Norms,culture,and worldpolitics:
insightsfromsociology's
institutionalismMarthaFinnemore
Meyer,and Associates,eds. 1994.Institutional
W. RichardScott,JohnWV.
and Individualism.
Complexity
Structural
and Organizations:
Environment
ThousandOaks, Calif.:Sage Publications.
George M. Thomas,JohnW. Meyer,Francisco0. Ramirez,and JohnBoli,
State,Society,and theIndiConstituting
Structure:
eds. 1987.Institutional
vidual.NewburyPark,Calif.:Sage Publications.
New York:
AlbertBergesen,ed. 1980.StudiesoftheModem World-System.
AcademicPress.
interestedin norms
Internationalrelationsscholarshave become increasingly
and othersocial
culture,identity,
understandings,
of behavior,intersubjective
largelyhave been carried
featuresof politicallife.However,our investigations
isolation.We tend to treatour argumentsthatthese things
out in disciplinary
"matter"as discoveriesand researchinto social phenomena as foraysinto
However,scholarswithinthe fieldsof internationallaw,
unchartedterritory.
and sociologyhave alwaysknownthat social realities
history,anthropology,
influencebehavior,and each fieldhas incorporatedthese social constructions
in different
waysintoresearchprograms.
Sociologistsworkingin organizationtheoryhave developed a particularly
powerfulsetofargumentsabouttherolesofnormsand culturein international
lifethatpose directchallengesto realistand liberaltheoriesin politicalscience.
Their argumentslocate causal forcein an expandingand deepeningWestern
world culture that emphasizes Weberian rationalityas the means to both
This essay benefitedgreatlyfromcommentsby Michael Barnett,JohnBoli, BarryBuzan, Eva
Buzsa, Lynn Eden, Ann Florini, Elizabeth Kier, FriedrichKratochwil,JeffLegro, Jonathan
James
Mercer,JohnMeyer,JohnOdell, RichardPrice,Thomas Risse-Kappen,VolkerRittberger,
N. Rosenau, ScottSagan,Yasemin Soysal,David Strang,Nina Tannenwald,HongyingWang,Steve
Weber, AlexanderWendt,and frommaterialsupportby the Social Science Research Council/
MacArthurFoundationProgramon Peace and Securityin a ChangingWorld.
IntemationalOrganization
50, 2, Spring1996,pp. 325-47
? 1996byThe 10 Foundationand the MassachusettsInstituteof Technology
326 InternationalOrganization
justice, definedas equality,and progress,definedas wealth accumulation.
These worldculturalrules constituteactors-includingstates,organizations,
and individuals-and definelegitimateor desirablegoals forthemto pursue.
World culturalnormsalso produce organizationaland behavioralsimilarities
across the globe that are not easily explained by traditionalparadigmsin
political science. Because theycall these culturalnormsand rules "institubythoseworkingwithin
tions,"theapproachhas been named "institutionalist"
it.
and explores
This essayprovidesan overviewof sociology'sinstitutionalism
itsimplicationsforthe studyofworldpolitics.At theoutsetit shouldbe noted
ways than do
that sociologistsuse the term "institution"in very different
emphasizingthe social
rational-choicescholarsor historicalinstitutionalists,
ratherthan structuraland constraining
and cognitivefeaturesof institutions
mean thatdespitesimilaritiesin labelfeatures.Incommensurabledefinitions
ing,these approaches-all called institutionalist-havelittlein common.In
or the
fact,rational-choicescholarsworkingon positivetheoriesof institutions
at all in the sociological
economicsare not institutionalists
new institutional
sense (and viceversa).1
should interestinternationalrelations (IR)
Sociology's institutionalism
scholarsin politicalscience forseveralreasons. First,it challengesdominant
paradigmsin political science directly.It providesa system-leveltheoretic
withwhichto analyzeinternationalpoliticsand generatestestable
framework
hypothesesabout internationalbehaviorthat competewiththose of realism
and liberalism.These hypothesespredictsimilaritiesin behaviorcaused by
in
commonglobalculture,whererealismor liberalismwouldexpectdifferences
interests.The fact that
situatedactorswithdifferent
behaviorby differently
explore their hypotheseswith data-intensivequantitative
institutionalists
methodsnotusuallyassociatedwithworkon normsand culturein IR butmuch
admired by skepticsof cultural argumentsintensifiesthe institutionalists'
challenge. Explanatoryclaims made by realists and liberals must address
iftheyare to be persuasive.
institutionalist
alternatives
institutionalist
argumentsspeak directlyto a numberof theoretical
Second,
outsidethe confinesof the neorealist-neoliberal
developed
approachesbeing
concernsabout
debate thathas dominatedU.S. IR scholarship.Institutionalist
the expansionof Westernworldcultureare sharedbyEnglishschool scholars
the expansion of the West and the nature of what theyhave
investigating
termedinternationalsociety.2Institutionalists'
argumentsalso lead them to
investigateglobalizingphenomena and the growingpower of individualsin
waysthatinvitecomparisonwiththe workof JamesRosenau, Michael Ziirn,
1. Jepperson 1991 provides an excellent discussion of the sociological understandingof
see DiMaggio
For comparisonsof the variousinstitutionalisms,
and institutionalism.
institutions
and Powell 1991; and Hall and Taylor1994.
2. See Bull 1977;Bull and Watson1984; Gong 1984; and Buzan 1993.
Institutionalism327
Ernst Otto Czempiel, and Philip Cerny.3Both the English school and
treat these
globalizationscholarsmay quarrel withthe way institutionalists
withthe sweeping
phenomena.Englishschool scholarsmaybe uncomfortable
of the sociologists'arguments.Those interestedin the
powerand determinism
processof globalizationand individuationmaybe put offby the institutionalists' claim that this process happens in conjunctionwith,ratherthan at the
can
But in both cases these differences
expenseof,increasingstate authority.
throughcoordinatedresearch.
and shouldbe settledempirically
argumentsin political
Third,while it sharessome featuresof constructivist
richer
and moredetailed
much
providesa
science,sociology'sinstitutionalism
Sociologistsspecifythesubstanthanhas constructivism.
theoreticalframework
more
than simplyargue that social
They
do
tive contentof social structure.
structureis. Institutionalists'
the
social
what
tell
us
they
structurematters;
as having particular
social
structure)
culture
(the
of
world
specification
Westernand Weberiancomponentshas yieldedhypothesesthatcan be tested
empirically;indeed, theyalreadyhave been tested in the large and growing
researchprogram.
institutionalist
specificationof social structureis global and
Further,the institutionalists'
all-encompassing.It permeates all aspects of political and social life in all
states. Political science research on norms and culture has tended to be
structuredaround specificissue-areas and thereforeargues that particular
have not made an
norms matterin particularissue-areas. Constructivists
integratedargumentabout how the various norms in differentareas fit
together.This lack maybe a legacyof regimesscholarship,whichprovidedthe
formuchearlyresearchon norms,since regimeswere
theoreticalframework
Withoutsuch an argumentabout the contentof a
by definition.4
issue-specific
cannot provide an alternativeto
systemicsocial structure,constructivism
systemictheories.The sociologistsclaim to have done this.As I will discuss
in politicalscience have reason to be concernedabout
below, constructivists
butbecause thesociologitheirclaims-not because theyare beingoutflanked,
and researchprogrammarginalizepolitics.
cal specification
incorporatesand endogenizeshistorical
Fourth,sociology'sinstitutionalism
changes ratherthan abstractingfromthem. The focus of most realist and
liberalIR scholarsis on developinggeneralizedprinciplesof interactionthat
applyregardlessof timeand place. Theiremphasisis on thewaysin which,for
example,Thucydides'politicsare like those of Metternich,whichare in turn
like thoseof HenryKissinger.The emphasisis on whatis the same overtime,
Historicalchangecreatesanomaliesin theseanalyses;itis
notwhatis different.
are interestedin developinggeneralizations
not partof them.Institutionalists
about historicalchange.They emphasizethe ways in whichstates' goals and
behaviorand even theirverynaturesare deeplyshaped by prevalentpolitical
3. See Rosenau 1990;Zurn 1995; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; and Cerny1995.
4. Krasner1983,1.
328 InternationalOrganization
ideas and social norms of a given time in history.Further,they offeran
argument,
albeita sketchyone, about thedynamicsof thischange.
Finally,institutionalist
argumentsabout global culture bear directlyon
recentpolicydebates. Rather than a "clash of civilizations"emergingas the
fundamentaldynamicoffutureworldpolitics,institutionalist
researchprovides
powerfulevidence of global culturalhomogenization.5
Scholars may quarrel
about how to operationalizecivilizationand culture-indeed, theyare already
have both an argumentand evidence to
doing so-but institutionalists
contributeto this-debate. They are less clear, however,about what cultural
homogenizationimpliesfor global order and stability.I returnto this issue
below.
The firstsectionof thisarticleprovidesa briefoverviewof institutionalist
argumentsand theirresearchprogram.To clarifythe natureand implications
of these arguments,I contrastthemwithothersbetterknownto American
has structural
politicalscientists.While sociology'sinstitutionalism
similarities
to ImmanuelWallerstein'sapproachand sharessubstantiveinterestswiththe
English school, it is fundamentallydifferentfrom both and from other
argumentspoliticalscientistshave encountered.6
The second halfof thisarticleexploresthe implicationsof the sociological
allowsus to
approachforpoliticalscienceresearch.Sociology'sinstitutionalism
ask questionsabout featuresofinternational
politicsthatare assumedawayby
otherparadigms.However,some of the answersit providesare not likelyto
about
politicalscientists.The articlecloses withsome recommendations
satisfy
ways in which politicalscientistscan engage and challenge the sociological
approachthatmightbenefitbothdisciplines.
Overviewofsociology'sinstitutionalism
Culture and organizations
Institutionalist
argumentsdate fromthemid-1970swhena groupat Stanford
Universityinterestedin cross-nationalanalyses of political and economic
change began to explore the relationshipbetween formal organizational
and culture.7Prevailingtheoriesabout bureaucraciesand organizastructures
tions held that,indeed, culturehad littleimpacton those entities.In fact,
formalbureaucraticorganizationscomprisedthe antithesisof culture;they
were technical,rational, and thereforeculture-neutral.They transcended
culture.
5. See Huntington1993; Ajami 1993; Bartley1993; Binyan1993; Kirkpatrick,
Weeks, and Piel
1993; and Mahbubani1993.
6. See Wallerstein1974a; 1974b;and 1980.
7. For a good discussionof the intellectualroots of institutionalanalysissee DiMaggio and
Powell 1991.
Institutionalism329
The Stanfordgroupchallengedthatview.Prevailingtheoriesexplainedthe
rise,form,and spreadofformalbureaucraticorganizationsin functionalterms.
FollowingMax Weber,theconventionalwisdomheldthatrationalizedbureauway to coordinatethe
and effective
craticstructureswere the most efficient
complexrelationsinvolvedin moderntechnicalwork.Expandingmarketsand
complexmanagementtasks.Bureautechnologicalchangescreateincreasingly
craticorganizationalformsmustalso thenexpandto coordinatetheseactivities
acrossmoreand moreaspectsofsociety.Bureaucraticorganizationwas seen as
the only way to divide labor, specifyresponsibilities,and institutionalize
ways.
coordinationand decisionmakingin rationaland efficient
The problemwiththisviewwas thatbureaucraticorganizationshave spread
even morequicklythanthemarketsand technologythatwere thoughtto have
createdthe need forthem.Cross-nationalanalysesof politicaland economic
change,especiallyin the developingworld,made it abundantlyclear thatthe
worldwas beingbureaucratizedand organizedmuchfasterthan it was being
Further,the linkbetweenformal
developed economicallyor technologically.8
organizationalstructure-theblueprintforhowthebureaucracyis supposedto
function-and the organization'sday-to-dayactivitieswas oftenveryloose.
analysesOrganizationtheoristshad recognizedthisearlier,butcross-national
especiallythose dealingwithdevelopingcountries-underscoredthe point.If
then
bureaucraciesdo notact accordingto theirrationalizedformalstructures,
of rational formalstructurecannot be the reason for their
the efficiency
proliferation.
The alternativeexplanationdevelopedbyMeyerand his colleaguesemphaof these organizations.Formal bureaucraticstructures
sized the environment
coordinatorsof
did notspread as a resultof theirfunctionalvirtuesas efficient
complex relationships(they may or may not be so) but because the wider
environment
supportsand legitimizesrationalbureaucracyas a social good.
and havetheformtheydo notbecause theyare
Organizationsexist,proliferate,
butbecause theyare externally
legitimated.9
efficient
This is the entrypointforculture.The contentof thisexternalenvironment
is cultural.The social values thatsupportand legitimatesome organizational
formsand notothers,some social activitiesand notothers,are culturalvalues.
Culturehad gottena bad name in sociologyformanyofthesame reasonsitgot
self-described
a bad name in political science. Part of the institutionalists'
One way theydo thisis to
missionis to reclaimcultureformacrosociology.10
make dominant Western culture the object of their study and thus to
denaturalizefeaturesofsocial lifethatappear naturaland inevitableto mostof
8. The studiesin Meyerand Hannan 1979pointto thisconclusion.
9. The seminalessayoutliningthisargumentis Meyerand Rowan 1977.Earlyapplicationsofthe
contextscan be foundin Meyerand Hannan 1979.
argumentin cross-national
10. Thomas et al. 1987,7.
330 InternationalOrganization
us because thisis our own culture.We are so deeplyembeddedin it thatit is
hardto see beyondit.
is not an unproblematicattributeof bureaucratic
Western-style
rationality
organizations,as mostorganizationtheoristsassume. Rationalityis a cultural
and progressand othercultural"goods"
value. It is associatedwithmodernity
of contemporarysocial life. Ironically,people create rational bureaucratic
organizationsforotherthanrationalreasons.When facedwithsocial workto
be done, people forma committeeor create a bureaucracybecause it is the
appropriatesociallysanctionedwayto addressa social task;it is "the thingto
do." We continueto formcommitteesand bureaucracieseven when we are
skeptical about their effectiveness,indeed, even as we deride them as
ineffective
and useless in public and politicaldiscourse.1"There is an almost
ceremonialaspect to bureaucraticorganizationin modernlife. Bureaucratic
withit is "ceremony"in theinstitutionrationality
is "myth"and conformance
alistview.12
Since JohnMeyerand Brian Rowan's articulationof the basic argumentthat externalculturallegitimationratherthan task demands or functional
needs explains much if not most of organizationalbehavior-institutional
argupaths empirically.The institutionalist
analyseshave followeddifferent
ment is not necessarilyinternationalin nature,and much of the work and
subsequenttheorizinghavebeen done byscholarslookingat nationaland even
have mapped normativeand
very localized phenomena.13Institutionalists
thatshape the behaviorof organizationsin professions
culturalenvironments
in
such as mentalhealth,in the arts and culture,in municipalgovernments,
and in the creationof whole businesssectors.14
Hownationalgovernments,
ever,Meyerand his colleagues have continuedtheirinterestin cross-national
and global phenomena. In fact, the logic of the argumentthat cultural
environments
operateon organizationsat all levelssuggeststhatlocal environmentsare alwaysembedded in largernationalor transnationalones. Thus, if
one were to push institutionalist
scholarsinvestigating
localized organizational
behaviorto specifythe originsor dynamicsof theirlocal environments,
they
would have to look ultimately
to global phenomenaof the kindMeyerand his
colleagues investigate.In this substantivesense, the global institutionalist
argumentsforma backdropfortheothersand logicallysubsumethem.It is this
international-level
argumentthat challengesIR scholarsin politicalscience
mostdirectlyand is thefocusof thisessay.
11. For an explorationof thisparadox in the contextof effortsto reformU.S. governmental
see Marchand Olsen 1989,especiallychap. 5.
bureaucracyoverthepast century,
12. Meyerand Rowan 1977emphasizethisin theirtitle.
13. Amongthosewho have been particularly
influential
are authorscontributing
to Powell and
worksincludeScott1981; Meyerand Scott1983; and Scottet al.
DiMaggio 1991.Otherinfluential
1994.
14. See Meyer 1994; DiMaggio 1988; McNeely 1993; Tolbertand Zucker 1983; Dobbin 1994;
Suchman1994;and Dobbin 1992.
Institutionalism331
The contentand consequences of the
world cultural environment
see expandingacrossand integrating
The worldculturethatinstitutionalists
literaturecontainsno
theglobe is a Westernculture.Althoughinstitutionalist
singleextendeddiscussionof eithertheoriginsor thecontentofglobalculture,
thefollowingpictureemergesfromseveralsourcesoftencitedbyinstitutionalIt has its originsin Western Christendomand Western
ist researchers.15
capitalism and has spread as the West has expanded economicallyand
politically.In doingso it has bureaucratized,marketized,and individuatedthe
worldin waysthatare not expectedor easilyexplainedbyothersocial science
In fact,Meyerarguesthattheexpansivenatureofitsideologiesand
arguments.
featureof Westernculturewithrootsin medieval
cultureis itselfa distinctive
Christendom.
Theoriesor ideologieslikethosefromtheWestthatmakeclaims
about all people and all places have much more expansivepotentialthan
like that of the Balinese
particularizedand localized ideational frameworks
Geertz.16
documentedbyClifford
theater-state
As notedearlier,one centralfeatureofWesterncultureis thevalue itplaces
mean simply
institutionalists
and purposiveaction.Byrationality,
on rationality
of action in termsof ends and means. Rational action, in
the structuring
Westernculturalterms,is not onlygood, it is natural.However,one does not
before
or area-studiesliteratures
history,
haveto readveryfarin anthropology,
is notso obviousor natural
purposiverationality
thatWestern-style
discovering
to non-Westerners
(or, indeed, to Westerners,thoughtheywould be loath to
social action,notablyin terms
admitit). There are manyotherwaysto structure
of roles, rituals,duties, and obligations,that are not consequentialistin a
guidesto social behaviornonetheless.17
Westernrationalwaybut are effective
Progress and justice are the two ends toward which Western societies
structuretheirrationalaction.Throughhistoricalexperiencethese two goals
have come to be definedin particularways.Progressor "success" is defined
whichforindividualsusuallymeansincreasingwealthand forstates
materially,
means increasinggrossnationalproduct.Justiceis usuallydefinedin termsof
equality. Rational means to both these goals, in the Western cultural
in contributing
are bureaucraciesand markets.Claimsof efficiency
framework,
to increased wealth and progresslegitimizeboth. Both locate authorityin
impersonalrules that can be legitimatedin termsof equality-equal access,
equal opportunity.
expandinggrossnationalproduct
The Westernculturalagenda ofpromoting
and equalitythroughexpandingand deepeningbureaucraciesand marketshas
are in Thomas et al. 1987 and Bergesen1980.
15. The besttreatments
16. See, respectively,
Meyer,Boli, and Thomas 1987,30; and Geertz 1980.
view,see
17. For a discussionof alternativelogics of action that supportthe institutionalist
Marchand Olsen 1989,chap. 2.
332 InternationalOrganization
spread to dominate global political and social life over the past several
centuries.One prominentartifactof Western cultural dominance is the
bureaucraticstates.Conventional
organizationof theworldintoWestern-style
argumentsabout the rise of the modern state emphasize its functional
revenueto explainitssuccessat
advantagesat providingsecurityand extracting
This may(or maynot) be
theexpenseofotherformsofpoliticalorganization.18
trueof the riseof the statein Europe, but it does not explainthe expansionof
statesto all cornersof theworld.The modernbureaucraticstate
Western-style
has become the sole legitimateformof political organizationin the world;
virtuallyall othershave been eliminated.Empires,colonies,feudal arrangements,and a varietyof otherformshave become extinctand, perhaps more
politics.19
unimaginablein contemporary
important,
This is nota functionalresultforat least tworeasons.Extremevaluationon
statehood as the only legitimateformof political organizationmakes many
to resolve.It means thatself-determination
kindsof politicalconflictdifficult
requireshavinga state.Ifyou are not a state,you are nobodyin worldpolitics,
and nationalliberationgroupsunderstandthis.This createsan all-or-nothing
dynamic in many conflictsthat might be more easily resolved if other
organizationalformswere available.
even
Second, this valuation on statehood has created many ineffective,
failed,states.Far fromhavingemergedas "lean, mean competitors"fromsome
organizationalselectionprocess,thestateas an organizationalformhas had to
be imposedand, indeed,proppedup in manypartsof theworld.The factthat
hopelesslyfailed states still must be reconstructedas states rather than
reorganizedin some otherway,forexampleas colonies,underscoresthestrong
ofotherpoliticalforms.20
culturalsupportforstatehoodand theillegitimacy
bureaucratic
Drawingon theirargumentabout Westernculturelegitimating
outcomesas
institutionalists
explainthese seeminglydysfunctional
structures,
the resultof externalculturallegitimationratherthaninternaltaskdemands.
Statesexistin manyplaces notbecause theyare good at whattheyare supposed
to do (providesecurityand economicgrowth,promoteequality)butbecause a
largerworldculturesupportsthem.
The other central feature of Western culture with importantpolitical
and expandingnotionsof individualrightsof all
consequencesis individualism
sorts-human rights,citizenrights,women's rights,children'srights.Meyer
makesa powerfulcase thatWesternculturalvalues have createdtheindividual
as an autonomousactor and describes the processes wherebyattributesof
individualpersonhood have become elaborated and expanded.21There is
thatemphasizes
morerecentargument
18. See Tilly1975;and Skocpol1979.For another,
see Spruyt
1994.
andexchange
dominance,
coercion
military
research
on this
empirical
see Meyer1980.For extensive
19. For a moredetailedargument,
see Strang1991;1990.
phenomenon,
1990.
onthispointseeJackson
argument
20. Fora related,
albeitnoninstitutional,
21. Meyer1987.
Institutionalism333
societies around atomized
nothinginevitableor obvious about structuring
individuals.Many othersocieties and cultureslocate social value and moral
in the family,the tribe,or some other social unit. Western
responsibility
individualismis distinctive,and its culturallogic leads to some distinctive
it leads to the expansionof individuallegal
behaviorpatterns.Substantively,
rights,noted earlier. Analytically,it leads Western social science to treat
irreducible,autonomousactorswho knowwhat
individualsas unproblematic,
theywantindependentofsocial or culturalcontextand,indeed,who createthe
claimis theopposite-that theindividualas
social context.The institutionalist
autonomoussocial actoris a product,nota producer,of societyand culture.
Sociology's institutionalismis thus radically differentfrom realism or
liberalismin IR in that it falls on the structuralor holist side of the
priorto
is ontologically
social structure
debate.22Analytically,
agent-structure
and generativeofagents.It createsactors;itis notcreatedbythem.In contrast,
most argumentsin IR and politicalscience begin withagents.They take as
set of interests-states
pre-specified
givensome set of actorshavinga similarly
pursuingwealth or security,membersof Congresspursuingreelection,firms
Macro-levelsocial
nationalleaderspursuinga place in history.
pursuingprofits,
structureis explained as the consequence of their interaction.Even in
realism,
like KennethWaltz's structural
approachesthatIR calls "structural,"
the internationalstructureis an epiphenomenonof the power capabilitiesof
and interactionamong individualactors; it has no independentontological
status.It constrainsonly;it is notgenerative.23
analysis,the social structureis ontologicallyprimary.It is
In institutionalist
thestarting
pointforanalysis.Its rulesand values createall theactorswe might
considerrelevantin internationalpolitics,includingstates,firms,organizations, and even individuals.The structureof this argumentis thus like
Wallerstein'sstructureis a
Wallerstein's,but the contentis quite different.
materialand economicone; it is capitalistproductionimperativesthatcreate
nationalliberations
thestates,multinational
transnational
organizations,
firms,
international
that
and
class
we
see
contemporary
driving
struggles
movements,
is
a
it
is Western
structure
cultural
one;
The
institutionalists'
politics.24
thatcreatestates,markets,bureaucraticorganizaand individualism
rationality
tions,and,theywould argue,capitalismitself.
substantiveconcernswiththeexpansionofWesternculture
Institutionalists'
to HedleyBull and Adam
mostresembleEnglishschoolconcerns.Contributors
Watson's volume, The Expansion of InternationalSociety,investigatemany
Like institutionalists,
they see
phenomena of interestto institutionalists.
Westerncultureexpandingto become a worldculturewithimportantglobal
in
politicalimplications.Howeverthetwogroupscarryout theirinvestigations
22. See Wendt1987;and Dessler 1989.
23. Waltz 1979.
24. Wallerstein1974a. For a detailed analysisof the structuralcharacterof Wallerstein's
see Wendt1987.
argument,
334 InternationalOrganization
carryout theirworkmorelike
ways.Englishschoolinvestigators
quitedifferent
events.They
thatinterpret
crafted
narratives
carefully
arrive
at
they
historians;
social
that
American
exercises
in
hypothesis-testing
not
the
explicit
engage
do
scientistsadmire.25
Institutionalists,
by contrast,operate verymuch in the American social
scientifictradition.Their theorizingand hypothesesare explicit,and their
sophisticated,muchmore so
and oftenquantitatively
methodsare positivistic
thanmostIR research.This allows themto engage and challengethose who
research
would dismissargumentsabout culturebased on more interpretive
methods.
The institutionalistresearchprogram
researchprogramflowsfrom
of theinstitutionalist
The intellectualstructure
(as opposed to
and
structure-oriented
the
Rowan
insight
the basic Meyerand
and
otherswho
liberals,
Realists,
argument.
nature
of
their
agent-oriented)
different
actors
and
interests
would
expect
about
actors
with
assumptions
begin
Similarbehaviorby dissimilar
intereststo behave differently.
withdifferent
actorsor actorswithdissimilarinterestswould be anomalous. But withinan
perspective,such behavioris easilyexplained.Global cultural
institutionalist
normsmaymake similarbehavioralclaimson dissimilaractors.Of course,in a
structural
realistperspectivethe internationalsystemmayconstraindissimilar
actorsintosimilarbehaviors,but such constraintsshouldnot applyuniformly.
Strongeractorswillbe less constrainedand, as structuralrealistsare quick to
point out, power constraintsoften still leave many options for states. A
of
cannotexplainthewide scope and uniformity
ofpowerconstraints
structure
document.
isomorphicoutcomestheinstitutionalists
Institutionalists
use this insightto investigateand explain isomorphismof
social formsacross very differentareas of the world in a wide varietyof
substantiveareas. Isomorphismacross states,a topicof obviousinterestto IR
and comparativistscholars in political science, has been investigatedby
have
along two research trajectories.First, institutionalists
institutionalists
posed a question that IR scholars cannot because of their ontologicalassumptionthatstatesare actors:whydo we live in a worldof states?As noted
providersof
earlier,statesare not alwaysor obviouslyfunctionalor effective
economicgrowth,and equalityrightsin manypartsof theworld.Yet,
security,
as David Stranghas demonstrated,sovereignstates are a remarkablyrobust
organizationalformthathas edged out all competitors.Giventheweaknessof
manyless-developedstates,thisresultcan onlybe understood,institutionalists
have argued,as theresultofstrongexternalculturalsupportforthestatein the
largerworldenvironment.26
25. Bull and Watson,1984.
26. See Strang1991; Meyer1980;Boli 1987b;Ramirezand Thomas 1987; and McNeely 1989.
Institutionalism335
A second and more central question addressed by the institutionalist
researchagenda is isomorphismacross states:whydo statesin such radically
might
look so muchalike? Some amountof similarity
circumstances
different
task
demands
on
common
focused
be expectedby conventionalperspectives
faced by all states.They all need money,so theyall have financeministries.
Theyall need coerciveapparatusesto collectmoneyfromtheirpopulations,so
theyall have police. They all need to controland/or provide servicesfor
But isomorphism
internalpopulations,so all have home or interiorministries.
is pervasiveto degreesthatare hardto explainfromthe pointofviewof local
taskdemands.
definecitizenrightsand obligationsin
For example,nationalconstitutions
waysthatcorrelatenotwithlocal conditionsin thevariousstatesbut withthe
written
kindsofideologiesand rightsarticulatedin othernationalconstitutions
articulationsof citizen
at thattime.JohnBoli's workshowsthatconstitutional
rightshave changed in a coordinatedway across the internationalsystemof
states over the past century.The patternof rightsexpansionhe documents
suggeststhatwhetheror not a state codifiessuffrageforwomenor economic
rightsfor citizens has little to do with the status of women or economic
conditionsin a state,but it has a greatdeal to do withinternationalcultural
and economicrightsat thetimetheconstitution
normsaboutwomen'ssuffrage
was written.27
Yasemin Soysal'sworkon guestworkersin European statesshows
Similarly,
howtheconceptofcitizenshipitselfis embeddedin globalhumanrightsnorms
thatgiverise to a patternof policies amongthese statesthatis puzzlingfrom
realistor liberalperspectives.All European statesinvitedguestworkersin to
began to rise,however,
When unemployment
labor shortfalls.
meetshort-term
it became politicallyimpossibleforanyof these statesto send workershome.
Moreover,European states have all providedfood, housing,medical care,
education,and otherbenefitsto these foreignnationalstheyno longerwant.
Soysaltracesthisbehaviorto global humanrightsnormsthatconstrainstates'
treatment
offoreignnationalsacrossthesystem.28
Education policyhas not concernedIR scholars,but as an arena in which
statescreate citizens,it is the pointat whichthe relationshipbetweenthe two
fociof Westernmodernity-thestate and the individual-is defined.Conseand it is
quently,it has receiveda greatdeal of attentionfrominstitutionalists,
features
the
institutionalist
argument
that
of
in thisresearch
manyimportant
havebeen developed.
years,and
State-sponsorededucationhas grownenormouslyin the past fifty
Institutionalists
similarities.
pointout
the
world
show
around
striking
curricula
thatthe reasonswhyeducationshould be state-directedand -formalizedare
no one can pointto a reasonforthesuddenexplosionin
notobvious;certainly,
27. Boli 1987a.
28. Soysal 1995.
336 InternationalOrganization
world education activityafter World War II. The rush to schoolingis a
relatively
recenthistoricalphenomenon.Further,thecontentofwhatis taught
(or what is supposed to be taught)aroundthe worldhas convergeddramatically. Again, looking at task demands one can thinkof good reasons why
educationcurriculain a statewhose economyproducesprimarycommodities
manufacfromone that produces high-technology
should be quite different
in formaleducation structuresdoes not reflectthis.
tures,but the similarity
argue,resultfromglobal changesin world
institutionalists
These similarities,
normsand cultureabout education.
bya common"ideologiIndividualnationaleducationsystemsare structured
cal order,"institutionalists
argue.As FranciscoRamirezand JohnBoli write,
[T]hisordercontainsa powerfuldialectic:One pole is theideologyof the
stateas theprimary
locus of social organizationand vehicleof societaldevelopment;theotheris the ideologyof theindividualas thebasic unitof
social action,the ultimatesourceofvalue, and thelocus of social meaning.
These poles are integratedwithintheideologyof citizenship,in whichthe
to thenationaldevelopmentproject
individualis seen as botha contributor
(as a producerand as a loyalsupporterof stateprograms,laws,and regulaof stateorganizationalaction(as a consumerand
tions)and as a beneficiary
as a "citizen"in thepure sense who enjoyscertainprotectionsand guarantees underwritten
bythe state).
of eduThis dialectichas clear implicationsforthemeaningand structure
cationin theworldsystem.The ideologyof theindividualrestsin parton a
functionalist
theorythatnew membersof society(children)are essentially
initiationand socialization.Eduunformedbeingsrequiringcomprehensive
cationis themeansto achievethisend.29
about what a
"Ideologies" or shared culturaland normativeunderstandings
state is and what an individualis thus structureeducation (and a myriadof
otherfeaturesofmodernsocial life)in commonwaysacrosstheglobe.
Welfarepoliticsand welfarepolicies also change in patternsthatcorrelate
or laborunrestbut
unemployment,
notwithnationallevelsofindustrialization,
ofstateresponsibility
redefinitions
vis-a-viscitizens.
withbroaderinternational
David Strangand PatriciaChang have shownthe importanceof international
organizationsto the elaborationand disseminationof these global definitions
to
of responsibility;
George Thomas and Pat Lauderdale extendthesefindings
land reformissues.30
Even the state defenseapparatus,the componentof the state thatrealism
would expectto be mostconstrainedby task demandsimposedby a self-help
all stateshave defense
First,virtually
world,exhibitsthiskindof isomorphism.
researchon education,see
29. Ramirez and Boli 1987a, 154. For additionalinstitutionalist
Meyer,Ramirez,and Soysal 1992; Meyer 1977; Ramirez and Rubinson 1979; Ramirez and Boli
1987a; 1987b;and Ramirezand Meyer1980.
30. See Strangand Chang 1993; and Thomas and Lauderdale 1987,respectively.
Institutionalism337
ministrieseven when theyface no externalthreat.Further,virtuallyall states
with an army,air force,and navy-even
have tripartitemilitarystructures,
landlocked states. Finally,weapons acquisitionpatterns,particularlyamong
cultural)considerdevelopingstates,is oftendrivenbysymbolic(and therefore
ations. Dana Eyre and Mark Suchman argue thatmanyof these states treat
ofweaponsthatmake
weaponslikeflagsand acquire amountsand assortments
fordefensebutthathave a lot
littlesense fromthepointofviewofdeployment
to understandfrom
These behaviorsare difficult
of "symbolicthrow-weight."
within an analytic frameworkthat assumes that militarystructuresare
againstoutsidethreats.They
determinedbythedemandsofdefendingterritory
make a lot of sense, however,if one understandshaving a militarywith
as beinga necessarypartof the trappingsof modern
particularcharacteristics
statehood.Understandingthatmilitarieshave a strongculturaland legitimatingrole to playforstates,vis-a-visbothotherstatesand theirownpopulations,
explainsa greatdeal ofwhatwouldotherwisebe anomalousbehavior.31
empiricalinterestsare wideAs these examples suggest,institutionalists'
ranging.The commonthreadin all of thisworkis an interestin the waysin
behaviorcorrelateswithand is drivenbysystemicor global
whichinternational
poses a
culturalfactorsratherthan local task demands.Each demonstration
challenge to conventionalactor-interestapproaches includingrealism and
liberalismin politicalscience.
Implicationsforpoliticalscience
is that it providesa
One of the chiefvirtuesof sociology'sinstitutionalism
framework
withwhichwe can ask questions about issues that realism and
liberalismtreatas assumptionsand therebyremovefromthe researchagenda.
is
researchon the originand natureof statesand sovereignty
Institutionalist
one example. The broadeningand deepening of the European Union, the
have put
of the SovietUnion,and thegrowthof multilateralism
disintegration
Neorealand statehoodhighon the agenda of manyIR scholars.32
sovereignty
ism and neoliberalismare of littlehelp in addressingthese questions since
these approaches begin with the assumptionthat states are actors having
While assumptionsof
certainprespecifiedand unproblematiccharacteristics.
theycome at the price
thiskindhave advantages(parsimony,generalizability)
of removingthe assumed features of politics from the research agenda.
by contrast,offersa set of empiricallytestable
Sociology'sinstitutionalism,
that can guide research.Political
propositionsabout states and sovereignty
31. See Eyre and Suchman forthcoming;and Suchman and Eyre 1992. For a related
constructivist
analysis,see Wendtand Barnett1993.
32. For examples,see Jackson1990;Thomson1994; Weber 1995; Lyonsand Mastanduno1995;
and Thomson1995.
338 InternationalOrganization
scientistsmaytestthese argumentsand findthemwanting,but theywould at
least have theoreticalguidanceforsuchtests.33
Human rights,especiallythe rapid expansionof successfulhuman rights
claims,is anotherarea about whichconventionalIR approacheshave littleto
offerin thewayof hypothesesor testableexplanations.Approachesthattreat
states as actorshave littleto say about individualsand provideno reason to
expectthatindividualswould be able to make claimsagainststatesthatin any
by
or controlovercitizens.Institutionalists,
waycompromisestatesovereignty
contrast,makeclearclaimsabouthowand whyindividualrightswillspreadand
have extensiveempiricalevidenceto back up theirclaims.34
Rosenau's turbulencetheoryalso emphasizes individuals,and it might
His argumentthatindividualsare
providea wayto challengeinstitutionalists.
able to make new and expandingclaimsagainststatesbecause of a revolution
patternofthe
suggestsa different
in cognitiveskillsassociatedwithtechnology
would expect:
spread of these rightsand claimsthan the one institutionalists
Rosenau would expectrightsexpansionto correlatewithtechnologicaldiffuwould expect roughlycontemporaneousglobal
sion, while institutionalists
change,regardlessofobjectivetechnologicalconditions.35
In addition to shedding light on issues that are assumed rather than
also has implications
byour dominantparadigms,institutionalism
investigated
for issues that have been centralto neorealistand neoliberal debates. For
wouldhave strongargumentsto make aboutmultilatexample,institutionalists
eralism and the role of internationalinstitutions-a cornerstoneof the
would expectcontinuedaggreneorealist-neoliberaldebate. Institutionalists
organizationsbutnot
gate growthin thenumberand influenceofinternational
willincreasenotonlybecause
forthereasonsneoliberalsclaim.Multilateralism
it facilitatesPareto-optimaloutcomesand helps statesget what theywant in
cost-effective
waysbut also forculturalreasons. Participationin the growing
networkof internationalorganizationsis culturallynecessaryand "appropriate," in James March and Johan Olsen's sense of the term.36Further,
participationin internationalorganizationsconstructsor constituteswhat
what theyare.37
stateswant or, in the case of European Union participation,
would focuson what Ruggie
argumentsabout multilateralism
Institutionalist
calls the "qualitativedimension"of multilateralism-thenorms,principles,
thatitembodies-but theyoffera muchmore
and sharedsocial understandings
detailednotionaboutwherethoseprinciplescome fromand theirrelation,one
The empirical
to another,than political scientistshave so far articulated.38
in favorof what I
33. For an explicitrejectionof institutionalist
argumentsabout sovereignty
wouldcall a "neo-Machiavellian"view,see Krasner1994.
34. See, forexample,Thomas et al. 1987,chaps. 6, 10, 11,and 12.
35. Rosenau 1990.
36. March and Olsen 1989.
37. See Soysal 1995; and Finnemoreforthcoming.
38. Ruggie1993,6.
Institutionalism339
expectationsstemmingfromthisargumentwould be forcontinuingand even
increasing adherence to multilateralism-evenwhen it runs contraryto
expressednationalinterests-becauseitembodiessome set ofvalues centralto
thelargerworldculture.
shouldconcern
However,at least twofeaturesofsociology'sinstitutionalism
researchhas been more concerned
political scientists.First,institutionalist
its
withdocumentingthe effectsof worldculturalstructurethaninvestigating
itself.Institutioncauses or themechanismsofchangein theculturalstructure
alists tend to produce global correlativestudies whose structureand logic
in the face
followfromMeyerand Rowan's initialinsightsabout isomorphism
of dissimilartask demands. Institutionaliststudies generallyproceed by
collectingquantitativedata on a large numberof units (usually states) and
withlocal taskdemands,attributes
thatratherthancorrelating
demonstrating
or behaviorof the unitscorrelatewithattributesor behaviorof otherunitsor
withworldwidephenomena(internationalconferencesand treatiesor world
historicalevents,forexample). These analysesare oftenquite sophisticated,
using event historyanalysisand other techniquesthat look exotic to most
political scientists.However,once correlationis established,world cultural
causes are assumed. Detailed process-tracingand case study analysis to
validate and elaborate the inferencesbased on correlationare missing.39
Research to uncoverthe processes and mechanismswherebyworld cultural
normsspread and evolvewould have at least twoeffects.The firstwouldbe to
argument.Such researchwouldopen up a moretruly
enrichtheinstitutionalist
dialectical relationshipbetween agency and structureand enable more
persuasiveaccountsoftheoriginsand dynamicsoftheworldculturalstructure.
Detailed case studiesabout the mechanismsbywhichculturalnormsevolve
and spread are also likely to call into question the cognitivebasis of
groundtheirargumentsabout theways
theory.Institutionalists
institutionalist
MeyercreditsErvingGoffman,
in whichcultureoperatesin social psychology.
Guy Swanson,and C. WrightMills withprovidinga connectionbetweenthis
Detailed examinationofcases
social psychologicalliteratureand institutions.40
that
itstriumphis not due only
is
to
of spreadingWesternculture likely reveal
studiesisone
institutionalist
The
by
to
painted
picture
or evenprimarily cognition.
acrosstheglobe.Little
and facelessly
in whichworldculturemarcheseffortlessly
or coercion.To anypoliticalscientist(or
is paid eitherto contestation
attention
an accountoftheriseofthemodemstatein theWestand itsexpansion
historian)
violence,and leadershipis
acrossAfrica,Asia,and theAmericasthatomitsconflict,
or
or citizenrights
thathumanrights
theimplication
incomplete.
Similarly,
grossly
even marketeconomiesbecome establishedand spread in a peaceful,orderly
aloneis untenableto anyonewhohas detailedknowledge
fashionthrough
cognition
ofcases.
39. For some examplesof studiesthataddressthisgap, see Thomas and Boli forthcoming.
40. See Goffman1959; 1974; Swanson1971; and Mills 1940.
340 InternationalOrganization
The lack of case study analysis or on-the-groundinvestigationof the
mechanismswherebyworldcultureproducesisomorphismobscuresthe roles
of politicsand power in world historyand normativechange. The cognitive
processes to whichinstitutionalists
point are important,but theyare by no
means the only processes at work in internationallife. Destroyingcultural
bothfiguratively
and literally,
is a time-honored
competitors,
wayof establishingculturaldominance.Treatmentofthenativepopulationsin NorthAmerica
is one example. Attemptsat ethnic cleansing in Nazi Germany,Bosnia,
Rwanda,and elsewhereare another.Culturalrulesare oftenestablishednotby
persuasionor cognitiveprocessesof institutionalization
but by forceand fiat.
Over time,culturalnormsestablishedbyforceindeed maybecome institutionalized in the sense thattheycome to have a "taken-for-granted"
qualitythat
shapes action in the ways institutionalists
describe. But emphasizingthe
institutionalized
qualityof sovereignty,
for example,and its effectsin world
politicsshould not obscurethe role playedbyforceand coercionin imposing
sovereignty
rulesand in arbitering
theirongoingevolution.
One instancewhereforceand military
powermaybe particularly
important
to institutionalist
concernsinvolvesthe Reformationand eventualProtestant
dominationof the West. Institutionalists
trace theirWesternculturalnorms
back to medieval Christendomwithouta word about the Reformationor
Protestantism's
effecton theseculturalrules.This is a startling
omissiongiven
theintellectualdebtthesescholarsowe Max Weber.Manyoftheculturalrules
institutionalistsemphasize-individualism and markets, for examplearguablyhave strongties to Protestantism
not Christianity
specifically,
generally. One could argue that the Westernculturethatis expandingacross the
did not come to dominate
globe is reallya Protestantculture.Protestantism
Europe throughcognitionand persuasionalone, as centuriesof religiouswars
make clear. Western culture may look the ways it does because of three
centuriesof Anglo-American(i.e., Protestant)power and dominationof the
West, dominationthat was secured throughrepeated militaryconquest of
France.
The second featureof institutionalist
researchthatshouldconcernpolitical
scientistsis theirspecification
of the contentofworldculture.Institutionalists
focus on Western rationalityas the means to both progressand equality.
Progressis definedas wealthaccumulation,justice is definedas equality,and
rational means, in institutionalist
research,are usually bureaucracies and
markets.Institutionalists
tendto treattheseelementsofWesternmodernity
as
at least looselycompatible.Equality,in the formof individualrights,expands
togetherwithmarketsand bureaucraciesacross the globe,and institutionalist
researchdocumentsthe collectiveand interrelatedspread of these cultural
norms.
The implication,whichwill be suspectto all politicalscientists,is that all
'good" things(in the Western cultural frame) can and do go together.
Institutionalists
maynot intendthisimplication,but both theirresearchand
Institutionalism341
nature of
their theorizingconsistentlyunderscorethe mutuallyreinforcing
theseWesternculturalrules.
In fact,thereare good reasonsto believethattheelementsofworldculture,
have specifiedit, contain deep tensions and
even as the institutionalists
thatconstrainisomorphismand limitthe stabilityof behavioral
contradictions
convergence.Most obviousis the tensionbetweenthe two "ends" of Western
world culture-progress, defined as economic accumulation,and justice,
betweenequityand growthin development
definedas equality.The trade-off
In makingdecisionsabout economicpolicies,thetwo
economicsis well-known.
oftenpull in oppositedirections.Partisansof
pillarsofthenormativestructure
policies have invokedequalitynormsin theirdefense.Those
redistributionist
pushingformore and fastergrowthwill evoke progressnorms.Policymakers
betweenthetwo.
trade-offs
oftenhave to makeexplicitand controversial
Similarly,the two rational means to justice and progress-marketsand
bureaucracies-may be in tension. Market arrangementsmay be justified
to progress(wealthaccumulation)
contributions
bytheirefficient
normatively
and by equality defined as opportunityor access, but they often create
outcomesthat offendother definitionsof equality,notablyequalityof outoutcomes.The comcomes. Marketstend to produce unequal distributional
monsolutionis to bringin bureaucracy,in theformof the state,to remedythe
equalityoffensesof markets.However bureaucraciesmay compromisethe
of marketsand so compromiseprogress.Again, progress(wealth)
efficiency
conflictswithjustice (equality).And, again, no obviousor equilibriumset of
can resolvethis.41
arrangements
Contradictions
amongdominantculturalnormsmean thatsocial institutions
times.
are continuallybeing contested,albeit to varyingdegrees at different
Unresolvednormativetensionsin a set of social compromisesat one timemay
later as
be the mobilizingbasis forattackson thatset of social arrangements
aside.
Further,
people articulatenormativeclaims that earlierwere pushed
compromisesamongcompetingworldnormativeprinciplesmaybe contingent
on local circumstancesand personalitiesand are likelyto reflectlocal norms
and customswithwhichinternationalnormshave had to compromise.Thus,
afterWorld War II Japanwas forced(note the processwas not cognitive)to
accept a set of Westerneconomic and politicalarrangementsthathad been
became
forgedelsewhere,in theUnitedStates.Overtime,thosearrangements
in Japanbut in unique waysthatreflectednon-Westernlocal
institutionalized
culturalnorms.The subsequentsuccess of Japan in Westernterms(a great
deal of economicaccumulationwithrelativeequality)has promptedWestern
firmsand Asian statesto adopt a numberof Japanesepractices,policies,and
norms.This kindof culturalfeedback,fromperipheryto core,is neglectedby
model.
theunidirectional
institutionalist
chap. 5.
41. For an expandeddiscussionofthisset oftensions,see Finnemoreforthcoming,
342 InternationalOrganization
These contestationprocessesfornormativedominanceare political.In fact,
normativecontestationis in large part what politicsis all about; it is about
competingvalues and understandings
ofwhatis good,desirable,and appropriate in our collectivecommunallife. Debates about civil rights,affirmative
action, social safetynets, regulationand deregulation,and the appropriate
degree of governmentintrusioninto the lives of citizens are all debates
preciselybecause thereis no clear stablenormativesolution.Further,theyare
all debatesinvolving
conflictamongthebasic normativegoods identified
bythe
institutionalists.
Civilrights,affirmative
action,and to some extentsocial safety
nets are debates about the natureof equality-who attainsequalityand how
thatequalityis measured.Since thesolutionsall involvebureaucraticintervention,these debates are also about the relationshipof bureaucraciesand the
stateto equality.Debates about social safetynetsraise specificissuesabout the
relationshipbetweenbureaucraciesand marketsand the degree to whichthe
lattermaybe compromisedby the formerin the serviceof equality.Debates
overregulationand government
intrusionare bothabout the degree to which
bureaucracycan compromisemarkets,on the one hand, or equality and
individualrightsthatderivefromequality,on theother.
If one takes seriouslythe tensionsand contradictionsamong elementsof
culture,researchmustfocuson politicsand process.If culturalelementsstand
in paradoxical relationssuch that equilibriumarrangementsare limitedor
theinteresting
constrained,
questionsbecome,whicharrangements
are adopted
where-and why?Institutionalists
may be right.Commonglobal normsmay
create similar structuresand push both people and states toward similar
behaviorat giventimes,butifthebodyofinternational
normsis notcompletely
congruent,then those isomorphismswill not be stable. Further,people may
adopt similarorganizationalformsbutshowlittlesimilarity
in behaviorbeyond
that.Botswanaand the United States maybothbe organizedin the formof a
modernstate,but thecontentof thoseformsand thebehaviorwithinthemare
verydifferent.
Isomorphismis not homogeneity;it does not create identical
behavioral outcomes.42 Without a specificationof culture that attends to
oppositionswithinthe overall structure,institutionalists
will not be able to
accountforeitherdiversity
or changein thatstructure.
Conclusions
Institutionalist
argumentsemphasizestructure
at theexpenseofagency.Doing
so has important
intellectualbenefits.It allowsinstitutionalists
to ask questions
about featuresof social and political life that other perspectivestake for
granted-ubiquitoussovereignstatehoodand expandingclaimsbyindividuals,
forexample.Further,froman IR theoryperspective,
institutionalists'
emphasis
42. I am gratefulto Michael Barnettforbringingthispointto myattention.
Institutionalism343
on structureallows for system-levelexplanationsthat compete with other
dominantparadigmsand so enrich the body of theoryavailable to tackle
puzzles in thefield.
Iftheneglectofagencywereonlyan omission,therewouldbe littlecause for
concern.No theoryexplainseverything.
One can alwaysexplain a fewmore
data pointsbyaddinga fewmorevariablesand increasingthecomplexity
ofthe
model. But the institutionalists'
inattentionto agencyleads theminto more
seriouserrors.It leads themto misspecify
boththemechanismsbywhichsocial
structure
itself.
produceschangeand thecontentofthesocial structure
Cognitiveprocessesmaydominateorganizationalchangein manyempirical
domains,but theycompetewithand oftenare eclipsedbycoercionin manyof
the empiricaldomains that concernIR scholars.Educational curriculamay
change in peacefulwaysdrivenby cognitivedecision-making
processes;state
authoritystructuresoften do not. Violence is a fundamentallydifferent
mechanismofchangethancognition.Both mechanismsmayoperatein a given
situation.Often there are choices to be made even withinthe constraints
imposedby force,but outcomesimposed externallythroughviolence are not
capturedbya cognitivetheoreticalframework.
Institutionalists
are not alone in this tendencyto overlook power and
coercionin explainingorganizationaloutcomes.Much of organizationtheory
shares this characteristic.Terry Moe has noted the failure of the new
economicsof organizationto incorporateconsiderationsof power,but even
concernedwithissues of violence
Moe, a politicalscientist,is not particularly
sincetheseoccurrarelyin hisownempiricaldomain-U.S. bureaucracy.43
Institutionalist
modelsimplya worldsocial structure
made up of normsthat
are largelycongruent.Their emphasis is on the mutuallyreinforcingand
expansivenatureof thesenorms.Theystressthe consensusthatarisesaround
various culturalmodels-of citizenship,of statehood,of education,of individual rights-to the point that these normsand institutionsare taken for
grantedin contemporarylife. The implicationis that the spread of world
cultureis relativelypeaceful.Institutionalists
specifyno sourcesof instability,
or oppositionto the progressiveexpansionofworldculture.Yasemin
conflict,
Soysal'sworkis perhapsthemostattunedto contradictions
amongthecultural
elementsofcitizenshipshe studies.However,evenin herworkthesecontradictionsresultonlyin paradoxicalarrangements
withwhichpeople seem to live
reasonablypeacefully.44
is thatall of politicsbecomes problematicin
The resultof thisspecification
If the worldculturetheyspecifyis so powerful
an institutionalist
framework.
and congruent,the institutionalists
have no grounds for explainingvalue
or normativecontestation-inotherwords,politics.A researchdesign
conflicts
that attended to agency and the processes wherebyisomorphiceffectsare
43. Moe 1984.
44. Soysal 1995.
344 InternationalOrganization
fromfallinginto this trap.
produced would have preventedinstitutionalists
draw
attention
to the contradictions
on
process
would
Focusingmore closely
to rethinkboth the
among normativeclaims and force institutionalists
ofworldcultureand itslikelyeffects.
specification
theorylie squarelyon the turf
These problematicfeaturesof institutionalist
ofpoliticalscientists.Politicsand process,coercionand violence,value conflict
would benefit
and normativecontestationare our business. Institutionalism
greatlyfroma dialogue withpoliticalscientists.Likewise,politicalscientists
Thus far,IR scholarsinterested
could learn a greatdeal frominstitutionalists.
in normshave lacked a substantivesystemictheoryfromwhichto hypothesize
and carry out research. Institutionalismprovides this. Taking its claims
seriouslymayproduceradicalrevisionsto the existingsociologists'theories.It
may also produce opposing theoreticalarguments.Either outcome would
advance researchin both disciplinesand enrichour understandingof world
politics.
References
72(4): 2-9.
ForeignAffairs
Ajami,Fouad. 1993.The summoning.
72(4): 15-18.
Bartley,RobertL. 1993.The case foroptimism.ForeignAffairs
New York: AcademicPress.
Bergesen,Albert,ed. 1980.Studiesofthemodemworld-system.
72(4): 19-21.
ForeignAffairs.
Binyan,Liu. 1993.Civilizationgrafting.
of constitutional
Boli, John.1987a. Human rightsor state expansion?Cross-nationaldefinitions
rights,1870-1970.In Thomas et al. 1987.
and organization,1870-1970.In
. 1987b.Worldpolitysourcesof expandingstateauthority
Thomas et al. 1987.
Press.
Bull,Hedley. 1977. Theanarchicalsociety.New York: ColumbiaUniversity
society.Oxford:
Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson, eds. 1984. The expansionof international
ClarendonPress.
Buzan, Barry.1993. From internationalsystemto internationalsociety:Structuralrealismand
Organization
47:327-52.
regimetheorymeettheEnglishschool.International
Cerny,Philip G. 1995. Globalization and the changinglogic of collectiveaction. International
49:595-625.
Organization
Organization
43:
debate? International
Dessler,David. 1989. What'sat stakein the agent-structure
441-73.
of U.S. art
DiMaggio, Paul. 1988.Managersofthearts:Careersand opinionsofsenioradministrators
resident
and local artsagencies.2d ed. WashingtonD.C.:
orchestras,
theaters,
museums,symphony
Seven Locks Press.
in
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1991. Introduction.In The new institutionalism
organizational
analysis,edited by Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio. Chicago: Universityof
ChicagoPress.
Dobbin, FrankR. 1992.The originsof privatesocial insurance:Publicpolicyand fringebenefitsin
America,1920-1950.AmericanJournalofSociology97:1416-50.
. 1994. Forgingindustrialpolicy: The UnitedStates,France, and Britainin the railway
Press.
age. New York: CambridgeUniversity
Eyre, Dana P., and Mark C. Suchman. Forthcoming.Status, norms,and the proliferationof
conventionalweapons: An institutionaltheoryapproach. In The cultureof nationalsecurity:
Institutionalism345
in worldpolitics,edited by Peter J. Katzenstein.New York: Columbia
Normsand identity
Press.
University
society.Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
in international
Nationalinterests
Finnemore,Martha.Forthcoming.
Press.
University
Bali. Princeton,N.J.:Princeton
innineteenth
century
1980.Negara:Thetheater-state
Geertz,Clifford.
University
Press.
life.New York. Anchor.
ofselfineveryday
Erving.1959. Thepresentation
Goffman,
. 1974.Frameanalysis.New York: Harper Colophon.
ininternational
society.Oxford:ClarendonPress.
Gong,Gerrit.1984. Thestandardof 'civilisation'
Hall, PeterA., and RosemaryC. R. Taylor.1994. Politicalscience and the fournew institutionalNow? 14-15 October,
isms. Paper presented at the conference,What is Institutionalism
ofMaryland,College Park.
University
72(3): 22-49.
ForeignAffairs
Samuel P. 1993.The clash ofcivilizations.
Huntington,
relations,and the ThirdWorld.
international
Jackson,Robert H. 1990. Quasi-states:Sovereignty,
Press.
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
In The new
Jepperson,Ronald L. 1991. Institutions,institutionaleffects,and institutionalism.
in organizationalanalysis,edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul DiMaggio.
institutionalism
ofChicago Press.
Chicago:University
Jeane J., Albert L. Weeks, and Gerard Piel. 1993. The modernizingimperative.
Kirkpatrick,
72(4): 22-26.
ForeignAffairs
Krasner,Stephen D. 1983. Structuralcauses and regimeconsequences: Regimes as intervening
variables. In Internationalregimes,edited by Stephen D. Krasner. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Press.
University
. 1994. Frail reeds: Institutionsin the internationalsystem.Paper presented at the
Now? 14-15 October, Universityof Maryland,College
conference,What is Institutionalism
Park.
and
Lyons, Gene, and Michael Mastanduno, eds. 1995. Beyond Westphalia:State sovereignty
Press.
international
intervention.
Baltimore,Md.: JohnsHopkinsUniversity
72(4): 10-14.
Mahbubani,Kishore.1993.The dangersof decadence.ForeignAffairs
basis of
The organizational
institutions:
March,JamesG., and JohanP. Olsen. 1989.Rediscovering
politics.New York: Free Press.
Ph.D. diss. StanfordUniverMcNeely,Connie. 1989. Culturalisomorphismamongnation-states.
sity,Stanford,Calif.
oftheprofessionalartist:Theoreticalextensionand
. 1993.Fundingand thetransformation
implicationsfromthe world of dance. CurrentResearchon Occupationsand Professions8:
119-40.
AmericanJournalofSociology83:
Meyer,JohnW. 1977.The effectsof educationas an institution.
340-63.
. 1980. The world polityand the authorityof the nation-state.In Studiesof the modern
edited byAlbertBergesen.New York: Academic Press. Reprintedin Thomas et
world-system,
al. 1987.
In Thomas et al. 1987.
and itseffects.
1987.Selfand lifecourse:Institutionalization
1994. Institutionaland organizationalrationalizationin the mental health system.In
editedbyW.
and individualism,
environments
and organizations:
Structural
complexity
Institutional
RichardScott,JohnW. Meyer,and associates.Thousand Oaks, Calif.:Sage.
Meyer, John W., John Boli, and George Thomas. 1987. Ontologyand rationalizationin the
Westernculturalaccount. In Thomas et al. 1987. Reprintedin W. Richard Scott,JohnW.
and
and organizations:
Structural
environment
complexity
Meyer,and associates,eds.,Institutional
individualism
(Thousand Oaks, Calif.:Sage, 1994).
and theworldsystem:
Meyer,JohnW., and Michael T. Hannan, eds. 1979. Nationaldevelopment
ofChicagoPress.
Educational,economic,andpoliticalchange,1950-1970.Chicago: University
Meyer,JohnW., Francisco 0. Ramirez, and Yasemin Soysal. 1992. World expansionof mass
education,1870-1980.SociologyofEducation65:128-49.
346 InternationalOrganization
as myth
organizations:Formalstructure
Meyer,JohnW., and BrianRowan. 1977.Institutionalized
AmericanJournalofSociology83:340-63.
and ceremony.
Ritualand rationality.
environments:
Meyer,JohnW., and W. Richard Scott. 1983. Organizational
BeverlyHills,Calif.:Sage.
SociologicalReview5:
Mills,C. Wright.1940.Situatedactionsand vocabulariesofmotive.American
904-13.
AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience28:
Moe, TerryM. 1984.The new economicsof organization.
739-77.
relationstheory.Workingpaper no. 92-6,
Moravcsik,Andrew.1993. Liberalismand international
Cambridge,Mass.
rev.,HarvardCenterforInternationalAffairs,
in organizational
Powell, Walter W., and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. 1991. The new institutionalism
ofChicagoPress.
analysis.Chicago:University
Ramirez,FranciscoO., and George M. Thomas. 1987.Structuralantecedentsand consequencesof
statism.In Thomas et al. 1987.
Ramirez,FranciscoO., and JohnBoli. 1987a. Global patternsof educationalinstitutionalization.
In Thomas et al. 1987.
. 1987b.On theunionofstatesand schools.In Thomas et al. 1987.
Ramirez,FranciscoO., and JohnW. Meyer.1980.Comparativeeducation:The social construction
AnnualReviewofSociology6:369-99.
ofthemodernworldsystem.
Ramirez,FranciscoO., and RichardRubinson.1979. Creatingmembers:The nationalincorporaand the worldsystem,edited by JohnMeyer and
tion of education. In National development
of Chicago Press.
Michael Hannan. Chicago:University
Princeton,
in worldpolitics:A theory
ofchangeand continuity.
Rosenau, JamesN. 1990. Turbulence
Press.
N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
Orderand
govemment:
Rosenau, JamesN., and ErnstOttoCzempiel,eds. 1992.Govemancewithout
Press.
changein worldpolitics.New York: CambridgeUniversity
Ruggie, John Gerard. 1993. Multilateralism:The anatomyof an institution.In Multilateralism
editedbyJohnGerardRuggie.New York:
matters:Thetheory
andpraxisofan institutionalform,
Press.
ColumbiaUniversity
EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.:
Rational,natural,and opensystems.
Scott,W. Richard.1981. Organizations:
Prentice-Hall.
and
environment
Scott, W. Richard, John W. Meyer, and associates, eds. 1994. Institutional
Thousand Oaks, Calif.:Sage.
and individualism.
Structural
complexity
organizations:
A comparativeanalysisof France,Russia,and
Skocpol,Theda. 1979. Statesand social revolutions:
Press.
China.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
in Europe.
Migrantsand postnationalmembership
Soysal,Yasemin N. 1995. Limitsof citizenship:
of ChicagoPress.
Chicago:University
Spruyt,Hendrik.1994. Institutionalselectionin internationalrelations:State anarchyas order.
48:527-57.
International
Organization
An event-history
analysisofdecolonization.
Strang,David. 1990.Fromdependencyto sovereignty:
AmericanSociologicalReview55:846-60.
. 1991.Anomalyand commonplacein European politicalexpansion:Realistand institutionalistaccounts.International
45:143-62.
Organization
Strang,David, and PatriciaMei Yin Chang. 1993. The InternationalLabor Organizationand the
Organizaeffectson nationalwelfarespending,1960-80.International
welfarestate:Institutional
tion47:235-62.
Suchman,Mark C. 1994.On adviceofcounsel:Law firmsand venturecapitalfundsas information
Stanford,
in the structuration
of SiliconValley. PhD. diss. StanfordUniversity,
intermediaries
Calif.
Suchman,Mark C., and Dana P. Eyre. 1992. Militaryprocurementas rationalmyth:Notes on the
ofweapons proliferation.
social construction
SociologicalForum7:137-61.
AmericanSociologicalReview36:
Swanson,Guy. 1971. An organizationalanalysisof collectivities.
607-23.
Institutionalism347
Thomas,George M., and Pat Lauderdale. 1987.Worldpolitysourcesof nationalwelfareand land
reform.In Thomas et al. 1987.
since 1875: World
Thomas, George M., and JohnBoli, eds. Forthcoming.Worldpolityformation
Stanford,Calif.: StanfordUniversity
organizations.
non-governmental
cultureand international
Press.
Thomas,George M., JohnW. Meyer,Francisco0. Ramirez,and JohnBoli, eds. 1987.Institutional
state,societyand theindividual.NewburyPark,Calif.:Sage Publications.
structure:
Constituting
State-building
and extra-teritorial
pirates,and sovereigns:
Thomson,Janice E. 1994. Mercenaries,
Press.
violencein earlymodernEurope.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversity
in internationalrelations:Bridgingthe gap betweentheoryand
. 1995. State sovereignty
StudiesQuarterly
39:213-33.
empiricalresearch.International
Europe. Princeton,N.J.:
Tilly,Charles A., ed. 1975. The formationof nationalstatesin Western
PrincetonUniversity
Press.
Tolbert,Pamela S., and Lynne G. Zucker. 1983. Institutionalsources of change in the formal
structureof organizations:The diffusionof civil service reform,1880-1935.Administrative
28:22-39.
ScienceQuarterly
and theoriginsofthe
Capitalistagriculture
Wallerstein,Immanuel.1974a. Themodernworld-system:
century.
New York: AcademicPress.
Europeanworldeconomyin thesixteenth
. 1974b.The rise and futuredemise of the worldcapitalistsystem.ComparativeStudiesin
Societyand History16:387-415.
and the consolidationof the European
2: Mercantilism
. 1980. The modernworld-system
world-economy,
1600-1750.New York: AcademicPress.
Reading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
ofinternationalpolitics.
Waltz,Kenneth.1979. Theory
the state and symbolicexchange.
Intervention,
Weber, Cynthia. 1995. Simulatingsovereignty:
Press.
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity
problem in internationalrelations.International
Wendt,Alexander. 1987. The agent-structure
41:335-70.
Organization
Wendt, Alexander,and Michael Barnett. 1993. Dependent state formationand Third World
militarization.
ReviewofInternational
Studies19:321-47.
A viewfromEurope. In
Zurn,Michael. 1995.The challengeofglobalizationand individualization:
and theendofthecold war,editedbyHans-HenrikHolm
Whoseworldorder?Unevenglobalization
and GeorgSorensen.Boulder,Colo.: Westview.