JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND GOVERNANCE
Dennis Russell D. Baldago1
1
Dennis Russell D. Baldago is a Ph.D. Student of the University of the Philippines – National
College of Public Administration and Governance (UP-NCPAG). He is currently the Chief
Judicial Reform Program Officer of the Supreme Court of the Philippines - Program Management
Office and Head of its Project Development and Resource Mobilization Group (PDRMG).
ABSTRACT
One of the pillars of a well-functioning judicial system is the independence of its justices
and judges – beholden to none except to the people and the constitution. Thus, the appointment
process of magistrates should be devoid of the ‘dark side’ of politics which tend to encourage
patronage to the appointing authority.
This paper reviews the screening, nomination and
appointment process of the justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of the lower courts as
provided for in the 1987 Constitution. It analyzes the role of the Judicial and Bar Council to screen
and nominate the applicants, and the authority of the President to make the appointment based on
the list endorsed by the JBC. Discussions will be made within the framework of Wilson’s politicsadministration dichotomy. Thereafter, it attempts to correlate the effects of these constitutional
provisions on the delivery of the justice system and good governance.
2
INTRODUCTION
One of the critical foundations of a well-functioning judicial system is the independence of its
justices and judges – beholden to no one except to the people and the constitution. For this reason,
the appointment process of magistrates should be devoid of the ‘dark side’ of politics which tend to
encourage patronage to the appointing authority. This paper reviews the screening, nomination and
appointment process of the justices of the Supreme Court and the judges of the lower courts as
provided for in the 1987 constitution. It analyzes the role of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) to
screen and nominate the applicants to the said positions, and the authority of the President to make
the appointment based on the list prepared by the former. Thereafter, it attempts to correlate the
effects of these constitutional provisions on the delivery of the justice system.
Politics-Administration dichotomy is never more clearly pronounced between the executive and
judicial branch of government. The provisions of the constitution divide, defines and sets the
limitations of public administration among the three branches of government. The structure and
organization of these branches is designed to provide check and balance while existing in a co-equal
but interdependent stature.
The framers of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines were determined not to repeat the pitfalls of
a dictatorial government under the 1973 constitution, thus it was more inclined for a Madisonian
framework of government. In fact, the 1987 constitution is considered a reactive constitution
against the excessive powers afforded by the 1973 constitution to the executive branch. Under the
1987 constitution, there are only three situations where the other branches of government can
legitimately ‘meddle’ with the judicial branch. First and foremost, which is the focus of this paper,
is the appointment of justices and judges by the President which does not need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.1 Second is the budget process which is a function of Congress.2
And lastly is the impeachment process of members of the Supreme Court, which is again the
domain of Congress.3
Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts are appointed by the President based on
the list of nominees submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. The screening and nomination
process is an administrative function of the JBC, whereas, the appointment process is a political
function of the President. Both functions are vested by the 1987 constitution. In performing their
functions, justices and judges should never, in all instances and at all costs, compromise their
independence. This is very clear in the constitution, “a member of the judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence” (1987 Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 7 (3)).
Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio underscored the importance of independence in one of his
speeches, “…the ultimate test for any Supreme Court, and for the Justices who compose it, is in
layman’s language, the test of courage. In constitutional lingo, this is the test of independence, for
3
the Constitution mandates that a member of the Judiciary, and more so a Justice of the Supreme
Court, must be ‘a person of proven independence. The most important qualification of a judge is
independence, not brilliance. In fact the Constitution does not require a judge to be brilliant but
only competent and independent, in addition to being of proven integrity and probity” (Carpio
2008).4
While the constitution provides the mechanisms for the separation of politics and
administration in the appointment process of justices and judges in the judiciary, it is not without
defect thus permeating the ‘evil tendencies’ of politics to intrude and compromise the independence
of our magistrates. There is clear and present danger in the system of judicial appointments.
PHILIPPINE COURT SYSTEM
System of Government
The constitution of the Philippines is the supreme and fundamental law of the land. It contains the
form and duties of the government, the distribution of powers of its branches, and the basic rights of
its citizens. The constitution has been rewritten six times from the ‘Malolos’ constitution of 1899 to
the constitution of 1987. The political evolution and every significant event in the country’s history
resulted in a change in the constitution. Under the 1987 constitution, the system of government in
the country is based on a framework of a presidential, representative, and democratic republic,
where the President is both the head of the state as well as the head of the government within a
multi-party system.
This system revolves around three separate, co-equal and interdependent
branches of government: the executive, the legislative and judicial branch.
Jurisdiction and Hierarchy of Courts
The Philippine judiciary is a hierarchal institution consists of the following courts at various levels:
First level courts. Composed of the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC) which are created in each
metropolitan area established by law; the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities (MTCC) which are
created in every city which does not form part of the metropolitan area, the Municipal Trial Courts
(MTC) which are created in each of the other cities or municipalities, and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTC) which are created in each circuit comprising such cities and/or municipalities
as grouped by law. At the same level are the Shari’a Circuit Courts (SCC) which has been
established in Islamic regions and provinces to interpret and apply the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws (Presidential Decree No. 1083).
Second level courts. Consists of Regional Trial Courts (RTC) which are established in each of the
thirteen regions in the Philippines. Regional Trial Courts serves as trial courts and may receive
evidence from the parties of the case. Each RTC is composed of several branches and also exercise
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appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the MeTCs, MTCCs, MTCs, and MTCCs in their respective
territorial jurisdictions.
Third level court. At the third level is the Court of Appeals (CA), the Sandiganbayan, and the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The Court of Appeals is assigned to review cases elevated to it from
the RTCs as well as quasi-judicial agencies such as the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and the Land
Registration Authority (LRA). It also reviews death penalty cases as well as decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. The CA is a collegiate court and may sit en
banc only for purpose of exercising administrative, ceremonial or other non-adjudicatory functions.
The CA exercises its powers, functions, and duties through 23 divisions of 3 members each.
The Sandiganbayan is an anti-graft court that tries public officers, including their co-accused
private persons, charged with criminal cases involving graft and corrupt practices as well as
corresponding civil cases for the recovery of civil liability. It is composed of a Presiding Justice
and 14 Associate Justices who sit in 5 divisions of 3 Justices each. Like the CA, its decisions are
appealable to the Supreme Court.
The Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees, or other charges, penalties
in relation, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) or Tariff and
Customs Code (TCC). It also exercises original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from
violations of the Tax or Tariff Codes and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) or the Bureau of Customs. It is composed of a Presiding Justice and 5 Associate
Justices, and may sit en banc or in 2 divisions of 3 Justices each. Republic Act No. 9282 which
took effect on March 30, 2004, has elevated the status of the CTA to that of the Court of Appeals.
Fourth level court. The highest court in the land, the Supreme Court, is the only constitutional
court created by the Constitution of the Philippines. The Supreme Court is considered ‘the court of
last resort’ since no more appeals can be made from a judgment or decision on the merits rendered
by this court.
A decision of a Supreme Court division is considered a decision of the entire Court. Decisions of
the Supreme Court are considered as part of the law of the land.
All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, shall be heard by the
Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard
en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with
the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
5
issues in the case and voted thereon. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or
resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of
at least three of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided
en banc, provided that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Supreme Court sitting en
banc [Section 4 (2) (3). Article VIII].
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS
Screening and Nomination Process: Role of the Judicial and Bar Council
In the aftermath of the Marcos autocracy, one of the many daunting challenges faced by the Aquino
administration was the restoration of public trust and confidence in the justice system.
As
mentioned earlier, a well-functioning judicial system is characterized to be efficient, effective and
more importantly, independent. Decisions rendered by any court should be impartial and devoid of
any influence from the other branches of government or the private sector. The independence of the
judiciary is closely linked to the selection and appointment of justices and judges who have proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence.
For this reason, one of the innovations of the 1987 constitution was the creation of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC), a brainchild of the late Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion.5 Its principal and
most important function is to recommend to the President qualified appointees for the positions in
the Judiciary, namely the Justices of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts [Section 8 (5).
Article VIII].
Appointment to the judiciary is no longer subject to the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments (Section 9. Article VIII). The rationale for this is to prevent if not
minimize unnecessary political interference in the appointment of Justices and judges.6
The JBC is under the supervision of the Supreme Court. It is composed of the Chief Justice as ex
officio7 Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of Congress as ex officio Members,
a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court,
and a representative of the private sector. The regular members of the Council are appointed by the
President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments [Section 8
(1) (1). Article VIII].
The constitution has clearly defined the minimum qualifications for justices and judges.
It
mandates that no person shall be appointed member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate
court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court must be
at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or
6
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines [Section 7 (1). Article VIII].
While the
qualifications of judges for lower courts shall be prescribe by Congress, the constitution is very
clear that no person may be appointed judge unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member
of the Philippine Bar [Section 7 (2). Article VIII]. Finally, a member of the judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence [Section 7 (3). Article VIII].
The JBC acknowledges that while it is not possible to lay down ‘iron-clad’ rules to determine the
fitness of those who aspire to become a justice or judge, certain guidelines or criteria must be
prescribed to ascertain if one seeking such position meets the minimum constitutional qualifications
and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of a member of the judiciary (Rules of the JBC
009).
Before it can submit to the President its shortlist of candidates for judicial posts, the JBC adheres to
a set of rules it has promulgated. It conducts background investigations as well as psychological
and psychiatric examinations of potential nominees. It also considers administrative complaints
against the candidates aside from their track records, educational backgrounds, bar ratings,
publications, employment records, and, with respect to judges, quality of decisions and speed of
disposition of cases. In addition, personal interviews of all applicants and nominees are conducted
for all judicial positions. A candidate may also be disqualified upon the negative vote of even a
single member on the crucial issue of integrity (Rules of the JBC 009 – Rule 10 on Voting
Requirements).8
Appointment Process: Constitutional mandate of the President
The 1987 constitution provides the President with broad powers to appoint officials in government.
The President wields the authority to nominate and appoint all officials provided for in the
Constitution including those authorized by law. It is also within the President’s jurisdiction to
appoint all other officers of government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law.
Among these public officers, the appointments of the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, and officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain are subject to the consent of the Commission on Appointments (Section 16. Article
VII).9 By law, Congress may vest the appointment of other public officers lower in rank to the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.10
The constitution also extends this power of the President to the judiciary. The President has the sole
authority to appoint all the fifteen justices of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts based
on a shortlist of nominees submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council. These appointments are not
subject to the consent of the Commission on Appointments (Section 9. Article VIII).11
The
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Supreme Court, for its part, has the power to appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary in
accordance with the civil service law [Section 5 (6). Article VIII].12
STATE OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE GOVERNANCE
The ‘Seniority Rule’
In choosing the next Chief Justice, the ‘seniority rule,’ where the most senior associate justice of the
Supreme Court, in terms of tenure, is selected as the next Chief Justice, is a major consideration for
the President. Even for its part, since its creation, the JBC has tended to respect this rule. The rule
however, is a tradition and not a legal requirement that mandates the President to follow. Still, most
Presidents have respected this rule and have only disregarded it five (5) times since the creation of
the Supreme Court in 1901.
In 1920, Secretary of Justice Victorina Mapa was appointed as Chief Justice, bypassing the more
senior Justice Torres. Another case was Chief Justice Jose Yulo who was appointed in 1942 during
the war.
Then there were Chief Justice Felix Makasiar and Ramon Aquino who were both
successively appointed by President Marcos in lieu of Justice Claudio Teehankee.
Justice
Teehankee had to wait for almost eighteen years before he was appointed as Chief Justice by
President Aquino in 1986. In 2005, Justice Artemio Panganiban was also appointed as Chief Justice
over senior associate Justice Reynato Puno. In 2006, Justice Puno was eventually appointed as
Chief Justice. The next table will show the JBC nominees for the Chief Justice of the Philippines
and eventual appointees from 1998 to 2006.
For the post of associate justices, again traditionally, nominees and appointees have come from the
appellate court. Of the thirty two (32) associate justices who have been appointed since 1988,
sixteen (16) have come from the Court of Appeals.
Other associate justice appointees were
previously court administrators, deans of law schools, and practicing lawyers.
In July 2007, the Supreme Court en banc (G.R. No. 177721, July 03, 2007) prevented
Sandiganbayan Justice Gregory S. Ong from accepting an appointment and assuming the position of
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court until such time that he can show that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and correct the records of his birth and citizenship. Malacañang thereafter withdrew
the appointment of Justice Ong. The vacancy was filled up with the appointment of Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice Teresita Leonardo de Castro in December 03, 2007.
Serving the Population: Ratio of Justices and Judges
8
By the end of 2007, of the total 2,287 positions of justices and judges in the country, 1,832 have
been filled up with 455 positions or approximately 20% remaining vacant. In 2001, the vacancy
rate was 33%. The vacancies are mostly located in the conflict zones of the southern region where
safety and security of judges is a major concern. The number of justices and judges translates to
one judge for every 50,643 Filipinos, or 20 judges for every million population. By the end of
2007, the population of the country was estimated at 88.6 million.
Public Perception
There has been a void of empirical data to clearly establish whether patronage to the appointing
President by justices and judges really exists and reflect on the cases they decide on. For this
reason, most data are based on perception surveys and media reports.
In the case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. L-36142, March 31, 1973) for example.
The case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1973 which was then composed of Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion, and associate Justices Querube Makalintal, Calixto Zaldivar, Fred Ruiz
Castro, Enrique Fernando, Claudio Teehankee, Antonio Barredo, Felix Makasiar, Felix Antonio and
Salvador Esguerra. Of the members of the court, Concepcion, Makalintal and Zaldivar were the
justices not initially appointed by Marcos, Concepcion being appointed in 1954 (he was later
appointed Chief Justice in 1966), Makalintal in 1962 and Zaldivar in 1964.
The court was severely divided on the issues raised in the petition. The said decision become the
legal basis for the 1973 Philippine constitution, and paved the way for the extension of the term of
then President Ferdinand Marcos and rule by absolute force and decree until his ouster by the
People Power Revolution in 1986. Chief Jsutice Concepcion took a leave of absence, 50 days
before reaching the mandatory age of retirement. It was perceived to have been done as a sign of
protest on the decision of the majority.
Another example was during the short term of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban as Chief
Magistrate from December 20, 2005 to December 7, 2006. The Chief Justice (originally appointed
by President Ramos as associate justice) and Justices Consuelo Ynarez-Santiago, Ma. Alicia Austria
Martinez, Renato Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Romeo Callejo, Adolfo Azcuna, Dante Tinga,
Minita Chico Nazario, Cancio Garcia, and Presbitero Velasco, Jr. were all appointed by President
Arroyo. Justice Leonardo Quisumbing and Justice Antonio Carpio were appointed by President
Ramos, while Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez was appointed by President Estrada. Because 12
of the 15-man tribunal including the Chief Justice were appointees of the President, there were
speculations that the Supreme Court would be influenced by Malacañang in rendering its decisions.
The following decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, proved otherwise:
9
•
Bayan v. Ermita (G.R. No. 169838), the Supreme Court declared as null and void the Arroyo
administration’s “Calibrated Preemptive Response” policy regarding rallies even as it upheld
regulations on the right to rally, including the permit requirement, under the Public Assembly
Act of 1985 (B.P. 880).
•
In Senate v. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777), the Supreme Court upheld the right of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials in congressional inquiries in aid of legislation by
partially voiding E.O. 464. However, the Court declared “valid on its face” the requirement in
E.O. 464 for executive officials to secure the President’s consent before appearing during the
question hour.
•
In David v. Arroyo (G.R. 171396), the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional arrests
without warrant during rallies, arbitrary cancellation of permits to rally, imposition of standards
on media and any form of prior restraint on the press, and takeover of privately owned public
utilities or businesses affected with public interest pursuant to P.P. 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency.
•
In KMU v. the Director General (G.R. 167798), E.O. 420 which adopts a unified I.D. system for
the government, was upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court ruled that E.O. 420 does not
establish a national I.D. system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government
entities less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Lastly, the Supreme Court declared as illegal and unconstitutional the Memorandum of Agreement
on Ancestral Domain (MOA on AD) last October 14, 2008 with a very close vote of 8-7. The MOA
on AD aims to establish a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJI) with its own laws, police and internal
security force, civil service, education, legislative and electoral institutions, as well as the full
authority to develop and dispose of minerals and other natural resources. Those who voted against
the MOA on AD where Chief Justice Reynato Puno, Justices Leonardo Quisumbing, Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, Antonio Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez, Conchita Carpio Morales, Adolfo
Azcuna, and Ruben Reyes. Except for Justice Quisumbing, and Justice Ynares-Santiago, the Chief
Justice and the rest of the justices, including those who dissented with the decision were all
appointed by President Arroyo.
It is important to note that while the Chief Justice carries only 1 vote out of 15 in the Court, and is
generally regarded, vis-a-vis the other justices, as the primus inter pares rather than as the
administrative superior of the other members of the Court.13 Nevertheless, the influence of the
Chief Justice within the judiciary and on the national government as a whole cannot be
underestimated. In the public eye, the Supreme Court is widely identified with the incumbent Chief
Justice, thus appellations such as ‘The Concepcion Court,’ ‘The Davide Court,’ ‘The Panganiban
10
Court’ or ‘The Puno Court.’ This is mainly because the Chief Justice retains high public visibility,
unlike the associate justices who tend to labor in relative anonymity, with some exceptions such as
Associate Justice Jose B.L. Reyes in the 1950s to 1970s. 14
In this relation, based on the second quarter 2008 Social Weather Station Report on public
satisfaction of top government institutions conducted on June 28 – 30, 2008 the Supreme Court was
given with a +6 net satisfaction rating. The highest satisfaction rating of the Supreme Court since
1986 was during the term of President Aquino and President Estrada with a +38 and +41 rating,
respectively.
In terms of public satisfaction of Chief Justices from October 1986 to June 2008, the following are
their ratings when they reached their retirement month based on the same survey by SWS.
Table 1: Net Satisfaction Rating of Supreme Court Chief Justices from 1986 to June 2008
Chief Justice
Retirement
Rating
Month
Claudio Teehankee
Oct. 86
+52
Marcelo Fernan
Nov. 91
+31
Andres Narvasa
Nov. 98
+36
Hilario Davide, Jr.
Dec. 05
+10
Artemio Panganiban
Dec. 06
+4
Source: Second Quarter 2008 Social Weather Station Report
Within the Asian region, the judicial system of the Philippines was ranked number 6 overall in
performance in a survey conducted by Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) Ltd. in the
2nd quarter of 2008. Hongkong was ranked number 1 with a score of 1.45 while Vietnam was
ranked last with a score of 8.10.
CONCLUSION
A well-functioning judicial system which is efficient and fair, accessible and transparent, and
independent and autonomous is expected to be a significant factor to restore public trust and
confidence in the system. This, in turn, will lead to a socio-economic environment that is stable and
predictable which are basic requisites for investors, both domestic and foreign, to invest in the
country.
A critical factor in attaining this objective is the selection and appointment of the members of the
Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts.
The members of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission have the best and noble intentions to avoid the pitfalls of the 1973 constitution which
served as a convenient tool of the autocratic Marcos regime. It is for this very reason that the
Judicial and Bar Council came into being. While judicial appointment, which no longer needs
approval of the Commission on Appointments, remains the sole function of the President, the
responsibility of screening and selection of nominees is incumbent upon the JBC. Thus, it is not
11
only important for the JBC to avoid any public doubt that its nominees not only have proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence; but equally important is that the decision to
nominate them is based on a rigid process devoid of any influence, especially from the President.
As mentioned earlier, there has been a void of empirical data to clearly establish whether patronage
to the appointing President by justices and judges really exists and reflect on the cases they decide.
This is not to say however, that there is no inherent weakness in the current judicial appointment
system.
The foundation of politics-administration dichotomy in the current system of screening, nomination
and appointment of justices and judges can be transgressed by a determined executive branch to
protect its interest, notwithstanding the wisdom of the 1987 constitutional provisions. There exists
a clear and present danger that can undermine judicial independence and encourage political
patronage to the appointing authority. This danger exists despite the determined efforts of the 1986
Constitutional Commission and lessons learned from the autocratic government brought about by
the 1973 constitution. For this reason, it would be prudent for the judiciary to continuously
safeguard its independence and strengthen it, especially in the areas where it is vulnerable, the
appointment of its members being one of them.
It is interesting to note that since the creation of the United State Supreme Court, there has been 130
nominations, where about 30 failed to secure the consent of the Senate. From 1994 to the middle
2005, there has been no new appointments, the longest in more than 180 years and the second
longest period in U.S. history without a change in the composition of the Supreme Court in U.S.
history. In the Philippines, before the next presidential election in 2010, all but possibly one of the
members of the Supreme Court will be appointed by the incumbent president.
Finally, the primary purpose of any constitution is to inform its people of the limits of its
government’s power, including the system of checks and balances that it has created to ensure that
these limits are observed.
Within the Philippines’ own jurisdiction, the role of our current
constitution can be best summarized in the words of then Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna during
his speech when he voted in favor for the approval of the draft Philippine Constitution on October
12, 1986.15
“But, in the final analysis, it is not the constitution but the social forces behind the constitution that
will determine the shape of our destiny. We have firmly established a document but, at the same
time, we have entrusted to others its final course.”16
12
Endnotes
1
1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Section 9. Article VIII.
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
2
1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Section 24. Article VI.
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
3
1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Section 2 and 3 (1). Article XII.
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
4
Speech of Supreme Court Justice Antonio T. Carpio on January 22, 2008 at the Far Eastern University during the
launching of the book, A Test of Courage by Ms Evelyn Miranda-Feliciano and former Senate President Jovito R.
Salonga.
5
Roberto Concepcion was the Chief Justice of the Philippines from June 17, 1966 until April 18, 1973. He took a leave
of absence, 50 days earlier from his scheduled mandatory retirement. It was speculated as a resignation to protest
the upholding of the ratification case (Javellana v. Executive Secretary; 1973) which upheld the 1973 Constitution,
and paved the way for extending the Marcos’ regime. During the Aquino administration, Chief Justice Concepcion
was as one of the commissioners tasked to draft the 1987 Constitution.
6
Prior to its creation, all appointments to the Judiciary were made by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. The selection is based from a list of candidates prepared under the supervision of
the Secretary of Justice. The list includes those within the Department of Justice whom the Secretary believes
would make good judges, as well as those who are proposed by leaders of the political party to which the President
belongs or by other persons who possess a strong influence over the President or the Secretary. Before inclusion in
the list, the candidates undergo screening as the Secretary may deem necessary. Occasionally, the President or the
Secretary consults with the Chief Justice and members of the Supreme Court, the Presiding Justice and Justices of
the Court of Appeals and leading members of the bar with respect to certain candidates, especially those who aspire
for appointment to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. As a practice, the Commission on Appointments, in
deference to the President, confirms every appointment provided that: (1) the nominee possesses the qualifications
prescribed by the law; (2) no serious charges are filed impeaching his integrity; and (3) no member of Congress
expresses a strong objection to the appointment. The final list from which the President chooses is not published.
7
Latin phrase meaning “By virtue of one’s office.”
8
Rules of the JBC 009 – Rule 10: Voting Requirements. Section 2.
Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case where the integrity of an
applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the
Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination.
9
1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 16. Article VII.
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions,
or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments
or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
13
10
Ibid.
11
1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 9. Article VIII.
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
12
1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 5 (6). Article VIII.
Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
13
Latin word meaning ‘first among equals.’ It indicates that a person is the most senior of a group of people sharing
the same rank or office.
14
Jose B.L. Reyes was a noted Filipino jurist who served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1954 to
1972. Widely known by the initials "JBL", his reputation for intellect and fearlessness was such that the popular
rumor took hold that President Ferdinand Marcos awaited his retirement from the Court in August of 1972 before
imposing martial law a few weeks later.
15
Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna is a member of the Supreme Court since he was appointed on October 17, 2002. Prior to
his appointment to the High Court, Justice Azcuna served as member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
representing Zamboanga del Norte as well as the 1986 Constitutional Commission. He held several government
posts during the term of President Aquino, first as Presidential Legal Counsel, then as Press Secretary and
subsequently as Presidential Spokesman. He received the degree of Bachelor of Arts, with academic honors, at the
Ateneo de Manila in 1959 and the degree of Bachelor of Laws, cum laude, at the same institution in 1962. He was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1963, placing 4th in the 1962 bar examinations. He forthwith embarked on a
government career as Assistant Private Secretary of then Presiding Justice Jose P. Bengzon of the Court of Appeals
in 1963 and, thereafter, upon the appointment of the latter to the Supreme Court in 1964, as his Private Secretary.
Justice Azcuna will reach the mandatory retirement age of 70 on February 16, 2009.
16
Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. V, p. 912.
14