Central Election Commission Case Study
Palestine 2007
Report Author
Mr. Jehad Harb, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)
Consultant for the Aman Coalition for Integrity and Accountability
AMAN Coalition for Integrity and Accountability
AMAN, established in February 2000, promotes integrity, transparency, and
accountability and seeks to combat corruption on a long-term, continuous, and
comprehensive basis. In cooperation with partners from government, civil society, and
the private sector, AMAN leads Palestinian civil society in the development and
implementation of a Palestinian National Action Plan against corruption. AMAN
concentrates on activities that enhance integrity, transparency, and accountability as
preventive measures against corruption in Palestinian society. AMAN published a
number of diagnostic studies on corruption in the Palestinian Society. AMAN has also
assembled a resource center for information on ethics, accountability, and corruption.
AMAN is currently implementing a two year programme entitled “ Promoting values
of integrity, principles of transparency and systems of accountability in the Palestinian
Society”. This programme aims at increasing public awareness about corruption,
promoting ethics and professional standards in the Palestinian public institutions,
providing capacity building for media professionals and media institutions in
exposing corruption, advocating the right to access information by the public, and
revising the Palestinian legal framework with regards to the principle of “Separation
of Powers” including the preparation of all necessary draft laws.
AMAN was founded as a network with representatives from different civil society
sectors. The six founding members are: The Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of
Global Dialogue and Democracy “MIFTAH”, Jerusalem; Arab Thought Forum
“ATF”, Jerusalem; The Palestine Trade Center “PalTrade”, Ramallah; The Palestinian
Institute for the Study of Democracy “MUWATIN”, Al-Bireh; Al-Mezan Center for
Human Rights, Gaza; The Palestinian Council on Foreign Relations, Gaza.
Tiri
Tiri is an international NGO based in London that partners with civil society,
governments, and business to create networks of committed change agents dedicated
to strategic integrity reform. Tiri is an incubator and facilitates innovative reforms and
provides a critical learning platform to disseminate cutting-edge experiences.
This paper is part of a series of eight studies of post-war reconstruction countries
commissioned by Tiri and funded by the Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
the Foundation Open Society Institute. All studies are accessible on www.tiri.org
Eight local policy centres undertook research using a shared terms of reference. The
countries covered are Afghanistan, Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Lebanon,
Mozambique, Palestine, Sierra Leone, Timor Leste. The research is the basis for an
advocacy and monitoring agenda to promote integrity in reconstruction both within
the eight countries and internationally. Together, these groups form the Network for
Integrity in Reconstruction (NIR).
2
All material contained in this survey was believed to be accurate as of January 10th,
2007. Every effort has been made to verify the information contained herein,
including allegation. Nevertheless, Tiri does not accept the responsibility for the
consequences of the use of this information for other purposes or in other contexts.
Tiri
Downstream Building (3rd fl),
1, London Bridge,
London SE1 9BG
United Kingdom
Harb, Jehad (2007) Central Election Commission Case Study, Palestine 2007.
Ramallah: Aman; London: Tiri
© 2007 Tiri
3
Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................5
1. The institutional framework of the CEC ................................................................7
2. The main work areas of the CEC .........................................................................11
3. International funding of the CEC.........................................................................13
4. Obstacles facing the work of the Commission......................................................14
5. Reasons behind the success of the CEC ...............................................................15
6. Inter-relation with other integrity pillars ..............................................................17
4
Introduction
Elections are important for strengthening the principle of separation of powers and
establishing stable political regimes in the post-conflict phase. Preparations for
conducting elections, with all the complications and procedures, constitute a first step
towards achieving stability and reconstruction. Therefore, the role of elections
commissions is particularly important for conducting fair and acceptable elections.
The work of the central election commission is based on its impartiality, integrity and
the transparency of its measures throughout the election process. The “popular”
satisfaction with its performance is the basis for endorsing and accepting election
results which support stability and peaceful circulation of power.
In the Palestinian context, demand for general elections was a core issue in all plans
and reports calling for reform, whether issued by official, national, or external
institutions. The “political will” for elections gained momentum twice and became a
factor for accelerating calls for elections after being postponed since 1999 (the end of
the interim period according to Oslo Accords). The first time was in 2002 after the
Israeli invasion of cities of the West Bank and Gaza strip and the severe destruction of
PNA institutions which showed how fragile the state building processes were.
Elections were the only way to renew legitimacy of official institutions within the
PNA such as the Palestinian presidency, the government, and the Legislative Council.
This legitimacy was partially lost due to the paralysis that affected all official
institutions during the Israeli invasion and the inability of these institutions to provide
basic services to the citizens. The importance of renewing legitimacy increased
especially after the Israeli occupation imprisoned President Arafat in his compound in
Ramallah, accused him of supporting terrorism and claimed that he was isolated from
his people. Political parties who were outside the governance circles (such as Hamas)
considered elections as an opportunity to become part of the political system. Other
stakeholders such as the United States and the Quartet considered elections as a
chance for creating a new Palestinian leadership capable of settling Palestinian-Israeli
conflict.
The other event which influenced political will was the death of President Arafat, the
historical leader of the Palestinian people. No one could easily replace him. Therefore,
elections were important to give legitimacy to the new president. The personality of
the new President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), and his status as one of the
important drivers of reform when he was a prime minister in 2003, increased
momentum not only for holding elections but also for changing electoral law to
promote democratic, free, fair and representative elections.
The “political will” was not only amongst the political elites but also amongst the
civil society activists and later became a demand of the people. The momentum of
political will gained more support with the gradual increase of people’s demands to
renew the political system through fair and democratic elections.
The establishment of a Central Election Commission (CEC) that enjoys integrity and
whose members are impartial and non-partisan was a primary demand since mid1999, the deadline to complete the final status negotiations. This demand increased in
October 2002 and led then President Yasser Arafat to call for general elections and
the establishment of a CEC to prepare for these elections. The formation of the CEC
5
opened new prospects for holding general elections. The CEC had to deal with many
obstacles related to the continuation of the Intifada, lack of security, Israeli military
checkpoints, in addition to the recent lack of political will to conduct elections.
The experience of the CEC is considered a success story in the reconstruction process
in Palestine. The presidential elections of 2005 and the legislative elections in early
2006 have underscored the capabilities and the success of the CEC in managing and
administering the elections process in a professional and impartial manner as
witnessed and acknowledged by local and international observers, as well as the
parties participating in the elections. The Palestinian Independent Commission for
Citizens’ rights (PICCR) in a special report on presidential elections said “The CEC
managed the election’s process effectively and with integrity in spite of huge
obstacles.”1 The PICCR report on monitoring Parliamentary elections also mentioned
how professional and independent the CEC was in running the process and
cooperating with monitoring committees.2
The EU monitoring group on presidential elections praised the credibility and trust the
CEC and its local offices have amongst people. It was a great improvement in
comparison to the 1996 elections which increased credibility of the whole elections
process.3 The American National Democratic Institutes (NDI) delegation, which was
headed by ex-president of the USA Mr. Jimmy Carter, commented in its report after
Parliamentary elections that the management of the election process was generally
well organized. It was managed by professional and committed people. In another
place in the same report, NDI noticed that the CEC was respected and gained high
trust of the Palestinian People. It showed ability to stand up to a great deal of political
pressure and performed its tasks effectively and neutrally. These two conditions were
required to conclude the successful democratic process and to gain people’s trust in
further elections. The same report describes how the monitoring delegation was
impressed by the commitment and professionalism of the people responsible for the
voting centres and the members of local committees and the way they cooperated with
the candidates, political parties and monitoring committees.4
The choice of this particular case study is not to show it as an “island of integrity” in
spite of the fact that it came to work in a very difficult environment. However, it came
in the context of internal and external calls for reform. It is proof that when there is a
real interest in making reform work it will succeed regardless of corruption
surrounding it. In this case, the two main political parties had interest in making the
elections work. Transparency of the CEC was used as a tool to gain approval of the
results of the elections. The failure of the CEC could lead to a civil war which
everyone wanted to avoid. The internal pressure and fear of the collapse of the
Palestinian political system was a strong motive behind supporting the CEC success.
There was a consensus to make elections work amongst internal as well as external
stakeholders.
The position of Fateh as the ruling political party was weakened because of the many
allegations of corruption of the PNA and the inability of the Palestinian people to
1
PICCR special report no. 41 2005.
PICCR report no 16 / 2006.
3
EU monitoring group report 2005.
4
National Democratic Institutes report on Parliamentary elections..
2
6
distinguish between the party and the authority (the state). At the same time Hamas
was gaining more trust and support at the grassroots level because of the many
services they provided and their status as opposition to the PNA. The two parties
needed elections to improve their position and to defend their different political
agendas. The only guarantee to achieve this was through a neutral CEC and fair
democratic elections.
This could be attributed to the structure of the CEC, professionalism of its members,
its sound institutional construction, the clear delineation of its responsibilities, the
smooth and easy communication channels between the CEC and all other groups
participating in the process, transparency and the public nature of the procedures
adopted by the CEC for conducting its business. These points could be explained in
details as follows:
1. The institutional framework of the CEC
The CEC is considered the highest entity that manages and supervises the elections
process. The CEC is assigned the responsibility of preparing and organizing the
elections, undertaking all measures necessary to ensure and guarantee its integrity and
free nature (article 1/22 of the Palestinian Election Law number 13 of 1995). The
CEC is composed of nine members selected among Palestinian judges, prominent
academic figures, and experienced lawyers with prominent careers and track records
(article 2/22 of the law).5
Four months after the announcement of “the one hundred days plan” for reform, on 10
October 2002, the presidential decree number 14 of 2002, appointed Dr. Hanna Naser
as Head of the CEC. Seventeen days later, the members of the CEC were appointed
by the presidential decree number 15 of 2002 issued on October 27th, 2002.
The structure of the Commission (Annex 1) indicates that the elections law was
observed, including the provisions that stipulated that members of the CEC should be
academics and judges. Selecting these personalities is important because they are
mainly non partisan, successful in their work at universities or other organizations,
respected by the public for their professionalism and their role in the national
liberation movement. In other words, they are seen as national personalities. The
CEC was restructured by President Abbas in 2005. He kept the same personalities that
President Arafat appointed since there was almost no criticism of the old structure or
its members.
Such selection of the committee is not a personal choice for the president. It is based
on consultation and approval of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC). In the case
of the 2005 committee, balance between the two political parties was taken into
consideration. The general secretary Dr. Hamdalalh was closer to Fateh politics while
his deputy Dr. Shbeir was closer to Hamas politics. Nevertheless none of the
committee members was an active member in any political party (this is the meaning
of non-partisan in this case). The fact that Abbas chose the same committee that
5
Articles 19 and 19 of the law number 9 of 2005 on elections maintained the same criteria and qualities
required of the Commission’s members.
7
Arafat selected, with minor changes, added to the committee’s credibility, especially
since it was responsible for the success of the presidential elections in 2005.
This structure of the committee was different from the structure of the Election
Commission that supervised the first presidential and legislative elections in 1996. At
that time, the Commission was chaired by Mr. Mahmoud Abbas (the current President
of the PNA), who was a member of the Central Committee of Fateh, the ruling party
at the time. The impartiality and the independence enjoyed by the Commission’s
members granted the CEC credibility, trust and respect of citizens and competing
political parties. This is among the best lessons learned in this context.
The CEC is formed of two main entities: the first is made up of members of the
Commission appointed by a presidential decree as a legislative and oversight body
within CEC. The second entity is composed of the electoral administrative body as the
executive body of the Commission.
The CEC is a recognized entity that enjoys financial and administrative independence.
The General Election Law of 2005 gave it the status of a permanent commission, and
assigned it with the powers to approve all procedures needed for the electoral process,
in addition to the supervisory and overall monitoring of the proceedings of the
election process at all stages, ensuring their compliance with the law. The law
delegated to the Commission the task of undertaking all measures needed to conduct
fair, transparent, and free presidential and legislative elections, as well as certifying
and approving the results of the elections and their public announcement. The lesson
learned is the need for a modern and clear election law that provides the transparent
nature of the CEC’s work, defining its responsibilities and those of the government
and security forces, and minimizing the interference of the government in the CEC’s
work.
The existence of a clear, well defined law is an added value to the success of the CEC.
However, having a law by itself is not a guarantee for success. The key issue as
mentioned elsewhere is the existence of political will among the different
stakeholders, especially the two largest political parties who were willing to
implement the election according to the Cairo national dialogue in 2004-2005, where
they agreed on many things including local and parliamentary elections. The law was
the general framework, safeguard and reference point which everybody respected.
The central election office, considered the administrative and executive body of the
Commission, falls under the CEC supervision, and is headed by an executive
manager. The central election office is responsible for preparing necessary plans,
procedures and regulations, as well as their implementation upon approval by the
CEC.
The executive manager is responsible for the administrative and financial body of the
CEC. Mr. Ammar Dweik, a lawyer, was hired by the Commission’s members in
October 2004 to fill this position. Staff members working in the administration were
hired in accordance with the hiring system and procedures approved by the CEC. The
approved hiring procedures included principles of advertising vacancies in the daily
newspapers and the Commission’s website, defining conditions and applicant
requirements for the announced vacancy, as well as the selection principle of
8
conducting interviews to hire potential candidates to fill the vacancy. By adopting this
approach, the CEC sought to provide equal opportunities to all the applicants for
positions within the Commission, at a time when hiring within the PNA was based on
favouritism and nepotism. The importance of this procedure lies in the fact that it
grants the hiring process a high level of transparency, without resigning to hiring
individuals based on their specific political affiliations.
All employees were hired based on temporary contracts of six months renewable upon
semi-annual evaluations. This has enhanced the keenness among the employees to
spare no efforts in order to keep their well-paying jobs with relatively good financial
privileges compared to salaries within the public sector. Furthermore, this method has
provided the CEC with a comfortable space to determine the efficiency and
professionalism of the administrative staff, and with the ability to terminate the
contracts of employees who failed to demonstrate the efficiency, the professionalism,
and the impartiality needed for the work. The method could also be seen from the
perspective of the following technical considerations : 1- Commission Members were
not convinced that the election process procedures were completed and finalized at
the time of the Commission’s establishment in 2002, and 2- upon completion and
finalization of the election procedures, and following the elections process, the
Commission will not need the services of a large team of staff who don’t have enough
work over a four-year period of time, which otherwise would lead to a “maskedunemployment” situation.
Members of the CEC meet once every month upon the invitation of the chair of the
Commission. Furthermore, the CEC is considered to be in a permanent operating
mode (convened) immediately upon the call for presidential or legislative elections, or
any sub or supplementary elections. The CEC discusses and approves all procedures
needed for the election process and approves all decisions related to the
Commission’s policies. The lesson learnt is that the CEC is effective through all of its
Members, without any hegemony of the Chair over the proceedings and work of the
CEC, as decisions are approved in a democratic manner, with problems addressed as
they arise rather than as they accumulate..
Due to the CEC’s quest and interest in achieving the highest levels of transparency
with its partners and the stakeholders of the election process, and due to the attention
accorded by political parties and many individuals to the election process and the
meetings of the CEC, the latter has published its decisions on its official website. The
lesson learnt lies in the fact that access to information is a crucial factor in enhancing
the credibility of the CEC. It also helps in abiding by the Commission’s decisions and
provides sufficient time for election stakeholders to appeal and challenge the CEC’s
decisions in a timely manner.
Plans, scenarios, and procedures needed for the various election processes were
prepared (voter registration, accepting candidacy applications, voting, sorting, and
accrediting observers and political parties) and implemented. The CEC also prepared
a detailed plan of the numbers and geographical distribution and location of polling
and registration centres in all populated areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as
well as training materials and manuals for the staff hired to carry out the registration,
voting, and sorting processes. Additionally, the CEC prepared media packages and
organized awareness and education campaigns organized to raise the awareness of
9
citizens of the importance of elections and how to practise their election rights. To
that end:
1.1
The CEC adopted the Palestinian Election Law and international standards and
criteria as the basis for its by-laws governing and regulating its work.
Independence, professionalism, and transparency are the core themes for the
principles and policies observed by the CEC in conducting its business and
administration of the election process, thus underlining the importance of
having and respecting legal terms of reference for the work of the CEC.
1.2
In its efforts to enhance and strengthen its independence, the CEC adopted a
policy whereby each employee hired by the CEC would sign a letter in which
he/she commits to “working in an impartial, honest, fair, unbiased manner
towards any candidate or political party at the account of the other.” The
commitment includes refraining from any conduct that might undermine the
integrity of the election process, and/or the impartiality and independence of
the CEC. In case of a violation of these commitments, considered as part of
the hiring and contract conditions, the employee loses the impartiality needed
in the work of the CEC and its employees, and is thus rendered unqualified to
work with the CEC in the framework of election process administration,
leading to termination of his/her employment.
1.3
The CEC considered its role as solely limited to the technical, administrative,
and executive aspects of the election process. In other words, the CEC did not
view itself as the competent body to draft the election law or amend it, but
rather to abide and work by it. The CEC did not take any position on the
format of the election system to be adopted, nor the number of PLC members,
nor the need to grant a quota for women, throughout the PLC deliberations to
pass the election law issued in 2005. However, as the competent party, the
CEC filed a memo on 24 March 2004 with the Legal Committee of the PLC
about the Election Law, presenting its point of view on the procedural aspects
of the law to ensure a higher level of transparency and applicability of these
procedures. The lesson learnt is the need for the CEC’s role to be a neutral
technical party related to procedures, whose purpose is to successfully conduct
the election process. This should prevent any conflict of interest or
interference that might be viewed as geared toward the benefit of one political
party at the expense of another.
1.4
The CEC was keen to preserve transparency in all its practices and work
stages, starting from the financial policies, to the hiring procedures, tenders,
and finally conducting the registration process that is open and accessible to
local and international observation entities, political entities and the media.
The CEC was also keen on publishing the results of the registration, notifying
all relevant parties of any amendments to its procedures or establishment of
any new procedures.
10
2. The main work areas of the CEC
The CEC supervised the presidential elections conducted on January 9th, 2005 and the
legislative elections on January 25th, 2006. To that end, the CEC carried out the
procedures required by the law and according to the following mechanisms:
2.1
Voters registration
During the year 2005, the CEC reopened registration centres several times. This
process was repeated 9 times due to changes in the dates of the general elections and
the amendment of the election law that reverted to adopting the voters’ registry only
and excluded the civil registry. The last registration process took place one month
prior to the elections, in the 16 electoral district offices for three days (16-18
December, 2005). The lesson learnt is that when political will exists on the part of the
ruling authority to conduct elections, the repetition of the technical procedures
according to the same usual work rules that render the election process successful is
considered an important step towards the achievement and enhancement of stability.
Transparency in the work of the CEC, which allows observers and political party
agents to monitor and observe the registration process and ensure its soundness and
legality, contributes towards strengthening the public trust in the election process.
2.2
Funding of election campaigns and the ceiling of spending allowed
The CEC receives financial reports from the candidates related to the funding and
expenses of campaigns carried out by the candidates or the election lists. The CEC
received the financial reports of candidates in the presidential elections of 2005. The
General Election Law of 1995 did not stipulate a ceiling for spending on campaigns.
The elections law of 2005, however, set the limit of spending on election campaigns
at a maximum of US$60,000 for the candidate in the districts, and the maximum
amount of spending for the election lists at the national level at 1 million dollars. The
CEC sent a letter to the candidates and representatives of election lists who
participated in the most recent legislative elections to submit detailed financial
reports, including all funding and expenses, to the CEC by the end of the work day on
February 27th, 2006. On March 14th, 2006, a reminder was sent out to the candidates.
In its meeting on April 1st, 2006, the CEC reviewed financial reports submitted by the
candidates in the legislative elections, and discovered that one of the candidates had
exceeded the spending ceiling in violation of article 101 of the elections law of 2005 6
and decided to refer him to the public prosecutor’s office. The lesson learnt lies in the
CEC’s abiding by the implementation of the law and the continuation of its work until
all election procedures are implemented and followed up on, referring those who
violate the provisions of the law to justice by referring them to criminal investigation.
As a result of the CEC’s referral to the public prosecutor’s office, trails were held for
504 persons who voted more than once in the presidential elections, and 97 trials for
6
Article 101 of Law number 9 of 2005 stipulates that “ All lists and candidates shall be prohibited to
spend on their election campaigns except within the following requirements: one million dollars or its
equivalent in national currency as a maximum for spending on the election campaign for the position of
the President and/or the election list, 2- US$60,000 or their equivalent in national currency as a
maximum spending amount for candidates in the legislative elections in the electoral districts.
11
double voting in parliamentary elections, in addition to a trial for one candidate who
started his campaign earlier than allowed. In this particular case, Mr. Hassan Braham
from Jenin was referred to the general attorney in May 20057. In September 2006, the
CEC was informed about the date of trial. This is not to say the judiciary system
worked exceptionally well in this case. In fact the CEC performed well in collecting
documents and evidence, and building good cases based on the law. The clarity of the
cases and the existence of evidence to prove them made the judiciary act. The
weakness of the judiciary is one of the major threats to the performance of the CEC.
The delay in concluding cases and the slow procedures may have bad consequences in
the future. It should be taken into consideration that the Palestinians do not have a
long tradition in holding elections. Any future elections will consider this experience
as a model.
2.3
Announcing of results
The committee of each polling station undertakes responsibility for sorting the votes
in its ballot box. Journalists and accredited agents or representatives of parties and
candidates, as well as local and international observers are allowed to attend the
sorting process inside the stations. This process should not be stopped or postponed
under any circumstances. Following the sorting process, the station’s results are
announced and are transferred to the office of the electoral district. The CEC then
compiles results coming in from the districts immediately as they arrive, and is
committed to announcing the initial results within a 48-hour deadline from the time
the voting process stops. The importance of this step, which the CEC carried out
successfully, lies in the fact that there is a relation between the transparency in
allowing party representatives and the local and international observers to observe the
sorting process and the integrity in announcing results of elections in each polling
station and centre. Such transparency prevents forgery, rigging of elections,
destruction of ballot papers or their replacement during the process of transferring the
ballot boxes from the polling stations and centres to the election districts in main
cities. Furthermore, it grants parties and representatives the ability to know initial
results, thus the ability to know their positions in the election results. This has
enhanced the credibility of the CEC with citizens and political parties and highlighted
transparency of its procedures.
2.4
Monitoring the election process
The CEC accredited 7,177 local observers representing 200 NGOs and 832
international observers, representing 69 international entities, and 177 observers of
international guests for the presidential elections of 2005. During the legislative
elections of 2006, 18,000 local and international observers were accredited. This
means that the CEC has given a large space for civil society organizations to
participate in the election process through monitoring of the Commission’s
performance, and evaluation of the CEC and the political parties’ compliance with the
law. The importance of monitoring the elections lies in the fact that it enhances the
credibility of the entity supervising the elections, as well as the credibility of the
7
Interview with Mr. Ammar Dweik, executive director for the Central Elections Commission,
30/03/2006
12
state’s institutions, exposing and revealing
manipulations of the election process.
any possible interventions or
3. International funding of the CEC8
The CEC depended on quasi-complete funding from donor countries since its
establishment in 2002, when the total amount of donations provided reached around
25 million dollars, with only some US$250,000 to the Palestinian National Authority
(the Ministry of Finance) for set-up expenses. The CEC believed from the beginning
that funding of its operations should be done through agreements with the Ministry of
Planning and/or Ministry of Finance, This was established in the first agreement
signed with the European Union through the Ministry of Finance, whereby funds from
the donor countries were to be transferred to the unified account of the public treasury
into a special fund for the CEC. The Ministry of Finance would transfer the allocated
funds to the CEC based upon a request for transfer by the Commission as needed. The
CEC’s decision to deposit funds with the Ministry of Finance allowed the
Commission to keep its distance from having to deal with the funds directly, a
transaction that might constitute a potential for the emergence of corruption-related
phenomena as well as accusations by the political parties of the CEC acting in the
name of the foreign donors.
The CEC submits a monthly report to the Ministry of Finance detailing all of its
activities, costs and expenses. The Commission also details in its report expenses
from the funds and budgets of each donor. In its turn, the Ministry of Finance submits
a report to the donors, and the Projects Coordination Committee, agreed upon with the
European Union, is convened. This Coordination Committee consists of
representatives of the CEC, the Ministry of Finance, and the Donors. The Committee
discusses the report and the monthly accounts. Financial oversight is carried out by an
external audit company contracted by the Ministry of Finance. After conducting an
audit of all the CEC’s accounts, the company submits its report to the Ministry of
Finance and to the CEC. A separate and special audit of some projects is carried out
upon the request of the donor and in accordance with the agreement signed with the
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning.
The process of identifying funding channels through the Ministry of Finance
enhanced the process of controlling funds. The Ministry of Finance is considered as
the party that exercises financial oversight over the funds of the CEC. This process
has minimized and prevented donors’ intervention in the CEC’s activities or control
over them. The donors of the CEC consisted primarily of the European Union, Japan,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Holland, Canada, Australia, and Italy (See table 1 for
amounts). Japan, Denmark, the United States, and UNDP provided in kind assistance
through UNDP. The European Union put a condition that any materials to be
purchased should be either of European or local origin, such as the purchase of
vehicles. Although this precondition did not undermine the professionalism or the
impartiality of the CEC since it is not a substantial condition related to the election
process itself, such conditions may prevent, when it comes to the recruitment of
8
An interview with Mr. Ammar Dweik, the executive director of the Central Elections Commission on
30/3/2006
13
experts from donor countries for training purposes, the independence and the
impartiality of these institutions.
Table # 1: Financial support provided to the Commission from donors9
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
Total
Donor
Australia
Canada
Denmark
European Union
Italy
Japan
Holland
Norway
Sweden
Turkey
Britain
USAID
Palestinian Ministry of Finance
UNDP-through funding from Japan
UNDP-through funding from Denmark
UNDP
Amounts in USDUS$
694,319
786,659
2,002,972
14,026,128
600,000
648,129
1,053,763
1,595,115
1,424,066
190,000
106,414
293,477
251,320
680,000
214,783
463,431
25,030,576
Financial reports of overall expenses for the period between October 27th, 2002 and
February 28th, 2005, i.e. the period that covered the initial set-up phase of the CEC
and the conducting of the presidential elections, indicates that the overall expenses of
the CEC are estimated at US$12,332,000, which amounts to half of the funds received
by the Commission over the past years, a quarter of which were spent on set-up
(around US$5 million).10
4. Obstacles facing the work of the Commission
The attempts to build a political regime based on electoral legitimacy, under
occupation and a situation of conflict with occupation but also amongst Palestinian
political forces, have faced many obstacles. The most serious obstacles come as a
result of the occupation practices, measures, and restrictions that hinder and impede
the election process, including the work of the CEC.
4.1
The Apartheid Wall
The Apartheid Wall constituted a major obstacle in some areas to the completion of
the election process in a free and transparent manner, particularly during the process
9
A document obtained from the CEC, Ramallah, 2006.
See CEC’s report (overall expenses “27/10/2002-28/2/2005” on the Commission’s website:
www.elections.ps
10
14
of voters’ registration, the awareness and information campaigns, and the voting
process. Some of the residential areas have found themselves behind the wall, which
has allowed the occupation forces to control the movement in and out of these areas
and hindered voters’ registration, staff movement and ultimately the transfer of voting
results in a timely manner. The continuation of the conflict with the Israeli occupation
forces, while starting the reconstruction process at the same time is a unique model.
Reconstruction in Palestine is closely linked to the peace process.
4.2
Prohibition of CEC activities inside the city of Jerusalem
Israeli occupation forces prevented the CEC’s staff from working in Jerusalem, closed
voters’ registration centres in the city and arrested staff. Other centres were closed due
to curfew imposed on some areas. The importance of registering voters and allowing
Palestinian citizens in Jerusalem to vote lies in the fact that Jerusalem is considered a
point of contention whose resolution was postponed to final status negotiations. Each
party (Palestinians and Israelis) tries to impose its point of view on the other using all
means available. The prohibition of Palestinians in Jerusalem or preventing the CEC
from working inside the city inhibits the legislative elections process and the
establishment of a legitimate political regime that would allow Palestinian to start the
process of reconstruction.
4.3
Attacks on CEC’s headquarters and offices
Several attacks took place against electoral district headquarters as well as voters’
registration centres in many Palestinian cities (Nablus, Rafah, Gaza, and Jerusalem)
by armed Palestinians, mainly belonging to the Fateh movement or its affiliated
militias. With the recurrence of these attacks, the CEC closed its offices in protest
demanding protection and safeguards for the safety and security of its staff and
offices. The heated competition among armed political forces, coupled with the
weakness of the PNA governance institutions, have together formed weak points that
would make the legislative elections a set-back, leading to chaos and infighting which
delay the initiation of the reconstruction process.
5. Reasons behind the success of the CEC
The success of the presidential and legislative elections processes in 2005 and 2006
respectively is considered an important achievement for the CEC in view of the
multiple difficulties that accompanied the work of the Commission in the past. The
reasons behind the success lie in the ability of the CEC to overcome obstacles
resulting from the continued conflict and the institutional weakness of the PNA during
five years of Uprising, the weakness of the legal framework, and the absence of
oversight and transparency in achieving the work. At the same time, there was a need
to conduct elections in order to build a system based on legitimacy to face the speed
of construction and overcome the state of destruction by rebuilding the public
institutions and facilities, and activating the services. The success comes also as a
result of the political will of the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, and the best
use of donors’ support. The reasons behind the success of the Commission can be
summarized as follows:
15
5.1
The structure of the CEC
The presidential decree related to the formation of the CEC observed provisions of the
law when the Commission was first established in 2002, and then re-established in
2005 by selecting public academic figures, judges, and lawyers, individuals who are
well-known and renowned for their competencies and professionalism. 11
5.2
Separation in the work of the CEC
The CEC provided a model for other public institutions, as the Commission’s
members considered themselves as supervisors within a framework that followed up
on the work of the electoral administration. The CEC worked on separating the
legislative and judiciary body of the Commission (Commission’s Members) from the
executive body known as the executive administration, granting the executive director
all executive powers related to administration and management without any
interference from their side. The Commission remained a supervisory body whether
by adopting various systems for the work of the CEC or by looking into election
claims in accordance with the provisions of the general election law.
5.3
Transparency in CEC’s handling of all issues
The CEC worked on issuing an internal system for the work through which it
identified the scope of its work, the decision-making process, limits of
responsibilities, consequences of its work and the Electoral Administration.
Furthermore, the CEC issued several rules regulating the work of the electoral
administration such as the financial system, the hiring system, and the procurement
system.
The CEC also worked on submitting all reports with justifications and explanations
through the various media outlets and on the CEC’s website, announcing all steps
taken according to a specific schedule.
5.4
The independence of the CEC from the PNA
The CEC worked over the past year on the true and practical interpretation of the
provisions of article 22 of the general elections law of 2005, which grants the
Commission the status of a natural entity, with financial and administrative
independence. This approach was enhanced through a group of factors including the
personality of the chairperson of the Commission, its Members, and its Executive
Director, in addition to the fact that the CEC’s funding does not depend on the budget
of the PNA but rather on international financial support (donors), and the existence of
political will on the side of the President of the PNA and the Cabinet to support and
maintain the independence of the CEC.
11
See report of Palestinian Independent Commission For Citizens Rights of 2005, a series of special
reports, particularly 41, p.14.
16
5.5
The sensitivity of the political situation and the growing heated
competition over power and authority
The sensitivity of the political situation and the competition among the Palestinian
parties and factions such as the Fateh movement, which attempted to stay in power,
and the Hamas movement, which sought to consolidate its legitimacy through
elections and establish itself as a large competitive party, while smaller parties
searched for a support base within the political arena, prompted the CEC to observe
and uphold the law as a means of protecting itself against accusations, suspicions and
the possibility that some parties might resort to force to vandalize the election process
and the work of the CEC.
5.6
Partnership with civil society organizations
The CEC sought to consolidate partnership with all civil society organizations
affiliated with parties, as well as non-governmental organizations, media, local and
international observers, informing them of all developments and details of the
Commission’s work. The CEC also asked these institutions and organizations to
nominate their representatives at all meetings of the CEC which were conducted on a
regular basis.
5.7
The political will to conduct elections
The political will of the current Palestinian President Mr. Mahmoud Abbas, which
was reflected in the unlimited support to the CEC, his insistence to conduct the
elections on time according to the highest standards of integrity and compliance with
the law, and his dispatching of a number of trained Presidential guards (members of
Force 17) to protect the CEC’ headquarters have had a large influence on rendering
the work of the Commission and the legislative elections process successful.
5.8
The international support to the CEC
The international political and financial support to the CEC has constituted an
important factor in the success of the Commission. This support was portrayed in the
form of visits made by many official delegations from all over the world, the most
prominent of which were the visits of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the UK,
Spain, Canada, Germany, Turkey and Mr. Javier Solana, European Union Minister of
Foreign Affairs, the Commission of External Relations, and the American exSecretary of State Mr. Colin Powell. These visits conveyed a clear message to the
PNA about the importance of work carried out by the CEC, and an important motive
to prevent any interference in its work. The financial support of donor countries to the
CEC was an important factor in supporting its independence and impartiality.
6. Inter-relation with other integrity pillars
It was mentioned earlier that the CEC needed other pillars to function well. Without
the political will and support of the executive, the CEC experience would not be
successful. The commitment of the PLC to discuss and approve new, more democratic
election laws was also essential to the success. The funding of international donors
17
was the guarantee for independence and professionalism. The monitoring role and the
awareness building which civil society took over were the certificate for the success.
Other pillars could have performed better, especially the judiciary, police and security
forces. Their performance could be an obstacle to the CEC but they performed
moderately in a way that did not hinder the achievements but did not increase
possibilities of success. The judiciary in particular should improve and be more
supportive of the CEC.
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Annex 1
Who’s who?
Members of the Central Election Commission
1. Dr. Hanna Nasser (Chairman of the Commission): holder of a PhD degree
in physics from Berdo University in the United States. Dr. Nasser is
considered the founder of Birzeit University and has served as its first
president until his retirement in September 2004. The Israeli Authorities
ensured his deportation between 1974 and 1993, a period during which he was
twice elected a member of the Executive Committee of the PLO. Dr. Nasser
was a prominent active member of the International Association of
Universities and served as its Vice-President between 2000 and 2004.
2. Dr. Rami Al Hamdallah (Secretary General): holder of a PhD degree in
applied linguistics from the University of Lancaster in the UK. He is the
president of An Najah National University in Nablus. Dr. Al Hamdallah is a
prominent member of many academic institutions that have cooperative
relations with Palestinian universities. He also serves as the chairman of the
board of the Palestinian Stock Market.
3. Judge Ishaq Muhanna: holder of an MA degree in Law from the University
of Alexandria, and works as a counsellor (Chairman of a Committee) and as a
judge in the Appellate Court in Gaza.
4. Judge Asa’ad Mubarak: Experienced judge and counsellor at the High
Court, trained in the Judicial Education program of the Law Institute at Birzeit
University. Holder of a certificate in judicial training from the National
Judicial College in Nevada, USA, and holder of an MA degree from Arab
Beirut University.
5. Judge Iman Naser Eldeen: holder of an MA degree in Law from the
University of Damascus, currently serving as judge in the Appellate Court in
Ramallah.
6. Judge Abdallah Ghuzlan: holder of a degree in law from the Arab Beirut
University, and is the author of many legal studies. Mr. Ghuzlan worked as a
lawyer and as a judge and is licensed to practice the legal profession in
religious and regular courts. He currently presides over the Society of
Palestinian judges.
7. Mrs. Lamees Al Alami: holder of an MA degree in English Literature from
the American University of Beirut, and an MA degree in Applied Linguistics
from Edinburgh University in Britain. She currently holds the position of
director general of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’
Rights serving in this position from July 2004 until present. She previously
headed the field education program of the UNRWA.
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8. Judge Mazen Sisalem: holder of an MA degree in law from Ein Shams
University in Cairo. He currently works as a counsellor at the Appellate Court
in Gaza.
9. Dr. Mohammad Shubeir: holder of a PhD degree in biology from the
University of West Virginia, USA. He served as the president of the Islamic
University in Gaza until his retirement in September 2005. Dr. Shubeir
submitted his resignation from the Central Election Commission on August
27th, 2005, upon his retirement from the Islamic University in Gaza, in order
to dedicate his time to academic research. The President of the National
Authority accepted his resignation on the 13th of January, 2005.
20