Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 73:1 (March, 1992), 31-43
HOW NOT TO FLIP THE SWITCH WITH THE FLOODLIGHT:
CAUSATIVE-INCHOATIVES, THE INSTRUMENTAL 'WITH',
AND THE IDENTITY OF ACTIONS
I. Causative-inchoatives
No action is a flipping of the switch unless the switch comes to be flipped, no action is an alerting
of the prowler unless the prowler becomes alert, and no action is a closing of the door unless the
door gets to be closed.1 This is not an accident; it is a matter of meaning.
Terms such as 'the flipping of the switch', 'the alerting of the prowler', and 'the closing of the
door' are, in fact, ambiguous. In one sense, they refer to events that the switch, the prowler, and
door undergo, events that terminate, respectively, in the switch's being in the state of being flipped,
the prowler's being alert, and the door's being in the state of being closed. In another sense, they
refer to the actions and events that bring about those events. The flipping of the switch is, in this
latter sense, just the action that, say, Smith, performed that brought about the switch's being in the
flipped position. The rock's breaking of the window, in this sense, is just the event, whose subject
was the rock, that resulted in the breaking of the window in the first sense, an event whose subject
was the window and which consisted in the window's undergoing a change that terminated in its
being in pieces.
It seems clear that, for at least a very large class of terms of this sort, the relation between
the referent of such a term in its latter sense and the referent of that term in its former sense is
causal. The rock's breaking of the window in the former sense caused the breaking of the window
in the latter sense, that is, the window's breaking. And to say that Smith flipped the switch is to say
that some action of Smith's (whether intentional or not) caused the switch's flipping, an event
consisting in the switch's coming to be in the flipped state.
Thus, certain transitive verbs are "causative-inchoatives".2 Roughly, the causativeinchoatives are those transitive verbs, '0/', such that
2
(1)
x 0/s y if and only if x causes y to be 0/ed.3
And, since, for an agent (or other substance) to cause a certain result is for that agent to do
something (or for that substance to change in a way) that has that result, the correct analysis of
'x causes y to be 0/ed', where x is an agent (or substance), is 'there is an action, a, x is its agent,
and a causes y to be 0/ed.'4 So, when x 0/s y, something x does causes y to undergo a change that
terminates in y's being in a certain state, the state of being 0/ed. Thus, the analysis of causativeinchoatives is as follows:
(CI)
x 0/s y =df
(a)
x is the agent of some action, a
(b)
a causes an event, e, of which y is the subject, and
(c)
e terminates in y's being 0/ed.
II. Parsons' argument
What happened when Smith got home was this. He flipped the light switch, thus turning on the
floodlight. A prowler, who was lurking about at the back of the house, noticed the floodlight go on,
and was thereby alerted to Smith's presence. Smith alerted the prowler by flipping the switch.
Some philosophers, among whom we are to be included, hold that, in circumstances such
as these, Smith's flipping of the switch and his alerting of the prowler are one and the same action.
But, on the assumption that (CI) is the correct semantic analysis of causative-inchoatives, of which
'alert' and 'flip', in their role as transitive verbs of action, are examples, is there anything semantic
that stands in the way of thinking that such an identity claim is true? Terence Parsons believes that
there is. He has argued that examples of sentences involving the "instrumental 'with'" show that
the identity of the flipping and the alerting cannot be maintained. Here is Parsons' argument.5
In the circumstances described, it is certainly true, Parsons correctly insists, that Smith
alerted the prowler with the floodlight; however, it is certainly false, Parsons claims - and he is
surely right about this too - that he flipped the switch with the floodlight. But no action that Smith
3
performed with the floodlight can be identical with an action that Smith did not perform with the
floodlight. Thus, the alerting cannot be the flipping.
This all comes out straightforwardly, when translated into the language of the analysis of
causative-inchoatives. The analysis of
(2)
Smith alerted the prowler,
that is, of 'Smith did something that caused a change in the prowler that terminated in his being
alert' is
(2')
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)[Action(x)6 & Agent(Smith, x) & Event(y) & Caused(x, y) & State(z) &
Is-a-being-alert(z) & Subject(the prowler, z) & Terminates-in(y, z)].
And the analysis of
(3)
Smith flipped the switch
(3')
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)[Action(x) & Agent(Smith, x) & Event(y) & Caused(x, y) & State(z) & Isa-being-flipped(z) & Subject(the switch, z) & Terminates-in(y, z)].
is
Now, Parsons recommends that we treat the "instrumental 'with'" as a relation between that action
and the floodlight.7 So, if an agent does something with an instrument, there is a relation, "With",
that holds between what the agent does and the instrument:
(W)
With(x, y) =df x is an object, y is an action, and an agent performs y with x.
Thus, the analysis of
(4)
Smith alerted the prowler with the floodlight
is, according to Parsons' view, just the analysis of (2) with 'With(the floodlight, x)' conjoined:
(4')
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)[Action(x) & Agent(Smith, x) & Event(y) & Caused(x, y) & State(z) & Isa-being-alert(z) & Subject(the prowler, z) & Terminates-in(y, z) & With(the floodlight,
x)].
However, if (assuming, for convenience, that there was just one alerting and just one flipping) we
suppose that the flipping and the alerting are one and the same, we can deduce from (3') and (4')
4
that Smith did something that (a) caused the switch to become flipped, (b) caused the prowler to
become alert, and (c) was done with the floodlight; that is, (5):
(5)
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(Ey')(Ez')[Action(x) & Agent(Smith, x) & Event(y) & Caused(x, y) &
State(z) & Is-a-being-flipped(z) & Subject(the switch, z) & Terminates-in(y, z) &
Event(y') & Caused(x, y') & State(z') & Is-a-being-alert(z') & Subject(the prowler, z')
& Terminates-in(y', z') & With(the floodlight, x)].
But, from (5), by dropping conjuncts, (6) follows:
(6)
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)[Action(x) & Agent(Smith, x) & Event(y) & Causes(x, y) & State(z) & Isa-being-flipped(z) & Subject(the switch, z) & Terminates-in(y, z) & With(the
floodlight, x)].
However, (6) is the analysis of
(7)
Smith flipped the switch with the floodlight,
which is patently false. And thus Parsons concludes that Smith's flipping of the switch cannot be
his alerting of the prowler, for the latter, but not the former, was done with the floodlight.
Apparently, this argument, which uses the instrumental 'with' to discredit claims of action
identity, is a popular argument with a history. Its earliest appearance, so far we have been able to
discover, is in 1969, in an article by Michael Cohen. Cohen's argument is reported with praise by
Julia Annas in 1976; and the argument appears again in Jonathan Bennett's book on events in
1988.8
It is time, we think, to put a stop to it!
III. Closing a loophole
Parsons says that his argument has an "apparent" loophole, which he is anxious to close.9 The
analysis of causative-inchoatives, (CI), shows that, in speaking of what an agent does to a patient
(the agent's "transitive" actions), we are really speaking of two events: a causing event (which is
sometimes an action) and an effect of that event (the caused event). And Parsons' analysis takes
the counterpart, in his theory, of the instrumental 'with' in ordinary English to be a relation between
5
an instrument and the causing event. [And so, since, according to Parsons, the event that caused
the switch to be flipped does not bear the "With"-relation to the floodlight, while the event that
caused the prowler to become alert does, the event that caused the switch to be flipped cannot be
the event that caused the prowler to become alert.]
It might appear that Parsons' objection to the identity of Smith's flipping of the switch and
his alerting of the prowler (the causing event(s) in question) can be circumvented by taking 'With'
to be a relation between the instrument and, not a causing event but, a caused event. Since the
caused events, the event that terminated in the switch's being in a flipped state and the event that
terminated in the prowler's being alert, are already clearly distinct, it would be a consequence of
no great moment that one of the two bears a relation to the floodlight that the other does not.
However, Parsons rightly closes the door on this ploy; for it is clear that the predicate
'With(the floodlight, x)' should not be redefined so as to be true of any of the caused events in
question. If it were, then the analysis of (4) would be
(8)
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)[Action(x) & Agent(Smith, x) & Event(y) & Caused(x, y) & State(z) & Isa-being-alert(z) & Subject(the prowler, z) & Terminates-in(y, z) & With(the floodlight,
y)].
But, (8) entails
(9)
(Ey)(Ez)[Event(y) & State(z) & Is-a-being-alert(z) & Subject(the prowler, z) &
Terminates-in(y, z) & With(the floodlight, y)],
which is the analysis of
(10)
The prowler became alert with the floodlight,
which, if we understand it at all, is clearly false.
Thus, seeing no alternative other than having 'With(the floodlight, x)' be true of either a
caused event, which it clearly isn't, or a causing event, from which one can deduce the distinctness
of the alerting and the flipping, Parsons chooses the latter alternative and concludes that the
alerting cannot be the flipping.
6
IV. Problems with Parsons' view
Two features of Parsons' view disturb us. One is semantic; the other is a bit more metaphysical.
First, the semantic worry. The word 'with', when used in ordinary sentences of English to
introduce an instrument, is a preposition which, together with its object, is used to form complex
verb phrases out of simpler ones; it takes us, for example, from 'stabs' to 'stabs with a knife'. But
on the surface, in "Jones stabbed Smith with a knife', 'stabs with' appears to express a relation
between stabbers and the things they stab with. Parsons' 'With', on the other hand, is a technical
term of his semantic theory and expresses a relation between a stabber's action (the causing
event) and the things stabbers do their stabbings with. Without some further argument, we thus
see no particularly good reason to think that the instrumental 'with' of ordinary English should be
analyzed directly in terms of the 'With' of Parsons' theory.
Our second, more metaphysical and more important concern is this. What Parsons is, in
effect, arguing is that there is a purely semantic reason - a reason consisting in (CI) and (W) - for
thinking it impossible for Smith's alerting of the prowler and his flipping of the switch to be the same
action. Now, there surely are cases where the meanings of certain referring expressions make it
impossible for them to refer to the same thing. The terms, 'the tallest of several people of various
heights in this room' and 'the shortest of several people of various heights in this room', must, if
they refer at all, refer to distinct entities.
But, we find it utterly astounding that the meanings of 'Smith's alerting of the prowler' and
'Smith's flipping of the switch' should be thought to make it impossible for them to refer to the same
thing. For their meanings are, in fact, explained, at least in part, by the idea that the transitive verbs
'flip' and 'alert' are causative-inchoatives.
That idea implies that 'Smith's alerting of the prowler' means, roughly, 'the action of Smith's
that caused the prowler to become alert'. So, if 'Smith's alerting of the prowler' refers to anything
7
at all, it must refer to some unique action of Smith's that caused the prowler to become alert.
Similarly, 'Smith's flipping of the switch' refers, if to anything, to some unique action of Smith's that
caused the switch to get to be in a flipped state. These terms, like many others, refer to the actions
and events they do by describing them in terms of the events that those actions and events cause.
How can it be a purely semantic matter whether distinct events can have a cause in common?
How can purely semantic considerations show it to be impossible that such distinct events as the
switch's coming to be in a flipped state and the prowler's coming to be alert should be caused by
the same action?10
Now, we accept the analysis of (at least some) transitive verbs of action, of which 'flip' and
'alert' are examples, as causative-inchoatives.11 Therefore, we are driven to the conclusion that
Parsons' explanation (W) of the meaning of the instrumental 'with', as it occurs in ordinary
sentences of English such as (4), must be mistaken. There must be an explanation of the meaning
of the instrumental 'with' which is compatible both with the analysis of causative-inchoatives (as
given by (CI)) and with the possibility that Smith's alerting of the prowler is Smith's flipping of the
switch, even though Smith alerted the prowler with the floodlight but did not flip the switch with the
floodlight. And we think we know what that explanation is.
V. The instrumental 'with' and the 'by'-locution
How did Smith alert the prowler with the floodlight? What does it mean to do something with the
floodlight? How does one accomplish some goal with an instrument?
It seems obvious to us that to accomplish some goal with an instrument (e.g., alert the
prowler with the floodlight, break the window with a rock) is to accomplish that goal by doing
something with that instrument. One does something with an instrument just in case one does that
thing by using that instrument; and to use an instrument is to do something that causes that
8
instrument to undergo some change. Thus, one breaks the window with the rock just in case one
breaks the window by doing something that somehow involves the rock (e.g., by throwing it); one
alerts the prowler with the floodlight just in case one alerts the prowler by doing something that
somehow involves the floodlight (e.g., by turning it on).
Our thesis is that the instrumental 'with' can be understood in terms of the notorious 'by'locution.
Of course, that thesis will be helpful to us only if it enables us to explain how it is possible
for Smith's flipping of the switch to have been his alerting of the prowler, despite the fact that
Smith's alerting of the prowler was, but his flipping of the switch was not, done with the floodlight.
And it might be thought that this is impossible, for it has often been argued that if a 0/s by U/ing, a's
0/ing cannot be identical with a's U/ing. And if that were so, then whatever else we might hope to
accomplish by analyzing the instrumental 'with' in terms of the 'by'-locution, we would not be able
to show that it is possible for Smith's flipping of the switch to be his alerting of the prowler when
Smith alerted the prowler by flipping the switch.
The argument for this goes back to Alvin Goldman,12 and relies on a principle of
substitutivity according to which, if terms t and t' have the same denotation, then t' may be substituted for t salva veritate. It is argued that this principle implies that, for example, if Smith's flipping
of the switch is his turning on of the floodlight, then Smith turned on the floodlight by flipping the
switch if and only if Smith flipped the switch by turning on the floodlight, and if and only if Smith
flipped the switch by flipping the switch. But, when it is true that Smith turns on the floodlight by
flipping the switch, it will not be true that he flips the switch by turning on the floodlight; and no one
has ever flipped the switch by flipping the switch. 'By' expresses an asymmetric and irreflexive
relation, and nothing can bear such a relation to itself. Hence, when Smith turns on the floodlight
by flipping the switch, his turning on of the floodlight cannot be his flipping of the switch.
9
We agree that it is true that 'by' does not relate identical actions. But that is because we
hold that 'by' does not relate actions (what Parsons calls the causing events) at all.
Goldman-like arguments presuppose that 'by' has the logical form of a two-place predicate
that takes actions as arguments, that, for example,
(11)
Smith turned on the floodlight by flipping the switch
has the form of
(12)
BY(Smith's turning on of the floodlight, Smith's flipping of the switch).
This undefended presupposition is not unavoidable and it is, in some ways, unnatural.13 More
importantly, it is possible to handle the relevant facts quite adequately without it.
When Smith turned on the floodlight by flipping the switch, he performed an action that
caused the floodlight to go on by causing the switch to flip. Smith's action caused both the
floodlight's going on and the switch's flipping. In addition, Smith's action caused the floodlight to
go on because it caused the switch to flip, and because the switch's becoming flipped caused the
floodlight's going on. The floodlight's going on was a more remote effect of Smith's action than was
the switch's flipping; it was caused by the switch's becoming flipped, which in turn was caused by
Smith's action. To turn on the floodlight by flipping the switch, then, is to do something that causes
the switch's flipping and for the switch's flipping to cause the floodlight to go on.
This pattern is quite general for the 'by'-sentences under consideration. They involve
causative-inchoative verbs of action that describe actions (the causing events) as having certain
effects, and these effects are often picked out by adjectives and intransitive verbs that are counterparts of the transitive verbs used to describe the actions that cause those effects. The causativeinchoative characterizes an action as having an effect of a certain type, a type characterized by an
intransitive counterpart of the causative-inchoative (or some related expression, e.g., 'die' in the
case of 'kill').
10
When a 'by'-locution is formed from a pair of such verbs, the resulting sentence implies
something about the causal relationship among the agent's action (generally, the causing event)
and the effects that the causative-inchoative verbs describe it as having. When a 0/s b by U/ing c,
a performs an action, the action causes an event that is c's coming to be U/ed, and that event
causes an event that is b's coming to be O
/ ed. Thus, the analysis of the 'by'-locution is this:
(BY)
a 0/s b by U/ing c if and only if (Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(Ey')(Ez') [Action(x) & Agent(a, x) &
Event(y) & State(z) & Is-a-being-U/ ed(z) & Subject(c, z) & Terminates-in(y, z) &
Event(y') & State(z') & Is-a-being-O
/ ed(z') & Subject(b, z') & Terminates-in(y', z') &
Causes(x, y) & Causes(y, z)].14
It is not actions (causing events) that are 'by'-related. Rather, it is the effects of an action that are
'by'-related insofar as they are, respectively, more and less remote effects of that action.
All this enables one to see how it is possible for Smith's flipping of the switch to be his
turning on of the floodlight, even when Smith turned on the floodlight by flipping the switch. For,
according to the account being offered here, if Smith turned on the floodlight by flipping the switch,
he performed an action with two effects, one of which was a cause of the other. How it is possible
for one action to be both Smith's flipping of the switch and his turning on of the floodlight should
be no more mysterious than how it is possible for an action (or any event) to have more than one
effect, with one of them more remote than the other.
A straightforward explanation of the surface asymmetry and irreflexivity of the 'by'-locution
is immediately available. That surface asymmetry and irreflexivity merely reflect the asymmetry and
irreflexivity of the causal relations that hold among the effects of an agent's action. To say that
Smith turned on the floodlight by flipping the switch is to say something that implies that the
floodlight's going on was caused by the switch's becoming flipped. To say instead that Smith
flipped the switch by turning on the floodlight is to say something that implies that the switch's
becoming flipped was caused by the floodlight's going on. Since causation is asymmetric, both
claims cannot, on the same occasion, be true. And to say that Smith turned on the floodlight by
11
turning on the floodlight is, on our proposal, to say something that entails that the floodlight's going
on caused itself; and that, causation being irreflexive, is impossible.
So much for the analysis of the 'by'-locution. The question that remains is how the analysis
helps to explain the instrumental 'with' and helps to explain how it is possible for Smith's flipping
of the switch to be his alerting of the prowler, even though Smith alerted the prowler, but did not
flip the switch, with the floodlight.
VI. How not to flip the switch with the floodlight
To use an instrument in performing some action is to do something with that instrument that is
"instrumental" in doing what is to be done. To perform an action with an instrument (and not merely
while having the instrument in one's hand at the time) is to perform that action by doing something
that causes the occurrence of an event that has that instrument as its subject. To break the window
with the rock is to perform an action which causes an event whose subject is the rock, say, a
movement of the rock, which then causes the window to break.
Sentences containing the instrumental 'with', in conjunction with causative-inchoatives, can
be understood as 'by'-locutionary sentences that are unspecific about the kind of event that the
instrument is caused by the agent's action to undergo.
Smith alerted the prowler with the floodlight. That is, Smith did something that caused the
prowler to become alert and what Smith did caused something or other to happen to the floodlight
and whatever it was that happened to the floodlight was a more immediate cause of the prowler's
becoming alert. Thus, (4)'s analysis should be as follows:
(4*)
(Ex)(Ey)(Ez)(Ey')(Ez')[Action(x) & Agent(Smith, x) & Event(y) & State(z) & Is-abeing-alert(z) & Subject(the prowler, z) & Terminates-in(y, z) & (Event(y') & State(z')
& Subject(the floodlight, z') & Terminates-in(y', z') & Caused(x , y') & Caused(y', y))].
12
According to us, Smith's alerting of the prowler with the floodlight was his flipping of the
switch. But it does not follow from this that Smith flipped the switch with the floodlight. What follows
from this is that what Smith did (a) caused something to happen to the floodlight (viz., it turned on)
and (b) caused the switch to become flipped, and that what happened to the floodlight was a cause
of the prowler's becoming alert. It does not follow from this that what happened to the floodlight was
a causal link between what Smith did and switch's becoming flipped. The switch's becoming flipped
was caused by something Smith did that affected the floodlight; but the switch's becoming flipped
was not caused by the change in the floodlight that Smith brought about.
From (4*), which says (again assuming uniqueness) that Smith's action caused the
floodlight to undergo a change that caused the prowler to become alert, it does not follow that
Smith's action caused the floodlight to undergo a change that caused the switch to flip; not even
on the assumption that Smith's flipping of the switch is his alerting of the prowler. For that
conclusion to follow from (4*) and the disputed identity, it would have to be assumed that Smith's
action (his alerting of the prowler with the floodlight) caused the switch to flip by causing something
to happen to the floodlight; that is, that the effect of Smith's action that happened to the floodlight
caused the switch to flip.
But neither (4) nor (4*) says anything relevant to this assumption at all; they say only that
what happened to the floodlight caused the prowler to become alert. Nor is such a claim likely to
be true; but if it were, it would also be true that Smith flipped the switch with the floodlight. Of
course, if Smith's alerting of the prowler should turn out to be his flipping of the switch, the switch's
flipping would be among the effects of Smith's alerting of the prowler with the floodlight; but this
does not imply that the switch's flipping was caused by the effect of Smith's action that happened
to the floodlight. And therefore, (4), the claim that Smith alerted the prowler with the floodlight, and
13
the claim that Smith's alerting of the prowler was his flipping of the switch, do not entail that Smith
flipped the switch with the floodlight.
VII. Conclusion
Naturally, our analysis of sentences involving the instrumental 'with' as 'by'-locutionary sentences
and our demonstration that (4) can be analyzed as (4*) do not alone show that Smith's flipping of
the switch and his alerting of the prowler are the same action. Semantic analysis can no more show
that the two effects in question of Smith's action have a cause in common than that they must have
no cause in common. But at least it shows that no semantic considerations stand in the way of that
identification.
Whether our (4*) or Parsons' (4') should be accepted as the analysis of (4) clearly depends
at least in part on metaphysical reflection on the nature of actions and events, reflections that are
eventually to be mirrored at least in part in a semantic analysis. Still, we think that a strong case
can be made for (4*) as the analysis of (4) and for the claim that, when Smith alerts the prowler
with the floodlight by flipping the switch, his alerting of the prowler is his flipping of the switch.15
Patrick Francken, Southern Illinois University
Lawrence B. Lombard, Wayne State University
14
NOTES
1. Though it is obvious that x does not 0/ y unless y is 0/ed, it does not follow from this that x does
not 0/ y until y is 0/ed; see L.B. Lombard's "'Unless', 'Until', and the Time of a Killing", Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 2 (June, 1989), pp. 135-154.
2. See Terence Parsons, Events in the Semantics of English: A Study of Subatomic
Semantics (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), Chapter 6. Our characterization of
causative-inchoatives will be slightly different from Parsons', but in ways that do not matter here.
3. Sometimes, the phrase '0/ed' cannot apply unless the patient gets to be in a certain state as a
result of some action; thus, while the door can be in the state of being closed without its ever being
closed by anything (it might always have been closed), no one can be in the state of being killed
unless he or she is in that state as a result of some action, a killing; and no one can have always
been in that state. This issue, not being particularly relevant here, will be ignored hereafter. All
matters concerning tense are also being ignored here, since they too are not germane.
4. Since the substances that cause may be conscious agents or inanimate things (e.g., the rock
broke the window), we do not intend that 'x is a's agent' to imply intentionality. We merely wish to
distinguish the causing event (the throwing of the rock) from the caused event (the window's
breaking); and since in most of the cases of this sort that have come up for discussion the causing
event has been a human action, we use the term 'action' for the causing event.
5. Op. cit., pp. 164f.
6. We really want this clause, so that the entailment of 'Something was done' by 'Smith did
something' can be explained. However, again, there is no need to suppose that 'Action(x)' implies
intentionality.
7. We should not confuse the use of the word 'with' in 'I hit the ball with the bat', which is truly
instrumental, with the use of the word 'with' in 'I swung at the ball with the bat', which is not. The
bat was the instrument I used in order to hit the ball; but the bat was not anything I used in order
to swing at the ball. That is, I did not swing by doing something with the bat; the bat was not
something such that by doing something with it I caused the bat to be swung I (unless I used the
bat to move my arms).
8. See Michael Cohen's "The Same Action", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S. Vol.
LXX (1970), p. 78, Julia Annas' "Davidson and Anscombe on 'The Same Action'", Mind, Vol. 85
(1976), pp. 254, and Jonathan Bennett's Events and Their Names (Indinapolis: Hacket Publishing
Co., 1988), p. 190.
9. Op. cit., p. 164.
10. Perhaps there are reasons, though we find ourselves hard pressed to imagine what they might
be, for thinking that certain actions and events could have at most one effect. But whatever those
reasons might be, they will surely concern the nature of actions and events, the nature of the
causal relation, or some other metaphysical issue. In any case, those reasons will not be purely
semantic.
15
11. See L.B. Lombard's "How Not To Flip The Prowler: Transitive Verbs of Action and the Identity
of Actions", in E. LePore & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events: Perspectives on the
Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 268-281.
12. Alvin Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p.
5.
13. The avoidability and unnaturalness of taking 'by' to be a two-place relation between actions is
discussed in P. Francken, Noncausal Connections and the Nature of Events (Ph.D. dissertation,
Wayne State University, 1985). Syntactically, 'by' seems to function more like an operator that
forms predicates from predicates than like a two-place relation between actions. The analysis to
follow is compatible with this.
14. A less formal, though essentially similar, treatment of the 'by'-locution is contained in P.
Francken's "The By-locutionary Argument", read at the Eastern Division Meetings of the American
Philosophical Association, December, 1986.
15. Our thanks go to Michael McKinsey and Larry Powers for their helpful suggestions concerning
a paper, "Logical Form and the Theory of Events: A Plea for Metaphysics", which Lombard read
as part of a symposium, with Terence Parsons and Stephen Neale, at the Pacific Division meetings
of the American Philosophical Association, March, 1991. Part of the present paper is an expanded
version of part of that symposium paper.