The President's Chief of Staff: Lessons Learned
Author(s): James P. Pfiffner
Source: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, Democracy in Transition (Winter, 1993),
pp. 77-102
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27551081 .
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The President's
JAMES
Professor
George
Chief
of Staff: Lessons
Learned
P. PFIFFNER
Government
of
Mason
University
and Public
Policy
Abstract
This paper argues that there are twofirm lessons of White House organization
no. 1, a
can
at their own
he
that
peril:
chief of staff is essential
ignored hy Presidents only
a
no.
in the modern White House;
2,
domineering chief of staff will almost certainly lead
to trouble.
the
argument for thefirst lesson, the hulk of the paper is devoted
After outlining
to a detailed examination of the conductof the chief of staff office hy each of thefour
H. R. Haldeman
for Nixon,
domineering chiefs of staff Sherman Adams for Eisenhower,
Donald Regan for Reagan, and John Sununufor Bush. Each of these chiefs of staff resigned
under a varying degree of pressure after considerable controversy. The paper concludes that
the preferred rolefor a chief of staff is that of afacilitator,
coordinator, and neutral broker.
level a new President has a free hand in choosing
the superficial
how to
on
or management
House
based
the
White
organize
personal preference
style. After
a
two
is
There
firm
office.
lessons of
the
are, however,
all,
very personal
presidency
can
own
at
House organization
that
be ignored by Presidents only
their
White
peril.
One: A chief of staff is essential in the modern White
House.
Lesson Number
At
Lesson Number
Two:
A domineering
chief of staff will
almost
lead
certainly
to trouble.
a
to arguing for the second
bulk of this paper will be devoted
principle:
or
chief of staff will
"strong"
likely lead to disaster.1 But first, the
domineering
a
is
in order to
House
of
that
White
chief
staff
necessary will be outlined
argument
into
lesson
the
second
put
perspective.
The
was
to establish
the first President
the office of chief of
Eisenhower
Dwight
But
House.
Sherman Adams as the person to run his White
staff, and he designated
no
one
to
own
be
decided
his
of
and
had
after Eisenhower
chief
staff
John Kennedy
was
to
the
Adams
of
duties
had
staffer whose
scope
sweeping
comparable
authority
to organize his White
in the 1950s. Lyndon Johnson
House
tried
and
sporadically
a chief of staff, but he was
to
and
sufficient
unwilling
delegate
designate
authority
in charge of everything
himself.
increased the size of theWhite
President Nixon
remained
centralize
control
because
he distrusted
intervening
staff and continued
to
branch bureaucracy
and even
his chief of staff and ran theWhite
the executive
his own political appointees. H. R. Haldeman
an iron hand. With
Eisenhower
House with
of staff and the two
House
Democrats
77
was
and Nixon
choosing
to name
choosing
to act as their own,
a chief
it still
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIESQUARTERLY
78
a chief of staff is necessary was an open
that the issue of whether
to
the option of operating
the White
trends had converged
preclude
a chief of staff. The White
to over 500
House
House without
office had grown
and foreign policy had been increasingly
centralized
staffers, and control of domestic
in 1976
seemed
one. But
two
in the White
House.
name
Ford took over, he reacted against Watergate
by refusing to
to run an open
Ford
intended
first
asked
Donald
presidency.
to join his White
House
Rumsfeld
staff, but he refused because Ford was unwilling
a chief of staff. But after a year of trying to run theWhite
to designate
House
by
that his broader duties as President were
himself Ford concluded
suffering from the
When
a chief
of
Gerald
staff and
lack of a chief of staff. Ford called Rumsfeld
tion, and Ford agreed to make
Rumsfeld
coordinator."2 When
became
again to ask him to join the administra
him chief of staff in fact, though officially
the "staff
was
of
Richard
Defense,
appointed Secretary
Cheney
chief of staff.
Ford's
also running against the specter of H. R. Haldeman
and Wa
Jimmy Carter,
own
to
his
chief
and
be
of
the
lessons
staff
that
Ford
wanted
had
tergate,
ignored
House
learned. But after two years of trying to manage
theWhite
Carter
himself,
own chief of staff
also admitted that his "spokes-of-the-wheel"
his
of
approach
being
was not
and designated Hamilton
Jordan to be his chief of staff. When
working
to join the campaign,
House
took over as chief
Jordan left theWhite
Jack Watson
of staff.
Thus
not
Lesson Number
One
is that the President
does not have
some
to have
sort of chief of staff; the role is necessary
a number
to
The chief of staff is necessary
House.3
perform
them are included:4
a realistic
in the modern
option
White
of functions.
Among
1. Impose order on the policy process. The White
House office is now so large
that a President who
tries to run it alone will soon be overwhelmed
with managerial
to the
A
of broader
neglect
responsibilities.
and foreign policy that used to be delegated
in the White
House.
centralized
details
domestic
in
range of functions
to cabinet secretaries is now
broad
are
among cabinet secretaries. Contemporary
public policy issues
cut across several
are rivals over
secretaries
and
Cabinet
complex
usually
departments.
of policy to a peer. A chief of staff is needed
policy turf and will not cede coordination
2. Arbitrate
to
impose
the President's
perspective
on
policy
disputes
among
the departments
and
agencies.
access and
on distasteful
tasks
play the heavy. Someone has to take
as
no
to
for the President,
such
access, saying
requests, and firing people.
controlling
no man" and also to act
The chief of staff is the right person to be the "abominable
as a
meant
attacks
the
rod
for
President.
lightning
by absorbing
3. Control
In sum,
someone
short of the President
must
be in charge of coordinating
the
run theWhite
a chief
House without
House. No president has successfully
of staff since 1968, and since 1979 no President
But Lesson Number
House
Two of White
White
who
takes too domineering
an
approach
has tried.
is that a chief of staff
organization
to the position will lead to major
problems.
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 79
|
chiefs of staff in the modern
four domineering
Sherman
presidency:
H. R. Haldeman
Donald Regan
for Reagan,
and
for Nixon,
for Eisenhower,
Bush.
of
these
chiefs
Sununu
has
for
Each
of
staff
under
John
domineering
resigned
a
rest
The
examine
of
this
will
the
service of these
of
pressure.
paper
varying degree
There
have been
Adams
that the preferred role for a chief
strong chiefs of staff and come to the conclusion
and
neutral
for
broker. The best model
of staff is that of a facilitator,
coordinator,
this role was James Baker inRonald Reagan's
first term, although Donald Rumsfeld,
to the chief of staff
and Jack Watson
took the facilitating
Richard Cheney,
approach
before
office
Baker.
Institutionalizes
Eisenhower
FDR
While
the White
the modern
began
Truman organized
itmore explicitly,
Before
staff became institutionalized.
itwas
House
House
and
staffing system in theWhite
House
under Eisenhower
that theWhite
he became President Dwight
had
Eisenhower
an
executive
of
been
for
the advantage
forces
many years, directing U.S.
having
to
War
and
in
War.
World
coordinated
the
allied
the
effort
II,
victory
having
during
to
his career he had given considerable
During
thought
leadership in organizations
firm ideas about how theWhite
and came to the presidency with
House
should be
He was
organized.
the strong
of
opinion
that White
House
needed
organization
improving.
I had been
For years
House,
which
and
I had
in frequent contact with
certain ideas about the
the executive
or
office
lack of
system,
it operated. With my training in problems
involving
to me that the work
House
inconceivable
of the White
systemized
the case in the years
than had been
of theWhite
system
under
itwas
organization
could not be better
I observed
it.5
cannot make a
stressed the importance
of organization:
"Organization
. . .On the other hand,
an
can
out
of
genius
incompetent.
scarcely fail
disorganization
to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster."6 Thus Eisenhower
organized his
or Roosevelt.
House much more
Truman
White
than
either
formally
a number of
to the White
innovations
Eisenhower
introduced
organizational
Eisenhower
the offices of Cabinet Secretary and Staff Secretary and the
among them were
to
the
staff
director
of the National
of
Security Council
upgrading
Special Assistant
to the President
for National
Security Affairs.
House,
to the
But perhaps the most
of Eisenhower
important and lasting contribution
was
was
to
of
the
the
office
of
chief
of
staff
whose
function
organization
presidency
oversee
The
combination
Sherman
more
staff for the president.
enlarged and
complex
of the powers of the office and the personality
of its first occupant,
in the
it the most powerful
made
short
of the president
position
and coordinate
Adams,
Adams'
government.
was
the much
official
title was
chief of staff. "I think of Adams
Assistant
as my Chief
to the President,
but his function
of Staff, but I don't call him that
think it sounds too military,"
the politicians
admitted
never laid out in detail what Adams' duties were
Eisenhower
because
Eisenhower.7
to be it was
Though
clear that
80
I
Adams
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
was
to be in charge of theWhite
House. He told Adams
that "The organiza
it plain to everybody
that I am looking to you to coordinate
make
tion plan must
this office."8
sure that staff work was
saw his job as
and that any
making
complete
were
to the
to
for
issues brought
involvement.
ripe
presidential
According
president
"A man like that is valuable because of the unnecessary
Eisenhower:
detail he keeps
doesn't know how to decentralize will
away from the President. A President who
Adams
have time to deal with
the big issues."9
be weighed
down with details and won't
a
amount
time
secretaries to
Adams
considerable
reluctant
cabinet
of
spent
forcing
settle their disputes and turf battles short of the president.
"Either you make up your
this.
minds or else tell me and Iwill do it.We must not bother the President with
to
keep the world from war."10 As Adams explained his role, "Eisenhower
a staff that would
me to manage
boil down,
simplify, and expedite
simply expected
.
.
.
as
much work of secondary importance off his desk
and keep
the urgent business
as
most domestic matters
had
his
that came
Adams
within
jurisdiction
possible."11
to the President
and he spent a good portion of his time on political appointments.
He did not have clear policy preferences of his own and did not act as a policy advocate
He
is trying
within
theWhite
suspiciously
Much
House
system,
though Republican
conservatives
regarded
him
as
moderate.
of Adams'
power
stemmed
of access
to the
president.
House
his absence from theWhite
from his control
to be
spared details,
preference
to stay behind
the scenes, Adams'
the time, and his conscious
decision
more
charts and official
that
much
became
organization
position
powerful. Despite
access
to
to
the president
all cabinet officers and a number of
policy that gave direct
as to who
House
that Adams
White
staffers, the reality was
usually had final say
Given
Eisenhower's
much
of
once said in
see the
and what
reach him. Adams
papers would
president
access
a
to
to
"What you say about
about cabinet
the president:
response
question
correct.
is
had
President
who
the
from
essentially
Anybody
[sic]
shielding people
to
attention
President
the
the
sufficient
of
business
of
occupy
importance
legitimate
got in; those that didn't didn't. I knew the difference."12 Cabinet members were correct
would
in blaming Adams
for enforcing
tight
the source of much of the resentment
control
of access
to the President.
This was
of Adams.
successor as
control can be contrasted with Adams'
tightness of Adams'
more
to
chief of staff, General Jerry Persons, who
people
reported that he allowed
see Eisenhower
than Adams had and gave him more details than had Adams.13 But
The
one of the
roles that Adams
important
played for the
only
for tough political
of staff. He took the heat for the president
president
He acted as a
such as firing people and negotiating
decisions,
political patronage.
an iron
House
the White
and Cabinet with
and organized
buffer for the President
ran
in
1955 Adams
the executive branch
first heart attack
hand. After Eisenhower's
controlling
access was
as chief
virtually by himself for several months.
These are all legitimate
and often necessary roles for the chief of staff but the
a
can be done in a
can
are
make
handled
way they
heavy handed
large difference. They
a firm hand, but without
or
can be
manner
overt hostility.
they
accomplished with
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 81
|
members
Cabinet
and staff may
chafe under
the decision
in either
case, but hostility
ill feeling will
result if the bearer of the bad news is gratuitously
rude also.
ran theWhite
Adams
House
the
his
Eisenhower
wanted,
way
Although
tight control
to his eventual
and personal
contributed
style
undoing.
it became public in June of 1958 that a textile
Adams'
downfall
began when
and old friend of Adams,
Bernard Goldfine,
manufacturer
had on several occasions
and
that Adams
requested
determine
made
Adams
agencies.
regulatory
find out the status of the cases but
that an official
the call cannot
did not
Adams
Adams
of Adams'
did not
suggest any change in agency actions.
free of improper intent, the very fact
may
to the
was
and
status, power,
proximity
making
president
to be taken seriously by any agency in the government.
the calls in themselves
While
the status of charges against him with
federal
to
House
the calls for Goldfine
the
White
from
help but
seem to be
became
have been
or appearance of his calls.
to the
implications
it was disclosed
in congressional
hear
when
rooms
from Goldfine
had paid for hotel
for
who
sensitive
vulnerable
doubly
ings that he had accepted gifts
a vicuna
Adams
and had given his wife
coat and an oriental
rug.14 Despite Adams'
to
context
in
that
he
had
also
Goldfine
the
of their friendship,
protestations
given gifts
the inquiries from theWhite
the combination
of gifts to Adams with
House
appeared
too much
like official actions in exchange
for gifts.
because in the 1952 elections the Republi
The charges were given added weight
cans had
instances of corruption
in the Truman
Democrats
for
criticized
the
severely
Administration.
Several of Truman's
aides had been fired for accepting financial and
in office. Republicans
had promised
the electorate that they would
other goods while
inWashington"
"clean up the mess
and that their administration
be "clean
would
as a hound's tooth." Adams
wore
the badge of righteousness
and had swiftly
proudly
to censure and fire members
of the administration
moved
who had been tainted by
any hint of impropriety. The irony of Adams
enemies to resist.
much
for his political
being
hoist
on his own
was
petard
too
not have
serious in themselves, might
The publication
of these actions, while
led to disaster, but in combination with other aspects of Adams' personality ultimately
led to his resignation. The first of these factors has already been mentioned:
Adams'
access to the President.
even
People resented it
tight control of
though the President
it that way. The public image of Adams was that he was virtually running
wanted
was
an
the presidency
and was part of
by himself. This
perception
exaggerated
to
conscious
exercise his power behind
decision
the scenes, but the
Eisenhower's
true
to
current
it that itwould
One
had
Americans.15
many
joke
popular image rang
became president but a disaster
to
forced
be president.
died and Eisenhower
cause of Adams'
An additional
downfall was his personal
important
on an official basis. To Eisenhower,
to colleagues
and others he dealt with
curtness was merely his way of communicating
in the most efficient manner,
be unfortunate
if Eisenhower
died and Nixon
ifAdams
was
Adams'
". . .he
to his 'yes' or 'no' if such an answer sufficed. It never occurred
. . . For Sherman Adams
nor
to say 'Hello'.
this was neither bad manners
no
was
to
to
in
But
he
Absorbed
his
he
had
time
waste."16
work,
pretense;
busy.
never
to him
added aword
rudeness
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
82
of common
the lack of the usual elements
others
courtesy and civility were perceived
and human beings. He seldom said "hello"
not say "good morning"
he came to
when
for them as fellow workers
as his disdain
on
"goodby"
the office. Adams
or
the phone and would
once
explained: "Why should I say hello? They know I'm here."17
it often did bother his
Adams'
did not bother his boss,
brusqueness
and others he dealt with. Adams' habitual harshness frequently reduced
While
subordinates
to tears, and at one time he allegedly had five of them crying at the
same time.18 Adams
treated members
of the Cabinet
and Congress
the same way,
no need for the usual amenities of human communication.
This
did not endear
feeling
his secretaries
him
to many,
to come
were
he was
and when
willing
he was an arrogant,
in trouble
forth. Many
and needed
in Congress
friends
to defend
and the executive
branch
him,
felt
few
that
his just deserts.
tyrant who was getting
power-hungry
to Adams' ability to weather
storm about his
the
Particularly damaging
supposed
were
was his alienation of the
in
who
put
Congress
corruption
Republican
leadership
conservatives
also saw him as biased against their
off by his arrogance. But GOP
to the liberal wing of the party.
Congressional
Republicans
policies and sympathetic
were afraid that in the upcoming
elections
Democrats
that
the
would
congressional
use the Adams
issue to make gains at the polls and defeat Republican
candidates. The
leaders informed Eisenhower
that campaign
coup de grace came when Republican
not open up their purses until Adams was
gone.19
Even a personal plea and vote of confidence
from Eisenhower
could not save
in
he
he had done
Adams. After Adams'
which
that
testimony
argued
congressional
contributors
would
said "I believe that the presentation
made by Governor
Eisenhower
nothing wrong,
Committee
Adams to the Congressional
yesterday
truthfully represents the pertinent
I admire his abilities.
I respect him because
like Governor Adams.
facts. I personally
of his personal and official integrity.
on the part of Eisenhower
weakness
I need him.20 But
than an effective
the plea was seen more as a
defense of Adams.
Finally
was
to resign.
persuaded
A further irony concerning Adams' moral stature was made public by The New
death. Safire, who had
York Times columnist William
Safire in 1986 upon Adams'
in the 1952 New Hampshire
worked with Adams
primary, reported that 1RS investi
over $300,000
not
in income. At the
had
found
that
Adams
had
gators
reported
President
former
President
the 1RS not to
told
Eisenhower,
Johnson
request of
Adams
prosecute Adams,
friends.21
Nixon's
When
Eisenhower's
Vice
and the taxes were
Tight
Richard
and closer
paid by
a fund
set up
by Adams'
Hierarchy
Nixon
returned
to the White
House
after serving as
and observing
the Kennedy/Johnson
years, he resolved
more
be
would
than the Democrats
had
formally organized
President
that his administration
been
eventually
in tone
to Eisenhower's.
to his cabinet
Nixon
secretaries
intentions
of
began his term with
to select their own subordinates
and
authority
delegating
on
to
He would
the goals of his administration.
spend much of his time
accomplish
take only the big plays. In May
international
affairs; in domestic
policy he would
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED
| 83
1968 Nixon
For
declared:
one
operate
thing, I would
disperse power,
spread it among able people. Men
are
best only if they
given the chance to operate at full capacity.
Iwould
Instead of taking all power
Johnson.
could do their jobs, and each of them
have the stature and the power to function effectively.
would
Publicity would
not center at theWhite
House alone. Every key official would have the opportu
man
a President
a
in his field. On
the other hand, when
takes
nity to be
big
to myself,
from President
operate differently
I'd select cabinet members who
all the real power to himself,
those around him become puppets.
. . .
creative.
become
less
and
less
and
your most creative people
up
in a monolithic,
centralized
power
set-up.22
Nixon's
intentions
initial
the work
of government,
Nixon's
Departments."23
taries of stature
included
were
echoed by H. R. Haldeman:
"Our job is not to do
to get the work
out to where
out to the
it belongs?
intentions were
in
his selection of cabinet secre
reflected
but
and independent
the disparate
shrivel
They
can't develop
viewpoints
a
House
staff that
political
standing and White
of liberal Patrick Moynihan
and conservative Arthur
Burns.
soon set in, Nixon
But disillusionment
found that the Democratically
controlled
an administra
to
to
him
what
he
he
and
shifted
wanted,
give
Congress
use all of his tools of the executive
tive strategy to accomplish his goals. He would
branch at his disposal. Nixon
became convinced
that a wide
array of forces were
was
not about
not pass his
his aims. The Congress
the
would
upon frustrating
proposals,
were critically hostile,
and the career bureaucracy would
their
collective
drag
feet and sabotage his policies. He even came to the conclusion
that his own appointees
intent
media
had "gone native" and become more concerned with
departments
their own power and standing in their policy areas than in carrying out his priorities.
He decided to rein in the departments
and agencies and created several mecha
in the executive
to facilitate White
nisms
House
control.
Thus
instead
of getting
the work
of the
out to the departments
and agencies, Nixon
decided to bring the work
administration
into the White
and agencies
House where
he could carefully
of the departments
control policy development
and oversee implementation.
to be
Nixon's
concept of the presidency was that the executive branch ought
at his
put it: "There shouldn't be a lot of leeway in
disposal. As John Ehrlichman
It
the
be like a corporation, where
President's
the executive
should
following
policies.
are tied
or to put
to the chief executive,
vice presidents
Cabinet
(the
closely
officers)
extreme
it in
he says jump,
terms, when
they only ask how high."24
As Nixon
became
disillusioned
ingly greater power
buffer the President
to his White
access
line between
with
House
the executive
staff. The
branch he gave correspond
role of the staff came to be to
and to protect his time so that he could read, write,
and ponder
see
is to
time
the big picture. In Nixon's words,
that the President's
"My disposition
is not frittered away. I've found away to do it. I'm a reader, not a buller."25 Nixon's
for time alone reinforced
the tendency of theWhite
House
staff to guard
preference
to him.
The
protecting
the President's
time and isolating
the
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
84
a fine one.
to Henry Kissinger,
Nixon
According
usually made
on the basis of memoranda
a few very intimate aides.
or with
. . . and he shunned
he disagreed
He abhorred confronting
colleagues with whom
or
He
his
subordinates.
would
decide
from
inside
his self-imposed
inspiring
persuading
.
.
.
a
cocoon.
ever
vicious circle in which
All this led to
the President withdrew
President
became
decisions
"in solitude
more
into his isolation
and pulled
the central decisions
increasingly
into the White
House."26
a chief of staff to run his White
the beginning Nixon
had wanted
House,
a brilliant and hard nosed
came
to
H.
R.
and the role
Haldeman,
organizer
naturally
since his 1960 campaign
To the rest
for the presidency.
who had been with Nixon
branch and the outside world Nixon
seemed isolated behind his
of the executive
From
"The White
House became
"Berlin Wall"
of Haldeman,
and Kissinger.
Ehrlichman,
an echo chamber that
the voice of the president but sacrificed true pitch."27
magnified
was the
House
Haldeman
staff system. He became the
lynchpin in theWhite
an
most
House
since
aide
Sherman
Adams
and ran the system with
White
powerful
iron hand. He
over
staffers. "We all knew where
as
said: there was
equal, but
[Bryce] Harlow
me.
a first among
was
it. I never asserted
clearly
Nobody
questioned
equals, and it
to Haldeman,
"If I told someone
it; I never argued it. I never had to."28 According
to do
it wasn't me ?he
it was;
it was an
he knew
knew exactly what
something,
an
order from the President.
get anywhere.29
They knew
appeal wouldn't
His role, as he saw it, was to institute a "zero defects system" in the staffing
ensure that all issues and
were
options for the President
fully
operation. He would
to the President by anyone
"staffed out" and that all bases had been touched. Access
we
clearly took precedence
were
five of us that were
fit. There
was
the other
fre
and cabinet members
by Haldeman,
see
to
cabinet secretaries actually did get in
his gatekeeping. When
the President, Haldeman
be present to take notes,
and the agenda for the
would
away as to determine
to
in
be
the
such
the
often
would
meeting
presented
president
outcome
to the staffs satisfaction but not the visitor's.30
was a
House
He controlled
the paper flow andWhite
staffing. There
follow-up
system that would
impose deadlines for staff projects. As the deadline approached
the staffer or his secretary would
be reminded,
and if the work was not ready or of
handed
reminders would
hound the person
quality,
increasingly heavy
unacceptable
except Kissinger
quently resented
carefully
controlled
was
to Haldeman's
satisfaction.
completed
run
The ostensible purpose of the tightly
system was to save the President from
on the
details so that he could concentrate
non-presidential
big picture. The irony
was that
time
that
Nixon
he was
the
reserved
for
thinking great thoughts,
despite
House operation, both of substance and style. He
obsessed with details of theWhite
until
was
the work
concerned
with White
in the Executive
presidents
on what wines would
be
House
Office
furniture,
Building,
served atWhite
who
had what
and he wanted
of former
photographs
memos
to him
extensive
House
functions. He had White
visitors made on the paintings displayed
in the west
staffers log the comments
lobby
and he kept careful inventory of small gifts (cufflinks,
ash trays, and copies of Six
were given out to visitors about the White
House.
There were many
Crises) that
House
tennis courts.31
memoranda
about the White
House
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED
theWatergate
scandals were
Although
were
and the staff organization
Watergate
character.
Despite
the fact
that Haldeman
occasionally
delay implementation
an irritated Nixon
there was
by
about
| 85
not caused
by the staffing system, both
reflections
of Nixon's
and
psychology
was close
to
to
the
President
enough
of questionable
never
off-the-cuff
orders and demands
or doubt in the White
House
any question
break-in. The tone was set by Nixon,
and
covering up the initial Watergate
the staff unquestioningly
carried out his wishes.
The problem was that Haldeman
and the staff system he set up faithfully
reflected and reinforced Nixon's
dark side
and need for isolation. Thus the zero-defects
allowed
the
"horrors"
system
Watergate
and led to the resignations
and convictions
of top White
House
staffers and the
a
of
U.S.
President.
resignation
unprecedented
Chiefs
Reagan's
Contrasting
As it is with
all presidents,
the shape and role of the White
House
staff
was a reflection of Ronald
all
both
accounts,
Reagan's
personality.
By
friendly and
House
staff. He
critical, Reagan was extremely passive in his approach to theWhite
was not
to
or
with
the
direction
of
his
respect
passive
major
presidency
public policy;
his was an active presidency.
But once the direction was
set by Reagan,
his aides
the policies and carried them out; Reagan was interested
formulated
outcomes
in
only
to be bothered with details.
and did not want
Part of his passiveness was his lack of intellectual
but part of it was
curiosity,
trust in whatever
or what
due to his uncritical
him
told
he read.32 This
people
on
to
sure
made
him
was
his
staff
not
who
had
make
he
passiveness
dependent
unduly
the most
recent person he saw.33 Donald
Regan
case in which
a time or canceled
remember
he
single
changed
ever
about an item on his schedule."34
complained
influenced
by
a
recalled, "I cannot
an
or
appointment
hands-off approach to his staff was based on amanagement
Reagan's
philosophy
on
that relied
In
of
his
words:
"Surround
with
the best
delegation
authority.
yourself
can
as
as
and
don't
interfere
the
find,
people you
delegate
authority,
long
policy
frustrated
you've decided upon is being carried out."35 This approach occasionally
to give them
officials because of Reagan's
administration
unwillingness
policy guid
ance. Donald
"In
the
I
four
that
served as Secretary of the
years
Regan
complained:
I never saw President Reagan
alone and never discussed economic philos
Treasury
...
to
I
out
had
like any other American,
ophy.
figure these things
by studying his
. . .After I
and
the
the
he
newspapers.
speeches
reading
job,
accepted
simply hung
"laid down no rules and articulated no missions"
and
up and vanished." Reagan
thus conferred great "latitude on his subordinates."36 To David
Stockman, Reagan
so serene and
no orders, no commands;
"seemed
"He
asked for no
gave
passive,"
.
.
.
no
I
to
Since
I
did
know
what
took
his quiet
information;
do,
urgency.
expressed
a
to
of
be
Stockman
confidence
mandate."37
observed
that whenever
there
message
was an argument
smile and say: "Okay, you fellas work
it out."38
Reagan would
and penchant
for delegation
made his staff crucial to his
passivity
Reagan's
a way
was not true of Franklin Roosevelt,
or
in
that
John Kennedy,
presidency
in a particularly
George Bush. The unique division of labor in his first term worked
86
I
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
for Reagan. The definition of staff roles began before the inauguration,
the decisions were made about the structure and
the election when
after
immediately
was driven
outcome
the
staff.
The
of
top
organization
expectation
by the widespread
headed the transition,
and had run
that Edwin Meese, who had run the campaign,
office in California,
would naturally be named Reagan's White
Reagan's Governor's
felicitous way
House
chief of staff. But
others around Reagan
judged that Meese,
though unques
not have the
did
and
talent or
dedicated,
ideologically
organizational
tionably loyal
as chief of staff.
to
well
discipline
perform
their advice that he needed aWash
Reagan must^be given credit for accepting
ington insider for his chief o? staff and saying no to the loyal Meese,
despite Baker's
to go
work
for George Bush in 1976 and 1980. In order to get Meese
along with
the plan, he had to be convinced
still play amajor role in the administra
that he would
tion. This
task was
accomplished
divided
amemo
initialed by both Baker and Meese
by
of the two advisers. On the surface, the division
up the responsibilities
slanted toward Meese,
giving
heavily
both foreign and domestic. Meese was
him
over
that
was
administration
jurisdiction
to have the title of "Counselor
policy,
to the President
in all meetings
of the full
for Policy" along with cabinet rank and was to participate
and supervision"
of the domestic
cabinet. He was in charge of "coordination
policy
was given a very wide
Meese
Thus
staff and the National
Council.39
range
Security
was
of responsibilities
left for Baker?
indeed. What
Baker was to get the formal title of chief of staff and the traditional process and
He was given control over "Coordination
and
of that position.
staffing powers
over
House
Staff
and
all
of
White
functions,"
"Hiring
supervision
firing authority
House
and control of all in and out paper
elements of White
Staff," "Coordination
and of presidential
schedule and appointments,"
and he was
flow to the President
to "Preside over meetings
House
Staff." Baker also claimed the traditional
ofWhite
An addition, written
in longhand,
in theWest Wing.
assured
?
and Baker had the right to "attend any meeting which Pr?s, attends
w/
his consent."40
On
had a huge advantage, with
cabinet participation
and
the surface Meese
so that Baker received
control of foreign and domestic policy. The memo was written
no substance and all
House
process often determines
process.41 But in the White
as detached a President as Ronald
and thus
with
outcomes,
Reagan,
especially
policy
in the administration's
Baker had the advantage over Meese
deliberations.
policy
As chief of staff Baker hired skilled Washington
insiders to help him, and he
term. He did not seek
orchestrated
the Administration's
policy agenda for the first
over access to the
and
and Deaver
sharing it with Meese
complete control
president,
he exercised his power in a subtle rather than a heavy handed way. With
his reputation
for pragmatism
that invoked the suspicion of the ideological reaganites, he was careful
Chief
of Staff office
that both Meese
to
to the
party,
right wing of the Republican
keep open his lines of communication
to
of Congress.
He was accessible
and he assiduously maintained
his ties
members
to and trusted by the press and often received favorable news coverage which
he used
was attentive to the major constituencies
to the administration's
He
thus
advantage.
that Reagan would need in order to accomplish his agenda. Richard Darman became
staff secretary
and controlled
paper flow7 to the Oval
Office.
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED
| 87
Michael
the third member
of the Troika,
had been with Reagan
for
Deaver,
an
in
California
and
had
almost
filial
with
both
and
many years
Nancy
relationship
Deaver
Ronald Reagan.
became Deputy
Chief of Staff, but he was not concerned
as much with
the substance of policy as with
the staging of the President
and his
to
the public.42 He concerned
himself with
that affected
presentation
everything
as a person: his comfort, his schedule, the
Ronald Reagan
for
his political
backdrops
was
to the East
Deaver
the
link
actions, etc. Perhaps most
importantly,
primary
or as
that
He
would
her
either
is, Nancy Reagan.
wishes,
convey
Wing,
explicitly
own
to
his
theWest Wing
staffers. Baker appreciated
the importance of Mrs.
ideas,
and was
Reagan
to accommodate
careful
was
her wishes.
in policy across the board, but she
Nancy Reagan
selectively
inserted her views very effectively when
she felt that the President's
person or
reputation was at stake. Several times this affected foreign policy and quite often
she played a role in the resignations
of cabinet secretaries James
staffing decisions;
a number of White
Edwin
and
House
Donavan,
Watt,
Meese,
staffers,
Raymond
Donald
including
Regan.43
The White
not
was
House
active
to
inReagan's
second term with
change drastically
large
at the top. Despite
scale changes of personnel
the 1986 tax reform, there were no
sweeping victories comparable to the economic agenda of 1981, and the administration
slid into the disaster of the Iran-Contra
scandal. The second term troubles were due,
in no small part, to the change in chiefs of staff. Treasury
Secretary Donald Regan
and chief of staff James Baker decided to exchange jobs, and
Regan,
characteristically,
and Nancy Reagan had agreed upon the switch before itwas presented
Baker, Deaver,
to Reagan.
to the staff decision with no
Reagan
Characteristically,
agreed
questions.
came in to run theWhite
When Regan
House he had several personal priorities.
to do away with
He wanted
the coll?gial staffing arrangement
of the first term which
some
he felt led to staff conflict and leaks, which
it did. He also wanted
to make
most
to
but
he
wanted
"let
be
personnel
changes,
importantly
Reagan
Reagan."
career
that he would
take a different
Regan's
personal
style and
suggested
to running
the White
House
than had James Baker. Regan
had been an
approach
was
to
in
Marines
officer
the
and
used
Iwas
being CEO of Merrill Lynch. "When
and I said, 'Jump,' people asked, 'How high?' As Secretary of the
mean
I said, 'Jump,'
do
Treasury,
people said, 'What do you
by jump? What
mean
one
to
of
"He
considers
the
Executive
aides,
you
by high'?"44 According
Regan's
are vice
Branch to be like a corporation.
Cabinet members
the President
presidents,
is the chairman of the board, the chief of staff is the chief operating officer."45 Regan
was used to
a
being
principal and did not easily slide into a staff role.
to work with
Whereas
Baker had brought
him, Regan
strong subordinates
would
brook no rivals for influence. The staffers he brought
from his days at the
were known
as "the Mice" because
around theWhite
House
Treasury Department
chief
executive
when
of their meek
personal
of Regan
good subordinates.
colleague
pick
to their boss.
toWhite
House
staffers Regan's
According
"almost obsequious
and scared stiff of him."46 A former
so strong he did not
said: "His weakness
is that his ego was
approach
staff aides were
competition."47
Or
if they were,
he broke
them. He
couldn't
stand
the
88
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
that Regan was establishing
himself as chief of staff other
House.
Baker and Meese
strong advisers to the President were
leaving the White
was
to be a
were
Deaver
the
White
House
cabinet
positions;
leaving
lobbyist;
taking
was
on
to
Darman
Stockman
Wall
Street. Max
his way
left with Baker; David
a
in the second term, but soon left.
and Ed Rollins
Friedersdorf
stayed for while
to
"let
be
led him to think that his
determination
Reagan
Regan's
Reagan,"
At
own
the same time
lack of
strong policy preferences
no one else's. But
goals and
president's
staff must
was
to best
a guarantee
that he was
serving the
serve the President
House
theWhite
In this case the President's weakness was
for his weaknesses.
compensate
to search out alternatives on his own. This
his passivity and not being willing
placed
on the staff to assure that contrasting
to the
the responsibility
views were brought
In the first term this was assured, despite the staff's intentions
attention.
President's
to protect the President from conflict, because the rivalries among the staff and the
struggle
conservatives
between
and moderates
the President's
conviction
could
not be entirely
suppressed.
that many policy problems were
simple
be Reagan,"
but this was not a favor
Reinforcing
of "letting Reagan
another consequence
to the President.
In criticizing Regan, David Stockman called this "the echo principle"
to
and argued that it shielded Reagan
from hard economic
realities.48 According
one of the
term conflictual
Richard Darman,
triumvirate was
advantages of the first
that the President was
the
forced to face up to some complex
realities.
"Seeing
was
a lot of
First of all, Ronald Reagan
learned
things happened.
interplay between us,
much more about reality."49
But Don Regan did his best to stifle this safety valve ofWhite
House
conflict.
access
to
He dominated
the White
the
House,
President,
controlling
scheduling,
and phone calls. He also, unlike other
paper flow, public appearances, appointments,
to assert control over national
chiefs of staff, attempted
security policy. But
to
too
control
became
much. Long time
handed
attempt
Regan's
heavy
everything
a
intimate Stuart Spencer observed
that Regan
he
"became
Reagan
prime minister,
in every photo op, he wasn't watching
became a guy that was
the shop. And he
strong
surrounded
Regan's
so great
yes people. Those were
of theWhite
House was so tight
himself
control
with
to me."50
all signs of weakness
and his demands of subservience
House held
that a joke circulating
around theWhite
a Catholic Cardinal.
to resign to become
The White
House
now
to
that's good,
kiss his ring.51
we'll only have
that Regan was going
staffers' response was:
to the Brownlowian
to have a
admonition
passion for anonymity,
was
to
the
and
get into photographs with
Regan
trying
sought
constantly
limelight,
most
in
the President
that would
The
the
appear
newspapers.
egregious
example of
at the Geneva
this was the official photograph
and Gorbachev
of Presidents Reagan
Contrary
Summit.
Don
The White
behind
House
them
photo
showed
the two
forward
as if he were
leaders
on a couch with
sitting
the orchestrator
of their
Regan
leaning
as chief of staff made
the final decision,
insisted that this
agreement. Regan, who
be the only photo of the summit agreement
released by the White
House.52
In "letting Reagan
be Reagan" Regan
acted as if the President were his only
constituent.
He did not seem to realize that in order to serve the President effectively
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 89
|
a chief of staff needs
to cultivate
and the
constituencies,
especially Congress
as
of
his
for
with
disdain
press. Regan
Congress
Congress
an institution
the press because of his
and his distaste for politics. He antagonized
over unfavorable
to control leaks and his
coverage
hostility
heavy handed attempts
of the administration.
Unlike
Baker, he acted as if he did not realize that the press
other
soon alienated members
and use
board" upon which Washington
insiders post notices,
his
advantage.53
President's)
(and
as chief of staff.
to David
drawbacks
Stockman he
had
other
Regan
According
as a bulletin
"serves
it to his
had an "insatiable
tion's victories
to take
ego" that led him to want
public credit for the Administra
"I had
others got favorable press coverage.
and to be jealous when
me
more
for being inadvertently
stop blaming
conspic
Regan would
always wished
to Nancy Reagan, Regan
uous than he."54 According
liked the sound of "chief" but
care much
not the sound of "staff."55 Nor did Regan
"Mrs. Reagan
for Nancy.
...
as
as
if
alter ego
the office that had been bestowed
the President's
regarded herself
into
somehow
the category of worldly
her
the
fell
husband
upon
goods
by
people
covered by the marriage vows."56 He also resented the influence of Nancy's
astrologer
on the management
move and decision the
of the presidency.
"Virtually every major
as
House Chief of Staff was cleared in advance
Reagans made during my time White
a woman
to make certain that the
up horoscopes
At
times the President's
the
for
alignment
enterprise."57
planets
or
at
set
the last minute
for precise timing at the
have to be changed
schedule would
behest of Joan Quigley,
the Reagans'
astrologer.58
like
other
strong chiefs of staff, seemed to think that all criticisms of
Regan,
to his role as buffer for the President.
"If someone gets a cold
him were attestations
with
in San Francisco
who
drew
in a favorable
were
I get blamed,"
he asserted.59 "One of the reasons I've gained so much
It's kind of nice for the President
is
the
blame
because
of
coming my way.
prominence
to be able to lay the blame off and say: 'I didn't do it, it was somebody down the
when
that as long as it goes two ways. Remember
line.' There's nothing wrong with
to
had
do
however
that
with
little."60
it,
something
maybe Regan
things go right
to take the heat for administration
But Regan wasn't
failures.
always willing
in this town,
the disclosure of the administration's
Iran, and the failed Reyk
dealings with
to
the
"Some of
distance
himself
from
embarrassment.
tried
summit,
Regan
javik
a
us are like a shovel
Main
Street
that
follow
down
cleaning up.
brigade
[sic] parade
that
and turned what was really a sour situation into something
We
took Reykjavik
After
is that Regan
is troublesome
about this statement
turned out pretty well."61 What
embarrassments
is shifting blame for administration
himself
and toward
from
away
at the
in charge of U.S.
Summit:
the person who was
performance
Reykjavik
as
The strong implication
here is that Regan
himself
President Reagan.
presented
a
mess
blame
made
This
the
of
of
after
President
things.
public shifting
cleaning up
to the
House
is unacceptable
for aWhite
staffer.
president
term as chief of staff was the
of the Tower
Report
over
that
that
he
had
control
the
fact
denied
any
Regan
foreign
Despite
him
for
the
Iran-Contra
Tower
Commission
the
held
of
part
responsible
policy,
over
to have jurisdiction
to Brent Scowcroft,
claimed
disaster. According
Regan
The
Commission.
final straw
in Regan's
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIESQUARTERLY
90
"He kept saying he did. One of the reasons
foreign policy advice to the President.
was
to report
McFarlane
because
wanted
McFarlane
quit
Regan
through him."62
The Tower
Board
that investigated
the Iran-Contra
scandal did not accept
it did not conclude
denials. Although
that Regan
Regan's
or the cover-up,
it did hold him responsible
for allowing
In citing the "failure of responsibility"
the Board.pointed
in the scandal
participated
it to happen on his watch.
out that ultimate
responsi
to
House
the
for
White
staff
the
President, but that Regan was
system belongs
bility
for the disaster. "More than almost any Chief of Staff of recent
partially responsible
he asserted personal control over the White
House
staff and sought to
memory,
to the National
was
extend
this control
He
active in
Advisor.
Security
personally
national
security affairs and attended almost all of the relevant meetings
regarding
...
Iran initiative.
He must
bear primary
for the chaos that
responsibility
House when
descended
such disclosure
did occur."63
upon the White
After resisting as long as he could and after much prodding
from his wife and
other intimates,
the President asked for Regan's
but
resignation,
agreed to wait until
as a face
several days after the release of the Tower Report
saving gesture. But the
the
after release of the Report
coup de grace was administered
by Nancy
immediately
itwas leaked to the press from her office that Howard Baker would be Reagan's
when
new chief of staff. As soon as he heard of the press announcement,
Regan
immediately
resigned.64
on
the resignation
February 27, 1987 Regan's
a
House
White
former
staffer:
up by
Reagan
After
problems
were
summed
never realized that while Wall
Street runs one way; Pennsylvania Avenue
street. He never realized there is a difference between
an
is a two-way
being
an
never
elected and
official. He
realized the distinction
between
appointed
a staff person and the chief executive
never realized that the
He
officer.
being
Don
House
White
talent throughout,
rather than talent derived. He never
to compensate
for the perceived
strengths and weaknesses
those weaknesses."65
than to dominate
demands
was
realized
of others,
his job
rather
Bush's
Pit Bull
a competent White
House
staff marked by profes
George Bush recruited
toWhite
sionalism and a low visibility
House
service.
The best inWhite
approach
to the President
House
Brent
Assistant
staff service was exemplified
Scowcroft,
by
same
in
for National
who
had
the
role
filled
the Ford Administration.
Security Affairs,
Scowcroft
board
was
was
tireless
Roger
a
to Bush, and often
provided
personal sounding
Another
House
affairs.
model
White
staffer
foreign
in his service
to Bush's
about
thoughts
Porter who had served
in the Ford
and Reagan
administrations
and was
in the Bush
and economic policy staff coordination
for domestic
responsibility
House. He provided experience,
and
sound
expertise,
policy analysis without
over
or status or
to
in
strong arm members
trying
engaging
policy
public disputes
of the cabinet.
given
White
Bush's White
President
House
and cabinet
staff did not
secretaries
tend
or have major
to interpose
fights with
themselves
between
the cabinet
the
departments
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 91
|
his cabinet well,
and unlike Reagan, made it a habit to keep in
House
them. So Bush's White
had no major ego problems or conflicts
touch with
one major
his Chief of Staff, John Sununu.
the cabinet, with
with
exception:
In order to understand why John Sununu was chosen by Bush to be chief of
Bush
because
knew
situation after the Iowa
of Bush's political
staff, it is helpful to recall the desperation
caucuses in the
1988.
of
Bush
had
primaries
just come in third behind
Republican
Senator Robert Dole and evangelist Pat Robertson.
New Hampshire
had always been
a rock-ribbed
conservative
conservative
credentials
state and a key to the
nomination,
Republican
were
somewhat
suspect.
an aide
had a plan. When
began to commiserate
But John Sununu
about the disaster of Bush's
finish
third place
"Don't
in fact an opportunity.
be able to do for the next President
situation was
and Bush's
with
him
in Iowa, Sununu
you see how much
of the United
States?"66
explained how the
to
good I'm going
Sununu then took the
in calling in every favor he had earned while
he was governor
of New
amedia blitz that
and designed
helped Bush win. The strategy centered
Hampshire
television
around having the Vice President "take the pledge" of "no new taxes" while
offensive
as "senator straddle"
that he might
consider
spots bashed Senator Dole
by charging
an
one
as
to
a tax increase
element of
shrink the deficit.67 The
strategy
attempt
on to win New
nomination
and Bush went
and
the
without
worked,
Hampshire
any serious difficulties.
Hints of future problems
House would
the Bush White
cabinet
future
arose after the election
over how
two
After
be organized.
turning down
reportedly
on the chief of staff slot, Sununu
to
his
define
began
In an interview with The Boston Globe Sununu gave
and insisting
positions
in
role
press interviews.
the impression
in the maneuvering
a strong chief of staff
a
"strong
by being
play the role of
saw
the
President
and the
of OMB's
before
it,
budget
was also
over the
Sununu
House
agenda.
fighting publicly
that he would
a
critic"
"tough
doorkeeper,"
setter of the daily White
M.
possible role of Robert
Teeter, who was offered the position of deputy chief of
him a strong voice
have guaranteed
but
whose
staff,
relationship with Bush would
in theWhite
House. The problem for Teeter, and probably why he decided to decline
was that Sununu insisted that Teeter not be allowed into
a
job in the administration,
the Oval
Office
to see the President
alone.68
in public and fighting over access to the president
House organization
his own decisions about White
was
Sununu
about
conduct
the
and
how
would
early warnings
unseemly
provided
a
occurs
for position
office of chief of staff. Of course maneuvering
during
always
were
and
less acrimonious
transition, but the Meese-Baker
negotiations
presidential
This
for position
jockeying
even
took office or made
before he
were
not fought out in public.
President Bush, who had a chief of staff as Vice President
a chief to organize
House
the White
and coordinate
wanted
(Craig Fuller),
clearly
policy development.
chief of staff roles. He made
of the traditional
Sununu performed well many
the trains run on time. He was the enforcer with
respect
And
the Cabinet,
Sununu
and Congress.
presided
over
toWhite
House
staffers,
fired people. He took the heat for unpopular decisions.
in the
the senior staff meeting
every day at 7:30 AM
He
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIESQUARTERLY
92
House. Typically
he spent from 8 to 9:30 AM in the Oval
for the national
for
security briefing and setting priorities
from 4:30 to 5 PM. During
the President
the day
the day and ended the day with
a total of 35-45 percent
see the
he would
president about 10 times and would
spend
the President.69
of the day with
Office
with
a
sharp
dog who
the President
common
One
reinforce
inWhite
Room
Roosevelt
mistake
a
of chiefs
weakness
of
staff
that Sununu
as had Haldeman
did not make
was
to
before him. He provided
the President's
"pit bull"
and Regan
presidential
contrast in personal style to the President. He was
act mean and allow the President
to take the "kinder
would
stance. Sununu, unlike the three previous
convictions
and advocated his own policy
and gentler"
of
chiefs
had
firm
staff,
strong
ideological
preferences. But what would
ordinarily be
amajor drawback
Sununu was more
than the President
in a chief of staff worked
conservative
to the President's
case.
advantage in this
to
and was willing
play
and representative
of the
politically
as
flame
highly visible role
keeper of the conservative
conservative wing
House. This was useful for
of the Republican
Party in theWhite
stake out a very conservative
Bush when
Sununu would
for instance on
position,
a more moderate
take
and
let
the
environmental
stance, thus reas
president
policy,
were
in
their interests
theWhite
House while
suring conservatives
being represented
a
still claim to be "the environmental
letting the president
president."
is also a policy advocate is that advice
The danger of a chief of staff who
President
might
be skewed
to favor
the chief of staffs
favored
outcome.
The
to the
other
common
a strong chief of staff is that access to the President will be
danger of
was a
to a trickle. But neither of these
to George
constricted
potential pitfalls
danger
to be able to discount
Bush. He knew enough about the policy issues himself
the
not become
his personal style assured that he would
isolated,
access to the Oval Office.
did
control
The
of
though
danger
becoming
isolated was averted because the President knew his cabinet members well and kept
assure
in touch with
them. They had the personal relationship with Bush that would
bias of his staff. And
even
Sununu
they could
phone
talk with
him
base with
touching
But the President's
on the
constantly
current
issues.
policy
in touch, while
the danger
avoiding
to
control
communication
attempts
if they needed to. The President
anyone who was involved with
was
for keeping
penchant
of isolation, did not entirely eliminate Sununu's
to the President.
Sununu's personal policy agenda made it at times difficult for those
to
in the cabinet or staff who wanted
the President
about a different
speak with
approach to get through Sununu's gauntlet. This problem became public when both
ran stories that senior Bush aides were
so upset at
cut off
Time and Newsweek
being
a
summer
was
to
at
Sununu
that
the
President
office
forced
box
his
open
post
by
so that his top advisers could contact
home inKennebunkport,
Maine as a backchannel
him directly without
Sununu's censorship.70
The
existence
of this avenue of communication
on
admitted
Secretary Louis Sullivan who
communicate
advice to the President.71 After
was
television
publicly confirmed by HHS
to
that he used the channel
the admission Sullivan quickly covered
no trouble
he
that
had
the President when he needed
meeting with
by saying
to on
issues
but
he
the
that
had
used
post office box for "political
public policy
himself
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 93
|
to say to the President,
the point is the
a
to
set
felt
fact
up
very
private post office box
compelled
was an admission of organi
House
outside
the
White
and
organizationally
physically
zational failure. John Sununu was not acting as a "neutral broker" of ideas for the
so that others would have confidence
their ideas would get to the President
President
advice."
point is not what
Bush
that President
The
had
Sullivan
House
them to theWhite
intact if they submitted
as a biased filter screening out ideas he
personally
the President
his rapport with
Despite
Sununu made four
chief of staff functions,
1. He let his ego cloud his judgement
staff. Instead,
like.
Sununu was
seen
did not
and his ability to perform very valuable
strategic errors as chief of staff:
and affect his behavior.
to the "John Tower
that he did not
syndrome,"
thinking
have to be nice to people.
was so
3. He fell victim to the "Gary Hart syndrome,"
important
feeling that he
2. He
succumbed
that he did not have
to pay attention
to the conventions
of public morality.
4. He developed
the "Don Regan
and if
stay in the limelight,
syndrome":
blame
the
President.
things go wrong,
in and out of the White
House
criticized Sununu for
colleagues
came
to
in Houston
convention
it was
he
the Republican
his large ego. When
he was chief of staff
aspirations.72 When
reported that Sununu had Vice Presidential
he had his staff do research to find out if the fact that he was born in Cuba disqualified
Professional
from being president.73 One of his soft spots was his stratospheric
IQ, which
was 180. But it struck many with whom
he worked
that he seemed to
reportedly
House
how smart he was. White
have to put others down in order to demonstrate
him
staffers and assistant
did not
secretaries
did not
in front of their
appreciate being denigrated
seem to measure
up to Sununu standards. He
their staff work
peers when
told one reporter who asked about his interpersonal
the other guy's screwing up."74
An administration
joke had it that theWhite
skills that it "Depends
House
was
how badly
run
by "John Sununu
to hire
interns," because he was unwilling
high quality subordinates
as his own aides for fear that
his
would
aspect
they
challenge
authority.75 Another
was
extreme
to criticisms
in the press.
Sununu's
the
of
ego problem
sensitivity
have one of his aides highlight
When
critical articles appeared he would
the negative
and a thousand
To
Sununu
their source
in theWhite
and then upbraid the presumed
House,
"Small
minds
ask small questions."77
said,
journalist
to
believe his oft stated maxim
that he had a constituency
really seemed
error number
two: the
This led to Sununu's
the President.
strategic
deduce
comments,
offender.76
one
he
of only one,
was President Bush's first nomination
to be
John Tower
syndrome. Senator Tower
on
in
After many years
the Senate
Services Com
the Armed
Secretary of Defense.
there was no doubt that
and several years as a Reagan
appointed negotiator
came forward with
But
he
had
been
nominated
after
qualified.
people
excessive
sexual misconduct,
about his private life, including
drinking,
allegations
a Senator will be
an easy time
and possible conflicts of interest. Normally
given
by
mittee
Tower
was
so rude and arrogant
hearings, but Tower had been
colleagues in confirmation
come to his defense
as a Senator that few of his former colleagues were
to
willing
former
94
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
were
raised. Thus
the charges of misconduct
a President
to be
to a cabinet position
nomination
by
he got into hot
fate would
befall John Sununu when
to a constituency
Far from being responsible
of
means
that serving the President
learned the hard way
when
was
Tower
the first
in history.
defeated
A
initial
similar
water.
only
strong chiefs have
able to cultivate other
one,
being
did not recognize this, and thus felt free to alienate
the cabinet, the press, and interest groups aswell as hisWhite House
subordi
Congress,
am
so
nates. It is as if his attitude were:
not
to
'I
that I do
have
be nice,
powerful
constituencies
for his use.
Sununu
In this he was ignoring
the old Lebanese
civil, to other people.'
minimally
one
cannot
"One
that
the
hand
that
Sununu
kisses
When
bite."78
holds,
yet
proverb
to
to
into
trouble
those
who
kiss
his
hand
turned
bite
it.
had
got
previously
or even
Sununu systematically
alienated and insulted many members
of Congress.
He
a serious insult inWash
once called
Trent
Lott
Senator
"insignificant,"
Republican
at the 1990
to a member
of the Senate.79 His behavior
ington, especially
Budget
in formal meetings
the leadership of Congress was so obnoxious
that
with
to chastise him: "I have had
in
he prompted
Senator Robert
the
Byrd
thirty years
never
in
I
I
in
U.S.
such
and
have
have
and
Senate,
summits,
many
my
participated
conduct as that displayed by the representatives
life observed such outrageous
of the
It is rude. It is intolerable."80
president of the United States. Your conduct is arrogant.
Summit
to alienate cabinet secretaries as well as their subordi
also willing
their policy proposals to the president, which may very well
often undercut
the policy development
have been part of his job as chief of staff policing
function.
When
he fought HHS Secretary Louis Sullivan on civil rights policy or EPA Adminis
Sununu was
nates. He
trator William
on environmental
Reilly
But
the President's wishes.
carrying out
cabinet members
issues, it was arguably part of his job and
the tone of his communications
often left
more than
were
feeling that
policy differences
being conveyed. The
a necessary part of the
not
is
others
of
gratuitous
insulting
policy coordination
a close friend of the President's,
told
function. Treasury
Brady,
Secretary Nicholas
a friend
Robert
that he was
Mosbacher
political
appointees.
Secretary
sick of being denigrated
Secretary
by Sununu.81 Commerce
to accept unwanted
about
forced
being
by Sununu
complained
Sununu also made a tactical error when he refused to let Defense
use
Cheney
the presidential
helicopter
to
fly
to
Camp
David
on official
business.82
is an important Republican
the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce
though
its president, Dick Lesher, when
Sununu did not hesitate to brutalize
constituency,
he supported a cut in Social Security payroll taxes. He did so in a series of four letter
a tax cut that the Bush Administration
was
supporting
expletives.83 That Lesher
was not amatter of
very well have backed in different circumstances
might
(i.e., it
Even
principle)
highlights
Sununu's
extreme
response
to a
relatively
minor
policy
differ
ence.
In defense
was
of his behavior
Sununu
the President's
merely
doing
president dozens of times during
...
I know enough
his agenda.
other chiefs of staff in claiming he
no freelancer.
"I'm
I meet with
the
bidding.
the day. . . .The president knows
I'm following
to do exactly what he wants
about the president
echoed
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED
done.
Exactly
what
he wants
done."84
for all of his own
authority
presidential
of them to the President.
In this statement
actions
and subtly
Sununu was
shifting
both
the blame
| 95
claiming
for any
is that each breach of good taste
for his lack of civility
explanation
was
"I
calculated:
guarantee you that contrary to the legend,
carefully
on
are
statements
to
both
deliberate
and designed
controlled,
any strong
my part
an
no
is
random outburst.
It all is designed
achieve
effect. There
for purpose. And
Sununu's
and manners
I think the efficiency
rationalization
This
by what we've been able to achieve."85
important role of the chief of staff, playing
the enforcer of tough decisions and bringer of bad
of the result is underscored
is consistent
the heavy for the President,
tidings to others. "I don't
with
one
being
care if
as
as
me for the
people hate me,
long
they hate
was
But
that
the
said
Sununu.86
problem. Washington
right reasons,"
professionals
are the
understand
that the policy preferences
of the President
of the
responsibility
are
chief of staff, and they expect him to be tough for the President.
Professionals
to
in
beaten
the
but
Sununu's
ad
hominem
arena,
accept being
gratuitous
willing
policy
insults and rude behavior generated resentments much greater than mere policy defeats
would
have. Sununu acted as if he did not understand
the import of his own words.
not because he was
the President's wishes but because
enforcing
People hated Sununu
to them.
Sununu was gratuitously
and
obnoxious
insulting
personally
error
was
the Gary Hart syndrome. Senator Gary Hart
Sununu's
third strategic
was married and running for the Democratic
nomination
for President in 1984. When
he was
of adultery, he denied them and
allegations
by the press with
to
to
the press
follow him around
prove his innocence. Not
challenged
surprisingly,
next time he spent the
and
the
did,
they
night with model Donna Rice.
reported
This doomed Hart's bid for the nomination.
The point here is not about sexual
confronted
it is rather about
and appearances. Any
respect for conventional
morality
on
or
must
constraints
his
her personal behavior
person running
accept
not
to
to
to general
in deference
If
is
he
his
behavior
conform
willing
public opinion.
not
to
he does
have enough
standards of public morality,
self restraint
be President.
behavior;
for President
not have to restrain himself
parallel with John Sununu is that he felt that he did
in the use of the privileges
and perks of his office.
Post reported that the chief of staff had taken
In spring of 1991 The Washington
more than 70 trips around the country aboard
aircraft. Almost
all of the trips
military
The
as official business,
even
designated
though the purpose
(by the chief of staff)
of some of them seemed to be to provide skiing trips for Sununu and his family. None
as
were
of the 27 trips to his home state of New Hampshire
designated
personal. One
as
was to Boston for an
his personal
of flights categorized
with
appointment
personal
at commercial
the government
dentist. On such trips he was required to reimburse
were
rates for
far less than the cost to the government
of operating
comparable flights,
one
to
In
Sununu
allowed
for
addition,
organizations
ski-industry
planes
person.87
air
and
for
his
his
lift
fare
for
wife.
meals,
tickets,
pay
lodging,
When
the disclosures caused a public scandal inMay 1991, the President
(whose
was to have an administration
above ethical reproach) ordered Sununu
early priority
to clear all future flights with
House Counsel's
theWhite
office. But in June Sununu
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
96
had aWhite
House
limousine
take him
to New
for a stamp auction he wanted
air travel back toWashington
and
York
to
corporations
provide
was
The
forced to restrict Sununu's
President
travel practices.88
again
trips.
In an eerie parallel to another governor
of New Hampshire,
Sherman Adams,
to
EPA and the U.S.
Forest Service to ask the status of
Sununu made
several calls
to attend
and solicited
other
political
Sununu
ski resort owned by a friend
the size of the Loon Mountain
a contributor
to Sununu's
Gravink was
previous
was
him
free
Sununu
and had let
ski for
when
governor. While
to double
applications
of Sununu,
Philip
T.
Gravink.
campaigns
did not demand
a favorable outcome
for his friend's applications,
his actions
an official as "a lot of
it clear
and
bluster"
that
"made
by
bullying
in this case."89 Ironically Sherman Adams,
House wanted
theWhite
what outcome
whose
forced his resignation,
acceptance of favors from aNew England businessman
were
was
described
one of the founders
resort.
of the Loon Mountain
is no argument here that Sununu's trips on government
planes constituted
or
or
House
thatWhite
staffers should always fly coach.
outrageous
illegal behavior,
on official
a few
Few would
with
of
occasional
combinations
trips
begrudge
planes
business with pleasure. High
level officials in Congress
and the executive branch have
There
this for decades, and it is standard practice in corporate America.
The point is
and pushed them to excess. His bending of the rules
that Sununu abused his privileges
was unable to restrain himself from
was routine,
and
systematic. He
pervasive,
taking
was
to rein himself
in even after
of
and
his
position
amazingly
unwilling
advantage
done
him. As with
the Sherman Adams
case, the small
publicly admonished
were not
to
he
from
his
affect
behavior. But
gratuities
corporations
likely
accepted
to
House
the combination
of those favors with White
inquiries
agencies
regulatory
too far
interest.
of
of
his
the
conflict
appearance
By
presented
pushing
privileges
the President
Sununu
became
an embarrassment
to the President
who
was
forced
to defend
him
in this position.
in public. A chief of staff should never put the President
error
was
the Don Regan
Sununu's final strategic
take credit when
syndrome:
things go well,
1991 campaign
and when
they
turn sour shift blame
to the President.
At
aNovember
speech inNew York President Bush remarked that people
in the financial community
felt that interest rates charged on credit cards were higher
if they came down a bit. The next
than necessary and that itmight
spur the economy
to impose a
D'Amato
Senator
introduced
day
legislation
(R-NY)
legal limit
Alphonse
fund raising
on the interest rates credit card companies could charge their customers. The economic
in the financial community
and the Dow
wisdom
of the proposal was challenged
to
120
The
back
industrial
fell
had
administration
Jones
average
away quickly
points.
and publicly
the proposed
argue against it.
legislation
When
asked by reporters about this embarrassing
episode, Sununu said that the
text but that the
remark about interest rates was not in the President's
prepared
from
President
blame
had "ad-libbed"
the remarks
on credit card interest
attempt to
rebutted by Marlin Fitzwater,
in the printed text
that the lines were
administration
officials even said that
on the President was
the embarrassing
remarks
the president's
spokesman. He told reporters
of the speech and were not ad-libbed. Some
Sununu, himself, was the author of the offending
lines.90
rates. This
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED
97
|
The
issue in this case is not whether
the lines were
in the speech
for an embarrassing
incident.
text or not.
In this case
takes the blame
publicly
were
to shift blame to the President.
If
Sununu
tried
lying about
publicly
But even if he were
the speech text, his behavior was outrageous.
telling the truth,
an
for
administration
it is not the role of the chief of staff to blame the President
The
issue is who
Sununu
for the chief of staff is to take the heat in order
The appropriate behavior
to protect
the President.
a contemporaneous
actions in this case can be contrasted with
Sununu's
flap
over civil
to the President C. Boyden Gray circulated a draft memo
Counsel
rights.
blunder.
in federal govern
the end of using affirmative action racial preferences
to embar
from
the
civil
threatened
the uproar
rights community
hiring. When
rass the President, Gray said that he acted without
the knowledge
of the President.
that instructed
ment
was not
It is highly unlikely
that such an important and controversial
policy change
save
to
in
the
President
took
the
blame
order
President.
But
the
with
discussed
Gray
an
House
staffers
thus demonstrating
from embarrassment,
important role forWhite
should have.91
and acting as Sununu
Sununu's general attitude toward the press was reflected in his public reaction
to a
Post reporter who
covered the story of the credit card flap. After
Washington
on
a bill
House
the
White
lawn, he told Ann Devroy
loudly and
signing ceremony
in front of others:
a
"You're
a liar. Your
stories
are all lies.
Everything
you write
is
lie."92
and firing of Sununu took place soon after the credit card
final downfall
term
was
the final straw. The striking thing about Sununu's
which
incident,
merely
was allowed to stay. It
as chief of staff is how
of
President
he
long
speaks strongly
for Sununu's
Bush's gratitude
support in the New Hampshire
primary and of the
to
it
but
also
demonstrates
that he was
his
President's
subordinate,
personal loyalty
for
the
President.
valued
functions
highly
performing
The
came at a low
the economy was
point in the Bush administration;
the President was sliding in public opinion polls from his huge popu
doing poorly,
seemed to be in disarray. Sununu
and the administration
the
Gulf War,
after
larity
could only be blamed for the last of the three, but the scapegoat factor
personally
without
Sununu's strategic miscalculations,
is a real one inWashington.
Nevertheless,
The
he could
firing
probably
have weathered
the storm
of problems
for which
he was
not
responsible.
When
he
asked for Sununu's resignation,
the ax finally fell, and the President
not admit to being at fault. He blamed the press, theWhite
House
staff,
and pro-Israeli groups (supposedly because he was of Lebanese origin and had been
still would
in his letter of resignation
Sununu implied
"I assure you that in pit
as
or pussy cat mode
I am ready to help."94
(your choice,
always)
in searching for enemies who would
if
have liked to do in John Sununu
Even
in Arab-American
groups).93
that all of his actions were at the behest
active
bull mode
But
of the President.
one is reminded of the
novel, Murder on the
Agatha Christie
they had the chance,
on
in which many
train had sufficient
the
Orient Express, amurder mystery
suspects
to
is
it
is
solved when
disclosed
that each
motive
have killed the victim. The mystery
98
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
the same knife into the victim.
of the suspects was guilty because each had plunged
the primary cause of John Sununu's demise as chief of staff was his own
Although
for many
he
had made so many enemies that there were abundant motives
behavior,
to do the deed.
people
Conclusion
House organization
experience with White
House
several important
lessons. White
The
has highlighted
faithfully reflect
If the President
to him
people
should
in the modern
presidency
staff and organization
will
strive to counter presidential weaknesses.
the President,
but should
is reclusive
(as Nixon was),
Persons
did
for Eisenhower).
(as
try to bring ideas and
is too open, the staff
(as Cheney did for Ford). If the
the staff should encourage
him
the staff should
If the President
some order on access to the President
impose
is too focused on details (as was Carter),
President
to look at the
is too detached,
big picture. If the President
even
the staff should raise issues,
(as the Baker system did for Reagan,
to the
president's
attention
unpleasant ones,
but Regan
did not).
this we have learned that, regardless
Beyond
the contemporary White
House
needs a chief of
development,
guard
are not of
presidential
someone
or
of personal
style
preference,
staff to impose order on policy
that
and settle administration
disputes
access
to the President,
importance. As the Ford and Carter
short of the President
must
be
in charge,
presidencies demonstrated,
or the President will be over
whelmed.
if that necessary chief of staff takes a domineering
approach to the job, it
is a likely prescription
for disaster. Each of the strong chiefs of staff (Adams for Ike,
Haldeman
for Nixon,
for Reagan,
and Sununu for Bush) have:
Regan
But
alienated members
of Congress,
of their own
alienated members
administration,
for the lack of common
had reputations
civility,
had hostile relations with
the press.
And
harm
each of them has resigned under varying degrees of pressure, having done
and the presidency.
president
A number of lessons about the role of chief of staff can be
gleaned from the
to his own
over
the past four decades
ignored by the domineering
experience
too often
1. Carrying
out the President's
These
of the Presidency.
lessons which were
chiefs of staff, include:
wishes will often make some people angry, but
or the chief of staff.
harshness will not help the President
gratuitous
as the President wishes,
to guard access as
2. It is appropriate
but a
tightly
assertion
will
of
members
anger
heavy-handed
personal power
unnecessarily
of the Cabinet.
than one. It includes:
chief of staff has a constituency
of more
sooner or later need support
The
President
chief
will
of
Congress:
(or
staff)
so fences should be mended
in Congress,
carefully after congressional
feelings have been hurt.
3. The
a.
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED 99
|
b. The Press: The President
needs favorable
with
a cordial,
press coverage. Having
the press may not ensure favorable
bad coverage.
professional working
relationship
but it can help to mitigate
coverage,
4. The President
should not be put in the position
aWhite
House
staffer.
chief of staff cannot
5. A
to defend
of having
publicly
in complete
but people will
anonymity,
into
notice
if the chief of staff squeezes
every photo-opportunity.
6. As Jack Watson
says, the chief of staff is the President's
"javelin catcher."
The chief of staff should take the heat for the President,
and in no circum
do
the job
shift blame to the President.
publicly
seem a bit
preachy and obvious. But the lessons bear repeating because
so often been
chiefs of staff in the modern
ignored by the four domineering
stances
This
list may
they have
presidency.
The ideal approach to the job is exemplified
Each served his president well
Richard Cheney.
and coordinator
of
administration
access
controlled
by James Baker,
and
Jack Watson,
as an honest broker
in no way
soft or
by performing
were
policy.
people
to their
firm hands
presidents with
These
and enforced
ineffectual. They
a
on the
the
other
chief of
process. They performed
discipline
policy development
such as giving credit for success to the President
and taking blame for
staff functions
own egos get in the way. Each demonstrated
that the
failures without
letting their
absolute control by one person. There
chief of staff job can be done without
is, of
that a good chief of staff will
lead to a successful presidency,
course, no guarantee
of the four domineering
but avoiding the mistakes
chiefs of staff can improve chances.
In the end there is no salvation from staff. As Presidential
scholar Bert Rockman
or
can
save
a
President
from himself
puts it: "No system
organization
ultimately
is uncomfortable
when he is inclined to self-destruct. And no system that a President
House
theWhite
with will
last."95 A President cannot manage
alone, but he must
sure that someone
is managing
it to his specifications.96
Presidents must be
make
If presidents
ruthless in their judgments
of aides who are not serving the presidency.
to these precepts their
do not pay attention
presidencies
run for others' purposes
rather than their own.
will
be vulnerable
to
being
Notes
1. For
a full
Cole,
Bruce
see James P. Pfiffner,
CA:
Brooks/
The Strategic
argument
(Pacific Grove,
Presidency
nor desirable,
see
2. For an argument
that a chief of staff is neither
Ch.
necessary
1988),
in
The
of
the
Demands
"Constrained
Buchanan,
Diversity:
Organizational
Presidency,"
Pfiffner, The Managerial Presidency (Brooks/Cole,
2. Remarks
"Presidential
3.
Presidency
by Donald
Rumsfeld
at the American
(4 September
Staffing,"
scholar Richard
Neustadt
1992),
argued
1991), pp. 78-104.
Political
Chicago.
in a memo
Panel on
Meetings,
on the
panel.
participated
to John
in 1960 that he should
Kennedy
Science
The
Association
author
be his own chief of staff. By 1988, however, Neustadt had concluded that a chief of staffwas
not a
in theWhite
House,
necessary
though
domineering
on
"Does
and
the White
the
President-elect,"
Staffing
in Pfiffner,
The
Managerial
Presidency.
chief. Richard
House
Need
a
Neustadt,
Strong
Chief
"Memorandum
of Staff,"
both
4. For other analyses of the office of chief of staff see Samuel Kernell and Samuel Popkin, Chief of
Staff (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1986) and Bradley Patterson, Ring ofPower (New
York: Basic Books, 1988).
100
I
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
5. Dwight
Mandate
Eisenhower,
City,
(Garden
Change,
for
New
York:
and Company,
Doubleday
1963), p. 87.
6. Dwight
D.
Mandate
Eisenhower,
(Garden
for Change
City,
New
York:
and Company,
Doubleday
1963), p. 114.
7. Michael
9.
The
Medved,
8. R.T.
Patrick
Shadow
Presidents,
the White
Johnson,
Anderson,
Managing
The Presidents'
243.
p.
House,
Men
82.
p.
(New
York:
Doubleday,
11. Richard
Tanner
12. Anderson,
Johnson,
The
Presidents'
Men,
House
theWhite
Managing
184;
p.
emphasis
(New
added.
York:
161.
p.
1969),
10. Michael Medved, The Shadow Presidents (New York: Times Books,
1979), p. 245.
and Row,
Harper
13. Fred Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency (New York: Basic Books,
15.
p.
Presidency,
Shadow
Medved,
See Greenstein,
16. Quoted
17. Medved,
The Hidden
Presidents,
Hand
18. Medved,
Presidency.
the
Organizing
Presidency,
Shadow Presidents,
p. 248.
Shadow Presidents,
p. 248.
The
19. Anderson,
The
Presidents'
Men,
The
21. William
Safire, "Abominable No-Man,"
22.
in
Quoted
23. Quoted
24.
Quoted
York:
25.
Quoted
26.
Quoted
27.
29.
Author's
32.
254.
p.
the
Organizing
The New York Times (3, 1986 [check date], p. A23.
Presidency
(Washington:
Brookings,
inWilliam
Safire, Before theFall (New York: Doubleday,
in Frederick
C. Mosher,
Books,
1974),
p.
et.
al. Watergate:
Implications
105-106.
pp.
1988),
1985), p. 116.
for Responsible
Government
(New
44.
in Hess,
28.
31.
Hess,
Stephen
Basic
Stephen
Author's
30.
Presidents,
65.
p.
196.
p.
20. Medved,
Shadow
1982), p. 148; Hess,
253.
p.
in Hess,
The
p. 93.
65.
the
Organizing
14. See Michael
1974),
the
p. 118.
Organizing
Presidency,
in Genovese,
The Nixon
(New York:
Presidency
the
Hess,
p. 119.
Organizing
Presidency,
Los
interview,
CA
Angeles,
Los Angeles,
interview,
(25 May
Greenwood
Press,
1990).
1983).
CA
1983).
(25 May
See Richard
T. Johnson,
the White
House,
p. 218-221.
Managing
See the testimony
of Alexander
Committee
Butterfield
before
the House
reprinted
Impeachment
in Larry Berman,
The New American
pp. 264-272.
Presidency,
a
See Lou Cannon,
The Role
Simon
and Schuster,
President Reagan:
(New York:
1991),
of Lifetime
Chapter 10 and p. 181.
33.
Hedrick
34.
Donald
35.
Ann
Smith,
Regan,
The
Power
For
the Record,
Dowd,
Reilly
"What
Game,
p.
(New
305.
York:
Can
Managers
Harcourt
Learn
Brace
from Manager
Jovanovich,
Reagan,"
1988),
Fortune
p.
272.
(15 September
1986), p. 33.
36.
For
Regan,
37.
Stockman,
38.
Stockman,
39.
See Smith,
the Record,
Triumph
144.
142-143,
pp.
of Politics,
p.
76.
p. 109.
of Politics,
Triumph
is
in Bob Schieffer
The memo
and Gary
The Power Game,
pp. 314-315.
reproduced
E. P. Dutton,
Paul Gates,
York:
83.
The Acting
President
p.
(New
1989),
in Schieffer
40. Memo
and Gates,
dated
The Acting
11/13/80,
President,
p. 83.
reproduced
41. Author's interview with Elliot L. Richardson, Washington
42.
Smith,
43.
See
The
Power
Game,
p.
(1 April 1988).
299.
in Richard
of Nancy
role in the Reagan
administration
Reagan's
Free
York:
and
the
Modern
Presidents
Neustadt,
Press,
(New
1990), pp. 312-316.
44. William
"For
Time
R. Doener,
and
Reason,"
p. 20.
Rhyme
(21 January
1985),
at the White
45. Ed Magnuson,
Time
House,"
p. 10.
(21 January
"Shake-Up
1985),
"
46. Bernard Weinraub,
"How Don Regan
Runs
theWhite
The New
York Times
House,
(5 January
the
discussion
insightful
Power
Presidential
1986), p. 33.
THE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF: LESSONS LEARNED
| 101
47.
48.
in Cannon,
Quoted
The
Stockman,
49. Quoted
Role
of
a
Triumph
563.
p.
Lifetime,
of Politics,
18-19,
p.
No.
Photograph,
42.
by Bob Schieffer and Gary Gates, The Acting President (New York: Dutton,
1989),
200.
p.
50. Quoted by Cannon, The Role of a Lifetime, p. 721.
51.
Patterson,
Bradley
52. Maureen
1991),
53.
54.
Smith,
David
pp.
55.
Dowd,
p. 306.
of Power,
Face Means
Having
Ring
"Saving
p. 1, 18.
The Power
Game,
The
Stockman,
p.
It in the Picture,"
The New
Times
York
(16 June
81.
Triumph
p. 243.
of Politics,
See also
the caption
under
No.
photograph
16.,
118-119.
Cannon,
Role
For
a
p.
of
Lifetime,
the Record,
p. 288.
the Record,
p. 3.
56.
Regan,
57.
58.
For
Regan,
See Lou Cannon,
59.
Bernard Weinraub,
The
Role
"How
566.
A
pp. 583-588.
of
Lifetime,
Don Regan
theWhite
Runs
The New
House,"
Times
York
(5 January
1986), p. 38.
60. Quoted in BusinessWeek (9 September 1985), p. 79.
61. Quoted by David Hoffman, "Regan: Chief of Risk" Washington Post (28 February 1987), pp.
were:
comments
it that took this disinformation
"Who was
1, 16. The rest of Regan's
thing and
on this loss in the Senate
was
to turn it? Who
out a few facts
it
and pointed
managed
[sic] took
to
I don't
in a row. But here we
be able to do it four times
and managed
say we'll
pull that?
and
we're
go again,
trying."
a
The Role
p. 720.
by Lou Cannon,
Lifetime,
of
Review
Board
the President's
(Washington,
oj
Report
Special
a
See the account
The Role
by Lou Cannon,
of
Lifetime,
62. Quoted
63.
64.
26 February
722-732.
IV-10-IV-11.
pp.
1987),
pp.
65. David Hoffman, "Regan: Chief of Risk," Washington Post (28 February 1987), pp. 1, 16. Reagan
as chief of staff:
was
Lou Cannon
that Regan
had four deficiencies
argued
1) His ego
biographer
too
in disdain.
He did not appreciate Nancy's
He held politics
in
role
the
administration.
3)
large. 2)
a strong
him to the White
House
He brought
instead of recruiting
the "mice" with
staff as
4)
a
Baker
The Role
had. See Cannon,
p. 567.
Lifetime,
of
66.
67.
68.
Time
p. 24.
"Big, Bad John Sununu,"
(21 May
Goodgame,
1990),
Post
See David
Bush
Owes
"What
Sununu,"
Broder,
(1 May
Washington
on Size of His White
House
"Sununu
See Ann Devroy,
Swiftly
Backpedals
Dan
Post (9 December
1988), p. B20.
69.
See Burt
1988), p. A9; and "Transition Watch,"
"No-Nonsense
Solomon,
Sununu,"
National
71.
"This Week
72.
p. 13.
See Eleanor
with
Sidney
74. Quoted
ABC
Brinkley,"
"The Washington
Randolph,
(2December
73.
David
Blumenthal,
in "John
Blumenthal,
(16 September
(30 December
of
Transcript
Chain-Saw
Massacre,"
79.
Sidney
80.
Blumenthal,
81.
82.
p.
1989),
2251.
1991), p. 4.
of
program
2 February
The Washington
"So Long,
What
Sununu:
Sununu,"
Color
"So Long,
Sununu,"
p.
p. 168.
Is Your
Parachute?"
Spy magazine
(March
1991), p. B12.
168.
in Time (21May 1990), p. 25.
78. Quoted
Washington
Post
1992,
Magazine
1990), p. 37.
75. See The New York Times (4December
76. Ibid.
77.
News,
Role,"
The New York Times (8 December
fournal
70. See Time (30 September 1991), p. 19; andNewsweek
p. A19.
1991),
Blumenthal,
"So Long,
Sununu,"
Sununu,"
p.
168.
Blumenthal,
"So Long,
"So Long,
Sununu,"
p.
113.
Blumenthal,
"So Long,
Sununu,"
p.
168.
Vanity
Fair
(February
1992),
p.
168.
1992),
p. 31.
102
I
PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY
83.
See Blumenthal,
84.
Juan Williams,
85.
Quoted
by Ann
(12 December
86.
"So Long,
Sununu,"
Bush's
"George
Flying
Year
of
Washington
Sununu
Post
(24 November
Defends
Actions,"
Triumph,
C4.
p. Cl,
1991),
Post
Washington
1990), p. A25.
inMaureen
Quoted
"Citing
Devroy,
113.
p.
Circus,"
"Sununu:
Dowd,
A Case
Study
in Flouting
The New
the Rules,"
York
Times
(5May 1991), p. 34.
87.
Charles
Babcock
and Ann
"Sununu
Devroy,
Post (24 April 1991), p. 1, 6.
88. The New York Times (4 December
89.
Dan
Goodgame,
"Fly
Free
or Die,"
Deems
Only
4 Plane
'Personal',"
Trips
Washington
1991), p. B12.
Time
(13 May
p.
1991),
18.
90. The New York Times (23 November 1991), p. 1, 10.
91. The New York Times (22 November 1991), pp. 1, 20.
92. Quoted in The New York Times (23 November 1991), p. 1, 10.
93.
Ann
"Sununu
Devroy,
Sees Vendetta
As
"So Long,
Blumenthal,
Sidney
Leave Washington
"Sununu Will
Solomon,
p. A5;
Source
Sununu,"
With
of Troubles,"
Fair
Vanity
'Low Opinion'
Post
Washington
(February
(26 June
1992),
Unchanged,"
p.
112;
1991),
Burt
Nationalfournal,
(11 January 1992), pp. 90-91.
94.
Letter
of
resignation
reprinted
in The New
York
Times
(4 December
1991),
p. B12
(emphasis
added).
95.
in Charles
and Organization
of the Reagan
Presidency,"
27.
Chatham
House,
NJ:
p.
1988),
Reagan
(Chatham,
Legacy
in Pfiffner,
"Can the President Manage
ed. The
See James P. Pfiffner,
the Government?"
Bert
Rockman,
"The
Style
O.
Jones,
ed. The
96.
Presidency (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole,
1991).
Managerial