The Self-Concept
Author(s): Viktor Gecas
Source: Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 8 (1982), pp. 1-33
Published by: Annual Reviews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945986 .
Accessed: 30/09/2011 18:37
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Annual Reviews is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Annual Review of
Sociology.
http://www.jstor.org
Ann.Rev. Sociol. 1982. 8:1-33
? 1982 byAnnualReviewsInc. All rightsreserved
Copyright
THE SELF-CONCEPT
Viktor
Gecas
Departments
of Sociologyand RuralSociology,Washington
State
University,
Pullman,Washington
99164
INTRODUCTION
The self-concept
is undergoing
something
of a renaissancein contemporary
socialpsychology.
It has, of course,been a centralconceptwithinsymbolic
interactionism
sincetheseminalwritings
ofMead (1934), Cooley(1902), and
James(1890). However,evenwithinthissociologicaltradition
therehas been
a revitalization
ofinterest
intheself-concept:
withdevelopments
inroletheory
(Turner1978; Gordon1976), withthe increasingfocuson the conceptof
identity
(McCall & Simmons1978; Stryker
1980;Gordon1968;Guiot1977;
Burke1980),withthereemergence
of interest
in social structure
andpersonality(House 1981;Turner1976;Kohn1969,1981;Rosenberg1979),andwith
thereconceptualization
ofsmallgroupexperimental
situations
(Alexanderand
colleagues1971, 1981; Webster& Sobieszek1974).
Thereemergence
oftheself-concept
is evenmoredramatic
withinpsychoof interestin selflogical social psychology.Much of this revitalization
is
phenomena
(e.g. self-awareness,
self-esteem,
self-image,
self-evaluation)
duetothe"cognitive
in psychology
Manis
revolution"
(Dember1974;
1977),
at theexpenseof behaviorism.As a result,theself-concept
has
generally
becomeconspicuousin areas and traditions
thatwerepreviously
considered
alienterrain:
withinbehaviorism
via Bem's (1972) theoryof self-attribution;
within
sociallearning
and
via Bandura's(1977) focuson self-efficacy;
theory
within
via Aronson's(1968) andBramel's(1968)
dissonancetheory
cognitive
andvalue
reformulations.
It is also increasingly
evidentintheoriesofattitude
formation
and change(Rokeach1973, 1979), in attribution
theory(Epstein
1973; Bowerman1978), and in variousotherrecenttheoriesof cognitive
1
0360-0572/82/0815-0001
$02.00
2
GECAS
as these
processes(see Wegner& Vallacher1980). Perhapsas important
"intentional"
theoretical
developments
in socialpsychology
fortherefocuson
of self"
self-concept
is whatone reviewercalls "theinadvertent
rediscovery
in experimental
social psychology(Hales 1981a). This refersto theobservationthatexperimental
resultsfrequently
couldbe explainedas wellorbetter
bytheoperation
of self-processes
withinthesesettings[suchas Alexander's
"situatedidentity
theory"(1981)] thanby thetheoretical
variablesunderinvestigation.
This "inadvertent"
to the
discoveryof selfmayhavecontributed
so-called"crisis"in social psychology
(Boutilieret al 1980; Hales 1981a).
In thisreviewI focuson developments
inself-concept
and
andtrends
theory
researchwithinsocial psychology.'However,as Stryker(1977) and House
(1977) pointout,thereareseveralsocialpsychologies.
The majordistinction
is betweensocialpsychology
and
developedwithinthesociologicaltradition
is inthatemergingfromthe psychologicaltradition.The self-concept
creasingly
important
withinbothdisciplines;developments
withinbothare
in theirfocus.Sociologytends
reviewed.The twosocialpsychologies
differ
to focuson theantecedents
andtypically
looksforthese
of self-conceptions,
withinpatterns
of social interaction.
Psychology,
on theotherhand,tendsto
focuson theconsequencesof self-conceptions,
especiallyas theserelateto
behavior.The latterfocusis morelikelythantheformer
to lead to questions
ofmotivation
mo(e.g. theself-esteem
motive,efficacy
motive,consistency
tive).In a sense,sociologyand psychology
have complementary
biases regarding
theself-concept.
Ifthe"fundamental
attribution
bias"ofpsychologists
is an overly"internal"view of the causes of behavior(Ross 1977), the
attribution
bias ofsociologistsis a tendency
tolookforthecausesofbehavior
outsidetheindividual-i.e. in culture,social structure,
or social situation.
Severalaspectsoftheself-concept
literature
arenotreviewed:I do notdelve
intotheextensiveliterature
on specificsocial identities,
such as sexual and
genderidentities,
variousoccupationalidentities,
and specificdeviantidentities (e.g. delinquent,criminal,mentalpatient).Here I treatthe socialon self-concept,
psychological
literature
largelyignoring
theclinical,humanistic,andphilosophical
traditions.
THE NATURE OF THE SELF-CONCEPT
An initial distinctionmust be made between the terms "self" and
Muchconfusion
in socialpsychology
"self-concept."
overwhether
theselfis
a processor a structure
stemsfromthefailureto distinguish
between"self"
'The selfanditsderivative
termshaveoccupieda centralplace withinhumanistic
andclinical
orientations
in thesocialsciences.The reemergence
oftheself-concept
refers
mainlytoitsstatus
withinsocial psychology.
THE SELF-CONCEPT
3
and "self-concept."
Self as used here refersto a process, the processof
reflexivity
whichemanatesfromthe dialecticbetweenthe "I" and "Me".
Whilediscussionsof the relationship
betweenthe "I" and the "Me" have
periodically
appearedin the literature
[see especiallyLewis (1979) for a
social-behaviorist
interpretation
of the "I"; Carveth(1977) and Petryszak
(1979) fora biologicalinterpretation;
and Weigert(1975) fora phenomenologicaltreatment],
themajoroutlinesoftheconceptofselfhaveremained
largelyunchangedsince the formulations
of James (1890) and Mead
(1934)-i.e. theselfis a reflexive
phenomenon
thatdevelopsin social interactionand is based on thesocial character
of humanlanguage.The concept
of selfprovidesthephilosophicalunderpinning
forsocial-psychological
inquiriesinto the self-concept
but is itselfnot accessible to empiricalinvestigation.
The"self-concept,"
on theotherhand,is a productofthisreflexive
activity.
Itis theconcepttheindividual
hasofhimself
as a physical,social,andspiritual
or moralbeing.2
Rosenberg
defines
theself-concept
ofan individual's
broadlyas "thetotality
thoughts
and feelingshavingreference
to himselfas an object" (1979:7).
Similarlybroadis Snygg& Combs's statement
that"thephenomenalself
includesall thosepartsof thephenomenal
fieldwhichtheindividualexperiences as part or characteristic
of himself"(1949:58). A more specific
definition
is providedbyTurner:"Typicallymyself-conception
is a vaguebut
vitallyfeltidea of whatI am likein mybestmoments,
of whatI am striving
towardandhave someencouragement
to believeI can achieve,or of whatI
cando whenthesituation
suppliesincentives
forunqualified
effort"
(1968:98).
In Turner's(1968, 1976)formulation,
theself-concept
also involves(to some
extent)thesenseof spatialand temporal
a distinction
of essential
continuity,
selffrommereappearanceandbehavior(whichhe terms"self-image"),
and
theidentification
of thepersonin qualitativeand locationaltermsas well as
in evaluativeterms.
Perhapsthemostnovelconceptualization
is offered
of theself-concept
by
Epstein(1973). Froman attribution
perspective,
Epsteinsuggeststhatthe
can bestbe viewedas a theory
self-concept
thata personholdsabouthimself
as an experiencing,
withtheworld.In spite
functioning
beingin interaction
is centralto humanexperienceand a defining
2Self-awareness
ofthehumancondition,
feature
butthereis some doubtaboutwhetherit is uniquelyhuman.Recentstudiesof chimpanzees
suggestthattheseprimates
areatleastcapableofself-recognition,
as measuredbytheirresponses
to theirmirror-images
(Gallup, 1977). In his reviewof the primatestudies,Meddin(1979)
concludesthatchimpanzeesare indeedcapable of reflexivethoughtand have at least a rudimentary
conceptofself.Furthermore,
itappearsthatthissenseofselfarisesinchimpanzees
much
as itdoes(according
toMead) inhumans-i.e. through
socialinteraction,
symboliccapacity,and
role-taking
ability.
4
GECAS
of his overemphasis
forselfon knowledgeand beliefsas the foundation
concepts(rather
thanon values,attitudes,
and motivations),
Epstein'sinterestingformulation
accountsformanyof therecurring
featuresof the selfconceptinthesocial-psychological
literature.
He wouldhavebeenevenmore
accurateifhe had conceptualized
theself-concept
as a self-ideology-when
itcomesto ourself-concepts,
we aremuchless interested
in "theory
testing"
thanin self-affirmation
and self-protection
(as we shallsee in thesectionon
self-concept
as a sourceof motivation).
Nevertheless,
Epstein'sideas about
the self-concept
are compatiblewithsociologicalformulations,
especially
thosestemming
fromstructural
versionsof symbolicinteractionism
(Stryker
1980; Heiss 1968; Gordon1968). Thereare differences
in emphasis,to be
as an
sure;butwithinbothoftheseviews,theself-concept
is conceptualized
and attributes,
and theirevaluorganization
(structure)
of variousidentities
ations,developedout of the individual'sreflexive,social, and symbolic
activities.
As such,theself-concept
is an experiential,
mostlycognitivephenomenonaccessibleto scientific
inquiry.This reviewdeals withthe selfconceptand notwiththeconceptof self.
SOURCES AND DIMENSIONS OF SELF-CONCEPTION
have been consideredin social
Numerousdimensionsof the self-concept
psychology
(forelaboratetypologiessee Gordon1968; Rosenberg1979:Ch.
is betweenthe contentof self1). An elementary
but usefuldistinction
conceptions
(e.g. identities)
and self-evaluations
(e.g. self-esteem).
Identity
focuseson themeaningscomprising
theselfas an object,givesstructure
and
to self-concept,
content
and anchorstheselfto social systems.Self-esteem
In
deals withtheevaluativeand emotionaldimensionsof the self-concept.
arecloselyinterrelated:
Selfthesetwoaspectsoftheself-concept
experience
and
evaluationsare typicallybased on substantive
aspectsof self-concept,
identities
typicallyhave evaluativecomponents.Withinsocial psychology
thesetwodimensions
involvelargelyseparateliteratures.
SourcesofSelf-Evaluation
Self-evaluation
or self-esteem
refersto theevaluativeandaffective
aspectsof
theself-concept
(Wells & Marwell1976; Shibutani1961). Mostresearchon
theself-concept
so thatsometimes
is
focuseson thisdimension,
self-concept
equatedwithself-esteem
(Wells & Marwell 1976). For example,Wylie's
deal almost
literature
(1974, 1979) extensivereviewsof the self-concept
The mainreasonforthepreeminence
ofthis
withself-evaluation.
exclusively
of self-esteem
is the motivational
aspectof self-concept
significance
(see
below).
THE SELF-CONCEPT
5
In muchof thisliterature,
self-esteem
refersto an individual'soverall
self-evaluation
[Rosenberg's(1965) unidimensional
scale is one of themost
widelyusedmeasuresofself-esteem].
Increasingly,
however,variousaspects
of self-esteem
have been differentiated-e.g.
sense of powerand sense of
worth(Gecas 1971); "inner"and "outer"self-esteem(Franks& Marolla
1976);evaluation
andaffection
(Wells& Marwell1976);senseofcompetence
and self-worth
(Smith1978); self-evaluation
and self-worth
(Brissett1972);
andcompetence
and morality
(Rokeach1973; Vallacher1980; Hales 1980).
Commontothesesubdivisions
is thedistinction
between(a) self-esteem
based
on a senseof competence,
power,or efficacy
and (b) self-esteem
based on
a senseofvirtueormoralworth.The importance
ofthisdistinction
lies inthe
suggestion
thatthesetwobases of self-esteem
maybe a function
of different
processesof self-concept
formation
(Wells & Marwell1976) and thatthey
constitute
selfdifferent
sourcesof motivation.Briefly,competency-based
esteemis tied closelyto effective
performance
(Bandura1978; Franks&
Marolla1976; Gecas 1979; Harter1978; Mortimer
& Lorence1979; Smith
1968).As a result,itis associatedwithself-attribution
andsocialcomparison
is groundedin
processes.Self-esteem
based on virtue(termedself-worth)
normsand valuesconcerning
personaland interpersonal
conduct e.g. justice,reciprocity,
honor.The processof reflected
appraisal(see below) contributes
to the formation
of self-worth
(Vallacher1980; Gecas 1971). The
imwhileconceptually
distinction
between"self-efficacy"
and "self-worth,"
tendstoblurattheexperiential
level. Senseofworthmaybe strongly
portant,
affected
andvice versa[see, forexample,Covington
bysenseofcompetence
betweenthesesourcesof self-esteem
& Beery(1976) on theinterconnection
in school].
reflect
theresponsesand apThatour self-concepts
praisalsof othersis the dominantpropositionin the sociologyof self.
in Cooley's (1902) influential
Grounded
conceptof the"looking-glassself"
theprocess
andinMead's theory
(1934) thattheself-concept
developsthrough
of
ofrole-taking
others,theprocessof reflected
appraisalsis thecornerstone
on self-concept
formation
thesymbolicinteractionist
perspective
(see Rosenberg1979:64;Kinch 1963).
Givenits widespreadacceptancewithinsociologyand even psychology,
one wouldthinkthisproposition
had been demonstrated
empirically
beyond
question;butthisis hardlythecase. To be sure,many(especiallysymbolic
have investigated
therelationship
betweenothers'appraisals
interactionists)
and the individual'sself-concept
(e.g. see Miyamoto& Dornbusch1956;
& Cooper1966). However,thepoweroftheopinionsofothersto
Quarantelli
is stillin doubt.
of the self-concept
initiateand/oraffectthe development
Shrauger& Schoeneman(1979) examinedthe empiricalevidenceforthe
REFLECTEDAPPRAISALS
6
GECAS
studies.They observethat:(a) People's
"looking-glass
self" in over fifty
withtheway theythinkothersperceive
self-perceptions
agreesubstantially
betweenpeople's selfthem.However,(b) thereis verylittleagreement
& Schoeneperceptions
andhowtheyareactuallyviewedbyothers.Shrauger
are
man concludethat"thereis no clear indicationthatself-evaluations
influenced
by the feedbackreceivedfromothersin naturallyoccurring
situations"
(1979:549).
at thedisparity
Thereare a numberof reasonswe shouldnotbe surprised
of
and theappraisalsof others.One is thedifficulty
betweenself-concepts
getting
honestfeedbackfromothers,especiallyifitis negative(Felson1980).
(1959)
in ourculture,whichGoffman
The normsof adultsocial interaction
examinedwithsuch insight,inhibithonestappraisalof others,substituting
As a
"tact"and proper"deferenceand demeanor"to protectself-esteem.
result,we mayoftenbe unawareof whatothersthinkof us.
and others'apAnotherreasonforthe mismatchbetweenself-concept
to us. In a largestudyof
praisalsis thatnotall othersare equallysignificant
andthe
Rosenberg(1973) foundthatthecredibility
Baltimore
schoolchildren,
thechild's
affected
other'sevaluationssignificantly
value of thesignificant
Webster& Sobieszek(1974) foundthatthecredibility
self-concept.
Similarly,
of the evaluatorhad a substantialeffecton the individual'stask-specific
self-perceptions.
between
reasonforthe low correspondence
Perhapsthe mostimportant
ofthe
influence
andtheappraisalsofothersis theactivedistorting
self-concept
of others'evaluationsof us are biasedtoward
self-concept.
Our perceptions
or self-enhancement
motivehas a
favorableassessments.The self-esteem
distorting
effecton our perceptions,concepts,and memories.Rosenberg
in whom
is evenreflected
(1973) demonstrates
howthisprocessof selectivity
we choosetobe oursignificant
others,as wellas inothersourcesofinfluence
on ourself-concepts
(Rosenberg,1979).
andtheactual
betweenself-evaluations
Giventhegenerally
low correlations
betweenselfevaluationsof others,and the generallystrongrelationships
evaluations
and theperceivedevaluationsof others,we mustfocusresearch
from
as: How is information
muchmoreon such neglectedconsiderations
and actedupon(Shothersabouttheselftransmitted,
received,interpreted,
is the fundamental
process
rauger& Schoeneman,1979)? If role-taking
whataffectsthecontentof whatis
through
whichappraisalsare reflected,
of reflected
"taken"in role-taking?
Even thoughthe hypothesis
appraisals
remainsimportant
in thetheoryof self-concept
formation,
empiricaldemonin recentyears.
stration
of itsvalidityhas becomeproblematic
is theprocessin whichindividuals
Social comparison
themto thoseof others.
assesstheirown abilitiesand virtuesby comparing
SOCIAL COMPARISONS
THE SELF-CONCEPT
7
themainfuncAccording
toFestinger's
(1954) theory
ofsocialcomparisons,
tionoftheprocessis reality-testing,
whichis mostlikelytooccurin situations
whereknowledgeabout a self-attribute
is ambiguousor uncertain.In the
processeshavebeen
experimental
researchguidedbythistheory,
comparison
initiated
by exposingthe subjectto the presenceof anotherperson.For
example,Morse& Gergen(1970) used "Mr. Clean" and "Mr. Dirty"as the
andfoundthatthepresence
comparison
othersina "job application"
situation,
while
of"Mr.Clean"produceda significant
decreaseinsubjects'self-esteem,
thepresenceof the undesirableother("Mr. Dirty")significantly
enhanced
subjects'self-esteem.
as merelya
It wouldbe a mistake,however,to thinkof social comparison
meansof reality-testing,
fortheindividualis nota neutralobserverbut an
activeconstructor
of social reality.Veblen's (1899) penetrating
analysisof
conspicuousconsumption
by the leisure class for the purposeof selfprocesses.
enhancement
revealsthemoreinsidiousside of socialcomparison
Within
sociology,socialcomparison
processesaremostlikelytobe studied
viatheconceptofthereference
group
group,whichserves(a) as a normative
and(b) as a comparison
(i.e. thesourceofnormsandvaluesfortheindividual)
of self-evaluation
(Kelley,1952)]. In
group[i.e. as theprovider
of standards
theformer
usage,thereference
group'snormsmaybecometheinternalized
Thiswouldbe consistent
standard
againstwhichtheindividual
judgeshimself.
of the
withJames's(1890) conceptualization
of self-esteem
as a function
and achievements.
discrepancy
betweenaspirations
Mostsociologicalresearchon socialcomparison
processestreatsreference
groupsas comparison
groups.Davis's (1966) studyofthecampusas a "frog
is a good
ofthelocal frameofreference)
theimportance
pond"(emphasizing
example.
Social comparison
processesare mostlikelyto operatewithinlocal groups
of competition
underconditions
[see Covington& Beery(1976) on theconand great
sequencesof "gradingon the curve"for students'self-esteem]
andvisibility.
differentiation
Rosenberg(1975) focusedon thelatter
subgroup
condition
in a studyof theeffectsof "contextualdissonance"on students'
self-esteem.
He used "contextualdissonance"to denotethe resultof the
and
in a socialcontextsuchas a classroom,betweenthemajority
interaction,
statuswithregardto
a disvaluedminority.
Rosenbergfoundthatminority
or values had a negativeeffecton students'
race,social class, competence,
The findings
self-esteem.
ofBachman(1970), andDrury(1980), showingthe
fortheself-esteem
ofblackchilnegativeconsequencesof schoolintegration
withRosenberg'sanalysis.
dren,are consistent
OTHER
PROCESSES
AFFECTING
SELF-EVALUATION
Bem's (1972) "self-per-
whattheyare feeling
ceptiontheory"proposesthatindividualsdetermine
8
GECAS
and thinking
based on observingtheirown overtbeby makinginferences
havior.ThusBem suggeststhatwe learnaboutourselvesandothersin essentiallythesameway-i.e. fromobserving
behaviorand makingdispositional
inferences.
Self-perception
theorycan be subsumedunderthemoregeneralattribution
theory,
whichdeals withhow individuals
makecausal inferences
abouttheir
ingeneralis moreappropriate
ownandothers'behavior.Attribution
to
theory
theconsideration
of self-concept
as a causal factorin social interaction
than
to questionsof self-concept
development.
This distinction
becomesrather
is an important
"cause" of itsown
blurred,
however,sincetheself-concept
formation.
For example,Rosenberg's(1979) discussionof "psychological
centrality"
andGergen's(1971) discussionof"biasedscanning"as processes
orprocesseswithin
ofself-concept
referto mechanisms
formation,
essentially
in theformation
of self-conceptions.
theself-concept
whichare instrumental
as a
Someof theseprocesseswillbe thefocusof thesectionon self-concept
sourceof motivation.
SOCIAL-STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS IN SELF-ESTEEM
A good deal has been writ-
tenon variations
inself-esteem
as raceandsocialclass.
acrosssuchcategories
between
Withregardto race,current
researchhas foundeitherno difference
theself-esteem
levelsofblacksandwhites,orthatblackshaveslightly
higher
self-esteem
thanwhites(Yancey et al 1972; Rosenberg& Simmons1972;
Jacques& Chason1977;Taylor& Walsh1979). Thiscounterintuitive
finding
has generated
theoretical
speculation.McCarthy& Yancey(1971) developed
theidea thatblacksaremorelikelythanwhitestoblamethe"system"(externalizeblame)fortheirrelatively
low status,thereby
theeffectof
minimizing
social stratification
on self-esteem.
Rosenberg& Simmons(1972) propose
"valueselectivity"
(i.e. devaluingthedomainwhereone has low status)as a
methodof mitigating
the effectsof low economicstatus.Heiss & Owens
is a reference
(1972) suggestthattheblacksubculture
groupthatprovidesa
buffer
betweenthelargersocietyand blackself-esteem.
All of these explanationssoundreasonable,
so far
butnonehasreceivedmuchempirical
support
(see Taylor&Walsh, 1979). In a recentreviewof researchon blackidentity
and self-esteem,
Porter& Washington(1979) observethatgeneralcomwithinminority
of self-esteem
parisonsshedlittlelighton thedevelopment
groups:"Atthispoint,we do notneedmorestudiesof generaldifferences
in
self-esteem
betweenblack and whitepopulations.Variationsin racial and
shouldbe investigated
personalself-esteem
withcarefulattention
bothto the
effect
of macrostructural
factorsand to thespecificsituational
and personal
in whichthesefactorsoperate"(1979:70). I wouldadd thatgreater
contexts
ofdimensions
ofself-evaluation
is advisable
specification
andof self-concept
inthisareaofresearch.Porter& Washington
(1979), forexample,foundthat
THE SELF-CONCEPT
9
but lowerfeelingsof personal
blacksreported
higherlevels of self-regard
of self-esteem
efficacy
thanwhites.Taylor& Walsh's (1979) decomposition
thatwould
intoseveralcontext-specific
dimensions
revealedracialdifferences
had been considered[see also
havebeen hiddenif onlyglobal self-esteem
Schwartz& Stryker's
of self-esteem].
(1970) dimensionalization
is fraught
with
Likewise,the literature
on social class and self-esteem
contradictory,
inconsistent,
and generallyweak findings(see Wylie 1979:
57-116). Theexception
tothisgeneralization
is theworkofRosenberg
andhis
of muchof thisresearch].
colleagues[see Rosenberg(1979) fora synthesis
the
structures
Pursuing
thequestionof how thebroadersocial environment
immediate
interpersonal
interactions
of theindividual,Rosenberg& Pearlin
(1978) masterfully
demonstrate
how social class impingeson theself-esteem
ofadultsthrough
formation
(i.e. reflected
apfourprocessesof self-concept
and psychologicalcentrality),
praisals,social comparisons,
self-attribution,
and whythe operationof theseprocessesproducesnegligiblesocial-class
differences
forchildren.
inhisanalysisofsocial-structural
Rosenberg
hasshownthesamesensitivity
especiallyschoolandfamily
influences
on self-esteem
inothersocialcontexts,
(Rosenberg1965, 1975;Rosenberg& Simmons1972). In thefamilycontext,
variablesas birthorder
Rosenberg
foundthattheinfluence
of suchstructural
affected
and"brokenfamilies"on theself-esteem
of childrenis substantially
by a numberof conditionalvariables-e.g. religiousbackground,age of
mother
at divorceor separation,
child'sage, andnumberand sex of siblings.
and
An important
intervening
variableis theextentto whichparentalinterest
and conditional
variables,
support
forthechildis affected
by thesestructural
Thisfinding
sinceparental
is positively
interest
relatedto child'sself-esteem.
ofa positiverelationship
and child'sselfbetweenparentalsupport/affection
esteemis one of the mostconsistent
in thefamilyresearchon self-esteem
formation
(Coopersmith
1967;Gecas 1971; Hales 1980;Thomaset al 1974).
Onelimitation
researchis thatittreatsself-esteem
ofRosenberg'sextensive
as a globalandunidimensional
variable.Thereis someevidence,forexample,
relatedto
thattheefficacy
andworthdimensions
ofself-esteem
aredifferently
familyprocesses.Gecas (1971) foundparentalsupportto have a stronger
withadolescents'feelingsof self-worth
thanwiththeir
positiverelationship
of self-efficacy.
on theotherhand,was moresensitive
feelings
Self-efficacy,
to thepowerrelationships
withinsocial contexts-i.e. senseof self-efficacy
waslowerwhentheindividual
was ina subordinate
position,suchas in school
Gecas (1972) foundthatparentalbehaviorsas
(Gecas 1972). Furthermore,
within
antecedents
of theadolescents'"familyself-esteem"
(i.e. self-esteem
in othersocialcontexts(i.e. when
thefamily)had littleeffecton self-esteem
forself-evaluations).
This
peersorschoolwereusedas theframeofreference
mustincreasingly
refineits
formation
suggeststhatresearchon self-esteem
10
GECAS
boththeconceptofself-esteem
focusbyspecifying
antecedents
anddelimiting
andthecontexts
in whichit operates[a conclusionalso reachedbySchwartz
to explaintheiranomalousfindings
& Stryker
(1970:122-23)in theirattempt
is beginning
regarding
theself-esteem
of"badNegroboys"].Suchrefinement
tobe pursuedintheresearchon socialclass andself-esteem
(Walsh& Taylor,
forthcoming)
andmayhelpto increasetheamountof variancein self-esteem
4% or less).
thatcan be explainedby social class (now typically
Identities
ContentofSelf-Concepts:
If thereis a centralthemein thesociologicalliterature
on theself-concept
it
thecontent
is theideathatthecontent
ofself-concepts
reflect
andorganization
as theevaluativedimensionof selfand organization
of society.Prominent
on thisproposition.
itdoes notbeardirectly
conceptis in socialpsychology,
The conceptof identity
does. Perhapsthisis one reasonthatthemostpromihas urgedthatwe
nentcontributor
to thesociologicalresearchon self-esteem
lies thecon"go beyondself-esteem"
(Rosenberg1979). Beyondself-esteem
attached
to
the
self
and comceptof identity,
thatvastdomainof meanings
prisingthecontentand organization
of self-concepts.
addressedin the
The interpenetration
of selfand societyis mostdirectly
to Mead (1934), Cooley
symbolicinteractionist
tradition[tracedprimarily
has splitintotwo major(and
(1902), and Thomas(1923)]. This tradition
and
conceptualizations
severalminor)variantsthatdifferon fundamental
foci, and on methassumptions
regarding
self and society,on substantive
(more
odology.The two mainvariantsare the "processualinteractionists"
interactionists"
commonly
knownas the"ChicagoSchool")andthe"structural
(associatedwiththe"Iowa School"). The divisionsbetweenthesetwooriendivisioninthesocialsciences
tations
reflect
inmanyrespectsthefundamental
oriand positivistic/nomothetic
betweenhumanistic/interpretive
orientations
entations[forreviewsof the "Chicago" and "Iowa" schools of symbolic
interactionism,
see Kuhn(1964) and Meltzeret al (1975)]. The conceptof
character
in each of theseorientations.
has a somewhatdifferent
"identity"
NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES IN SOCIAL INTERACTION
The key featureof the pro-
cessualinteractionist
as exemplified
byBlumer(1969), itsmajor
perspective,
and others(Glaser & Strauss1967; Strauss1978; Becker 1964;
architect,
Stone1962), is itsemphasison thesocial situationas thecontextin which
theprocessof negotiation.
through
identities
are establishedand maintained
Thisidentity
oridentity
(Blumstein1973),is a central
negotiation,
bargaining
aspect of the individual'sbroadertask of "definingthe situation"and
of thisfluidand
"constructing
reality."Meaningis viewedas an emergent
areseenprimarily
as
Actionandinteraction
reciprocal
processofinteraction.
"I" and theprobleminvolvedin
indeterminate
becauseof theunpredictable
THE SELF-CONCEPT
11
aligningactions.The construction
of identitiesforself and othersin the
situation
is alwaysa problematic
activity
basedon a tenuousconsensusofthe
participants.
Role-taking
becomesan important
in thisdiacognitiveactivity
lecticalprocess(Turner1962), as is the processof altercasting
[imposing
identities
on others(Weinstein
& Deutschberger
1963)]. In sum,identity
from
theprocessualinteractionist
is situated,
perspective
emergent,
reciprocal,
and
negotiated.
Furthermore,
processualinteractionists
view theself-concept
as
inseparable
cause and consequencein social interaction.
Theinseparability
ofself-concept
as cause andconsequenceis mostevident
in Goffman's
(1959, 1963, 1967) imaginative
and influential
variantof processual symbolicinteractionism.3
Utilizingthe metaphorof social life as
Goffman
describesinconsiderable
detailthe"stagingoperations"
theater,
and
"impression-management"
involvedin thepresentation
of selfin social encounters.
Desiredidentities
are theprizessoughtin theseinteraction
arenas,
whichareacquiredas muchbycompetent
oftheactorsas bythe
performance
socialconstraints
ofthesituation
andthedispositions
oftherelevant
othersin
theinteraction.
In Goffman'sview, self and othersconstruct
identities
by
of thesituationthatinvolvesall participants.
staginga definition
We are at
oncetheproductsand thecreatorsof theseencounters.
The methodological
of theprocessualinteractionists
predilection
has been
theobservation
of social
(especiallyfromthevantagepointof a participant)
in "natural"social settings.
interaction
The rationale[emphasized
by Blumer
(1969)] is thattheinvestigator
can bestcapturetheprocessof identity
construction
by entering
the "universeof discourse"of thissocial worldas a
role-taking
participant.
Othermethodologies
havealso beenusedtorevealthe
worldof theinteractantse.g. lifehissituated,
processual,andmeaningful
tories,historicalanalysis,and even the laboratory
when it is
experiment
viewed as a social situationcreated by the scientist(Denzin 1970; McPhail
1979).
Severalresearchstreamsrelevantto thedevelopment
of theself-concept
havebeengenerated
bytheprocessualinteractionist
orientation.
One bodyof
research,inspiredlargelyby Goffman'swork,deals withthedynamicsof
and altercasting
self-presentation
[see Arkin(1980) and McCall & Simmons
(1978) forreviews].These studieshave focusedon suchtopicsas tacticsof
identity
bargaining(Weinstein1966; Blumstein1973, the presentation
of
and accounts(Hewitt& Stokes1975; Scott& Lyman
motives,disclaimers,
3There
is somequestionregarding
Goffman's
"fit"within
theprocessualsymbolicinteractionist
For example,Gonos (1977) makes a persuasivecase for viewingGoffmanas a
tradition.
"structuralist"
ratherthanas an "interactionist"
because of Goffman'semphasison theformal
of social interaction
properties
ratherthanon processper se and itsinfinite
variations-a point
madewithsomecondemnation
by Denzin& Keller(1981).
12
GECAS
1968;Blumstein
et al 1974), and embarrassment
and face-saving
processes
(Goffman1967; Gross & Stone 1964; Modigliani 1971).4
In contrast
to thenaturalistic
methodsof mostsymbolicinteractionist
research,some recentstudieson thesetopicsuse experimental
methods.Of
special note is the work of Alexander and his colleagues (1971, 1977, 1981)
on "situatedidentity
theory."Buildingon Goffman'sideas aboutthe importanceof "expressionsgivenoff" as the basis formakingdispositional
inferences,
Alexander& Lauderdaledefinesituatedidentities
as "theattriin a particularsettingas a conbutionsthatare made aboutparticipants
sequenceoftheiractions"(1977:225). The establishment
of identities
is consideredthefundamental
taskof social encounters.
Alexanderconsidersan
identity
to be a workingself-meaning
constructed
out of thematerialof a
carriedfrom
particular
situation,
andnotan aspectof a person'sself-concept
one situationto another(Alexander& Wiley 1981). Alexanderarguesthat
people act (because of the self-esteem
motive)to createthe mostsocially
desirablesituated
identity
available(Alexander& Wiley1981).Alexander
has
testedsituatedidentity
studiesoriginally
theoryin a numberof experimental
theories
designedtotestothersocial-psychological
(e.g. cognitive
dissonance,
riskyshift,prisoner'sdilemma,and expectationstates).He has foundthat
situated
can accountfortheresultsoftheseexperiments
atleast
identity
theory
as well as theothertheoriesproposed.
in Alexander's
It shouldbe noted,however,thatthe"situatedidentities"
studiesaredescribedby evaluativeterms-warm,friendly,
honest-thatare
suchas "conforming
attachedto experimental
outcomealternatives
subject"
vs. "non-conforming
situatedidentisubject".Otherwaysofoperationalizing
results.Furthermore,
therelationship
tieswouldpresumably
producedifferent
actorsbringwiththeminto
and theidentities
between"situatedidentities"
socialsituations
has notbeenexplored.Alexanderandassociatesareawareof
thisissue buthave not yetpursuedit themselves[see Alexander& Wiley
interaction
(1981)]. Doingso wouldtakethembeyondtheimmediate
situation
andcloserto theconcernsof thestructural
symbolicinteractionists.
A secondbodyofworkinspired
bytheprocessualinteractionist
perspective
involves"labelingtheory."Labelingtheoryis an adaptationof the more
ofdeviantidentities
generalprocessofreflected
appraisalto thedevelopment
in theoriesof deviance].
[Wells (1978) reviewsthe place of self-concept
Labelingtheory
suggeststhatsociety'sreactionto an individual'sinitialdeviof deviance,sinceit
antbehavioris themajorfactorin thesystematization
ofthepersonlabeled(Lemert1951;
alterstheself-concept
andsocialidentity
Becker1963; Scheff1966). This societalresponsecan be eitherformal(e.g.
and"self-presentation"
4Theconceptsof "impression
management"
havebecomeincreasingly
prominent
withinpsychology
as well (see, forexample,Tedeschi1981).
THE SELF-CONCEPT
13
arrest
orimprisonment)
or informal
(e.g. stigmatization)
(Goffman
1963). As
on
Wells (1978) pointsout, the self-concept
is implicitin thisperspective
deviance:"[It] functions
moreas an intuitively
obviousintervening
process
thanas a variableto be actuallymeasuredin empiricalevents"(1978:193).
The relatedconceptof "self-fulfilling
prophecy"has generated
itsownbody
of researchshowinghow labelingprocessescreatecertain"self-fulfilling"
identities
intheclassroomandelsewhere(Jones1977;Rosenthal& Jacobson
1968).
Labelingtheory,
thedominant
theoryof deviance,has beencriticizedand
debatedin thepast decade (Wells 1978; Glassner& Corzine1978), partly
becauseitpositedtoopassivea rolefortheindividualinbecominga deviant.
tolabeling"
Conceptssuchas "self-labeling"
(Rotenberg
1974)and"resistance
thegeneraltrend
(Prus1975;Rogers& Buffalo1974)haveappearedreflecting
on deviof a moreassertiveselfin thesociologicalliterature
towardtheories
ance.
A thirdresearchstreamfromtheprocessualinteractionist
has
perspective
focusedon socialization.Some studieshavedealtwithchildsocializationand
self-concept
development
(Denzin 1972; Stone1970),butmosthavefocused
on adults(symbolicinteractionists
seemrecluctant
to studychildren).Mostof
thisresearch
hasdealtwithoccupational
socialization[e.g. Beckeretal (1961)
on socializationin medicalschool)], socializationintovarioussubcultures,
especiallydeviantsubcultures
(Adler& Adler1978; Becker1963), and contextsofresocialization
oridentity
transformation
(Lofland1977;Gecas 1981).
Mostof thesestudiesof socializationfromtheprocessualinteractionist
perthe
spectivearebasedon fieldresearch-i.e. ethnographic
reports
illustrating
operation
ofgeneralsymbolicinteractionist
assumptionsconcerning
commuformation.
and self-concept
nication,social interaction,
realityconstruction,
a numberof "sensitizing
The processualinteractionists
have contributed
formation
and
to thestudyof identity
concepts"and conceptualrefinements
morethantested
reformation.
has illustrated
Empirically,
theircontribution
theseideas (althoughtheincreasing
turntowardexperimentation,
mentioned
maintain
above,maychangethissituation).
Processualinteractionists
strongly
thatselfand societyinterpenetrate.
However,sincebothselfand societyare
viewedin fluid,processualterms,it is notclearhow social organization
is
intheorganization
reflected
ofself-conceptions.
Theconceptsofstructure
and
organization
remaina problemat boththe social groupand theindividual
levels[in spiteof thevaliantefforts
of Maines (1977) and Strauss(1978) to
arguethecontrary].
THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY IN STRUCTURAL SYMBOLIC
INTERACTIONISM
What
theconceptof "situation"is to theprocessualinteractionists,
theconceptof
"role"is to thestructural
interactionists
as theentreforconsidering
identity
14
GECAS
roles.The conareviewedmainlyas internalized
Identities
andself-concept.
nectionbetweenthesetwo conceptsis so close thattheyare oftenused
(Stryker1980:60; McCall & Simmons 1978:16;
together,as in "role-identity"
tosocial
linksself-conceptions
directly
Burke& Tully1977).Thisconnection
and it probecauserolesare seen as elementsof social structure,
structures
terms-i.e.
in organizational
theself-concept
videsthebasis forconsidering
putitthisway:
Stryker
ofrole-identities.
configuration
as a multidimensional
linkedto therolesandrole
multipleidentities
"Theselfis seenas embracing
relationshipsthat constitutesignificantelementsof social structures"
justhowroleslinkpersonstosocialstructures:
(1979:177).Gordonelaborates
aspects
"thevalue aspectsof rolesconnectpersonsto culture;thenormative
to social action;and the
to conductand structure
ofrolesprovidemotivation
muchof personal
aspectsof rolesdetermine
or interpretive
'sense-making'
memories,andplans"(1976:405). The
predispositions,
attitudinal
cognition,
associatedwitha
refersto thebehavioralexpectations
term"role"typically
in a social system.However,
positionor status(eitherformalor informal)
especiallywhen
used interchangeably,
"role"and "position"are frequently
they are translatedinto identities e.g. "father,""handball player,"
mediator".
of an
organization
is viewedas a hierarchical
of self-concept
The structure
Heiss
1978;
Simmons
McCall
&
(Stryker1968;
individual'srole-identities
of
as a saliencehierarchy
developedtheidea of self-concept
1968). Stryker
identitiesmost fullythroughthe concept of commitment.He proposes that
to an identityto thedegreethatone is enmeshedin social
''oneis committed
(1979:177). In thisview of selfdependenton thatidentity"
relationships
themoreconsequential
identity,
to
an
commitment
the
thegreater
structure,
in Stryker
(1980), especiallypp.
itis fortheindividual'sconduct[elaborated
emphasizesthere83-84]. Note thatStryker'sconceptionof commitment
ofthe"role-set"
The natureandextensiveness
lationalaspectofrole-identities:
and roleof
identities
network
the
or
(i.e.
"identity-set"
1957)
(Merton
to the
implies)affectthedegreeofcommitment
relationships
a givenidentity
identity.
commitment
process.He
Turner(1978) expandsourvisionof theidentity
mergerand
in the formof role-person
casts theproblemof commitment
underwhichthisis mostlikelytooccur.A distinction
examinestheconditions
and "individualdeterminants".
determinants"
is madebetween"situational
underwhichobserversconsiderthepersonas
The former
are circumstances
threeprinrevealedin therole. Underthelattercategory,Turneridentifies
tendto mergewiththose
merger:(a) Individuals
role/person
ciplesgoverning
them;(b) theytendtomergeroleand
othersidentify
rolesbywhichsignificant
motive)
(cf. theself-efficacy
so as to maximizeautonomy
personselectively
THE SELF-CONCEPT
15
andpositiveself-evaluations
(cf. theself-esteem
motive);and(c) theytendto
mergewiththoserolesin whichtheirinvestment
has beengreatest
(1978:13).
Turnerformulates
numerouspropositions
derivedfromtheseprinciplesof
role-person
merger.This workconstitutes
the mostextensiveand formal
attempt
to integrate
roletheoryand selftheory.
has often
Researchon self-concept
by structural
symbolicinteractionists
usedtheTwentyStatements
Test(TST), an open-ended
instrument
thatsimply
asks personsto give twentyanswersto thequestion"Who am I?" [Other
measuresof identity
have recentlyappeared e.g. Burke& Tully (1977),
Jackson(1981), Turner& Schutte(1981).] Originally
developedbyKuhn&
McPartland
(1954) theTST has been used in numerousstudiesfocusingon
identities
and theirorganization
[see Spitzeret al (1971) fora review].The
selfTST [and a parallelinstrument
developedwithinphenomenological
psychology
byBugental& Zelen (1950) calledthe"WhoareYou?" (W-A-Y)
forself-descriptions.
technique]
is nota measureofself-concept
buta stimulus
Measurement
becomespossiblewhentheresponsesarecoded.Variouscoding
between
schemeshavebeen developed,fromtheinitiallysimpledistinction
"consensual"
(public)and"subconsensual"
(personal)identities
(Kuhn& McPartland1954), to theelaborate,computer-based
schemedevelopedby Gordon (1968). Most such schemesaim to developidentity
categoriesthat(a)
and social systems,
enableexamination
of thelinkbetweenself-conceptions
and (b) revealpatterns
thatcompriseself-conceptions.
amongtheidentities
in theTST haveoftenbeenconsidered
to be
Self-descriptions
mentioned
first
moreimportant
to therespondent
thanthosementioned
later[an assumption
questioned
byGordon(1968) and McPhail& Tucker(1972); theimportance
of sequencehas been shown to vary across populations].Some coding
schemes[e.g. Kuhn& McPartland's(1954) distinction
between"consensual"
of"rolesand
and"subconsensual"identities,
andGordon's(1968) categories
memberships"]
explicitlyfocuson the"anchorage"of individualsin social
institutions.
Comparisonsare typicallymade betweenpopulations(men vs
women;lowerclass vs middleclass; college studentvs oldersubjects,etc)
or theirdiversity
of
withregard,forexample,to theirstructural
integration
self-designations.
forspecial
OtherresearchusingtheTST has isolatedparticular
identities
suchas gender,ethnic,or familyidentities
attention,
(Wellman1971; Gecas
atten1973).Theseparticular
identities
have,ofcourse,receivedconsiderable
tionoutsideof structural
as well, and have been
symbolicinteractionism
to variousmeasurement
subjected
strategies
[see Wylie(1979) fora review].
focuseseitheron socialization
Thebulkof theresearchon specificidentities
intotheidentity
on sex-rolesocialization),evalu(e.g. themassiveliterature
ationsoftheidentity
muchoftheresearchon racialand
[whichcharacterizes
16
GECAS
ethnicidentities],
or conflict
and strainin theself-concept
as a consequence
of role-transitions
[e.g. Lopata (973) on adjustments
to widowhood;and
Weigert& Hastings(1977) on identity
loss in thefamily].
The influence
ofsocial
structure
on self-conceptions
has been mostapparentat the macrolevelsof
analysis-i.e. wherethe societyor its majorinstitutions
are the focusof
attention.
Turner's(1976) workon "therealself"is exemplary.
He arguesthat
"thearticulation
of real selveswithsocial structure
shouldbe a majorlinkin
thefunctioning
and changeof societies"(1976:990). By "real self"Turner
meansthelocus of an individual'ssenseof authenticity,
responsibility,
and
accountability.
"To varyingdegrees,"Turnerproposes,"people acceptas
evidenceof theirreal selveseitherfeelingsand actionswithan institutional
focusoronestheyidentify
is
as strictly
impulse"(1976:990). Thisdistinction
reminiscent
ofKuhn& McPartland's
between"consensual"
(1954) distinction
and"subconsensual"
although
Turnerelaboratesto a muchgreater
identities,
extenttheconsequencesof thesetwo self-anchorages
forpersonalbehavior,
forsocial structure,
and forsocial change."Institutionals"
are likelyto be
and considertheselfto
future-oriented;
theyadhereto highmoralstandards
be createdthrough
theiractions."Impulsives,"on theotherhand,are likely
tobe oriented
tofeelconstrained
towardthepresent,
byinstitutional
roles,and
toviewtheselfas something
tobe discovered.Turnerseekstolocatethe"real
self"byusingan open-ended
format
to elicitresponseson thecircumstances
in whichpeople feelmost"authentic"
or "inauthentic"(Turner& Schutte
is notonly
1981). An important
of Turner'sapproachto self-concept
feature
itsconcernwithwhattheselfis (experientially),
butalso withwhattheself
is not(Turner& Gordon1981).
social change,Turner(1976) hypothesizes
thatoverthepast
Considering
and
fewdecadestherehas beena substantial
shiftawayfroman institutional
towardan impulsivelocus of self. (He also speculatesaboutFreud'srole in
thisshift.)Othershaveobservedsimilarchangesinself-orientation
facilitating
as a function
of changesin society:Riesmanet al (1950) arguedforan
historical
shiftfrom"inner-directed"
to "other-directed"
motivational
types;
Lifton's(1970) chameleon-like
"proteanman" and Snyder's(1979) high
of the individualin
individualare offeredas prototypes
''self-monitoring"
contemporary
society.Zurcher(1977) proposedthe"mutableself" to be a
torapidsocialchange.Marginality
anduncertainty
healthy
adaptation
seemto
facilitate
thedevelopment
of a "mutableself". Even if such conditionsare
thereis somequestionwhether
becoming
increasingly
prevalent,
rootlessness,
lack of commitment
to social institutions,
and "goingwiththe situational
flow"are salutary
of theselfeven in a rapidlychangingsociety.
features
therelationship
Symbolicinteractionists
havenotbeenaloneinconsidering
SOCIAL STRUCTURAL INFLUENCES ON SELF-CONCEPTION
THE SELF-CONCEPT
17
betweensocialorganization
andtheself-concept.
Thisconcernis increasingly
evidentin studiesof social structure
and personality
[see House (1981) and
Simpson(1980) forreviews].For example,Kanter's(1977) analysisof the
psychological
consequencesof powerand opportunity
in theworkplace,and
Kohn's (1969, 1981) extensiveworkon theconsequencesof occupational
conditions
forself-values
andintellectual
flexibility
(bothforming
theirargumentsin thesociologicaltradition
of Durkheim,
Weber,andMarx)arerelevanthere.In general,theMarxistperspective
(and variousderivatives)
has
conditionsin the develencouragedexaminationof social organizational
opmentof self-estrangement,
powerlessness,
alienation,and othernegative
aspectsoftheself-concept
[see, forexample,Bowles & Gintis(1976) on the
An
negativeeffectsof thepublicschoolsystemon students'self-concepts].
workfromthisperspective
earlyimpressive
is Luria's (1976) research,conductedin theearly1930s,on theeffectsof thecommunist
on the
revolution
consciousness
andself-conceptions
ofpeasantslivingintheremotevillagesof
USSR. Throughextensiveinterviews
withthesepeasants,Luria
Uzbekistan,
andhiscolleaguesfoundthatdegreeof exposureto communist
ideologyand
involvement
in collectivefarmworkhad a dramaticeffecton thelevel and
nature
ofself-awareness.
SomeofLuria'sconclusionsmayhavebeencolored
byhiscommitment
toMarxist-Leninist
ideologyandhisdesiretodemonstrate
itsbeneficial
consequences.The specificcontentof theideologymaybe less
in explainingchangesin cognitiveprocessesand self-awareness
important
thantheexperience
ofa revolutionary
movement
itself,especiallya movement
thatradicallyredefinesrelationships
betweenindividualsand betweenthe
individual
and society.Inkeles's(1960) work,forexample,has shownthat
modernization
has similarconsciousness-expanding
consequences.
SELF-CONCEPT AS A SOURCE OF MOTIVATION
Theself-concept
is, toa largeextent,an agentofitsowncreation.Thissection
focuseson threemajormotivesassociatedwiththe self-concept:
the selfor self-enhancement
efficacy
motive;the self-esteem
motive;and the selfmotive.Whilesociologistshave occasionallyventured
consistency
intothis
withtheirhistorically
domain,ithasbeendominated
bypsychologists,
greater
interest
in questionsof humanmotivation.
Motive
Self-Efficacy
Perhapsthemostfundamental
senseof self-concept
as cause is foundin the
notionof humanagency,expressedin such termsas effectance
motivation
(White1959;Harter1978),personalcausation(deCharms1968),self-efficacy
(Bandura1977), intrinsicmotivation(Deci 1975), intentionality
(Weigert
18
GECAS
1975; Giddens 1979; Taylor 1977), internallocus of control(Rotter1966) and
agent
self-control
(Mischel& Mischel1977). Thattheselfis an originating
seemscrucialto the fundamental
experienceof self. As Turnerobserves,
"behaviorsthoughtto revealthe trueself are also ones whose causes are
(1976:991).
perceivedas residingin thepersonratherthanthesituation"
has strongly
advocatedan active,
Historically,
symbolicinteractionism
of this
creative,and agentiveview of theself.One of thebasic assumptions
perspective
is thatmanis an actoras well as a reactor.BothJamesandMead
theseactive
emphasizedthe creativeaspectsof humanaction,attributing
metaproperties
to the"I" aspectof theself.Even Cooley,his looking-glass
oftheself
phornotwithstanding,
considered
effective
actionas thewellspring
of this
[see Franks& Seeberger(1980) and Reitzes(1980) forexaminations
themeinCooley'swork].The activeselfis also quiteevidentincontemporary
a hallmarkof the
expressionsof symbolicinteractionism,
constituting
forexample,in Goff"processualinteractionist"
orientation.
It is apparent,
as interpersonal
Weinman's(1959) workonimpression
control,
management
stein's(1969) workon altercasting
as identity
andvariousother
manipulation,
of constructing
andnegotiating
realities(Blumer1969;
discussions
situations
Stone & Farberman1970).
interactionists,
theyhave
Centralas theideaofhumanagencyis tosymbolic
beenreluctant
terms.[Stone& Farberman
(1970:467)
tocastitinmotivational
fortheconceptof motivation.]
reflect
thesymbolicinteractionists'
antipathy
As a result,theactiveselfis seen primarily
as themajorsourceof indeterand selfminancyin humanconduct,ratherthanas a sourceof motivation
on thepartofpsychologists
determination.
Therehasbeenno suchreluctance
fromtheself.One of the
to conceptualize
motivational
processesemanating
mostinfluential
has beenWhite's(1959) conceptof effectance
formulations
or competence
Whitemade a strongcase fortheoperationof a
motivation.
formastery
motivation
and theexperienceof selfas a causal agentin one's
behaviors(in anienvironment.
and manipulative
He notedthatexploratory
in theirown rightand characteristically
malsas well as man) are rewarding
occurwhenbasic physiologicaldrivesare satisfied[see deCharms& Muir
motivation"
literature,
and Ross (1976)
(1978) fora reviewof the"intrinsic
fora reviewof conditions
intrinsic
underwhichextrinsic
rewardsundermine
commotivation].Foote & Cottrell's(1955) concept of "interpersonal
effects
(p. 38),
petence,"whichtheydefineas theabilitytoproduceintended
to seek
Brehm's(1966) conceptof"psychological
reactance"(themotivation
freedomfromconstraints),
Adler's (1927) conceptof "mastery,"Smith's
(1968, 1978) discussion of the "competentself," Franks & Marolla's (1976)
based on efficacious
action),and
conceptof "innerself-esteem"
(self-esteem
' (1975) "powermotive"(striving
forpowerandcontrol)all stress
McClellands
thebasic motivational
elementof the activeself.
THE SELF-CONCEPT
19
The importance
of self-efficacy
as a majormotivation
becomesapparent
or suppression.
Within
whenwe considertheconsequencesof its inhibition
sociology,thishas been associatedwiththeconceptof alienation(Seeman
1959).Theclassicstatement
on thisassociationwas formulated
byMarx,who
is alienation.
arguedthatthemostimportant
consequenceof powerlessness
Alienation
hererefersto thefeelingof self-estrangement
producedwhenthe
products
ofworkareno longerreflections
oftheself.Thishappenswhenlabor
becomesmerelyinstrumental
and theindividualloses controloverthedirectionandproductsof his work.
Within
ofself-efficacy
is addressed
thecase fortheimportance
psychology,
by Seligman(1975), who has tiedhis conceptof "learnedhelplessness"to
redepression.Learnedhelplessnessrefersto a chronicsense of inefficacy
sulting
fromlearningthatone's actionshaveno effecton one's environment.
In recentformulations
ofthetheory,
Seligmanandhiscolleagues(Abramson
is likely
etal 1978)arguethatdepression
fromlearnedhelplessness
stemming
tooccurwhentheindividual
hisinefficacy
topersonalfailurerather
attributes
thanto universalconditions.Seligmanviews learnedhelplessnessas a
sufficient
of depression.His work,however,
butnota necessaryantecedent
accentuates
theimportance
of self-efficacy
forpsychological
well-being.
of self-as-cause
have
The conditionsand consequencesof theperception
becomea majorfocusofcontemporary
attribution
theory.Especiallyrelevant
herearetheself-attributions
individuals
makewithregardtopersonalcontrol
overeventsthataffectthem.Rotter(1966) distinguishes
between"internal"
and "external"loci of control,as generalizedexpectanciesthatindividuals
developin relationto theirenvironment.
DeCharms(1968) distinguishes
"origins"from"pawns".Kelley(1971) discussestheneedtoperceiveoneself
as exercising
controlinattribution
effective
processes.In mostoftheliterature
on consequencesof thesegeneralizedexpectancies,it is betterto be origin
(internal
control)thanpawn(externalcontrol)[see Wortman
(1976) andLefcourt(1976) forreviewsof causal attributions
and personalcontrol].
Bandura(1974, 1977, 1978, 1981), who has recently
been developinga
on self-evaluation
highlycognitiveversionof social learningtheory
centered
processes,has addedseveralrefinements
to theself-efficacy
literature.
Banduramakesan important
distinction
betweenefficacy
expectations
andoutcome
An outcomeexpectation
is an estimate
thata givenbehaviorwill
expectations.
lead to a certainoutcome;an efficacy
is thebeliefthatone can
expectation
successfully
perform
thebehaviorrequiredto producetheoutcome(Bandura
1977:193).The former
is a beliefaboutone's environment,
thelattera belief
aboutone's competence.Feelingsof futility
mayresultfrom(a) low selfor (b) perception
to one's acas unresponsive
efficacy
of a social structure
tions."To alterefficacy-based
of competencies
futility
requiresdevelopment
andexpectations
to changeoutcomeof personaleffectiveness.
By contrast
20
GECAS
basedfutility
necessitates
changesin prevailing
environmental
contingencies
thatrestorethe instrumental
value of the expectanciesthatpeople already
possess"(Bandura,1977:205).ThusBanduradifferentiates
perceptions
ofself
fromperceptions
of self in relationto social structurea distinction
that
providesa bridgeto traditional
sociologicalconcerns.
The motivational
significance
ofbeliefsregarding
self-efficacy
is also evidentin theliterature
on self-fulfilling
prophecies(Jones1977). Whenpeople
actonerroneous
beliefstheycan sometimes
altersocialrealityinthedirection
of theinitially
mistaken
belief(Bandura1981; Merton1957). Self-fulfilling
prophecies,
ofcourse,can eitherincreaseordecreaseself-efficacy,
depending
on thenatureof theindividual'sbeliefor expectation.
Motive
Self-Esteem
of oneselfhas
The motivation
to maintain
andenhancea positiveconception
beenthought
to be pervasive,even universal(Rosenberg1979; Wells 1978;
Kaplan 1975; Rokeach1979; Hales 1981a). Wells & Marwellobservethat
everyselftheorypositssome variantof thismotive(1976:54). Even some
thatdidnotstartoutas selftheories
becamesuch
social-psychological
theories
oftheself-esteem
largelybecauseoftheoperation
motive.Themostdramatic
transformation
occurredfor cognitivedissonancetheory[see especially
in whichthe
Greenwald
& Ronis(1978)]. The originalversionof thetheory,
motivational
factorwas a perceivedincongruity
betweentwo cognitiveelements,has essentially
beenreplacedwithone in whichself-esteem
motivates
dissonance-reducing
actions. Aronson(1968) and Rokeach (1968, 1973)
motivational
forceonlywhen
dissonanceis a significant
arguedthatcognitive
theself-concept
is involved.Greenwald& Ronisdescribethepresentstateof
forcein present
cognitivedissonancetheoryas follows:"The motivational
characversionsof dissonancetheoryhas muchmoreof an ego-defensive
ter. .
.
. The theoryseems now to be focused on cognitivechanges occurring
in theserviceof ego defense,or self-esteem
rather
thanin the
maintenance,
interest
of preserving
psychological
consistency"
(1978:54-55).
Othernotabletheories
becomeselftheories
becauseofthe
haveincreasingly
oftheself-esteem
motiveincognitive
perceived
importance
functioning-e.g.
Rokeach'svalue theory(1973, 1979), and attribution
theory.Rokeachhas
stated:"Thus,in thefinalanalysis,I havecometo viewtheproblem
recently
of attitudechangeand behaviorchangeas being ultimately
linkedto the
ofhowchangesarebrought
aboutin theself"(1979:53). Rokeach's
problem
resemblesthereformulated
theory
cognitivedissonancetheoryin thatboth
betweena cognitiveor
locatethemotivating
mechanismin thediscrepancy
Such discrepancies
are
behavioral
elementand theperson'sself-conception.
self-maintenance
and
Rokeachpointsout,becausetheythreaten
motivating,
self-enhancement
(1979:53).
THE SELF-CONCEPT
21
emphasizesgrowth,
motive,self-enhancement
As aspectsoftheself-esteem
focuses
whileself-maintenance
one's self-esteem,
expansion,andincreasing
behavioralstrategies.
different
on notlosingwhatone has. The twoengender
in the classroom,Covington& Beery
of self-esteem
In theirexamination
forsuccess"
as "striving
orientations
(1976) describethesetwomotivational
aremotivated
and"fearof failure."In general,personswithlow self-esteem
thanby self-enhancement.
moreby self-maintenance
to
theory,a motivation
In Duval & Wicklund's(1972) self-awareness
betweenone's idealized
changearisesfromone's awarenessofan incongruity
and one's self-image(the self as it appearsin behavior).The
self-concept
himor herto
individual'sevaluationof selfas less thandesirablemotivates
Duval & Wicklund
self-esteem.
behaviorinordertomaintain
improve
his/her
attention
as theinitialstepinthewholeprocess.They
emphasizeself-focused
etc) exertlittle
arguethatcomponentsof self (values, beliefs,identities,
untilactivated.(Thisviewis at oddswith
on individual
functioning
influence
ofself.)Activation
can
conceptions
mostsociologicalandmanypsychological
be inducedby anystimulussuggestiveof theself-Duval & Wicklundused
attention
in their studies.Once self-directed
mirrors
and voice recordings
oftheself.The
towardthemostsalientfeature
comesintoplayitwillgravitate
Rokeach
natureofsalienceis notwelldevelopedin thistheory.[By contrast,
subjectswithfeedbackdesignedto increasetheirawarenessof
confronts
(Rokeach
in salientaspectsof theirself-conceptions
discrepancies
apparent
comes to bear on a
1973).] Wicklund(1979) suggeststhat"once attention
takeshold"(1979:189). Thisevalof self,self-evaluation
specificdimension
uationcan be eitherpositiveor negative;but,accordingto Wicklund,only
consequences.At first
motivational
have important
negativeself-evaluations
theory;
theory"
appearsto be a cognitiveconsistency
glance,"self-awareness
is
motive,activatedby a negativeself-evaluation,
butin facttheself-esteem
of thispointby Hull
as themajorimpetusforchange.[See criticism
offered
& Levy (1979).]
motiveis most
of theself-esteem
Withinattribution
theemergence
theory,
processes(Bradley
bias in attribution
evidentin discussionsof self-serving
ofpeople
1978;Arkinet al 1980;Bowerman1978). Thisbias is thetendency
fornegative
totakecreditforpositiveoutcomeswhiledenyingresponsibility
researchrevealsstrong
outcomes.Bradley's(1978) reviewof theattribution
or defensive,causal attributions
supportforthe operationof self-serving,
[Miller& Ross (1975) presenta moreskepticalinterpretation].
inthegeneraltendency
todistort
motiveis manifest
reality
Theself-esteem
suchstrategia positiveself-conception,
intheserviceofmaintaining
through
ofpersonalhistory
es as selectiveperception
(Rosenberg1979),reconstruction
mechanisms
(Hil(Greenwald1980), and someof theclassicego-defensive
by
protectsself-esteem
gard1949). Rosenberg(1979) showsthatselectivity
22
GECAS
influencing
(a) whichotherswill be significant
(i.e. through
selectiveinteraction,imputation,
and valuation),(b) whichsocial comparisonswill be
made,and(c) whichaspectsoftheself-concept
willbe central.Psychological
in theserviceof self-esteem
selectivity
is also thebasis of Kaplan's (1975)
theory
of delinquent
behavior.Kaplan (1975) proposesthatlow self-esteem
duetofailurein thepursuit
of "legitimate"
activities
increasestheprobability
thata personwill engagein deviantactivitiesand selectdeviantothersas a
reference
groupin an effort
toincreaseself-esteem.
His ownresearchandthat
ofothers(Rosenberg& Rosenberg1978) seemsto supportthismotivational
component
of self-esteem
in theetiologyof devianceand delinquency.
SELF-ESTEEMAS AN INDEPENDENTVARIABLE There is a vast researchliterature
in whichtheself-concept
is considerednotin motivational
termsbutforits
effects
on a widerangeofpsychological
andbehavioralphenomena.Mostof
thisliterature
focuseson the evaluative dimensionof self-concept,
partly
of the self-esteem
becauseof the strength
and pervasiveness
motive.As a
result,self-esteem
hasbeenrelatedtoalmosteverything
atonetimeoranother
has been foundto affectcon(Crandall1973:45). For example,self-esteem
orpersuasibility,
formity
interpersonal
attraction,
moralbehavior,educational
andvariousaspectsofpersonality
andmentalhealth[see Wells
orientations,
& Marwell(1976) andRosenberg(1981) forreviews].In mostresearchareas,
low self-esteem
is associatedwithundesirableoutcomes,such as greater
to engage in delinquentbehavioror lower academicinterests,
propensity
and achievements.
aspirations,
but
is generally
viewedas havingfavorable
Highself-esteem
consequences,
theresearchliterature
is by no meansclearon thispoint.To be sure,high
self-esteem
is commonlyassociatedwitheffectiveand "healthy"personal
confidence
andindependence
functioning-e.g.
(Rosenberg1965),creativity
and flexibility
(Coopersmith
1967), and lowerdispositiontowarddeviance
(Kaplan 1975). But it can also be arguedthatdefensemechanisms
operate
moreeffectively
to inhibit
andforcefully
underconditions
ofhighself-esteem
theperception
of negativeinformation
(Byrne1961), therebymakingthe
individualless open to new experiencesand change(Katz & Zigler 1967).
Othersarguethata "medium"amountof self-esteem
is optimalforpsychologicalfunctioning,
boththehighand thelow positionsas dysconsidering
functional
(Cole et al 1967). Wells & Marwell(1976:69-73) reviewthe
stateof theresearchon optimalself-esteem.
confusing
Partof thereasonforthisconfusionis thathighself-esteem
maybe due
eithertogenuinely
basedon effective
orto
highself-evaluation,
performance,
based on insecurity
and confounded
witha
"defensively"
highself-esteem,
needforsocial approval(Hales 198ib; Crowne& Marlowe1964; Franks&
Marolla(1976). But theproblemis morecomplicatedthanthequestionof
differential
bases of self-esteem.
It has alreadybeen arguedthatthe self-
THE SELF-CONCEPT
23
esteemmotivedistorts
perceptions
andcognitions,
resulting
in self-deception.
This may be bothfunctional
and dysfunctional
forthe individual.In this
on the
regard,someinteresting
butdisconcerting
findings
havebeenreported
relationship
betweenaccuracyof self-perception
and depression(Alloy &
Abramson
1979;Lewinsohn& Mischel1980). Lewinsohn& Mischel(1980)
foundthatclinicallydepressedpatientswere morerealisticin theirselfand
perceptions
(as judgedby thedegreeof congruence
betweenself-ratings
observer
ratingson a numberof social competencies)
thanwerethosein the
"normal"controlgroup,who weremorelikelyto engagein self-enhancing
led
distortions.
This line of researchon the mixedbenefitsof self-esteem
information
Mischelto speculatethat"self-enhancing
processingand biased
self-encoding
may be botha requirement
forpositiveaffectandthepricefor
achievingit" (1979:752).
Motive
Consistency
in self-concepts
is considered
The motivation
forconsistency
and continuity
weakerthanthatforself-enhancement
(Jones1973). Some have evenquestionedits existenceas a selfmotive(Gergen1968). The researchevidence
seemsto supporttheclaimthatself-esteem
is a morepowerfulmotivethan
self-consistency
when the two are posed againsteach other(Jones 1973;
Krauss& Critchfield
1975). However,thismaybe due largelyto thenature
between
ofthecontrasts
madeandtheareasoftheirapplication.
Comparisons
of self-esteem
andself-consistency
haveall beenmadeat
therelativeefficacy
a circumstance
thatfavorstheselftheevaluativelevel of theself-concept,
is morerelevant
tothesubstantive
dimension
esteemmotive.Self-consistency
of the self-concept,
the domainof identitiesand beliefsabout self. Two
motive:thepsyliteratures
in social psychology
addresstheself-consistency
ofknowledge
on self-concept
as a cognitive
chologicalliterature
organization
and beliefs;and the sociologicalliterature
on identities
as sourcesof morefersto the cognitiveorganization
of
tivation.In the former,
consistency
between
attitudes
abouttheself.In thelatter,consistency
is thecongruence
identities
and rolebehaviors.
To considertheself-concept
ofknowledgeis toemphaas an organization
size itsinformation
whichstrivetoward
processing(or encoding)functions,
perceivedconsistency[see Epstein (1973), discussedearlier;Greenwald
(1980);Markus(1977, 1980)]. Lecky(1951), an earlyadvocateoftheconsisof a unifiedconceptualsystemas the
tencymotive,viewedthemaintenance
as a self-theory
needof theindividual.The self-concept
overriding
(Epstein
a coherent
viewofitselfinordertooperateeffectively
1973)seekstomaintain
to be a collectionof
in theworld.Markus(1977) considerstheself-concept
of selfthatorganizetheprocessing
cognitive
generalizations
(self-schemata)
relevant
becomeincreasingly
resistant
to
information.
These self-schemata
24
GECAS
inconsistent
information
[Fiske& Linville(1980) providea criticalassessment
socialpsychology].
Hull& Levy(1979) have
oftheschemaconceptincurrent
theory(whichis based on
recastDuval & Wicklund's(1972) self-awareness
information
ofself-concept
emphasizing
theself-esteem
motive)intoa theory
They propose that
processingand the organizationof self-knowledge.
in termsof its
"self-awareness
corresponds
to the encodingof information
relevancefortheself"(Hull & Levy 1979:757).Greenwald(1980) identifies
(as an organization
ofknowledge)
themotivational
elementintheself-concept
to preserve
as "cognitive
conservatism,"
whichhe viewsas "thedisposition
suchas percepts,schemata(categories),and
existingknowledgestructures,
memories"(1980:606). The motivationfor cognitiveconservatismand,
manifests
itselfintheactivereconstruction
hence,perceivedself-consistency,
(Greenofmemories
as well as in selectiveperceptions
andpersonalhistory,
is typically
self-serving,
wald1980). Thisselectiveprocessing
ofinformation
from
whichis whyitis sometimes
difficult
to distinguish
self-esteem
theories
(1980) considersthesetwoself-motives
self-consistency
theories[Greenwald
complementary].
The self-concept
as an organizationof identitiesalso providesa motivationalbasis forconsistency.Foote (1951) arguedthatindividualsare
motivated
to act in accordancewiththe values and normsimpliedby the
Morerecently,
(1980) has
Stryker
identities
towhichtheybecomecommitted.
the
withintheself-concept,
arguedthatthehigherthesalienceof an identity
a proposition
thathas receivedsome
greater
is itsmotivational
significance,
& Serpe,
empiricalsupport(Jackson1981; Santee& Jackson1979; Stryker
1982). The motivationfor consistencyor congruencebetween selfinseveral
andbehaviorshasbeendemonstrated
rolepreferences,
conceptions,
studies(Backman& Secord 1968; Burke& Reitzes 1981). Note thatselfconsistencydoes not mean actual consistencyand continuityin selfwe have a
conception,but ratherthe sense or perceptionof consistency;
and coneven if consistency
to createa sense of self-consistency
tendency
tinuity
maynotin factexist.
SELF-CONCEPT OVER THE LIFE CYCLE
overthelifecyclehas been
Thetopicof stability
andchangein self-concepts
of longitudinal
research.Also,
neglected,partlyowing to the difficulties
psychologists
life-cycleconcernshave been dominatedby developmental
(especiallyPiaget and Kohlberg),withtheir major interestin childhood
and by neo-Freudians
[especiallyErikson(1959)], withtheir
development,
focus on personalityratherthan on self-conceptper se. A promising
onthelifespan,
influences
is theincreasing
attention
tohistorical
development
suchas Elder's (1974) excellentlongitudinal
studyof a cohortof children
THE SELF-CONCEPT
25
duringtheDepressionand in thefollowingdecades. Some of thishistorical
research
has triedto demonstrate
thesociohistorical
relativity
of someof our
life-spanconceptsand assumptions,
especiallyour ideas aboutchildhood,
adolescence,
andold age (Gergen1980;vandenBerg1961). Buthereas well,
theself-concept
concern.
tendsto be an incidental
some
attempts
have
been
made
to considerself-concept
changes
However,
in thecontextof life-stageanalyses.Gordon(1976), forexample,uses a
of
"stage-developmental"
modelbasedlargelyonErikson's(1959) delineation
stage-specific
dilemmastodiscusschangesinself-concepts
overthelifecycle.
has tendedto focuson
Mostresearchon life-cyclechangesin self-concepts
The bulk of this
transitions
to or froma specific"stage"of development.
researchhas focusedon the transition
to adolescence,inspiredlargelyby
Erikson's(1959) notionof an identity
crisisassociatedwiththisstage.The
researchevidence,while farfromconsistent(cf Long et al 1967), seems
in adolescence
to supportthe idea of a self-concept
disturbance
generally
(Rosenberg1979; Simmonset al 1973; Simmonset al 1979). Rosenberg
in self-concept
is due,notonlytobiological
(1979)foundthatthisdisturbance
andhormonal
schoolto
changes,butespeciallyto theshiftfromelementary
and social
juniorhigh.The interacting
effectsof biological,environmental,
factors
on self-esteem
in earlyadolescenceareexaminedin greaterdetailby
tojuniorhigh
Simmons
etal (1979), whofoundthattheshiftfromelementary
is morestressful
forgirlsthanboys,andis especiallyhardon theself-esteem
of earlymaturing
(pubertal)girlswhohavebegundating.The shifttojunior
butearlyphysicaldevelopment
had
highhadlittleeffect
on boys' self-esteem,
a positive effect.Clausen(1975) also foundearlymaturation
to be advantageousforboys' self-concepts,
especiallyforthosefromthelowerclass.
and body-image,otheraspectsof the self-concept
Alongwithself-esteem
fromchildhoodto adolescenceare the
foundto be affected
by thetransition
locusand contentof self-knowledge
[e.g. see Rosenberg(1979) on theshift
from"external"
to "internal"
selfattributions,
Gordon(1976) on changesin
thecontentof role-identities,
and Montemayor
& Eisen (1977) on changes
fromconcreteto abstractmodesof self-representation].
as adolescence.
Laterlifestageshavenotreceivednearlyas muchattention
Recently,
someinterest
has beendirectedtowardthe"middleyears"andthe
"mid-life
crisis"(Brim1976; Levinson,1978), and towardold age and the
the"emptynest,"
varioustransitions
associatedwithit, suchas retirement,
bereavement,
anddeath.Thesearepromising
developments,
thoughthisliteof self-concept.
rature
is onlyindirectly
concernedwithmatters
thebestwayofaddressing
Focuson stagesofthelifecycleis notnecessarily
thequestionof continuity
over time.Another
and changein self-concepts
andcontent
of self-concepts
acrosstime,
approach
is toexaminethestructure
withan eyeto determining
andmodeofinteraction
theirstability,
variability,
26
GECAS
withlifeevents.In a sophisticated
andinnovative
analysis,Mortimer
andher
colleagues(Mortimer
et al 1981; Mortimer
& Lorence1980) examinedstabilityand changein self-concept
in a panel studyof 368 men. Usingfour
separatecriteria
of self-concept
stability,
Mortimer
et al (1981) founda high
levelof stability
forthissampleon fourself-concept
dimensions.Theyalso
demonstrate
how earlyself-concept
(focusingon the"senseof competence"
dimension)
shapesone's lifeeventsin theareasofworkandfamily,andhow
theselifeevents,inturn,havean independent
effect
on self-concept.
Through
a seriesof regression
analyses,Mortimer
et al (1981) demonstrate
"thatthe
relationship
betweenlifeexperiences
andtheself-concept
is truly
reciprocal."
MEASURING THE SELF-CONCEPT
Measurement
continuesto be a seriousproblemfacingresearchon theselfandvalidknowledge
inthisarea.
conceptandthemajorobstacletocumulative
Thereare severalexcellentreviewsand critiquesof the multitude
of selfconceptmeasures:Crandall(1973), Wells & Marwell(1976), and Wylie
(1974, 1979) focusmainlyon measuresof self-evaluation;
and Spitzeret al
Test. Wylie's(1974,
(1971; Spitzer1976) deal withtheTwentyStatements
1979) extensivereviewsgive themostdismalpictureof themethodological
stateofself-concept
theprevalenceofinstruresearch.She amplydocuments
mentsofuntested
orquestionable
reliability
andvalidity,
manyusedonlyonce
mostsocial and
or twice.Note, however,thatsuch problemscharacterize
measurement
psychological
(Wells& Marwell1976:250),andhaveespecially
plaguedcognitiveand motivational
constructs.
Scholarsin thisarea are at leastbecomingsensitiveto problemsof meaas a favorablesign].
surement
[whichevenWylie(1974:324) acknowledges
This is mostevidentin the studyof substantive
self-concept
(identities),
where,indeed,themostworkhas beenneeded.The TST, themostfrequently
used measureof identities,has been severelycriticizedas a measureof
forits lack of reliability
and its questionablevalidity(Wells &
self-concept
itimposes
Marwell1976:120;Wylie1974:246),as well as forthelimitations
on statistical
measuresof identianalysis(Jackson1981). Severalpromising
tieshaverecently
appeared.Burke& Tully(1977) haveproposedtheuse of
multiple-discriminant
analysison an "Osgood-type"semanticdifferential
scaleto discoverempirically
the(connotative)
meaningsassociatedwithparticularrole-identites.
Burke(1980) considersthisprocedureto be consistent
withthemeasurement
foran interactionist
requirements
conceptionof roleidentities.
Another
development
is Jackson's(1981) measureof commitment
to role-identities,
and cona 23-itemindexwithapparently
good reliability
struct
validity.Burke& Tully,as well as Jackson,have shunnedtheopen-
THE SELF-CONCEPT
27
endedformat
oftheTST. Turner(Turner& Schutte1981),on theotherhand,
people's
to elicitresponsesregarding
is developing
an open-ended
instrument
senseof their"real selves" and "falseselves." For certainaspectsof selfmeasure.
is stillthemostappropriate
concept,an open-endedformat
CONCLUSION
concernin socialpsycholThe self-concept
is rapidlybecomingthedominant
ogy. In sociology,whereit has long been a centralconcernof symbolic
to examinethe
interactionists,
the past decade has seen increasedefforts
of
and thecontentand organization
relationship
betweensocial organization
In psychology,the past decade or so has witnessedthe
self-concepts.
of several
of a number
of specificselftheoriesandtheconversion
emergence
majorcognitiveandbehavioraltheoriesintoselftheories.The pervasiveness
and enhancement
of theprocessesof self-concept
maintenance
may have
A
precipitated
whathas cometo be considereda crisisin socialpsychology.
key factorin thiscrisisforpsychologicalsocial psychologyhas been the
is a social situationin which
realizationthatthe laboratoryexperiment
"demandcharacteristics"
and "situatedidentities"are as relevantto the
manipulations.
subjects'behavioras are theintendedexperimental
of
has tendedto focuson thedevelopment
Sociologicalsocialpsychology
andcontextual
influences.
Psyself-concepts,
withan eyeto social structural
in theconsequencesof
has beenmoreinterested
chologicalsocialpsychology
forindividual
functioning.
Still,severaltrendsin therecentself
self-concepts
to
tendency
literature
are commonto bothdisciplines.One is theincreasing
viewtheself-concept
as active.The themeofhumanagencyis, ofcourse,an
to
oldonein socialpsychology
New is theattempt
(as wellas inphilosophy).
A relatedtrendis the
thisactiveaspectoftheself-concept
empirically.
capture
deterthattheselfanditssocialworldarereciprocally
increasing
recognition
implications
(of
and theoretical
mined,an idea withbothmethodological
1980). This bringsme to thethirdtrend:greater
Snyder1981; Wentworth
stateof selfconcern[mainlydissatisfaction
(Wylie,1974)] withthecurrent
will be condiscomfort
conceptmeasurement.
One hopes thisintellectual
vertedintothecreationof moreadequatemeasuresof self-constructs.
Thecurrent
be resolvedbyan
mayultimately
"crisis"in socialpsychology
as severalscholarshavesuggested
(Marlowe& Gergen
integrated
self-theory,
1969:643;Sherif1977); butwe stillhavea long wayto go. How toreconcile
theneedfora moreanthropomorphic
ofthehumanbeing(McCall
conception
in the self-con& Simmons1978:254), one sensitiveto the reciprocity
withtheneedforgreatermethodological
prerelationship,
cept/environment
cisionis themajorchallengein thestudyof theself-concept.
28
GECAS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I wishto thankMorrisRosenberg,JeylanMortimer,
Susan Hales, Milton
Rokeach,Michael Schwalbe,DrethaPhillips,and Ralph Turnerfortheir
helpfulcomments
and criticisms
of earlierdrafts.Workon thispaperwas
supported
in partby Project0364, Department
of RuralSociology,AgriculturalResearchCenter,Washington
StateUniversity.
Literature
Cited
Abrahamson,
L. Y., Seligman,M. E. P.,
Teasdale,J. D. 1978. Learnedhelplessness
in humans:critiqueand reformulation.
Abnorm.Psychol.87:49-74
Adler,A. 1927. The Theoryand Practiceof
IndividualPsychology.NY: Harcourt
Adler,P.A., Adler,P. 1978. Tinydopers:A
case studyof deviantsocialization.Symb.
Interact.1:90-105
Alexander,
N. C., Knight,G. W. 1971. Situatedidentities
and social psychological
experimentation.
Sociometry
34:65-82
N. C., Lauderdale,P. 1977. SituAlexander,
atedidentities
andsocialinfluence.
Sociometry40:225-33
Alexander,N. C., Wiley,M. G. 1981. Situatedactivity
and identity
In Soformation.
ciologicalPerspectives
on Social Psychology,ed M. Rosenberg,
R. Turner.NY: Basic
Alloy,L. B., Abramson,L. Y. 1979. Judgmentof contingency
in depressedand nondepressedstudents:sadder but wiser? J.
Exp. Psychol.Gen. 108:441-85
Arkin,R. M. 1980. Self-presentation.
In The
Selfin Social Psychology,
ed. D. M. Wegner,R. R. VallacherNY: Oxford
Arkin,R. M., Appelman,A. J.,Burger,J.M.
1980. Social anxiety,self-preservation,
and
theself-serving
bias in causal attribution.
J.
Person.Soc. Psychol.38:23-35
Aronson, E. 1968. Dissonance theory:
progress
andproblems.In TheoriesofCognitiveConsistency:
A Sourcebook,ed. R. P.
Abelsonet al. Chicago:Rand McNally
Bachman,J. G. 1970. TheImpactofFamily
Backgroundand Intelligenceon TenthGrade Boys. Vol. 2. Youthin Transition.
AnnArbor,Mich: Inst.Soc. Res.
Backman,C. W., Secord,P. F. 1968.The self
androleselection.In TheSelfin Social Ined. C. Gordon,K. J.GergenNY:
teraction,
Wiley.Vol. 1.
Bandura,A. 1974. Behaviortheoryand the
modelsof man.Am. Psychol.29:859-69
Bandura,A. 1977. Self-efficacy:
towarda uniofbehavioralchange.Psychol.
fying
theory
Rev. 84:191-215
Bandura,A. 1978. The selfsystemin reciprocaldeterminism.
Am.Psychol.33:344-58
A. 1981.Theselfandmechanisms
Bandura,
of
agency.In Social PsychologicalPerspec-
tiveson theSelf,ed. J. Suls. Hillsdale,NJ:
Erlbaum
Becker,H. S. 1960. Noteson theconceptof
commitment.
Am.J. Sociol. 66:32-40
Becker,H. S. 1963. Outsiders.Studiesin the
SociologyofDeviance. NY: FreePress
Becker,H. S. 1964. Personalchangein adult
life.Sociometry
27:40-53
Becker, H. S., Hughes, E. C., Greer,B.,
Strauss,A. 1961. Boys in White:Student
Culturein Medical School. Chicago:Univ.
ChicagoPress
Bern,D. J. 1972. Self-perception
theory.In
AdvancesinExperimental
Social Psychology,ed. L. Berkowitz
Vol. 6. NY: Academic
Blumstein,P. W. 1973. Audience,machiavellianism,and tactics of identitybargaining.Sociometry
36:346-65
Blumstein,
P. W. et al. 1974. The honoring
of
accounts.Am. Sociol. Rev. 39:551-66
Blumer,H. 1969. SymbolicInteractionism:
Perspective
andMethod.EnglewoodCliffs,
NJ:Prentice-Hall
R. G., Roed,J.C., Svendsen,A. C.
Boutilier,
1980. Crisesin thetwosocialpvhocevic
A critical comparison. Soc. I",
'.
'
43:5-17
Bowerman,W. R. 1978. Subjectivecompetence:the structure
process, and funccausal attributions.
tioningon self-referent
J. Theor.Soc. Behav. 8:45-77
Bowles, S., Gintis,H. 1976. Schoolingin
CapitalistAmerica.NY: Basic Books
biases in
Bradley,G. W. 1978. Self-serving
the attribution
of
process:a reexamination
thefactor fiction
question.J. Person.Soc.
Psychol.36:56-71
Bramel,D. 1968.Dissonance,expectation
and
the self. In Theoriesof CognitiveConsistency,ed. R. P. Abelsonet al. Chicago:
Rand McNally
Brehm,J.W. 1966.A TheoryofPsychological
Reactance.NY: Academic
Brim,0. G. Jr. 1976. Theoriesof the male
mid-lifecrisis.Counsel.Psychol.6:2-9
of
Brissett,D. 1972. Toward a clarification
self-esteem.
35:255-63
Psychiatry
Bugental,J., Zelen, S. 1950. Investigations
intotheself-concept:
theW-A-Ytechnique.
J. Personal. 18:483-98
Burke,P. J. 1980. The self:measurement
re-
THE SELF-CONCEPT
29
quirements
froman interactionist
perspeca theory of a theory. Am. Psychol.
tive.Soc. Psychol.Q. 43:18-29
28:404-16
Burke,P. J., Reitzes,D. C. 1981. The link Erikson,E. H. 1959. Identity
and thelifecybetweenidentity
androleperformance.
Soc.
cle. Psychol.Iss. 1:1-171
Psychol.Q. 44:83-92
Felson,R. B. 1980. Communication
barriers
Burke,P. J.,Tully,J. 1977.The measurement and the reflectedappraisalprocess. Soc.
of role-identities.
Soc. Forces 55:881-97
Psychol.Q. 43:223-33
Byrne,D. 1961. The repression-sensitization
Felson, R. B. 1981a. Self and reflected
apscale: rationale,reliability,
and validity.J.
praisalsamongfootballplayers:a testofthe
Personal.29:334-49
Meadian hypothesis.Soc. Psychol. Q.
D. L. 1977.Thedesembodied
Carveth,
44:116-26
dialectic:a psychoanalytic
critiqueofsociological Felson,R. B. 1981b. Social sourcesof inforrelativism.
Theor.Soc. 4:73-102
mationin thedevelopment
of self. Sociol.
Clausen,J. A. 1975. The social meaningof
Q. 22:69-79 Soc. Psychol.Q. 44:64-69
differential
physicaland sexualmaturation. Festinger,L. 1954. A theoryof social comIn Adolescencein theLifeCycle,ed. S. E.
parisonprocesses.Hum.Relat. 7:117-40
Dragastin,
G. H. Elder,Jr.NY: Wiley
Fiske,S. T., Linville,P. W. 1980. Whatdoes
Cole, C., Oetting,E. R., Hinkle,J. 1967.
theschemaconceptbuyus? Personal.Soc.
Non-linearity
of self-concept
discrepancy:
Psychol.Bull. 6:543-57
the value dimension. Psychol. Rep. Foote,N. N. 1951. Identification
as thebasis
21:58-60
fora theory
of motivation.
Am.Socio. Rev.
Cooley,C. H. 1902. HumanNatureand the
16:14-21
Social Order.NY: Scribner
L. S. Jr.1955.Identity
Foote,N. N., Cottrell,
Coopersmith,
S. 1967. The Antecedentsof
and InterpersonalCompetence.Chicago:
Self-Esteem.
San Francisco:W.H. Freeman
Univ. ChicagoPress
M. V., Beery,R. G. 1976. Self- Franks,D. D., Marolla,J. 1976. Efficacious
Covington,
worthandschoollearning.NY: Holt,Rineactionand social approvalas interacting
dihartandWinston
A tenativeformumensionsof self-esteem:
of selflationthrough
construct
validation.SociomCrandall,R. 1973. The measurement
esteemand relatedconstructs.
In Measures
etry39:324-41
of Social PsychologicalAttitudes,ed. J. Franks,D. D., Seeburger,F. F. 1980. The
Robinson,P. Shaver.AnnArbor,MI: Inst.
personbehindthe word:Mead's theoryof
Soc. Res.
universalsand a shiftof focusin symbolic
Crowne,W. J., Marlowe,D. 1964. The Apinteractionism.
Sym.Interact.3:41-58
provalMotive: Studiesin EvaluativeDe- Gallup, G. G. Jr. 1977. Self-recognition
in
pendence.NY: Wiley
primates-a comparativeapproachto the
Davis,J.A. 1966.The campusas a frogpond.
bidirectionalpropertiesof consciousness.
Am.J. Sociol. 72:17-31
Am.Psychol.32:329-38
R. 1968.PersonalCausation.NY:
deCharms,
Gecas, V. 1971. ParentalbehavioranddimenAcademic
sionsofadolescentself-evaluation.
SociomdeCharms,
R., Muir,M. S. 1978. Motivation:
etry34:466-82
social approaches. Ann. Rev. Psychol. Gecas, V. 1972. Parentalbehaviorand conin adolescentself-esteem.
29:91-113
textualvariations
35:332-45
Decii, E. L. 1975. Intrinsic
Motivation.NY:
Sociometry
Plenum
of migrant
Gecas, V. 1973. Self-conceptions
Dember,W. N. 1974.Motivation
andthecogand settled Mexican Americans. Soc. Sci.
nitiverevolution.
Am.Psychol.29:161-68
Q. 54:579-95
Denzin,N. K. 1970. TheResearchAct. Chi- Gecas, V. 1979. Beyondthe "looking-glass
self" towardan efficacy-based
cago: Aldine
model of
Denzin,N. K. 1977. ChildhoodSocialization:
self-esteem.
Paper presentedat the Ann.
Studiesin the Developmentof Language,
Meet. Sociol. Assoc., Boston
Social Behavior,and Identity.San Fran- Gecas, V. 1981. Contextsof socialization.In
cisco:Jossey-Bass
Social Ps chology:Sociological PerspecDenzin,N. K., Keller, C. M. 1981. Frame
tives,ed. M. Rosenberg,R. Turner.NY:
analysis reconsidered.Contemp. Sociol.
Basic
10:52-59
and
Gergen,K. J. 1968. Personalconsistency
and
thepresentation
ofself.In TheSelfinSocial
Drury,D. W. 1980. Black self-esteem
desegregated schools. Sociol. Educ.
Interaction.ed. C. Gordon,K. J. Gergen.
53:88-103
NY: Wiley
R. A. 1972.A Theoryof Gergen,K. J. 1971. TheConceptofSelf.NY:
Duval,S., Wicklund,
NY: Academic
and Winston
ObjectiveSelf-Awareness.
Holt,Rinehart
Elder,G. H. Jr.1974. Childrenof theGreat Giddens,A. 1979. CentralProblemsinSocial
Depression.Chicago:Univ. ChicagoPress
Theory.Los Angeles:Univ. Calif.Press
or Glaser,B. G.. Strauss,A. L. 1967.Awareness
revisited
Epstein,S. 1973.The self-concept
30
GECAS
ofDying:A StudyofSocialInteraction.
Chiality. In Social Psychology:Sociological
R. Turner.
ed. M. Rosenberg,
Perspectives,
cago: AldinePress
NY: Basic
Glassner,B., Corzine,J. 1978. Can labeling
1979.
The
organiA.
S.
Levy,
Hull, J. G.,
theory
be saved?Symb.Interact.1:74-89
to
zationalfunctions
of self:an alternative
Goffman,
E. 1959. ThePresentation
ofSelfin
Everyday Life. NY: Doubleday and
the Duvall and Wicklundmodel of selfawareness. J. Person. Soc. Psychol.
Company
37:756-68
Goffman,
E. 1963.Stigma.EnglewoodCliffs,
man:therelation
NJ:Prentice-Hall
Inkeles,A. 1960. Industrial
andvalof statusto experience,
perception,
Goffman,
E. 1967. InteractionRitual. NY:
Doubleday
ue. Am.J. Sociol. 66:1-31
ofcommitS. E. 1981. Measurement
Gonos,G. 1977. "Situation"versus"frame": Jackson,
The "interactionist"
and the "structuralist" mentto roleidentities.
J. Person.Soc. Psychol. 40:138-46
analysisof everyday
life.Am. Sociol. Rev.
42:854-67
Jacques,J. M., Chason, K. J. 1977. Selfesteemand low statusgroups:a changing
Gordon,C. 1968. Self-conceptions:
configscene?Sociol. Q. 18:399-412
urationsof content.In The Self in Social
Interactions,
ed. C. Gordon,K. J. Gergen, James,W. 1890. Principlesof Psychology.
Vol. 1. NY: Wiley
NY: Holt
Prophecies.
Gordon,C. 1976. Developmentof evaluated Jones,R. A. 1977. Self-Fulfilling
roleidentities.
Ann.Rev. Sociol. 2:405-33
NY: Wiley
evalA. G. 1980. The totalitarian
Greenwald,
ego: Jones,S. C. 1973. Selfandinterpersonal
uations:esteemtheoriesversusconsistency
fabrication
andrevisionofpersonalhistory.
theories.Psychol. Bull. 79:185-99
Am.Psychol.35:603-18
A. G., Ronis,D. L. 1978. Twenty Kanter,R. 1977.Men and WomenoftheCorGreenwald,
yearsofcognitivedissonance:case studyof
poration.NY: Basic
anddeviant
the evolutionof a theory.Psychol. Rev. Kaplan,H. B. 1975. Self-attitudes
behavior.PacificPalisades,CA: Goodyear
85:53-57
Gross,E., Stone,G. P. 1964. Embarrassment Publ.
andtheanalysisofrolerequirements.
Am.J. Katz, P., Zigler, E. 1967. Self-imagedisapproach.J. PerSociol. 70:1-15
parity:a developmental
son. Soc. Psychol.5:186-95
and identity
Guiot,J. M. 1977. Attribution
in Social Inconstruction:
Am. Sociol. Kelley,H. H. 1971. Attribution
somecomments.
Rev. 42:692-704
teraction.In Attribution:
Perceivingthe
Causes ofBehavior,ed. E. E. Joneset al.
modelofselfHales,S. 1980.A developmental
NJ:GeneralLearningPress
esteembased on competence
Morristown,
and moralbeof referhavior:a longitudinal
and cross-sectional Kelley,H. H. 1952. Two functions
encegroups.In ReadingsinSocial Psycholanalysis. PhD thesis. Univ. California,
ogy,ed. G. E. Swansonet al. NY: Holt
Berkeley
ofthe
theory
Hales, S. 1981a. The inadvertent
rediscovery Kinch,J.W. 1963. A formalized
of "self" in social psychology.Paper preAm.J. Sociol. 68:481-86
self-concept.
sentedat theAm. Psychol.Assoc. Meet., Kohn, M. L. 1969. Class and Conformity.
Homewood,IL: DorseyPress
Los Angeles
therelation- Kohn, M. L. 1981. Personality,
occupation,
Hales, S. 1981b. Understanding
a frameof referand social stratification:
ship betweenself-esteemand social deence. In Research in Social Stratification
sirability:A longitudinalstudy. Paper
and Mobility,ed. D. J. Trieman,R. V.
presentedat the Soc. Res. Child Devel.
Robinson,Vol. 1. Greenwich,CT: JAI
Meet.,Boston
Press
reconmotivation
Harter,S. 1978. Effectance
L. L. 1975. Considered:towarda developmentalmodel. Krauss,H. H., Critchfield,
Hum.Devel. 21:34-64
self-esteem
theoryand consistency
trasting
in predicting
attraction.
interpersonal
theory
Heiss,J. 1968.FamilyRoles and Interaction.
38:247-60
Sociometry
Chicago:RandMcNally
of Kuhn,H. 1964. Major trendsin symbolicinHeiss, J., OwensS. 1972. Self-evaluation
teractionist
blacks and whites. Am. J. Sociol. 78:
theoryin the past twenty-five
360-70
years.Sociol. Q. 5:61-84
T. 1954.AnempirHewitt,J. P., Stokes,R. 1975. Disclaimers. Kuhn,M. H., McPartland,
ical investigation
of self-attitudes.
Am. SoAm.Sociol. Rev. 40:1-11
ciol. Rev. 19:68-76
Hilgard,E. R. 1949. Humanmotivesand the
H. M. 1976.LocusofControl.Hillsconceptof theself.Am.Psychol.4:374-82 Lefcourt,
dale, NJ:Erlbaum.
House, J. S. 1977. The threefaces of social
40:161-77
psychology.
Sociometry
Lemert, E. 1951. Social Pathology. NY:
andpersonMcGraw-Hill
House,J.S. 1981.Social structure
THE SELF-CONCEPT
31
Levinson,D. J. 1978. TheSeasonsofa Man's
Boston:Routledgeand Kegan Paul
Life.NY: Ballantine
Merton,R. 1957. Social Theoryand Social
Lewinsohn,
P. M., Mischel,W. 1980. Social
Structure.
Glencoe,IL: The Free Press
competence
anddepression:
theroleof illu- Miller,D. T., Ross, M. 1975. Self-serving
soryself-perceptions.
J. Abnorm.Psychol.
biasesin theattribution
of causality:factor
89:203-12
fiction?
Psychol.Rev. 82:213-25
Lewis,J.D. 1979. A social behaviorist
of coginter- Mischel,W. 1979. On the interface
ofthemeadian"I". Am.J. Sociol.
nitionand personality:
Beyondthepersonpretation
85:261-87
situationdebate.Am.Psychol.34:740-54
Lifton,
R. J. 1970.Boundaries:Psychological Mischel, W., Mischel, H. N. 1977. SelfMan inRevolution.
NY: RandomHouse
controland the self. In The Self: PsychoLofland,J. 1977. Becominga world-saver
relogical and PhilosophicalIssues, ed. T.
visited.Am.Behav. Sci. 20:805-18
Mischel.Oxford:Basil Blackwell
Long,B. H., Henderson,
E. H., Ziller,R. C.
Miyamoto,S., Dornbusch,S. 1956. A testof
1967. Developmentalchangesin the selfthe interactionisthypothesis of selfAm.J. Sociol. 15:399-403
conceptduringmiddlechildhood.Merrillconception.
PalmerQ. 13:210-15
faceModigliani,A. 1971. Embarrassment,
Lopata,H. Z. 1973. Self-identity
work,and eye contact:testinga theoryof
in marriage
andwidowhood.Sociol. Q. 14:407-18
embarrassment.
J. Person. Soc. Psychol.
Its
17:15-24
Luria,A. R. 1976.Cognitive
Development:
Culturaland Social Foundations.Cam- Montemayor,
R., Eisen,M. 1977. The develfromchildhood
opmentof self-conceptions
bridge,MA: HarvardUniv. Press
Maines,D. R. 1977. Social organization
to adolescence.Devel. Psychol.13:314-19
and
social structure
in symbolicinteractionist Morse, S., Gergen,K. 1970. Social comthought.
Ann.Rev. Sociol. 3:235-59
andtheconceptof
parison,self-consistency,
self.J. Person.Soc. Psychol.16:148-56
Manis,M. 1977. Cognitivesocialpsychology.
Personal.Soc. Psychol.Bull. 3:550-66
J. T., Finch,M. D., Kumka,D.
Mortimer,
Markus,H. 1977. Self-schemataand pro1981. Persistence
a! J- -I i m]rnande-i.: selfcessinginformation
velopment: the
l ia
abouttheself.J. Person. Soc. Psychol.35:63-78
and Beconcept.In Life-SpanDevelopment
Marlowe,D., Gergen,K. J. 1969. Personality havior,ed. P. B. Baltes, 0. G. Brim,Jr.
and social interaction.
In TheHandbookof
NY: Academic.Vol. 4.
Social Psychology,ed. G. Lindzey, E.
Mortimer,J. T., Lorence, J. 1979. OcAronson.Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley, cupationalexperienceand theself-concept:
2nded. Vol. 3.
a longitudinalstudy. Soc. Psychol. Q.
42:307-23
McCall,G. J.,Simmons,J.L. 1978.Identities
andInteractions,
NY: The FreePress.rev. Mortimer,J. T., Lorence, J. 1980. Selfed.
conceptstability
and changefromlateadoJ.D., Yancey,W. L. 1971. Uncle
lescenceto earlyadulthood.In ResearchIn
McCarthy,
TomandMr.Charlie:Metaphysical
and MentalHealth,ed. R. G.
pathsin
Community
the studyof racism and personaldisorSimmons.Greenwich:JAIPress.Vol. 2.
Am.J. Sociol. 76:648-72
N. 1979. The biosociologyof the
ganization.
Petryszakk,
social self.Sociol. Q. 20:291-303
McClelland,D. C. 1975. Power: The Inner
R. E. 1979. Black
Experience.NY: Irvington
Porter,J. R., Washington,
Ann.Rev. Sociol.
and self-esteem.
identity
McPartland,T. S. 1965. Manual for the
5:53-74
Twenty-Statements
Problem.Kansas City:
Greater
KansasCityMentalHealthFounda- Prus,R. C. 1975. Resistingdesignations:
an
tion.rev. ed.
extensionof attribution
theoryintoa negotiatedcontext.Sociol. Inq. 45:3-14
researchis
McPhail,C. 1979. Experimental
withsymbolicinteraction.
convergent
Sym- Quarantelli,E. L., Cooper, J. 1966. Selfbol. Interact.2:89-94
test of
conceptionsand others:a further
Meadianhypotheses.
Sociol. Q. 7:281-97
McPhail,C., Tucker,C. W. 1972. The classification
and orderingof responsesto the Reitzes,D. C. 1980. Beyondthelooking-glass
self:Cooley'ssocialselfanditstreatment
in
question, "Who am I?". Sociol. Q.
13:329-47
textbooks.Contemp.Sociol.
introductory
9:631-40
Mead, G. H. 1934. Mind,Self,and Society.
Riesman,D., Glazer,N., Denney,R. 1950.
Chicago:Univ. ChicagoPress
TheLonelyCrowd.New Haven,CT: Yale
Meddin,J. 1979. Chimpanzees,symbols,and
the reflectiveself. Soc. Psychol. Q.
Univ. Press
42:99-109
Rogers,J.W., Buffalo,M. D. 1974. Fighting
B. N., Petras,J.W., Reynolds,L. T.
back: ninemethodsof adaptation
to a deviMeltzer,
1975. SymbolicInteractionism:
antlabel. Soc. Probl. 22:101-18
Genesis,
Varietiesand Criticism.London/Henley/Rokeach,M. 1979. Someunresolved
issuesin
32
GECAS
theories
ofbeliefs,attitudes,
andvalues.PaAm. Sociol. Rev. 33:46-62
perpresented
attheNebraskaSymp.on Mo- Seeman,M. 1959. On themeaningof alientivation,
March,1979
ation.Am. Sociol. Rev. 24:783-91
Rokeach,M. 1968. A theoryof organization Seligman,M. E. P. 1975. Helplessness:On
andchangewithin
and Death. San
value-attitude
systems.
J.
Suppression,
Development,
Soc. Iss. 24:13-32
Francisco:Freeman
Rokeach,M. 1973.TheNatureofHumanVal- Sherif,M. 1977.The crisisin socialpsycholoues. NY: FreePress
gy.Personal.Soc. Psychol.Bull. 3:368- 82
Rosenberg,
F. R., Rosenberg,M. 1978. Self- Shibutani,T. 1961. Societyand Personality.
esteemand delinquency.
J. YouthAdolesc.
EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:Prentice-Hall
7:279-94
Shrauger,J. S., Schoeneman,T. J. 1979.
Rosenberg,
M. 1965. Societyand theAdolesSymbolic interactionistview of selfcentSelf-Image.Princeton,NJ: Princeton
concept:through
the lookingglass darkly.
Univ.Press
Psychol.Bull. 86:549-73
Rosenberg,M. 1973. Whichsignificant
oth- Simmons,R. G., Blyth,D. A., Van Cleave,
ers?Am.Behav. Sci. 16:829-60
E. F., Bush, D. M. 1979. Entryintoearly
Rosenberg,M. 1975. The dissonantcontext
adolescence:theimpactof schoolstructure,
and theadolescentself-concept.
In Adolespuberty,and earlydatingon self-esteem.
cence in the Life Cycle: Psychological
Am. Sociol. Rev. 44:948-67
Changeand Social Context,ed. S. Drag- Simmons,R. G., Rosenberg,F., Rosenberg,
astin,G. H. Elder.Washington
M. 1973. Disturbancein theself-imageat
DC: Hemisphere
adolescence.Am. Sociol. Rev. 38:553-68
Rosenberg,M. 1976. Beyond self-esteem: Simpson,M. 1980.The sociologyofcognitive
someneglectedaspectsof theself-concept. development.
Ann.Rev. Sociol. 6:287-313
Paperpresented
at theAm. Sociol. Assoc. Smith,M. B. 1968. Competenceand socialMeet.,New YorkCity
ization.In Socializationand Society,ed. J.
Rosenberg,
M. 1979.Conceiving
theSelf.NY:
A. Clausenet al. Boston:Little,Brown
Basic
Smith,M. B. 1978. Perspectives
on selfhood.
Rosenberg,M. 1981. The sociologyof the
Am.Psychol.33:1053-63
In Social Psychology:Socio- Snyder,M. 1979. "Self-monitoring
process."
self-concept.
logicalPerspectives,
Adv.Exper.Soc. Psychol.12:85-128
ed. M. Rosenberg,R.
Turner.NY: Basic
Snyder,M. 1981. On the influenceof indiRosenberg,M., Pearlin,L. I. 1978. Social
viduals on situations. In Personality,
class and self-esteem
amongchildrenand
Cognition, and Social Interaction,ed.
adults.Am.J. Sociol. 84:53-77
N. Cantor,J. F. Kihlstrom.
Hillsdale,NJ:
Rosenberg,
M., Simmons,R. G. 1972. Black
LawrenceErlbaum
and WhiteSelf-Esteem:
The UrbanSchool Snygg,D., Combs, A. W. 1949. Individual
Child.Washington
for PsyDC: Am. Sociol. Assoc.
Behavior:A Frame of Reference
Rose Monogr.Ser.
chology.NY: Harper
Rosenthal,
R., Jacobson,L. 1968. Pygmalion Spitzer,S. P. 1976. Perceivedvalidityandasin the Classroom.NY: Holt, Rinehart&
sessmentof theself:a decadelater.Sociol.
Winston
Q. 17:236-46
Ross, L. 1977. The intuitive
and Spitzer,S., Couch,C., Stratton,
J. 1971. The
psychologist
in the attrihis shortcomings:
Assessmentof the Self. Iowa City, IA:
distortions
butionprocess.InAdvancesinExperimental Sernoll
Social Psychology,
ed. L. Berkowitz,Vol. Stone,G. P. 1962. Appearanceandtheself.In
10. NY: Academic
HumanBehaviorand Social Processes,ed.
Ross,M. 1976.Theself-perception
A. M. Rose. Boston:HoughtonMifflin
ofintrinsic
InNewDirectionsinAttribution Stone,G. P. 1970. The playof littlechildren.
motivation.
In Social Psychology
InThroughSymbolic
Research,J.H. Harvey,W. J. Ickes,R. F.
Kidd,Vol. 1. NY: Wiley
teraction,ed. G. P. Stone, H. A. FarM. 1974. Self-labeling:
Rotenberg,
a missing
berman.Waltham,MA: Ginn-Blaisdell
linkinthe"societalreaction"
H. A. 1970. Social
ofdevi- Stone,G. P., Farberman,
theory
ance. Sociol. Rev. 22:335-54
PsychologyThroughSymbolicInteraction.
Rotter,J. B. 1966. Generalizedexpectancies
Waltham,MA: Ginn-Blaisdell
forinternal
versusexternalcontrolof rein- Strauss,A. L. 1978. Negotiations:Varieties,
forcement.
Psychol.Monogr.80
Contexts,
Processes,and Social Order.San
Scheff,T. J. 1966. BeingMentallyIll: A SoFrancisco:Jossey-Bass
Stryker,S. 1968. Identitysalience and role
ciologicalTheory.Chicago:Aldine
J. Mar. Fam. 30:558-64
Schwartz,M., Stryker,S. 1970. Deviance,
performance.
in twosocial
S. 1977. Developments
DC: Am. Stryker,
Selves,and Others.Washington
Sociol. Assoc.
ofmutowardan appreciation
psychologies:
tal relevance.Sociometry
40:145-60
Scott,M. B., Lyman,S. W. 1968. Accounts.
THE SELF-CONCEPT
33
Stryker,
S. 1979. The profession:comments
cupationalcorrelatesof multidimensional
froman interactionist's
perspective.
Sociol.
self-esteem:comparionsamong garbageFocus 12:175-86
collectors,bartenders,
professors,
andother
Stryker,
S. 1980. SymbolicInteractionism:
A
workers.Sociol. Soc. Res. (Forthcoming)
SocialStructural
Version.MenloPark,CA: Webster,M. Jr.,Sobieszek.B. 1974. Sources
Benjamin/Cummings
of Self-Evaluation:A Formal Theoryof
Stryker,
S., Serpe,R. T. 1982. Commitment, Significant
OthersandSocialInfluence.
NY:
identity
salienceand role behavior:theory
Wiley
andresearch
examples.In Personality
Roles Wegner,D. M., Vallacher,R. R., eds. 1980.
and Social Behavior, ed. W. Ickes, E.
TheSelfin Social Psychology.
NY: Oxford
Knowles.NY: Springer
Univ. Press
Taylor,C. 1977. Whatis humanagency?In Weigert,A. J. 1975. Substantitial
self:a primTheSelf: Psychologicaland Philosophical
itive termfor a sociologicalpsychology.
Issues,ed. T. Mischel.Oxford:Basil BlackPhilos. Soc. Sci. 5:43-62
well
Weigert,A. J., Hastings,R. 1977. Identity
Taylor,M. C., Walsh, E. J. 1979. Explaloss, family,and social change.Am.J. Sonationsofblackself-esteem:
someexpirical
ciol. 82:1171-85
tests.Soc. Psychol.Q. 42:242-53
Weinstein,E. A. 1966. Towarda theoryof
Tedeschi,J.T. 1981.Impression
Management
interpersonal
tactics.In Problemsin Social
Theoryand Social PsychologicalResearch.
Psychology,ed. C. W. Backman,P. F.
NY: Academic
Secord.NY: McGraw-Hill
Thomas, D. L., Gecas, V., Weigert,A., Weinstein,E. A. 1969. The development
of
Rooney,E. 1974. FamilySocializationand
interpersonal
competence.In Handbookof
the Adolescent.Lexington,MA: D. C.
SocializationTheoryand Research,ed. D.
Heath
A. Goslin.Chicago:Rand McNally
Thomas,W. I. 1923. The UnadjustedGirl. Weinstein,E. A., Deutschberger,
P. 1963.
Boston:Little,Brown
Some dimensionsof altercasting.
SociomeR. H. 1962. Role-taking:
Turner,
processvertry26:454-66
susconformity.
InHumanBehaviorand SoWellman,B. 1971. I am a student.Sociol.
cial Processes, ed. A. M. Rose. Boston:
Educ. 44:422-37
Mifflin
Houghton
Wells, L. E. 1978. Theoriesof devianceand
Turner,R. H. 1968. The self-conception
in
theself-concept.
Soc. Psychol.41:189-204
socialinteraction.
In TheSelfinSocialInter- Wells. L. E., Marwell,G. 1976. Self-Esteem:
action,ed. C. Gordon,K. Gergen. NY:
Its Conceptualizationand Measurement.
Wiley
BeverlyHills: Sage
R. H. 1976.Therealself:frominstitu- White,R. W. 1959. Motivation
Turner,
reconsidered:
tiontoimpulse.Am.J. Sociol. 81:989-1016
the conceptof competence.Psychol.Rev.
R. H. 1978. The roleand theperson.
Turner,
66:297-333
Am.J. Sociol. 84:1-23
W. M. 1980. Contextand UnderWentworth,
Turner,R. H., Gordon, S. L. 1981. The
standing.NY: Elsevier
boundariesof the self: the relationship
of Wicklund,R. A. 1979. The influence
of selfto inauthenticity
authenticity
in theselfconawarenessof humanbehavior.Am. Sci.
ception.In The Self-Concept:
in
Advances
67:187-93
Theoryand Research,ed. M. Lynch,A.
Wortman,B. 1976. Causal attributions
and
Norem-Hebeisen,
K. Gergen.Cambridge,
personalcontrol.InNewDirectionsinAttriMA:Ballinger,
Springer
butionResearch,ed. C. H. Harvey,W. J.
Turner,
R. H., Schutte,J. 1981. The trueself
Ickes, R. F. Kidd, Vol. 1. NY: Wiley
methodfor studyingthe self-conception. Wylie, R. C. 1974. The Self-Concept.LinSymbol.Interact.4:1-20
coln, NE: Univ. NebraskaPress.Vol. 1
Vallacher,
R. R. 1980. An introduction
toself Wylie, R. C. 1979. The Self-Concept.LinIn TheSelfinSocial Psychology,
theory.
ed.
coln, NE: Univ. NebraskaPress.Vol. 2
D. M. Wegner,R. R. Vallacher.NY: Ox- Yancey,W. L., Rigsby,L., McCarthy,
J. D.
fordUniv.Press
1972. Social positionand self-evaluation:
Van denBerg,J. H. 1961. TheChangingNatherelativeimportance
of race. Am.J. SotureofMan. NY: Norton
ciol. 78:338-59
Veblen,T. 1899. The Theoryof theLeisure Zurcher,L. A. Jr. 1977. The MutableSelf.
Class. NY: MacMillan
BeverlyHills: Sage
Walsh, E. J., Taylor, M. C. 1982. Oc-