CHUNZAN WU
https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/graduate-program/candidates/chunzan-wu
chunzan@sas.upenn.edu
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
MANOVSKI@ ECON.UPENN.EDU
Placement Director: Iourii Manovskii
Placement Director: Andrew Postlewaite
Graduate Student Coordinator: Kelly Quinn
APOSTLEW@ECON.UPENN.EDU
KQUINN @ ECON.UPENN.EDU
215-898-6880
215-898-7350
215-898-5691
Office Contact Information
160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Phone: 530-219-7231
Personal Information
Citizenship: China
Undergraduate Studies
B.S., Chemistry, Peking University, 2004
B.A., Economics, Peking University, 2004
Masters Level Work
M.A., Economics, Peking University, 2007
Graduate Studies
University of California, Davis, 2009 to 2011
University of Pennsylvania, 2011 to present
Thesis Title: “Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policy Implications of Household Labor Supply”
Expected Completion Date: June 2016
Thesis Committee and References:
Professor Dirk Krueger (Primary Advisor)
Department of Economics,
University of Pennsylvania,
3718 Locust Walk,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
Phone: (215) 573-1424
Email: dkrueger@econ.upenn.edu
Professor Harold L. Cole
Department of Economics,
University of Pennsylvania,
3718 Locust Walk,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
Phone: (215) 898-7788
Email: colehl@sas.upenn.edu
Professor Guido Menzio
Department of Economics,
University of Pennsylvania,
3718 Locust Walk,
Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA
Phone: (215) 898-5170
Email: gmenzio@sas.upenn.edu
Teaching and Research Fields
Primary fields: Macroeconomics
Secondary fields: Public Finance, Labor Economics, Computational Economics
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Teaching Experience
Ph.D. Level
Spring, 2014
Macroeconomic Theory I , University of Pennsylvania, Teaching Assistant for
Spring, 2013
Professor Dirk Krueger And Professor Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde
Undergraduate Level
Fall, 2015
Macroeconomic Theory, University of Pennsylvania, Teaching Assistant for
Professor Dirk Krueger
Spring, 2015
Macroeconomic Theory, University of Pennsylvania, Teaching Assistant for
Professor Guido Menzio
Fall, 2014
Macroeconomic Theory, University of Pennsylvania, Teaching Assistant for
Professor Guillermo Ordonez
Fall, 2013
Statistics for Economists ,University of Pennsylvania, Teaching Assistant for
Professor Francis J. DiTraglia
Fall, 2012
International Trade, University of Pennsylvania, Teaching Assistant for Professor
Wilfred J. Ethier
Research Experience and Other Employment
Fall, 2013
University of Pennsylvania, Research Assistant for Professor Mathieu
Taschereau-Dumouchel
Spring, 2013
University of Pennsylvania, Research Assistant for Professor Iourii Manovskii
Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships
2015
Joel Popkin Graduate Student Teaching Prize in Economics for outstanding
teaching performance by a teaching assistant in economics, University of
Pennsylvania
2012
Lawrence Robbins Prize in Economics to the student judged to be the best in the
first year class, University of Pennsylvania
Research Papers:
“More Unequal Income but Less Progressive Taxation: Economics or Politics?” (Job Market Paper)
Abstract: Since the 1970s, income inequality in the U.S. has increased sharply. During the same time
span, the U.S. federal income tax has become less progressive. Why? I examine this question in a
Ramsey optimal tax policy framework. Within this framework, the tax policy is determined by: (1) a set
of Pareto weights representing the government's preference over different households; and (2) household
lifetime utilities summarizing the effects of economic fundamentals. I first study the changes in
economic fundamentals using an overlapping generations incomplete-markets life-cycle model with
heterogeneous households. The model features both endogenous human capital accumulation and
household labor supply and is calibrated to the U.S. economy in the 1970s and 2010s. Then I use this
economic model to determine whether the change in income tax is the result of an optimal policy
response to changing economic fundamentals or the consequence of a change in Pareto weights. I
interpret the latter as changes in the political influences of various income groups. I find that: (1)
changes in economic fundamentals alone induce a less progressive optimal income tax and can account
for 40% of the reduction in progressivity we observe; and (2) the change in Pareto weights required to
explain the remaining part of tax policy change favors high-income households and also implies less
valued government services. Finally, using a stylized political economy model, I discuss potential
explanations for this change in Pareto weights such as the lower cost of conveying information to swing
voters and the rising inequality of voter turnout among different socioeconomic groups.
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“How Much Consumption Insurance in Bewley Models with Endogenous Family Labor Supply?”
(with Dirk Krueger)
Abstract: We show that a calibrated life-cycle two-earner household model with endogenous labor
supply can rationalize the extent of consumption insurance against wage shocks estimated empirically
by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2014) (BPS hereafter) in the U.S. data. With additive
separable preferences, the model can account for about 94% and 91% of consumption insurance against
male and female permanent wage shocks in the data, and only 41% of male and 28% of female
permanent wage shocks in the model pass through to household consumption. With non-separable
preferences, more consumption insurance is generated, and the pass-through rates are 27% and 18%,
respectively. Most notably, the majority of the consumption insurance against permanent male wage
shocks is provided through the endogenous labor supply response of the female earner. We also
evaluate, using model-simulated data, whether the empirical approach of BPS delivers unbiased
consumption responses to wage shocks. We find that the method overestimates the amount of
consumption insurance against male permanent wage shocks, and underestimates that against female
permanent wage shocks, but only moderately so. We find larger biases for the outside insurance
coefficient which BPS use to capture the insurance provided through channels outside their model. We
document that the magnitudes of the biases are not sensitive to the existence of tight borrowing
constraints or the presence of an extensive female labor supply margin given their implementation
method.
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