “no theory changes what a theory is about” (1971, p. 215). If both
theories can be proven to represent the same relations of reality, than their language can
be successfully substituted for each other.
Freire posits that humanization is a process achieved when man is able to change
the world by interacting with it (1998, p. 69). In the same manner as Skinner, Freire
represents man’s peculiar ability to interact with the world through language, more
specifically, the process of naming the world. This process is named “Dialogue” with its
crucial component being “the word.”
For Freire, human action through the world—what is in essence a dialogical twoway conversation between humans and reality—must be subdivided into two co-necessary
processes: action and reflection. Action is depicted as humankind physically interacting
with the world and society, while reflection is the process of speaking to understand the
world for the purpose of interacting with it.
When humankind engages in these two processes in an effort to constantly
transform an ever-altering reality, the resulting human state is labeled critical
consciousness. In this state, people are fully humanized, having the freedom to consider
and choose their course of action in the world based on thoughtful reflection. Freedom is
choice expressed through a combination of action and corresponding reflection. Without
reflection, action would be blind, and therefore not by a fully free choice. Without action,
humankind would not act upon his choices, entailing a lack of ability to express its free
choice, which is therefore also a lack of freedom.
When freedom through choice is expressed in such social terms, the student
untrained in psychology can easily see the empirical applicability of this expression of
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human freedom. We as humans are necessarily bound in a dialogical relationship (i.e.
mutually influencing) relationship with the world. At the same time, we are not blind
actors, also reacting; we have the capability to reflect in our actions to choose better
courses in future actions. Herein lies our freedom.
At last, Skinner’s theory can be made fully accessible to all by revealing the
connections between the behaviorist expression of human psychology and Freire’s
explanation of sociology. Freire’s “action” parallels observable behaviors and their
associated reinforcers. Freire’s “reflection” is another name for the way human’s can
verbally self-strengthen and consider the relations between their actions and distant
reinforcers. The two theories, both expressing man’s interaction with the world, are
synonymous.
In the same way that Freire pleads for an adoption of critical consciousness,
behaviorism can be understood as supporting freedom of choice. As incredibly complex
functions of behaviorism, humans have evolved to the point where we are reinforced for
considering all perspectives of a given situation. What this means is that, instead of
reacting to a situation rashly based on simple previous reinforcements, society has
developed to the point where we can be taught to overpower simple, immediate
reinforcements by substituting them with the distant reinforcement of acting rationally and
appropriately. Instead of punching the co-worker who takes her favorite parking spot at
work (an action which would certainly be reinforcing), a woman may pause, and consider
all possible scenarios, initiating a covert verbal behavior series of self-strengthening, until
she decides to ask the co-worker to move his car, a behavior which has been reinforced
positively in the past.
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Such processes of critical “thinking” may not be immediately accessible to all adults
or younger children, which is why Freire suggests the need for developing conscientização
through a dialogical teaching style. Skinner would agree, saying that it is the responsibility
of man to arrange contingencies of reinforcement to help other members of society realize
the full development of society. Education lies as the chief method to further the realization
of human freedom.
Skinner’s behaviorism, he makes explicit in several places (Skinner, 1957, 1971), is
meant to supplant the “autonomous man” as a cause for behavior. We do not engage in
actions merely because we “wish” to, regardless of environment influences in our past,
present, and future contingences. Freire would agree, saying that we are firmly grounded in
reality and must engage in a dialogical relation with the world. Using such a formulation
proves that radical behaviorism as advocated by B. F. Skinner does not rely on a lack of
human freedom for its explanatory power. The power of behaviorism rests in the fact that
as a scientific theory it has been empirically proven and has the explanatory power to
further our conception of the development of culture and society. Behaviorism relies on the
human ability to not only be influenced by the world; but to influence other humans, to
influence the self, and to influence the world in return. As long as humans can consider all
possible courses of action, we still have freedom of choice.
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References
Freire, P. (1998). Pedagogy of the Oppressed. New York, NY: Continuum.
MacCorquodale, K. (1970). On Chomsky’s review of Skinner’s verbal behavior. Journal of
the experimental analysis of behavior. 13, 83-99.
Palmer, D. C. (2006). On Chomsky’s appraisal of Skinner’s verbal behavior: A half-century of
misunderstanding. Behavioral Analysis. 29(2), 253-267.
Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior. New York, NY: Meredith Corporation.
Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond Freedom & Dignity. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing
Company, Inc.