Appendix 4.6 (Americanization of European Culture? Case Study: Disney in France)
Until 1992, the Walt Disney Company had
experienced nothing but success in the theme park
business. Its first park, Disneyland, opened in
Anaheim, California, in 1955. Its theme song, "It's a
Small World After All," promoted "an idealized
vision of America spiced with reassuring glimpses of
exotic cultures all calculated to promote
heartwarming feelings about living together as one
happy family. There were dark tunnels and bumpy
rides to scare the children a little but none of the
terrors of the real world....” The Anaheim park was
an instant success.”
In the 1970s, the triumph was repeated in Florida
(DisneyWorld), and in 1983, Disney proved the
Japanese also have an affinity for Mickey Mouse
with the successful opening of Tokyo Disneyland.
Having won over the Japanese, Disney executives in
1986 turned their attention to France and, more
specifically, to Paris, the self-proclaimed capital of
European high culture. France beat out more than
200 bidders from all over the world who tried to
attract Disney to their countries. But Paris was
chosen because of demographics and subsidies.
About 17 million Europeans live less than a two-hour drive from Paris. Another 310 million can fly there in
the same time or less. Also, the French government offered the company more than $1 billion in various
incentives, in the expectation that the project would create 30,000 French jobs.
Cultural Mistakes
From the beginning, it was clear that there would be conflict between the American theme park and the
culturally proud French people. Intellectuals in Paris attacked the transplantation of Disney's dreamworld
as an assault on French culture. They called it the “new beachhead of American imperialism” and a
“terrifying step toward world homogenization.” The Minister of Culture boycotted the opening,
proclaiming it to be an unwelcome symbol of American clichés and a consumer society. But Disney seemed
unconcerned about fitting in to French cultural norms: "We didn’t come in and say O.K., we’re going to put
a beret and a baguette on Mickey Mouse. We are who we are." Disney pushed ahead with the 1992 opening
of the $5 billion park. But, shortly after EuroDisneyland opened, French farmers drove their tractors to
the entrance and blocked it, focusing attention upon the cultural tension between Disney and Paris.
Then there were a number of cultural mistakes in the park's operation. Disney's policy of serving no
alcohol in the park caused astonishment in a country where a glass of wine for lunch is a given. Disney
thought that Monday would be a light day for visitors and Friday a heavy one and allocated staff
accordingly, but the reality was the reverse. Another surprise was the hotel breakfast debacle. "We were
told that Europeans 'don't take breakfast,' so we downsized the restaurants," recalled one Disney
Adapted from Hill, Charles W.L. (2000). Disney in France. In International Business, Competing in the Global
Marketplace. Irwin McGraw Hill, pp. 106-107. Online at web.efzg.hr/dok/UMK/Case DISNEY Hill.pdf
Appendix 4.6 (Americanization of European Culture? Case Study: Disney in France)
executive. "And guess what? Everybody showed up for breakfast. We were trying to serve 2,500
breakfasts in a 350-seat restaurant at some of the hotels. The lines were horrendous.” Lunch turned out
to be another problem. "Everybody wanted lunch at 12:30. The crowds were huge. Our smiling cast
members had to...engage in some 'behavior modification' to teach them that they could eat lunch at 11:00
AM or 2:00 PM." Other cultural miscalculations included serving only American food in the park and
celebrating American cultural events (like Halloween) that had little relevance for Europeans.
.
There were major staffing problems too. Disney tried to use the same teamwork model with its staff that
had worked so well in America and Japan, but it ran into trouble in France. Controversies erupted when
Disney's American managers required English to be spoken at all meetings and enforced Disney's
appearance code for staff, which strictly regulated the use of makeup, facial hair, tattoos, and jewellery.
In the first months 1,000 employees, 10 percent of the total, quit. One former EuroDisney employee
called Disney's training, "brainwashing," and left after dispute over the timing of his lunch hour. Other
French trainees questioned Disney's policy that employees always smile. (Generally, French people don't
smile unless they mean it, and seldom smile when talking to a perfect stranger.) Another former employee
noted, "I don't think that they realize what Europeans are like. . . that we ask questions and don't think all
the same way."
One of the biggest problems, however, was
that Europeans didn't stay at the park for the
four to five days that Disney expected. While
EuroDisney succeeded in attracting 9 million
visitors a year, in line with its plans, most
stayed only a day or two. Most Europeans
regard theme parks as places for day
excursions, not a destination for an extended
vacation. This was a big shock for Disney that
had invested billions in building luxury hotels,
but stood half empty most of the time. As a
result, by the end of 1994 Euro-Disneyland had
lost $2 billion.
At this point, EuroDisneyland changed its
strategy. First, the name was changed to
“Disneyland Paris” in an attempt to strengthen
French protesters outside EuroDisney in 1992
the park's identity as a fun and exciting
destination. Disney CEO Michael Eisner admitted: "for Americans, the word 'Euro' is believed to mean
glamorous or exciting. For Europeans it turned out to be ... associated with business, currency, and
commerce." Second, food offerings were expanded to include more European cuisine, but still used selfservice style like in the US parks. Third, the prices for day tickets and hotel rooms were cut by one-third.
The result was an attendance of 11.7 million in 1996, up from a low of 8.8 million in 1994. Today, more
people visit Disneyland Paris each year than visit the city of Paris itself.
when you are finished reading: individually answer the questions on the attached sheet
Adapted from Hill, Charles W.L. (2000). Disney in France. In International Business, Competing in the Global
Marketplace. Irwin McGraw Hill, pp. 106-107. Online at web.efzg.hr/dok/UMK/Case DISNEY Hill.pdf
Appendix 4.6 (Americanization of European Culture? Case Study: Disney in France)
U.S. Values
U.S. Interests
What cultural values are presented in Disney theme parks
and their operation?
What did the American Disney corporation have
to gain from expanding into Europe?
What aspects of French culture were not addressed by the
original EuroDisney plan?
To what extent did the Disney brand negatively impact
French culture? Was it a real threat?
French Values
French Interests
Name: __________________________ (to be submitted at the end of class period)
Adapted from Hill, Charles W.L. (2000). Disney in France. In International Business, Competing in the Global
Marketplace. Irwin McGraw Hill, pp. 106-107. Online at web.efzg.hr/dok/UMK/Case DISNEY Hill.pdf