B EYOND H UMAN I NTERESTS IN A H EALTHY E NVIRONMENT:
P ROTECTION OF THE E NVIRONMENT, FOR THE E NVIRONMENT.
Darren L. Weber, B.Sc.(Hons.)
c 1993
Copyright Written in June, 1993
Philosophy: Environmental Ethics
2
Inherent Value in Ecosystems
Humanity has evolved within an environment that it has come to dominate, but that domination
has come with massive destruction of ecosystems. Never before in the history of life on Earth has a
species evolved with the capacity to destroy numerous species, including itself, despite knowledge of
that very capacity. Humanity faces the difficult problem of how to curb the satisfaction of its interests before it destroys itself. Perhaps humanity is on a path toward irreversible self-consumption; if
humanity is nothing without its relations to the environment, then humanity dwindles into oblivion
with every forest tree cut down to build more houses or make room for more crops and live-stock.
Perhaps the endeavour to preserve the environment is simply an endeavour to preserve humanity, but
it is more likely that the preservation of ecosystems will benefit those ecosystems as much, if not more
so, than humanity. In this paper, I attempt to explore the extension of our sympathies for living beings
beyond our family and friends, to all humanity, and to the evolution of life. It should become clear that
organisms other than people have significant interests in being free from adverse human interference.
Human Interests in a Healthy Environment
In 1972, The United Nations Stockholm Conference on the Environment added an important facet to
the entourage of human rights;
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.1
However, human rights to liberty, equality, and a healthy environment will conflict in various circumstances. William Baxter proposes four criteria by which we can evaluate the costs and benefits of
possible solutions to environmental problems:2
A. Every person should be free to do whatever she/he wishes in contexts where her/his actions do
not interfere with the interests of other human beings.
B. Waste not, want not. People have unlimited wants, but there are limited resources available to
satisfy those wants, so the satisfaction of humanity will be greatest when resources are applied
efficiently.
C. People are ends in themselves, not means to the satisfaction of the wants of others. People should
be given equal respect and each person should be expected to abide by legal prescriptions adopted
by a majority and applied universally.
D. People should have equal incentive and opportunity to improve their capacity to satisfy their
wants. Provisions of incentives for better work prompts the efficient use of resources. To ensure
that people have some incentives and opportunities there must be a welfare system to provide a
minimum standard of living from which people can aspire to rise above.
1
W. Rowland, The Plot to Save the World, Clarke, Irwin and Co., Toronto, 1973, p. 142. A discussion of the international
implications of enforcement of the human right to a healthy environment may be found in J. Symonides, “The Human Right
to a Clean, Balanced, and Protected Environment”, International Journal of Legal Information, 20, 1992, pp. 1-17.
2
W. Baxter, “People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution”, in D. Van De Veer (Ed), People, Penguins, and Plastic
Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics, Wadsworth, 1986, pp. 214-218.
Inherent Value in Ecosystems
3
Baxter’s criteria seem to be fair or relatively uncontroversial. That people should have the liberty to do
as they please so long as they do no harm to the interests of others seems just. Furthermore, although
people may not necessarily have unlimited wants, most people would agree that waste of important
resources limits the satisfaction of human needs or wants. Certainly, people in developed nations want
more than a subsistence lifestyle and people in undeveloped nations are demanding similar satisfactions. It may be true, as Marx asserts, that as society develops the capacity to produce new commodities, people begin to want those commodities; that humanity creates itself in the production of new
materials. However, people need essentials such as food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and education
before they would like to satisfy some of their sophisticated wants. With this in mind, it is a shame that
people in developed nations are concerned about the purchase of the latest television, video, or stereo
available while people in undeveloped nations worry about where the next meal is coming from. This
problem is basically one of too much freedom in developed nations, restricting freedom in undeveloped nations. This conflict in freedom leads to the need for Baxter’s fourth criterion; that all people
should have their basic needs satisfied. Baxter’s criteria provide for human freedom and the resolution
of human conflicts in such a way that satisfies human needs and as many human wants as possible.
As applied to the environment, Baxter’s criteria provide for the preservation of environments that
people desire. Baxter raises the question of whether penguins should be protected from the use of DDT
in human agriculture. He suggests that the determination of what should be done about the pollution
of penguins depends only on how possible solutions affect human interests; for Baxter, penguins have
no interests or at least any interests that can be known. He states,
Damage to penguins, or sugar pines, or geological marvels is, without more, simply irrelevant. One must go further . . . and say: Penguins are important because people enjoy seeing
them walk about rocks; and furthermore, the well-being of people would be less impaired
by halting use of DDT than by giving up penguins. . . . I have no interest in preserving penguins for their own sake.3
Baxter proposes that the well-being of ecosystems is provided for by consideration of human interests
alone because people will preserve ecosystems that they depend on for their health and sustenance. He
believes that other organisms have no interests that should be respected by people and that the interests
of people are, more often than not, consistent with the interests of other organisms. Furthermore, Baxter
argues that there is no normative implications to be drawn from “the state of nature” and that people
should pollute the environment just as much as they please. As he puts it,
I reject the proposition that we ought to respect the “balance of nature” or to “preserve
the environment” unless the reason for doing so . . . is the benefit of man. I reject the idea
that there is a “right” or “morally correct” state of nature to which we should return. The
word “nature” has no normative connotation. . . . From the fact that there is no normative
definition of the natural state, it follows that there is no normative definition of clean air or
pure water – hence no definition of polluted air – or of pollution – except by reference to the
needs of man. The “right” composition of the atmosphere is one which has some dust in
it and some lead in it and some hydrogen sulphide in it – just those amounts that attend a
sensibly organised society thoughtfully and knowledgeably persuing the greatest possible
satisfaction for its human members.4
3
4
Ibid, p. 215.
Ibid, p. 216.
4
Inherent Value in Ecosystems
For Baxter, preservation of the environment is a matter of human choice. If people want to enjoy
wilderness areas and clean air, water, and soil, they will, so long as they want those satisfactions at
least as much as the satisfaction of other wants that might detract from the satisfaction of needs for
pristine or healthy environments. He states,
. . . the costs of controlling pollution are best expressed in terms of the other goods we will
have to give up to do the job. . . . Badly as we need more housing, more medical care, and
more can openers, and more symphony orchestras, we could do with somewhat less of
them, in my judgement at least, in exchange for somewhat cleaner air and rivers. . . . Once
the trade-off relationship is clearly perceived, it is possible to state in a very general way
what the optimal level of pollution is.5
Thus, following Baxter’s criteria, the resolution of environmental problems is a free choice that should
be made so that solutions maximise human freedom to satisfy wants, without frustrating essential
human needs.
John Passmore also suggests that the resolution of environmental problems rests upon the proper
satisfaction of human needs.6 Passmore evaluates the conception of human relations with nature as it
has developed in the western world, arguably the source of most environmental vandalism. He concludes that the moral traditions of the west are adequate to resolve environmental problems and he
suggests that environmental problems will be properly resolved after the restriction of human greed
and the development of an ethos of sensual experience that kindles love of the environment. He concludes thus,
As Leopold recognised, there are “seeds” in the West of the morality he advocates in which
the active cherishing of nature is accounted good and its wanton destruction evil, even if it
would be unsafe to assume . . . that such a new morality will inevitably come to dominate
the West. The traditional moral teaching of the West, Christian or utilitarian, has always
taught men . . . that they ought not so to act as to injure their neighbours. And we have
now discovered that the disposal of wastes into sea or air, the destruction of ecosystems,
the procreation of large families, the depletion of resources, constitute injury to our fellowmen, present and future. . . . The supposition that anything but a human being has “rights”
is . . . quite untenable. It is not “rubbish” to suggest that our society actually, although not in
its explicitly-enunciated moral principles, does honour to violence, short-sightedness and
greed. What this brings out . . . is that new modes of behaviour are much more important
than new moral principles. All I am condemning is the view that every pursuit is valuable
just in so far as it is a way of making money or that money-making is the rational norm in
comparison with which all other pursuits are irrational and abnormal. . . . there is little hope
for us unless we can moderate our desire to possess. We shall do so, however, only if we
can learn to be more sensuous in our attitude to the world, more ready to enjoy the present
moment for itself, as an object of immediate pleasure, instead of frenetically seeking the
power and security that possessions offer. . . . it is as if the smoke of the industrial revolution
had destroyed men’s eyes, ears, noses, and sense of touch, or as if only be seizing upon
and making their own the familiar tenets of what had been a minority puritanism could
men justify the ugliness which they were creating around them. A more sensuous society
5
6
Ibid, p. 217.
J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, 2nd ed, Duckworth, London, 1980, pp. 173–195.
Inherent Value in Ecosystems
5
could never have endured the desolate towns, the dreary and dirty houses, the uniquely
ugly chapels, the slag heaps, the filthy rivers, the junk yards which constitute the “scenery”
of the post-industrial West and which it has exported to the East. Only if men can learn to
look sensuously at the world will they learn to care for it. Not only to look at it, but to touch
it, smell it, taste it.7
Passmore encourages love, care, and respect of the environment, but he denies that organisms other
than people have any significant interests or rights; for Passmore, humanity is the rightful custodian
of life on Earth and may plunder the resources of the Earth so long as that plunder does not harm
humanity. However, if his sensuality is taken a bit further, humanity may come to understand the
interests of other living beings and interrelationships between them.
Beyond Human Interests
There is one important problem with the views of Baxter and Passmore; they both deny that organisms
other than people are ends in themselves rather than means to the satisfaction of the wants of others. An
extension of Passmore’s encouragement of sensitivity, however, leads to attribution of intrinsic worth
to organisms other than people.
John Rodman proposes an ethics of “ecological sensibility,” which comprises three essential principles;8
A. Recognition of intrinsic value in nature.
i. Beings with a capacity for self-regulation and self-direction have purpose in their lives and
therefore should be respected as ends in themselves rather than means to the satisfaction of
the wants of others.
ii. A system of values that incorporates preservation of diversity, complexity, integrity, harmony, stability, etc. in ecosystems. For example, Leopold proposes that “a thing is right
when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.”
B. A metaphysics that accounts for relationships and systems as well as individuals. That is, a conceptualisation of the identity of beings as intrinsically related to other beings and the processes of
their evolution.
C. An ethics that includes duties such as non-interference with nature, intervention to repair environmental damage, and a style of co-habitation with nature.
Rodman does not so much attempt to persuade people to adopt a new ethics as suggest that a
person interested in this system of ethics may develop an “ecological sensibility” from interaction with
nature and the growth of a sense of wonder.9 Rodman suggests that an ecological sensibility is “. . . a
complex pattern of perceptions, attitudes, and judgements which, if fully developed, would constitute
7
Ibid, pp. 188–189.
J. Rodman, “Ecological Sensibility”, in D. Van De Veer (Ed), People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics, Wadsworth, 1986, pp. 165–168.
9
A similar argument may be found in P. Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature”, in D. Van De Veer (Ed), People,
Penguins, and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics, Wadsworth, 1986, pp. 169–184.
8
6
Inherent Value in Ecosystems
a disposition to appropriate conduct that would make talk of rights and duties unnecessary under
normal conditions.”10 An ecological sensibility challenges the superiority of humanity and places value
on the well-being of nature as a whole. Although Baxter may be correct in asserting that there is no
normative state of nature, an ecological sensibility predisposes people to consider the well-being of
other organisms and the ecological processes that support them, so that people begin to appreciate
healthy ecosystems. People with an ecological sensibility would more often than not choose to preserve
healthy ecosystems rather than their dissolution, even if their choices frustrate some of their civilised
wants.
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of an ecological sensibility is the recognition of intrinsic value
in nature. It is argued that systems as complex as ecosystems have a purpose because of their tendency
to promote diversity in life forms. However, if such complex entities as ecosystems have a telos or
purpose of their own that should be respected, then how are we to know what it is exactly that we
should respect? Although it may be difficult to understand the purposes of a complex entity such as an
ecosystem, we cannot assume that ecosystems have no purpose of their own. Just as we cannot know
the purposes of children, we assume that children have purposes of their own, or at least that they
will develop their own purposes. A lack of understanding of an entities purpose should prompt us to
wonder at it with the expectation of discovering a real purpose or a potential purpose.
Some people may be cynical about the possibility that ecosystems have purposes and, furthermore,
they may be concerned that if ecosystems have purposes then it will be difficult to respect those purposes properly. Baxter, for instance, cannot believe that the preferences of nature can be known or
represented in human decision making. He states,
. . . if polar bears or pine trees or penguins, like men, are to be regarded as ends rather than
means, if they are to count in our calculus of social organisation, someone must tell me how
much each one counts, and someone must tell me how these life forms are to be permitted
to express their preferences, for I do not know either answer. If the answer is that certain
people are to hold their proxies, then I want to know how those proxy-holders are to be
selected.11
Although knowledge of the interests of illiterate beings is difficult to obtain, it is not unreasonable to
assume that biologists (zoologists, botanists, ecologists, etc.) have a very good understanding of what
promotes the well-being of various organisms. Thus, if anybody is to represent the interests of various
organisms, it should be biologists, who could be appointed to an official office responsible for preservation of various organisms and their interactions. The weight that should be attached to the interests
of various organisms is a sticky issue. It would be unrealistic to assign equal weight to the interests of
all organisms. Rather, if we adopt an ecological sensibility, particularly a respect for the integrity, diversity, complexity, and stability of ecosystems, then it would be reasonable to assign greatest value to
rare or endangered organisms and least value to organisms that disrupt the well-being of ecosystems.
Furthermore, the adoption of an ecological sensibility requires that an office responsible for preservation of various organisms be endowed with the power to interrupt human activities that endanger
various organisms and the power to implement reparation of damage done to various organisms due
to human activity. Also, an office responsible for preservation of various organisms should present regular reports to a legislative authority and sincere recommendations to public authorities and private
enterprises for the adaptation of human activities to better preserve various organisms.
10
11
Rodman, op cit, p. 165.
Baxter, op cit, p. 216.
Inherent Value in Ecosystems
7
Conclusion
The preservation of wilderness and the health of the biosphere would benefit not only humanity but all
life on Earth.12 It is not yet clear exactly what interests that organisms other than people have, but we
cannot assume that our ignorance is proof that other organisms have no interests. We have a lot to learn
from biology about the well-being of the biosphere and, with the development of an ethos similar to the
ecological sensibility of Rodman, we could expect to move toward a proper respect for the biosphere
and our place in it. Although human interests in a healthy environment are significant, they are not
sufficient to preserve the health and well-being of the biosphere. People may be able to preserve the
genetic material of organisms they wish to possess, but unless they have a proper respect for other
organisms as ends in themselves they may not preserve the habitats that organisms belong to. The
development of an ecological sensibility entails respect for organisms as ends in themselves, as beings
that are intrinsically related to other beings. It also extends our conception of our well-being as the
well-being of our bodies and the interactions we have with other organisms and inanimate entities in
the biosphere. An ecological sensibility provides us with a new perspective on life, one that appreciates
diversity, complexity, stability, and beauty in the biosphere.
Bibliography
Books
Passmore J., Man’s Responsibility for Nature, 2nd ed, Duckworth, London, 1980.
Rowland W., The Plot to Save the World, Clarke, Irwin and Co., Toronto, 1973.
Articles
Baxter W., “People or Penguins: The Case for Optimal Pollution”, in D. Van De Veer (Ed), People,
Penguins, and Plastic Trees: Basic Issues in Environmental Ethics, Wadsworth, 1986, pp. 214-218.
Rodman J., “Ecological Sensibility”, in D. Van De Veer (Ed), People, Penguins, and Plastic Trees: Basic
Issues in Environmental Ethics, Wadsworth, 1986, pp. 165-168.
Symonides J., “The Human Right to a Clean, Balanced, and Protected Environment”, International Journal of Legal Information, 20, 1992, pp. 1–17.
12
I have referred to ecosystems throughout this paper, but the collection of ecosystems on Earth, as they exist now and as
they evolve, is better referred to as the biosphere. The biosphere is roughly that portion of the earth’s crust, its waters and
soils, and the atmosphere that is inhabited by life.