PHI 219 Ethics: Theoretical and Practical Miranda Fricker m.fricker @sheffield.ac.uk Office hours: Mon 4.15-­‐5.15, Thurs 11.00-­‐12.00 Course Aims and Objectives Ever wondered whether morality is objective or subjective, and whether this matters? These are perhaps the most basic questions in ‘meta-­‐ethics’. Much of Moral Philosophy is meta-­‐ethics—that is, inquiry into the nature and status of moral judgements about right and wrong, whether there is such a thing as moral truth, moral knowledge, objective moral reasons, or whether morality is really a construct out of human sentiments or conventions. This course will explore different aspects of the fundamental pull and push of subjectivist and objectivist leanings in meta-­‐ethics. That is to say, we’ll be thinking about features of moral life that suggest morality is objective, and, by contrast, features that pull us back to the idea that morality is made by us—an artefact of human nature or of a particular culture. The course will mix philosophical theory with some real applied topics. And it will mix contemporary debate with attention to the views of key historical figures. Roughly speaking, the first third of the course will focus on aspects of subjectivism, where our historical figure will be the 18th-­‐century philosopher David Hume (famously a subjectivist about morality). The second third of the course will focus on the objectivist side, where our historical figure will be the philosopher Immanuel Kant (famously an arch objectivist). And the final third will allow us to think about applied topics in the light of these different meta-­‐ethical theories and the normative approaches they offer us—topics such as world hunger, animal rights, and euthanasia. In the small group discussions in particular you will have the chance to debate the rights and wrongs of these issues. Lectures, Small Group Discussions, and Seminars Each week there will be one standard lecture (me delivering essential material with students taking notes and asking questions), followed either by another lecture or by a small group work session. (Basically I’ll give two lectures in those weeks where there is too much material to get through in one.) The small group session will normally end in a plenary discussion to bring things together again. In small group sessions I will set some questions for you to discuss in groups, based on the material of the lecture you heard earlier in the day, and I might ask each group to report their thoughts back to the class as a whole, so that we get some considered debate going. This will be an active learning session that enables students to do philosophy together in a safe space, so that the learning is deepened as you handle the ideas among yourselves. It will help you rehearse the ideas, and form your own objections and arguments, which you are then better equipped to present in your written essays. In Week 4 we will also use the discussion session to focus on Study Skills for essay writing; and in Week 11 we will have a Study Skills session devoted to exam technique.
Lectures are held on Mondays at 11.00 (Hicks, Lecture Theatre 03) and at 3.00 (Mappin, Lecture Theatre 11). Weekly seminars will start in Week 3 on Mondays at 12.00 in the Jessop Building, Seminar Room 215. Details of readings for the seminars are in the reading list. Attendance at all sessions is mandatory. Students who do not attend regularly will be reported to the University for unsatisfactory progress, and risk failing the module. Attendance records go on file in the department office and are used in writing student references. Week 7 (11th-­‐15th November) is a reading/writing week during which there will be no lectures or seminars. Assessment: TWO coursework essays (50%) and ONE two-­‐hour unseen examination (50%) in which you will have to answer two questions. Essays must be between 1500 and 2000 words in length. The bibliography does not count toward the word count, though footnotes do. Both over-­‐length and under-­‐length essays may be penalised, and the limit is a strict one. (Penalties will of course depend on severity of the violation.) Essays are marked anonymously, so there should be no record of your name on the essay itself. Please make sure that your registration number is at the top of your essay. The university-­‐wide policy is that essays submitted late will be docked 5% for each working day after the deadline, unless the Director of Second and Third Year Studies has granted the student a formal extension owing to special circumstances. The Director of Second and Third Year Studies this year is me, Miranda Fricker m.fricker@sheffield.ac.uk. Essays submitted more than five days late without permission are automatically given a mark of zero. Please note that the Director of Studies is not normally at liberty to grant more than ONE extension per essay. After that the standard deduction of marks for lateness applies. Furthermore, any second time a deadline is missed without an extension an Unsatisfactory Progress Report to the Faculty is automatically triggered. (For information see http://www.shef.ac.uk/ssd/sca/progress ). All essays must be submitted both electronically and in paper form. Electronic submission is done through MOLE, which you can access through your MUSE webpage. Go to the Assignments link of the relevant module, and upload your essay there. Be sure to press the submit button. The paper copy should be submitted by handing it in to the Departmental Office (45 Victoria Street – front desk right inside the door). Unfair Means The following four examples of unfair means are serious academic offences and may result in penalties that could have a lasting effect on a student’s career, both at University and beyond (including possible expulsion from the University). Plagiarism (either intentional or unintentional) is the stealing of ideas or work of another person (including experts and fellow or former students) and is considered dishonest and unprofessional. Plagiarism may take the form of cutting and pasting, taking or closely paraphrasing ideas, passages, sections, sentences, paragraphs, drawings, graphs and other graphical material from books, articles, internet sites or any other source and submitting them for assessment without appropriate acknowledgement. Submitting bought or commissioned work (for example from internet sites, essay “banks” or “mills”) is an extremely serious form of plagiarism. This may take the form of buying or commissioning either the whole assignment or part of it and implies a clear intention to deceive the examiners. The University also takes an extremely serious view of any student who sells, offers to sell or passes on their own assignments to other students. Double submission (or self plagiarism) is resubmitting previously submitted work on one or more occasions (without proper acknowledgement). This may take the form of copying either the whole assignment or part of it. Normally credit will already have been given for this work. Collusion is where two or more people work together to produce a piece of work, all or part of which is then submitted by each of them as their own individual work. This includes passing on work in any format to another student. Collusion does not occur where students involved in group work are encouraged to work together to produce a single piece of work as part of the assessment process. Course Outline and Reading List Most of the essential readings for this course are in either Fricker & Guttenplan, Reading Ethics: selected texts with interactive commentary (Wiley-­‐Blackwell) or LaFollette ed. Ethics in Practice (3rd edition; Blackwell). You may like to purchase one or both, though the library will make the essential readings and seminar readings available online through MOLE. Week One: Subjectivism about Value—Mackie’s ‘error’ theory Essential reading ‘Subjectivism and Objectivism’ ch.4 in M. Fricker & S. Guttenplan Reading Ethics: selected texts with interactive commentary (2009). This gives an introductory commentary on an extracted version of ‘The Subjectivity of Values’, ch. 1 of J. L. Mackie: Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) Some further readings Michael Smith: ‘Objectivity and Moral Realism: on the significance of the phenomenology of moral experience’ in J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection (1993) Simon Blackburn: ‘Error and the phenomenology of value’ in Ted Honderich ed., Morality and Objectivity; reprinted as essay 8 in Essays in Quasi-­‐Realism (1993) Bernard Williams: ‘Ethics and the Fabric of the World’ in Ted Honderich ed. Morality and Objectivity; reprinted in Williams’ Making Sense of Humanity David Brink ‘Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness’, eds. Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin Arguing About Metaethcs (2006) Piers Benn: Ethics, ch.2, esp. pp.40-­‐42 Alexander Miller: An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics ch.6 Thomas Nagel: The View From Nowhere ch.VIII esp section 2; reprinted with commentary in ch.4 of Fricker & Guttenplan Reading Ethics (2009) Marilyn Friedman, ‘Going Nowhere: Nagel on Normative Objectivity’, Philosophy, Vol.65, No.254, pp.501-­‐09 Questions for discussion in small groups session Are there moral properties ‘out there’? In what sense? On what does the issue of moral objectivity turn? What is moral realism? Is it true? Are moral values objective? Does it matter whether realism is true or not? What is an ‘error theory’? Week Two: Humean subjectivism about value Lec 1 -­‐ Hume on reasons and motivation for action Essential reading ‘Reasons for Action’ ch.3 in Reading Ethics: selected texts with interactive commentary, M. Fricker and S. Guttenplan (Blackwell 2009) (This gives you a helpful commentary on key extracts from the Hume, which you could read in the original instead -­‐ or as well! – see here below...) David Hume: Treatise Bk.II Part III §3 and you should also read (his argument for subjectivism) Bk.III Part I §1 (1739) Some further readings J. L. Mackie: Hume’s Moral Theory chs.3-­‐4 (1980) Barry Stroud: Hume, chs. VII & VIII (1977) Michael Smith: ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’ Mind 1987 pp.36-­‐61; (reprinted as) chapter 4 of his The Moral Problem (1994) Philippa Foot: ‘Hume on Moral Judgement’ in Virtues and Vices (1978) James Baillie: Hume on Morality (2000) chs.3&4 Lec 2 – Hume’s ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ virtues Essential reading: On natural virtues, David Hume Treatise Bk. III Part III, and Enquiry Concerning The Principles of Morals sect. 2, and sects. 6-­‐8 On artificial virtues, David Hume Treatise Bk. III Part II (esp. sects.1-­‐2 on justice), and Enquiry Concerning The Principle of Morals sects. 3-­‐5, Appendix 3 Some further readings: James Baillie Hume on Morality (2000) ch.6 J. L. Mackie: Hume’s Moral Theory chs.VI-­‐VII (1980) Barry Stroud: Hume, chs. IX (1977) Jonathan Harrison, Hume’s Theory of Justice (1981) Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments chs. 9 & 10 Week Three: Varieties of Moral Relativism Lec 1 – The ‘conventionalism’ of Gilbert Harman Essential reading: Gilbert Harman ‘Moral Relativism’, ch.1 Part I in Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Blackwell, 1996) [If you can get hold of the book, all of Part I is relevant.] Some further readings: Bernard Williams: ‘Interlude: Relativism’ in Morality Gilbert Harman: Explaining Value (2000), Part I. Moral Relativism. [This includes reprints of various papers, crucially including ‘Moral Relativism Defended’.] Miranda Fricker ‘Styles of Moral Relativism’, in Roger Crisp ed. Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics (OUP, 2012), draft on my webpage Mary Midgely, ‘Trying Out One’s New Sword’ in Shafer-­‐Landau (first ed. only), Ethical Theory, p. 58 Philippa Foot: ‘Moral Relativism’ in Meiland & Krausz (eds.) Relativism: Cognitive and Moral Tim Scanlon: ‘Fear of Relativism’ ch.9 in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence & Warren Quinn (eds.) Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory (1995) James Rachels: The Elements of Moral Philosophy ch.2 (1986) Lec 2 -­‐ Bernard Williams’ ‘relativism of distance’ Essential reading: Bernard Williams ‘The truth in relativism’ essay 11 in Moral Luck (CUP, 1981) (reprinted from Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75, 1974-­‐5) Some further readings: B. Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy ch 9 M. Fricker: ‘The Relativism of Blame and Williams’ Relativism of Distance’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. (July) 2010 Mark P. Jenkins Bernard Williams (2006), pp. 140-­‐148 David Wong: ‘Relativism’ Section 39, in Part VI of Peter Singer ed. A Companion to Ethics (Blackwell) David Wong, Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism (2006) David B. Wong ‘Pluralistic Relativism’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy XX (1995); 378-­‐399 John Kekes, ‘Pluralism and the Value of Life’ in Ellen Paul, Fred Miller, Jeffrey Paul eds Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge (CUP, 1994) Wk 3 Seminar set reading David Wiggins: ‘Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Moral Beliefs’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Vol. 91 (1990-­‐92); 61-­‐85 Week Four: Moral Knowledge -­‐ A non-­‐objectivist conception Essential reading Simon Kirchin ‘Thick and Thin Concepts’, introduction to Kirchin (ed.) Thick Concepts (2013) Further readings Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (1985), ch.8 (re relativism, reflection’s destruction of ethical knowledge, and ‘ethical confidence’) And/or Bernard Williams: ‘Who Needs Ethical Knowledge?’ in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 35, Ethics, ed. A.Phillips Griffiths 1993 Miranda Fricker: ‘Confidence and Irony’ in E. Harcourt ed. Morality, Reflection and Ideology (2000) Mark P. Jenkins ‘Truth, Objectivity and Knowledge’, ch. 6 in Bernard Williams (2006) Stephan Burton, ‘”Thick” concepts revised’, essay 26 in Andrew Fisher and Simon Kirchin (eds) Arguing About Metaethics (Routledge, 2006) Questions for small groups discussion – though in this session we’ll also cover Study Skills regarding how to plan a well-­‐structured essay What are thick concepts, and how does their existence support moral cognitivism? Is ‘non-­‐objectivist’ moral knowledge really moral knowledge? Is it right to say that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge? What is ethical confidence? And why should we want it? Wk 4 Seminar set reading Bernard Williams ‘Relativism and Reflection’, ch. 9 in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Week Five: Explaining Kantian Deontology (duty-­‐based morality) Lec 1 and Lec 2– Introducing and explaining Kant’s view Essential reading ‘Morality and Obligation’, first half of ch. 5 (pp. 222-­‐244) in M. Fricker & S. Guttenplan: Reading Ethics (2009) [This gives commentary on excerpts from Kant’s original text Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785).] Further reading (introductory – be selective) Christine Korsgaard, Introduction to the Cambridge edition of the Groundwork ed. Mary Gregor Piers Benn, Ethics (1998) ch.4 esp. 91-­‐102 Richard Norman, The Moral Philosophers ch.6 (1998) Stephen Darwall, Philosophical Ethics chs.14-­‐15 (1998) Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics ch.14 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality ch.6 More specialist exegetical essays (in case you get really interested!) Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (1996), ch.2; ch.3 (on willing universalized maxim); ch.4 (on Formula of Humanity/End-­‐in-­‐Itself) Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason (1989), esp. chs. 5 and 7; see also her chapter 14 ‘Kantian Ethics’ in Singer ed. A Companion to Ethics (1991) Paul Guyer (ed.), Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays (1998); esp. Thomas Pogge chapter Philip Stratton-­‐Lake ‘Moral Motivation in Kant’, A Companion to Kant, ed. G. Bird (Wiley Blackwell, 2010, pp. 322-­‐334) Wk 5 Seminar set reading ‘Between consenting adults’, Onora O’Neill, ch. 6 in her Constructions of Reason (1989)
Week Six: Some criticisms of Kant’s view Essential reading Philippa Foot ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ in her Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (2002) Further readings Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character and Morality’ in his Moral Luck Susan Wolf: ‘Morality and Partiality’ pp.243-­‐59 Philosophical Perspectives 6, Ethics 1992 Laurence Blum: Friendship, Altruism and Morality (1980) chs.1-­‐2 Laurence Hinman: ‘On the Purity of our Moral Motives: A Critique of Kant’s Account of the Emotions and Acting for the Sake of Duty’ Monist 66 (1983) pp.251-­‐66 Questions for Small Group Discussion What is Kant’s Categorical Imperative a test for? And how is it meant to work? Does Kant’s Categorical Imperative successfully tell one what to do? How? Pick one or two of Kant’s illustrations and assess whether it works for the CI or not. Think up an example of your own where the CI seems to work, and one where it doesn’t. Wk 6 Seminar set reading C. Korsgaard, ‘The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil’ in James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 2 (originally in Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 15 (1986)) Week 7: READING/WRITING WEEK Week Eight*: Williams’ critique of ‘the morality system’ Essential reading ‘Morality and Obligation’, second half of ch. 5 (pp.244-­‐265) in M. Fricker & S. Guttenplan, Reading Ethics (2009) [This gives commentary on excerpts from Williams’ ‘Morality, the Peculiar Institution’, ch. 10 of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.] Further readings Robert B. Louden ‘The Critique of the Morality System’, ch.4 in Alan Thomas ed. Bernard Williams (2007) Mark P. Jenkins ‘Critique of the Morality System’ ch.4 (esp pp.67 onwards) in Bernard Williams (2006) Wk 8 Set seminar reading Charles Taylor: ‘A Most Peculiar Institution’, in J. Altham and R. Harrison eds. World, Mind, and Ethics Questions for Small Group Discussion What does Williams mean by ‘the morality system’? And do you think he’s right that we would be better off with a different conception of ethical life? What are the key features of ‘the morality system’ according to Williams? What does he think is wrong with them? * The Week eight lecture, small group discussion, and seminars will be taken by Elianna Fetterolf.
Week Nine: Utilitarianism Lec 1 – Explaining Utilitarianism Essential reading John Stuart Mill, ‘Utilitarianism’ (1863); or read as extracted in R. Shafer-­‐Landau (ed.), Ethical Theory (2nd edition) section 48, p. 417 Further reading On Mill and introductory: Roger Crisp: Mill -­‐ On Utilitarianism (1997) Piers Benn: Ethics ch.3 (1998) On ‘rule’ utilitarianism/consequentialism: J. J. C. Smart ‘An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics’, esp. sections 1-­‐3, in J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams: Utilitarianism: For and Against (1963) Brad Hooker: ‘Rule consequentialism’, Mind 99, No. 393 (Jan 1990), pp.67-­‐77; alternatively read his piece of the same name in LaFollette, H. (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory (Blackwell, 1999) Lec 2 – The Critique of Utilitarianism Essential reading Bernard Williams section 2 of ‘A critique of utilitarianism’, in J. J. C. Smart & B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (1963) AND Williams ‘Jim and the Indians’ section 85 in P. Singer (ed.) Ethics pp. 339-­‐345 Further reading Bernard Williams, sections 4 & 5 ‘A critique of utilitarianism’ in Smart & Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against Peter Railton ‘Alienation, consequentialism and the Demands of Morality’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984); reprinted in Ethical Theory: An Anthology (ed.) Russ Schafer-­‐Landau (2nd ed 2007) sect. 51 pp.441-­‐57 Philippa Foot, ‘Utilitarianism and the Virtues’, Mind 94 (1985), pp. 196-­‐209 Set seminar reading Susan Wolf ‘Moral Saints’, Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 419-­‐39; reprinted in Peter Singer (ed.) Ethics pp. 345-­‐61 Week Ten: World Hunger Essential reading Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1972) pp. 229-­‐243; reprinted in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice (3rd ed. 2007) essay 56, pp. 613-­‐622 John Arthur, ‘Famine relief and the Ideal Moral Code’, essay 57 in LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice Further reading Onora O’Neill, ‘The Moral Perplexities of Famine Relief’ in Tom Regan (ed.) Matters of Life and Death, (3rd ed. 1993); reprinted as ‘Kantian Approaches to Some Famine Problems’, in Ethical Theory: An Anthology (ed.) Russ Schafer-­‐Landau (2nd ed 2007) sect. 57 pp. 510-­‐520 Set seminar reading Thomas W. Pogge, ‘Eradicating Systemic Poverty: Brief for a Global Resources Dividend’ in Journal of Human Development, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2001); reprinted as essay 58 in LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice (3rd ed. 2007) Questions for Small Group Discussion What is the Utilitarian argument concerning world hunger? Is it satisfactory? What is the Kantian argument concerning world hunger? Is it satisfactory? Is utilitarianism too demanding?
Week Eleven: The Moral Status of Animals Essential reading Peter Singer, ‘All Animals Are Equal’, in Tom Regan and Peter Singer (eds.) Animal Rights and Human Obligations (1989), pp. 148-­‐162; reprinted as essay 14 in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice (3rd ed. 2007), pp.171-­‐180 Further reading Other readings from the ‘Animals’ section of LaFollette (ed.) above (p. 171-­‐211): Michael Allen Fox, ‘The Moral Community’, essay 15 R. G. Frey, ‘Moral Standing, the Value of Lives, and Speciesism’, essay 16 Tom Regan, ‘The Case for Animal Rights’ essay 17 And a Kantian paper: Christine Korsgaard, ‘A Kantian Case For Animal Rights’, in Animals and Law eds. Michel, Kuhne, Hanni (2012) available online via her web page Set seminar reading There is no set reading this week, as we will have a Study Skills session on exam technique, ahead of your unseen exam (revision, choosing questions, managing your time, planning your essay…) Questions for Small Group Discussion What, if anything, is wrong with eating animals? What does it mean to say that all animals are equal? Is it true? Are animals part of the moral community? What is the Kantian view of animals? Do animals have rights?
Week Twelve: Euthanasia Essential reading John Hardwig, ‘Is There a Duty to Die?’, The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1997) pp. 34-­‐42; Reprinted in numerous places and readily available online. Further reading Other essays in the ‘Euthanasia’ section of LaFollette (ed.): Brad Hooker, ‘Rule-­‐Utilitarianism and Euthanasia’, essay 4 Tom L. Beauchamp, ‘Justifying Physician-­‐assisted Deaths’, essay 5 Felicia Cohn and Joanne Lynn, ‘A Duty to Care Revisited’, essay 8 ‘Dying at the Right Time: Reflections on (un)assisted suicide’, essay 7 in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice (3rd ed. 2007) pp.91-­‐102 AND freely available at http://web.utk.edu/~jhardwig/RightTime.htm Set seminar reading J. David Velleman, ‘Against the Right to Die’, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1992) 17 (6), pp. 665-­‐681; reprinted as essay 6 in Hugh LaFollette (ed.) Ethics in Practice (3rd ed. 2007), pp. 81-­‐90 Questions for Small Group Discussion Why shouldn’t I end my own life if that’s what I genuinely and stably want? Why does Kant regard suicide as a breach of moral duty? Must the Kantian argue this for all cases? In an ideal rule-­‐utilitarian code, would there be a rule against euthanasia? Does a moral duty of care sometimes require a physician to end a life?