Situationism and Virtue Epistemology
Rie Iizuka
(i)
Introduction
Sometime around the year 2000, some philosophers began criticizing virtue ethics
based on social psychological data. These data could be seen in everything from the
Milgram experiment on obedience to the Stanford prison experiment on authority by
Zimbardo; they also appeared in empirical research on mood effects and group effects,
and in the Good Samaritans studies (Alzola 2008; Darley and Batson 1973; Isen and
Levin 1972; Latane and Darley 1970; Milgram 1963; Zimbardo et al. 1973).
Situationists believe that various psychological data show that our behavior is heavily
influenced by trivial and morally irrelevant factors; thus virtue theories, which are
based on cross-situationally coherent character traits, are empirically inadequate. John
Doris repeatedly emphasized the importance of committing to ‘psychological realism’
in ethics. The idea is that ethical reflection should be predicated on a moral
psychology bearing a recognizable resemblance to actual human psychologies (Doris
2002: 112). Gilbert Herman is in the same camp (Herman 1999). Having complied
with this methodology, these philosophers drew a conclusion that virtue ethics is
empirically inadequate.
At around the same time, in epistemology, the notion of intellectual virtues began to
gain popularity1, in order to solve new and traditional epistemological problems. It is
now widely known that virtue epistemology is divided into two main camps:
reliabilist virtue epistemology and responsibilist virtue epistemology. In virtue
responsibilism, virtues are understood as our excellent intellectual characters traits,
typical examples being open-mindedness, intellectual courage and tenacity.
Responsibilist virtue epistemology is an epistemic counterpart of virtue ethics, and
could thus be easily assumed to become a target of situationist critique in the same
vein. As expected, Mark Alfano recently criticized virtue responsibilism as being
empirically inadequate. Alfano took intellectual courage as a typical case of
intellectual virtue, and argued that we do not normally have intellectual courage as a
global trait in the way that virtue epistemologists have assumed. To this end, he cites
experiments designed by Solomon Asch. According to the well-known Asch paradigm
experiments, ‘seven confederates and a single participant judged serially and aloud,
1
Strictly speaking, intellectual virtue (or, epistemic virtue) was first introduced
in epistemology in 1980 by Ernest Sosa (1980). Here, I especially have virtue
responsibilism in mind, with reference to Linda Zagzebski’s (1996) groundbreaking
book on virtue responsibilism .
which of two lines was longer. The correct answer was always obvious to the naked
eye. Nevertheless, occasionally, the confederates unanimously said that the shorter
line was longer. After hearing the confederates rattle off their wrong answers,
participants often went along with the majority’ (Alfano 2012: 244). While 25% of the
participants refused to go along with the majority, a great many (75% of the
participants) went along with majority more often than not. This is just the tip of the
iceberg, and Alfano took it as a case of people behaving under the influence of trivial
and epistemically irrelevant situational factors. His assumption is that this kind of
argument can be generalized into various kinds of epistemic virtues, thus threatening
the empirical adequacy of responsibilist virtue epistemology. Thus, responsibilist
virtue epistemology, as well as virtue ethics, are the targets of situationists’ attacks.
For the sake of argument, I will hereafter use the term ‘virtue theory’ to indicate both
virtue ethics and responsibilist virtue epistemology.
Is virtue theory really as empirically inadequate as situationists assume? Is it
incompatible to be a psychological realist as well as a virtue theorist? In the following
sections of this paper, I investigate some possible interpretations of why situationists
think that virtue theory is empirically inadequate, and I argue that the critique is not
justified. In showing this, I will look into the psychological research on motivation,
and conclude that the social psychology approach is not the only way to be
“psychologically real.”
(ii)
Why are virtue theories under attack?
The reason why neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism, but only virtue theories, are
under attack is that virtues are morally thick concepts (Alfano 2012: 229). While the
nature of morally thick concepts (as opposed to morally thin concepts, like what is
right or good) still remains controversial, it is widely understood as a normative
notion with descriptive content. For instance, intellectual courage, one of those
paradigmatic intellectual virtues, pertains to the way a virtuous person takes action
(by taking a risk, overcoming fear, etc.); it is normative in that it is praiseworthy.
The object of situationist criticism is the descriptive part of virtue concepts;
specifically, situationists are skeptical about the empirical adequacy of the properties
virtues designate. Yet, the idea that the descriptive component of virtue is empirically
inadequate remains uncertain, and calls for further investigation. In Doris’s picture,
the explanation and predication of our behavior relates to the roles that descriptive
components are supposed to serve.
Attributing a quality of character invokes a depiction of behavior and psychology: the
brave person acts distinctively, with distinctive motives, affects, and cognitions.
Attributions also underwrite explanation and prediction: knowing something about a
person's character is supposed to render their behavior intelligible and help observers
determine what behaviors to expect. (Doris 2002: 5)
The simplest interpretation of this argument can be reconstructed in the following
manner:
(1) The descriptive component of virtue is to serve the explanation and prediction
of our behavior;
(2) Social psychology gives us a genuine explanation and prediction of our
behavior, which is not compatible with the properties involved in the
descriptive component of virtue;
(3) Thus, virtue theory is wrong-headed
However, this is the case only if virtue theories are meant for the explanation and
prediction of “our” behavior in the first place. Here “we” implies the majority of
human beings. Normally, virtue theorists don’t assent to this thesis. This interpretation
is based on the skewed understanding of virtue theories and, most of the time, virtue
theorists admit that it is rare and difficult for normal human beings to possess virtues.
In the similar vein, King explicitly opposes the situationist conclusion by saying
that ‘even in some of the most ‘situationist-friendly’ studies, 13% to 20% of the
subjects were reported to exhibit the relevant behavior. If we take the studies at face
value, and their results as representative of the population at large, there may still be
hundreds of millions of people who exhibit responsibilist virtues’ (King 2014: 252). If
virtue theories describe the properties of the disposition of those 13% to 20% of
human beings, there’s no reason to doubt that the descriptions might help the rest of
us who are striving for virtues as well. The more precise descriptions of virtues we
find, the better the possibilities of appreciating those virtues. Thus we might be able to
encourage further investigation on virtues, rather than give up on this endeavor.
Considering this, it can be said that virtues are our ideals. Doris, however, is
skeptical about this kind of virtue theory as well. It is widely acknowledged that one
of the advantages of committing to virtue theory is that it provides a way of
inculcating appropriate dispositions and to escape the worry of the ‘creepiness’ of
theory-driven moral reflection. It is assumed that a habituated person behaves as she
should, without any reference to theory. But when we construe virtue as our ideal,
‘now worries about theoretical mediation may recur, if ethical practice consists in
regulating behavior by references to an ideal of virtue instead of simply acting from
virtuous dispositions’ (Doris 2002: 152). In section 4, I will argue that this worry is
misplaced, because of Doris’ skewed understanding of virtue theory.
In the next section, other possible interpretations of the “empirical inadequacy of the
descriptive components of virtues” are considered, and the argument shows that even
the most promising interpretation is compatible with virtue theory.
(iii)
Descriptive implication of virtues
Up to this point, it has become clear that situationist critique, if understood as “the
majority of us is not virtuous”, is based on a misunderstanding of virtue theory. But
this is not the end of our debate. It might still be the case that situationists trace back
to the descriptive implications of virtue realization, and become skeptical about the
empirical adequacy of these.
In other words, while the fact that many of us are not virtuous at the moment may
not be harmful for virtue theory, if those descriptive implications of virtue i.e. the
empirical background condition, which is necessary for realizing the properties of the
descriptive components of virtues, turn out to be empirically inadequate in some way,
it can prove to be detrimental for virtue theories. In essence, virtue theories turn out to
be empirically inadequate only if the following conditions are true:
① Our character traits in principle never explain nor predict our behaviors at all; our
actions are nothing but the construct of situational factors, never of our dispositions
② Character traits exist, but they are fixed and resistant to change
③ Character traits, if any, are not responsive to internal variables (for example,
motivation)
In this section, I visit ① and ②, and consider ③ in later sections. You may notice
that ① and ② are mutually exclusive because ① denies the existence of character
traits, and ② affirms them. Both of them, however, oppose the foundation of virtue
theory in distinct ways.
First of all, ① is an extremely radical standpoint. Even Doris, an eminent situationist,
is reluctant to endorse this view. Among the three theoretical commitments of virtue
theories: consistency, stability and evaluative integration2, he denies consistency and
2
Doris argues that virtue theorists commit to the following three conditions:(1) Consistency.
Character and personality traits are reliably manifested in
trait-relevant behavior across a diverse range of trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary
widely in their conduciveness to the manifestation of the trait in question; (2) Stability. Character and
personality traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behaviors over iterated trials of similar
trait-relevant eliciting conditions. (3) Evaluative integration. In a given character or personality, the
occurrence of a trait with a particular evaluative valence is probabilistically related to the occurrence of
other traits with similar evaluative valences. (Doris 2002: 22).
evaluative integration, but retains stability. In other words, he doesn’t believe that our
behavior remains the same across situations, but rather believes it is stable in highly
limited domains (for instance, honesty in tests or generosity towards family members),
and he calls these ‘local traits’. So, our behavior is explained and predicted by the
reference to character traits in this minimum sense.
It is widely embraced that a renaissance is underway in the study of the Big Five
personality traits. Many psychologists now believe that ‘there are five major
dimensions along which all human characters vary. Thus, any individual can be given
five scores that will tell us a great deal about the ways [in which] they are reliable to
behave through their lives’ (Nettle 2007: 9). Those five factors are openness,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. In each of these
factors, we are placed somewhere along the continuum of personality dimensions.
The idea of fixed traits is strongly supported. Point ① can be denied in this vein.
Unfortunately, however, the Big Five is not a boon to virtue theorists, but just
another obstacle. According to Alfano, the Big Five is different from virtue theory in a
sense that personality traits are assumed as innate and relatively fixed, and that they
are hard to change. Thus, those traits are not under our control, not a result of our
choice, and not a proper subject of responsibility, praise or blame. On the other hand,
responsibility, choice, praise and blame are all central concepts in virtue theories.
Although it is undeniable that the two theories are independent, one of the threats for
virtue implication (point ①) is removed by the Big Five.
As for point ②, the description of the Big Five is likely to support this point, and
thus threaten the descriptive implication of virtue theory. But wait, we must consider
how situationism and the Big Five can be compatible, for both assume a completely
different picture of human nature. In big five, our behavior is determined by innate
fixed traits; in situationism, on the other hand, nothing but situational factors play an
explanatory role in our behavior. When we take both these factors at face value, it is
very likely that the two would seem contradictory to each other. Here, neither aims at
providing a singular explanation of our behavior, but they do compete in terms of
explanatory superiority with regards to our behavior.
This is, quite simply, another way of drawing a debate between genetic determinism
and environmental determinism. The explanatory superiority might interest
philosophers, but ending this debate is not our concern at the moment. Rather, by
admitting that both these theories are right to some extent, and that the two parties are
at a standstill, is likely to support the denial of point ②—and this is crucial to our
present argument.
In this section, we have scrutinized the descriptive implication of virtue and its
empirical adequacy. It was revealed that the psychological theories on our character
(personality) traits did not deny our descriptive implications of virtue. Before moving
on to consider point ③, however, the requirement of virtue is to be articulated.
(iv)
Moral and epistemic motivation
In order to be virtuous (to possess virtue), what must we be equipped with? In this
section, by paying close attention to the commitment to virtue theory, the conditions
imposed upon us for becoming virtuous are to be articulated.
First of all, let’s take a look at the epistemological requirements of virtue. Virtue
responsibilists propose three conditions:
(a) all intellectual virtues have in common something like a 'love of truth' or a desire
for knowledge;
(b) each individual virtue has its own distinctive and more immediate focus
or a motivation on account of which it can be individuated from other intellectual
virtues; […]
(c) the immediate focus or characteristic of particular intellectual virtues is 'grounded
in' or 'flows from' the more basic concern with truth, knowledge, and the like. (Baehr
2013: 100)
For instance, in order to possess open-mindedness, agents are to be motivated by
epistemic goods, and because of this love of epistemic goods, the person forms an
individual disposition to avoid falling prey to partiality, and to listen to another
person’s opinion.
Along similar lines, virtue theorist Rosalind Hursthouse, emphasizes the
importance of being appropriately motivated to become virtuous. Williams maintains
that the virtuous choose virtuous actions “for their own sake, and that is required for
acting virtuously,” and Hursthouse followed suit:
The virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions ‘for their own sake’; [this] means that
the virtuous agent chooses virtuous actions for at least one of a certain type or range
of reasons X, where “the type or range” is typical of, and differs according to,
whichever virtue is in question. What are the reasons “typical of” a virtue? They will
be the sorts of reasons for which someone with a particular virtue, V, will do a V act.
So, thinking of the sorts of reasons a courageous agent might have for performing a
courageous act, we can come up with such things as ‘I could probably save him if I
climbed up there,’ ‘Someone had to volunteer,’ ‘One can't give in to tyrants,’ or ‘It's
worth the risk (1999: 127-28).
Moral motivation is thus an important notion in terms of possessing moral virtues.
Specifically, what is required is to act on certain reasoning that is appropriate for
individual virtues. It is crucial to note that these reasons are not necessarily mediated
by any theory. Virtue theorists are aware of the danger of falling prey to the platonic
fantasy (the assumption that in order to possess virtue, a person must also know the
theory of virtues), and deliberately avoid committing to theoretical assumptions.
Uncertainty still remains on moral motivation. Some theorists suggest that it is not
necessary to be consciously aware of the aforementioned reasons of action when
carrying them out. They equally admit that this kind of requirement sounds too
strong and severe. Hursthouse (1999:132-34) rightly points out that apparent cases
of action with appropriate moral motivation sometimes fail, for example, in the cases
of small children, severely mentally handicapped people, and adults who act with an
appropriate reason for virtue, but “uncharacteristically” None of these agents are
morally motivated in a genuine sense. What is missing in these subjects compared to
the genuinely virtuous? With regards to this issue, Baehr (2013: 103) detailed further
requirements. To be genuinely virtuous, the traits in question must become a person's
own, i.e. they must become integrated into the person’s psychology or character in a
relatively deep and personal way. In order to meet this requirement, two further
conditions ought to be met: according to Baehr, first, the agent ought to identify with
or endorse this trait, which in turn would seem to require at a minimum that the
person take a positive view of the trait or have some grasp or awareness of its value.
Second, the person himself/herself ought to become a significant part of the
explanation of his/her possession of the traits in question. Baehr believes that, in this
way, if an apparent virtuous trait T turns out to be infused by the person’s
community or parents, and the possession of the traits are solely explainable by this,
we cannot credit the person with them. Thus, in terms of virtue possession, we have
both synchronic requirements of moral motivation for individual actions, and
diachronic requirements on ourselves, to which those actions are attributed.
These arguments have two theoretical implications for our present problems. First,
it articulates that having a natural inclination and possessing a virtue is a distinct
matter. Thus insight from the Big Five personality traits has nothing to do with virtue
possession in any significant way.
Second, this point plays an important role in replying to Doris’s worry introduced
in section 1. If virtue is our ideal, he infers from it the conclusion that we must refer to
the theory, and thus fall prey to theoretical mediation However, we have just seen that
this is an ill-motivated worry, and that the reference to virtue theory is not necessary
for virtue procession at all. What is mainly required for agents is to act on one of the
reasons, X, appropriate for an individual virtue, V. As Hursthouse rightly noted,
appropriate reasons can be partly shared by many of atypical virtuous people, and we
might be able to learn from them through observation.
In this section, we have seen the requirements of virtues and found that the Doris’s
worry is misplaced. In the last section, it will be shown that our consideration on
virtue is, in one sense, ‘psychologically real’.
(v)
Self-determination theory and virtue ethics
We have seen that virtue theories as a normative ideal do not necessarily entail
theoretically-heavy concepts. It is time to return to our original argument, namely,
point ③. How has it been proved that we form our dispositions based on our internal
variables (i.e. motivations)? While many virtue theorists implicitly see this idea as a
prerequisite, unfortunately, they do not rely on any empirical data. If it is not feasible
to show that this is the case on any justificatory ground, virtue theories might turn into
a house of cards. In this section, empirical support for the theoretical assumption for
virtue theory is to be introduced, and I will especially look into the psychological
study on our motivation.
Self-determination (or the study of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation) theory, proposed
by Ryan and Deci, suggests that the idea of intrinsic/extrinsic motivation implies not
the quantity or magnitude of motivation, but the quality of it (the orientation of our
motivation); it is this that can predict the outcome of our behavior. The most basic
distinction made with regards to the orientation of our motivation is between intrinsic
and extrinsic motivations. Intrinsic motivation refers to doing something because it is
inherently interesting or enjoyable, while extrinsic motivation is doing something
because it leads to a concrete outcome. ‘Over three decades of research have shown
that the quality of experience and performance can be very different
when one is behaving for intrinsic versus extrinsic reasons' (Deci and Ryan 2008: 55).
Already in the early stages of motivation studies, the results indicated that those who
solved puzzles under the threat of punishment, or having the payment of money
contingent upon their performances, were less intrinsically motivated during the
free-choice period than subjects who solved the same puzzles with no threats or
rewards (Deci 1972). Deci drew the conclusion that when extrinsically motivated, our
interest in the activity is diminished.
A more recent study on motivation indicates that the orientation of extrinsic
motivations can vary. The state of lacking intention to act is called “amotivation.”
Such behaviors are performed to satisfy an external demand or to obtain an externally
imposed reward; this is called “external regulation.” Behaviors with a type of internal
regulation that is still quite controlling—performing actions upon feeling the pressure
to avoid guilt or anxiety, or to attain ego-enhancement or pride—is called “introjected
regulation.” When a person has identified with the personal importance of a behavior
and has thus accepted its regulation as being his or her own, it is called
“identification.” The most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation is “integrated
regulation.” Integration occurs when identified regulations have been fully assimilated
to the self (Ryan and Deci 2000). This last type of orientation of our extrinsic and
intrinsic motivation is both taken as autonomous and self-determined motivation.
The qualitative difference of our motivation explains the different outcomes of our
behavior. SDT and motivation theory have two implications that support the
descriptive components of virtue theory, one of which gives indirect support, while
the other provides more direct support. I will visit them both here.
First, how does SDT support virtue theory in an indirect manner? Here, I say
“indirect,” because the conclusion that we are aiming to arrive at comes not as an
empirical result of SDT, but rather as a presupposition. Based on the explanatory and
predictive power of SDT, it is inferred that its presupposition is also empirically
adequate.
SDT is not feasible unless it is possible that our behavioral outcome changes based
on the orientation of our motivation. Empirical results strongly support that
intrinsically motivated subjects are led to various desirable outcomes compared to the
extrinsically motivated counterparts. Here, SDT is confirmed by various empirical
results, thus, the adequacy of its presupposition, namely, our behavioral outcome
changes based on the orientation of our motivation. Also, the orientation of our
motivation is understood as our internal variables. This supports the denial of point
③.
Next, how does SDT support virtue theory in a direct manner? The most important
point is that SDT pays attention to subjects who engage in desirable behaviors in a
variety of contexts. For example, SDT is applied to the domains of sports, education
and healthcare. Believing in the importance of these domains in our life is undeniable.
Among them, I will take education as a representative. Our understanding of
successful or ideal agents in education is universally shared with less controversy
compared to other domains, such as morality. Believing that success in education
contributes towards a good life is widespread across cultures and eras. If it were
argued to the contrary, I believe that the burden of proof is on the side of showing us
why that isn’t the case.
According to the review of studies on SDT and education, “students who are
regulated by autonomous motivations (i.e., intrinsic and identified) experience
positive consequences at school. These consequences can take different forms
(behavioral, cognitive, or affective).” (Guay et al. 2008: 234) Behavioral outcomes are
found by conducting a series of experiments. Students who dropped out of high
school had lower intrinsic motivation and identified regulation, and higher
amotivation compared to students who persisted. Autonomous motivation and
persistence (for example, in terms of picking up additional reading or taking on
optional exercise) in college students can be enhanced by activating intrinsic
educational goals. It has also been shown that autonomous motivation predicted
greater achievement over a one-year period (Guay et al. 2008).
Thus, SDT has shown that our orientation of motivation has a strong influence
on the achievement of desirable activities. This is extremely suggestive for virtue
epistemology. Responsibilist virtue epistemologists inquired into what is necessary for
becoming responsible, intellectual agents. They found that this could be achieved by
the cultivation of intellectual virtues. In essence, as we have already seen in the
previous section, it is necessary for the possession of virtues to be motivated by
epistemic goods for their own sake. It is also important to cultivate individual
character traits derived from these motivations, internalize its value to the self (i.e.,
having a positive perspective on traits), and the agents must be a significant part of the
explanation of the possession of virtues. These conditions, imposed upon us, have a
significant overlap with the motivational structure of autonomous agents who are led
to desirable outcomes. We have already seen that students with desirable educational
outcomes tend to be motivated by educational activities themselves, or that they
integrated values of education within themselves. These agents precisely meet the
conditions imposed upon us by virtue epistemologists to be responsible inquirers.
Thus it can be inferred that these empirical findings support the adequacy of the
descriptive component of (intellectual) virtues.
SDT implies that agents with desirable outcomes in real life are motivated by
activities, or that they integrate the value of the activities within themselves. This is
the same criteria for virtuous agents. Skepticism regarding the adequacy of the
descriptive component of virtue theory has been eradicated by the framework of
psychological study on the orientation of motivation. In addition, experimental
findings with regards to SDT and education encourage us to believe that the
descriptive components of intellectual virtues are true to reality.
(vi)
Conclusion
Although situationists have criticized virtue theory for its empirical inadequacy,
the nature of this criticism remains ambiguous and the specification of them was an
urgent task for us. The debate between virtue theorists and situationists drag on,
especially when it comes to this ambiguity. In this paper, possible interpretations on
empirical inadequacy of the descriptive components of virtues were scrutinized
individually, and the conclusion was drawn that none of them diminished the validity
of virtue theories. While situationists have assumed that social psychological studies
undermine the empirical adequacy of virtue theory, it only shows that, at best, not
many of us are virtuous. The important point is that psychology is not exhausted by
social psychology, and when we pay close attention to studies on the orientation of
motivation, it is more convincing to believe that our motivation has an influence on
desirable behavioral outcomes. Moreover, the descriptive components of virtues are
supported by those motivation studies, and they correspond well with the way people
are motivated when they engage in important activities. Supporting virtue theory and
being a psychological realist are, thus, compatible after all.
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