Title
Author(s)
Patron-client politics in Hong Kong
Kwong, Kam-kwan.; 鄺錦鈞.
Citation
Issued Date
URL
Rights
2004
http://hdl.handle.net/10722/52457
The author retains all proprietary rights, (such as patent rights)
and the right to use in future works.
Patron-Client Politics in Hong Kong
By
Kwong Kam Kwan
( f l a m
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Hong Kong
2004
Declaration
I declare that this thesis represents my own work, except where due
acknowledgement is made, and that it has not been previously included in a thesis,
dissertation or report submitted to this University or to any other institution for a degree,
diploma or other qualifications.
Signed
Kwong Kam-kwan
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to a number of people who gave me support in the progress of
completing the thesis. My fellow colleagues Mr. Eilo Yu Wing-yat, Mr. Benson Wong
Wai-kwok and Mr. Cheung Yat-fung, who have given me a lot of insightful comments
on my topics. The co-working spirits we have been experienced over the years at the
University of Hong Kong and our brotherhood-like friendship gained are unforgettable.
I must thank several Legislative Councilors for granting me in-depth interviews,
including Mr. Lee Wah-ming, Mr. Chan Wai-yip, Miss Choi So-yuk and Mr. Tang
Siu-tong. I cannot name other district-level activists who gave me inside information,
but their help was indispensable to the completion of my thesis. Thanks are also due to
all those political elites who answered my questionnaires on the Chief Executive
election, Legislative Council elections and District Council elections. Without their
support, my empirical data could not have been enriched considerably.
Finally, I must extend my gratitude to my girlfriend, who has supported and
encouraged me all the time, and helped me take care of my four lovely puppies when I
was crazily constructing this thesis.
Last but not least, I must make use of this opportunity to express my most sincere
appreciation and graceful heart to my respectful supervisor, Professor Sonny Lo
Siu-hing, who has taught me the insightful knowledge in political sciences as well as
public administration.
in
Abstract of thesis entitled
"Patron-Client Politics in Hong Kong
Submitted by
Kwong Kam-kwan
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
at the University of Hong Kong
in 2004
This thesis proves that patron-client relations are indispensable to all levels of Hong
Kong's election, including the elections held for the Chief Executive, Legislative
Council, District Councils, grassroots level institutions such as MACs, HYK and
pro-Beijing district groups. Patron-client relations have varying degree of significances
in these four levels of elections. Patron-client network plays a critical role in Chief
Executive election. However, patron-client relations tend to assume a lesser importance
in Legislative Council's direct elections because of the larger geographical
constituencies, although ren-ch'ing and guanxi are still crucial in the candidates'
campaign for functional constituencies election.
At the grassroots level, clientelism is crucial for political party members to
penetrate housing groups, such as MACs and OCs. Due to the fact that the geographical
constituencies in District Council elections are smaller than LegCo's direct elections,
patron-client politics tends to be a decisive factor shaping candidates' chances of
electoral victory at the district level. Though the 2003 District Council elections saw a
decline in the impact of patron-client relations, patronage politics still persists in MACs,
HYK and pro-Beijing group mobilization of voter registration in the 2004 LegCo's
direct elections.
In short, patron-client relations are particularly prominent in CE election, LegCo's
functional constituency elections and party infiltration into housing organizations at the
grassroots level.
Table of Contents
Declaration
Acknowledgements
Tables of Contents
List of Illustration
Abbreviations
Chapter 1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
Chapter 2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
Chapter 3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
1
ii
iv
vii
x
Introduction
Introduction
Patron-Client Politics From British Hong Kong Colony to
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China
The Concept of Patron-Client Politics
Research Hypotheses and Arguments in the Thesis
Research Methodology
Summary
Toward An Analytical Framework of Analysis
Introduction
The Existing Literature on Patron-Client Relations
An Analytical Framework of Patron-Client Politics
Summary
Patron-Client Relations and Public Administration
Introduction
Public Administration and Patron-Client Relations
Appointment System from the Colonial Era to Post-Colonial
Era
The Politics of HKSAR Awards in Advisory Bodies
Corruption, Patron-client Politics and Public Administration
Beijing's Patronage and Its Impact on Hong Kong's Politics
and Public Administration
Summary
IV
1
2
6
30
32
34
35
37
59
72
74
74
89
95
100
106
113
Chapter 4
4.1
The Chief Executive Election and Patron-Client Politics
Introduction
Patron-Client Politics in the First CE Election
The 2002 CE Election
Survey Findings on the Second CE Election in 2002
Summary
114
117
126
132
149
Chapter 5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
The Legislative Council Election and Patron-Client Politics
Introduction
Interview with Legislative Councilors
Survey Results
Summary
153
156
161
184
Chapter 6
District Council Elections and Grassroots Level Politics
Introduction
Role of District Councilors
The 1999 and 2003 District Councils Elections
MACs and Patron-Client Relations
The Case of Tseung Kwan O Women Center
Case Study of Patron-Client Relations: District Council
Candidate and MAC in Kowloon City Constituency
Heung Yee Kuk (HYK) and Patron-Client Politics
The Cases of Chan Yat-sun and Lau Wong-fat: Clients of the
Colonial Government and the HKSAR Administration
Summaty
4. 2
4.3
4.4
4.5
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.6
6.7
6.8
Chapter 7
7.1
7.2
7.3
Conclusion
The significances of patron-client relations in the election
Scott's Features of Patron-Client Politics and the Hong Kong
Case
The Past, Present and Future of Patron-Client Politics in Hong
Kong
186
186
187
197
199
203
207
210
215
216
218
221
Appendices
Bibliography
224
238
vi
List of Illustrations
Figures:
1.1
2.1
2.2
3.1
4.2
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
Patron-Client Cluster and Pyramid
Simple factions and support structures in Hong Kong
The Dynamics of Patron-Client Politics in Hong Kong
Sources and Types of Ethical Responsibility
Profiles of Selected Members of the Preparatory Committee in
1996
Profile 1: Maria Tam
Profile 2: Tam Yiu Chung
Profile 3: Leung Chun Ying
Profile 4: Lee Chak Tim
Profile 5: Raymond Wu Wai Yung
Profile 6: Fong Wong Gut Man
Profile 7: Arthur Lee Kwok Cheung
Profile 8: Paul Ip Kwok Wah
Patron-Client Relations Pyramid in District Council Elections
Patron-Client Pyramid in MAC Level
Patron-Clientelist Ties of Local Politics revealed by Tseung Kwan
0 Women Centre
Institutional Privileges of Indigenous Inhabitants
Vll
10
45
58
77
119
119
119
120
120
121
121
122
122
191
197
202
207
Tables:
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.1
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Three Orders of Political Relations
Exchange of Benefits
Survey on 17 Most Prestigious Occupations in Hong Kong
Pattern of Beneficiaries from Corruption in Less Developed
Nations
Changes in Loyalty Ties and Party Inducements
The Relationship Between Loyalty Bonds and Party Inducements
Personalistic ties in the First Grand Bauhinia Medal (GBM)
Award
Benefits of Li Ka Shing under the Tung Regime
The course of TVB in getting benefits through its communications
with Tung Chee-hwa
Run Run Shaw's dyadic ties with Tung Chee-hwa
Profile of Local Elites Co-opted into Chinese Consultative
Organizations
Members in an Advisory Body violating the "6-year rule"
List of Appointed DC councilors with patriotic organization
background
Exchange of Benefits
Four Sectors of the Election Committee
Election Members' Attitude Toward Criticism of Tung.
Nomination of Tung as Candidate
129
134
136
137
4.5
4.6
Factors of Nominating Tung
Expectations of Election Committee Members
137
138
4.7
4.8
4.9
Political Expectation of Election Committee Members
How did you know the candidate, Mr. Tung
The Legislative Councilors elected through Election Committee,
can play a check and balance role in the Council
As Mr. Tung was the only candidate in the CE election, the
majority of nomination can help to increase his legitimacy
The majority of nomination can help Mr. Tung to build up a
strong government
139
140
141
2.2
2.3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
4.10
4.11
Vlll
13
27
29
52
53
54
82
85
87
88
92
98
99
141
142
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
5.7
5.8
5.9
5.10
5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
The EC should expand the number of membership so as to
increase its legitimacy
The EC should add more representatives from other subsectors to
increase its legitimacy
Mr. Tung should appoint EC members, who had nominated him,
into advisory bodies or even the principle officials as a means of
reward
The EC membership can help you to upgrade your political
attainment. Do you agree with this statement
Expectations of Election Committee Members on Tung on their
role in the government
Appointment concerning the EC electors at different levels
What factor(s) made you won the 2000 Legco election?
Some scholars have identified the following factors may drive to
the electoral victory of a candidate, which of the factor(s) you
agree with
Do you think that social network is important to campaign
engineering
Do you think that social network is important to campaign
engineering
How do you construct connection with the voters
If you have sponsored activities, what kind of sponsorship you
adopted
It will be a major reason of losing votes in the absence of building
up good personal relations with voters
Concentrating on managing complaint and committee work is the
best way to build up the relation networks at the local level
On basis of the activities you organized to maintain relations with
voters, how do the voters respond
Which of the following group(s) you have maintained good
relations with
Which of the following group(s) assisted in your campaign
activities
How do they assist your campaign activities
Why do these groups agree to help you
The voters vote for you or your political party
IX
143
144
144
144
145
146
162
163
163
164
164
165
166
166
166
167
167
168
169
170
5.15
5.16
5.17
5.18
5.19
5.20
5.21
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
5.26
5.27
5.28
5.29
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
It will be a major reason of getting lesser votes without building
up a good local connection networkl71
To sponsor local organizations' activities is a must in a district
level work
To sponsor local organizations' activities is the best way to build
up a good local connection network
A District Councilor can effectively help to strengthen personal
relationship with voters
Local organizations/societies can effectively help to strengthen
personal relationship with voters
I can effectively strengthen personal relationship with voters
myself without the assistance of local organizations/societies
In short, guanxi and social network stand in a very important
position in electoral engineering
A Comparison of the 1998 and 2000 Legislative Council's
Election Results
The 2000 LegCo Election Results in Functional Constituencies
and the Election Committee
The Education Level of DP and DAB's Supporters
The Class Background of DP and DAB's Supporters
Self-Identification of DP and DAB's Supporters
Voting Considerations of DP and DAB's Supporters
(November 2003) Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with
both Central and HKSAR governments
(April 2004) Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with both
Central and HKSAR governments
Comparative voter turnout rates in 1999 and 2003 District Council
Election
Comparative Result of Political Parties in DC Election 1999 and
2003
Exit poll at King Lam Estate, TKO on November 23, 2003
What factors make you consider to vote for that candidate?
You vote for the candidate or political party?
If you can select, what kind of candidate is your ideal type?
Which category of person has mobilized you or your family to
vote for a specified candidate?
171
171
171
172
172
173
173
175
177
179
179
180
181
182
183
188
189
193
194
195
195
196
Abbreviations
ADPL
Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood
CCP
Chinese Communist Party
CE
Chief Executive
CF
Civil Force
CPPCC
Chinese People's Political Consultation Conference
DAB
Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong
DC
District Council
DP
Democratic Party
HKPA
Hong Kong Progressive Party
HKSAR
Hong Kong Special Administration Region
HYK
Heung Yee Kuk
ICAC
Independent Commission Against Corruption
LegCo
Legislative Council
LP
Liberal Party
MAC
Mutual Aid Committee
NPC
National People's Congress
oc
Owners Corporation
PRC
People's Republic of China
XI
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Political science research in Hong Kong covers a whole range of topics. Local
political scientists and sociologists focus on topics such as the Legislative Council,
electoral systems, political culture, and voting behaviour, as well as competitive
political party systems.1 In fact, Hong Kong has debated democratization since the
British Hong Kong Government introduced representative government in the early
1980s. Since 1993, several political changes have caught the attention of political
scientists as well as the people of Hong Kong. These changes included former
Governor Mr. Christopher Patten's political reforms, the implementation of Hong
Kong Basic Law, and the frequent elections held for the Legislative Council (LegCo),
the Urban and Regional Councils, and the District Council (formerly Boards). In
1
For examples see, Kuan Hsin-chi et al., Power Transfer & Electoral Politics (Hong Kong: The
Chinese University Press, 1999). See also Rowena Kwok et al., Votes Without Power (Hong Kong:
general, political science research tends to focus on macro-level political phenomena,
such as institutional change and political party systems in transition.
The study of local politics and political party operations at the grassroots level,
however, has been relatively sparse. The interactive personal relationship between
citizens and political elites has received little attention as well. This phenomenon
existed not only in the colonial era, but persists in the post-colonial Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Sophisticated personal relationships are crucial for political elites to maintain the trust,
loyalty, emotional support, and affection of Chinese citizens. The importance of these
relationships is demonstrated by the legacy of Chinese personal relationships and
human affections.
1.2 Patron-Client Politics From British Hong Kong Colony to Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region of China
Patron-client politics imply a reciprocal relationship between patrons and their
Hong Kong University Press, 1992).
2
This phenomenon is discussed thoroughly by Andrew Walder in Communist Neo-Traditionism: Work
and Authority in Chinese Industry (California: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 166-189; see
clients. This type of politics existed in Hong Kong under British rule. The British
coopted the Hong Kong elites into various advisory committees and political
institutions, such as the Legislative Council (LegCo) and the Executive Council
(ExCo). Generally, the elites were absorbed into the colonial polity by appointment
and through the rewarding of such titles as Justices of Peace (JP), Master of British
Empire (MBE), and Order of British Empire (OBE). Sociologist Ambrose King
referred to this cooptation as the "administrative absorption of politics."3 British rulers
usually conferred these medals and titles upon the local elites, who were, in turn,
expected to publicly support and promote various government policies.
The patron-client relationship has become more prominent since the
establishment of the HKSAR. One observer noted that a "lack of representation and
the proliferation of clientelism" characterize HKSAR polity.4 It appears that, since
power was handed over to the HKSAR, the administration has rewarded those who
voted for Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in December of 1996, by appointing them
to various advisory and policy-making bodies. For example, Tung supporters Leung
also Morton Fried, The Fabric of Chinese Society (New York: Praeger, 1953).
3
See King, Ambrose, "Administrative Adsorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Empire on the Grassroots
Level," Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 5, (May 1975).
4
Lo, Shiu Hing, "Political Parties, Elites-Mass Gap and Political Instability in Hong Kong",
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 20, No. 1, (April 1998), p. 75.
Chun-ying, Anthony Leung Kam-chung, and Tam Yiu-chung were all appointed to the
ExCo. Anthony Leung was also appointed Financial Secretary in February 2001. In
turn, these political appointees were expected to publicly promote and defend
government policies. If clientelism has become a hallmark of the political arena in the
HKSAR, patron-client relations should be studied not only at the LegCo level, but also
at the grassroots level where local elites regularly interact with the masses.
Since 98 percent of residents in the HKSAR are Chinese, HSKAR is bound to
demonstrate a legacy of personal relationships and human affections. This thesis is
designed to study patron-client politics in Hong Kong. The objectives of this thesis are:
1) to prove that patron-client relations exist between political elites and citizens at the
grassroots level; 2) to examine how the political elites cultivate support from clients in
order to obtain more votes during local elections, and 3) to evaluate the extent to which
patron-client networks are crucial to the electoral victory of candidates.
This Chapter discusses the content of this research, and the concept of
patron-client relations, including the politics of clientelism from the global perspective,
in ex-colonial states and Southeast Asia, and in Chinese society. Chapter two offers a
literature review and analytical framework. This chapter will review literature from
several scholarly perspectives, and will build the original framework used to analyze
the patron-client phenomena in Hong Kong. Chapter three discusses the connections
between patron-client relations and public administration. Chapter four studies the
election of the Chief Executive to discover whether patron-client relations affect this
election in Hong Kong. Chapter five examines the Hong Kong Legislative Council
election to discover how some legislators have become patrons seeking the support of
clients—both local politicians and the masses—and how patron-client relations are
manipulated. Chapter six researches the Hong Kong District Councils election,
focusing on how Councilors cultivate patron-client relationships with the masses.
Chapter six will also study grassroots-level political organizations, such as Mutual
Aids Committees (MACs), Owner's Corporations (OCs), and Heung Yee Kuk (HYK),
focusing on how these local organizations become clients of Legislative Councilors
and District Councilors, and how government has co-opted these organizations.
Chapters four to six make use of the data from a questionnaire-style survey and
face-to-face interviews5 to prove that patron-client politics have a major impact on the
campaign strategy of local politicians. This thesis uses elections at various levels to
discern to what extent patron-client relations exist and are manipulated.
' More details of these three research techniques can be found in Therese Baker, Doing Social Research
1.3 The Concept of Patron-Client Politics
1.3.1 An Overview of Patron-Client Politics
Many political scientists and surveys identify the voting behaviour of HKSAR
voters in elections at the territorial and local levels. Kuan Hsin-chi identified the
political culture in Hong Kong as subject-parochial, rather than participant-oriented.6
Other research reaches a similar conclusion, showing that voters are motivated by
factors such as political instability rather than simply an obligation to fulfill their civic
duty.7 On the other hand, surveys conducted by local newspapers during the 1999
District Councils and Legislative Council elections found that the people of Hong
Kong did vote to fulfill their obligations as citizens. These surveys have scarcely
touched upon the inter-personal relationships between the politicians (i.e., the electoral
candidates) and the citizens (i.e., the voters). This thesis seeks to fill the research gap
to discern what motivates voters to choose certain candidates.
(McGraw-Hill International Editions, 1988), pp. 85-198 and pp. 433-440.
6
Kuan, Hsin-chi, "Power Dependence and Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong Kong," The
China Quarterly (March 1992), p. 777.
7
My unpublished independent research paper written in 1992 regarding the political culture and citizen
participation in District Board elections before 1991. See Kwong, Kam-kwan, Political Culture and
The study of patron-client politics can be regarded as an exploration of the
inter-personal relationships between politicians (the patrons) and voters (the clients).
Its definition is universally applicable and concerns the personal interests of and
benefits to each participant in the relationships. James Scott identified the
relationships between patrons and clients as being distinguished by three factors:
1. Its basis in inequality—the patron supplies goods and services to the clients who
need them for their survival or well-being;
2. Its face-to-face character—the trust and affection that exists between the patron and
clients are based on a continuing pattern of reciprocity;
3. Its diffuse flexibility—it is a strong "multiplex" relationship, unintentionally built
between the two parties; such relationships may be created by personal connection,
tenancy, friendship, past exchange of services, or family ties.8
Scott and Nobutaka Ike noted that patrons typically include local notables,
political bosses, union leaders, local politicians, and leaders of local organizations.9 In
Citizen Participation in District Board Election: 1982-1991, unpublished manuscript, (1992).
8
Scott, James C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The American
Political Science Review, Vol. 66, (1972), pp. 92-95.
9
Ike, Nobutaka, "Japanese Political Culture and Democracy," Schmidt, Steffen W. et al., Friends,
Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (California: University of California Press,
1977), p. 381.
Ike's interpretation of the model, voters "tend to trade their ballots for anticipated
benefits that are particularistic in character - that is: for jobs and favours for
themselves or their relatives; schools, roads, hospitals, and other public works projects
for the community. Political issues and questions of ideology are relatively
unimportant."10 Thus, Ike identifies the benefits received by the clients.
According to Scott, the patrons may make use of scarce resources they control.
They may rely on 1) their own knowledge and skills, such as their professional status
as a lawyer, doctor, local military chief, or teacher; 2) direct control of personal real
estate; and, 3) indirect control of the property or the authority of others (often the
publics).11 Knowledge and skills represent less perishable resources than material
possessions, such as property. Although more time is spent employing these resources,
offering knowledge and skills is a relatively secure means of building a clientele.12
For Scott, patron-client relationships can be divided into two modes, a
10
Ibid.
11
Scott, James C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," Schmidt, Steffen W.
et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism (California: University of
California Press, 1977), p. 129.
11
Ibid.
8
patron-client cluster and a patron-client pyramid.13 The former refers to clients who
are directly tied to the patron, whereas the latter involves enlargement of the cluster
while vertically focusing on and linking to the patron.14 These two relationships are
illustrated in Figure 1 below. In the case of the HKSAR, the patron-client cluster is
applied to our analysis of the relationship between local District Councilors and voters
at the grassroots level. The patron-client pyramid applies to our understanding of the
three-level relationships among elected LegCo members, elected District Councilors,
and ordinary citizens.
13
Scott, James C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The American
Political Science Review, Vol. 66, (1972), p. 96.
14
Ibid., pp. 96-97.
Figure. 1 Patron-Client Cluster and Pyramid
Patron-Client Cluster
Patron-Client Pyramid
Source: Scott, James C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast
Asia," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, (1972), p. 96.
10
Andrew Nathan mentioned similar relationship modes in his study of
factionalism in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Nathan used factions to describe
inter-personal relations15, and through it referred to the same phenomenon as that of
clusters. He also identified the hallmarks of the PRC's clientelist ties, in which 1) a
relationship is between two people, and, 2) members select relationships to be
cultivated from their complete social network. For Nathan, the clientelist tie is
cultivated by the constant exchange of gifts or services. In this exchange, each partner
secures goods or services desired by the other party. Therefore, parties are attractive to
one another when they are dissimilar, and are often unequal in status, wealth or power.
The rights and obligations of each partner must be delineated and can be abolished by
either member. According to Nathan, the tie is not exclusive; either member is free to
establish ties with others so long as they do not involve contradictory obligations.16
Nathan further distinguishes clientist ties in the PRC from power relationships
and exchange relationships.17 Power relationships are superior-subordinate and, in
some cases, authoritative. Exchange relationships refer to "rational, goal-oriented
15
Nathan, Andrew J., " A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," Schmidt, W. Steffen et al., Friends,
Followers, and Factions: a Reader in Political Clientelism, (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1977), pp. 383-385.
16
Ibid., pp. 382-383.
17
Ibid., pp. 383.
11
behaviour that can profitably be analyzed in terms of exchange."18 By contrast,
Deborah Davis explained that chronic shortages and a bureaucratic system of
allocation are crucial factors when personal connections are used to effectively
position one's self.19 Sinologists like Nathan and Davis also observed the existence
and proliferation of patron-client relations in the PRC.
1.3.2 Anthropological Perspective of Patron-Client Relations
Patron-client politics can be traced back in a study of political anthropology.
Political anthropology originated in the 19th century. Ted Lewellen argued that, in
some tribes, the sociopolitical structure placed upon marriage partners is egalitarian,
0(\
and is based on sets of interpersonal relations. French political anthropologist J.
Maquet has developed three models of political relations in which three elements are
present—the actors, the roles, and the specific content. 21 These models are
summarized in Table 1.1.22 This thesis does not apply the Table to analyze the HKSAR
18
Ibid., pp. 383-384.
19
Davis, Deborah, "Patron and Clients in Chinese Industry," Modern China, Vol. 14, No. 4 (October
1988), p. 494.
20
Lewellen, Ted C., Political Anthropology: An Introduction (Westport: Connecticut, 1992), p. 10.
21
Quoted in Georges Balandies, Political Anthropology, translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith, (London:
Penguin Books Ltd. published, 1972), p. 42.
22
Ibid.
12
case. However, Table 1.1 makes the important point that "interpersonal agreement'"
constitutes the "specific content" of the patron-client relationships.
Table 1.1 Three Orders of Political Relations
Elementary Model Elementary Model Elementary Model
Actors
of Political
of Social
Relations
Stratification
Governors
Superior, equal and
Lord
and
inferior according to
and
governed
position in the order
dependent
of Feudal Relations
of strata
Role
To command
To know how to
Protection
and obey
behave according to
and services
one's status
Physical
Rank
Specific
coercion legitimately
Content
used
Interpersonal
Agreement
Source: Balandies, Georges, Political Anthropology, translated by A.M. Sheridan
Smith (London: Penguin Books Ltd. published, 1972), p. 42.
The first model is not valid in democracies because it involves physical
coercion. To a certain extent, however, the feudal relationship model exists in modern
capitalist society in the exchange of mutual interest, i.e., protection and services.
Georges Balandies interpreted the model of social stratification as a preliminary model
of clientelism.
13
It is, in fact, a relative recent society in its present form (early nineteenth
century), founded on conquest, established on highly differentiated ethnic
entities, in which the state was set up by force and in which the social and
political hierarchies are interlinked. Nevertheless, the office associated with
the royal power confer more in the way of prestige and privilege, and
constitute in a way the hierarchy of reference. Subjacent to the system are
the inequalities set up between ethnic groups and the elementary inequalities
established according to sex, age and position in the kinship and descent
group. The function performed determines a hierarchical order... each group
has an internal, more or less formalized hierarchy and personal success leads
to a kind of promotion.23
For Balandies, sociopolitical relations represent the "relations of clientage, which are
of ties between socially and politically unequal persons."24 Anthropologists also view
the existence of patron-client relations as universal, cutting across feudal and capitalist
societies.
23
Ibid., pp. 93-94.
14
1.3.3 Global Perspective of Patron-Client Relations
Patron-client politics can be found all over the world. Political scientists,
sociologists, and anthropologists study clientelism in places such as Italy, Latin
America, and Southeast Asia.25 For instance, in Colleverde, Italy, the Mezzadria
system formulates the relationships between the lower-class (usually the peasants) and
the landlord or other local person with high status and power.26 Furthermore, the
political
culture
in
Columbia
has
transformed
from
patrimonialism
to
patron-clientelism.27 Highly personalized structures have taken shape in Columbia
where reciprocity is reflected in "an exchange of client labour and loyalty for the
protection of the patron."
Patron-client politics can also be found in well-developed countries such as
France, where there is continuous interaction among the citizens, the notables, and the
24
Ibid, p. 95.
25
Scholars such as Oskar Kurer, James Scott, Rene Lemarchand, S.N. Eisenstadt, and Steffen Schmidt
have written a large volume of books and comparative research articles on this topic. Other scholars
such as Andrew Nathan, Deborah Davis, Yang Lien-sheng wrote on China's clientelism.
26
For a detailed discussion, see Silverman, Sydel F., "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships
in Central Italy," Schmidt, W. Steffen et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: a Reader in Political
Clientelism (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1977), pp. 293-304.
27
Martz, John D., The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy & the State in Colombia (New Brunewick:
Transition Publishers, 1997), pp. 35-62.
15
civil servants in both the center of the country (Paris) and in the periphery (the
province).29 During the Fifth Republic, the Gaulist Party of France discovered that the
citizens supported a renowned, high-ranking technocrat with strong local roots,
notable appearance, and local connections. Since the citizens preferred someone with
this profile to serve as their electoral broker, the party agreed to offer The technocrat a
ministerial position in the cabinet.30 Like France, Italy has recently become better at
developing clientelism during elections—a phenomenon labeled by scholars as the
OI
new clientelism. The Christian Democratic Party of Italy, a mass-based party, has
survived by playing the role of a patron depending on the votes and consensus of their
clients. The latter is obtained only in exchange for the tangible benefits dispensed by
the party.32
1.3.4 Patron-Client Relations in Ex-Colonial States
28
Ibid.
29
Medard, Jean-Francois, "Political Clientelism in France: the Centre-Periphery Nexus Reexamined,"
Eisenstadt, S.N. and Rene Lemarchand, eds., Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development,
(SAGA, 1981), p. 129.
30
Ibid., pp. 158-169.
31
A detailed discussion is published in Caciagli, Mario and Frank P. Belloni, "The 'New' Clientelism in
Southern Italy: The Christian Democratic Party in Catania," Eisenstadt, S.N. and Rene Lemarchand,
eds., Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development (SAGA, 1981).
32
Ibid.
16
Patron clientelism provides the authoritative rule commonly present in colonial
regimes with useful means of control. In 1882, soon after the fall of Egypt, brought on
by financial crisis, it was occupied by the British Empire.33 With the hope of making
the transition in Egypt smoother, British settlers attempted to win the loyalty of the
Egyptians. To do so, the settlers offered what the Egyptians wanted most, financial
security. The British solved their financial management needs by attracting the
"European creditors and left something over for public works, agriculture, and
communication" in order to make safeguard their ruling authority34
Under colonial rule in Northern Nigeria, clientelism adopted patron-client
politics for public administration. In Northern Nigeria, officials and vassal are seen as
barori, or clients of the ruler. Smith observed that,
Appointment in the Native Administration is not governed by merit of
technical qualifications, but by ties of loyalty in a situation of political
rivalry where the stakes are considerable. Consequently, in much the same
way that the Emir appoints his own supporters and kin to office, or the Chief
33
Owen, Roger, The Middle East ofEgypt in the World Economy 1800-1914 (London: 1981).
34
Newbury, Cilin, Patrons, Clients and Empire: Chieftaincy and Over-rule in Asia, Africa, and the
Pacific (US: Oxford University Press, p. 84).
17
Judge appoints his kinsmen to judgeships, so do the departmental and
territorial chiefs allocate office on bases of personal loyalty and solidarity to
themselves.35
British colonial rule in Uganda has successfully shifted the loyalty of the local elites
from the Buganda kingdom to the British. To alleviate resistance from Baganda
officials, the British appointed local chiefs and collected taxes to pay the chiefs fixed
salaries from the revenue. Several years after this reform, "many of the Baganda
officials had transferred their loyalty in the outstations to British official patrons who
defined their duties, fixed salaries."36 Vincent stated,
The networks of influence and patronage which engendered Iteso Big
Manship provided the New Men of Teso politics with the makings of a
political machine that went virtually unrecognized by the British until it was
eventually used against them. Big Manship proved not only resilient, but
extraordinary adaptive to the exogenous changes brought about by colonial
35
Smith, M. G., Government in Zazzau: a Study of Government in the Hausa Chiefdom of Zaria in
Northern Nigeria from 1800-1950, (London: 1960, p. 288).
36
Ibid., p. 130.
18
rule.37
The above Ugandan case is actually not exclusive to African post-colonial
regimes. Lord Hailey suggested the adoption of "Native Administration" to deal with
the political changes of British colonies in Africa.38 Smith's insights were similar to
Hailey's work on colonial rule in Africa.
In the absence of developed legal institutions, which Hailey commented on
at length, networks of clientage, personal loyalty, and reciprocal obligations
were still the stuff of civil jurisdiction through nominated "Native Courts"
and resources allocation by "Native Councils," especially for personal
emoluments of chiefs. Appointments to such institutions, he admitted, were
still made "by native custom and usage," that is by exercise of a modicum of
patronage and agreement of elders, clan heads, and in some protectorates,
youngmen s associations.39
37
Vincent, Joan. "Colonial Chiefs and the Making of a Class: A Case Study from Teso, Eastern
Uganda," Africa, vol. 47 (1977), p. 144.
38
Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories (London: H.M.S.O.,
1950-1951).
39
Smith, p. 142.
19
In colonized imperial regimes in East Asia, such as Malaya, British settlers
discovered how difficult it was to control a country in which kings ruled several states.
The sultans (kings), rajas (head district men), and the penghulu (village chief) held
several degrees of power to control their own lands. In the late 18th century, Governor
William Robinson offered "conditions of reciprocity in supervising through Malay
hierarchies," including patronage appointments, official status, and supervision of
government programmes.40 The British government prolonged her influential power
in Malaya to assure benefits even after she had retreated, and to insure British heritage
after decolonization. The British found a noble indigenous Malayan, Barrister Tunku
Abdul Rahman, a client of the British Malaya government, to succeed the first Prime
Minister of the independent Malaya government.41 Even now, though Malaya is an
independent Muslim country, she maintains a very close relationship with the British
government in Asia.
Patron-client politics affect ex-colonial countries dominated by tribes and
under-civilized traditions, such as Fiji and Hawaii in Pacific Islands. In both Fiji and
Hawaii, the colonial governments offered official positions and material benefits to
40
Ibid., pp.
41
For details on the independence of Malaya, see Brian Lapping, End of Empire (London: Paladin,
149-176.
1989), Chapter 4.
20
local leaders. Such benefits included taxes and tariffs levied to gain the loyalty and
trust of the people in the settlements. In Fiji, for example, Macnaught's study found
that indigenous chiefs and agents were appointed to official positions and were
delegated certain degrees of power in exchange for their support.42 This constitutes, as
Newbury describes it, a "line of power along which subordinate social and political
units were dependent for access to new resources and services on the actions to chiefly
administrators with ascribed status and prescribed functions who could do favours for
kin and followers."43 Newbury discovered that, although tradition can be seen as
grounds for penalty and rewards in jurisdiction, tradition is "suffused with reciprocal
obligations and access to goods and services on the part of office-holders."44
In Hawaii, where a similar style of governance was found, the sugar trade
presented a major benefit to the United States. The Hawaiian king resisted the
development of this overseas market because of heavy tariffs. The U.S. government,
therefore, made a concession on the tariff as a means of promoting reciprocity. In fact,
the U.S. government used reciprocal relations for political reasons rather than merely
economic salvation. Some believe that the superficial motive of this reciprocity was to
42
Macnaught, Timothy J., The Fijian colonial experience: a study of the neotraditional order under
British colonial rule prior to World War II (Canberra: Australian National University, 1982).
43
Newbury, p. 229.
21
build up patron-client relations with Hawaiians in order to earn their friendship and
trust. However, the underlying reason for the use of reciprocity was to prepare the way
for annexation.45 The reciprocal policy caused the plantation and related interest
groups to urge for constitutional change, resulting in the annexation of Hawaii in
1898 46
According to anthropological studies of global and ex-colonial regimes, the
phenomenon of patron-clientelism stems from human nature. As a result,
patron-clientelism exists regardless of a country's political system or ideology. It
would be easy to assume that patron-client relations exist only in Third World regions
such as Africa, China, and South East Asia, but case studies indicate that developed
countries should not be exempt from the adoption of patron-client relations in their
governance.
The above examples demonstrate how patron-client relations are useful to
politicians as they play political games. Specifically, patron-client relations help to
44
Ibid., p. 230.
45
For details on the mutual relations of the US and Hawaii before annexation, please see Ralph
Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1938-1967) and Colin Newbury,
Patronage and Bureaucracy in the Hawaii Kingdom, 1840-1893, PS 24 (2001).
46
Croix, Summer and Christopher Grandy, "The Political Instability of Reciprocal Trade and the
22
build personal relationships and networks with citizens, making governance easier.
They also help politicians gain the support, trust, friendship, and loyalty of the people.
These elements are very crucial for a politician to expand political power through
public recognition. Finally, these relations can even help win the heart of the people so
as to attain the governing role of a state. It is possible, therefore, to skillfully use
patron-client relations in an election at both the national and local level to achieve
victory.
1.3.5 Human Relations and Human Affections in the Chinese Tradition: A Factor
Reinforcing Patron-Client Relations
Apart from the concept of patron-client relations discussed above, human
relation {guanxi) and human affection (ren-ch'ing) are two important concepts in
Chinese society.47 Peter Blau addresses these two concepts using the exchange theory,
stating that "an individual who supplies rewarding services to another obligates him.
Aft
To discharge this obligation, the second must furnish benefits to the first in turn."
There are two types of personal exchange behaviours: economic and social exchange.
Overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom," Journal of Economic History 57, (1979).
47
King, Ambrose Y.J., Chinese Society and Culture (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press 1992) pp.
17-85.
23
Economic exchange uses money as its media, is easy to calculate, and is
affective-neutral. Social exchange uses ren-ch 'ing as its exchange media. In each type
of personal exchange, ren-ch'ing is created when the client receives material or
non-material benefits from the patron and thereby becomes obligated to reward the
patron. The client must find ways to fulfill this obligation to the patron or the client
will feel he owes a debt of ren-ch 'ing to the patron.49
Traditional Chinese society sees guanxi (human relations) as an exchange of
personal relationships.50 The success of such an exchange depends on whether it
suitably matches with ren-ch 'ing.51 Ren-ch 'ing refers to the principles of interpersonal
relationships, including affection and reciprocity.52 For example, when you are given a
gift, generally you must give a gift in return. Bruce Jacobs described this kind of
unique relationship as one with particularistic ties, and one that has played an
important role in Chinese politics.53 Andrew Nathan points out that "such ties include
48
Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life, (John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 89.
49
King, Ambrose Y.J., Chinese Society and Culture, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.
27.
50
Liang, Shuming, Zhongguo wen huayaoyi (Xianggang: San lian shu dian Xianggang fen dian, 1987),
p. 93
51
King, p. 20
52
Feng, Youlan, Xin shi xun : sheng huo fangfaxin lun (Xianggang : Tian di tu shu you xian gong si,
1999.) p. 43.
53
Jacobs is the first one to use this term to illustrate these two phenomena in Chinese society. See Jacobs,
24
patron-client relations, godfather-parent relations, some types of trader-customer
relations...[that] combine to form complex networks which serve many functions,
including social insurance and the mobilization and wielding of influence, i.e. political
conflict."54
Guanxi and ren-ch 'ing have been common in Chinese society for many years.
They highlight the importance of human relations and affection which deeply
influence the Chinese people's philosophy of interpersonal relationships. These
principles also influence clientelism in Hong Kong politics and serve to reinforce
patron-client relations between voters and candidates. These two concepts, as well as
the theory of patron-client relations, will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.
1.3.6 Identifying Benefits of Patron-Client Relations in HKSAR
The exchange of benefits is a major characteristic of patron-client relations.
However, scholars have not explicitly outlined the benefits delivered by the patrons to
the clients. Nor have scholars discussed these benefits in material and non-material
J. Bruce, "A Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese Political Alliances: Kan-Ch'ing and
Kuan-His in a Rural Taiwanese Township." The China Quarterly, (June 1979) No. 18.
54
Nathan, Andrew, p. 24.
25
terms. This section will identify the benefits usually offered by the councilors to the
citizens,55 and will explore councilors' ability to discern whether the benefits they
offer to the clients are those expected by the institution. When what is offered is
institutionally expected, no patron-client relation exists. However, if the offer is not
expected, proof that patron-client relations occurred exists.
Table 1.2 clearly shows that the benefits are both material and non-material.
Material benefits include money and gifts, whereas non-material benefits include
services and activities. Of all these, money sponsorship, trips, and hobby classes are
the benefits most welcomed by the clients and adopted by the District Councilors in
the HKSAR.56
55
Joseph Chan suggested me to discuss the material and non-material benefits in patron-client
relationships. However, scholars studying patron-client politics have not used such analytical categories.
See, for example, Scott, James C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, (1972); Ike, Nobutaka, "Japanese Political Culture and
Democracy" Schmidt, Steffen W. et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political
Clientelism (California: University of California Press, 1977); and Nathan, Andrew J., "A Factionalism
Model For CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 53, (January/March 1973).
56
Personal interview with an unnamed District Councilor's personal assistant (hereafter named
informant 1) on 10 February 2001 and an unnamed District Councilor (hereafter named informant 2) on
20 April 2000. The former said that money sponsorship could make people remember that you had sold
them a ren-ch'ing. The latter said that trips allowed him to face hundreds of people at one time, gifts
were usually offered by lucky draw, and the people appreciate you so much.
26
Table 1.2 Exchange of Benefits
Benefits Offered by the
Content
Effect
Reward from the
Councilors
Material
Voters
-
Sponsor with money
Build
-
Offer gifts
personal
-
Free lunch and dinner relations
for
elderly
or
up Vote
for
politician
and
at social network
Mother's Festival
Non-material"
-
Legal consultation
-
Trips
-
Snake soup banquets
-
Chinese opera evening
shows
-
To provide communal
entertainment
activities
Social services, e.g. forms
filling, hobbies class,
etc
** Some of the non-material services provided are free of charge, or under-valued if
payment is required.
57
Personal interview with an unnamed District Councilor's personal assistant (hereafter named
informant 1) on February10,2001 and an unnamed District Councilor (hereafter named informant 2) on
20 April 2000. The former said that money sponsorship could make people remember that you had sold
them a ren-ch'ing. The latter said that trips allowed him to face hundreds of people at one time, gifts
27
the
The content of the benefits and functions of the District Councilors in Hong
Kong makes it obvious that the benefits illustrated in Table 1.2 are not what they are
institutionally expected to offer. Some of the benefits are carried out by social workers,
tourism agencies or District Offices. According to informants 1 and 2, Councilors
enjoy giving benefits because they want to build personal relations with their clients.
According to the social exchange theory, the Councilors expect the clients to
reciprocate by voting for them in the next election.
I will discuss the dimensions of material and non-material benefits in the case
of patron-client politics in Hong Kong. Specifically, what kinds of benefits—material
or non-material—tend to shape the electoral victory of candidates? Are these benefits
prominent in the political landscape of the HKSAR? These questions have not been
explained sufficiently in the precious studies of Hong Kong politics.
were usually offered by lucky draw, and the people appreciate you so much.
28
Occupation
% Interviewees choosing this item Rank
Scientist
59.8%
1
Doctor
34.2%
2
Banker
24.5%
3
Lawyer
22.7%
4
Engineer
19.1%
5
Property Developer
18.4%
6
Architect
18.3%
7
Full-time
16.9%
8
Preacher
14.5%
9
Teacher
12.4%
10
Professional Athlete
12.3%
11
Accountant
11.5%
12
Actor
10.5%
13
Journalist
10.1%
14
Policeman
8.5%
15
Labour Union Leader
6.6%
6.6%
16
Ordinary Businessman
3.4%
17
Legislative Councilor
Source: The Apple Daily, 30 October 2000, p. All.
Note: The sample size was unclear.
29
Table 1.3 lists the most popular occupations in Hong Kong. If knowledge and
skills, such as professional status, are crucial considerations under the concept of
patron-client relations, this ranking is useful in our study of Hong Kong politics. In
fact, no study exists detailing which type of occupation is most likely to win an
election. However, this Table indicates that professionalism is most important to the
people of Hong Kong. Therefore, it can be concluded that professionals will likely be
the most successful group in political campaigns. This assertion, combined with
Scott's observation that skills and knowledge can be used by the patrons to attract
clients, argues that professionalism can be a useful tool in patron-client relations.
1.4 Research Hypotheses and Arguments in the Thesis
This thesis examines whether patron-client relations are critical to the electoral
victory of candidates. It will test the extent to which whether patron-client relations are
crucial in order for candidates to obtain more ballots during elections. It hypothesizes
that the better candidates cultivate patron-client relations, the greater their chance of
winning the election. Moreover, the smaller the size of the electoral constituency, the
greater the impact of patron-client relations. The reason is that smaller constituencies
tend to facilitate the impact of patron-client networks. In short, this thesis seeks to
30
demonstrate the existence and impact of patron-client relations in the HKSAR at the
grassroots level. The thesis will also examine the validity of Scott's three
characteristics of patron-client relations in the context of the HKSAR. These
characteristics of patron-client relations include the following:
1. Its basis in inequality—the patron supplies goods and services to the clients
who need them for their survival or well-being;
2. Its face-to-face character—the trust and affection that exists between the
patron and client are based on a continuing pattern of reciprocity;
3. Its
diffuse flexibility—it is
a
strong
"multiplex" relationship,
unintentionally built between the two parties; such relationships may be
created by personal connection, tenancy, friendship, past exchange of
services, or family ties.58
Furthermore, this thesis will test whether patron-client relations have
contributed to the success and electoral victory of Chief Executive candidates, LegCo
candidates and District Council candidates. Indeed, the electoral success of candidates
may be due to other factors, such as (1) the appeal of political parties, (2) the electoral
system (the functional constituency election in LegCo may favor candidates from
58
Scott. James C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The American
31
certain occupational sectors), and (3) the ideology of party candidates. This thesis will
make use of survey data to examine whether these factors, apart from patron-client
networks, play a crucial role in the candidates' electoral success. This thesis
hypothesizes that patron-client relations may be a neglected, though significant, factor
in explaining candidates' electoral success.
1.5 Research Methodology
The study of patron-client politics in elections involves an exploration of the
mutual and dynamic relationships between voters and candidates. From a lay
perspective, nothing special exists within these relationships because voters are
expected to cast their ballots for the candidates they believe are best for the job.
However, the theory of patron-client politics involves an exchange of interest between
the patron (i.e., the candidate) and the clients (i.e., the voters). This exchange of
interest involves both material and non-material benefits. Few citizens publicly admit
that they vote for particular candidates because they have been given some material or
non-material benefits. Similarly, few candidates are likely to admit they won an
election because they offered voters material or non-material interests. As a result, it is
political Science Review, Vol. 66, (1972), pp. 92-95.
32
difficult to collect information from the two parties on the exchange of interest because
it is a highly sensitive political issue. This is especially true when the exchange of
interest involves bribery. As I will discuss in Chapter six, grassroots politics entails
such mysterious exchange in the cases of MACs, OCs, and HYK.
To combat the difficulties of analyzing interest exchange, this thesis adopted
four surveys to collect useful data for further analysis.59 Four surveys involved the
mailing of self-administered questionnaires to newly elected (not appointed) District
Councilors in 1999, Legislative Councilors in 2000, members of the Chief Executive
Election Committee in 2002, and an exit poll in the 2003 District Council elections to
test whether, and to what extent, candidates cultivated patron-client relations. Second,
face-to-face interviews were conducted with the aforementioned elected councilors
and district-level leaders (such as chairpersons and active volunteers of MACs to
clarify their answers on the questionnaire, and to collect additional inside information
concerning the exchange of mutual interests. This thesis therefore makes use of
numerous research instruments, including interviews and various questionnaires
surveys, including exit poll, to understand the dynamics of patron-client politics in the
59
These two research techniques are commonly used by researchers today. The research technique
adopted here refers to Baker, Therese L., Doing Social Research, (McGraw-Hill International, 1988), pp.
165-227.
33
HKSAR.
1.6 Summary
The study of patron-client politics is new to the study of Hong Kong political
science. Many relevant studies have already been conducted in other countries in the
world. The main theme of patron-client politics centers on the exchange of benefits,
either material or non-material. Relative literature has not concretely identified the
benefits received by clients from the patrons. In fact, the literature discusses the
benefits only in broad terms, such as services, human affection, and specific
knowledge and skills held by the patrons.60 The key to success in electoral activities
may depend largely upon 1) closely working at the local level, 2) personal connections
and networks, 3) personal professionalism, social status, and popularity, and 4) the
distribution of benefits. This thesis seeks to assess the extent to which patron-client
networks are crucial in shaping the electoral victory of candidate at different levels.
60
See, for example, Scott, James C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,"
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, (1972); Ike, Nobutaka, "Japanese Political Culture and
Democracy," Schmidt, Steffen W. et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political
Clientelism (California: University of California Press, 1977); and Nathan, Andrew J.," A Factionalism
Model for CCP Politics," Schmidt, W. Steffen et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: a Reader in
Political Clientelism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
34
Chapter 2
Toward An Analytical Framework of Analysis
2.1 Introduction
Patron-client relations comprise an inter-disciplinary field of study covered
by anthropology, sociology, psychology, public administration and political science.1
The concept of patron-client relations is not an unusual phenomenon in political
science and public administration, although it is commonly neglected by scholars in
related fields. It is curious that patron-client relations are rarely considered or applied
in the study of electoral behaviour and strategy at all levels of officially recognized
elections. Scholars who cover electoral behaviour and related topics often
1
Many publications focus on this area: for example, E. Gellner and J. Waterbury eds., Patron and
Clients in Mediterranean Societies (London: Duckworth, 1977); K.E. Folsom, Friends, Guests and
Colleagues: The Mu-fu System in the late Ch 'ing Period (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1968); M. Bax, "Patronage Irish Politicians as Brokers," Sociologische Gids, 17, pp. 179-191; E. Fel
and T. Hofer, "Tanyakert-s, Patron-Client Relations and Political Factions in Atany," American
Anthropologist, 75: pp. 787-801; Lucian W. Pye, Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the
Modernization of Republican China (New York: Prager, 1971); A. Gregory, "Factionalism and the
Indonesian Army. The New Order" Journal of Comparative Administration, 1970, 2(3): pp. 341-354,
and James Stockdale, Courage Under Fire: Testing Epictetus' Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human
Behaviour (Standford: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1993). Readers may find it
very useful to understand patron-client relations by reading these publications with different
perspectives. James Stockdale's psychological discussion on love and friendship is especially
interesting.
35
concentrate on inequality, reciprocity and proximity,2 whereas the concept of
exchange relations (the basic element of patron-clientelism) has rarely been
discussed.3
By the same token, sociologists studying exchange theory have tended
to avoid the discussion on the functional power of patron-client relations in human
interaction.
It would be meaningful to conduct an in-depth study of patron-client relations
in a Chinese society such as Hong Kong. Therefore, this thesis is going to adopt two
unique Chinese characteristics, human relations (guanxi) and human affection
(ren-ch'ing) to supplement or reinforce the theoretical framework of patron-client
relations, thus analyzing the actual political behavior in the Chinese setting of Hong
Kong.
This chapter will also review the existing literature on patron-clientelism and
2
It is reasonable to adopt these aspects as fundamental concepts of patron-client relations, because
these aspects are manifested in observations of inter-personal relationship. Please see, for example,
Powell, J.D., "Peasant Society and Clientelism Politics," American Political Science Review, 64 (2):
pp. 411-425; Weingrod, A., "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties," Comparative Studies in Society
and History, 10(3): pp. 376-400; Lande, C., "Networks and Groups in Southeast Asia: Some
Observations on the Group Theory of Politics," American Political Science Review, 67(1): pp.
103-127; and Eisenstadt S.N. and Lemarchand, Rene eds., Political Clientelism, Patronage and
Development, contemporary Political Sociology Volume 3, (Beverly Hills : Sage, 1981).
3
Some suggested books on Exchange Theory worth noting are Blau, Peter, "A Theory of Social
Integration," American Journal of Sociology, 65, (1960), pp. 550-553; Von Mises, Ludwig, Human
action; a treatise on economics, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1949); and Fiedler, Fred Edward,
Leader attitudes and group effectiveness : final report of ONR project NR 170-106, N6 ori-07135,
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981).
36
its dynamic relationship with guanxi and ren-ch 'ing. On basic of these discussions,
an analytical framework will be formulated to seek to explain effective electoral
strategies at different levels. This analytical framework, as suggested below, may be
applied by other scholars to study other societies where patron-client networks
mushroom and persist.
2.2 The Existing Literature on Patron-Client Relations
2.2.1 Exchange Relations and Patron-Client Relations
Social interactions, whether between parents and children, siblings, friends,
classmates, co-workers, or husbands and wives, are unavoidable for anyone living in
the modern world. Sociologists describing these kinds of social associations often
focus on the exchange behavior.4 As Ambrose King points out, exchange behaviour
is a pre-requisite for any social relationship; without such exchange behaviour,
relationships could not function, and no kind of human ethics could be built.5 King's
observation is summarized by the study of social associations:
While structures of social relations are, of course, profoundly influenced by
common values, these structure have a significance of their own, which is
ignored if concern is exclusively with the underlying values and norms.
Exchange transactions and power relations, in particular, constitute social
4
Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1964) p.
4.
5
King, Ambrose, Chinese Society and Culture,(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp.
21-22.
37
forces that must be investigated in their own right, not merely in terms of
the norms that limit and the values that reinforce them,.. [FJorces of social
attraction stimulate exchange transactions. Social exchange, in turn, tends
to give rise to differentiation of status and power.6
The starting mechanism that prompts exchange behaviour remains an
interesting question. Marcel Mauss, for example, asserts that the concept of
reciprocity is a key concept of exchange behaviour.7 He explains that individuals
associate with one another because they all profit from their association.8 Lien-sheng
Yang called this kind of reciprocity pao (reward), which is, as he claims, a
fundamental concept in Chinese social association,9 and so pao has become
necessary tool in social exchange theory.10 If pao is so important to the course of
reciprocal relations, then its origin and extent must be discussed, as follows.
According to Blau, once we are sensitized to the concept of social exchange,
it can be observed in a variety of forms:
[N]ot only in market relations but also in friendship and even in love, as we
have seen, as well as in many social relations between these extremes in
intimacy. Neighbours exchange favours; children, toys; colleagues,
6
Ibid., pp. 13-14
Mauss, Marcel, The gift: forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies (London : Cohen &
West, 1954); , and see also Peter P. Ekeh, Social exchange theory: the two traditions (London :
Heinemann Educational, 1974).
8
Blau, p. 18.
9
Yang, Lien-sheng, "The Concept of 'Pao' as a basis for Social Relations in China," in John K.
Fairbank ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp.
291-309.
10
Ekeh, Social Exchange Theory, p. 32
7
38
assistance; acquaintances, courtesies; politicians, concessions; discussants,
ideas; housewives, recipes.11
When social exchange occurs, the party receiving the benefits (whether material or
non-material) subjectively creates an obligation to repay the party who gives. Since
this reciprocal obligation is a commitment in the process of social exchange, the
giving party trusts that the receiving party will discharge the obligation of reciprocity
at the appropriate time. 12 Although social exchange assigns this reciprocal
commitment to the recipients, it cannot guarantee the trustworthiness of the recipient.
Still, it is reasonable for all parties performing exchange behaviour to express their
willingness to carry on this relation. A fair exchange may reasonably include such an
acceptance. As George Homans elucidates:
[A] man in an exchange relation with another will expect that the rewards
of each man will be proportional to his cost - the greater the rewards, the
greater the cost - and that the net rewards, or profits, of each man be
proportional to his investments - the greater the investments, the greater the
profit.13
Therefore exchange relations provide useful analyses to reinforce our
understanding of patron-client relations on the grounds that both relations study
11
Blau, p. 88; for the discussion of the inter-relationship between love and friendship, please see
Eduardo A. Vel&squez eds., Love and friendship : rethinking politics and affection in modern times,
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
12
Ibid., pp. 98-99.
13
Homans, George, Social Behavior : its elementary forms, (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1961,) p. 75.
39
reciprocity in human interactions. The patron-client concept can be used to explore
human behaviors and their effects on society; speaking specifically of electoral
politics, it affords politicians electoral strategies to help pursue electoral victory. In
short, reciprocity constitutes the hallmark of both exchange theory and patron-client
relations.
2.2.2 Patron-Client Relations
Typically, patron-client relations occur between two or more parties in the
course of exchanging personal interests or benefits, materially or non-materially. To
phrase it in terms of electoral behaviour, patron-client relations concern
inter-personal relationships between the politicians or candidates (the patrons) and
the citizens or voters (the clients). The exchange of patrons and clients may be
associated with their economic well-being, political power, or social status.14
Clientage can be regarded as a relationship of personal loyalty existing
between superior and subordinates at all levels of the hierarchy as a basis for
confirmation of offices and titles.15 Political clientelism can be distinguished from
economic clientelism in that patrons "do not have to be owners of means of
14
Kurer, Oskar, The political foundations of development policies, (Lanham, Md.: University Press
of America, 1997) p. 31.
15
Whitaker, C.S., The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and change in Northern Nigeria 1946-1966,
(Princeton 1970) p.33.
40
production and therefore the capitalist-worker or landowner-peasant relationship is
not an essential part of the patron-client tie."16 In fact, the players of patronism also
expect prestige or honour as their basic reward.17 A prestigious man may receive
services, commodities, or obedience that may be otherwise inaccessible or less
favorably priced.18 In addition, political charisma may yield more obedient and loyal
followers, so that politicians can enhance their influential power through the
followers' affection.19
In some underdeveloped countries (especially in tribal societies), the
patron-client network is of comparable importance to kinship, in that it involves an
exchange between a superior patron or patron group and an inferior client or client
group; the latter will attach to the former in order to survive in a hostile
environment.20 Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald further explain the formulation
of patron-client relations in underdeveloped societies by citing J.D. Powell's
three-part definition:
1.
The patron-client tie develops between persons who are unequal in
terms of status, wealth and influence.
16
Ibid., p. 35.
Jackson, J. A, Social stratification (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968) p.244.
18
Ibid., p. 247.
19
Evans, Grant, "Political Cults in East and Southeast Asia", in Trankell, Ing-Britt and Laura
Summers, eds., Facets of Power and Its Limitations: Political Culture in Southeast Asia, (Uppsala
University Press, 1998).
20
Randall, Vicky and Robin Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment: A Critical
Introduction to Third World Politics, (Basingstoke: Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1985), pp. 50-52.
17
41
2.
The formation and maintenance of the relationship depends upon
reciprocity in the exchange of goods and service. Typically, the
low-status client will receive material assistance in one form or
another whilst his patron will receive less tangible resources such as
deference, esteem, loyalty and perhaps personal services.
3.
The development and maintenance of the relationship depends on
face-to-face contact between the two parties.21
The unequal relations, the element of reciprocity in material and non-material
benefits, and face-to-face contacts echo Scott's delineations of the three features of
patron-client relations as discussed in the previous chapter.
Powell's classifications can used to explain the aspects of patron-client
relations. However, his observations are criticized as comparatively narrow and he
tends to focus on underdeveloped societies; in other words, his definition is rather
particularistic. John Martz, by contrast, has observed that clientelistic systems are
crucial to our understanding of the link between developing regions' national,
urban-based modernizing elites and the urban and rural masses. Martz identifies the
feature of patron-client relations as follows:
There will be large numbers of individuals of low status, interests in return
for deference or material rewards. The rural patron has increasingly become
a member of the higher clientelistic system as well. He stands as an
intermediary dependent on a patron who operates at the national level. This
enables urban elites to mobilize low status clients for such acts as mass
demonstrations of political loyalty to the regime.22
21
Ibid., p. 54.
Martz, John D., The politics of clientelism: democracy & the state in Colombia, (New Brunswick,
NJ : Transaction Publishers, 1997.) p. 9.
22
42
Objectively speaking, Powell and Marts's discussions of paron-client
dynamics have appeared to reflect the contours of patronage politics as delineated by
Scott. Here it is necessary to reiterate Scott's memorable (though perhaps more
general) definition of patron-client relations. Scott persistently distinguishes the
correlation between patrons and clients in terms of the following three features :
1.
Their basis in inequality - the patron supplies necessary goods and
services to the clients for their survival or well-being;
2.
Their face-to-face character - the trust and affection between the
patron and client created are based on a continuing pattern of
reciprocity;
3.
Their diffuse flexibility - the strong "multiplex" of relations may be
constructed by personal connection, tenancy, friendship, past
exchange of services, or family ties.
J3
Scott's observations provide a good summary of the general perspectives on
patron-client relations. In addition, Scott observes that patrons may use scarce
resources to enhance influences upon clients by employing the following means:
1.
Their own knowledge and skills, such as their own professional status
23
Scott, James C, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," in The American
political Science Review, Vo. 66, (1972), pp. 92-95.
43
(i.e., lawyers, doctors, local military chief, teachers);
2.
The direct control of personal real property; and
3.
The indirect control of the property or authority of others (often the
publics).24 Patrons with knowledge and skill possess a less perishable
resource than other material resources (e.g. real property). Although
they may need to engage more time in their work, their knowledge
and skills provide a relatively secure means of building a clientele.25
Thus, knowledge, skills, property and authority constitute the indispensable assets of
patrons to argument their influence on clients.
In his discussion of patron-client relations, Scott also draws on the
patron-client cluster and the patron-client pyramid.
Of*
Andrew Nathan draws a more
complex figure to elaborate on the other side of patron-client network when it
involves factionalism, a necessary adjustment when discussing China.27 To apply
Nathan's factional diagram in the case of Hong Kong, Figure 2.1 illustrates the
mutual relations of candidates, voters, government organs and local organizations
24
Scott, James C, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," in Schmidt, Steffen
W. et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism, (California: University
of California Press, 1977), p. 129.
25
Ibid.
26
Chapter one of this thesis has already discussed these two modes, and tried to apply them in
electoral behavior of Hong Kong candidates.
27
Nathan, Andrew J., "A Factionalism Model For CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 53,
(January/March 1973), pp. 34-66.
44
Candidates can be seen as the patrons who attempt to cultivate and expand political
support through a careful building or construction of reciprocal relations with clients
like voters, and local organizations or groups. The patrons may also penetrate
government organs to distribute material or non-material benefits to clients.
Figure 2.1
Simple factions and support structures in Hong Kong.28
Candidate or the
politician in
office
Clients
Local
organization
Local
organization
Q
Q
Government organs
In Figure 2.1, Nathan's discussion of factions and support structures can be
applied to the case of Hong Kong. On the right hand side of the Figure, "candidate"
28
Ibid., p. 41. The origin of this diagram indicates a phenomenon of individual leader's mobilization.
I try to apply it in the case of Hong Kong and later name the respective layers to identify their roles.
45
refers not only to the person who participates in an election, but also the politician
who has been in office (for example, the Chief Executive, Legislative Councillor,
District Councillor, or any leader at the rural advisory body Heung Yee Kuk).
"Clients" refers to the voters or people living in a particular constituency, or people
who seek exchanges (such as services) with the politician. The small triangles here
refer to the clients, who help the patrons (the candidates or the politicians) maintain
good relationships with the people of that community; they may, for instance, help
cultivate votes for that patron.29 Finally, the largest triangle refers to the government
organs which constitute a channel for patronage and which give a helping hand to the
candidates or politicians on certain occasions. These government organs may even be
departments at both local and central government levels.30 They may also be
statutory or advisory bodies where appointees are coopted as clients supportive of the
government in power.
2.2.3
The Politics of Guanxi and Ren-ch 'ing
It is observable that guanxi (personal relations) and ren-ch'ing (human
29
The kind of political association has operated in Hong Kong for years at a low profile, but it is now
becoming more prominent.
30
These phenomena are more manifest in Hong Kong after the handover. The central governmental
organs are participating in local political association more subjectively than in the past. Especially on
occasions when the local government faces political crisis, the central government mobilizes officials
to influence the local governance, so as to gain the patriotic loyalty of both the local government and
people as well. The means of exchange may include economic benefits, vote buying, national status
and intimidations, etc.
46
affection) are two important features in Chinese politics/1 As King has maicaieu,
these features can be seen as exchange behavior that compromises
a necessary
component of human relationships.32 Lucian Pye notes that the concept of guanxi,
fundamental to Chinese society, is difficult to explain in English because there is no
English equivalent.33 In his study of the Chinese negotiating style, Pye has found
that guanxi usually denotes friendship, and "friendship in Chinese culture is not just
a positive sentiment, it means sharing guanxi."34 Pye adds that "friendship itself
becomes a matter for skillful management as the individual seeks to constantly
expand his network of personal ties. The result is the accumulation of a host of
'friendships', but very few that are emotionally close."35 Thus, friendship exists
"when two people allow their feelings about each other to influence the way they act
toward each other."36 It must be noted that guanxi does not necessarily indicate a
patron-client relationship, for it may not involve any exchange behavior.
It is noteworthy that the term exchange behaviour has normally been
understood as an exchange of materials. But guanxi, by its very nature, represents
either a horizontal or a vertical dyadic alliance that can be used to pursue personal
interests.37 This dyadic alliance (guanxi) can subsequently bring forth personal
benefits in Chinese society, where "the relationship of comrades means relationship
31
King, Ambrose Y.J., Chinese Society and Culture, (Hong Kong : Oxford University Press), 1992,
pp. 17-85. See also Liang, Shuming zhu, Zhongguo wen huayao y, (Xianggang : San lian shu dian
Xianggang fen dian, 1987,) p.93.
32
Ibid., pp. 21-22.
33
Pye, Lucain W., Chinese Negotiating Style: Commercial Approaches and Cultural Principles (US:
Quorum Books, 1992,) p. 101.
34
Ibid.
35
Pye, Lucian W., The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's political cultures (Aim Arbor: Center for
Chinese Studies, the University of Michigan, 1988).
36
Jollimore, Troy A., Friendship and agent-relative morality (New York ; London : Garland Pub.,
2001).
37
Oi, Jean C., "Communism and Clientelism: Rural Politics in China," World Politics, Vol. XXXVIII,
No. 2, (January 1985), p. 252.
47
of benefits," in the sense that both parties can exchange benefits through bureaucratic
processes.
38
This kind of personal exchange can be summarized as an individual
supplying rewarding services to another; he or she is therefore obligated to furnish
benefits to the first, thus engendering "feelings of personal obligation, gratitude, and
trust."40 To conclude, the cultural concept of ren-ch'ing does not merely exist
beneath the cognitive stratification of Chinese society, but in the external cognitive
stratification of individuals; it possesses the power to bind personal associations.41
There are two types of personal exchange behaviour. The first is economic
exchange, and the second is social exchange. The former uses money as its media of
exchange. It is easy to calculate and neutrally affective. The latter uses ren-ch 'ing as
its media of exchange. Ren-ch 'ing refers to the principle of inter-personal
relationships, including affection and reciprocity.42 In Hong Kong, ren-ch 'ing can be
regarded as an obligation and a widely accepted social norm. For example, one has to
give money as a gift to the host in a wedding banquet, and this form of gift is named
ren-ch 'ing, meaning that the invitation is made because of face-giving (respect) and
friendship, so that the money represents a reward.43 As another example, if someone
performs a favour, then the recipient owes a ren-ch'ing and must reciprocate the
favour back in any form the person needs. In either case, if no reciprocity occurs, it is
conventional to assume that a ren-ch 'ing debt is owed to benefactor.44
38
Cui, Beifang and Zhu Da'an zhu, The Relationship of Chinese (Zhongguo ren de guan xi), (Beijing:
Zhongguo she hui chu ban she, 2000) pp.85-87.
39
Ibid.
40
Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Lift (John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 94.
41
King, Ambrose, "The analysis of Ren-Ch'ing in Personal Relations," in Yang, Guoshu eds.,
Zhongguo ren de xin I, (Taibei: Gui guan tu shu gu fen you xian gong si, 1989), p. 88.
42
Feng, Youlan, Xin shi xun : sheng huofang fa xin lun (Xianggang : Tian di tu shu you xian gong si,
1999.) p.43.
43
There is a series of interesting discussion about gifts edited by Osteen, Mark, The question of the
gift: essays across disciplines (London: Routledge, 2002).
44
King, Embrose Y.J., Chinese Society and Culture, (Hong Kong : Oxford University Press, 1992).
48
The concept of ren-ch 'ing has become more crucial to human relations in
Hong Kong45 and its business sector than even before.46 Nathan points out that
personalistic ties, including "patron-client relations, godfather-parent relations, some
types of trader-customer relations....combine to form complex networks which serve
many functions, including social insurance and the mobilization and wielding of
influence, i.e. political conflict."47
In summary, guanxi and ren-ch 'ing have existed in Chinese society for many
years. They highlight the importance of human relations and human affections,
which deeply influence the Chinese people's philosophy of inter-personal
relationships. In other words, they can also influence the clientelism in Hong Kong
politics and serve as a factor reinforcing patron-client relations between voters and
candidates.
2.2.4 The Exchange of Benefits
Another consideration in manipulating patron-client relations is the exchange
p.27. and see also Li, Jing, Ren qing she hui: ren ji guan xiyu zi wo guan de jian gou (River Edge, NJ:
Ba fang wen hua qi ye gong si, 2002).
45
The Department of Psychology, Chinese University of Hong Kong conducted a series of surveys
over the characteristics of the Hongkongers from 1992 to 2001. The survey found that the Hong Kong
Chinese were more concerned about ren-ch'ing and face. Cheung, R M., Leung, K., Zhang, J. X. Sun,
H. R, Gan, Y. Q., Song W. Z., & Xie, D. (2001). "Indigeous Chinese personality construct: Is the Five
Factor Model complete?," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, vol. 32, pp.407-433. See also The
Apple Daily, March 17,2002, p. A6 for the presentation report in a press conference. And see also Hu,
Fo, Political Culture and Political Life (Zheng zhi wen hua yu zheng zhi sheng huo), (Taibei shi: San
minshuju, 1998).
46
Another interesting publication claims that the business sector has more frequently adopted
ren-ch 'ing in doing business. See Robinette, Scott and Claire Brand ; with Vicki Lenz eds., Emotion
marketing : the Hallmark way of winning customers for life, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001) for
detailed discussion, and Chen, Hengjun, The Mutual-dependence of Governance and Policy
Implementation (Taibei: Shang ding wen hua chu ban she, 2002).
47
Nathan, Andrew J., "A Factionalism Model For CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 53,
(January/March 1973), p. 24.
49
of benefits. The term benefits here refer not only to the exchange of material
(physical) benefits, but also non-material benefits (non-physical, such as services or
friendship.)
48
Scott has made very insightful observations of the exchange of
benefits in several underdeveloped Asian and African countries, as shown in Table
2.1. In this research, he found that all the countries in his research exhibited
patron-client relations, though they appeared in different hierarchies. Only in
countries with competitive elections, however, was there a need for exchange
relations between voters and vote brokers. Although a large number of these relations
involved corruption, to certain degree they reflected that the greater the competitive
nature of election within a country, the larger the degree of patron-client relations. In
Hong Kong, this phenomenon may be no exception to this rule, as I will discuss later.
Table 2.2 tracks the changing loyalties in different electoral phases. It is
worth noting that each phase emphasizes loyalty, though the method of attaining
loyalty may need to be modified. In phase B, for example, the competitiveness of
electoral pressure may require the use of supportive materials, whereas the degree of
economic growth may require a modification of benefits to suit the market
48
Schmidt, W. Steffen, et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions : a reader in Political Clientelism
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Zappala, Gianni, "Clientelism, Political Culture and
Ethnic Politics in Australia," Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 381-397;
Velasquez eds., Love and friendship: rethinking politics and affection in modern times (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), and Jollimore, Friendship and agent-relative morality (New York:
Garland Pub., 2001).
50
requirements of the political need.
Scott's delineations of the beneficiaries of corruption in clientelist politics
and the changing phases of political loyalties as well as party inducements are
valuable insights that can be applied to Hong Kong. In particular, when Scott
mentions in Table 2.2 about the widen distribution of material inducements
corresponding to the greater degree of electoral competition, this hypothesis can be
applied to Hong Kong elections. Moreover, at a higher stage of economic
development, other inducements of party support tend to come from policy concerns
and ideology rather than from material benefits. This insight is particularly useful to
our study of Hong Kong.
51
Table: 2.1
Pattern of Beneficiaries from Corruption in Less Developed
Recipients of Benefits
Benefits*
Type of Political
System
Individuals
and Groups
Party
Voters
Wealth Bureaucrats/ Leaders
and vote
with Parochial Elites Military
and Cadre Brokers
Ties to
Power-Holders
Bureaucratic/military X
Policy (e.g. Thailand
until 1971; post-1965
Indonesia)
X
X
Party-dominated
X
X
xX
X
Party-dominated
X
Polity-competitive
(e.g. Philippines until
1971; India until 1971)
X
xX
X
Polity-noncompetitive
(e.g. Guinea until
1966; Ghana
1960-1965)
X
Note: * Large X's indicate the probable major beneficiaries of corruption in each
type of political system, while small x's indicate minor beneficiaries. The overall
level of corruption is not a factor in this table, only the distribution of benefits from
whatever level exists. Thus it is conceivable that a minor beneficiary in one system
might, because the overall level was quite high, actually receive more benefits than a
major beneficiary in another system with less corruption.
Source: James Scott, Comparative political corruption, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1972), p.95.
49
Fir detailed explanation of this table, please see Scott, James C., Comparative political corruption,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), p.95.
52
Table 2.2
Changes in Loyalty Ties and Party Inducements50
Phase A
Political ties are determined largely by traditional patterns of
deference (vertical ties) to established authorities. Material,
particularistic inducements to cooperation play a minor role except
among a limited number of local power-holders.*
Phase B
Deference patterns have weakened considerably in a stage of rapid
socioeconomic changes. Vertical ties can only be maintained
through a relationship of greater reciprocity.** Competition among
leaders for support, coupled with the predominance of narrow,
parochial loyalties, encourages the widespread use of concrete,
short-run, material inducements to secure cooperation. The greater
the competitive electoral pressure, the wider the distribution of
inducements is likely to be. Influence at the enforcement stage is
common.
Phase C
New loyalties have emerged in the process of economic growth that
increasingly stress horizontal (functional), class, or occupational
ties. The nature of inducements for political support are accordingly
likely to stress policy concerns or ideology.
*
Traditional ties generally allow some scope for bargaining and reciprocity; the possibility that
clients might flee to another jurisdiction, and labour and defense needs that make the implied
contract in the classical feudal tie between lord and serf recognizes the modicum maintenance of
a sizable clientele desirable, providing subordinates with some leverage. Distinctions in the
degree of reciprocity are therefore relative.
** What appears to happen in the transitional situation is that the client is less "locked-in" to a single
patron and the need for political support forces patrons to compete with one another to build
larger clienteles.
Source: James Scott, Comparative political corruption, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. :
Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 105.
50
Ibid, p. 105.
53
Table 2.3
1.
2.
3.
The Relationship Between Loyalty Bonds and Party Inducements
Ties of traditional deference or Protection and symbolic, nonmaterial
of charisma.
inducements.*
Community or local orientation Indivisible rewards, public works, schools,
(also ethnic concentration)
"pork-barrel"; communal inducements.
Individual, family, or
small-group orientation.
Particularistic material rewards; patronage,
favors, cash payments, "corruption"; individual
inducement.
4.
Occupational or class
orientation
Broad material rewards; policy commitments,
tax law subsidy programmes, etc.; "general
legislation"; sectional inducements.
# Charismatic ties naturally involve more purely symbolic inducements than do ties of traditional
deference in which clients are generally assured a certain minimal level of material well-being
(security) by their protector or patron in return for their loyalty.
Source: James Scott, Comparative political corruption, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. :
Prentice Hall, 1972), p. 110.
Table 2.3 most accurately reflects the structure of modern society. Scott's
tables indicate that if a party wishes to acquire different kinds of loyalty, then he or
she must offer different types of inducements. It is particularly pertinent to the
empirical study of different electoral levels in Hong Kong. The first nature of loyalty
is applicable to candidates in a larger geographical constituency, such as the Chief
Executive election and the Legislative Council (LegCo) election. Charisma is a
personal quality that can influence others through feeling and affection. Max Weber
describes it as a "certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is
54
set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman,
or at least specifically exceptional qualities."51 When a political leader has once
been recognized to have charismatic leadership, the followers may respond to the
leader's will as if such a response fulfills their duty or obligation.52
Apart from charisma, the second and fourth degrees of loyalty may be very
applicable at the level of the LegCo elections. Due to the fact that the geographical
constituencies are so large (smaller than the Chief Executive election, but far larger
than in the District Council election) a legislator cannot have close contact with the
constituent voters, necessitating a more remote status. He can still keep up relations
with the voters by offering the practical benefits described by the second and fourth
inducements, such as public works, policy commitments, tax programmes and
legislation protecting sectoral interests.
The third degree of loyalty may be applicable to the nature of the District
Councils election. Since the geographical constituencies in a District Councils
election are relatively very small (consisting of about 17,000 voters), face-to face
contacts more important for candidates to cultivate personal networks with voters. In
51
Quoted in Henderson, A.M. and Talcott Parsons tr. And ed. with an introd. by Talcott Parsons, The
Theory of Social and Economic Organization (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1947), p. 239.
52
Ibid., p. 359.
55
Table 2.2, particularistic material rewards and favours may be especially applicable
to District Councils members because voters are easier to individual contacting in a
relatively small constituency. Voters can realistically express their problems,
including what kinds of resources they need, to their District Council representatives.
They can easily evaluate their representatives' performance, and obtain benefits from
the Councillors as well.
The benefits offered by District Council members are pluralistic, including
social services, local or overseas tours, educational or special-interest opportunities,
entertainment opportunities (like opera tickets and snake soup dinners), and even
gifts. Scott's discussion of benefits (with the exception of job patronage) is very
useful for us to construct a dynamic picture of patron-client relations in Hong Kong
with Chinese characteristics such as guanxi and ren-ch 'ing. Job patronage, according
to Scott, can benefit the locality through approved public works, so that "job
patronage can be wielded to favour an entire community or ethnic group."
CO
Whereas job patronage is a useful means for cultivating voters' loyalty, it may not be
applicable to the political environment of Hong Kong. The reason is that the
anti-corruption agency in Hong Kong—Independent
53
Scott, Comparative political corruption, 1972, p. 110
56
Commission
Against
Corruption—must look into such reported case. Unlike Taiwan where corruption
appears to be widespread and where job patronage can appear in the form of
acquiring construction tenders and then hiring friends and supporters as workers, the
HKSAR situation remains less "corrupt" and thus job patronage appears to be less
prominent.
57
Figure 2.2 The Dynamics of Patron-Client Politics in Hong Kong
Possible factors reinforcing patron-client relationships
l.Mass political culture
(more preference towards material or non-material
benefits, stronger patron-client relations).
Factors in Legco and District Council elections
1. Political ideology of parties
2. Party mobilization of voters
3. Personal image & popularity
2. Elite political culture
(more patronage-style politicians, more likely to use
patron-client networks).
(Usual Hypothesis)
3. Small constituencies
(smaller constituency, closer interaction between
voters and candidates, stronger patron-client relations)
(Hypothesis in this Thesis)
4. Party competition
(more party competition, stronger patron-client
relations).
Patron-Client Relations
5. Imitating Taiwan-style campaign strategies
(Taiwan-style campaign, stronger patron-client
relations).
Electoral success
of candidates
(Neglected factor)
or Independent Variable
6. Electoral law
(more ambiguities in election law, more favourable to
Patron-client relations)
58
Dependent Variable
2.3 An Analytical Framework of Patron-Client Politics
In the study of electoral politics in Hong Kong, scholars have usually
explained the electoral victory of candidates, who may be affiliated to political
parties or groups, by using such factors as the attractive political ideology of parties,
the mobilization of voters and the candidates' personal image and popularity.54
Nevertheless, Figure 2.2 reflects, in general, the dynamics of patron-client politics in
Hong Kong that may apply to different electoral levels. As the chart illustrates,
candidates or politicians may utilize one or more or even all of the factors that
reinforce patron-client relationships in order to accomplish their electoral campaign
strategies or connect with constituencies. These factors or variables include: (1) mass
political culture, (2) elite political culture, (3) the size of constituencies, (4) party
competition, (5) Taiwan-style campaign strategies, and (6) electoral law. It can be
observed that these factors are important in electoral engineering, though they may
be neglected by political analysts. A clever manipulation of these factors may, to a
certain degree, help to achieve electoral victory of candidates (or increase the chance
34
For more details, see Lo Shiu-hing and Yu Wing-yat, "The 2000 Legislative Council Elections in
Hong Kong", Representation, vol. 38, No. 4, (2002), pp. 327-339; Lo Shiu-hing, Election and
democracy in Hong Kong: the 1998 Legislative Council election (Baltimore: University of Maryland,
1999); Lo Shiu-hing, Yu Wing-yat and Wan Kwok-fai, "The 1999 District Council Elections," paper
presented at a conference on Hong Kong at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology,
(December 16, 2000); and Lo Shiu-hing, Yu Wing-yat and Wan Kwok-fai, "Guest Editors'
Introduction," in Chinese Law and Government: The 2000 Legislative Council Elections in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region, vol. 34, no. 2, (March/April 2001).
59
of victory for councilors or the Chief Executive candidates. As mentioned above,
major factors have been usually identified concerning the voters' decision to vote in
Legislative Council or District Council elections: namely, the political ideology of
parties, party mobilization of voters, and personal image and popularity of the
candidates. The following sections will discuss the six factors shaping patron-client
relations, which in turn influence whether candidates win the electoral battles.
2.3.1 Mass Political Culture,
Mass behaviour is an unpredictable factor that is difficult to be controlled. A
strategist who can effectively manipulate mass voting behaviour can increase the
probability of his or her electoral victory. Winning the masses' support then becomes
the most important strategy for candidates in their election engineering. Gabrial
Almond and Sidney Verba's findings on civic culture (i.e., parochial culture, subject
culture, and participant culture), while useful for studying voter behaviour, were
insufficient for us to explain the masses' practical behavior or their inclination to
vote for a particular candidate.55
One practical way for candidates to attract voters is to maintain healthy
55
Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: political attitudes and democracy in five
nations .(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963)
60
patron-client relations. As argued in the previous chapter, the concept of reciprocity
(pao) is a conventional structure in Chinese thought and training.56 Also, the mass is
more easily accessed through collective activities, which provide a context for the
candidates" dispersal of benefits.57 Mass social exchange behaviour has existed as
an informal politics in Chinese society for some time. 58 Therefore, strong
patron-client relations provide a well-established pattern for patrons to provide
material or non-material benefits to clients. If a candidate neglects to use
patron-client relations to cultivate votes, then their chance of electoral victory will
likely be dimmed.
It is understandable that none of the candidates totally excludes the use of
patron-client relations for associations with the constituency. Indeed, other factors
may be at play, such as elites political culture as discussed below.
2.3.2 Elite Political Culture
The elite group comprises the middle and upper class (the well-educated and
56
Wen, Chongyi, "Repay and Revenge: an analysis to exchange behaviour,," in Yang, Guoshu eds.,
Zhongguo ren de xin li (Taibei: Gui guan tu shu gu fen you xian gong si, 1989), p. 88.
57
Olson, Mancur, The logic of collective action; public goods and the theory of groups, (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), pp.5-52.
58
Dittmer, Lowell, Haruhiro Fukui, Peter N.S. Lee ed., Informal politics in East Asia, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000).
61
the professionals, etc.)59 The Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Tung Chee-hwa,
supplied a remarkable definition of old and new elitism at the University of Hong
Kong's 90th Anniversary Dinner. He defined the elitism as follows:
Any group of people who gather together for a certain purpose or hierarchy
of purposes must have leaders, who are needed to give direction, impart
orderliness and instill a sense of unity among the organization's members
that they lead or serve. For society as a whole, the leaders of its many
constituent organizations - business firms, government organs, charities,
political and labour unions, cultural and ethnic groups, etc., together form
the elite, which is the fountainhead of power, creativity and systems of
beliefs of that society. Thus, every society has an elite and needs it. That is
a fact beyond contest. What is contestable is the nature and purpose of the
elite - whether it is closed, self-perpetuating and self-serving, or whether it
is open, meritocratic and possessing strong altruistic tendencies.60
Obviously, Tung did not support this 'old' time elitism and he called for a new
elitism, a kind of new patron-client politics.
I am not trying to resurrect the kind of elitism based on aristocratic blood
relationships and class background; not even the closed, self-perpetuating
type with altruistic tendencies. What I am rooting for is the new kind of
elitism - open, meritocratic and strongly altruistic in outlook. The new elite
draws its members from all walks of life, so that when they as individuals
become successful they do not forget where they have come from, and
understand that in lifting themselves up they must also help lift up others. I
am sure this New Elitism is also the kind that most of our citizens would
espouse. It is in essence the spirit of Hong Kong!61
59
See also Walder, Andrew G., Politics and Property in Transitional Economies: A Theory of Elite
Opportunity, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20209/Walder Elite Qpps.pdf.
60
Tung, Chee-wah, speech at the 90th Anniversary Dinner, University of Hong Kong.
http://www.info.gov.hk/ce/speech/cesp.htm.
61
Ibid.
62
Tung has realized that an elite is a small circle or a faction which isolates
outsiders. In other words, elites are difficult to be influenced. Further, elites are, in
general, professionals with good educational and family incom, so ordinary materials
of exchange may not be practical to lure support from elite groups. Nevertheless,
non-material exchange in patron-client relations (such as guanxi or social status) may
be useful for maintaining networks with elites. Thus, patronage-style politicians are
more likely to adopt patron-client networks to cultivate votes from elites.
Although Tung's rhetoral included the emphasis on "open, meritocratic and
altruistic" ingredients of new elites, he actually dispensed benefits to elites since July
1, 1997, as the nest chapter will show Elite political culture, that is, the attitudes of
elites towards politics, can shape the success or failure of patron-client relations. If
elites tend to strive for political power, they obviously side with their powerful
patrons. Similarly, if elites want to achieve economic gains through an alliance with
the political patrons, patronage politics must work effectively to attract elite support.
However, if elites oppose patronage politics and dislike power-holders, patron-client
networks may encounter difficulties of penetrating the psyche of all the elites.
Likewise, elites imbued with democratic or open mentality may hate or detest
patronage politics. Thus, the way in which elites perceives patronage is crucial to the
63
impact of patron-client relations.
2.3.3 Small Constituencies
The size of an electoral constituency can influence the campaign strategy in a
local election. A larger constituency tend to minimize the impact of patron-client
networks, such as the Hong Kong Island LegCo constituency comprising over 1.2
million voters.62 By contrast, a District Councilor of, for example, Kwun Long
constituency, serves a population of just 14,000. In a larger constituency, the
candidate has to invest a large amount of resources, including money and manpower
(usually paid volunteers), into the long and arduous process of serving the
constituency. A local councilor, whose district office is located at the constituency,
can keep in touch with his or her constituents by just walking around for an hour or
so. In fact, it is a normal practice for candidates to move to reside in his or her
electoral constituency to make it more convenient to maintain personal relations and
social networks. This phenomenon is discussed by a District Councilor as follows:
I moved to this flat a few years ago, and won the chairmanship position of
the Owner's Corporation. I found that this special background can help me
to have higher chance of public exposure so that I can deliver services to
them easily, and maintain a very good relationship with the public. So I
participated in the District Council election and defeated the other candidate,
who was not a resident here. I believe that residential status and my status
62
http://www.info.gov.hk/eac/pdf/legco/2004/ch/lc2004 lcl.DOC.
64
are the major factors for me to win this game.63
In short, a smaller constituency can enable a closer interaction between voters
and candidates, thus making it easier for candidates to maintain strong patron-client
relations with the voters. A large constituency, however, may allow other factors to
come into play and to exert more influence on voters, such as the ideology of
political parties. Indeed, large constituencies may lead to an increasing distance or
communication gap between the candidates and voters, thus reducing the impact of
patron-client networks.
2.3.4 Party Competition
Party competition has become more intense in Hong Kong since the
introduction of LegCo's direct elections in 1991. Political parties must cultivate more
votes for their members to survive and win elections.64 Further, parties may find that
the Chief Executive election is carefully structured to block out candidates not
selected by the central government, so local elections may provide the only
battlefields between political parties. Parties must mobilize all their resources at the
local level to polish their popularity. Second, political parties have to construct better
63
Personal interview with an unnamed District Councilor of the New Territories West constituency on
November 25,2003.
64
Kwong, Kam-kwan, "Leave the Governing Alliance to revive again," Hong Kong Economic Times,
December 9,2003, p. A32.
65
local networks suited to their electoral strategies. Third, parties must utilize their
resources to help LegCo and District Council members conduct district-level work,
in order to shape up their competitive ascendancy.
Party competition is an ordinary phenomenon in Hong Kong politics which
has grown more radical and polarized recently since the 1997 retrocession. The
major concern of the parties in this competitive environment is to defeat the
competing parties, or at least to grasp a superior ascendancy, so as to enhance party
members' chance to win elections. It is natural that more party competition will lead
to stronger patron-client relations. Party competition means that party candidates
have to rely on all means, including the cultivation of patron-client networks, to win
their competitive electoral battles.
2.3.5 Imitating the Taiwan-Style Campaign Strategies
Elections in Taiwan are well known for their carnival-like electoral
atmosphere, and, of course, for their tradition of corrupt campaign strategies.
Candidates in Taiwan election spend lavishly and perhaps excessively in their
campaigns in order to augment their patron-client networks with voters. Taiwan's
electoral constituencies are in general larger than Hong Kong, thus implying that a
66
huge amount of campaign expenditure is needed for Taiwan candidates to maintain
their patronage relations with voters. It is noteworthy that not all the campaign
strategies of Taiwan candidates necessarily involve corruption. Taiwan campaigns
may be parallel to Hong Kong in that there are features like the delivery of party
badges, national flags, and election banquets. These campaign strategies may be
universal and are hardly associated with corruption, but they surely can influence
electoral success of candidates.
Apart from the exceedingly high level of campaign expenditure, other crucial
and prominent feature of Taiwan-style campaign strategy is the function of factions.
Joseph Bosco describes the Taiwanese factions as a process in which "a person is
considered in a faction if he exchanges favours with other faction members; no
ceremony or formal act indicates a person has joined a faction. Exchanging favours
is not merely a transaction but implies a relationship, the tie that is at the heart of
factions."65 Members of a faction help cultivate and stabilize votes during the
electoral period. Factions are therefore the electoral machines.66 Bosco observes that
in Taiwan, "factional mobilization and leadership are based on guanxi, a term for
65
Bosco, Joseph, "Taiwan Factions: guanxi, patronage, and the state in local politics," Ethnology,
Volume XXXI, No. 2, (April 1992), p. 165.
66
Ibid., p. 164.
67
particularistic ties connoting connections, networks, and patron-client relations."67
From his observation, factions in Taiwan serve a crucial function in electoral
activities.68
Although typical Taiwan-style factions are not so visible and obvious in Hong
Kong, they may be identified by using the local pockets of campaign assistance.
Campaign assistance is not a formal position for any candidate; it can be appear in
different pockets or forms, such as Mutual Aids Committees (MACs), Owners'
Corporations (OCs), or even small group of District Council members in a
geographical constituency of LegCo's direct election. It is possible that more
Taiwan-style campaigns, which are characterized by a huge amount of campaign
expenditure and by factional groups, may gradually grow in Hong Kong where
electoral stakes are seen as higher by local and territory-wide candidates than ever
before. Candidates in Hong Kong may see political offices as a channels for them to
gain prestige and influence, thus forcing them to adopt a more Taiwan-style
campaign in elections.
67
Ibid., p. 167.
Chen, Mingtong, Pai xi zheng zhi yu Taiwan zheng zhi bian qian (Taibei shi: Yue dan chu ban she
gu fen you xian gong si, 1995); Liao, Zhongjun, Taiwan di fang pai xi de xing cheng fa zhan yu zhi
bian (Taibei: Yun chen wen hua shi ye gu fen you xian gong si, 1998); and Tien, Hung-mao, ed., with
a foreword by Robert A. Scalapino, Taiwan's electoral politics and democratic transition : riding the
third wave (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); Liu , Alan P. L., How China is Ruled (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1986) pp. 232-246; and Brumfiel, Elizabeth M. and John W. Fox ed.,
Factional competition and political development in the New World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994).
68
68
2.3.6 Electoral law
The laws relating to electoral activities in Hong Kong are relatively strict. It
emphasizes fairness in all levels of elections, but somehow the laws are criticized for
irritating candidates and, in certain areas, for being too vague and difficult to follow.
Since a large proportion of candidates are not legal practitioners and may not possess
any professional knowledge of Hong Kong laws, the Electoral Affairs Commission
(EAC) has since 1994 drafted and issued the Guidelines on Election-related
Activities to educate the candidates on how to avoid unlawful loopholes.69 Still, as
discussed in Chapter Six, grassroots campaign assistants have violated the election
law by even falsifying the signatures of voters.
Although the EAC has accumulated a rich experience in drafting and
improving the guidelines for elections at each level, the guidelines are confused and
70
difficult for either candidates or assistants to follow.
In fact, candidates do not
know if some of the laws written in the guidelines should be exercised. Ma Lik, the
69
The whole version of the Guidelines on Election-related Activities in respect of the District
Councils Elections can be found on http://www.info.gov.hk/eac/en/distco/dc guide.htm. Although
these guidelines are for District Council election, the Guidelines for Legco election are similar.
Ordinances related to elections include Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Conduct) Ordinance, Chapter
554, of Hong Kong Laws, http://www.iustice.gov.hk/eng/home.htm.
70
Apple Daily, November 11,2003, p. A12.
69
Chairman of the pro-government political party. Democratic Alliance for Betterment
of Hong Kong (DAB), has complained that the guidelines are ambiguous, that "there
are a lot of loopholes and grey areas in the Guidelines which happen to have different
explanations by different candidates."71 Meanwhile, the EAC led by Judge Woo
Kwok-hing has refused to accept these allegations from candidates and political
parties, and claims that no amendment is necessary.72 Still, a candidate in the 1999
District Council election complained that
the EAC did not wish to implement the guidelines though several versions
were coming from them. I made several complaint to the EAC and the
District Office, saying that my competitor had displayed posters without
official permission and that he failed to deposit copies of the advertisements
to the District Office. But the civil servants in the District Office just asked
my opposing candidate to tear off the posters and to remember to obtain the
prior permission of the landowner concerned. No legal action was
eventually taken.73
The former chairman of the DAB, Tsang Yuk-sing, expressed that it was unwise to
announce one's participation in an election, because this would limit the chances for
candidates to conduct district-level work.74 Thereby many candidates conduct
campaign-like work, including the cultivation of patron-client relations, in
non-election time without the need to report to the EAC. The so-called official
campaign period designated by the EAC is usually a period for candidates to report
71
72
73
74
MingPao, October 21,2003, p. D7.
MingPao, November 17, 2003, p. A l l .
Personal interview with informant 3, April 22,2000.
MingPao, May 21,2004, p. A23.
70
their campaign expenditure to the EAC later after the election. Still, there is no
guarantee that all candidates frankly report their campaign expenditures to the EAC.
The ordinances relating to electoral behaviour are written in a relatively strict
and prudent way. Because the laws are sometimes too rigid and the personnel staff
overseeing the electoral activities are usually insufficiently trained, it is necessary for
candidates to cultivate more votes through district-level work and patron-client
relations. In other words, ambiguities in election laws tend to be favorable for the
conduct of patron-client relations. The more ambiguity or more loopholes the
election law has, the more widespread use of patron-client relations by electoral
candidates.
71
2.4 Summary
The study of patron-client relations is the study of human exchange
behaviour. A patron exchanges material or non-material benefits for obligations from
clients. Through the exchange, the patron can build up personalistic ties with the
clients, a process in which a dyadic relationship will emerge and take root gradually.
The material benefits may include any kind of physical favors (such as gifts, jobs and
receptions). The non-material benefits are broader, including friendship, services, and
even human feelings. Exchanges happen through reciprocity, networking, pao,
guanxi, and ren-ch'ing. In China, the concepts of guanxi and ren-ch'ing can
supplement our study of patron-clientelism developed from Western political theory.
No matter what kinds of exchanges occur, the clients are bound to reciprocate to the
patron as an obligation or duty. The uncertainty is concerned with the type of
obligation decided by the clients, although the patron may require or hope that the
clients can act in accordance with the patron's will.
The dynamics of patron-client relation are applicable as a theoretical
framework for examining the political situation in Hong Kong. At each elective level,
electoral victory can be explained by a combination of two or three or more factors.
72
The most neglected factor, as I have hypothesized is patron-client relations that have
traditionally been neglected by scholars strategy Hong Kong politics and elections.
Other factors or variables that may shape the influence of patron-client relations
embrace mass political culture, elite attitude, smaller constituencies, party
competition, Taiwan-style campaign strategies (high campaign expenditure and
factional groups) and the electoral law. Since these factors have been commonly
swept under the carpet by scholars researching on Hong Kong elections, the
patron-client framework I propose here may constitute an area ripe for further study.
73
Chapter 3
Patron-Client Relations and Public Administration
3.1 Introduction
Patron-client relation is one of the important areas in the study of public
administration, but has been neglected by scholars in the study of Hong Kong politics.
It will be universally acceptable if one claims that the government is the biggest patron
whereas the citizens are clients because the government possesses the largest resources
of a state, for example, lands, public money, making public policy and power of
governance. In other words, there is an unequal status between public administrators
and citizens, thus the higher rank of administrators will have higher degree of
administrative and political power. This situation can be applied to almost all types of
political system, such as the president in a presidential system, a prime minister in a
constitutional monarchy, and the chief executive in a special administrative region like
Hong Kong. It is conceivable by reasonable men that public administrators will act in
accordance with the laws and regulations, and more important, that they are anticipated
74
by the public to have a highest sense of ethics and morality. Public administrators may
easily be corrupted if their powers are not checked. However, it is observable that
public administrators can skillfully avoid being accused of corruption or bribery
through making use of patron-client politics to deliver public benefits to clients in
exchange of the latter's obligations in return. This reciprocal relation has been
continuously taken place in Hong Kong before and after the handover in July 1997.
Ethics of a public administrator is thus very important. This Chapter aims at exploring
the interrelationships between public administration and politics in the HKSAR.
3.2 Public Administration and Patron-Client Relations
Classical views of public administration emphasized the neutrality, inhuman job
nature and procedural orientations of the administrators.1 The term ethics refers to the
"right conduct" and action that "can be justified with individual and social standards of
"right and wrong."2 There are two categories of administrative responsibility: objective
and subjective. Objective responsibility (or accountable) means "responsibility of a
person or an organization to someone else and it is similar to accountability or
1
There are a lot of classical compositions on public administration, see for example, Simon, Herbert A.,
Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, Public administration, (New York : Rnopf, 1958,) and
Weber, Max, Tr. by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons. Ed. with an introd. by Talcott Parsons, The
theory of social and economic organization, (Glencoe, III.: The Free Press, 1947.)
2
Gortner, Harold F., Ethics for Public Managers, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991,) p. 274.
75
answerability. Subjective (or psychological) responsibility focuses on the personal
feeling and belief, and it emphasizes personal loyalty and conscience.3 Ethics involves
substantive reasoning about obligations, consequences and ultimate ends. Terry Cooper
has indicated that the process of being ethical ultimately requires the individual
administrator to apply ethical values and make a decision. He emphasizes the need to
improve control over individual decisions.4 Therefore, administrators have a higher
autonomy of discretionary power to decide policy outputs depending on the level of
responsibility. To clarify whom should the public administrators be responsible to,
Dwight Waldo has suggested a hierarchy of ethical responsibility answering this
question, as shown in Figure 3.1 below.
3
Mosher, Frederick C., The GAO: the questfor accountability in American government, (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1979.)
4
Terry L. Cooper, The responsible administrator: an approach to ethics for the administrative role,( San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998.)
76
Figure 3.1 Sources and Types of Ethical Responsibility5
The Constitution
Nation
Law
Organization-Bureaucratic Norms
Family and Friends
Public Interest or General Welfare
Middle-Range Collectivities (e.g. party, class, race)
Democracy
Profession
Religion or God
Self
Humanity or the World
Source:
Waldo, Dwight, The Enterprise of Public Administration: A Summary View, (Novato, Calif.:
Chandler & Sharp Publishers, 1980,) pp. 103-106.
Waldo observes that an public administrator is responsible for the public interest or
general welfare, asserting that the "public and media concern about public service ethics
has centered on conflict of interest and, to a lesser extent, on issues of political
partisanship, public comment, and confidentiality."6
In short, public administration and patron-client relations are two inter-related
concepts. Public administrators, who control public resources, may decay if the
resources are used as means of benefits to exchange with clients. The exchange is
usually very difficult to be categorized as illegal, but it can be seen as immoral while
immorality is itself not necessarily a crime. Nevertheless, a public administrator who
5
See also Denhardt, Kathryn G., The ethics of public service : resolving moral dilemmas in public
organizations, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988.)
77
adopts patronage will see it a legal means to conduct good relationships with clients so
as to make the governance smoother, or to reach a good deal with the clients.
3.2.1 Means of enhancing government supporters
The delivery of public resources as benefits to the clients in HKSAR can be
categorized into four types: (1) appointment to official positions or advisory boards; (2)
building up friendship through cooptation; (3) granting honorary awards; and (4)
upgrading priority in bidding government contracts. The following sessions attempt to
examine the usual practices of the government to carry out these patronages.
(a) Appointments
The reciprocity of benefits in the HKSAR government's appointment can be observed in
two ways: (1) those conducted by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa himself and (2) those
executed Principal officials. Since Tung became the first Chief Executive of HKSAR in
December 1996, he started to establish his own Chief Executive Office located in a
business premises and to recruit his friends and loyal servants into the superstructure of
his governing clan, such as Lo Cheung On,7 the ex-Senior Special Assistant to Chief
6
Robert F. Adie and Paul G. Thomas, Canadian Public Administration: Problematical Perspectives
(Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 359.
7
Lo was a loyal staff to Tung's company for more than 10 years, and he accompanied Tung to pass
78
Executive Office, and Mr. Chan Kin-ping, Assistant to Chief Executive Office.9
Chan's appointment was extraordinary because firstly, he was neither a close friend nor
had any family ties with Tung. Secondly, he was poorly experienced in working in a
large public organization. Thirdly, as a junior reporter, he was by no means qualified to
bear such a high ranking position.10 The fact behind this appointment might be that
Chan is an agent of Beijing with a major duty to coordinate between Tung and the
central government. In other words, Tung, as a client to his patron Beijing, has to fulfill
the objective required by the patron, namely demonstrating his loyalty. In turn, his
patron Beijing must give him strong support. From this trilateral perspectives, there was
a cluster of patron-client relations composed of patron Beijing and its client Tung;
patron Tung and his client appointees; and client appointees and patron Beijing.
(b) Cooptation
Co-opting political elites into government structures has become a usual practice of
both the British Hong Kong government and the HKSAR government, while the
through afinancialcrisis in 1982, so Tung awarded him with a top post.
8
The positions of Assistant to the CE's Office, whose were in the Directorate rank, were newly
established positions in HKSAR. Interestingly, this rank was not mentioned in the Chief Executive
Office's website or in the Civil Service Bureau, thus making this appointment more mysterious.
9
Chan was a journalist of pro-Beijing newspaper, Wen Wei Po before he was appointed to the Chief
Executive Office.
10
Ranking is an important consideration in Chinese society. Even the former Chief Editor of pro-Beijng
newspaper Tai Kung Pao, Tsang Tak Shing, was appointed as a full-time member of the Central Policy
Unit under the Chief Executive Office. From this point of view, Chan's appointment seemed to be
extraordinary.
79
HKSAR government plays this game in a more manifest way. Cooptation is the "process
of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an
organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence."11 Through
appointing the pro-government elites and representatives from friendly groups into
different government organizations and public corporations, the government policy
making can be safeguarded from political disputes and the disruption of policy
implementation. On the other hand, the appointments are welcomed by most of the elites
who can enhance their status and prestige, thus reinforcing their pro-government
proclivity.12 The art of Tung's cooptation is imitated from Beijing's united front work
that is aimed at mobilizing the majority of Hong Kong people to support the ruling
Chinese Communist Party,13 but Tung's cooptation strategy looks quite clumsy and
explicit.
(c) Awards
The original aims of awards are to "to give due recognition to contributions to the
11
Selznick, Philip, "The Cooptative Mechanism," in Shafritz and Hyde, eds., Classics of Public
Administration, p. 171.
12
Lo, Shiu Hing, Governing Hong Kong: legitimacy, communication and political decay, (New York:
Nova Science Publishers, 2001,) p. 237.
13
See for example, Wan, Kwok Fai, Beijing's united front policy toward Hong Kong: an application of
Merilee Grindle's model, (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 2003) and Wong, Wai Kok, "Can
Co-optation Win Over the Hong Kong People? China's United Front Work in Hong Kong Since 1984,"
Issues & Studies, vol. 33, no. 5 (May 1997).
80
reunification with China, to establish social values and set role models for the HKSAR,
and to enhance cohesion of the community."14 However, the persons to be awarded are
politically oriented and tend to have personalistic ties. In Table 3.1, it is coincidental to
see that all of the award recipients were members of Election Committee whose
responsibility was to elect the Chief Executive and the Provisional Legislative Council
in late 1996. Clearly the political rewards were to a certain degree, linked with the
special background of their identity in the Election Committee, and, at least, we can
draw a conclusion that their personalistic ties played a critical role in getting such a
highest honor in Hong Kong's society.
14
Citationfromthe press release of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government before
the handover on June 25,1997 that the set up of this honours system was to mark a historic new era on its
return to the motherland on July 1, please refers to http://www.info.gov.hk/press/p970625a.htm.
81
Name of recipients
Personal relations with Mr.Tung Chee-hwa
Ann Tse Kai
Member of Electioni Committee,
Committee,campaign
campaign assistant
assistant to
to
Mr. Tung.
Committee
Member of Election[Committee
Committee,campaign
campaign assistant
assistant to
to
Member of Electioni Committee,
Mr. Tung.
Committee
Member of Electiont Committee
Member of Election Committee
Elsie Tu
Simon Fok Siu Li
Quo Wai Lee
Cha Chi Ming
Xu Simin
Ka Lap Wong
Tsang Hin Chi
Sai Ping Chuang
Fok Ying Tung
Dr. Chung Sze Yuen
Tak Sing Lo
Member of Election Committee
Member of Election Committee
Member of Election Committee
Member of Election Committee
Member of Election Committee, campaign assistant to
Mr. Tung.
Member of Election Committee, campaign assistant to
Mr. Tung.
Member of Election Committee
Apart from the personalistic ties with Tung to achieve honor and prestige, politically,
Tung has traditionally used awards to repay the ren-ch'ing debt to patron Beijing's
connections. Yeung Kwong, for example, was formerly a president of the pro-Beijing
Federation of Trade Unions and a chief organizer of the Struggle Committee under the
New China News Agency in the 1967 riots.15 He was accused of instigating the
1966-67 riots that caused deaths and casualties.16 In other words, Yeung's behavior
15
16
Hong Kong Daily News, July 10, 2001 p. A02.
For more detailed information about the 1966-67 riots in Hong Kong, please see Zhang, Jiawei,
82
during the riots was controversial, or he was rejected by the majority of the people of
Hong Kong. Tung's government was severely criticized for his appointment and was
asked to expose if any objective standards had been laid, or whether the reward was the
personal gift offered by Tung himself.17 In fact, the award to Yeung was out of its
original principle of appreciating individual contribution to society. Instead, the award
was clearly as Tung's personal gift and has return of the ren-ch'ing debt.18 Or even
worst, that the award might deepen the governing crisis of the Tung regime.19 In short,
the award itself might degenerate into a kind of benefits to exchange for other ends with
the clients, and, in the case of Tung as a client, he used it as a gift to strength relatives
with patron Beijing.
(d) Contracts:
A fair and competitive bidding of governmental contract is a usual practice in Hong
Kong under colonial rule, but it has changed a bit in Tung's government. The case of
tycoon Li Ka Shing is a good example. Li has been a close supporter of Tung before the
Xianggang liu qi bao dong nei qing, (Xianggang: Taipingyang shi ji chu ban she you xian gong si, 2000)
Liang, Jiaquan, Liu qi bao dong mi xin : Ying fang jue mi dang anpu guang, (Xianggang : Jing ji ri bao
chu ban she, 2001).
17
Oriental Daily, July 11,2001.
18
Lo, Shiu Hing, Yu Wing Yat, Kwong Kam Kwan, Wan Kwok Fai and Cheung Yat Fung eds., Tung
Chee Wah Government: governing crises and solution, (Hong Kong: MingPao Publisher Limited, 2003)
pp. 127-128
19
Ibid., pp. 129-130
83
latter became the Chief Executive. In 2003, Li was found to have a lot of business with
Tung's family business, the former had invested a lot to the Orient Overseas
(International) Limited (OOIL) when the latter was the Chairman. The investment made
Li become the second biggest shareholder of OOIL as it encountered a financial crisis.20
Indeed, Li's investment brought the company out of indebtedness. Furthermore, Li
played an active role in the transition of Hong Kong and most important, had a
harmonious relationship with Tung's patron, namely Beijing. These ascending status
made Li's standing economically beneficial and politically influential.
It is observable that Li has acquired tremendous privileges and benefits since the
retrocession in 1997. A lot of benefits are material ones and few are of non-material
aspect, such as awards, face and prestige. The material benefits can be offered to the
subsidiary companies he has controlled or to the persons with family ties or personalistic
ties to the Li's family. Table 3.2 indicates the benefits offered by the Tung government
in his first term of office.
20
Next Magazine, August 14,2003, p. 61
84
Table 3.2 Benefits of Li Ka Shing under the Tung Regime.
Year
Benefits
Competition
1998
Single tender: Ma On Shan hotel site with
an average price of HK$ 200 per sq. ft.21
No
1998
Bidding for Canton Road site which was
20% below the market price.22
Yes
1999
Single tender: Li's second son, Richard Li
No
had proposed the cyberport project to the
Tung government to promote computersrelated design and research business, and
Tung approved the project to be run by
Richard without any public bidding
because Richard was the original promoter
of this project.23 Later the cyberport
project was criticized as a lie because it
was changed into a property project.24
Tung denied that it had any reciprocity
25
relation in return to Richard's father.
2000
Listing of Tom.Com: The company
acquired lots of exemption when it applied
for the listing status at the Hong Kong
26
Growth Enterprise Market.
No
Source: Next Magazine, August 14, 2003, p. 61.
It is worthwhile to note that Tung was very concerned about Li Ka Shing's feeling and
behavior toward the situation in Hong Kong. For example, Li once angrily claimed to
21
South China Morning Post (SCMP), 17-3-1998, p. 2.
, SCMP, March 14,1998, p. 1 and also March 15,1998, p. 12
23
Next Magazine, August 14,2003, p. 62, and see also MingPao, January 21,1999, p. B2.
24
Richard Li was criticized by Stephen Vines that the cyberport proposal was a lie after 5 years of
observation. Vines claimed that the cyberport was not a great construction, but a prominent real property
project offered to the most influential business leader's son. For details, please see
http://www.quam.net/fcgi-bin/c/ccolumnists,fpl?par2=5&par3=3&par4=17&par5:=03&par6=2004.
25
MingPao, May 7,1999, p. A16.
26
Next Magazine, August 8,2003, p. 62.
22
85
pull HK$10 billions investment items out of Hong Kong because the investment
environment was damaged by the politicians.27 Obviously Li was unhappy about the
criticism from the mass media and pro-democracy politicians, who said he cultivated
patronage relations with the Tung Regime. Tung immediately sent the former Chief
Secretary for Administration, Anson Chan and the former Financial Secretary, Donald
Tsang to visit Li to console him.
The special relations between Tung and Li were
clear.
The second case exposing Tung's mentality of reciprocity is the offer of a rent to
the Television Broadcasting Group (TVB) at a very generous price for the company to
move its base to Tseung Kwan O district. Table 3.3 comprehensively introduces the
course of the TVB in obtaining special offers from the government after two
correspondences between the Chief Executive and the Chief Executive. It is interesting
to find that there was no explicit agreement or negotiation between Tung, Run Run
Shaw and the Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau, but changes could be seen
after the first and second correspondences with Tung. Together with the rapid changes to
27
28
MingPao, December 2,1998, p. A2.
MingPao, December 12,1998.
86
the use of land, it is logically to come to the conclusion that Tung manoeuvrred behind
the scene and exerted pressure on the government officials concerned.
Table 3.3 The course of TVB in getting benefits through its communications with
Tung Chee-hwa
Year
Price of land
Run Run Shaw's letter to Follow-up action
Tung
Late 1997 2,750/sq.ft (suggested)
13-1-1998
Asking for help because Sent the letter to The
the nature of the business Commerce, Industry and
did not fit for the use oifjTechnology Bureau to
have follow-up action.
land.
The Commerce, Industry
and Technology Bureau
efficiently amended the
use of land and eventually
made the TVB qualified to
use the land to run its
entertainment business.
Assigned the letter to The
Complained that the
price of the land was still Commerce, Industry and
Technology Bureau again
expensive and
unreasonable in spite of to have follow-up action.
July 1998
21-12-1998
the flat that 15% was off
from the original price.
May 1999 Signed at the price of
2,350/sq.ft.
February Signed a new contract
at the price of
2000
1,850/sq.ft
Totally HK$81.9 million was
saved.
Sources: Apple Daily, June 10, 2004, p. A2 and June 11,2004 p. A8
87
Tung's zealous heart in assisting Shaw to acquire a cheaper price to buy the land could
be explained in terms of patron-client relations. This statement can be further argued by
the dyadic relations of Tung and Shaw in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Run Run Shaw's dyadic ties with Tung Chee-hwa
Year
1996
1998
2001
Personalistic ties
Event
Nominated and assisted Tung to
run for the first Chief Executive
election.
Social relations
1.
Same native birthplace with
Tung.
2.
Good relationships with Beijing.
3.
Patriotism: Shaw donated more
than HK$2 billion to build
schools in mainland.
Awarded the Great Bauhinia
Medal.
Supported Tung to run for the
second term and joined his
campaign team, and donated
HK$ 100,000
for
Tung's
campaign expenditure.
Certainly, these dyadic elements can substantiate the necessary patronage behavior
of Tung; nevertheless, the personalistic and social ties constitute a concrete proof of
Tung's unique relations with Shaw. Furthermore, Shaw's social connections created the
affection of Tung to cement their friendship. Shaw's TVB could also constitute a
88
platform of publicity by the Tung regime. In the process of conferring the Bauhinia
Medal to Shaw, Tung's powers of political patronage can be viewed as indispensable.
Both the case of Li Ka Shing and Run Run Shaw revealed that, firstly, Tung was
very concerned about his major clients' problems in the sense that he tried to repay his
clients with benefits they wanted. Secondly, Tung clients possessed similar background
in that they were successful businessmen whose businesses played an important role in
Hong Kong's economy and society. Thirdly, Tung was not very skillful in managing
public administration; although he repeatedly offered benefits to his clients, the benefits
were risky because they could be interpreted as public administrative misconduct. In
other words, Tung was quite unskillful in playing patron-client politics.
3.3 Appointment System from the Colonial Era to Post-Colonial Era
The British Hong Kong government and the Tung Chee-hwa regime have
coincidently used the appointment system to co-opt political elites into government
organs. The cooptation strategy can to a large extent maintain a higher degree of
political stability, and it can buy the loyalties of these elites to the government through
the award of certain positions instead of using public coffers. In brief, appointments are
89
legal and politically effective weapons for patronage. After the first five years of
governance under the experimental concepts of "one country two systems," "Hong Kong
people ruling Hong Kong," "higher degree of autonomy," the science of cooptation has
to a certain degree been modified from the colonial regime to the post-colonial
administration. A key dimension of change is the ruling style of colonial Hong Kong and
that of the post-colonial government: whether Hong Kong remains having a British style
of cooptation (more conservative and low profile) or cooptation with traditional Chinese
characteristic (more conservative but more aggressive).
3.3.1 Appointment systems in Colonial Hong Kong
The British government was a veteran controlling colonies by means of co-opting
local elites and business people to take up some government positions, such as
memberships of advisory bodies, Legislative Councilors and, more higher, Executive
Councilors. The elites who were appointed tended to support the colonial government,
which in return further protected the interests of cooptees. The entire process led to the
legitimacy of the colonial rulers. Ambrose King called it the administrative absorption of
politics.29
29
King, Ambrose, The Politics and Culture of China, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press), pp. 21-45.
90
King explained that administrative absorption politics referred to a process of
"governmental absorption of political power through representation by elites or elite
group in the society in the policy-making structure so as to attain a certain degree of elite
integration.30 This process conferred legitimacy upon the ruling authority, thus forming
"a loosened but integrated political society."31 Since colonial Hong Kong was not a
democratic society, the colonial government could not use representative government to
enhance its legitimacy. G. B. Endacott suggested the concept of government by
discussion to refer to the colonial consultative governance that could achieve a higher
degree of legitimacy.32 Apart from the advisory bodies, the British Hong Kong
government also appointed the political elites into the Legislative Council and the
Executive Council. John King Fairbank called it "synarchy," i.e. an alien government
delegating part of its authority to the local Chinese.33 This Sino-Foreign joint rule was
practiced fully in Hong Kong under British rule.
30
31
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 27
32
33
Fairbank, J.K. ed., Chinese Thought and Institution, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957,)
pp. 163-203
91
3.3.2 Beijing's Cooptation Before the Handover
To achieve a smooth transition from British Hong Kong to a Special
Administration Region under China, to avoid brain drain and the shifting of wealth,
Beijing started to coopt local elites to participate in the transitional arrangements, such
Table 3.5 Profile of Local Elites Co-opted into Chinese Consultative Organizations
Name
Member of
Member of Basic
Hong Kong
Consultative
Law Drafting
Affairs Advisor
Committee for the
Committee
Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special
Administrative Region
Li Ka-shing
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Tung Chee-hwa
Yes
Yes
Henry Fok Ying-tung
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Leung Chun-ying
Yes
Yes
Yes
Louis Cha Leung-yung
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Chan Wing-kee
Yes
Yes
Yes
Tsang Hin Chi
Yes
Yes
Yes
Lau Wong-fat
Yes
Yes
Yes
James Tien Pei-chun.
Yes
Yes
No
Martin Lee Chu-ming
Yes
Yes
No
Szeto Wah
92
Table 3.5 displays some of the major politicians in Hong Kong coopted by Beijing in the
transition period. It is interesting to note that two famous dissidents, Martin Lee and
Szeto Wah, were once coopted into Beijing's consultative bodies. They resigned from
the Basic Law Drafting Committee after the June 4 crackdown in 1989 and eventually
appeared as anti-communist crusaders in Hong Kong's political arena. After their
resignations, they participated and won the LegCo direct election in 1991. On the other
hand, Henry Fok, in spite of his political status as the vice-chairman of the CPPCC, is a
very close friend and patron of Tung. For example, when Tung's father Tung Hao-yun
died in 1982, Tung discovered that his the family company OOIL ran into a huge debt of
about RMB22.35 billion (US$2.7 billion) as a result of a worldwide slump in the
shipping industry that it and was on the verge of bankruptcy. Tung turned to the
Kuomintang government in Taiwan for cash infusion, but he was rejected. In 1986,
Henry Fok took an initiative to get a load from the Bank of China, thus rescuing Tung's
OOIL with funds from the PRC side. Critics later used this financial arrangement as
leverage against Tung, saying that he relied on the Chinese Communists to rescue his
ailing company.34
34
For detail of the story, please click on the web
http://www.chinaonline.com/refer/biographies/secure/Tung^_Cheehwa.asp
93
3.3.3 HKSAR's Cooptation After the Handover
The political development of the HKSAR demonstrates the proliferation of patron-client
ties explicitly. Arguably, the politics of patron-clientelism has become manifest since the
re-election engineering of Tung's second-term Chief Executive election.35 Furthermore,
when Tung was "re-elected" in the second term, he proposed an accountability system
for Principle Officials. The system was designed to make the principle official of each
policy bureau to be more responsible to the citizens, but actually this principle was
skeptical. In fact, the appointment of principle officials was made up of personal
relations.36 Actually, Tung arranged lots of his friends into the Executive Council and to
be principle officials. For example, C. Y. Leung was Tung's client, supporting his bid
for the second term. Eventually, Leung was easily reappointed to the Executive Council
as a non-government member. As with the Executive Council and the principle officials,
the politics of the Election Committee that selected the Chief Executive was criticized as
the triumph of personal relations.37 Overall, Tung's personal style of personnel
arrangement is to a large extent similar to that in mainland China. In Liaoning province,
for example, a police commissioner in a county reportedly arranged 128 officers into the
35
MingPao Monthly, Feb. 2002, pp. 1-3
Ibid, p. 2
37
Sung, Lap Kung, "The Election of the Chief Executive and it Poltiical and Economic Relations," Hong
Kong Economic Journal Monthly, no. 237, December 1996, pp. 9-12.
36
94
police training school under his patronage and command. Among those appointments, a
13-years old young girl was his granddaughter and other relatives were recruited.38
Compared with this typical case with Tung's leadership style, it is obvious that Tung has
widely adopted a Chinese style of patron-client relations. Ultimately, Tung himself is a
very good Chinese leader emphasizing harmony, consensus and good relations with
patron Beijing.
3.4 The Politics of HKSAR Awards in Advisory Bodies
The appointment of elites into governmental organizations is often criticized as the
"delivery of cakes," which means that the ruling authority uses positions in the
government's advisory bodies as a means of distributing gifts, exchanging benefits, and
enhancing friendships with the clientelist appointees. Democrats in the LegCo
occasionally criticize the appointment for focusing on its conditions and its maximum
period. The Home Affairs Bureau finally issued a consultation paper on the review of
the role and functions of public sector advisory bodies in April 2003 after years of long
criticisms. The consultation paper revealed the policies of establishing an advisory or
statutory body under the following ten conditions:
Oriental Daily, May 11,2003, p. B08.
95
(1) a new advisory or statutory body should only be set up if there is a
demonstrated need for it;
(2) advisory and statutory body should not determine government policies;
(3) responsibility for the policies of the day rests with principle officials;
(4) an advisory or statutory body should be accountable to the Chief Executive or
a principle official for the advice they give and/or for the way they carry out
their functions;
(5) the best people for the job should be appointed to an advisory or statutory
body;
(6) an advisory or statutory body should be open and transparent;
(7) an advisory or statutory body should be representative of the different
interests and sections of the community;
(8) when making appointments to advisory and statutory bodies, there should be
no discrimination on the ground of gender, age, race, disability, religion,
marital status, sexual orientation or social background;
(9) a statutory body should only be set up if it is the most appropriate and
cost-effective means of carrying out its given function; and
96
(10)an advisory or statutory body, which is no longer needed, should be wound up
so as to keep the number of advisory and statutory bodies to a minimum/9
Besides these policies, the Home Affairs Bureau had several guiding principles to
regulate the appointment to advisory or statutory bodies, that is, the appointment should
be made on (1) the basis of merit, (2) equal opportunities, (3) the balance of participation
of women, (4) a system of declaration of interests of members, (5) openness and
transparency, (6) 6-year maximum period of continuous appointment, (7) a maximum of
members serving six committees simultaneously and (8) a judgment on the workload of
appointed members. The guidelines of these appointments appears to be fair and
accountable if and only if the appointments are made in accordance with the six
principles. In fact there are a lot of loopholes.
For instance, a study was conducted on the 103 advisory or statutory bodies in
Hong Kong found that the government did not really follow the guidelines it laid
down.40 The seriousness of the breach of 6-year rule was shown in Table 3.6 Besides
39
40
Cheung, Chiu Hung, "A Study on the Advisory and Statutory Bodies in Hong Kong.: a brief report,"
issued by the Power for Democracy, a political interest group. Full report can be located in
http://www.pfd.org.hk/.
97
the 6~year rule, the same research found that a large proportion of members of the
800-people Election Committee for the Chief Executive dominated the advisory
structures. Among the 33 mostfrequentlyappointed persons found in the 103 advisory
or statutory bodies, 17 (51.25%) of them were also members of the Chief Executive
Election Committee. This percentage showed that Election Committee members were
given more weight by the government. Finally, the survey also discovered that
appointees with commercial background tended to be more represented in the advisory
institutions.41 Clearly, there seemed to be a hidden political bias in the cooptation
process.
Table 3.6 Members in an Advisory Body violating the "6-year rule"
% of Members in a Body who violate the
No. of Bodies (%)
"6-year rule"
0%
42 (40.78%)
0.01%-20.00%
36 (34.95%)
20.01%-40.00%
19 (18.45%)
40.01% - 60.00%
4 (3.88%)
60.01% - 80.00%
0 (0%)
0 (0%)
80.01% - 100.00%
2(1.94%)
Not Applicable
Total :
103
Source: Cheung Chiu-hung, "A Study on the Advisory and Statutory Bodies in Hong Kong: a brief report,"
Power for Democracy, http://www.pfd.org.hk.
41
Cheung, "A Study on the Advisory and Statutory Bodies in Hong Kong.: a brief report," p. 4
98
Patriotic organization affiliated
Number of appointees
Guangdong Association for Societies
8
Kowloon Association of Societies
7
2
11
11
1
1
8
5
4
New Territories Association of Societies
Heung Yee Kuk
Chinese People's Political Consultative Committee
National People's Congress
Patriotic organizations
Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong
Hong Kong Progressive Alliance
7
48
Liberal Party
Others
102
Total
Note: For those who were affiliated with more than one organization, they were counted
in accordance with the highest title they bore in that organization. In fact, appointed
councilors with this background were very common. Those who had both national
political status and local patriotic organization background were labeled as affiliated
with patriotic organizations.
Apart from appointments it advisory and statutory bodies, appointments to
eighteen District Councils are arguably exchanges of benefits. In Table 3.7, the
appointments of members from pro-government organizations into District
Councils are prominent. Despite the fact that individuals have neither party nor
42
This list is a statistical data calculated from the 2003 DC appointment list.
99
group affiliation, have good relations with the government in the sense of
supporting and promoting government policies in various districts. In reality,
many members of pro-Beijing associations, such as the Kowloon Association of
Societies and the Hong Kong Progressive Alliance, constitute crucial sources of
the appointment list. Here we can draw a preliminary conclusion that the Tung
regime is not concerned only about its clients in local political parties, but it is
even more concerned about the clients of patron Beijing. In other words, the
Tung administration treats Beijing's clients as its own clients and thus taking
care of them with the parallel treatment of all clients as by patron Beijing.
3.5 Corruption, Patron-client Politics and Public Administration
The nature of patron-client relation is somewhat close to corruption, which
according to Peter Harris refers to "the action (or lack of action) on the part of an
official which results in his showing performance to one citizen over another
advantages."43. According to the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance of Hong Kong,
interest refers to:
43
Harris, Peter, Foundations of Political Science, (Singapore: Prentice-Hall, 1997), p. 229.
100
A. a person offers an advantage if he, or any other person acting on his behalf,
directly or indirectly gives, affords or holds out, or agrees, undertakes or
promises to give, afford or hold out, any advantage to or for the benefit of or
in trust for any other person;
B.
a person solicits an advantage if he, or any other person acting on his behalf,
directly or indirectly demands, invites, asks for or indicates willingness to
receive, any advantage, whether for himself or for any other person; and
C.
a person accepts an advantage if he, or any other person acting on his behalf,
directly or indirectly takes, receives or obtains, or agrees to take, receive or
obtain any advantage, whether for himself or for any other person.44
According to Section 9 in Chapter 201, of the Ordinance, a person shall be guilty of
corrupt transactions with agents, if "any agent who, without lawful authority or
reasonable excuse, solicits or accepts any advantage as an inducement to or reward for
or otherwise on account of his
l.
doing or forbearing to do, or having done or forborne to do, any act
in relation to his principal's affairs or business; or
44
For detail of this ordinance, please see http://www.justice.gov.hk/eng/home.htra.
101
2.
showing or forbearing to show, or having shown or forborne to show,
favor or disfavor to any person in relation to his principal's affairs or
business.45
Here it is clear to see that if the exchange of any benefit concerning an action is
required by the client in response to the offender, then corruption is committed.
But this corrupt act is different form patron-client relations where no immediate
action is required. Instead, the clients bear an obligation. Above all, the question
and when the obligation will be returned is decided by the clients. From this
point of view, public servants who exchange personal relations with others may
show their misconduct or inappropriate behavior, but such misconduct is not
necessarily not a crime. This phenomenon can be illustrated by the following
case studies of corrupt behavior of police officer Sin Kam-wah and the
misconduct of the former Financial Secretary Anthony Leung.
45
For details of this ordinance, please see appendix 1
102
3.5.1 The case of Sin Kam Wah
In 2003, Sin Kam-wah, a senior Superintendent of Police, was convicted of
three charges of misconduct in public office by the District Court of Hong Kong.
Sin was found guilty of accepting free sexual services from prostitutes arranged
by a nightclub operator, a case described by a judge as the clearest case of
'keeping sweet' corruption.45 Judge Saunders ruled that Sin, who accepted free
sexual services from four prostitutes who worked for the nightclub operator, had
not only turned a blind eye to prostitution but also taken part in the protection of
vice offences.
The case might not a clear-cut bribery case as Judge Saunders commented,
but it raised the element of corruption because Sin had opened himself up to ask
for favors. Therefore it was the clearest example of "keeping sweet' corruption,
as Judge Saunders emphasized, where advantages are given to someone in
authority without asking for a quid pro quo at the time the advantage is given,
SCMP, November 11,2003, p.l.
103
but building a store of goodwill to provide a basis for future corrupt demands.47
If bribery is "a manner of cheating by officer of the public who they are
supposed to serve,"48 the Sine case could be seen as having both bribery and
corruption.
3.5.2 The case of Leung Kam Chung
Leung was a former Financial Secretary of Hong Kong having an ethical problem
of using his authority to obtain and further his private interests. In January 2003, Leung
purchased a new deluxe car Lexus, a transaction concluded few weeks before the new
annual budgetary proposal. Later Leung's proposal was announced, raising the
registration tax of new cars. The time discrepancy between his car purchased and the tax
announcement made Leung save a total of HK$190,000 tax money. The pro-government
legislators were accused of bringing about shame on the Legislative Council by
shielding Anthony Leung from any punishment over his car purchase.49 A
no-confidence vote was initiated at the LegCo over the car purchase scandal but it was
47
48
49
Ibid, see also District Court case No. DCCC 579/2003.
Harries, Foundations of Political Science, p. 229.
Apple Daily, March 10,2003, p. A2.
104
rejected by a vote of 31-22 with four abstentions.50 The Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) also investigated the case but later found no case to follow.51
Although both Sin and Leung's cases yielded different result, there were some
similarities that firstly, both of them were not accused of really violating the Ordinance
related to bribery. Secondly, they were all accused of committing offences under the
common law. Thirdly, Sin's case showed that there existed an exchange of ren-ch 'ing
and guanxi. The Leung case was concerned about administrative ethics, whereas the Sin
case highlighted the patron-client relations and corruption. Their behavior could best be
eliminated by extensive education on the need to observe administrative ethics.
In short, social exchange can universally take place in public administration. Some
public officers may misunderstand the practice of personal exchange, ren-ch 'ing, and the
abuse of power as well as authority. In fact, public officers may aware of the fact that
these practices may not relate to any criminal offence, and that they are just ethical
50
See http://www.thestandard.com.hk/news_detail_frame.cfm?articleid=38736&intcatid=l.
The ICAC was set up in 1974 by the late Governor Sir Murray Maclehose. For anti-corruption in Hong
Kong, see Ranee P. L. Lee, ed., Corruption and Its Control in Hong Kong, (Hong Kong: The Chinese
University Press, 1981).
51
105
obligations. But such obligations are actually the core element of patron-client relations
in the sense that a client has to repay the obligation back to the patron once a personal
exchange occurs. The major difference is that if the obligation exceeds the boundary of
patron-client relations, then it can be viewed as a criminal offence punishable by the
court of law.
3.6 Beijing's Patronage and Its Impact on Hong Kong's Politics and Public
Administration
Article 45 of the Basic Law—Hong Kong's constitution—stipulates that the
HKSAR is a local government and the Chief Executive as well as Principle Officials
have to be appointed by the Central People's Government.52 In other words, the
constitutional power of the Hong Kong Government originates from the central authority.
That is to say, the central government becomes the natural patron of Tung.
Unfortunately, Tung is not an appropriate leader to govern HKSAR because there have
been numerous administrative malpractices under his administration. Nevertheless, such
malpractice did not lead to the resignation of Tung, mainly because he has enjoyed the
support of a very friendly patron Beijing. In fact that the former PRC President Jiang
52
http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulItext/c-index.htm.
106
Zemin fully supported Tung and regarded Hong Kong reporters as too simple,
sometimes naive" was a case showing the patron-client relation between Jiang and Tung.
Similarly, PRC leaders such as Zeng Qinghong supports Tung also demonstrates that
Zeng is a protege of Jiang.53
When the pro-Beijing political party, the DAB, was confronted with a drastic
downturn in 2003 District Council election in which the Pan-democrats won numerous
seats, Beijing was forced by the circumstances to put its hands on Hong Kong's internal
issues explicitly. The PRC has mobilized its agents since December 2003 to intervene in
Hong Kong administration. As commentator Ching Cheong observes, mainland China
has put its foot down and spelt out clearly whom it will not allow to govern Hong
Kong.54 He also discerns that Beijing has already decided ten principles on ruling Hong
Kong. As he wrote:
The first principle it emphasized was that in the 'one country, two systems'
model - under which Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty - 'one
country' must always take precedence over 'two systems'. Next, it said, while
central government would continue to honor its promise of letting the Hong
Kong people govern themselves, 'patriots' should form the backbone of any
53
For Zeng's relations with Jiang, soo Sonny Lo, "Hong Kong, 1 July 2003 - Half a million protestors:
The Security Law, Identity Politics, Democracy, and China," Behind the Lines, vol. 60, no. 4 (2004), pp.
1-14.
54
http://straitstimes. asial.com.sg. Accessed on February 19,2004.
107
self-governing arrangement. Finally, it said, the 'high degree of autonomy' that
Hong Kong enjoyed came with Beijing's approval, which meant Hong Kong
should never forget its place as just a region under central government rule even
as it sought to evolve its own political system.55
Ching has added that Beijing also outlines seven major conditions in addition to these
three principles: (1) Hong Kong remains an inalienable part of China; (2) it is a local
administrative entity directly under the central government; (3) central government
continues to appoint the new Chief Executive; (4) he is accountable to both the central
and SAR governments, with the meaning of accountability clearly defined; (5)
democratization should be gradual; (6) the system should not jeopardize the interests of
any classes; and (7) it should also be conducive to developing a capitalist economy.56
Furthermore, Ching has reported that Beijing lists three groups of people who are
not fitting its definition of patriots. Firstly, the members of organizations who aim at
overthrowing the communist regime in mainland China including leaders of the Hong
Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (HKAPDM),
which was established in 1989 to protest against the Tiananmen crackdown in Beijing. It
has now become the largest grassroots pro-democracy advocacy group in the HKSAR,
55
56
Ibid.
Ibid
108
with many members elected to the legislature. Secondly, those who opposed the
implementation of the Basic Law, are blacklisted. For Beijing, the enactment of a
national security law such as Article 23 of the Basic Law was necessary on the grounds
that it would protect the sovereign interests and clamp down subversive political
activities. Finally, those who support Taiwan's independence movement are blacklisted.
These three types of people are not classified as Chinese patriots and can be seen as the
non-clients to Tung and Beijing, such as legislator Emily Lau of the political party
Frontier.57
The non-clients refer to those citizens excluded from the patronage circle; they are
not only the political "dissidents" but are also alienated residents. As a Buddhist wrote in
the editorial page, expressing that when the Buddha finger was transported to the
HKSAR in 2004, Buddhism was politically used by the PRC to serve the purpose of
placating the minds of the politically alienated Hong Kong people.
I was saddened, as a Buddhist westerner, that the celebration of the Buddha's
birthday this year and the blessing ceremony for the Buddha's Finger ceremony
for the Buddha's political circus.
What should have been a joyful religious celebration instead became an
opportunity by mainland officials to score political points. I find it extraordinary
57
The Frontier is a "radical" political group. For details, see Gavin Kwok, "Party Institutionalization in
Hong Kong Transition: A Study of the Frontier," MPhil Thesis, Division of Social Science, Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology, 2000.
109
that the delegation from China which accompanied the Buddha's Finger relic
was led by the director of the Communist Party's United Front Work
Department, Liu Yandong. Why was the delegation not led by the president of
the Chinese Buddhist Association, Master Yicheng, or the abbot of Famen
Monastery, Master Xuscheng? Or even a Chinese government official, rather
than a Communist Party Official? The fact that Liu Yandong led the delegation,
rather than Master Yicheng, tends to suggest that the real reason for displaying
the Buddhist relic in Hong Kong was for united-front purposes, rather than the
benefit of Buddhist devotees, though the Buddhist faithful in Hong Kong,
including me, are happy that the relic is being displayed here.
But I am concerned that the Hong Kong SAR government now appears to be
quite content to deal openly with Chinese Community Party cadres, in addition
to dealing with Chinese government officials. Does the HKSAR government
really need to deal with the Chinese Communist Party, when there is no mention
of this in the Basic Law?"58
Clearly, there were complaints about the danger of Buddhism being used by the
HKSAR government and Beijing as a kind of clientelist religion serving the political
objectives of ruling elites.
Needless to say, Tung agrees that he has follow the ideas of patron Beijing though,
in theory, the Basic Law stipulates that Beijing does not intervene in the affairs in the
HKSAR. Furthermore, what makes Beijing concerns most is the LegCo election result in
September 2004 and the strength of the united Pan-democrats.59 Patron Beijing once
58
59
Ibid.
Totonto Star, 10-10-2004, "Beijing controls reforms in Hong Kong, at http://www.thestar.com
110
expressed its clear view in opposition to direct elections of the Chief Executive and
LegCo in January and February 2004, when there was a surge of international public
opinion believing that Beijing should not apply its brake on democratic development in
the clientelist city-state of Hong Kong. In brief, patron Beijing expresses its deep
concern over whether the HKSAR's policy may follow the footstep of Taiwan where
pro-Taiwan independence leader Chen Shui-bian was re-elected as President in March
2004. Beijing must disallow its clientelist Hong Kong to adopt the Taiwan-style of
democratic development.
Overall, there is a clash of civilizations between Hong Kong and Beijing in both
judicial system and political culture.60 Client Tung naturally plays a loyal role to his
patron Beijing which then offers full support to Tung to bolster his relatively
incompetent and chaotic administration over the HKSAR. To Tung, Beijing is his only
patron entrusting him. Therefore Beijing's will is the first priority in the mind of Tung.61
As Tung himself admitted, he had to ask for Beijing's approval to overhaul Hong
Kong's electoral system.62 In Hong Kong, Tung is surrounded by Beijing's agents with
60
Lo, Shiu Hing, "The inevitable decline of HK and the clash of civilizations", 26-6-2002 at
http://edition.cnn.eom/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/06/24/hk.lo.essay.
61
See http://straitstimes.asial .com.sg/asia/story/0,4386,228931,00.htm
62
See
111
different factional leanings in Beijing, some loyal to the Jiang Zemin faction and others
to the President Hu Jintao's grouping. Yet, Tung's supporters tend to side with the Jiang
faction, which fully supported Tung's bid for the second term. Still Tung has to deal
with his local clients very carefully as they may like to seek more material or
non-material benefits than others. As a result, a failure to deal with clients can yield
political disputes bringing Tung troubles. If Tung cannot handle disputes among his
clients, Beijing may become the arbitrator, thus diminishing his own support. Moreover,
the non-clients bear different views of Tung's government. They are normally composed
of middle classes, having a more open mind toward political and social issues. Tung has
to find a way to keep harmonious relationships with them so as to minimize his
problems including political chaos and the loss of authority. It is not easy for Tung to
stand inside this complex political triangle if he cannot balance the conflicting interests
of various parties, or even worse, if he is included to support one side at the expense of
the other. In a nutshell, it is by no means for Tung, as a client of Beijing, to deal with the
potentially conflictual interests of other clients in the HKSAR.
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-hongkongl6apr 16,1,814352.story?coll—la-headline
s-world.
112
3.7 Summary
This Chapter shows that patron-client politics and public administration are
interwined, including notably appointments to various political institutions, cooptation,
corruption and administrative impropriety. While patron-client politics did exist in Hong
Kong under British rule, they have become far more prominent and visible in the
HKSAR than ever before. Perhaps part of the reasons is that Hong Kong has become a
Chinese place where guanxi and ren-ching have been practiced in a more traditional and
widespread manner. Other reasons include the political necessity of the post-colonial
regime to use patronage as a vehicle to buttress its legitimacy, the need for the Chief
Executive to widen his supportive and powerbase, and the increasingly important role of
patron Beijing to win public support through the help of its agents in the HKSAR.
113
Chapter 4
The Chief Executive Election
and Patron-Client Politics
4.1 Introduction
The Chief Executive (CE) is the highest leader governing the HKSAR. In fact,
this central position was established immediately after the handover of Hong Kong
on July 1, 1997, replacing the colonial Governor of the British government. The
major duty of the CE is to govern Hong Kong to promote prosperity and stability. As
Article 43 of the Basic law stipulates, "the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be the head of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region and shall represent the Region."1 It is clear that the major
task of the CE is to serve and represent the people of Hong Kong, while at the same
time accountable to the central government in Beijing. The CE's relationship with
Beijing is bound to entail patron-client network, for Beijing ass the central
1
HKSAR Basic T.aw Article 43. http://info.gov.hk/basic law/fulltext/index.htm.
114
government has to endorse and announce the CE's appointment after a local election
process.
Unlike the era of Hong Kong under colonial rule when the Governor was
appointed by the Queen of the British Empire, the CE was elected by a 400-member
Election Committee (EC) in the first term from 1997 to 2002, and a 800-member EC
at the second term from 2002 to 2007.2 That is to say, in a narrow sense, the CE is
elected by a group of elites but is still not born through universal suffrage. And in a
layman's perspective, the CE should be accountable to the people of Hong Kong. In
fact, as mentioned above, it is another story. Article 43 also emphasizes that "the
Chief Executive of the HKSAR shall be accountable to the Central People's
Government and the HKSAR in accordance with the provisions of this law."3
Highlighting the target for which the CE is responsible, Article 45 also mentions that
"the Chief Executive of the HKSAR shall be selected by election or through
consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government."4
2
For the method of the CE election, please see Annex 1 Method for the Selection of the Chief
Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the Hong Kong Basic Law,
http://info.gov.hk/basic law/fulltext/index.htm.
3
Basic Law, Article 43, paragraph 2.
4
Basic Law, Article 45, paragraph 1.
115
This stipulation makes it clear that the CE is appointed by and responsible to the
Central People s Government, but not really the people of Hong Kong. In a sense, the
CE is a political sandwich between the Hong Kong people and the central
government, but in reality the CE must toe the line of Beijing as the source of his or
her powers comes from the central government, according to the Basic Law.
More interestingly, the election of the CE, who represents Hong Kong, is
conducted not by all the people of Hong Kong, but by a group of 400 people in the
first term and 800 elites in the second term. This type of "small circle election" is
arguably very dangerous because a small number of voters can be manipulated easily
either through controlling their voting behavior or shaping the voter's turnout. The
manipulation of voting behavior can be done by vote buying, vote planting or impact
as well as explicit intimidation. Apparently, theses types of interference are unlawful
and may have to face the possibility of criminal prosecution. In fact, the voters may
not be so obedient even though they are bribed. Usually voters may have more
options if there is more than one candidate in any election. On the other hand,
candidates for the CE election find it risky and unnecessary to put themselves in such
a dangerous position because there may be other alternatives to boost votes' turnout
116
in a legitimate or lawful manner. Patron-client relation is one of the most usual
means through which CE candidates cultivate votes. The purposes of this Chapter are
to see whether the small circle election is vulnerable to patron-client relations and
also to test whether patron-client networks led to victory of Chief Executive Tung
Chee-hwa in his second term election in early 2002.
4.2 Patron-Client Politics in the First CE Election
The first CE election was held in December 1996 and Tung was elected by a
400-people Election Committee. Shortly before the handover of Hong Kong, the
Preparatory Committee (PC) played a crucial role in the late transitional period,
arranging all sorts of transition matters such as the provisional Legislative Council
and the smooth transfer of all civil servants from the colonial era to the post-colonial
period. A large number of Hong Kong representatives possessed a dual identities
because they were members of both the Preparatory Committee and the Election
Committee that would elect the CE in December 1996. The Preparatory Committee
was also responsible for establishing the HKSAR and deciding the specific method
of formation of the first HKSAR government. It was appointed by Beijing in January
1996. This Committee was composed of 150 members, with 94 drawn from Hong
117
Kong and others from the mainland. The Committee had its headquarters in Beijing
and a liaison office in Hong Kong.5 The Preparatory Committee decided that the
first CE should be elected by an Election Committee of 400 members. Members of
the EC would include 300 members from the private sector, 40 former political
figures, 26 Hong Kong deputies to the National People's Congress (NPC), and 34
representatives of the Hong Kong members of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Although some of the EC members were national
congressmen in the People's Republic of China (PRC), they were not as influential
as the PC members. The reason is that the PC members could also select the EC
members who would choose the members of the Provisional Legislative Council.
It is clear that if a candidate wished to participate in the CE election, he or she
must try to nurture good personal relations with voters, thus helping him or her to
win the election. A brief profile of some selected local members of the PC is listed
below. We can easily observe whether Tung could cultivate patron-client networks
with the key persons such as Maria Tam, Tam Yiu-chung, C. Y. Leung, Lee Chak
Tim, Wu Wai Yung, Arthur Li and Paul Yip (see Figure 4.2). in a sense, these
http://www.librarv.ca.gov/CRB/97/l 0/crb9701 Q.html#the preparatory committee.
118
persons had their personal networks, which could be utilized to support Tung easily
in the first term of the CE.
Figure 4.2 Profiles of Selected Members of the Preparatory Committee in 1996
Profile 1
Name:
Maria Tam
Profile:
Barrister, Chairwoman of the pro-Beijing Liberal Democratic
Party, member of the Airport Authority Hong Kong, member of
CPPCC, Hong Kong Affairs Advisor, member of EC.
Selected speech:
"I have no time for my loving affairs. I am a member of the
Executive Council, Legislative Council, Urban Council and
District Board. I have to attend meeting all the day round."
Personalistic ties Support Tung to run for the first term; and
with Tung after
the CE election. Member of the Basic Law Consultative Committee.
Source: Wu, Xiangmin, Xianggang chou wei ren wu. (Yi), (HongKong: Hong Kong
Commercial Daily, 1996), p. 9.
Profile 2
Name:
Profile:
Tam Yiu Chung
Vice Chairman of DAB, Vice President of the Federation of Trade
Unions (FTU), Hong Kong Affairs Advisor, Chairman of
Employees Retraining Board, member of the PC.
Selected speech: "I have never described that I am a symbol of patriot. Anyone
who follows me means patriot? Never."
Personalistic ties Vive Chairman of a pro-Beijing political party, DAB; and
with Tung after
the CE election. Member of the Executive Council.
Source: Wu, Xiangmin, Xianggang chou wei ren wu. (Yi), (HongKong: Hong Kong
Commercial Daily, 1996), p. 81.
119
Profile 3
Name:
Leung Chun Ying
Profile:
Managing Director of Leung & Company Limited, Hong Kong
Affairs Advisor, Vice president of the PC.
Selected speech: "I myself have chosen the most difficult way to go. If we do not
want to be too difficult, we can imitate, China says one, we say
two, OK, that's easy."
Personalistic ties Member of the Executive Council
with Tung after
the CE election.
Source: Wu, Xiangmin, Xianggang chou wei ren wu. (Yi), (HongKong: Hong Kong
Commercial Daily, 1996), p. 91.
Profile 4
Name :
Profile:
Lee Chak Tim
President of FTU, member of NPC, member of Preliminary PC,
member of the PC.
Selected speech: "The Socialist mother country is ruled by labor."
Personalistic ties President of Pro-Beijing and pro-Tung organization, FTU.
with Tung after
the CE election. Awarded with the Great Bauhinia Medal.
Source: Wu, Xiangmin, Xianggang chou wei ren wu. (san), (HongKong: Hong Kong
Commercial Daily, 1997), p. 11.
120
Profile 5
Name :
Raymond Wu Wai Yung
Profile:
Justice of Peace, Basic Law Consultative Committee member,
Basic Law Drafting Committee member.
Selected speech: "People should love the country like a son loving his parent, even
though they treat him badly."
Personalistic ties Member of the Basic Law Committee.
with Tung after
the CE election.
Profile 6
Name:
Fong Wong Gut Man
Profile:
Chartered Accountant, Hong Kong Affairs Advisor, Member of
EC, member of PC.
Selected speech: "I admire when I see the national flags of other countries hoisted
in the Olympic Game. Why do the people of Hong Kong live
without a country?"
Personalistic ties Member of Executive Council.
with Tung after
the CE election.
Source: Wu, Xiangmin, Xianggang chou wei ren wu. (si), (HongKong: Hong Kong
Commercial Daily, 1997), p. 91.
Note: Fong was atone time a close friend of the former Hong Kong Macau Affairs
Office Director Lu Ping.
121
Profile 7
Name:
Arthur Li Kwok Cheung
Profile:
Pro-Vice Chancellor of the Chinese University of Hong Kong,
member of EC, member of the PC.
Selected speech: "So many people say that it is too bad to be pro-China, I think it is
not a bad thing because I am a Chinese. Do you want me to
pro-Japan?"
Personalistic ties Appointed as the Secretary for Education and Manpower at
with Tung after Tung's second term of office.
the CE election.
Source: Wu, Xiangmin, Xianggang chou wei ren wu. (Er), (HongKong: Hong Kong
Commercial Daily, 1996), p. 31.
Note: Li was viewed by some of his colleagues at he Chinese University as an
"authoritarian" leader, but he commands the support of many of his educational
sector's clients.
Profile 8
Name:
Profile:
Paul, Ip Kwok Wah
Chairman of Hong Kong Research Institute Limited, Hong Kong
Affairs Advisor, member of EC, member of PC
Selected speech: "More than a decade, my patriotism has remained quite balanced.
I insist on my love to China, our nation, and the Chinese
Communist Party.
Personalistic ties Special Advisor at the Chief Executive Office in the first term of
with Tung after Tung's office.
the CE election.
Source: Wu, Xiangmin, Xianggang chou wei ren wu. (Si), (HongKong: Hong Kong
Commercial Daily, 1997), p. 71.
122
From the profiles of the members of the PC, we can see that all the persons
listed above had a very close relationships with Tung, while enjoying the trust from
Beijing. It is of course their connections with Beijing gave them considerable
leverage and convenience to build up their connections with Tung. By securing these
pro-Beijing elites support, Tung's power base could be enhanced. On the other hand,
these pro-Beijing loyalists could prepare for better careers in the HKSAR
government once Tung won the CE election. The loyalists then became Tung's
clients, laying down a tacit pre-condition that no one would doubt the chance of
Tung in winning the CE election, especially after Tung was fully supported by the
former CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin, who had approached Tung to shake
hands with the designated new CE in 1996.
In the first CE election, the campaign was conducted in a relatively low profile
manner because Hong Kong was still governed by the United Kingdom. However,
the campaign strategies adopted by all the candidates, such as Simon Li, Peter Woo,
T. L. Yang and Tung tended to focus on their platform and image. No doubt, Tung's
patron-client networks were the strongest among all the candidates, thus giving him
the decisive edge in his electoral victory. All candidates focused on their campaign
123
activities in the Election Committee, whose members have overlapping memberships
of the PC. First, the profile of the selected PC members like Maria Tam and C. Y.
Leung revealed their important role in Hong Kong's commercial sector, which was
taken seriously by Tung. After all, Tung himself had a businessman's history.
Second, the pro-Beijing clients were possessing key positions in the official Chinese
suprastructure such as Hong Kong Affairs Advisors, from which the power base of
the Chief Executive was derived. Third, a lot of PC members like Tam Yiu-chung
and Lee Chak-tim had patriotic background, or were even the leaders of such
patriotic organizations. This "redness" of the elites made Tung realize that forging
harmonious relationship with them would be critical to his election. Finally, the
patriotic way of thought was revealed by the speeches of the selected members of the
PC. Therefore, the political philosophy of the patriotic elites matched with Tung's
nationalistic mind. As a result, Tung felt a deep sense sentimental ties with the
pro-Beijing clients in the HKSAR.
Of course, Tung was not a leader waiting for the political blessing from others,
apart from the need for him to show his governing ability. Above all, ability was the
fundamental requirement of a successful CE politically acceptable to the Chinese
124
authority. It is observable that Tung has been warmly received by most Hong Kong
businessmen, who believe in Tung's trustful attitude toward Beijing who see Tung's
client relations with the central government as creating a stable business environment.
In brief, there was a commonality of interests among Tung, Beijing's clients in the
HKSAR, and the local Hong Kong business people.
Tung realized that his electoral victory cannot be achieved in the absence of
benefits exchange to the political elites supportive of the PRC. The major duty of the
EC was to elect the CE and the provisional legislative councilors. In the mind of
Tung, the elites who supported him or possessed the potential votes to support him in
the future had to be awarded with different kind of benefits, materially or
non-materially, during the first term of his office. The benefits shown in the profiles
of elites in Figure 4.2 show that those who had cultivated personalistic ties with Tung
were coincidentally awarded with various benefits in Tung's first term, ranging from
the title of Executive Councilors to special advisors. Clearly, such benefits are
evidence of establishing a prelude to Tung's clientelist style of governance.
Compounding the need for Tung to create his power base through his clients was that
he had to deal with and struggle with some former British loyalists, notably Anson
125
Chan Fong On-sang, who tended to cast a distrustful eye on Tung's ability and
inexperience in the governance of Hong Kong.
4.3 The 2002 CE Election
The second CE election took place in March 2002. Tung Chee-hwa was well
prepared this time and he started the election campaign as early as 2001. Tung had to
set up an office in the Central District and constructed a website to release any news
about his campaign activities. It is interesting to see that why Tung adopted a drastic
change as he refused to be more communicative in his public propaganda. As a
traditional Chinese leader, Tung did not want to be seen as putting up a political show.
However, election required political promotion, and, in a small circle election like
the CE election, a candidate has to expand the exchange of social relations with
voters. Hence, Tung's campaign managers like C.Y. Leung changed the campaign
strategy to one that projected a more communicative and high-tech image of the
incumbent candidate, Tung.
4.3.1 Identifying the Benefits of Patron-Client Relations in the 2002 Chief Executive
Election
While the above discussion reveals that the exchange of benefits is a
126
hallmark of patron-client relations, scholars studying patron-client politics have not
really concretized the benefits received by clients and delivered by patrons. In
general, political scientists, anthropologists and sociologists have seldom concretized
the benefits received by the clients. Also they have not discussed in detail the
benefits in material and non-material terms. So this section is trying to identify some
of the benefits that were used by the CE candidate Tung to interact with the electors
in 2002.6
The exchange of benefits offered by Tung to his clients can be seen throughout
the history of his first term in office. Table 4.1 illustrates the possible benefits that
Tung could deliver to his clients. In this Table, the benefits included material and
non-material forms. Material benefits encompass food receptions, public resources
whereas non-material benefits included the appointments made to various
governmental consultative committees, offering positions in governmental or
semi-governmental bodies, and rewarding the clients with medals of honor like the
6
Joseph Chan suggested me that I should discuss the material and non-material benefits in
patron-client relationships. However, scholars studying patron-client politics have not used such
analytical categories. See, for example, James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in
Southeast Asia", in The American political Science Review, Vo. 66, (1972); Nobutaka Ike, "Japanese
Political Culture and Democracy" in Steffen W. Schmidt, et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A
Reader in Political Clientelism, (California: University of California Press, 1977); and Andrew J.
Nathan, "A Factionalism Model For CCP Politics", The China Quarterly, No. 53 , (January/March
1973). One may argue that the benefits offered by the elected politicians to the clients are
"institutionally expected," (comments made by Joseph Chan during my personal discussion with him
on January 8, 2001.) In other words, the elected politicians may be expected by the public to deliver
such benefits. However, none of the scholars studying patron-client politics adopt such a view,
because they regard it as not only universal but also activities showing a reciprocal relationship
between the elected politicians and citizens. Even if some members of the public may expect the
elected politicians to act as clients delivering various benefits, it does not mean that patron-client
relationship is non-existent. Public expectations of the elected politicians is one thing, the existence of
patron-client relationship is another.
127
Big Bauhinia Medals. Other possible long-term benefits included the appointments
made to the Chinese political institutions such as the CPPCC, although some clients
had already enjoyed this benefit from the PRC officials who lobbied for their support
of Tung. Among all these benefits, the appointment to governmental consultative
committees, enhancing social status, and the award of medals were most favored by
the clients. In the HKSAR, most of these material and non-material benefits are
beyond the duties and responsibilities of the CE. Yet, government officials who
advise the CE on carious appointments tend to use the power of appointment in an
arbitrary way. For example, a medical professor Sidney Chung of the Chinese
University of Hong Kong who criticized the HKSAR government for mishandling
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) was excluded from the July 1,2004
honor list of the HKSAR. Yet, other professor who refrained from criticizing the
government for mishandling the SARS was awarded with various honors praising
their service to the HKSAR.8
7
Personal interview with an unnamed District Councilor's personal assistant on FebruarylO, 2001
and an unnamed District Councilor on April 20, 2000. The former said that money sponsorship could
malfs people remembered that you had sold them a ren-ch'ing, the latter said that his political party
would like to help the CE when he was in trouble so as to build up closer relation network, the CE
will later reciprocate the party in terms of appointment to the consultative committee and a seat at the
District Council.
8
Apple Daily, July 1,2004, p. A4.
128
Table 4.1 Exchange of Benefits
Benefit offered by the CE
Material
Content
Effect
Reward from
the Voters
Deluxe food
Non-material
receptions
Indirectly offering
special rights in doing
business
Vote for the
More public resources To pay back the
ren-ch 'ing debts, candidate
build up personal
A position at the
relations and social
governmental
consultative
committee
A position in the
governmental
administrative body
Medals of honor
Policy adjustment
Social status
networks
** Some of the non-material benefits may be offered soon after the election or some
days later.
The material and non-material benefits illustrated in Table 4.1 can be seen in
the 2002 CE election. Tung's exchange of benefits could be seen in the case of
Arthur Li, who was eventually chosed as one of the first batch of Principle Officials
on July 1, 2002. Tung also rewarded C. Y. Leung with his continuous appointment to
ExCo in July 2004. Judging from these appointments, Tung has learnt the political
craft of patronage, carefully rewarding his supporters while penalizing his critics..
129
In other words, Tung's campaign strategies can be explained by Scott's
three features of patron-client relations. That is to say, the art of patron-client
relations could be widely found in Tung's campaign strategy, which involved
personal connections, face-to-face contacts and the influential appointment power of
Tung as a patron. The reciprocal relations between Tung and his supporters led to his
electoral victory in the 2002 CE election (he was the only candidate but he required
nominations for political support).9 Subsequently, most of the 800members of the
EC nominated Tung, scaring away other opposing candidate in 2002.
If the first CE election, Tung gained an easy victory. The former Chief
Justice Ti-liang Yang got 82 votes, Peter Woo 54 votes and Tung 206 votes during
the first round of voting. But the second round showed rapid shifts of clientelist
support of Tung, who got 46 DAB members' support and who eventually got 320
votes. Woo obtained only 36 votes and Yang 42 votes.10
Indeed, the electoral success of candidates in elections may be due to other
factors, such as the appeal of political parties, the electoral law, the ideology of
9
In the first CE election, there were four candidates in the first round of voting. Tung was elected in
the final round. For details, see Lo Shiu-hing, Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication
and Political Decay (New York: Nova Science, 2001), pp. 141-145.
10
Lo, Governing Hong Kong, p. 142.
130
candidates, and the China factor. Yet, in the CE election, parties were not influential
in both 1996 and 2002; the electoral law on anti-corruption appeared to be unable to
deter any attempt at using hidden patron-client relations; and the China factor
appeared to influence the EC members to support Tung as the only candidate in 2002.
while the China factor was at play, a neglected but significant factor or variable was
patron-client politics. Needless to say, patron-client relations may also be shaped by
other variables, such as mass political culture, elite political culture, size of
constituencies, party competition, Taiwan-style election campaign, and the electoral
law as discussed in the last chapter. In a small circle election, elite political culture
that accepted guanxi and ren-ching was clearly beneficial to Tung's electoral victory.
I also conducted a survey to collect very useful data for our early analysis
of patron-client politics in CE elections.11 The survey involved the mailing of
questionnaires to all 800 electors of the EC in the 2002 CE election. The objective
was to test whether they cultivated patron-client relations, and the extent of
patron-client politics if they did so. Apart from the survey, the author's face-to-face
interviews with the electors were conducted in order to collect more inside
11
These two research techniques are commonly used by researchers today, and the research technique
I adopt here is referring to Baker, Therese L, Doing Social Research, (McGraw-Hill International,
1988), pp. 165-227.
131
information concerning the possible exchange of mutual interest. In a nutshell, two
research instruments, namely interviews and questionnaire survey were used, to
comprehend the dynamics of patron-client politics in the 2002 CE election.
4.4 Survey Findings on the Second CE Election in 2002
As mentioned before, Article 45 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR says that,
the CE "shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be
appointed by the Central People's Government." In addition, the CE shall be elected
by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating
committee in accordance with democratic procedures.
1
However, given the concern
and fear of the PRC over Hong Kong's democratic reform and given the internal
opposition (specifically the business opposition) to political democracy along the line
of selecting the CE through universal suffrage just like the Taiwan case, it is different
for such democratic way of selecting the CE to be achieved at least in the short run.
Nor does the Basic Law stipulate any timeframe in which the CE will be directly
elected, perhaps contingent upon the political development of both the HKSAR and
the PRC. In April 2004, the National People's Congress (NPC) interpreted the Basic
Law in a way that would disallow the selection of the CE by universal suffrage in
12
For the powers and functions of the CE, please see Articles 48 to58 of the Basic Law.
132
2007 and the direct election of the whole LegCo by 2008. Needless to say. Beijing as
a patron has the veto power over the pace and scope of democracy in its clientelist
city-state Hong Kong.
The method of selecting the CE is rather complicated. According to the Annex I
of the Basic Law, the EC is composed of 800 people representing four major sectors
in Hong Kong (details of the sectors shown in Table 4.2). In brief, the composition of
this 800-member Election Committee contains of (1) 664 members elected from 35
subsectors; (2) 40 members nominated by the religious subsector; and (3) 96
ex-officio members (Hong Kong deputies to the National People's Congress and
LegCo members). These 800 EC members, who are selected by the fields they are
working in or related to, are expected to reflect or represent the political stance of
their sectors in their votes.
1 "5
These 800 members are influential because they are the
voters qualified to vote in the CE election. If any candidate in the CE election can
cultivate a clear majority support from the EC members, then there is no doubt that
he or she can win the election.
13
Full list of the sub-sectors composing the 4 major sectors, and the way these representatives are
elected, can be found on the website http://www.info.gov.hk/eac/en/ecse/flinction.htm and
http://www.info.gov.hk/reo/en/voter/appIication.htm.
133
Table 4.2 Four Sectors of the Election Committee
Name of the Sectors
Number of the
representatives
Industrial, commercial and financial sectors
200
The professions
200
Labor, social services, religious and other sectors
200
Members of the Legislative Council, representatives of
district-based organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the
National People's Congress, and representatives of Hong Kong
Members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative
200
Conference
Note: The term of office of the members of the Election Committee is five years.
Source: Basic Law, Annex I,
http://www.info.gov.hk/basic law/fulltext/c-index.htm.
Interestingly, there was no opposing candidate except for Tung, the first CE
of the HKSAR, who submitted his nomination form. Tung was the sole candidate in
the CE election and could automatically win.14 In fact, there was no other candidate
could submit the second effective nomination form simply because Tung had already
obtained 714 nominations out of the 800 members in the EC. This was in a sense an
intimidating strategy adopted by Beijing to frighten any opponent to Tung.
According to Section 3.6 (a) of the Guidelines on Election-related Activities, the
55 MingPao, March 1, 2002, p.l.
134
nomination should be subscribed to by not less than 100 electors, otherwise the
nomination would be regarded as disqualified. That is to say, Tung's competitor
could not get sufficient nomination because the rest of the unsubscribed electors were
bound to be less than 100 and thereby could not meet the basic requirement. One
may question that since there was only Tung running for the CE election, it was not
meaningful to conduct any questionnaire survey. This argument, however, is wrong
and misleading because the questionnaire survey could be utilized to envisage how
and why Tung had been able to garner the support of so many EC members and to
scare away any possible contender in the 2002 CE election.
It was worthwhile to ask why there were so many voters who had agreed
to nominate (or de facto vote for) Tung as he had long been criticized for his poor or
unsatisfactory performance in the first HKSAR administration from July 1, 1997 to
March 2002. Were there any political deals? Were the electors thinking of or
anticipating any material/non-material interests they could secure from the
nomination of Tung? Did Tung and his campaign assistants realize the need to return
or reciprocate the ren-ch 'ing debt, namely nomination, he owed? More concretely,
was patron-client relationship playing a critical role in the 2002 CE election? These
questions are crucial to our study of the likelihood and dynamic of patron-client
135
politics.
Three months after the CE election, I administered a questionnaire survey
and tried to send it to each of the 800 EC members to test whether patron-client
politics might exist in the CE election. I could only locate 700 mailing addresses of
the EC members due to the fact that a few of them had wrong addresses. Out of the
700 EC members, I received 111 responses in which 4 of them were invalid
questionnaires returned without answers. Analyzing the data, I came up with some
interesting findings pertinent to our study of clientelism or patron-client politics.
Table 4.3 Mr. 'Ring was criticized of his poor performance in his first term,
what do you think?
The criticisms were wrong
23%
The first term was his learning period
39%
He was misled by the people around him
8%
Correct, he should not compete for the second term
8%
The major reason was that the principle officials trained by the
former British Hong Kong Government did not cooperate with him
14%
Others
8%
Table 4.3 shows that Tung was received the sympathy of a majority of
EC electors. Only 8 percent of the respondents thought that Tung should give up his
campaign in the second CE election. This finding seems to conform with the
136
majority of nominations (714) which supported Tung, or conversely these EC
members opposing him. The respondents did not say that Tung should step down on
the one hand and yet signed the nomination on the other hand. Table 4.4 disclosed
another interesting phenomenon. When I asked the electors if they had subscribed
their nominations to Tung, 17 percent replied no. Compared with Table 4.3, there
was only 8 percent opposed Tung to be re-elected. This figure shows that some
electors appeared to be contradictory or paradoxical on whether Tung should seek
Table 4.4 Did you subscribe to nominate Mr. Tung as the candidate of the second CE
election?
Yes
83%
No
17%
Table 4.5 Why did you consider to nominate Tung to be the candidate in the CE
election?
He had helped me before
0%
My friend asked me to nominate him
8%
There was no other candidate
Hope it would help a lot to my career/field
He was supported by the central government
33%
Others
137
12%
24%
23%
When I tried to test whether patron-client relations existed in the 2002 CE
election, 12 percent of the respondents expressed their view that the nomination
might help a lot on their career, and 8 percent said that they subscribed because of
their friendship with their friends. If we compare these figures with Table 4.6, the
phenomenon is much clearer. In Table 4.6,41 percent said that, as EC members, they
would expect to get more resources from Tung to protect the rights of their fields or
sectors. Moreover, 6 percent expected to be appointed into governmental consultative
committees; 9 percent wanted to build up good relationships with the CE; but only 3
percent frankly express their will to change the government. Clearly, many EC
members expected concrete benefits from Tung—a kind of clientelist attitude toward
the patron.
Table 4.6 Being a EC member, what is (are) your anticipation(s)?
Build up a good relationship with the CE
9%
Hope I can be appointed into governmental consultative
committees
6%
Request for more resources to protect the rights of my fields or
subsectors
41%
I wanted to support Mr. Tung
19%
I wanted to change the government
3%
Others
22%
138
Table 4.7 When Mr. Tung was elected, what should he do to the member of the
Nothing to do to the EC members
10%
Try his best to appoint us into the governmental consultative
committee
6%
6%
Consider to appoint us as a minister or District Councilor
0%
Try to understand and response our requests in the consultation
28%
conference
Set up routine meeting, listen and help to solve the EC members
52%
or the subsectors' problems
4%
4%
Others
Following up the question in Table 4.6, Table 4.7 displayed how the EC
members expected Tung to concern more about their personal interests. 6% of the
respondents frankly admitted their anticipation of a position in the governmental
consultative committees. Whereas 28% wanted the CE to respond to their request in
the consultation conference, 52% clearly wished to have routine meeting with the CE
so that he could explain their problem and ask for CE's help effectively. It is
interestingly to find out that only 10% thought that the CE was unnecessary to
concern on their interest. Table 4.7 once again revealed that the Election Committee
membership might yield to be a bridge of building network with CE, and this identity
endowed an official title to them so that they could be able to approach CE easier
than an ordinary citizen. In fact, there were little EC members who knew the CE
before they obtained the membership. Table 4.8 reflected that only 3% and 13% were
friend with Tung because of business connection or introduced by others respectively.
139
27% knew through campaign leaflets, 34% through media and 23% even did not
know him. Certainly, if an EC member wanted to either get more personal benefits
from or submit policy-oriented opinion to Tung, an EC membership is undoubtedly a
short cut to build up connection with Tung to attain above aims.
Table 4.8 How did you know the candidate, Mr. Tung?
Campaign leaflets
27%
We once had business correlation
3%
He appointed me into a governmental consultative committee
0%
Mass media
34%
Introduced by our friends
13%
I did not know him
23%
Table 4.9,4.10 and 4.11 are designed to test how the EC members see their role
in the constitutional establishment. In Table 4.9, 55% agreed that the Legislative
Councilors, who are elected through Election Committee, could play a check and
balance role in LegCo to balance the influence of members from geographic
constituencies and Functional constituencies. Only 24% disagreed with this
statement and 21% had no idea. Table 4.10 tested the EC members' view if Tung's
legitimacy would be diminished on the grounds of Tung who had almost acquired
90% of the EC members' nomination. In other words, there was insufficient quota
left for another candidate, if any, to obtain a minimum nomination to run for the CE
140
election. A total of 59% thought that it would increase Tung's Legitimacy. 29%
disagreed and 12% remained neutral. Interestingly, 66% of the respondents in Table
4.11 agreed that this majority of nomination could help Tung to build up a strong
government, 23% disagreed and 11% remained neutral. That was to say, a large part
of EC members optimistically anticipated an effective executive-led government
could be maintained.
Table 4.9 The Legislative Councilors elected through Election Committee, can
play a check and balance role in the Council
Strongly agree
7%
Agree
48%
Neutral
21%
Disagree
20%
Strongly disagree
4%
Table 4.10 As Mr. T\mg was the only candidate in the CE election, the majority
of nomination can help to increase his legitimacy
Strongly agree
9%
Agree
50%
Neutral
12%
Disagree
17%
Strongly disagree
12%
141
Table 4.11 The majority of nomination can help Mr. Tung to build up a strong
government
Strongly agree
15%
Agree
51%
Neutral
11%
Disagree
14%
Strongly disagree
9%
Table 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 tended to test the EC members see their functions in
the constitutional establishment in Hong Kong. When the EC members were asked
whether they agreed that the expansion of the number of EC member could increase
its legitimacy, 63% agreed with this statement, 19% disagreed and 18% neutral. This
findings shows that a critical part of the EC member expressed their reservation of
this electoral system even though they themselves were members of the EC. When
the respondents were asked if they agreed to expand the EC in order to increase its
legitimacy in Table 4.13, there were only 54% agreed with this statement, 20%
disagreed and 26% neutral. Table 4.14 shows a very sensitive but direct statement
that whether Tung should appoint EC members, who had nominated him, into
advisory bodies or even the principle officials as a means of reward, to test if
reciprocal anticipation existed in the mind of the EC members. 87% disagreed with
this statement, and it was strange to see that there were 7% refused to answer this
dichotomized question, whereas 6% frankly agreed with this statement. These three
tables comprised the implications that firstly, the lack of a clear majority part of the
142
respondents think that the legitimacy of EC is problematic even the number of
membership expanded or the subsectors enlarged. Secondly, even a small part of the
respondents admitted to anticipate a reward from Tung by means of obtaining a
position under the existing establishment, it does not mean that a reciprocal relations
is fading out. If we compare with Table 4.6, there was 41% admitted that as an EC
member, they would request for more resources to protect the rights of their fields or
subsectors from Tung.
It is crystal clear that even these questions revealed a little part of the
respondents admitted to look for personal benefits; a large number of the EC
members were trying to obtain more resources, assistances and even professional
protection from the government. So they wished to build up a good personal
relationship with Tung by means of nominating him for the second term.
Table 4.12 The EC should expand the number of membership so as to increase
its legitimacy
Strongly agree
15%
Agree
Neutral
48%
Disagree
17%
Strongly disagree
2%
18%
143
Strongly agree
9%
Agree
45%
Neutral
26%
Disagree
19%
Strongly disagree
11%
%
Table 4.14 Mr. Tung should appoint EC members, who had nominated him, into
advisory bodies or even the principle officials as a means of reward
2%
Strongly agree
4%
Agree
Neutral
7%
Disagree
35%
Strongly disagree
52%
Table 4.15 The EC membership can help you to upgrade your political
attainment. Do you agree with this statement?
Strongly agree
0%
Agree
6%
6%
Neutral
Disagree
11%
47%
Strongly disagree
36%
144
Table 4.16 Some EC member openly said that Tung should appoint the electors,
who had nominated Mr. Tung, to play a role in the government. Do you agree
with this statement?
Strongly agree
1%
Agree
6%
Neutral
7%
Disagree
30%
Strongly disagree
56%
Table 4.15 and Table 4.16 illustrate an interesting but a clear-cut
phenomenon. 6 percent of the respondents in Table 4.15 agreed that their EC
membership could help upgrade their political attainment. Table 4.16 shows that 7
percent of the respondents agreed that Tung should appoint the electors, who had
nominated him, to play a certain role in the government. It is crystal clear that the
number of response was very stable in similar questions in both Table 4.15 and 4.16.
The disagreement amongst the respondents might be due to four explanations: (1)
they actually disagreed with the statement; (2) they needed only material benefits
(such as public resources); (3) they wanted to build up personal networks with Tung,
and (4) they really wanted to support Tung.
Indeed, my survey findings might not totally reflect the real motives of the
EC electors on the following grounds. First, a large number of the electors were
145
businessmen and they were quite conservative, and staying away from politically and
personally sensitive questions. Second, it seems to be too politically sensitive and
perhaps immoral to admit the earning of benefits at this highest level of the CE
election. Ultimately, respondents might be concerned about the impact on them if
they told me frankly about political patronage. Third, if the electors' intention of
advancing their interests were realized or identified by the public especially the mass
media, then such media exposure might reduce or limit their chances of achieving
their political objectives such as being appointed to advisory bodies and receiving
medals of honors. Nevertheless, history seems to be an evidence showing that the
CE's electors or supporters were almost guaranteed to receive political rewards.
Table 4.17 indicates part of the benefits that were distributed to the electors at
different levels.
Table 4.17 Appointment concerning the EC electors at different levels
Means of Patronage
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
Grand Bauhinia Medal (G.B.M.)*
2001
2002
146
Number of EC electors
appointed
11 (out of 12)
3 (out of 4)
2 (out of 5)
3 (out of 5, including 2
officials)
3 (all)
1 (out of 4, including 3
current or former principal
officials)
Unofficial members (non-civil servants or
non-ministers) in the Executive Council**
2002
5 (filled up all the unofficial
seats effective from Mr.
Tung's second term)
Justice of Peace"
14 (out of 28)
2002
Town Planning Board8"
2002
1 (out of 5)
Sources: * http://www.info.gov.hk/cml/eng/miscell/index2.htm.
** http://www.info.gov.hk/chinfo/cexe7.htm.
#
http://www.info.gov.hk/cml/eng/miscell/index3.htm.
## http://www.info.gov.hk/tpb/index c.htm (Singtao Daily, March 28, 2002,
p. 16)
From Table 4.17, it is crystal clear that the EC electors' background can
help them a lot in earning non-material benefits and achieving social status at
different levels. Certainly not all the electors could acquire such a high level of status
because of the fact that the political vacancies might be limited. After all, the
demands for political rewards might outstrip the supply of such rewards. Hence,
Tung and his supporters also need to balance different opinions amongst different
sectors. For example, Tung needs to please the pro-Beijing groups while at the same
time wooing the support of some pro-government independents. Thus there were
rumors at one time that independent legislator Eric Lee Kar-cheung might be
appointed to the ExCo. Even within the pro-Beijing groups, there are different
fragments such as the die-hard supporters of Beijing (such as Raymond Woo) and the
more moderate elements. Furthermore, not all the electors were qualified to earn and
receive political rewards except for (1) those who had enjoyed personal friendships
and harmonious relationships with Tung; (2) those who might serve as patrons to Mr.
147
Tung (like Henry Fok who had supported Tung publicly in the first and second CE
elections); (3) those who were really influential or powerful in the patriotic camp
(such as ExCo member Leung Chun-ying); and (4) those who have become the target
of political cooptation by the PRC authorities.15 The first three possibilities can be
reasonably understood, but the last possibility can be a pragmatic move by the CE to
silence potential critics. When the CE asked the electors to subscribe to his
nomination in 2002, pro-democracy politician Francis Chau, who was the
Vice-Chairman of the Sai Kung District Council and a social worker, rejected the
nomination partly because of his political stance and partly because of the will of the
social workers' subsector. But later he was found to subscribe to the nomination,
Chau admitted that he had changed his decision after seeking the opinion of one of
his colleagues.16 Later on the 5th anniversary day of the handover of Hong Kong
July 1, 2002, Chau was awarded with a medal of honor by Tung. Chau's
pro-democracy stance and relatively soft-line attitude, in this case, made him become
a target of cooptation by the HKSAR government. If such kind of opportunistic
democrats accepted the nomination of Tung, the political implication was that even
some of the democrats recognized the legality of the so-called "small circle election"
15
For a good study on cooptation, see Benson Wong, "Can Co-optation Win Over the Hong Kong
People? China's United Front Work in Hong Kong Since 1984," Issues & Studies, vol. 33, no. 5 (May
1997).
16
See The Next Magazine, February 28,2002, p. 76.
148
and thus moderating their stance due to pragmatic political considerations, such as
obtaining political rewards.17 On the other hand, the Tung regime is keen to woo the
support of any opportunistic democrats for the sake of widening its power base in
Hong Kong politics.
In short, from my survey findings, patron-client politics persisted in the
2002 CE election. While the CE required political support from the clients, namely
the EC electors, the latter needed to support the CE in exchange of other political
benefits, such as the formal recognition by PRC authorities and the prospects of
rising up the political ladder in the HKSAR through appointments to various
institutions and committees. Hence, the case study of the 2002 CE election fully
demonstrates the importance of patron-client politics in the HKSAR's political arena.
4.5 Summary
The study of patron-client politics is an underdeveloped area in the study of
Hong Kong politics. For other countries in the world, the studies on clientelism are
commonplace. It is universal that the main theme of patron-client politics lies in the
exchange of benefits, materially or non-materially. Yet, the relevant studies have not
17
Personal discussion with a district-level government official on April 22, 2003 whose identity had
to be protected.
149
attempted to concretize the benefits received by clients and delivered by patrons. In
fact, scholars studying patron-client relations usually adopt broad terms such as
services, human affections, and even the specific knowledge and skills the patrons
hold as means of delivery.18 Regarding the electioneering activities in the 2002 CE
election, it is critical to note the ability of patrons in maintaining: (1) the control of
public resources for political patronage; (2) the personal connections and networks in
cultivating the reciprocal relationships as delineated by James Scott; and (3) the
contributions of benefits to the patron's desire to achieve Tung's immediate political
objective of being elected. In the above survey, human factor seems to be a key
factor shaping the campaign strategy of the sole candidate Tung, who also obtained
the support of pro-Beijing elites and indeed PRC officials in his electioneering
activities.
In fact, patron-client politics is becoming more prominent at all levels of
elections in the HKSAR, namely the District Council's elections, the Legislative
Council's direct elections, the rural organizations' elections and the CE election.19
18
See, for example, Scott, James J. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia,"
in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, (1972); Ike, Nobutaka, "Japanese Political Culture
and Democracy" in Schmidt, Steffen W. et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in Political
Clientelism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); and Nathan, Andrew J., "A Factionalism
Model For CCP Politics" in Schmidt, Steffen W. et al., Friends, Followers, and Factions: A Reader in
Political Clientelism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).
19
Shiu-hing Lo, Wing-yat Yu and Kwok-fai Wan, "The 1999 District Council Elections," in Ming K.
Chan and Alvin Y. So, eds., Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe,
150
The major difference between these elections, from the perspective of patron-client
politics, is perhaps the delivery of different means of benefits. One may say that the
second CE election in 2002 was a monopolized election in the sense that the only
candidate—Tung Chee-hwa—was "competing with himself." However, the weak
leadership and poor performance of Tung during his first term of office from July 1,
1997 to March 2002 undermined his chances to win the re-election. Ironically, with
the overwhelming majority support from the EC members, and the active
behind-the-scene lobbying by PRC officials, he could win easily and comfortably so
as to create an undisputable picture that Tung obtained the goodwill of the people of
Hong Kong. In a sense, the clients of Tung "crowned" him again because of the
success of patron-client politics. Even though there was no competitor challenging
Tung, the absolute majority of nomination could be regarded as the "votes"
supportive of him. This was exactly the strategy of Beijing in portraying Tung's
"success" in governing the HKSAR from July 1997 to 2002. If Tung gave up the
necessity of playing patron-client politics together with his campaign strategy
orchestrated by Leung Chun-ying, nobody could guarantee that he could secure such
a large number of nominations. In any case, patron-client politics served the function
of portraying Tung as enjoying "unquestionable" legitimacy amongst the people of
2002), pp. 139-165.
151
Hong Kong. It is crystal clear that the sophisticated adventure in clientelism led to
Tung's "re-election" and "glorious victory." From the perspective of patron-client
politics, the study of CE election provides significant insights on the dynamics of
clientelism in the increasingly complicated picture and perhaps Chinese colors of
Hong Kong politics.
152
Chapter 5
The Legislative Council Elections
and Patron-Client Politics
5.1 Introduction
The Legislative Council (Legco) is the law making body in the HKSAR. In the past,
the legislative councilors were mostly appointed by the colonial government. The first
direct election was held in 1991 in which a total of 18 seats were opened for competition.
At that time, the democrats had won a majority of directly-elected seats. The victory was
seen as the aftermath of the June 4th crackdown in Beijing. Here, the anti-communist
ideology of the democrats was at play, for they were expected to fight for more human
rights for the people of Hong Kong. This image drove the democrats to win the elections
until the 1998 elections, which took place one year after the handover. The pro-Beijing
political party, Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), recorded a
clear increase in the number of seats in the 1998 LegCo, thanks to the newly
153
implemented proportional representation (list) system that tended to favor smaller and
weaker groups. Other reasons explaining this phenomenon was the cooling down effect
of the political confrontation with China and the DAB's extensive use of patron-client
relations. This chapter will try to test whether patron-client relations were prominent in
the electoral victory of candidates at LegCo's direct elections and functional
constituencies.
To test whether a Legislative Council member adopts patron-client relations to
cultivate personal networks with voters, it is essential to understand the institutional
functions underlying the duty and authority of Legislative Councilors. If a councilor
provides services or offers material benefits to a citizen, he or she may have the
legitimacy to do so if this action is required by his or her institutional functions. But if
that services or materials offered are out of scope of such institutional function, and if
there are guanxi or social network involving the voters, then the councilor is likely
utilizing patron-client relations with the voters in order to accumulate potential support
for future elections.
1
See Lo Shiu-hing and Yu Wing-yat, Election and Democracy in Hong Kong (Occasional Paper,
University of Maryland's School of Law, 1999).
154
The functions and powers of a Legislative Councilor are clearly stipulated as Article
73 of the Basic Law outlines the powers and functions of legislators as follows:
1.
To enact, amend or repeal laws in accordance with the provisions of the
Basic Law and legal procedures;
2.
To examine and approve budgets introduced by the Government;
3.
To approve taxation and public expenditure;
4.
To receive and debate the policy addresses of the Chief Executive;
5.
To raise questions on the work of the Government;
6.
To debate any issue concerning public interests;
7.
To endorse the appointment and removal of the judges of the Court of Final
Appeal and the Chief Judge of the High Court;
8.
To receive and handle complaints from Hong Kong residents;
9.
If a motion initiated jointly by one-fourth of all the Members of the
Legislative Council charges the Chief Executive with serious breach of law
or dereliction of duty and if he or she refuses to resign, the Council may,
after passing a motion for investigation, give a mandate to the Chief Justice
of the Court of Final Appeal to form and chair an independent investigation
committee. The committee shall be responsible for carrying out the
investigation and reporting its findings to the Council. If the committee
considers the evidence sufficient to substantiate such charges, the Council
may pass a motion of impeachment by a two-thirds majority of all its
Members and report it to the Central People's Government for decision; and
10. To summon, as required when exercising the above-mentioned powers and
155
functions, persons concerned to testify or give evidence."
In terms of patronage politics, LegCo members can articulate the interests of their clients
or constituents by asking questions related to the constituents and by lobbying the
government for more resources given to the constituencies. In these ways, the bonds
between LegCo members and constituents can be cemented. In turn, the LegCo members
expect the constituents to vote for them in the next election.
5.2 Interview with Legislative Councilors
To examine whether Legislative Councilors adopt patron-client networks to cultivate
votes or build up personalistic ties with voters, I interviewed four LegCo members with
different political background and asked them to respond to the factors laid down in
Chapter One about the dynamics of patron-client relations, including (1) mass political
culture, (2) elite political culture, (3) small constituencies, (4) party competition, (5)
imitating Taiwan style campaign strategies, and (6) electoral law.
According to my interview with Legislative Councilor Chan Wai Yip on August 26,2004,
http://www.legco.gov.hk/english/index.htm
156
he affirmed the need to cultivate patron-client networks. On mass political culture, he
said:
It depends on many factors. Of course democracy should have to be compatible
with resources, but there will be problems if I just build up relations without
mass support. Why do voters vote for me? Even if they have taken gifts from me,
they may not vote for me. District-level work does not only mean snake soup
dinners or tours. It is not easy for me to build up relations with voters as they
want my help them by the time they need it most. I have good relations with
voters because I visit my district frequently, say hello to them, interview them
and expose my face as much as I can.3
With regard to elite political culture, Chan said there was no interrelationship between the
CE and political parties. However, to Chan, the CE shared one "political cake" with
pro-government parties, such as the DAB, the Liberal Party (LP) and the Hong Kong
Progressive Alliance (HKPA). Second, to coopt some patriotic organizations such as
women associations and to let them obtain more resources, the Tung regime must see
Personal interview with Chan Wai Yip, August 26,2003.
157
them as patronage targets, according to Chan. Interestingly, Chan does not believe that
smaller constituencies could lead to his easy victory in elections. He remarked: "The
democrats have done little at the local level, but the result is that there is discrepancy.
Each side including the pro-democracy and patriotic camp wins about 30 to 40 percent in
District Councils elections." On party competition, Chan said: "It is comparative to say
that small constituencies can make my local-level work appear to be more efficient, but
sometimes it is more complicated because the local-level work is more short-term."
Regarding the imitation of Taiwan-style campaign strategies, Chan explicitly commented
that he would not use the Taiwan experience to explain Hong Kong's electoral dynamics.
Instead, Chan believed in the attractiveness of political platforms of candidates in
elections. Finally, on the impact of electoral law, Chan said: "The laws are fair and just
enough, but I think that excessive restrictions would pose an obstacle to campaigns."
In short, Chan emphasized the importance of political platforms while not playing down
the significance of patron-client politics. Perhaps Chan himself is an ideological democrat
with a strong stress on democracy and liberal values. This explained why he did not see
patron-client networks as of paramount importance.
158
Chan's democratic colleague Lee Wah Ming viewed mass political culture as significant.
Lee said: "It is always true that more social activities can make the voters know you
better. My district councilor's office always organizes activities such as HKS10 for taking
12 pictures, tours, hair cut services, etc. These basic services can be carried out easily
depending on the district's nature."4 However, Lee does not see that elite political culture
plays a crucial role in his electoral victory, saying that Hong Kong has no ruling party
and that candidates have no choice but to rely on district services. He affirms the impact
of small constituencies on his electoral victory. With regard to party competition, Lee
believes that none of the political parties are as strong as the pro-Beijing FTU because it
helps voters to find jobs, conducts home visits for candidates and acts as a machine
dispensing benefits to clientelist workers, whose unemployment can be solved or tackled
by the FTU services. Lee was unattracted to any Taiwan-style campaign strategies, for he
prefers visits to various districts in person, especially if the district has no agent
representing himself. He remarked" "When there is an agent in the district, I sometimes
visit the constituent." Lee also agrees that the electoral law always has ambiguous areas.
Overall, Lee tends to stress the importance of constituency work.
4
Personal interview with Lee Wah Ming, August 28,2003.
159
Another Legislative Councilor Choi So Yuk, a DAB member, stresses the importance of
personal relations, which to her can attract mass support. She said: "Once you need votes,
you have to flatter the voters. It is hard to avoid the cultivation of personal relations,
which can be cemented by using your own clan in the Fujianese community.'"5 On elite
political culture, Choi remarked: "There is no other candidate who obtains such
influential power as the CE, who can exchange information with businessmen." As a
district politician, Choi stresses the overriding importance of patron-client networks in
small constituencies. She also thinks that party competition can enhance her patron-client
networks. Interestingly, she also agrees that Taiwan-style campaign is becoming more
common in Hong Kong.
The fourth LegCo member whom I interviewed and who affirmed the significance
of patron-client networks is Tang Siu-tong. Tang agrees that mass political culture can
shape his electoral success, for different voters in different districts may call for specific
electoral culture or campaign strategies.6 As with Lee Wah Ming, tang conceives that the
absence of ruling political parties means elite political culture seems to be less important
in his electoral victory. Nevertheless, as with Choi and Lee, Tang agrees that smaller
5
6
Personal interview with Choi, September 18,2003.
Personal interview with Tang Siu-tong, September 30,2003.
160
constituencies need more district network, whereas large electoral constituencies need a
higher degree of candidates' popularity. On party competition, Tang agrees partly that it
plays a crucial role in electoral success, for the society is politicized. People view parties
as either pro-China or anti-China, to Tang. He also thinks that party ideology can even
override livelihood issues in LegCo. But District Councils elections tend to envisage the
need for candidates to construct personal relations with voters. Tang foresees the
increasing popularity of Taiwan-style campaign strategies due to fierce party competition
at LegCo's direct elections.
In brief, while Chan tends to slightly plays down the importance of patron-client
networks, the other three LegCo colleagues have the proclivity of stressing the need for
candidates to cultivate patron-client linkages with voters, especially Tang and Choi who
are both affiliated with clientelist parties like the HKPA and the DAB respectively.
5.3 Survey Results
I conducted a questionnaire survey of the 60 LegCo members in 2000. The response
rate was 28.3 percent (17 out of 60); 33 percent came from geographical constituencies,
161
30 percent from functional constituencies, and others did not indicate their background.
Table 5.1 What factor(s) made you won the 2000 Legco election?
I fight for substantial benefit for the constituent
My friendly District Councilors and local activists help to cultivate votes
Bigger constituency is more beneficial to me
Stricter competition of political parties make me strengthen the local personal
connections
My successful penetrative campaign strategy strengthens social network
The electoral system is suitable for me
The ideology of my political party is very attractive
My political party has mobilized a lot of voters to support me
My personal image and popularity
62.5%
12.5%
0%
12.5%
18.8%
12.5%
31.3%
0%
68.8%
In Table 5.1, most respondents believe that they fight for constituent interests and
that their personal image and popularity are crucial to electoral victory. Still, 12.5 percent
say District Council members can help them gain more votes and personal connections
are crucial. Yet, Table 5.2 reveals a similar finding. Nevertheless, we can see an
interesting phenomenon here in this table that 31.3% respondents admit a successful
district-level work would be a factor of their success but downgrade the influence of local
relations (18.8%) and assistance from groups (18.8%). These answers are later found
contradictory in Table 5.3, Table 5.4, Table 5.7 and Table 5.8.
162
Table 5.2 Some scholars have identified the following factors may drive to the
a I have a high degree of popularities
b Voters trust that I can help tofightfor their rights
c Because of my democraticfighterimage
d Because I can voice out opinion for them
e My district-level work is successful
f I acquire supports and assistancesfromseveral groups
g My electoral platform
h I promise to fight for more rights for my subsector
i My local relations
j My education/occupation background
k Others
43.8%
62.5%
25%
75%
31.3%
18.8%
31.3%
18.8%
18.8%
50%
12.5%
Table 5.3 Do you think personal connection is important to campaign engineering?
37.5%
Very important
62.5%
Important
0%
Not important
0%
Extremely not important
In Table 5.3, an overwhelming majority of respondents believe that personal
connections are important to their electioneering activities.
163
Very important
43.8%
56.2%
0%
0%
Important
Not important
Extremely not important
In Table 5.4, again an overwhelming majority of respondents affirm the paramount
importance of social networks in their electoral campaigns in LegCo's elections.
including both direct elections and functional constituencies.
Table 5.5 How do you construct connection with the voters?
Hold more social activities (such as snake soup dinner, tour, legal
consultations, study groups
Organize local residential consultative meetings
Organize protest or demonstrations tofightfor rights
Dinner gatherings
Manage complaints
Sponsor activities
My party or other political party helps to do so
We have already built up a good personal relations
Others
37.5%
43.75%
37.5%
25%
81.2%
0%
12.5%
31.2%
18.7%
Table 5.5 illustrates that most respondents construct social networks with voters
through hard work such as managing complaints, organizing local residential consultative
meetings, holding social activities such as snake soup dinners and tours, organizing
protests, and holding dinners. Clearly, many respondents do recognize the importance of
164
district work to cement their personal bonds with voters.
Table 5.6 If you have sponsored activities, what kind of sponsorship you adopted?
Supply gifts for lucky draw
43.8%
Sponsor part of the running capital
Supply manpower
Help to promote the activity
Help to apply for location or invite guests
Others
25%
37.5%
43.8%
43.8%
0%
Furthermore, Table 5.6 shows that many respondents cultivate social and personal
networks with voters through the sponsorship of various activities, such as the supply of
gifts for lucky draws, promotion of district activities, the provision of manpower and the
invitation of guests for district functions. When asked whether the absence of good
personal connections with voters constitutes a major factor for their possible failure in
electoral battles, a majority of respondents agree and strongly agree with the statement
(see Table 5.7). When asked further whether concentration on the management of
citizens' complaints and LegCo's committee work is the best way to build up personal
networks with voters, about one-third of the respondents disagree; 43.8 percent are
neutral; and none agrees with the statement (see Table 5.8). Clearly, most LegCo
members recognize the other alternatives such as district work to cement their personal
165
bonds with voters.
Strongly agree
12.5%
62.5%
18.7%
0%
0%
Agree
Neutral
Disagree
Strongly disagree
Table 5.8 Concentrating on managing complaint and committee work is the best
way to build up the relation networks at the local level.
Strongly agree
0%
Agree
0%
43.8%
Neutral
31.2%
Disagree
6%
Strongly disagree
Table 5.9 On basis of the activities you organized to maintain relations with
voters, how do the voters respond?
43.8%
a They appreciate me
6.25%
_b
b They wish to reciprocate me
0%
ren-ch,ing
ing
c They feel that they own me a ren-ch,
56.3%
Td I ought to do so
56.3%
e We have built up a good friendship
37.5%
Tf At the political arena, I am their real friend
6.3%
g Others
While testing the voters' response to the activities the respondents organized, it is
166
interesting to find that 43.8% respondents think that the voters appreciated their services
and that more than half of them could build up good friendships. Obviously, this kind of
a
Mutual Aids Committee
31.3%
b
Owners Corporation
31.3%
c
Local group
31.3%
d Village head/rural committee
12.5%
e
Political organization
56.3%
f
Pressure group
37.5%
_g
g Famous politician
37.5%
h None
i
0%
others
31.3%
Table 5.11 Which of the following group(s) assisted in your campaign activities?
a
25%
Mutual Aids Committee
18.8%
_b
b Owners Corporation
c
Td
e
Tf
8s
Local group
25%
Village head/rural committee
6.3%
Political organization
56.3%
Pressure group
31.3%
25%
Famous politician
h None
18.8%
i
12.5%
others
167
Table 5.10 and Table 5.11 indicate personal relations of District Councilors with
local groups and organizations. Table 5.10 shows more than 30% of the respondents
maintain good personal relations with local groups and organizations. In Table 5.11, 25%
of the respondents can successfully acquire assistance from MACs and local groups and
18.8% acquire assistance from OCs in their campaign activities. That these local
organizations can help the councilors to cultivate more votes as these organizations
possess a very good social network in the buildings they accommodate. Table 5.12 and
Table 5.13 confirm that these local organizations can play a remarkable role in an election.
43.8% of the respondents in Table 5.12 claim that they can invite these local
representatives to accompany them for home visiting and mobilize District Councilors or
friendly local activists to participate in their campaign activities. One may find it
reasonable to understand that the candidates cannot be able to attain these objectives in
the absence of good social relations and personal network.
Table 5.12 How do they assist your campaign activities?
a
T
c
T
e
T
Deliver campaign leaflets or display posters
62.5%
Be my campaign assistance
62.5%
Ask their friends or members to vote for me
62.5%
Accompany me to carry out home visit
43.8%
Arrange volunteers
37.5%
Mobilize District Councilors or friendly local activists to participate my
43.8%
campaign activities
g
12.5%
Others
168
Table 5.13 indicates one of the major reasons why the local organizations helped in the
campaign activities is that the candidate has maintained a good personal relationship with
these groups, and one more important phenomenon to observe is that this answer has a
equal weight with the answer about the candidates' political output and service. In other
words, services and good personal relationship are equally important in constructing
networks with local groups.
Table 5.13 Why do these groups agree to help you?
Recognize my political output
56.3%
Support my political party
50%
I have helped them to solve problems
56.3%
I have offered different sponsorships
12.5%
Arranged by a third party
6.3%
I am a member of that group/organization
37.5%
They do not want other candidates to win the election
_h Because we have a good personal relationship
i
25%
56.3%
12.5%
Others
Table 5.14 reflects the view of candidates in voters' behavior. A crystal clear
majority of respondents (87.5%) believe that the voters vote for them rather than their
political party (25%). It shows that they recognize their own capacity in electoral victory
rather than party influence. The role of their parties is veiy low in this aspect.
169
8 ' 5%
a
For me
b
For my political party
25%
c
They vote for me because of my well known nominators
6.3%
d
Difficult to say
6.3%
e
Others
12.5%
Table 5.15, Table 5.16 and Table 5.17 try to find out the respondents' views on the
importance of constructing local connection. As shown in Table 5.15, more than 60%
admit that a good local connection network can play a key role in obtaining more votes
whereas there is only 6.3% who disagree with the statement. In addition to maintaining
relationship with local organizations in terms of sponsorship, Table 5.16 displays a close
discrepancy between the pros and cons that 25.1% think that sponsorship is a must in a
district level work whereas 43.8% disagree, 18.8% give no comment. From this finding,
we can see that sponsorship is a sensitive issue that the respondents remain reservation to
answer this question. This phenomenon becomes clearer when the respondents are asked
in Table 5.17 that if sponsoring local organizations' activities is the best way to build up a
good local connection network. 25% agree and 25% disagree with the statement whereas
a total of 37.5% stay neutral in this dichotomized question.
170
Strongly agree
6.3%
Agree
56.3%
Neutral
18.8%
Disagree
6.3%
Strongly disagree
0%
0%
Table 5.16 To sponsor local organizations' activities is a must in a district level
work
Strongly agree
6.3%
Agree
18.8%
Neutral
18.8%
Disagree
25%
Strongly disagree
18.8%
Table 5.17 To sponsor local organizations' activities is the best way to build up a
good local connection network
Strongly agree
0%
0%
Agree
25%
Neutral
37.5%
Disagree
6.3%
Strongly disagree
18.8%
Moreover, Table 5.18, Table 5.19 and Table 5.20 attempt to test how the respondents
construct personal relationship with voters through local agents. In Table 5.18, a total of
43.8% think that a District Councilor can effectively help to strengthen personal
relationship with voters, and only 12.5% hold an opposite view.
171
Table 5.19 even
displays the importance of local organizations and societies. 56.3% agree that these
groups can effectively help to strengthen personal relationship with voters while 6.3%
disagree. Comparing with Table 5.18 and Table 5.19, Table 5.20 shows that 18.8% of the
respondents refuse the effect of these local organizations and societies, they think that
they themselves can strengthen personal relationship, whereas 31.2% disagree with the
statement.
Table 5.18 A District Councilor can effectively help to strengthen personal
relationship with voters
Strongly agree
0%
Agree
43.8%
Neutral
25%
Disagree
12.5%
Strongly disagree
0%
Table 5.19 Local organizations/societies can effectively help to strengthen personal
relationship with voters
0%
Strongly agree
Agree
56.3%
Neutral
18.8%
Disagree
6.3%
0%
Strongly disagree
172
Table 5.20 I can effectively strengthen personal relationship with voters myself
without the assistance of local organizations/societies
Strongly agree
S q%
Agree
18.8%
Neutral
25%
Disagree
31.2%
Strongly disagree
0%
Finally, Table 5.21 concludes the importance of guanxi1 and social network in
electoral engineering, a total of 68.8% agree with this question and 12.5% neutral. No
opponent is found in this question. It is clear in these findings that although some of the
respondents behaved reservation in revealing their stance in cultivating votes through
maintaining good guanxi and social network in local level, which constitutes part of the
important aspect of patron-client politics.
Table 5.21 In short, guanxi and social network stand in a very important position in
electoral engineering
Strongly agree
18.8%
Agree
50%
Neutral
12.5%
Disagree
0%
Strongly disagree
0%
In fact, patron-client politics became important in LegCo's direct elections. For
7
This questionnaire clearly used the term guanxi instead of other indirect terms to recall the respondents'
attention of the main theme of this questionnaire.
173
instance, when the veteran LegCo member Lee Wing Tat of the Democratic Party (DP)
lost the 2000 LegCo election, he claimed it was the result of neglecting district-level
work.8 On the other hand, Lee's DP colleague. District Councilor Albert Chan Wai Yip,
asserted that his victory in the 2000 LegCo direct election was attributable to his sold and
diligent district-level work. Chan vowed to continue his district-level work despite
entering the legislature.9 Even the DP adopts a "back-to-the-mass" strategy to
corroborate how sincere it is about district-level work.10 Another interesting and
contingent example took place in the 2000 LegCo by-election. At that time, an
independent democrat candidate, barrister Audrey Eu, promoted her legal profession and
work to the voters, and she invited many barristers, solicitors, pro-democracy legislators,
social workers, and even academics to support her electoral campaigns. These examples
provide solid evidence that patron-client relations exist in Hong Kong's elections. After
Eu's electoral victory in 2000, she even offered legal consultation services to voters in the
Hong Kong Island. Arguably, educated candidates as with Eu recognize the need to
develop and entrench patron-client networks.
8
Ming Pao, December 16,2000, p. A48.
SCMP, December 16,2000, p. 6.
10
Apple Daily, December 16,2000, p. A20.
9
174
2000 LegCo
1998 LegCo
GC
FC
EC
Total
GC
FC
EC
Total
DP
9
3
0
12
9
4
00
13
DAB
7
3
1
11*
5
2
2
9
10
(later 10)
LP
0
8
0
8
00
9
Frontier
4
0
0
4
4
00
1
0
HKPA
1
1
2
4
00
2
3
4
5
ADPL
1
0
0
1
00
00
00
00
FTU
0
0
1
00
11
0
11
CTU
1
1
0
0
00
11
0
0
0
11
00
123 Alliance
0
0
0
00
00
Independents
1
13
3
0
18*
11
11
0
00
0
4
11
CP
1
0
11
00
16
(later 19)
Sources: The 2000 LegCo elections result is derived from Ming Pao's Special Issue for
the LegCo Elections, 11 September 2000 and the 1999 result is derived from Ming Pao,
26 May 1998.
Notes:
GC = Geographical constituencies
FC = Functional constituencies
EC = Election Committee
LP = Liberal Party (a pro-business political party)
HKPA = Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (a pro-Beijing political party)
FTU = Federation of Trade Unions (a pro-Beijing union)
CTU = Confederation of Trade Unions (an independent union)
ADPL = Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (a
district-based political
party)
CP = Citizens Party (which did not participate in the 2000 LegCo direct elections)
Frontier (a pro-democracy party which is led by LegCo members Emily Lau and Cyd Ho)
175
* This denotes that after the by-election held for the seat vacated by Gary Cheng in the
Hong Kong Island constituency, independent Audrey Eu was elected on December 10,
2000 and she defeated Chris Chung of the DAB.
In reality, analyzing the 1998 and 2000 LegCo elections (see Table 5.22), the
government's clientelist parties such as LP and HKPA usually obtained more seats in
functional constituency elections. The LP in particular relies heavily on functional
constituencies, which are in general smaller than geographical constituencies. A closer
look at the results of the 2000 LegCo election result in functional constituencies and in
the Election Committee in Table 5.23 shows that (1) many functional constituencies had
unopposed
candidates because of internal compromise, (2)
some
functional
constituencies are relatively small (such as the real estate and construction, transport and
finance), and (3) the franchise varies from one functional constituency to another. More
interestingly, in Table 5.23, the Election Committee tended to produce elected candidates
with relatively strong patron-client networks, notably Rita Fan, Ambrose Lau, Yeung
Yiu-chung, Ng Leung-sing, David Chu and Ng Ching-fai. Candidates with weaker
patron-client networks or poor personal connections were defeated, notably Siu Sin-por
who was once regarded by some civil servants as politically arrogant. Obviously, the
smaller the number of voters, the more influence the patron-client networks.
176
Table 5.23 The 2000 LegCo Election Results in Functional Constituencies and the
Election Committee
Functional Constituencies
Candidates
No. of Votes
Heung Yee Kuk
Lau Wong-fat (LP)*
unopposed
Agriculture and Fisheries
Wong Yung-kan (DAB)*
Insurance
Commercial (First)
Bernard Charnwut Chan*
James Tien Pei-chun (LP) *
unopposed
unopposed
unopposed
Commercial (Second)
Philip Wong Yu-hong*
unopposed
Industrial (Second)
Lui Ming-wah*
unopposed
Sports, Performing Arts, Culture
Timothy Fok Tsun-ting*
unopposed
Hui Cheung-ching (HKPA) *
Sophie Leung Lau Yau-fiin (LP) *
unopposed
unopposed
Lo Wing-lok*
Dennis Lam Shun-chiu
1,804
1,458
Kwok Ka-ki
867
Engineering
So Kai-ming
Raymond Ho Chung-tai*
386
2,186
1,416
Real Estate and Construction
John Luk Wang-kwong
Abraham Razack (Shek Lai-him) *
357
Health Services
Jimmy Tse Lai-leung
Michael Mak Kwok-fung*
116
5,857
Thomas Wong Kwok-shing
3,908
Alice Tso Shing-yuk
3,668
Li Fung-ying*
Leung Fu-wah (FTU)*
Chan Kwok-keung (DAB)*
283
259
Leung Suet-fong
Henry Wu King-cheong*
102
177
Fung Chi-kin (HKPA)
133
Irene So Wai-yin
Margaret Ng Ngoi-yee*
21
1,520
Anthony Chow Wing-kin
982
and Publication
Import and Export
Textiles and Garment
Medical
Labour (3 seats)
Financial Services
Legal
177
226
Tourism
Howard Young (LP)*
274
Joseph Tung Yao-chung
197
Bagaman Francis
13 7
Miriam Lau Kin-yee (LP)*
106
Thomas Pang Cheung-wai (DAB)
33
Cheung Man-kwok (DP) *
35,793
Lee Kit-kong
5,686
David Li Kwok-po*
89
Leo Kung Lin-cheng
32
Accountancy
Eric Li Ka-cheung*
3,867
Architectural, Surveying and
Edward Chow Kwong-fai
Peter Chan Po-fiin
Lau Ping-cheung*
1,363
761
938
Planning
Christopher Law Kin-chung
767
Edward Ho Sing-tin (LP)
647
Law Chi-kwong (DP)*
3,061
Grace Chan Leung Yuet-ming
1,582
Kenneth Ting Woo-shou (LP)*
305
Cammy Chan Siu-king
228
Wholesale and Retail
Selina Chow Liang Shuk-yee (LP)*
David Lau Chi-wing (DAB)
1,459
476
Information Technology
Sin Chung-kai (DP)*
1,770
Kan Wing-kay
632
Tommy Cheung Yu-yan (LP)*
1,478
Leung Kwong-cheong
720
David Ng Tak-leung (DAB)
560
District Council
Ip Kwok-him (DAB)*
Chiang Sai-cheong (LP)
198
141
Election Committee
Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai*
651
Ambrose Lau Hon-chuen (HKPA)*
594
Yeung Yiu-chung (DAB)*
490
Ng Leung-sing*
483
David Chu Yu-lin (HKPA)*
464
NgChing-fai*
401
Transport
Education
Finance
Social Welfare
Industrial (First)
Catering
178
Ho Sai-chu
378
Ma Fung-kwok
376
Shiu Sin-por
360
Ho Ka-cheong
117
Source: South China Morning Post, September 12, 2000.
Table 5.24 The Education Level of DP and DAB's Supporters
Education Level
DP's Supporters
DAB's Supporters
Tertiary
10.8%
37.0%
42.4%
20.4%
Post-tertiaiy
52.3%
37.1%
Total
100%
100%
Primary and secondary
X
A,22=33.4;
=33.4; d.f.=8; p=0.0001
Table 5.25 The Class Background of DP and DAB's Supporters
DAB's Supporters
DP's Supporters
Class
Middle-low
18.9%
20.5%
34.6%
18.5%
Middle
51.5%
39.5%
Middle-upper
9.1%
7.4%
Total
X2=6.7; d.f.=3; p=0.081
100%
100%
Working
In LegCo's direct elections, those voters who support the DAB, a clientelist political
party enjoying the patronage of the HKSAR government, have a number of features. First,
they tend to come from primary and secondary educational background as opposed to the
179
DP supporters who tend to be more highly educated (Table 5.24). Second, Table 5.25
shows that the voters supportive of the clientelist DAB tend to come from middle-lower
classes, whereas the DP supporters tend to be more middle-class in their self-perception.
Table 5.26 Self-Identification of DP and DAB's Supporters
Self-Identification
DP's Supporters
DAB's Supporters
Hong Kong Chinese
21.1%
29.1 %
Chinese
19.5%
33.7%
Hong Kong Persons
54.9%
33.7%
Hong Kong British
3.8%
1.2%
Overseas Chinese
0.8%
2.3%
Total
100%
100%
~
2
X =12.8; d.f.=4; p=0.012
Third, the DAB supporters tend to identify themselves as Chinese and Hong Kong
persons, whereas the DP supporters tend to mainly identify themselves as Hong Kong
persons (Table 5.26). This result demonstrates the "patriotic" identity of voters supportive
of the DAB. Fourth, voters of the DAB tend to express their patriotism of Hong Kong
and China (Table 5.27), whereas the DP supporters appear to be less patriotic. These
findings give us a clearer sense of those voters supporting Beijing's clientelist party, the
DAB, in LegCo direct elections.
180
Table 5.27 Voting Considerations of DP and DAB's Supporters
Considerations
DP's Supporters
DAB's Supporters
59.2%
41.3%
87.8%
80.5%
70.9%
63.0%
46.5%
68.2%
Dissatisfaction with the HKSAR
government's performance
Selection of representatives to monitor
the government
Wishing to use directly elected LegCo
seats to balance the influence of
business sector in functional
constituencies
Expression of their patriotism to Hong
Kong and China
Notes:
1. Question: "How important was the following consideration in your voting decision?"
The choices were (1) veiy important, (2) important, (3) less important, and (4) not
important.
2. The figures only show the percentages of importance and veiy importance. All of the
figures are statistically significant with 95 percent confidence.
181
Table 5.28 (November 2003) Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with both Central and HKSAR governments: (%)
N=710
Neutral
Very
Somewhat
Somewhat
Very
Don't
Dissatisfied
Dissatisfied
Satisfied
Satisfied
Know
a. Your current life in Hong Kong
b. The general performance of the SAR Government?
2.1
3.2
9.9
32.6
28.6
42.7
51.6
14.5
5.2
1.0
2.5
5.9
c. The performance of the SAR Gov't in dealing with
1.8
11.8
24.5
43.6
5.2
13.0
China?
d. The general performance of Tung Chee Hwa
e. The general performance of Chief Secretary Donald
3.2
3.9
39.1
4.2
34.6
14.2
14,2
60.5
1.4
4.4
7.5
12.7
Tsang
f. The general performance of Financial Secretary Heniy
3.5
5.2
20.2
36.1
1.8
33.1
Tang
g. The general performance of Sec. For Justice Elsie Leung
h.The performance of the Chinese (PRC) Gov't in ruling
3.0
2.0
23.3
5.1
32.6
14.0
24.4
50.6
0.6
10.0
16.2
18.3
China
i.The performance of the Chinese Govt in dealing with
1.8
5.6
12.6
54.3
11.4
14.2
HKSAR affairs?
j.The general performance of China's President HuJintao
1.1
1.0
3.0
58.8
17.2
18.9
k.The general performance of China's Premier Wen Jiabao
1.4
1.1
2.5
57.8
21.0
16.1
Source: Hong Kong Tansition Poject.
182
Table 5.29 (April 2004) Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with both Central and HKSAR governments: (%)
N=810
Very
Somewhat
Somewhat
Very
Don't
Dissatisfied
7.7
Dissatisfied
20.1
Satisfied
60.3
Satisfied
6.2
Know
5.6
b. The general performance of the SAR Government?
c. The performance of the SAR Gov't in dealing with
China?
27.0
18.2
39.9
35.1
22.4
30.7
0.7
2.7
10.0
13.4
d. The general performance of Tung CheeHwa
e. The general performance of Chief Secretary Donald
Tsang
35.1
5.1
31.1
17.6
20.6
57.9
1.0
4.2
12.3
15.2
f. The general performance of Financial Secretary Henry
Tang
3.8
14.2
53.9
3.0
25.1
g. The general performance of Sec. For Justice Elsie Leung
h.The performance of the Chinese (PRC) Gov't in ruling
China
18.2
6.1
29.4
14.2
28.6
50.6
2.1
7.7
21.7
21.4
i.The performance of the Chinese Govt in dealing with
HKSAR affairs?
9.9
27.2
41.3
4.8
16.9
j.The general performance of China's President HuJintao
2.3
4.1
63.1
12.5
18.0
k.The general performance of China's Premier Wen Jiabao
1.0
3.1
63.2
19.4
13.2
a. Your current life in Hong Kong
Source: Hong Kong Tansition Poject.
183
From Table 5.28 and Table 5.29, we find that voters whop are not clients of Tung or
Beijing tend to have independent political views. In general, they are more happy with
the performance of Beijing than that of Tung. Moreover, many Hong Kong people were
unhappy with the performance of the HKSAR government, especially during he outbreak
of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). A case in point was the resignation of
the secretary for health Yeoh Eng-kiong over his performance during the SARS crisis.
Here, public opinion exerted tremendous pressure on Yeoh to resign." Clearly, the
people of Hong Kong who are neither the clients of Tung nor the full supporters of
Beijing tend to hold their own views on political and social issues. Hence, patron-client
politics has limitations in shaping public opinion because of the rapid increase in the
political maturity of Hongkonger.
5.4 Summary
This Chapter shows that in LegCo direct elections, patron-client relations tend to be
neglected by scholars studying Hong Kong politics. Although LegCo members have
recognized that other factors like party ideology, political platform and district work are
Apple Daily, July 8,2004, p. Al.
184
at play, some of them affinn the significance of patron-client networks. Patron-client
networks also tend to be influential in smaller circle elections, such as functional
constituency elections in which the number of voters is relatively restricted, and the
Election Committee where patron-client relations played an indispensable role. Voters
supportive of the clientelist DAB also tend to be "•patriotic.'" Overall, patron-client
relations and dynamics have increasingly become more prominent, yet relatively
neglected in the electoral dynamics in the HKSAR.
185
Chapter 6
District Council Elections and Grassroots Level Politics
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is going to assess the extent to which patron-client relations is crucial
to the local District Council elections and to grassroots-level politics such as the
operations of the MACs and HYK. A survey of District Council members will be used
to analyze my findings. Also, a case study of the Tseung Kwan O Women Centre will be
used to illustrate the complexities of patron-client relations in local elections.
6.2 Role of District Councilors
According to the government, the functions of a District Council are:
(a) to advise the government
i.
on matters affecting the well-being of the people in the District; and
ii.
on the provision and use of public facilities and services within the District; and
iii. on the adequacy and priorities of Government programmes for the District; and
186
IV. on the use of public funds allocated to the District for local public works and
community activities; and
(b) where funds are made available for the purpose, to undertake
i.
environmental improvements within the District;
ii. the promotion of recreational and cultural activities within the District; and
iii. community activities within the District.1
From the above functions, we can see that District Councilors can allocate public funds
for various district activities and promote community improvement. Thus District
Councilors have potential power that can improve the district—a sort of influence that
can help them build up clientelist networks.
6.3 The 1999 and 2003 District Councils Elections
In Table 6.1, the voter turnout in the 2003 District Council elections increased to
44.1 percent—a rise of about 8 percent compared to the 1999 election. The increase in
the number of voters in 2003 was even more drastic; 1,066,373 voters cast their ballots.
Due to the fact that for more voters went to the polls in 2003, the end result was
1
See http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public services/district administration/dbmain.htm.
187
that the impact of patron-client relations was minimized in the 2003 District Council
elections.
Table 6.1 Comparative voter turnout rates in 1999 and 2003 District Council
Election.
Electorate
Aggregate Voter Turnout
19992
20033
2,279,504
2,418,078
816,503
1,066,373
35.82
44.10
Aggregate Turnout Rate (%)
Source: The website of the Election Affairs Commission
Table 6.2 shows that the DAB performed not so well in the 2003 elections compared to
the 1999 one. However, the Pan-democratic camp composed of the DP, ADPL, and the
Frontier had overall gains in 2003, particularly the DP. The DAB had only 62 candidates
elected in 2003, a drop of 21 candidates compared to the 1999 elections. Because of the
political earthquake on July 1,2003, when half a million Hong Kong people took to the
street to protest against the legislation on Article 23 of the Basic Law—which outlaws
treason, sedition, subversion and secession against the central government—more voters
registered in the 2003 elections and then cast their ballots. It appears that the anti-control
2
http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/dcelect99/chi/result/result.htm
^ http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/dc2003/english/result/result_view_all.html
188
or pro-democracy ideology of the democratic camp matched the concerns of most voters,
who abandoned many DAB candidates. The image of the DAB was severely
undermined by its leaders Tsang Yok-sing's defense of Article 23. As a result of
anti-control or pro-liberal ideology, many voters no longer supported incumbent DAB
candidates in the 2003 elections, thus facilitating the Pan-democratic camp's apparent
victory.
Table 6.2 Comparative Result of Political Parties in DC Election 1999 and 2003
2003
No. of
1999
Elected
Candidates
DP
No. of
Elected
Candidates
12
95 (79.2%)
173
86(49.1%)
DAB
206
62(30.1%)
176
83 (47.2)
ADPL
37
25 (67.6 %)
32
19(59.4)
HKPA
37
20 (54%)
30
21 (70%)
LP
25
12 (48%)
34
15(44.1%)
Frontier
13
6 (46%)
Individual/others
399
180 (45.7%)
344
162 (47.1%)
Total
837
400
798
390
4 (44.4%)
Source: Oriental Daily, November 25,2003.
One interesting example showing the impact of ideology on voters, rather than
patron-client networks, in the 2003 elections was the competition in Chung Nga
189
constituency in Tai Po where a 30-years old new young man Wong Tin-lung defeated a
local HKPA councilor. Wong's electoral strategies could be seen in two ways. First, his
professional background was backed up by many professionals, who were his campaign
assistants. Second, he claimed himself to be a democrat. In other words, he had no
political platform but had to sell his democratic ideology and professionalism. His
electoral victory demonstrated the triumph of democratic ideology over the influence of
patron-client networks in the 2003 elections.
Another good example showing the special or extremely ideological impact of
anti-control philosophy, or anti-government thinking, in the 2003 District Council
elections was the victory of Frontier member Cyd Ho Sau-lan over DAB incumbent Ip
Kwok-him in Kwun Lung constituency. Although Ip cultivated strong patron-client
networks in Kwun Lung, he was no match for Cyd Ho who decided to penetrate his
power base or long-time headquarters. Kwun Lung's older generation was split between
supporting Ip and Ho and its younger generation obviously tilted towards Ho. Eventually,
Ho narrowly defeated Ip, who staunchly supported Article 23, by just 64 votes.
190
Figure 6.1 Patron-Client Relations Pyramid in District Council Elections
DC Candidate
OC Chair
District Groups
MAC Chair
(amenities centre, social services, guanxi, ren-ch 'ing, networking, personalistic ties)
(Property owners)
(Residents)
(Residents)
Basically, many DAB members who are candidates in District Council elections
adopt a pyramidal may of cultivating their patron-client networks. The process is shown
in Figure 6.1 in which the DC candidate utilizes the MAC chairs, OC chairs and district
groups to deliver benefits and services, such as tours and free legal services, so that the
clients including property owners and residents sense the need to support the patron at
the top. This pyramidal operation was quite effective in the 1999 District Council
elections but not the 2003 counterpart.
191
In reality, my exit poll of 27 voters at King Lam Estate in Tseung Kwan O on
November 23, 2003 demonstrated the unusual emergence of political ideology, which
was parallel to the democratic victory in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. When asked
why they cast their voters, 70 percent of the 27 respondents gave the reason of fulfilling
their citizens' responsibility, a sign of maturity of Hong Kong voters. Table 6.4 shows
that an overwhelming majority of respondents point to political ideology consideration
in their voting behavior. This factor alone became unfavorable to the operation and
impact of patron-client relations in the 2003 elections. In Table 6.5, it seems that the
party identifiers are not strong in the 2003 elections, for only 30 percent of the 27
respondents say they vote for political parties. Table 6.6 shows that voters appear to
favor candidates with professional and strong educational background. In Table 6.7,
while many respondents are influenced by campaign propaganda to vote for a particular
candidate, some are attracted by the political stars and, interestingly, local organization
or groups that deliver patronage benefits.
192
Table 6.3 Exit poll at King Lam Estate, TKO on November 23,2003
Question: Why do you come to vote today?
Citizens' responsibility/right
70%
To vote for the candidate I like
30%
Following the trend to vote District Council
0%
193
a
Always hold social communication activities in district level (such as
tour, Chinese opera shows, snake soup dinners, etc.)
0%
0%
b
Concern citizens' welfare (such as delivering face mask in SARS
30%
period, volunteer hair-cut for elderlies, holding hobbies learning
classes, etc.)
c
Fight for matters about my livelihood.
80%
d
The candidate has helped me, this is my reciprocity to him.
20%
e
Based on political ideology consideration.
90%
f
The candidate has a strong ability to be a councilor.
70%
g
We have built up a good friendship.
20%
h
Academic or the professional background.
20%
i
My friends ask
ask me
me to
to vote
vote him.
him.
0%
0%
j
The candidate is a successful bridge of communication between
70%
70%
citizens and government officials.
k
Other candidates are worse than this one.
20%
1
Other factors.
0%
0%
Note: Respondents can choose more than one answer.
194
Table 6.5 You vote for the candidate or political party?
a
The candidate.
60%
b
The Political party.
30%
c
No opioion.
10%
Table 6.6 If you can select, what kind of candidate is your ideal type?
a
Higher education background/professionals
50%
b
Focus on citizens' livelihood.
30%
c
Focus on political work.
20%
195
a
MACs/OCs
0%
0%
b
Fong!fntn&s.
Kai Fowg/friends.
0%
c
Local organization.
20%
d
Political stars/local Famous persons.
30%
e
Campaign propaganda.
50%
f
The candidate contacts me.
0%
0%
196
6.4 MACs and Patron-Client Relations
Figure 6.2 Patron-Client Pyramid in MAC Level
MAC Chair
Treasurer
Secretary
Vice-Chair
( social services, guanxi, ren-ching, networking, personalistic ties)
Floor representatives
1
Residents of the Building
As with the elected District Council members, MAC chairs tend to cultivate their
political support and personal network through pyramidal arrangement. Figure 6.2
shows that the MAC chair, especially if he or she has political ambition and desires to be
a candidate in District Council elections, tries to build up a power base through the
197
MAC office-bearers, such as the treasurer, secretary and vice-chairperson. Then these
middle-level actors can cultivate further support of the MAC chair by using their ties
with the floor representatives, which are elected by each household in a multi-storey
public housing estate or private building. The floor representatives play a crucial role in
electing the executive committee of the MAC, which is composed of the four crucial
persons like the chair, vice-chair, secretary and treasurer. Due to the fact that some
household residents are apathetic and may not be keen to be the floor representatives,
political parties can penetrate the private or public housing by mobilizing politically
active residents to become floor representatives. As political parties mobilize residents
to be floor representatives, the District Office's Liaison Officers actually welcome this
development, for their duty of encouraging resident participation is actually facilitated
by party work. Overall, if a MAC chair wants to climb up the district-level political
ladder and cultivate patron-client networks, he or she has the political mechanism or
structure to do so, as illustrated by the pyramid in Figure 6.2.
198
6.5 The Case of Tseung Kwan O Women Center
The scandal involving some assistants, who are affiliated with the Tseung Kwan O
Women Center and who have been questioned by the Hong Kong police for suspectedly
falsifying the signatures of voters in preparation for the September 2004 LegCo direct
elections, demonstrates the patron-clientelist ties at the grassroots level. The Center has
close relations with LegCo member and DAB legislators, Lau Kwong-wah. The Center
is both a client of Lau and the pro-Beijing Hong Kong Women Development
Association, whose chairlady Yip Shun-hing is a DAB founder and an executive of the
pro-Beijing New Territories Association of Societies. The Center was used as a
campaign vehicle of the DAB incumbents such as Yeung Yiu-chung and Law. But since
some assistants of the Center come from lower classes without the necessary legal
knowledge on law and elections, some of them have been suspected of falsifying the
signatures of some voters, who eventually complained to the mass media. In fact, those
voters who have complained to the mass media appear to be more highly educated than
the Center's assistants. The incident aroused the concern of human rights activists and
democrats. The crux of the problem is that the Center has been utilized as a machine
having clientelist relations with the DAB and its auxiliary support organization, the
199
Hong Kong Women Development Association. Moreover, the Center cultivates the
political support from clients through hobbies classes and other women activities. Yet,
the Center's assistants were not fully aware of the legal implications of falsifying the
signature of voters—an act leading to police investigation in 2004.
The major aim of the Center is to actually carry out united front work not only as its
daily practice but also on behalf of Beijing, its final patron.4 During the LegCo or
District Councils election period, the Center mobilizes its members or students to
participate in its hobbies classes, and to vote for the specified candidate (normally from
the patriotic camp or friendly candidates). The Center, which appears to be an ordinary
organization without any signs of political affiliation, was founded shortly the handover
and its similarity with other community organizations confuse people's ability of
identifying its real political background as a patriotic group fulfilling the missions of
Beijing and the HKSAR government. Its immediate patrons are the Hong Kong Women
Development Association and the New Territories Association of Societies which
4
Personal discussion with a member of the Center's executive committee member on July 15, 2001. She
stated that the Center was one of the patriotic organizations established in Tseung Kwan O to carry out the
PRC's unitedfrontwork. It is sponsored by several patriotic organizations through several means, such as
personal donations, sponsorship of administrative facilities, hiring of full-time staff with the title of
volunteers, etc.
200
actually forges a close linkage with the Liaison Office, the PRC's official representative
in the HKSAR. Since the massive demonstrations on July 1, 2003, the Center's patrons
have injected a large sum of money to organize low-cost activities to attract the support
of citizens and to inculcate a pro-government mentality amongst residents.5 Promoting
voter registration was one of the major tasks of the pro-Beijing groups including the
Center so as to consolidate the support of unregistered and yet friendly voters and to
collect citizens' personal data (such as addresses and phone numbers) for canvassing in
the September 2004 LegCo elections.6 Clearly, the Center became a vehicle or agent for
Beijing's carefully orchestrated unitedfrontpolicy toward the HKSAR.
5
Personal discussion with a senior member of the Center's executive committee on August 2,2003.
Personal interview with a senior member of the Center's executive committee on May 10, 2004. She
mentioned that the Liaison Office had fixed a target in every district and pushed the coordinator of each
district to register a certain number of voters. For example, the targets in Sai Kung were 3,000 newly
registered voters and the targets were 5,000 in Shatin.
6
201
Figure 6.3 Patron-Clientelist Ties of Local Politics revealed by Tseung Kwan O
Women Centre
Beijing
Patron
Client
Tung Chee Wah
government
Client of the following
groups
Civil Force
DAB
(Convener)
(Membership)
Hong Kong
Women
Development
Association
Lau Kwong Wah
Client
of Lau
Close relation with CF and DAB
Tseung Kwan O Women Centre
Members
Students of
hobbies class
Families and Kai Fongs
(Build up personal relations so as to mobilize them to vote for the patriotic candidates)
202
6.6 Case Study of Patron-Client Relations: District Council Candidate and MAC in
Kowloon City Constituency
District Councilor X was a electedin Kowloon City district. He is a resident in the
district. Over the past 19 years of service as a District Councilor, X had progressively
established a strong relationship with all the MACs, totally 9 MACs, because he had
realized the important of getting the MACs' support. He did successfully build up a very
good guanxi with all the MACs, as one might easily observe some signboards that were
displayed at several main roads with all the names of the MAC chairs on it. This showed
that Councilor X had quite skillfully built up patron-clientelist networks in his
constituency. As Councilor X claimed that putting all the names of all the MAC chairs
together and displaying them on the street could yield a rare opportunity for their
political promotion or marketing, and for the consolidation of friendships and personal
relations. To council X, his status in the district is indispensable for the expansion of
influence and networks on the part of MAC chairs.7.
7
Personal interview with a MAC chair who is a MAC chair in Councilor X's constituency on March 3,
2003
203
The MAC chairs were indeed emotionally touched by this indirect promotion of
their personal popularities. As MAC chair G express his appreciation of this act,
claiming that "Councilor X is a good Kai Fong because he always remembers us and
concerns about our housing issues."8
Meanwhile, residents in that constituency supported Councilor X's other
district-level work. As Kai Fong M told me, she suppoted X because he had often
delivered benefits to the residents, such as gifts for lucky draw, local and mainland tours
at a very low price, and lots of entertainment activities. Therefore she voted for X for
more than three times. Yet, later she did not support him because X had cheated the
residents by not dispensing Tuen Ng Festival food all of them."
9
She added: "I had
used to be a campaign assistant at Tsuen Wan before I moved here. All the District
Councilors provided benefits to citizens and, of course, to supporters like us, Otherwise,
I did not see any incentive to help him."10 Thereby it is clear and significant to witness
the exchange of benefits in local politics. Material benefits or ren-ch'ing exchange are
8
Personal interview with MAC chair G on July 18,2002.
Personal interview with Kai Fong M on December 15,2003
10
Personal interview Kai Fong M on June 10,2001
9
204
critical for candidates to consolidate their chances to attain electoral victorv.
X claimed that he had won four times at District Council elections in which one of
his major tricks was to build up guanxi with MAC chairs who could help him promote
himself before elections, such as displaying more posters of his constituency services,
promoting his name to residents and mobilizing MAC members to be his campaign
assistants. This way, his chance to win an election was enhanced.11
It is obvious that different political actors actively participate in MACs. They provide
various attractive services to MACs and co-organize various activities for residents. The
ultimate aim of these political actors is to win the hearts and the minds of residents, i.e.
their potential votes. They want to develop personal networks with MAC members and
hope the latter will assist them when necessary. Through different social and cultural
activities, they have more chance to become prestigious. They also regard MACs as a
stepping-stone to cultivate closer relationships with citizens.
Personal interview with X on June 6,2003
205
Even some people argue that this strategy is not critical to elections, but it has influenced
on shaping the marginal votes, especially when the constituency in District Councils
elections is relatively small.
Finally, X won in the 2003 District C elections with a huge discrepancy of votes
with his competitor. He was astonished by this unexpected outcome, saying that the
result might be triggered by the political earthquake on July 1,2003. he belived tghat the
voters might be misled by the mass media and the tide of democray, which had negative
impact on the patriots. (FN: Personal interview on December 26, 2003)
From Councilor X's and MAC chairs' interviews, we find that patron-client
networks are very decisive in local-level elections because unlike the large
constituencies in LegCo direct elections, the connections between a District Councilor
and residents are very close. If their personal relations are undissatisfactory, the
candidate must find it difficult to win the election. Certainly, political ideology might
change the political culture of residents in a short period of time.
206
6.6 Heung Yee Kuk (HYK) and Patron-Client Politics
Figure 6.4
Institutional Privileges of Indigenous Inhabitants12
Legislative
Council
Through Heung Yee Kuk
Functional Constituency
Election Committee
(21 seats out of 800, responsible to
select the Chief Executive and
LegCo Councilors of
Election Committee)
Heung Yee Kuk
District Council
(Ex-Official membership)
Chairman and Vice-Chairman
Chairman
Rural Committee
Resident Representatives
Indigenous Inhabitant
Representatives
t
t
Candidates
Candidates
(Open to all residents of a given
village including
Indigenous Inhabitants)
(Indigenous Inhabitants only)
207
#
Resident Representative was a newly formed sector in 2003 opened to the non-indigenous villages.
Once a non-indigenous villager is elected as a Resident Representatives, he or she is qualified to
have all the institutional privileges as with an Indigenous Inhabitant Representatives. For more
details
of
the
eligibility
requirements
for
electors
and
candidates,
please
see
http://www.had.gov.hk/vre/eng/electors/index.html.
Parallel to MACs and district groups like the Tseung Kwan O Women Center, the
rural advisory HYK is actually a client of the HKSAR government. The government
confers upon various benefits, such as power, prestige, status and information on
governmental infrastructure development plans in the New Territories, to the HYK. In
return, the HYK is often expected to reciprocate by supporting government policy, such
as the controversial "double village heads elections" in 2002-2003.13
Figure 6.4 shows the institutional benefits of an indigenous inhabitant
representative in three ways. Firstly, if an indigenous inhabitant is elected as an
indigenous inhabitant representative and eventually directly elected by villagers as the
13
For an excellent discussion of the "double village heads elections," see Cheung Yat-fung,
"Modernization and Rural Politics in Hong Kong," unpublished MPhil thesis, Department of Politics and
Public Administration, University of Hong Kong, 2004.
208
Chair of the Rural Committee, then he or she is qualified to be the ex-official member of
both the HYK and the District Council. Therefore the competition in village elections is
usually fierce. As an indigenous District Council member claimed, "no one will give
you a vote if you have not offered benefits to the influential persons in a particular
village."15 Secondly, the Rural Committee's Chair is also a member of the HYK's
Executive Committee and he is qualified to be elected as LegCo's HYK functional
constituency member. This functional seat was created in 1991 on the basis of a British
counter-united front work against the PRC.16 Thirdly, as 21 seats are reserved for the
HYK members in the Election Committee, the HYK is politically influential upon
government policy because of the close relations between the clientelist HYK and its
patron Tung.
14
Personal interview with a high-level leader in a Rural Committee in New Territories West.
Personal interview with an unnamed District Council member in New Territories West on February 28,
2002 about the dispute over the "double village heads election."
16
Personal interview with a higher-level leader of HYK. He stated that the PRC intended to offer him a
National People's Congress membership. When the Chief Secretary, Sir David Ford, knew this move, he
tried to persuade the HYK leader not to accept China's appointment. Ford also told him that the Hong
Kong government would create a HYK functional constituency seat in LegCo as a means to exchange the
leader's decision of rejecting the NPC appointment.
15
209
6.7 The Cases of Chan Yat-sun and Lau Wong-fat: Clients of the Colonial
Government and the HKSAR Administration
In reality, the rise of Chan Yat-sun and Lau Wong-fat in rural politics demonstrate
the persistence of patron-client relations in the New Territories—a phenomenon
neglected by most local scholars studying rural development in Hong Kong. Chan
Yat-sun was the first generation of the influential landlord in the New Territories after
the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong in the Second World War. He helped the
colonial government to implement land resumption in many villages,receivingmonetary
rewards through property investments. In 1954, he became the chairman of the Tuen
Mun Rural Committee.17 Chan inherited another pro-government elite, Ho Chuen-yiu,
to become the HYK chairman from 1962 to 1964. Then Chan was elected as the HYK
chairman again from 1968 to 1978.18 He was coopted by the PRC government as a
CPPCC member in 1991. Because he was influential in the New Territories, some
17
See "The God Father of the New Territories: The Myth of Chan Yat-sun," Next Magazine, October 3,
2002,
102, pp. 94-99.
18
Territories Heung Yee Kuk 70* Anniversary's Special Collection (Hong Kong: Heung Yee
See New Territori
Kuk, 1996), pp. 6-7.
210
villagers called him the "godfather."19
The relationships between Chan and the colonial government was harmonious
especially during the period of urbanization in the New Territories from the 1960s to the
1970s. The government depended on Chan to stabilize the rural society and to conduct
land resumption. In the 1967 riots, Chan and some rural elites like Cheung Yan-lung and
Pang Fu-wah folly supported the colonial government. In 1968 he received a medal of
honor. In the 1970s, when the colonial regime developed Tuen Mun as one of the new
towns, Chan helped the colonial government to resume land from many farmers from So
Kwun Wat and Tai Lam Chung.20 Chan received first-hand information from the
colonial government prior to its rural development plans. His investment in the New
Territories brought about lucrative returns. After investing in the property market from
the 1970s to the 1990s, Chan's total assets were estimated at HK$486 million in 2002.21
Chan stepped down from the post of HYK chairman in 1978 as his relations with
19
"The Godfather of the New Territories: The Myth of Chan Yat-sun," Next Magazine, October 3, 2002,
p. 96.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
211
the colonial government turned sour. The post of HYK chairman was captured by Wong
Yuen-cheung in 1978, but Chan cultivated Lau Wong-fat to become the second
generation of the influential rural leader. The case of Chan showed that he was once the
client of the colonial administration. When the British abandoned him, Chan's status and
power declined. After the handover, however, Chan has become a target of cooptation
by the PRC. He advertised in newspapers in 2004 to support the NPC's interpretation of
the Basic Law to veto any idea of having direct election of the Chief Executive in 2007.
Lau Wong-fat was the second generation of the influential landlord. Both Chan and
Lau were from the Tuen Mun district, but the latter came from a family devoting itself to
agricultural development.22 In 1960, when Lau was 24 years old, he became a village
representative in Lung Kwu Tan village. From 1966 to 1972, he was elected as the
vice-chairman of the Tuen Mun Rural Committee. Lau became the HYK vice-chairman
in 1978-1980 and the chairman since 1980 as Chan retired. From 1985, Lau has become
a LegCo member representing the rural functional constituency.
22
"Lau Wong-fat's financial burden," Next Magazine, September 12,2002, pp. 46-54.
212
The relationships between Lau and the colonial government were harmonious. Like
Chan, Lau helped the colonial government and property developers to resume land from
villagers. In the late 1960s, Lau convinced villagers in Lung Kwu Tan to sell their
farmlands to the British administration. As a result, he obtained the full trust from the
colonial rulers.23 In the 1970s, China Lights and Power Company Limited planned to
build the Castle Peak Power Station near Lung Kwu Tan, while the Cheung Kong
Holdings wanted to build the Green Island Cement next to the power station. Lau
became a representative negotiating for the compensation paid to villagers. He also
bought agricultural and building land from many villagers, acquiring profits by selling
land to the government, the electricity company, and the property developers.24 Lau
therefore became an influential rural landlord.
Lau has encountered two major crises in the 2000s, including his personal financial
problems due to a rapid loss in his property investments, and the challenges from other
rural elites opposing the "double village heads election." His political foes include, for
example, Tang Siu-tong and horse-trainer Kan Ping-chee. In the early 1990s, Lau tried
23
24
Ibid.
Ibid.
213
to invest in properties on the Hong Kong Island and Kowloon.25 He earned much from
urban property investments before 1997 due to the economic boom. But after the Asian
financial crisis in 1998, his assets plummeted and he lost about HK$54 million.26 Lau
needed to sell one of his land in Tuen Mun to reduce his loss. However, since Lau
staunchly defended the "double village heads election" introduced by the Tung
government, he was re-elected as HYK chairman easily without any opponent. It
appears that his patron, the HKSAR government, implicitly supports Lau even though
his background has been viewed as controversial and problematic. The Lau case shows
that as long as the patron, the government, relies on his support of controversial policy,
such as the "double village heads election," Lau remains a useful target of political
cooptation. From the perspective of realpolitik, Lau's political utility can be translated
into rural support of the government. As with Chan, Lau has filled the HYK with their
clients or political supporters, thus increasing their bargaining ability vis-a-vis the
colonial and post-colonial governments. Patronage politics thus has become widespread
at the village level, including rural advisory body HYK.
25
26
Ibid.
Ibid.
214
6.8 Summary
Local politics in the HKSAR, notably District Council elections and grassroots
politics at the MAC and village levels, is characterized by the proliferation of
patron-client relations and personal networks. Although the 2003 District Councils
elections envisaged a decline in the influence of patron-client relations and a
corresponding increase in the influence of political ideology such as democracy,
patron-client networks still persist at the MAC level, village leadership dynamics and the
electoral mobilization of voters by the pro-Beijing agents such as the Tseung Kwan O
Women Center. If patron-client politics has become prominent in the HKSAR's
grassroots-level personnel arrangements and institutions, such as MACs and HYK, this
phenomenon will be unlikely fade away in the foreseeable future.
215
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 The significances of patron-client relations in the election
This thesis proves that patron-client relations are indispensable to all levels of Hong
Kong's election, including the elections held for the Chief Executive, Legislative
Council, District Councils, grassroots level institutions such as MACs, HYK and
pro-Beijing district groups. Patron-client relations have varying degree of significances
in these four levels of elections. Patron-client network plays a critical role in Chief
Executive election. However, patron-client relations tend to assume a lesser importance
in Legislative Council's direct elections because of the larger geographical
constituencies, although ren-ch'ing and guanxi are still crucial in the candidates'
campaign for functional constituencies election.
216
At the grassroots level, clientelism is crucial for political party members to
penetrate housing groups, such as MACs and OCs. Due to the fact that the geographical
constituencies in District Council elections are smaller than LegCo's direct elections,
patron-client politics tends to be a decisive factor shaping candidates' chances of
electoral victory at the district level. Though the 2003 District Council elections saw a
decline in the impact of patron-client relations, patronage politics still persists in MACs,
HYK and pro-Beijing group mobilization of voter registration in the 2004 LegCo's
direct elections. In short, patron-client relations are particularly prominent in CE election,
LegCo's functional constituency elections and party infiltration into housing
organizations at the grassroots level.
If patron-client politics exist in CE election, we can anticipate that if the Election
Committee composition is widened further, it will be more difficult for both patron
Beijing and her agents to control the electoral process. Clearly patron Beijing can
manipulate the political orientation of her supporters, but patronage politics has its limits.
Such limitations are caused by the independent mind of voters and their political
ideology. The most prominent constraint is the size of the constituency. The larger the
size, the lesser the impact of patron-client relations.
217
From a comparative perspective, the case of Hong Kong proves a universal
phenomenon, namely patron-client politics that exist in many developing and even
developed countries. However, there are Chinese features in the Hong Kong version of
patron-client relations: guanxi and ren-ch 'ing tend to color the operation of proliferation
patron-client networks. Guanxi implies a reciprocal relationship whereas ren-ch'ing
embraces friendship, mutual assistance, obligations, and human affections. Arguably,
guanxi and ren-ch 'ing reinforce the operation and smooth functioning of patron-client
politics in Hong Kong, as this phenomenon could be seen particularly in the CE
elections and grassroots-level politics.
7.2 Scott's Features of Patron-Client Politics and the Hong Kong Case
The Hong Kong case also proves the validity of the three features of patron-client
relations as delineated by James Scott. It is not difficult for us to prove Scott's assertion
that patron-client relations after entail the element of inequality, namely patrons offering
goods and services to clients who need them for survival. Perhaps survival is a serious
word in Scott's formulation. Yet, the Hong Kong case does prove that patrons often
218
have more power and services, such as Tung's government granting land to Shaw's
TVB and allowing Richard Li to develop the cyberport. Second, the patron does have
face-to-face contacts with the clients, as this can be shown in the CE election in which
Tung had to "campaign" or lobby for the support of the 400 EC members in 1996 and of
the 800 members in 2002. Face-to-face contacts are also a must regarding a district
politician's relations with the voters. My Chapter on District Councils elections and the
role of the grassroots institutions like MACs and pro-Beijing district groups illustrate the
need for face-to-face encounters between patrons and clients. Finally, there is diffuse
flexibility in patron-client relations as Scott asserts. Patrons cultivate relations with
clients through multiple means, such as friendship, personal connections, exchange of
benefits and family ties. Choi So-yuk's emphasis on her Fujianese clan connections in
electoral victory was a case in point. Similarly, the EC members who voted for Tung in
his second term also expected concrete exchange in benefits, a pragmatic consideration
of voters.
In short, the Hong Kong example tends to reinforce Scott's observations. Moreover,
as Scott argues, when economic development reaches a higher stage, other inducements
of political party support tend to come from policy concerns and ideology rather than
219
material benefits. The Hong Kong case proves that many educated and middle-class
voters appear to attach more importance to political ideology rather than material or
non-material benefits in the patron-client network. The result of the 2003 District
Councils elections illustrated the limitation of patron-client politics in Hong Kong,
where political ideology oscillates from time to time and where voters' considerations
also evolve over time.
Another important insight of Scott is that the greater the competitive electoral
pressure, the wider the distribution of material inducements is likely to be. Again, the
Hong Kong case proves that as electoral competition is fierce, the distribution of
material inducements is wider. The case of the Tseung Kwan O Women Centre proves
that it did not try to expand its women activities to benefit the constituents so as to
prepare for the September 2004 LegCo's direct elections. But due to the Center's
ignorance of the legal implications of falsifying the signatures of voters, it ran into
trouble in May 2004. In any case, James Scott's theory and insights all be substantiated
in my case study of Hong Kong.
220
7.3 The Past, Present and Future of Patron-Client Politics in Hong Kong
Patron-client relations existed in Hong Kong under British rule in the forms of
cooptation, political appointments and the bestowing of medals of honors. This pattern
persists in the HKSAR but with a wider impact; patron-client networks mushroom at all
levels of elections as I have argued. In the foreseeable future, patron-client relations may
generate crises and opportunities for the HKSAR.
First and foremost, if patron-client relations deepen in the HKSAR government, a
huge communication gap between the rulers and the ruled persists, resulting in repeated
protests. The massive protests by half a million people on July 1,2003 and July 1, 2004
were alarming signs of political decay. The phenomena also reflected the public anger at
the seriousness of patronage politics. To arrest the trend of incessant protests, the ruling
elites may have to reduce the saliency of patron-client relations by appointing
pro-democracy "trouble-makers" into the various advisory committees or bodies. A new
style of cooptation will be needed to maintain the political stability of the HKSAR. If
not, more people will be alienated by salient patron-client relations at the top level of
government appointments and the outcome will continue to be street protests. More
221
importantly, if the network of patronage is too narrow and focuses on all the pro-Beijing
elites, a confrontational relationship between the excluded elites and masses on the one
hand and the ruling pro-Beijing elites will likely the outcome.
Second, patron-client politics, if tolerated for a long time and if developed without
checks, may degenerate into corruption. Fortunately, so far the ICAC can check
public-sector and private-sector corruption in the HKSAR. But the anti-graft agency will
likely encounter a huge challenge if patron-client network proliferates from the top to
the bottom, ranging from the Chief Executive elections to the village politics at the
grassroots level. While the manpower and resources of the ICAC appear to be
over-stretched, its vigilant attitude toward machine politics and corruption will be
critical to the relatively clean society and polity in the HKSAR.
In the final analysis, as patron-client network expands in Hong Kong's elections at
all levels, the ethical conduct of all politicians and individuals concerned will be critical.
In the past several years, the codes of conduct regarding District Councilors and
Principal Officials, like the car scandal concerning former Financial Secretary Anthony
Leung, were instituted and highlighted respectively. However, the reality is that some
222
local politicians tend to take the political risk of accepting bribes and benefits that are
regarded as corruption by the law. If some politicians and individual citizens do not
observe their conduct ethically, the trap for them to fall into corruption will persist.
Regardless of whether patron-client relations will exert more negative impact on
Hong Kong politics, one thing is certain. Patron-client politics has become more
prominent and visible in the HKSAR than ever before. Perhaps since the retrocession in
1997, the political arena of Hong Kong has become more imbued with the mainland
Chinese characteristics of guanxi and ren-ching than ever before. While this
phenomenon has been ignored by many political observers studying Hong Kong, it is
high time for us to re-evaluate the significance and perhaps the long-term impact of
patron-client relations on the rapidly changing political landscape of Hong Kong.
223
Appendix I
Methodological Appendix1
This thesis adopts three types of research methods, namely, self-administered
questionnaires survey, interviews, and observations, designed in line with the framework
of this thesis proving that the framework is valid.
Self-administered questionnaires survey
S Individual—an exit poll survey is conducted at King Lam Estate Polling
Station,Tseung Kwan O District, on November 22,2003.
^ Group—questionnaires are issued to ALL the District Councilors elected in 1999
District Council direct election.
Face-to-face interview
S Individual—personal interviews are conducted to several local activists and leaders,
Legislative Councilors, District Councilors, and members of Rural Committees,
Heung Yee Kuk, OCs, MACs and local organizations. To secure their personal
privacy, this thesis will not disclose the names of the interviewees unless few of
them accepted to do so.
Observation
V On the street observations are conducted, and also occasionally participated in both
district-level work and campaign activities.
Reliability and validity of the data
Some of the data will compare with data from other resources to seek intersubjectivity in
order to consolidate the reliability and validity of the surveys.
1
For detailed discussion of social research methods, please see Babbie, Earl R., The practice of social
research, (Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1986), and Baker, Therese L., Doing social research, (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1988.)
224
Appendix 2: The Power and Function of the Chief Executive
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Article 43
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the head of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall represent the Region.
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be accountable
to the Central People's Government and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in
accordance with the provisions of this law.
Article 44
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be a Chinese
citizen of not less than 40 years of age who is a permanent resident of the Region with no
right of abode in any foreign country and has ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a
continuous period of not less than 20 years.
Article 45
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by
election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's
Government.
The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual
situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the
principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief
225
Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating
committee in accordance with democratic procedures.
The specific method for selecting the Chief Executive is prescribed in Annex 1; "Method for
the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region".
Article 46
The term of office of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall be five years. He or she may serve for not more than two consecutive terms.
Article 47
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must be a person of
integrity, dedicated to his or her duties.
The Chief Executive, on assuming office, shall declare his or her assets to the Chief Justice
of the Court of Final Appeal of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. This
declaration shall be put on record.
Article 48
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
(1 )
To lead the government of the Region;
l1 \
Trv ho rocrmncihlfi fnr the imr.lomontatir.n nf +hic I ovm anH n+hor lavwc urfvi-h in
226
(3)
To sign bills passed by the Legislative Council and to promulgate laws;
To sign budgets passed by the Legislative Council and report the budgets and
final accounts to the Central People's Government for the record;
(4 )
To decide on government policies and to issue executive orders;
(5)
To nominate and to report to the Central People's Government for appointment
the following principal officials: Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of
Departments, Directors of Bureaux, Commissioner Against Corruption,
Director of Audit, Commissioner of Police, Director of Immigration and
Commissioner of Customs and Excise; and to recommend to the Central
People's Government the removal of the above-mentioned officials;
(6 )
To appoint or remove judges of the courts at all levels in accordance with legal
procedures;
(7)
To appoint or remove holders of public office in accordance with legal
procedures;
(8)
To implement the directives issued by the Central People's Government in
respect of the relevant matters provided for in this Law;
(9 )
To conduct, on behalf of the Government of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, external affairs and other affairs as authorized by the
Central Authorities;
(10)
To approve the introduction of motions regarding revenues or expenditure to
the Legislative Council;
(11)
To decide, in the light of security and vital public interests, whether government
officials or other personnel in charge of government affairs should testify or
give evidence before the Legislative Council or its committees;
(12 )
To pardon persons convicted of criminal offences or commute their penalties;
227
and
(13 )
To handle petitions and complaints.
Article 49
If the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region considers that a bill
passed by the Legislative Council is not compatible with the overall interests of the Region,
he or she may return it to the Legislative Council within three months for reconsideration. If
the Legislative Council passes the original bill again by not less than a two-thirds majority
of all the members, the Chief Executive must sign and promulgate it within one month, or
act in accordance with the provisions of Article 50 of this Law.
Article 50
If the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region refuses to sign a bill
passed the second time by the Legislative Council, or the Legislative Council refuses to
pass a budget or any other important bill introduced by the government, and if consensus
still cannot be reached after consultations, the Chief Executive may dissolve the Legislative
Council.
The Chief Executive must consult the Executive Council before dissolving the Legislative
Council. The Chief Executive may dissolve the Legislative Council only once in each term
of his or her office.
Article 51
If the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region refuses to pass
the budget introduced by the government, the Chief Executive may apply to the Legislative
228
Council for provisional appropriations. If appropriation of public funds cannot be approved
because the Legislative Council has already been dissolved, the Chief Executive may,
prior to the election of the new Legislative Council, approve provisional short-term
appropriations according to the level of expenditure of the previous fiscal year.
Article 52
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region must resign under
any of the following circumstances:
(1 )
When he or she loses the ability to discharge his or her duties as a result of
serious illness or other reasons;
(2 )
When, after the Legislative Council is dissolved because he or she twice refuses
to sign a bill passed by it, the new Legislative Council again passes by a
two-thirds majority of all the members the original bill in dispute, but he or she still
refuses to sign it; and
(3)
When, after the Legislative Council is dissolved because it refuses to pass a
budget or any other important bill, the new Legislative Council still refuses to pass
the original bill in dispute.
Article 53
If the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is not able to
discharge his or her duties for a short period, such duties shall temporarily be assumed by
the Administrative Secretary, Financial Secretary or Secretary of Justice in this order of
precedence.
In the event that the office of Chief Executive becomes vacant, a new Chief Executive shall
229
be selected within six months in accordance with the provisions of Article 45 of this Law.
During the period of vacancy, his or her duties shall be assumed according to the
provisions of the preceding paragraph.
Article 54
The Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be an organ
for assisting the Chief Executive in policy-making.
Article 55
Members of the Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
be appointed by the Chief Executive from among the principal officials of the executive
authorities, members of the Legislative Council and public figures. Their appointment or
removal shall be decided by the Chief Executive. The term of office of members of the
Executive Council shall not extend beyond the expiry of the term of office of the Chief
Executive who appoints them.
Members of the Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
be Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the Region with no right of abode in
any foreign country.
The Chief Executive may, as he or she deems necessary, invite other persons concerned
to sit in on meetings of the Council.
Article 56
The Executive Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be presided
over by the Chief Executive.
230
Except for the appointment, removal and disciplining of officials and the adoption of
measures in emergencies, the Chief Executive shall consult the Executive Council before
making important policy decisions, introducing bills to the Legislative Council, making
subordinate legislation, or dissolving the Legislative Council.
If the Chief Executive does not accept a majority opinion of the Executive Council, he or
she shall put the specific reasons on record.
Article 57
A Commission Against Corruption shall be established in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region. It shall function independently and be accountable to the Chief
Executive.
Article 58
A Commission of Audit shall be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. It shall function independently and be accountable to the Chief Executive.
A Commission of Audit shall be established in the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region. It shall function independently and be accountable to the Chief Executive.
Source: http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/c-index.htm.
231
Appendix 3: The Power and Function of the Legislative Council
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Article 66
The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be the legislature
of the Region.
Article 67
The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of
Chinese citizens who are permanent residents of the Region with no right of abode in any foreign
country. However, permanent residents of the Region who are not of Chinese nationality or who
have the right of abode in foreign countries may also be elected members of the Legislative
Council of the Region, provided that the proportion of such members does not exceed 20 percent
of the total membership of the Council.
Article 68
The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by
election.
The method for forming the Legislative Council shall be specified in the light of the actual situation
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual
and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all the members of the Legislative
Council by universal suffrage.
The specific method for forming the Legislative Council and its procedures for voting on bills and
motions are prescribed in Annex II: "Method for the Formation of the Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Its Voting Procedures".
232
Article 69
The term of office of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Reg ton shall
be four years, except the first term which shall be two years.
Article 70
If the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is dissolved by the
Chief Executive in accordance with the provisions of this Law, it must, within three months, be
reconstituted by election in accordance with Article 68 of this Law.
Article 71
The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
elected by and from among the members of the Legislative Council.
The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
a Chinese citizen of not less than 40 years of age, who is a permanent resident of the Region with
no right of abode in any foreign country and has ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous
period of not less than 20 years.
Article 72
The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
exercise the following powers and functions:
(1 )
To preside over meetings;
(2)
To decide on the agenda, giving priority to government bills for inclusion in the agenda;
233
( 3)
To decide on the time of meetings;
(4)
To call special sessions during the recess;
( 5)
To call emergency sessions on the request of the Chief Executive; and
(6 )
To exercise other powers and functions as prescribed in the rules of procedure of the
Legislative Council.
Article 73
The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall exercise the
following powers and functions;
(1 )
To enact, amend or repeal laws in accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal
procedures;
(2 )
To examine and approve budgets introduced by the government;
(3)
To approve taxation and public expenditure;
(4 )
To receive and debate the policy addresses of the Chief Executive;
(5)
To raise questions on the work of the government;
(6)
To debate any issue concerning public interests;
(7)
To endorse the appointment and removal of the judges of the Court of Final Appeal and
the Chief Judge of the High Court;
(8)
To receive and handle complaints from Hong Kong residents;
( 9)
If a motion initiated jointly by one-fourth of all the members of the Legislative Council
charges the Chief Executive with serious breach of law or dereliction of duty and if he or
she refuses to resign, the Council may, after passing a motion for investigation, give a
234
mandate to the Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal to form and chair an
independent investigation committee. The committee shall be responsible for carrying out
the investigation and reporting its findings to the Council. If the committee considers the
evidence sufficient to substantiate such charges, the Council may pass a motion of
impeachment by a two-thirds majority of all its members and report it to the Central
People's Government for decision; and
(10 ) To summon, as required when exercising the above-mentioned powers and functions,
persons concerned to testify or give evidence.
Article 74
Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may
introduce bills in accordance with the provisions of this Law and legal procedures. Bills which do
not relate to public expenditure or political structure or the operation of the government may be
introduced individually or jointly by members of the Council. The written consent of the Chief
Executive shall be required before bills relating to government polices are introduced.
Article 75
The quorum for the meeting of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region shall be not less than one half of all its members.
The rules of procedure of the Legislative Council shall be made by the Council on its own,
provided that they do not contravene this Law.
Article 76
235
A bill passed by the Legislative council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may take
effect only after it is signed and promulgated by the Chief Executive.
Article 77
Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be
immune from legal action in respect of their statements at meetings of the Council.
Article 78
Members of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall not be
subjected to arrest when attending or on their way to a meeting of the Council.
Article 79
The President of the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall
declare that a member of the Council is no longer qualified for the office under any of the
following circumstances:
( 1 ) When he or she loses the ability to discharge his or her duties as a result of serious illness
or other reasons;
( 2 ) When he or she, with no valid reason, is absent from meetings for three consecutive
months without the consent of the President of the Legislative Council;>
( 3 ) When he or she loses or renounces his or her status as a permanent resident of the
Region;
( 4 ) When he or she accepts a government appointment and becomes a public servant;
( 5 ) When he or she is bankrupt or fails to comply with a court order to repay debts;
236
( 6)
When he or she is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for one month or more for a
criminal offence committed within or outside the Region and is relieved of his or her duties
by a motion passed by two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Council present, and
( 7 ) When he or she is censured for misbehaviour or breach of oath by a vote of two-thirds of
the members of the Legislative Council present.
Source: http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/c-index.htrn.
237
Appendix 4: The Power and Function of the Legislative Council
Functions of a District Council
The functions of a District Council are (a) to advise the Government (i)
on matters affecting the well-being of the people in the District; and
(ii) on the provision and use of public facilities and services within the District; and
(iii) on the adequacy and priorities of Government programmes for the District; and
(iv) on the use of public funds allocated to the District for local public works and community
activities; and
(b) where funds are made available for the purpose, to undertake (i) environmental improvements within the District;
(ii) the promotion of recreational and cultural activities within the District; and
(iii) community activities within the District.
Source: http://www.had.gov.hk/en/public_services/district_administration/dbmain.htm.
238
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