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Notes on Environmental Aesthetics
Prof. Linquist
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Intro
In these lectures I first discuss some basic issues in the philosophy of aesthetics. The three main points
that I cover are (1) that there is a distinction between aesthetic value and individual taste, (2) that
standards of aesthetic value are defined relative to particular traditions, and (3) that in the case of
artwork, the artist’s intention often determines the appropriate tradition for evaluating a particular
piece of art. I then turn to environmental aesthetics. We will review Sober and Russow’s aspirations for
this view. Finally, we will consider the attempts by Saito and Brady to identify the appropriate standards
for aesthetically evaluating natural objects.
1. The distinction between aesthetic value and preference.
There is a famous saying that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Some people understand this to mean
that aesthetic standards are determined by nothing more than individual preference. Two people might
disagree about whether some song or painting has aesthetic merit, on this view, and there would be no
higher court of appeal –no independent standard of value—to decide whether one of them is correct.
Most philosophers reject this view, because it conflicts with certain ways that people normally
think and behave. I will now provide a few examples of the kinds of behaviour that seem to suggest that
beauty is not merely in the eye of the individual beholder.
For one thing, consider our tendency to defer to experts in certain matters. We appeal to the
wine expert to identify a good vintage. We defer to the art historian when trying to figure out whether
Duchamp was a brilliant artist or a hack. We defer to architects to judge the design of the McKinnon
building. This tendency to defer to experts suggests that we acknowledge the existence of standards
independent of our individual taste. Why else would be defer to experts? These individuals are by no
means a reflection of public opinion, and aside of their expertise there is no other reason to care about
what they think.
A second noteworthy feature of our thought and behaviour is the way we argue about the merit
of cultural objects. Have you ever had a disagreement with a friend over the quality of a song or band?
Consider how these arguments tend to go.
Friend: “Don’t you agree that Justin Bieber is an excellent artist?”
You: “What on earth would make you say that?”
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Friend: “Well, for one thing, he is hugely popular. You don’t sell that many albums unless you have real
talent”
You: “On the contrary, his melodies are repackaged versions of the same boy-band songs from the
1980s and 90s. His lyrics are vapid, with no emotional depth or insight. Even his singing and dancing are
mediocre at best. I would hate to hear him without digital production and the rest of the industry smoke
and mirrors.”
Notice that in this hypothetical conversation, your character is appealing to a set of standards or virtues
against which vocal artists are often judged. You cite such virtues as original melodies, lyrical ingenuity
and singing and dancing ability – arguing that Bieber falls down on all counts. This kind of thinking comes
natural to us. When we argue this way, we are acknowledging the existence of standards independent
of our individual taste.
Of course, it is possible that your friend might respond as follows:
“Okay, I admit that Bieber is bad music, but I just like his stuff”.
Maybe your friend individual can’t resist a poppy tune, or maybe s/he associates Bieber with fond
memories. The important thing to note is that this admission appeals to a distinction between aesthetic
value and personal preference. One can recognize something as bad but still like it; or one can
recognize that something is good and dislike it. Aesthetic values are distinct from preferences.
I have so far appealed to (1) our tendency to defer to experts and (2) our willingness to argue
about the merit of cultural objects to suggest that, in our ordinary thought and speech, we recognize
aesthetic standards independent of personal preferences. Allow me to make a third observation. In the
case of many cultural objects our initial response is one of dislike. For example, most people dislike wine
on the first few tries. Many people dislike classical music at first. However, it is often possible to train
oneself to appreciate the merit of these things. Over time you might acquire the capacity to appreciate
different vintages. Likewise, you might come to acquire an ear for classical music, if you do not have one
already. Recognizing the distinction between aesthetic value and taste provides a plausible way of
explaining this phenomenon. According to this view, the process of overcoming one’s initial distaste
involves acquiring a body of knowledge. The knowledge that one acquires is about the standards that
embody a particular aesthetic tradition. Eventually, as a result of acquiring this knowledge you might
come to appreciate certain artworks that originally only repulsed you. However, this appreciation may
or may not involve coming to like them.
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2. What determines aesthetic value?
Nothing that I have said up to this point explains where these standards of aesthetic value come from.
One thing that seems to be true is that they vary to some extent across different cultural or artistic
traditions. Consider the example of Duchamp’s fountain:
The significance of this important work of art (which happens to be a urinal placed in a gallery) can only
be understood in relation to certain artistic traditions. One must understand the tradition that
Duchamp was defining, and perhaps also the one that he was reacting to, in order to judge whether this
piece is a good or bad artwork.
Philosophers disagree over whether there are some aesthetic principles that transcend all
traditions. Perhaps there are certain very basic elements that all good pieces of art have in common
(originality might be one factor, although Warhol’s work retaliates against this very suggestion). I am
not going to take sides on this issue. For the purposes of the present discussion I am hoping that we can
avoid it.
How does one determine which tradition(s) are relevant for evaluating a piece of art? One
option is to leave it entirely up to the interpreter. For reasons that I won’t discuss here, this approach
runs into a wide range of problems. A superior view (I think) states that the author’s intention
determines which tradition an artwork should be evaluated in relation to. This suggestion is not without
problems. For example, intentions are not easy to determine. Did Kurt Cobain intend to define a new
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tradition of grunge music? Or, was his intention to react against some other tradition. Is it possible to
create art with no intention at all? Some philosophers argue that artists’ intentions have nothing to do
with locating the relevant tradition for evaluating an artwork. I will not try to defend this view any
further than pointing out that (a) it provides a neat and tidy solution to the problem of triangulating on a
relevant tradition for evaluating art and (b) it seems to capture what people do in many cases.
Having warmed up our thinking about the nature of aesthetic value, I now want to turn to the
topic of aesthetic value in nature. You will notice from the outset some glaring disanalogies between
works of art and natural objects. In the case of nature there is no authorial intention. Arguably, also,
there is no tradition to which natural objects belong. This appears to raise a problem for the very idea
of environmental aesthetics. How can one judge a natural object as good or bad if there is (a) no author
to determine what the artwork aims to say or achieve and (b) no tradition against which it can be
judged? Maybe nature’s beauty admits of no such standards. IN which case, perhaps there really is
nothing more to natural beauty than what lies in the eye of the beholder.
3. Why want a theory of environmental aesthetics?
Here is one, very simplistic way of summarizing the recent history of environmental philosophy. On the
one hand most people share certain intuitions about the environment. For example, many people feel
that it is a bad think to cause destruction to pristine environments. For example, when presented with
images like the Burtynski photo on the home page, or a picture of the Alberta tar sands, we think that
there is something inherently bad about these practices. On the other hand, it has proved surprisingly
difficult to provide a solid moral argument to justify these intuitions. I have attempted to illustrate this
point over the past few weeks. The first position we considered was Leopold’s Land Ethic. Leopold
argued that we should extend moral consideration to biotic communities. He saw this as the next step
towards moral progress. He also argued that biotic communities are morally significant because they are
integrated wholes that exist in a sort of natural balance. Another approach was Singer’s utilitarian
philosophy. This view appeals to the moral status of sentient beings, arguing that we have a duty to
promote their interests.
We have identified numerous problems with both of these theories. Leopold’s moral expansion
argument seems to fail because it assumes the very conclusion that it is trying to establish – that we
should extend moral concern to biotic communities. Moreover, the conception of highly integrated,
delicately balanced communities depends on a kind of essentialism that is no longer accepted by
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ecological science. Singer’ s approach (arguably) conflicts with certain environmentalist as outlined by
Sagoff. At the very least, this view does not extend to non sentient organisms, which comprises the vast
majority of nature. So where does this leave us with respect to our intuitions? Specifically, how could we
defend those intuitions against someone who does not already accept them?
There are three obvious alternatives. (1) Reject ecological science, and hold on to the
essentialist views that underpin the Land Ethic. This was the approach of Deep Ecology. (2) Reconcile
the land ethic (or something like it) with ecological science. (3) Find an alternative justification for our
environmentalist convictions. The appeal to environmental aesthetics explores this third alternative.
That is, it attempts to explain our conviction that nature is good and that its destruction is bad by
interpreting “bad” and “good” to mean “ugly” and “beautiful”, as opposed to “right” and “wrong”.
3. Previous authors’ appeals to environmental aesthetics.
Your first reaction might be that aesthetic considerations are just too weak to support our
environmental convictions. Many people consider judgments of beauty to be subjective and, therefore,
easily dismissed. However, I have already argued that there is something more tangible to aesthetic
value than individual preference. Furthermore, it is in fact not the case that people dismiss aesthetics
out of hand. Consideration beauty are of considerable importance when it comes to the way that we
design buildings and parks. We wouldn’t consider it strange, for example, for someone to renovate an
old building simply because it is rare and beautiful. Perhaps then it is time to adopt a similar attitude
towards nature.
Several of the authors that we have encountered in this class, especially those who are critical of
the land ethic or deep ecology, have appealed to aesthetics as an alternative means for justifying
environmentalist convictions. In what follows I review some of the main points from Russow and Sober:

Russow outlined several examples of things that environmentalists consider important to conserve.
Some of these are individual species. Others are subspecies or traits. She also notes that some
species are simply not regarded as important to most conservationists. Russow suggests that these
intuitions are best explained in terms of aesthetic value, as opposed to extrinsic value or
stewardship duties. That is, she wants to argue that environmentalism is more like art appreciation
than it is like ethics.
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For one thing, she claims, some people who value nature value it because of its beauty. For instance,
we value diversity in nature and this could be because more diverse landscapes strike us as more
beautiful.
Russow notes that many of the things that environmentalists care about are not species, they are
subspecies or traits. This is consistent with an aesthetic mode of appreciation, she claims, because
this mode of appreciation is not committed to species as a special taxonomic category.
Russow further suggests that aesthetic values admit of degrees. Something might be more or less
beautiful than something else. This allows one to compare and rank alternative conservation
outcomes. Russow sees this as superior to a view that assigns the same amount of value to all of
nature.
Russow also claims that aesthetic value assigns the appropriate level of importance to the
environment. Intuitively, we think that it is wrong to destroy a piece of art for economic gain.
Likewise, she claims, it is wrong to destroy beautiful nature for economic gain (she notes that in the
case of non-aesthetically valuable nature this doesn’t apply). Similarly, when it comes to moral
duties, these tend to trump artistic considerations. Once again, Russow argues, this is the level at
which people value the environment.
Finally, Russow suggests that there is one intuition or conviction that this framework cannot account
for. This is our belief that rare or endangered species are more valuable than common ones. (Note
that this is arguable. See her final footnote -12). Russow’s solution is that the objects of aesthetic
value are not species, they are individuals.

Elliot Sober also attempts to justify environmental convictions in terms of the aesthetic value of
nature. Like Russow, his strategy is to identify the many things that artistic value and environmental
concerns share in common. (see page 189-91)
First he notes that in both cases our values extend beyond the concerns we have for experiencing
pleasure. I take Sober to be alluding to the distinction between preferences and value, mentioned
earlier. Just as people recognize that art can be good or bad independent of whether people enjoy
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it, so might some aspect of nature be aesthetically good or bad independent of whether people
derive enjoyment from it. (This is a controversial suggestion. Is Sober suggesting that we normally
speak this way about nature? Is he right?)
Sober also notes that, as in the case of art, authenticity is important when it comes to the value of
natural objects. The analogy here is between an original piece of art and an old growth forest. In
both cases we tend to value the genuine article. A forgery or a man-made replica are less valuable,
even if they are otherwise identical. Or, so Sober suggests. Russow might make a similar point with
respect to species: we value a species in the wild more than one that is created in a lab or
maintained only in captivity.
Sober also claims that we value artwork as a token individual, not as the member of a type. He
compares this to objects of affection. Even if a perfect clone could be created of someone you love,
you would not love this copy. You love a person as an individual, not as a bundle of desirable
properties. To be honest I am not sure how this applies to the case of valuing nature.
Another similarity between our value of art and our value of nature, according to Sober, is that
context is important. It is important to preserve a species in its natural habitat, for example.
Likewise, we tend to think that it is more valuable to view certain artworks –e.g. murals and
buildings—in their natural settings.
Another similarity: just as the value of an artwork increases with its rarity, so does the value of a
species increase when it becomes rare or endangered. Here Sober agrees again with Russow.
However, the lessons that they draw from this observation are quite different. Sober argues that as
an ethical concern rarity is hard to understand. Why should something be considered more ethically
significant just because it is rare? By contrast, he claims, rarity makes perfect sense from an
aesthetic perspective. A work or art is often considered more valuable if there are no others like it.
Finally, Sober concurs with Russow on the idea that aesthetic values rank below certain moral
considerations. This is not problematic, he claims, “It would the height of condescension to expect a
nation experiencing hunger and chronic disease to be inordinately concerned with the autonomous
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value of ecosystems or with creating and preserving works of art” (191). Sober suggests that this
does not render aesthetic values frivolous, rather, it places them in an appropriate perspective.
4. The scenic approach and charismatic megafauna: two problematic traditions.
Up to this point we have considered some of the analogous ways that people value nature and art.
However, there are many questions that have not been addressed. Perhaps the most fundamental
questions concern the features of natural objects that make them aesthetically valuable. What are
these? Unlike artwork, there is no obvious tradition to appeal to, no author who intends to stir a certain
idea or emotion. Notice that these questions must be answered if the aesthetic theory of
environmental value is going to fulfil the expectations of Leopold, Russow and Sober. In order to decide
which natural objects to preserve or when to prioritize aesthetic values against other goods like
economics or ethics, one must be able to specify what these aesthetic values are.
Perhaps the most frequently criticized theory of environmental aesthetics is the so called
‘scenic’ or ‘pictoral’ approach. The central idea behind this approach is to identify a set of principles
that capture what most people enjoy or seek out when seeking an authentic ‘nature’ experience. This
approach is often associated with the ‘Visual Resource Management’ movement of the 1960s and 70s.
This school identifies aesthetic value as a kind of resource, akin to building materials, fresh water or
recreational opportunities. The VRM movement offered a set of guidelines for maximising the scenic
value of a given region. These guidelines describe landscape design in much the same way that people
have traditionally described landscape painting. For example, as visual scene should strive for the right
amount of balance between foreground and background. Other considerations included the temporal
progression of an experience—it should begin with tantalizing glimpses and end with a climax view of a
large, encompassing valley or mountainside.
Here are a couple of examples taken from R. B. Litton’s defining work on VRM guidelines, Forest
Landscape Description and Inventories- a basis for land planning and Design.
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The philosopher Yuriko Saito mentions several criticisms to the scenic approach to environmental
aesthetics. One of these is that there is an undue emphasis on vision as the means of appreciating
nature, which “has led us to regard nature as a series of scenes consisting of two dimensional designs”
(101). She also argues that these guidelines are fairly static, not taking into account the ways that
nature changes both seasonally and over extended periods. Another objection states that these
guidelines are arbitrary. Specifically, they seem to embody the aesthetic criteria of 17th and 18th Century
landscape painting. What is so special about this period? If one were to select another artistic tradition,
it might be possible to come up with an entirely different set of guidelines. A third objection states that
the guidelines are exclusive – they focus mainly on medium sized terrestrial landscapes, ignoring aquatic
and marine habitats, and environments that are larger or microscopic in scope. A further objection,
which I shall return to momentarily, states that these guidelines are bad because they do not always
emphasize the kinds of objects that ecologists and environmentalists recognize as important. This will
come up again in our consideration of a second problematic tradition in environmental aesthetics.
The term “charismatic megafauna” (fauna= animal) refers to those large, compelling creatures
most often used to convey an environmental message, to attract visitors to a zoo or aquarium, to inspire
people to donate money to a cause, or in various other forms of advertising. It seems to be a brute fact
about human psychology that we are moved by the sight, and especially the plight, of organisms like
these:
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So strong is this association between charismatic megafauna and the conservation movement that
many people view the preservation of these organisms as a top priority. In fact, the loss of many insect,
fish and plant species are arguably of a much greater concern, from an ecological perspective at least.
Yet, it seems that there is a strong tradition aesthetic tradition that ranks these charismatic animals at
the top of its list. Some environmentalists view this in itself as a reason for rejecting the aesthetic
justification of our environmental convictions. They argue as follows:
1) The Aesthetic Justification states that the most aesthetically valuable organisms are the most
important to protect (all things being equal).
2) Aesthetically speaking, charismatic megafauna are the most valuable.
3) However, charismatic megafauna are not the most important organisms to protect.
___________
C) Therefore, Aesthetic Justification is an in adequate guide for environmental decisions.
There are two ways that people tend to respond to this argument. The first option is to reject premise
3. After all, who says that we shouldn’t be protecting these charismatic animals at the expense of other
creatures? It seems question begging to assume that aesthetic values conform perfectly with the things
that are the most ecologically significant. (Remember, to beg the question is to assume what one is
attempting to prove). The whole point of the aesthetic justification is to provide an alternative (non
moral) foundation for our environmental intuitions. And what those intuitions seem to suggest is that
big, charismatic animals are the most important.
Before biting this bullet on this one, it is important to determine whether there are any other
options. A second response challenges premise 2. That is, it claims that as a matter of fact charismatic
megafauna are not the most aesthetically valuable. Both Yuriko Saito and Emily Brady are arguing for
this view. Although they do so in importantly different ways.
5. Should environmental aesthetics be grounded in science?
Earlier I argued that in order to determine the value of a piece of art one must hold it up against the
right tradition or framework. Perhaps, then, the two traditions discussed in the previous section are the
wrong ones for evaluating the aesthetic value of nature (contrary to what premise 2 says). This raises
the question, what other traditions might there be?
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Perhaps the most popular alternative to the scenic and charismatic traditions is the scientific
one. As Saito puts it:
“Scientific knowledge about a natural object’s own structure, history and function will facilitate
the most correct and rewarding appreciation by suggesting the best approach to each of the
diverse environments. (104)
It is worth taking a moment to read this passage carefully. Notice that Saito is appealing to the natural
object’s ‘own’ structure, history and function as the relevant aesthetic features. It is not the context that
we as humans place the object into, but rather the actual biological details belonging to that object,
Saito suggests, that are of significance according to this tradition. Furthermore, she claims that the
appreciation of these factual details will provide the ‘most correct and rewarding appreciation’ of that
object. This is just to say that the scientifically informed perspective is superior to any other (such as the
scenic or charismatic traditions).
Saito argues for this by drawing a comparison to certain kinds of ‘higher’ artistic appreciation.
Earlier I noted an interesting feature about the development of aesthetic appreciation. Often people
start out unable to notice the value of some object, but then they eventually come to appreciate its
significance acquiring a certain amount of knowledge. Saito takes this a step further. She sees it as a
requirement of morality (or what I would describe as good character) that one must open themselves up
to the possibility of aesthetic value. She states that,
Our refusal to experience an art object on its own terms, that is, within its own historical and
cultural context as well as by reference to the artist’s intention, indicates an unwillingness to put
aside our own agenda...
Similarly, in the case of nature, our effort at understanding its origin, structure and function
indicates our willingness to recognize its own reality quite apart from us and to suspend our
exclusive pursuit for entertainment in nature” (102).
Consider an example. One might initially be repulsed by the image of a rotting carcass full of maggots
and bacteria. Yet, by becoming open to the individual history and function of these organisms, one
might come to recognize their aesthetic merit.
I find this to be an interesting proposal. On the one hand, it seems true that the acquisition
scientific knowledge can lead people to aesthetically value new things. People often discover a new
found respect for a certain organism after discovering that it possesses some fascinating evolutionary or
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ecological feature. Moreover, it seems correct that by ‘intellectualizing’ one’s initial response it is
possible to sometimes overcome or control it. So I can grant that there is some basis in daily experience
for thinking that scientific knowledge forms its own aesthetic tradition. But what justifies the claim that
this perspective is superior to or more appropriate than others, including the scenic and charismatic
traditions? Notice that, in the case of nature, we cannot solve this problem as easily as we might in the
case of artwork. In the case of art, one can determine the appropriate tradition by appealing to
intentions. It is not appropriate to judge Jackson Pollock according to the standards of realism, because
this is not what Pollock was aiming for. But in the case of nature, intentions are absent. So what
determines whether one tradition is more appropriate than another? At issue here is the very
distinction between values and preferences, at least as far as natural objects go.
It is not clear to me that Saito has a solution to this problem. In fact, this is an issue that Emily
Brady raises against Allen Carlson, who is closely aligned in his views with Saito. Brady begins by noting
that it is not clear what counts as ‘scientific knowledge’. Many of the observations that people make of
biotic entities are accurate and seemingly relevant to grasping their nature. In the case of a rotting
carcass, for instance, the size and number of maggots is presumably relevant under any description of
this scene that purports to assess its beauty. But is this a scientific observation? Part of Brady’s point is
that this distinction is blurred under the appeal to science –based aesthetics.
As an alternative approach, Brady outlines four ways in which the imagination must be engaged
in order for an experience of some object to qualify as aesthetic (as opposed to scientific or some other
mode of interpretation). I will not review her description of the imagination here, but I’m sure that you
will find it insightful. My only closing point is to show that this brings us around full circle on one of the
issues that we have been wrestling with.
Brady recommends talking about aesthetic appreciation (as a distinct category) in terms of
certain imaginative functions. For example, imagining an organism with a different trait or in a totally
different context might count for her as an aesthetic appreciation of that organism. Suppose that we
accept some version of this view. How does one rank organisms as more or less aesthetically valuable?
It would have to be the case, on Brady’s view, that some organisms lend themselves more than others
to the right sorts of imaginative musings. But what might that involve? Is it true that some organisms
differ in this respect? Or, is it more likely that the imaginative potential lies more in the observer than
the observed? If this is so, then it would appear that aesthetic value, in the case of nature at least, looks
a lot more like preference than it does like value in art.
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This week I conclude with various questions unresolved – such is the current state of the field. I
leave it to you to consider the following:
6. Questions for your philosophical consideration
1. Is there any other way besides appealing to intentions that would allow one to locate a piece of art
(or nature) within a given tradition?
2. What exactly are the problems (if any) with the scenic or charismatic standards for appreciating
nature?
3. How many alternative traditions for valuing nature could there be? Is the field open ended? Or, is it
fairly constrained?
4. If one could specify a range of traditions, say, for aesthetically valuing nature, how likely is this to
satisfy the environmentalist as a means of grounding his or her convictions?
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