The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48 Author(s): Melvyn P. Leffler Reviewed work(s): Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 (Apr., 1984), pp. 346-381 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1862556 . Accessed: 06/01/2012 04:13 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. The University of Chicago Press and American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review. http://www.jstor.org AHR Forum The AmericanConceptionof NationalSecurity and theBeginnings of theCold War,1945-48 MELVYN P. LEFFLER IN AN INTERVIEW with Henry Kissingerin 1978 on "The Lessons of the Past," WalterLaqueur observedthatduringWorldWar II "fewifany people thought... of the structureof peace thatwould followthe war except perhaps in the most general termsof friendship,mutual trust,and the other noble sentimentsmentioned in wartimeprogrammaticspeeches about the United Nationsand related topics."Kissingerconcurred,notingthat no statesman,except perhaps Winston Churchill,"gave any attentionto what would happen afterthe war." Americans, Kissingerstressed,"weredeterminedthatwe weregoingto base thepostwarperiod on good faithand gettingalong witheverybody."' politicswere That twosuch astuteand knowledgeableobserversof international so uninformedabout Americanplanningat the end of the Second World War is testimony to the enduringmythology of Americanidealismand innocencein the areas worldof Realpolitik.It also reflectsthestateof scholarshipon theinterrelated of strategy,economy,and diplomacy.Despite the publicationof severalexcellent overviewsof the origins of the Cold War,2despite the outpouringof incisive monographson Americanforeignpolicyin manyareas of the world,3and despite Researchon thisarticlewas made possibleby generoussupportfromthe WoodrowWilsonInternational and the VanderbiltUniversity Center,the Councilon ForeignRelations,the HarryS. Truman Institute, ResearchCouncil.The authorwishesto expresshis gratitudeforthe incisivecommentsand constructive criticism of Samuel Walker,MichaelHogan, WalterLaFeber,Thomas G. Paterson,CharlesEagles,Cecilia Stiles,EduardMark,RobertPollard,RajonMenon,ErnestMay,and AndrewGoodpaster.Specialthanksgo to documentspertaining to declassify to atomicstrategy. David Rosenbergforhisunceasingefforts ' Kissinger, 1977-1980(Boston,1980), 123-24. Statements, FortheRecord:Selected 2 For recentoverviews of theoriginsof the Cold War,whichseek to go beyondthe heatedtraditionalistStates andthe L. Gaddis,TheUnited ofthe 1960sand early1970s,see,forexample,John revisionist controversies Peace: TheOrigins oftheColdWarand the Origins oftheColdWar(New York,1972); Daniel Yergin,Shattered NationalSecurity State(Boston,1978); Thomas G. Paterson,On EveryFront:TheMakingoftheColdWar(New York,1979); and RoyDouglas,FromWartoColdWar,1942-48 (New York,1981). 3 For someof themostimportant and mostrecentregionaland bilateralstudies,see,forexample,Bruce and in Iran,Turkey, andDiplomacy oftheColdWarin theNearEast: GreatPowerConflict Kuniholm,TheOrigins inGreece (NewYork,1982);AaronMiller, Greece American Intervention 1980); LawrenceS. Wittner, (Princeton, Foreign Policy, 1939-1949(ChapelHill,N.C., 1980);MichaelB. Search SaudiArabianOilandAmerican forSecurity: onForeign Oil,1941-47 (NewHaven,1980); a National Policy TheSearchfor Security: Stoff, Oil,War,andAmerican (Westport, Organization Atlantic oftheNorth Alliance:TheOrigins theEntangling TimothyIreland,Creating Treaty 346 TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 347 some first-rate studies on the evolution of strategicthinkingand the defense establishment,4 no comprehensiveaccount yet exists of how American defense officials definednationalsecurityinterestsin the aftermathof World War II. Until recently, the absence of such a studywas understandable,forscholarshad limited access to records pertaining to national security,strategicthinking,and war planning.But in recentyearsdocumentsrelatingto theearlyyearsof theCold War have been declassifiedin massivenumbers.5 Conn., 1981); William W. Stueck,Jr., The Road to Confrontation: AmericanPolicytozward China and Korea (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol:AmericanForeignPolicy,t.heCold War, and Korea, 1945-50 (Kent,Ohio, 1981); DorothyBorg and Waldo Heinrichs,eds., Uncertain Years:Chinese-American Relatio , 194 7-50 (New York, 1980); Robert J. McMahon, Colonialismand Cold War: The UnitedStatesand the Strugglefor IndonesianIndependence(Ithaca, N.Y., 1981); Robert M. Blum, Drawing theLine: The Originof the AmericanContainment Policyin East Asia (New York, 1982); Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-American Relationsin Asia, 1945-1954 (Norman, Okla., 1981); Bruce Cumings, The OriginsoftheKorean War: Liberationand theEmergenceof SeparateRegimes,1945-47 (Princeton, 1982); Geir Lundestaad, America,Scandanavia, and theCold War, 1945-49 (New York, 1980); Kenneth Ray Bain, March toZion: UnitedStatesForeignPolicyand theFoundingofIsrael (College Station, Texas, 1979); Evan M. Wilson, Decision on Palestine:flow the U.S. Came to RecognizeIsrael (Stanford, 1979); Robert M. Hathaway, AmbiguousPartnership:Britainand America,1944-47 (New York, 1981); Ierry H. Anderson, The UnitedStates,GreatBnrtain,and theCold War, 1944-47 (Columbia, Mo., 1981); Edtard Mark, "AmericanPolicytowardEastern Europe and the Originsof the Cold War, 1941-46: An Alternative Interpretation,"Journal ofAmerican History[hereafter,JAHM, 68 (1981-82): 313-36; MichaelSchaller,"Securing theGreatCrescent:OccupiedJapanand theOriginsof Containment in SoutheastAsia,"ibid.,69 (1982-83): 392-414; ScottJackson,"Prologueto theMarshallPlan,"ibid.,65 (1978-79): 1043-68; and MichaelJ. Hogan, "The Searchfora 'CreativePeace': The UnitedStates,EuropeanUnity,and theOriginsoftheMarshallPlan," Diplomatic History, 6 (1982): 267-85. 4 For recentworkson strategy, the nationalmilitary establishment, and the emergenceof the national securitybureaucracy, see, for example, Richard Haynes, The AwesomePower: HarryS. Trumanas Commanderin Chief(BatonRouge,La., 1973); AlfredD. Sander,"Trumanand theNationalSecurity Council,1945-1947," JAH, 59 (1972-73): 369-88; Michael S. Sherry,Preparingfor theNext War: AmericanPlans for PostwarDefense, 1941-45 (New Haven, 1977); Brian L. Villa,"The U.S. Army,Unconditional Surrender,and the Potsdam Declaration,"JAH, 63 (1976-77): 66-92; JamesF. Schnaebel,TheHistorvoftheJoint ChiefsofStaff:TheJointChiefs ofStaffand NationalPolicy,volume 1: 1945-1947 (Wilmington,Del., 1979); Kenneth W. Condit, TheHistoryofthe JointChiefsof Staff:TheJointChiefsof Staffand National Policy,volume 2: 1947-49 (Wilmington,Del., 1979); Gregg Herken, The WinningWeapon: The AtomicBomb and theCold War, 1945-1950 (New York, 1980); David Alan Rosenberg, "AmericanAtomicStrategy and the HydrogenBombDecision," JAH,66 (1979-80): 62-87; Harry R. Borowski, A Hollow Threat:StrategicAir Power and Containment beforeKorea (Westport,Conn., 1982); Mark Stoler,"From Continentalism to Globalism:General StanleyD. Embick,theJointStrategicSurvey Committee, and the Military View of AmericanNationalPolicyduringthe Second WorldWar,"Diplomatic 6 (1982): 303-21; WalterS. Poole,"FromConciliation History, to Containment: The JointChiefsof Staffand theComingoftheCold War,"Military Affairs, 42 (1978): 12-16; ThomasH. Etzold,"The Far EastinAmerican Strategy,1948-1951," in Etzold, ed., Aspectsof Sino-American Relationssince 1784 (New York, 1978), 102-26; Paolo E. Coletta, The UnitedStatesNavyand DefenseUnification, 1947-1953 (East Brunswick,N.J., 1981); Douglas Kinnard,TheSecretary ofDefense(Lexington,Ky., 1980); Anna K. Nelson,"NationalSecuLrity I: Inventinga Process,1945-1960,"in Hugh Heclo and Lester M. Salamon,eds., TheIllusionofPresidential Government (Boulder,Col., 1981),229-45; LarryD. O'Brien,"NationalSecurityand the New Warfare:DefensePolicy, War Planning,and NuclearWeapons,1945-50" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio StateUniversity, 1981);john T. Greenwood,"The Emergenceof thePost-WarStrategic AirForce,1945-1955,"paperdeliveredat theEighth Military HistorySymposium, held at the UnitedStatesAir ForceAcademyin October1978; and RobertF. Futrell,Ideas, Concepts,Doctrine:A HistoryofBasic Thinkingin theUnitedStatesAir Force,1907-1964 (Maxwell Air ForceBase, Ala., 1971). 5 For the recordsof the JointChiefsof Staff, see Record Group 218, NationalArchives,Washington (hereafter, RG 218); fortherecordsof theOfficeof theSecretary ofDefense,see RecordGroup330,National Archives, Washington (hereafter, RG 330); and, fortherecordsof theNationalSecurity Council,see Record Group273,Judicial,Fiscal,and SocialBranch,NationalArchives, of Washington. (I used thisspecialcollection declassified NationalSecurityCouncildocumentspriorto theirreceiving a recordgroupnumberwithinthe Judicial,Fiscal,and Social Branchof the NationalArchives.)There are important NationalSecurityCouncil materials in the HarryS. TrumanPapers,President's Secretary's File,HarryS. TrumanPresidential Library, IndependenceMissouri(hereafter, HTL, HSTP, PSF), boxes 191-208.Forassessments bytheCIA, including thosepreparedformeetings oftheNationalSecurity see ibid.,boxes249-60, 203-07. Council(NSC), especially For a helpfulguideto War and Armydepartment recordsin theNationalArchives, see Louis Galambos,ed., 348 AHR Forum This documentationnow makes it possible to analyze in greater depth the perceptions,apprehensions,and objectivesof those defense officialsmost concerned withdefiningand defendingthe nation'ssecurityand strategicinterests.6 This essayseeks neitherto explainthe processof decisionmakingon any particular issue nor to dissectthe domesticpoliticalconsiderationsand fiscalconstraintsthat narrowedthe optionsavailableto policymakers.Furthermore,it does not pretend to discernthe mnotivations and objectivesof theSovietUnion.7Rather,thegoal here is to elucidatethe fundamentalstrategicand economicconsiderationsthatshaped the definitionof Americannationalsecurityinterestsin the postwarworld.Several of these considerations-especiallyas they related to overseas bases, air transit rights,and a strategicsphere of influencein Latin America-initiallywere the logical resultof technologicaldevelopmentsand geostrategicexperiencesrather than directlyrelated to postwarSoviet behavior.8But Americandefense officials The Papers ofDwightDavid Eisenihower, 9 vols. (Baltimore, 1970-78), 9: 2262-70. Of greatestutilityin studying the viewsof civilianiand militaryplanners in the Armyand War Department are Record Group 165, Records of the Operations Division (OPD), and Records of American-BritishConversations (ABC); Record Group 319, Records of the Plans and Operations Division (P&O); Record Group 107, Records of the Officeof the Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson Papers (RPPP), safe file and general decimal file,and Records of the Officeof the AssistantSecretaryof War, Howard C. Peterson Papers (HCPP), classifieddecimialfile;and Record Group 335, Records of the Under-Secretary of the Army, Draper/Voorhees files, 1947-50. The records of the navy's StrategicPlans Division (SPD) and the Politico-MilitaryDivision (PMD) are divided into many subseries; helpful indexes are available at the Naval Historical Center (NHC). The center also contains, among many other collections,the records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO, double zero files) as well as the mantuscriptcollections of many influentialnaval officers,inicludingChester Nimitz, Forrest Sherman, Louis Denfeld, and Arthur Radford. For air force records, I tried-with only moderate success-to use the following materialsat the National Archives: Record Group 107, Records of the Officeof the AssistantSecretaryof War for Air, Plans, Policies, and Agreements, 1943-47; Records of the Officeof the AssistantSecretaryof War for Air, Establishmentof Air Fields and Air Bases, 1940-45; and Incoming and Outgoing Cablegrams, 1942-47; and Record Group 18, Records of the Officeof the Chief of Air Staff,Headquarters Army Air Forces: Officeof the Air AdjutanitGeneral, confidentialand secretdecimal correspondence file,1945-48. For the records of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and its successor, the State-Army-Navy-AirForce Coordinating Committee, see Record Group 353, National Archives, Washington, and, for the important records of the Committee of Three (meetings of the secretaries of state, war, and navy), see Record Group 107, RPPP, safe file. 6 I use the termn "defense officials"broadly in thisessay to include civilianappointees and militaryofficersin the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, in the officeof the secretaryof defense, in the armed services, in the intelligence agencies, and on the staffof the National Security Council. While purposefully avoiding a systematicanalysis of career diplomats in the Department of State, who have received much attentionelsewhere, the conclusionis I draw here are based oIi a consideration of the views of high-ranking officialsin the State Department, includingJames F. Byrnes, Dean Acheson, George C. Marshall, and Robert Lovett. For an excellent analysis of the views of career diplomats, see Hugh DeSantis, The Diplomacyof Silence: The AmericanForeign Service,the Soviet Union, anld the Cold War, 1933-1947 (Chicago, 1980). Also see, for example, Robert L. Messer, "Paths Not Taken: The United States Department of State and Alternativesto Containment, 1945-1946," DiplomaticHistory,1 (1977): 297-319; and W. W. Rostow, The DivisionofEurope after WorldWar II: 1946 (Austin, Texas, 1981). Many of the references in note 3 deal extensivelywith the views of State Department officials;see pages 346-47, above. 7For recent studies of Soviet policy during this era, see, for example, Adam Ulam, The Rivals: Americaand Russia sinceWorldWar II (New York, 1971), 3-151, and Stalin: TheMan and His Era (New York, 1973), 604-99; William Zimmerman, "Choices in the Postwar World, 1: Containment and the Soviet Union," in Charles Gati, anidtheCold War (Indianapolis, 1974), 85-108; Vojtech Mastny,Russia'sRoad to ed., Caging theBear: Containment the Cold War (New York, 1979); William 0. McCagg, Stalin Embattled,1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978); William Taubman, Stalin's AmericanPolicy: From Ententeto Detenteto Cold War (New York, 1982); Werner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Policies: The Fall of Zmd anov and theDefeat of Moderation(Ithaca, N.Y., 1982); and Alvin Z. Rubinstein,SovietForeignPolicysince WorldWar II: Imperialand Global (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 2-70. 8 Any assessment of postwar national securitypolicy must also take note of the role of the atomic bomb in U.S. strategyand diplomacy. But, since nuclear weapons have received extensive attentionelsewhere, I deal with this issuLe rather briefly; see pages 371-72, below. For excellent work on the atomic bomb, see, for TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 349 also considered the preservationof a favorablebalance of power in Eurasia as fundamentalto U.S. nationalsecurity.This objectiveimpelleddefenseanalystsand intelligenceofficersto appraise and reappraisethe intentionsand capabilitiesof the SovietUnion. Rathermodestestimatesof theSoviets'abilityto wage war againstthe United Statesgeneratedthe widespreadassumptionthatthe Sovietswould refrain frommilitaryaggressionand seek to avoid war. Nevertheless,Americandefense officialsremained greatlypreoccupied with the geopoliticalbalance of power in Europe and Asia, because thatbalance seemed endangeredbycommunistexploitation of postwar economic dislocation and social and political unrest. Indeed, Americanassessmentsof the Soviet threatwere less a consequence of expanding Soviet militarycapabilitiesand of Soviet diplomaticdemands than a result of growingapprehensionabout the vulnerability of Americanstrategicand economic interestsin a world of unprecedented turmoiland upheaval. Viewed from this perspective,the Cold War assumed many of its most enduring characteristics during 1947-48, when American officialssought to cope with an array of challengesby implementingtheirown conceptsof nationalsecurity. OFFICIALS FIRST BEGAN to think seriouslyabout the nation's postwar securityduring 1943-44. Militaryplannersdevisedelaborateplans foran overseas base system.Many of these plans explicitlycontemplatedthe breakdownof the wartimecoalition. But, even when strategicplanners postulated good postwar relationsamong theAllies,theirplans called foran extensivesystemof bases. These bases were defined as the nation's strategicfrontier.Beyond this frontierthe United States would be able to use force to counterany threatsor frustrateany overtacts of aggression.Withinthe strategicfrontier, Americanmilitarypredominance had to remain inviolate.Althoughplans for an overseasbase systemwent throughmany revisions,theyalways presupposed Americanhegemonyover the Atlanticand Pacificoceans. These plans receivedPresidentFranklinD. Roosevelt's endorsementin early 1944. Afterhis death, army and navy planners presented theirviews to PresidentHarry S. Truman, and ArmyChief of StaffGeorge C. MarshalldiscussedthemextensivelywithSecretaryof StateJamesC. Byrnes.9 AMERICAN example, MartinJ. Sherwin,A WorldDestroyed: TheAtomic Bomband theGrandAliance (New York, 1973); BartonJ. Bernstein, "The Quest forSecurity:AmericanForeignPolicyand International Controlof AtomicEnergy, 60 (1973-74): 1003-44; Herken,TheWinning Weapon;and Rosenberg,"AmericanAtomic 1942-1946,"JAH, Strategy and theHydrogenBombDecision."For older,butstillveryimportant accounts,see P. M. S. Blackett, Fear, War,and theBomb(New York, 1949); Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar G. Anderson, TheNew World:A History of theUnitedStatesAtomicEnergnCommission, 1939-1946 (UniversityPark, Pa., 1962); Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, AtomicShield:A Historyof theUnitedStatesAtomicEnergyCommission, 1947-52 (UniversityPark, Pa., 1969); Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: andPotsdam (New York,1965); and HerbertFeis,The Hiroshimna AtomicBomband theEnd of WorldWar II (Princeton, 1966). 9PlansforAmerica'soverseasbase systemmaybe foundin RG 218, CombinedChiefsof Staff(CCS) series 360 (12-9-42):JointStrategicSurveyCommittee[hereafter, JSSC], "Air Routesacrossthe Pacificand Air Facilities forInternational PoliceForce,"March15, 1943,JSSC 9/1;JointChiefsof StaffUCS], "UnitedStates November2, Military Requirements forAir Bases, Facilities, and OperatingRightsin ForeignTerritories," 1943,JCS 570/2;JointWar PlansCommittee[hereafter, JWPC],"OverallExaminationof the UnitedStates Requirements forMilitary Bases,"August25, 1943,JWPC361/4;andJWPC,"OverallExamination of United States Requirementsfor MilitaryBases," September 13, 1945, JWPC 361/5 (revised).For Roosevelt's endorsement, see RoosevelttotheDepartment ofState,January7, 1944,ibid., JWPC361/5;forcivilian-military 350 AHR Forum Two strategicconsiderationsinfluencedthe developmentof an overseas base system.The firstwas the need for defense in depth. Since attacksagainst the United Statescould only emanate fromEurope and Asia, theJointChiefsof Staff concluded as early as November 1943 that the United States must encirclethe WesternHemispherewitha defensiveringof outlyingbases. In the Pacificthisring had to include the Aleutians,the Philippines,Okinawa, and the formerJapanese mandates.Recognizingthe magnitudeof thisstrategicfrontier, AdmiralWilliamE. Leahy, chiefof staffto the president,explained to Truman that thejoint chiefs were not thinkingof the immediatefuturewhen,admittedly, no prospectivenaval power could challengeAmericanpredominancein the Pacific.Instead,theywere contemplating the long term,when the United Statesmightrequirewartimeaccess to theresourcesof southeastAsia as wellas "a firmlineof communications fromthe West Coast to the Asiaticmainland,plus denial of thisline in timeof war to any potential enemy."'0 In the Atlantic,strategicplanners maintained that their minimumrequirementsincluded a West Africanzone, withprimarybases in the Azores or Canary Islands. Leahy wenteven further,insistingon primarybases in West Africa itself-for example, at Dakar or Casablanca. The object of these defensivebases was to enable the United Statesto possess completecontrolof the "I Atlanticand Pacificoceans and keep hostilepowersfarfromAmericanterritory. Defense in depth was especiallyimportantin lightof the Pearl Harbor experience, the advance of technology,and the development of the atomic bomb. Accordingto theJointChiefsof Staff,"Experiencein the recentwar demonstrated mustbeginbeyondits conclusively thatthedefenseof a nation,ifitis to be effective, frontiers.The advent of the atomic bomb reemphasizesthis requirement.The fartheraway from our own vital areas we can hold our enemy through the possession of advanced bases..., the greater are our chances of surviving successfullyan attack by atomic weapons and of destroyingthe enemy which employs them against us." Believing that atomic weapons would increase the incentiveto aggressionby enhancingthe advantageof surprise,militaryplanners never ceased to extol the utilityof forwardbases fromwhich Americanaircraft could seek to interceptattacksagainstthe United States.'2 discussionof base requirements followingthe president'sdeath,see OPD, "Extractof Conversation-Adm. Duncanand Gen. Lincoln,"June 18, 1945,RG 165,OPD 336 (topsecret);OPD, Memorandum fortheRecord, June 30, 1945,ibid.;GeneralGeorge A. Lincoln,"MemorandumconcerningU.S. Post-WarPacificBases," June30, 1945,ibid.;and GeorgeC. MarshalltoJamesF. Byrnes, July23, 1945,ibid. '? For Leahy'sexplanation, see JCS,"Strategic Areasand Trusteeships in thePacific," October10, 18, 1946, forAir Bases," RG 218, ser.CCS 360 (12-9-42),JCS 1619/15,19;JCS,"UnitedStatesMilitary Requlirements November2, 1943; JCS, "OverallExaminationof UnitedStatesRequirements Bases and Base forMilitary Rights," October25, 1945,ibid.,JCS 570/40. "JCS, "UnitedStatesMilitary Requirements forAir Bases,"November2, 1943;JCS, Minutesof the 71st meeting, March30, 1943,RG 218, ser.CCS 360 (12-9-42);Leahy,MemorandumforthePresident, November 15,1943,ibid.;Nimitz,Memorandum, October16,1946,ibid., JCS 1619/16;andJointPlanningStaff[hereafter, JPS],"Basis for the Formulationof a Post-WarMilitaryPolicy,"August20, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 (5-13-45),JPS 633/6. '2JCS,"Statement of Effect ofAtomicWeaponson NationalSecurity and Military Organization," March29, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 471.6 Atom (8-17-45),JCS 477/10.Also see JCS, "Guidanceas to the Military Implications of a UnitedNationsCommissionon AtomicEnergy," January12, 1946,ibid.,JCS 1567/26;and JCS, "Over-AllEffectof AtomicBomb on Warfareand Military Organization," October30, 1945,ibid.,JCS 1477/1. TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 351 The second strategicconsiderationthatinfluencedthe plan fora comprehensive overseas base system was the need to project American power quickly and effectively againstany potentialadversary.In conductingan overallexaminationof requirementsfor base rightsin September 1945, theJointWar Plans Committee stressedthatWorld War II demonstratedthe futility of a strategyof staticdefense. The United States had to be able to take "timely"offensiveaction against the adversary'scapacityand will to wage war. New weapons demanded thatadvance bases be establishedin "areas well removedfromthe United States,so as to project our operations,withnew weapons or otherwise,nearer the enemy."Scientists, like of thesenew weapons VannevarBush, argued that,"regardlessof the potentialities [atomic energy and guided missiles],they should not influencethe number, location,or extentof strategicbases now consideredessential."The basic strategic concept underlyingall American war plans called for an air offensiveagainst a prospectiveenemyfromoverseasbases. Delays in the developmentof the B-36, the firstintercontinental bomber,onlyaccentuatedthe need forthese bases.'3 In October 1945 the civilianleaders of the War and Navydepartmentscarefully reviewedthe emergingstrategicconcepts and base requirementsof the military planners.Secretaryof the NavyJames Forrestaland Secretaryof War Robert P. Pattersondiscussed them with Admiral Leahy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,and Secretaryof State Byrnes.The civiliansecretariesfullyendorsed the conceptof a far-flung systemof bases in the Atlanticand Pacificoceans thatwould enhance the offensivecapabilitiesof the United States.'4Having expended so much blood and effortcapturingJapanese-heldislands, defense officials,like Forrestal,naturally wishedto devise a base systemin the Pacificto facilitate the projectionof American influenceand power. The Philippineswere the keyto southeastAsia, Okinawa to the Yellow Sea, the Sea of Japan, and the industrialheartlandof northeastAsia. Fromthesebases on America's"strategicfrontier," the UnitedStatescould preserve itsaccessto vitalraw materialsin Asia, denytheseresourcesto a prospectiveenemy, help preservepeace and stability in troubledareas, safeguardcriticalsea lanes,and, of any if necessary,conduct an air offensiveagainst the industrialinfrastructure Asiaticpower,includingthe Soviet Union.'5 1? For the emphasis on "timely"action, see JWPC, "Overall Examination of Requirements for MilitaryBases" (revised), September 13, 1946; for the need for advance bases, see JCS, "StrategicConcept and Plan for the Employmentof United States Armed Forces," September 19, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 (5-13-45), JCS 1518; for Bush's view, see JWPC, "Effectof Foreseeable New Developments and Counter-Measures on a Post-War StrategicConcept and Plan," August 22, 1945, ibid.,JWPC 394/1/M.Also see, for the evolution of strategicwar plans, many of the materials in RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46). 14 For the discussions and conclusions of civilian officials,see Leahy to Patterson and Forrestal, October 9, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret); Robert Lovett to Chief of Staff,October 12, 1945, ibid.; Patterson to the Secretaryof Navy, October 17, 1945, ibid.; and Forrestal to Byrnes, October 4, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42). For Forrestal's views, also see Forrestal to James K. Vardaman, September 14, 1945, Mudd Library, Princeton University,James Forrestal Papers [hereafter ML, JFP], box 100; Forrestal to Byrnes, October 4, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42); and Vincent Davis, PostwarDefensePolicyand theU.S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), 157-206, 259-66. 15 For the Philippines, see, for example, Strategy Section, OPD, "Post-War Base Requirements in the Philippines,"April 23, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret),and "Report on the MilitaryBase Requirements in the Philippines," October 20, 1945, ibid. For Okinawa, see JCS, "Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands," September 10, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-942),JCS 1619/9;JCS, "Reviewof United StatesControl Needed over the Japanese Islands," August 26, 1947, ibid.,JCS 1619/24; and Lincoln, "Memorandum concerning U.S. Post-War Pacific Bases," June 30, 1945. 352 AHR Forum Controlof the Atlanticand Pacificoceans throughoverseasbases was considered indispensableto the nation's securityregardlessof what might happen to the wartimecoalition.So was controlover polar air routes.AdmiralLeahy criticizeda JointStrategicSurveyCommitteereportof early 1943 thatomittedIceland and Greenlandas primarybase requirements.When General S. D. Embick,the senior member of that committee,continued to question the desirabilityof a base in Iceland, lestit antagonizethe Russians,he was overruledby AssistantSecretaryof WarJohnMcCloy.McCloychargedthatEmbickhad "a ratherrestricted conceptof whatis necessaryfornationaldefense."The firstpostwarbase systemapproved by both theJointChiefsof Staffand the civiliansecretariesin October 1945 included Iceland as a primarybase area. The JointWar Plans Committeeexplained that Americanbases must controlthe air in the Arctic,preventthe establishmentof enemy militaryfacilitiesthere,and support America'sown strikingforces.Once Soviet-American relationsbegan to deteriorate,Greenlandalso was designatedas a primarybase for American heavy bombers and fightersbecause of its close proximityto the industrialheartlandof the potentialenemy.As the United States sought rights for bases along the Polar route in 1946 and 1947, moreover, Americandefense officialsalso hoped to thwartSoviet effortsto acquire similar rightsat Spitzbergenand Bear Island.'6 In theimmediatepostwaryearsAmericanambitionsforan elaboratebase system encounteredmanyproblems.Budgetaryconstraints compelledmilitary plannersto drop plans for many secondaryand subsidiarybases, particularlyin the South Pacificand Caribbean. These sacrificesmerelyincreasedthe importanceof those bases thatlay closer to a potentialadversary.By early 1948, thejoint chiefswere willingto foregobase rightsin such places as Surinam,Curacoa-Aruba,Cayenne, Nounea, and Vivi-Levu if 'joint" or "participating"rightscould be acquired or preservedin Karachi,Tripoli,Algiers,Casablanca,Dharan, and Monrovia.Budgetary constraints, then,limitedthe depth of the base systembut not the breadthof Americanambitions.'7Furthermore,the governmentsof Panama, Iceland, Denmark,Portugal,France,and Saudi Arabia oftenrejectedor abolishedthe exclusive rightsthe United States wanted and sometimeslimitedthe numberof American personnelon such bases. Washington,therefore,negotiateda varietyof arrangementsto meetthe objectionsof hostgovernments.By early 1948, forexample,the base in Iceland was operated by a civiliancompanyunder contractto the United 16 For Leahy'sviews,see JCS, Minutesof the 71stmeeting, March30, 1943. For the differences between Embickand McCloy,see EmbicktoJohnHickerson, June8, 1945,RG 165,OPD 336 (topsecret);and HarrisonA. of Iceland and Greenlandas Gerhardt,MemorandumforGeneralHull, June16, 1945,ibid.For the utility bases,see JWPC,"Attributes of UnitedStatesOverseasBases," November2, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42),JWPC 361/10;NSC, "Reportby the NSC on Base Rightsin Greenland,Iceland,and theAzores," November25, 1947,ibid.,NSC 2/1;and AlbertC. Wedemeyer toSecretary ofDefense,March6, 1948,RG 330, box 19,CD 6-1-44(decimalcorrespondence file).And,forthedilemmaposed byprospective Sovietdemands forsimilarbase rightsat Spitzbergen, see,forexample,JCS,"ForeignPolicyoftheUnitedStates,"February10, 1946,RG 218,ser.CCS 092 US (12-21-45),JCS1519/2;Department ofState,Foreign Relations oftheUnited States [hereafter, FRUS], 1947, 8 vols. (Washington,1971-73), 1: 708-12, 766-70, and 3: 657-87, 1003-18; and Lundestad, America,Scandanavia, and theCold War, 63-76. 17 See, forexample,Reportof the Director, JointStaff,March 18, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (12-9-42), JointStrategic PlansGroup [hereafter JSPG]503/1.For thespecialemphasison NorthAfricanbases,see, for example,Forrestalto Truman,January6, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 156. And, for furtherevidence regardingplansforthedevelopment of thebase systemin 1947-48,see notes70-71, below. TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 353 States Air Force; in the Azores, the base was manned by a detachmentof Portuguesemilitarypersonnel operatingunder the Portugueseflag,but an air forcedetachmentservicedthe Americanaircraftusing the base. In Port Lyautey, thebase was under thecommandof the Frenchnavy,butunder a secretagreement an American naval team took care of American aircrafton the base. In Saudi Arabia,theDharan air stripwas cared forby300 U.S. personneland was capable of in handlingB-29s. Because these arrangementswere not altogethersatisfactory, mid-1948 Secretaryof Defense Forrestaland Secretaryof the Army Kenneth Royall advocated using American economic and militaryassistanceas levers to acquire more permanentand comprehensivebase rights,particularly in Greenland and NorthAfrica.18 Less well knownthanthe Americaneffortto establisha base system,but integral to the policymakers'conceptionof national security,was the attemptto secure military air transitand landingrights.Military plannerswantedsuch rightsat critical locationsnot onlyin the WesternHemispherebut also in NorthAfrica,the Middle East, India, and southeast Asia. To this end they delineated a route from Casablanca through Algiers,.Tripoli, Cairo, Dharan, Karachi, Delhi, Calcutta, Rangoon,Bangkok,and Saigon to Manila.'9 In closingout theAfrican-MiddleEast theater at the conclusion of the war, General H. W. Aurand, under explicit instructions fromthe secretaryof war,made preparationsforpermanentrightsat seven airfieldsin North Africaand Saudi Arabia.20Accordingto a studyby the JointChiefs of Staff,"Militaryair transitrightsfor the United States along the NorthAfrican-Indianroutewere mostdesirablein order to provideaccess to and familiarity withbases fromwhichoffensiveand defensiveactionmightbe conducted in the eventof a major war,and to providean alternaterouteto China and to United States Far Eastern bases." In other words,such rightswould permitthe rapid augmentationof Americanbases in wartimeas wellas therapid movementof Americanair unitsfromtheeasternto thewesternflankof theU.S. base system.In order to maintainthese airfieldsin a stateof readiness,the United Stateswould have to relyon privateairlines,whichhad to be persuadedto locatetheiroperations in areas designatedessentialto militaryair transitrights.In thisway,airports"in being" outside the formalAmericanbase systemwould be available for military operationsin timesof crisisand war.AssistantSecretaryMcCloyinformedtheState 18 For the situation in Iceland,the Azores,and PortLyautey,see EdmondT. Wooldridgeto theGeneral Boardof theNavy,April30, 1948,NHC, Recordsof theGeneralBoard 425 (ser.315); forSaudi Arabia,see duringRecentTripto theMediterranean-Middle Observations Reporton Pertinent G. R. Cooperetal., "Joint on theDharanbase, EastArea,"September25, 1948,NHC, SPD, centralfiles,1948,A8; formoreinformation "KeepingtheDoor Open inSaudi Arabia:The U.S. and the alsoseeFRUS, 1948,5: 209-63; JamesL. Gormly, 4 (1980): 189-206; and, for aspirationsto secure more History, Dharan Airfield,1945-46," Diplomatic 28, 1948,RG 330,box 1 9, CD 27-1-21; see Royallto Forrestal,July baserights, and comprehensive permanent concernwithbase rightsin Icelandand and Forrestalto Royall,August7, 1948,ibid.The StateDepartment's pact;see FRUS, 1948,3: 169-351.For talkson a security theexploratory Greenlandwas evidentthroughout NorthAfrica,also see ibid.,682-715. Basesand Rights," forMilitary September27, of UnitedStatesRequirements '9JCS,"Over-AllExamination forTransit of Requirements 1945,RG 218, ser.CCS 360 (12-942),JCS 570/34;JPS,"Over-AllExamination Air Bases in ForeignCountries,"January8, 1946, ibid.,JPS 781; and JCS, "Over-AllExaminationof June30, 1946,ibid., JCS 570/52. forTransitAirBasesand AirBase Rightsin ForeignCountries," Requirements Library, Abilene,Kansas 20Aurandto Patterson, February7, 1946,DwightDavid EisenhowerPresidential ofState,March17, 1946,ibid. of Warto Secretary [hereafter, DDEL], H. S. AurandPapers,box 28; Secretary 354 AHR Forum Departmentat the beginningof 1945 that a "strongUnited States air transport system,internationalin scope and readilyadapted to military use, is vitalto our air powerand futurenationalsecurity."Even earlier,thejoint chiefshad agreed not to include South American air bases in their strategicplans so long as it was understoodthatcommercialfieldsin thatregionwould be developed witha viewto subsequentmilitaryuse.2' In Latin America,Americanrequirementsforeffective nationalsecuritywentfar beyondair transitrights.In a reportwritteninJanuary1945 at AssistantSecretary McCloy'sbehest,the War Departmenturged Americancollaborationwith Latin American armed forces to insure the defense of the Panama Canal and the WesternHemisphere. Six areas withinLatin America were consideredof special significanceeither for strategicreasons or for their raw materials:the Panama Canal and approaches within one thousand miles; the Straits of Magellan; northeastBrazil; Mexico; the river Plate estuary and approaches within five hundred miles; and Mollendo, Peru-Antofagusta, and Chile. These areas were so "important," Secretaryof War Pattersonexplained to Secretaryof StateMarshallin early 1947, "thatthe threatof attackon any of themwould forcethe United States to come to theirdefense,even thoughit were not certainthatattackon the United Statesitselfwould follow."The resourcesof theseareas wereessentialto the United States,because "it is imperativethatour war potentialbe enhanced... duringany "22 nationalemergency. Whilepayinglip serviceto the United Nationsand worryingabout the impactof regionalagreementsin the WesternHemisphereon Sovietactionsand American influencein Europe, theJointChiefsof Staffinsistedthatin practicenon-American forceshad to be kept out of the WesternHemisphereand the Monroe Doctrine had to be keptinviolate."The WesternHemisphereis a distinctmilitary entity,the integrity of whichis a fundamentalpostulateof our securityin theeventof another worldwar."23 Developmentsin aviation,rockets,guided missiles,and atomicenergy had made "thesolidarity of the Hemisphereand itsunitedsupportof theprinciples of the Monroe Doctrine"more importantthanbefore.Pattersontold Marshallthat effectiveimplementationof the Monroe Doctrine now meant "thatwe not only refuse to tolerate foreign colonization,control,or the extension of a foreign politicalsystemto our hemisphere,but we take alarm fromthe appearance on the continentof foreignideologies,commercialexploitation,cartelarrangements,or 21JPS, "Over-All Examination of Requirements for Transit Air Bases . . .," January 20, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 360 (10-9-42), JPS 781/1; and McCloy, Memorandum to the Department of State, Jan-uary31, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret). Also see JPS, "Over-All Examination of Requirements for Transit Air Bases," January 8, 1946; and, for the joint chiefs' view on South American air fields, see JCS, Minutes of the 69th meeting, March 23, 1943, RG 218, CCS 360 (12-9-42). 22 P&O, "The Strategic Importance of Inter-American MilitaryCooperation" [January 20, 1947], RG 319, 092 (top secret). Also see H. A. Craig, "Summary,"January 5, 1945, RG 107, Records of the AssistantSecretary of War for Air, Establishment of Air Fields and Air Bases, box 216 (Latin America); and War Department, "Comprehensive Statement" January 1945], ibid. 23JCS, "Foreign Policy of the United States," February 10, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 United States (12-21-45), JCS 1592/2; and JCS to the Secretaryof the Navy and Secretaryof War, September 19, 1945, ibid., ser. CCS 092 (9-10-45),JCS 1507/2. ForJCS views onithe Western Hemisphere, also seeJCS to the Secretaryof the Navy and Secretary of War, February 11, 1945, ibid., ser. CCS 092 (1-18-45); JCS, "International Organization for the Enforcement of World Peace and SecuLrity," April 14, 1945, ibid.,ser. CCS 092 (4-14-45), JCS 1311; andJCS, "Guidance as to Command and Control of the Armed Forces to be Placed at the Disposal of the SecurityCouncil of the United Nations," May 26, 1946, ibid.,JCS 1670/5. TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 355 other symptomsof increased non-hemisphericinfluence.... The basic consideration has alwaysbeen an overridingapprehensionlesta base be establishedin this area by a potentiallyhostileforeignpower."The United States,Pattersoninsisted, musthave "a stable,secure,and friendlyflankto the South,notconfusedbyenemy penetration,political,economic,or military."24 The need to predominatethroughoutthe WesternHemispherewas not a result of deterioratingSoviet-Americanrelationsbut a naturalevolutionof the Monroe Doctrine,accentuated by Axis aggression and new technologicalimperatives.25 Patterson,Forrestal,and ArmyChiefof StaffDwightD. Eisenhowerinitiallywere impelledless by reportsof Sovietespionage,propaganda, and infiltration in Latin Americathanby accountsof Britisheffortsto sell cruisersand aircraftto Chile and Ecuador; Swedish sales of anti-aircraft artilleryto Argentina;and Frenchoffersto build cruisersand destroyersfor both Argentinaand Brazil.26To forecloseall foreigninfluenceand to insure United Statesstrategichegemony,militaryofficers and the civilian secretariesof the War and Navy departmentsargued for an extensivesystemof United States bases, expansion of commercialairlinefacilities throughoutLatinAmerica,negotiationof a regionaldefensepact,curtailment of all foreignmilitaryaid and foreignmilitarysales, trainingof Latin Americanmilitary officers in the United States,outfitting of Latin AmericanarmieswithU.S. military equipment,and implementation of a comprehensivemilitary assistanceprogram.27 The militaryassistanceprogram,as embodied in the Inter-AmericanMilitary CooperationAct,generatedthe mostinteragencydiscord.Latin Americanexperts in the State Department maintained that militaryassistance would stimulate regionalconflicts, dissipateLatin Americanfinancialresources,and divertattention fromeconomicand social issues.Before leavingoffice,Byrnesforcefully presented the State Departmentpositionto Forrestaland Patterson.Instead of dwellingon the consequencesof militaryassistanceforLatin America,Byrnesmaintainedthat such a programwould be too costlyforthe UnitedStates,would focusattentionon a region where American interestswere relativelyunchallenged, and would underminemore importantAmericaninitiativeselsewhereon the globe. "Greece and Turkeyare our outposts,"he declared.28 21 For Patterson's views, see P&O, "Strategic Importance of Inter-American MilitaryCooperation" Janutary 20, 1947]; and Patterson to Byrnes, December 18, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 3. 25 This evaluation accords with the views of Chester J. Pach, Jr.; see his "The Containment of United States MilitaryAid to Latin America, 1944-1949," DiplomaticHisto7y,6 (1982): 232-34. 26 For fears of foreign influence, see, for example, [no signature] "MilitaryPolitical Cooperation with the Other American Republics," June 24, 1946, RG 18, 092 (International Affairs),box 567; Patterson to the Secretary of State, July31, 1946, RG 353, SWNCC, box 76; Eisenhower to Patterson, November 26, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, general decimal file,box 1 (top secret);S. J. Chamberlinto Eisenhower,November 26, 1946, ibid.; Minutes of the meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, December 11, 1946, ibid.,RPPP, safe file, box 3; and Director of Intelligence to Director of P&O, February 26, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 091 France. For reports on Soviet espionage, see, for example, Military Intelligence Service [hereafter, MIS], "SovietCommunist Penetration in Latin America," March 24, 1945, RG 165, OPD, 336 (top secret); and MIS, "Summary of a Study ... on Soviet-Communist Penetration in Latin America," September 27, 1945, ibid. 27 See, for example, Craig, "Summary,"January 5, 1945; JPS, "MilitaryArrangements Deriving from the Act of Chapultepec Pertainingto Bases," January14, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (9-10-45),JPS 7661/3;Pattersonto Byrnes, December 18, 1946; and P&O, "Strategic Importance of Inter-American Military Cooperation" January 20, 1947]. 28 Minutesof the meetingof the Secretariesof State, War, and the Navy, December 18, 1946, April 23, May 1, 1947, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 3; and M. B. Ridgway, Memorarndum for the Assistant Secretary of War, February 1947, ibid.,HCPP, 092 (classified). 356 AHR Forum The secretaryof stateclearlydid not thinkthatCongresswould authorizefunds for Latin America as well as for Greece and Turkey. AlthoughTruman favored militaryassistanceto Latin America,competingdemands for Americanresources in 1947 and 1948 forcedbothmilitaryplannersand U.S. senatorsto givepriority to WesternEurope and the Near East. In June 1948 the Inter-AmericanMilitary CooperationAct died in the Senate. But thissignifiedno diminutionin American nationalsecurityimperatives;indeed, it underscoredByrnes'sstatementof December 1946 thatthe "outposts"of the nation'ssecuritylay in the heartof Eurasia.29 FROM THE CLOSING DAYS OF WORLD WAR II, Americandefenseofficials believedthat theycould not allow any prospectiveadversaryto controlthe Eurasian land mass. This was the lesson taught by two world wars. Strategicthinkersand military analystsinsistedthatany poweror powersattemptingto dominateEurasia mustbe regardedas potentiallyhostileto the United States.30Their acute awarenessof the importanceof Eurasia made Marshall,Thomas Handy, George A. Lincoln,and other officerswaryof the expansion of Soviet influencethere. Cognizant of the growthin Sovietstrength,GeneralJohn Deane, head of the United Statesmilitary missionin Moscow, urged a tougher stand against Soviet demands even before World War II had ended. While acknowledgingthatthe increasein Sovietpower stemmedprimarilyfromthe defeatof Germanyand Japan,postwarassessmentsof the JointChiefs of Staffemphasized the importanceof deterringfurtherSoviet aggrandizementin Eurasia.3' Concern over the consequencesof Russian dominaPach, "MilitaryAid to Latin America," 235-43. This view was most explicitlypresented in an army paper examining the State Department's expostulation of U.S. foreign policy. See S. F. Giffin,"Draft of Proposed Comments for the AssistantSecretary of War on 'Foreign Policy"' [early February 1946], RG 107, HCPP 092 inter-nationalaffairs(classified). The extent to which thisconcern withEurasia shaped Americarimilitaryattitudesis illustratedat greater length below. Here I should note that in March 1945 several of the nation's most prominent civilian experts (Frederick S. Dunn, Edward M. Earle, William T. R. Fox, Grayson L. Kirk, David N. Rowe, Harold Sprout, and Arnold Wolfers) prepared a study,"A SecurityPolicy for Postwar America," in which theyargued that the United States had to preventany one power or coalition of powers fromgaining controlof Eur-asia.America could not, theyinsisted, withstandattackby aniypower that had firstsubdued the whole of Eturopeor of Eurasia; see Frederick S. Dunn et al., "A Security Policy for Postwar America," NHC, SPD, ser. 14, box 194, A1-2. The postwar concept of Eurasia developed out of the revival of geopolitical thinkingin the United States, stimulated by Axis aggression and strategic decision making. See, for example, the re-issued work of Sir Halford F. Mackinder. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality(1919; reprintedn., New York, 1942), and "The Round World and the Winning of Peace," Foreignr Affairs, 21 (1943): 598-605. Mackinder's ideas were modified and widely disseminated in the United States, especially by intellectuals such as Nicholas John Spykman. Hans W. Weigert, Robert Strausz-Hupe, and Isaiah Bowman. Spykman flatlytook exception to Mackinder's dictum, "Who controls eastern Europe rules the heartland; who rules the Heartland rules the World Island; and who rules the World Island rules the World." Instead, Spykman emphasized, "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the wvorld."Spykman, Tlhe ofPeace (New York, 1944), 43. Also see Spykman, America'sStrategy itnWorldPolitics:ThleUtitedStates Geography and theBalance ofPower (New York, 1942); Weigert, Generalsand Geographers:The Twilightof Geopolitics(New York, 1942); Strausz-Hupe, Geopolitics:The Strqgglefor Space antdPower (New York, 1942); RtussellH. Fifield and G. Etzel Pearcy, Geopolitics in Principleand Practice(Boston, 1944); and Alfred C. Eckes, ThleUnitedStates and theGlobal StruggleforMinerals (Austin, Texas, 1979), 104-08. 31 For views of influentialgenerals and army planners, see OPD, Memorandum, June 4, 1945, RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret). Also see the plethora of documents from May and June 1945, L.S. MilitaryAcademy, West Point, New York [hereafter,USMA], George A. Lincoln Papers [hereafter,GLP], War Departmenitfiles. For Deane's advice, especiallysee Deane, "Revisionof PolicywithRelation to Russia,"April 16, 1945, RG 218, ser. at lWartimeCo-operation CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JCS 1313, and The Stranrgee Alliance: The StoryofOtirEfforts uwithi Ru,ssia(New York, 1946), 84-86. For theJCS studies,see, forexample,JPS, "StrategicConcept and Plan for the 29 30 TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 357 tionof Eurasia helps explain whyin July1945 thejoint chiefsdecided to oppose a Sovietrequestforbases in the Dardanelles; whyduringMarchand April 1946 they supporteda firmstand againstRussia in Iran, Turkey,and Tripolitania;and why in the summerof 1946 Clark Cliffordand George Elsey,two WhiteHouse aides, argued thatSovietincorporationof any partsof WesternEurope, the Middle East, China, or Japan into a communistorbitwas incompatiblewithAmericannational security.32 Yet defenseofficialswere not eager to severthe wartimecoalition.In early 1944 Admiral Leahy noted the "phenomenal development"of Soviet power but still hoped for Soviet-Americancooperation. When members of the Joint Postwar Committeemet with theircolleagues on the JointPlanningStaffin April 1945, Major General G. V. Strongargued againstusing U.S. installationsin Alaska for stagingexpeditionaryforces,lest such a move exacerbate Russo-Americanrelations.A few monthslater Eisenhower,Lincoln,and otherofficersadvised against creatinga centraleconomicauthorityforWesternEurope thatmightappear to be an anti-Sovietbloc.33The American objective, after all, was to avoid Soviet hegemonyover Eurasia. By aggravatingSovietfears,the UnitedStatesmightfoster whatitwishedto avoid. Americanself-restraint, however,mightbe reciprocatedby the Soviets,providingtime for WesternEurope to recoverand for the Britishto reassertsome influenceon the Continent.34 Therefore,many defense officialsin 1945 hoped to avoid an open riftwiththe SovietUnion. But at the same timethey were determinedto preventthe Eurasian land mass fromfallingunder Sovietand communistinfluence. Studies by the JointChiefs of Staffstressedthat,if Eurasia came under Soviet domination,eitherthroughmilitaryconquest or politicaland economic "assimilation," America's only potentialadversarywould fall heir to enormous natural resources,industrialpotential,and manpower. By the autumn of 1945, military plannersalreadywere worryingthatSovietcontrolover much of EasternEurope and its raw materialswould abet Russia's economic recovery,enhance its warmaking capacity,and deny importantfoodstuffs, oil, and mineralsto Western Europe. By the earlymonthsof 1946, SecretaryPattersonand his subordinatesin the War DepartmentbelievedthatSovietcontrolof the Ruhr-Rhinelandindustrial complex would constitutean extreme threat. Even more dangerous was the Employment of UnitedStatesArmedForces,"September14, 1945,RG 218,ser.CCS 381 (5-13-45),JPS744/3; and JCS,"UnitedStatesMilitary Policy,"September17, 1945,ibid.,JCS 1496/2. 32 For the decisionon the Dardanelles,see the attachments to JCS, "UnitedStatesPolicyconcerningthe Dardanellesand Kiel Canal" July1945],RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (7-10-45),JCS 1418/1;forthejoint chiefs' positionon Iran,Turkey,and Tripolitania,seeJCS,"U.S. SecurityInterestsin theEasternMediterranean," March1946,ibid.,ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JCS 1641 series;and Lincoln,MemorandumfortheRecord, April16, 1946,RG 165,ser.ABC 336 Russia(8-22-43);and,fortheClifford memorandum, see ArthurKrock, Memoirs:SixtyYears on theFiringLine (New York, 1968), 477-82. 33 Leahy,excerptfromletter, May 16, 1944,RG 59, lot54D394 (Recordsof theOfficeof EuropeanAffairs), box 17. For Strong'sopinion,see JPS, Minutesof the 199thmeeting,April25, 1945,RG 218, ser. CCS 334 (3-28-45);and, fortheviewsof Eisenhowerand Lincoln,see Lincoln,MemorandumforHull,June24, 1945, USMA, GLP, War Dept. files;and Leahy,Memorandumforthe President[lateJune 1945],ibid. 34 Fortheemphasis on expediting recovery in WesternEurope,see,forexample,McCloy,Memorandumfor MatthewJ. Connelly,April26, 1945,HTL, HSTP, PSF,box 178;and,fortheroleofBritain,see,forexample, JointIntelligence Staff[hereafter, JIS], "BritishCapabilitiesand Intentions," December5, 1945,RG 218, ser. CCS 000.1 GreatBritain(5-10-45),JIS 161/4. 358 AHR Forum prospect of Soviet predominance over the rest of Western Europe, especially France.35Strategically,this would undermine the impact of any prospective American naval blockade and would allow Soviet militaryplanners to achieve defensein depth. The latterpossibility had enormousmilitary significance, because American war plans relied so heavilyon air power and strategicbombing,the efficacyof which mightbe reduced substantially if the Sovietsacquired outlying bases in WesternEurope and the Middle East or ifthey"neutralized"bases in Great Britain.36 Economic considerationsalso made defense officialsdetermined to retain Americanaccess to Eurasia as wellas to denySovietpredominanceover it.Stimson, Patterson,McCloy, and AssistantSecretary Howard C. Peterson agreed with Forrestalthatlong-termAmericanprosperityrequiredopen markets,unhindered accessto raw materials,and the rehabilitation of much-if not all-of Eurasia along liberal capitalistlines. In late 1944 and 1945, Stimsonprotestedthe prospective industrialemasculationof Germany,lest it undermineAmerican economic well being, set back recoverythroughoutEurope, and unleash forcesof anarchyand revolution.Stimsonand his subordinatesin the Operations Divisionof the army also worriedthatthe spread of Sovietpower in northeastAsia would constrainthe functioningof the free enterprisesystemand jeopardize American economic interests.A report prepared by the staffof the Moscow embassyand revisedin mid-1946by Ambassador (and formerGeneral) WalterBedell Smithemphasized that"Sovietpower is by nature so jealous thatit has alreadyoperated to segregate fromworldeconomyalmostall of theareas in whichithas been established."While Forrestaland the navysoughtto containSovietinfluencein the Near East and to retain American access to Middle East oil, Pattersonand the War Department focused on preventingfamine in occupied areas, forestallingcommunistrevolution,circumscribing Sovietinfluence,resuscitating trade,and preservingtraditional American markets especially in Western Europe.37 But American economic 35Joint LogisticPlansCommittee [hereafter, JLPC],"RussianCapabilities," November15, 1945,RG 218,ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JLPC35/9/RD; Military Intelligence Division[hereafter, MID], "Intelligence Estimate of theWorldSituationand Its Military Implications," June25, 1946,RG 319, P&O 350.05 (top secret);Joint Intelligence Committee[hereafter, JIC], "Intelligence EstimateAssumingthatWarbetweentheSovietUnion theNon-SovietPowersBreaksOut in 1956,"November6, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC 374/1;andJIC,"Capabilities and Military Potential of Sovietand Non-Soviet Powersin 1946,"January 8, 1947, ibid.,JIC 374/2.For concernwiththe Ruhr-Rhineland industrialcomplex,especiallysee Pattersonto the ofState,June10, 1946,RG 107,HCPP, 091 Germany(classified); Secretary and,fortheconcernwithWestern Europe,especiallyFrance,see, for example,JCS, "UnitedStatesAssistanceto Other Countriesfromthe Standpoint of NationalSecurity," April29, 1947,inFRUS, 1947, 1: 734-50,esp. 739-42. Alsosee theGeneral Board, "National Security and Navy Contributions Thereto for the Next Ten Years," Enclosure D, June 25, 1948, NHC, General Board 425 (ser. 315). 36 See, for example, JIS, "MilitaryCapabilities of Great Britain and France," November 13, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 000.1 Great Britian (5-10-45), JIS 211/1; JIS, "Areas Vital to Soviet War Effort,"February 12, 1946, ibid.,ser.CCS 092 (3-27-45),JIS226/2;andJIS,"Supplemental Information Relativeto Northern and Western Europe," April 18, 1947, ibid.,JIS 275/1. 37 Moscow embassy staff, "Russia's International Position at the Close of the War withGermany,"enclosed in Smith to Eisenhower,July 12, 1946, DDEL, Dwight David Eisenhower Papers, file 1652, box 101. Also see, for example, Stimson to Roosevelt, September 15, 1944, ML, JFP, box 100; Stimson to Truman, May 16, 1945, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 157; McCloy, Memorandum for Connelly, April 26, 1945, ibid., box 178; MID, "Intelligence Estimate of the World Situation,"June 25, 1946; numerous memoranda, June 1945, USMA, GLP, War Dept. files; numerous documenits, 1946 and 1947, RG 107, H(C1P, 091 Germany (Classified); and Rearmament Subcommittee, Report to the Special Ad Hoc Committee,July 10, 1947, RG 165, ser. ABC TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 359 interestsin Eurasia were not limitedto WesternEurope, Germany,and the Middle East. Militaryplanners and intelligenceofficersin both the army and navy expressed considerable interestin the raw materialsof southeastAsia, and, as alreadyshown,one of the purposesof thebases theywantedwas to maintainaccess to thoseresourcesand deny themto a prospectiveenemy.38 fearedthe loss of Eurasia, theydid Whilecivilianofficialsand militarystrategists conquest.In the earlyCold War notexpectthe SovietUnion to attemptitsmilitary years,therewas nearlyuniversalagreementthatthe Soviets,whileeager to expand their influence,desired to avoid a militaryengagement. In October 1945, for example,theJointIntelligenceStaffpredictedthatthe SovietUnion would seek to avoid war forfiveto ten years.In April 1946, whileSoviettroopsstillremainedin Iran, General Lincoln,the army'sprincipalwar planner,concurredwithByrnes's viewthatthe Sovietsdid not wantwar. In May,when therewas deep concernabout a possiblecommunistuprisingin France,military intelligencedoubted the Kremlin would instigatea coup, lestit ignitea fullscale war. At a high-levelmeetingat the WhiteHouse in June, Eisenhowerstatedthathe did not thinkthe Sovietswanted war; only Forrestaldissented.In August,when the Sovietnote to Turkey on the circles,General Dardanelles provoked consternationin American policy-making Hoyt Vandenberg, directorof centralintelligence,informedPresidentTruman thattherewere no signsof unusual Soviettroopmovementsor supplybuild-ups.In March 1947, while the Truman Doctrine was being discussed in Congress, the directorof armyintelligencemaintainedthat the factorsoperatingto discourage Sovietaggressioncontinuedto be decisive.In September1947, the CIA concluded thatthe Sovietswould not seek to conquer WesternEurope for several reasons: theywould recognizetheirinabilityto controlhostilepopulations;theywould fear triggeringa war with the United States that could not be won; and theywould preferto gain hegemonyby politicaland economic means. In October 1947, the JointIntelligenceStaffmaintainedthat for three years at least the Soviet Union would take no actionthatwould precipitatea militaryconflict.39 Even the ominous developmentsduringthe firsthalfof 1948 did not alterthese assessments.Despite his alarmistcable of March 5, designed to galvanizecongressional support for increased defense expenditures,General Lucius Clay, the 400.336(3-20-47).For Forrestal's concernwithMiddleEasternoil,see,forexample,"Notesin Connectionwith Navy's'Line' on ForeiginOil" [late 1944 or early 1945], ML, JFP,box 22; Minutesof the meetingof the Secretaries of State,War,and theNavy,April17, 1946,RG 107,RPPP,safefile,box 3; and WalterMillis,ed., The ForrestalDiaries (New York, 1951), 272, 356-58. 38 Strategy April23, 1945;JCS,"Strategic in thePhilippines," Section,OPD, "Post-WarBase Requirements Areas and Trusteeshipsin the Pacific,"October18, 1946; MID, "PositiveU.S. ActionRequiredto Restore NormalConditionsin SoutheastAsia,"July3, 1947,RG 319, P&O, 092 (topsecret);and LaurisNorstadto the Directorof Intelligence, July10, 1947,ibid. October25, 1945,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS 80/10; Capabilities," 39JIS, "RussianMilitary Lincolnto M. B. Gardnerand F. F. Everest,April10, 1946,RG 165,ser.ABC 336 Russia(8-22-43);0. S. P., fortheRecord,June Memorandum forHull,May3, 1946,ibid.,ser.ABC 381 (9-145);S. W. D., Memorandum 12, 1946, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret);Vandenberg,Memorandumfor the President,August24, 1946, March 27, 1947, RG 165, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; Chamberlin,"Reevaluationof SovietIntentions," Recordsof theChiefof Staff, 091 Russia(topsecret);CIA, "Reviewof theWorldSituationas It Relatesto the Securityof the UnitedStates,"September26, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 203; and JIC, "SovietMilitary Objectivesand Capabilities,1947-50,"October27, 1947,RG 165,ser.ABC 381 USSR (3-2-46),JIC 391/1. 360 AHR Forum Americanmilitary governorin Germany,did notbelievewar imminent.A fewdays later,the CIA concluded thatthe communisttakeoverin Czechoslovakiawould not increaseSovietcapabilitiessignificantly and reflectedno alterationin Soviettactics. On March 16, the CIA reportedto the president,"The weightof logic,as well as evidence,also leads to theconclusionthattheSovietswillnotresortto military force withinthe next sixtydays." While thisassessmentwas far fromreassuring,army and navyintelligenceexpertsconcurredthatthe Sovietsstillwantedto avoid war; the questionwas whetherwar would eruptas a resultof "miscalculation" by either the United States or Russia. Aftertalkingto Foreign MinisterV. M. Molotov in June, AmbassadorSmithconcluded thatSoviet leaders would not resortto active hostilities.During the Berlin blockade, army intelligencereported few signs of Sovietpreparationsforwar; naval intelligencemaintainedthatthe Sovietsdesired to avoid war yetconsolidatetheirpositionin East Germany.In October 1948, the MilitaryIntelligenceDivisionof the armyendorsed a Britishappraisal that"all the evidenceavailable indicatesthatthe SovietUnion is not preparingto go to war in thenear future."In December ActingSecretaryof StateRobertLovettsummedup the longstandingAmerican perspectivewhen he emphasized that he saw "no evidence thatSoviet intentionsrun towardlaunchinga sudden militaryattackon the westernnationsat thistime.It would not be in characterwiththe traditionor mentalityof the Soviet leaders to resort to such a measure unless they felt themselveseitherpoliticallyextremelyweak, or militarily extremelystrong."40 AlthoughAmericandefenseofficialsrecognizedthatthe Sovietshad substantial militaryassets, they remained confidentthat the Soviet Union did not feel extremelystrong. MilitaryanalystsstudyingRussian capabilitiesnoted that the Sovietswere rapidlymechanizinginfantry unitsand enhancingtheirfirepowerand mobility.It was estimatedduring the winterof 1946-47 that the Soviets could mobilizesix milliontroopsin thirty daysand twelvemillionin six months,providing sufficient manpower to overrunall importantpartsof Eurasia. The Sovietswere also believedto be utilizingGerman scientists and Germantechnologicalknow-how to improve their submarine force, develop rockets and missiles,and acquire knowledgeabout the atomicbomb. During 1947 and 1948, it was reportedas well thatthe Sovietswere makingrapid progressin the developmentof high performance jet fightersand already possessed several hundred intermediaterange bomberscomparableto the AmericanB-29.41 40 CIA, "SpecialEvaluationNo. 27," March 16, 1948, RG 319, P&0, 350.05 (topsecret);MID, "Intelligence DivisionDailyBriefing," October18, 1948,ibid.;and LovetttoJohnL. Sullivan,December20, 1948,NHC, double zero files,1948, box 2. Also seeJean Edward Smith, The Papers ofGeneralLucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945- 1949,2 vols.(Bloomington, March10, Ind.,1974),2: 564-65,568-69,602; CIA, "ReviewoftheWorldSituation," 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 203; R. H. Hillenkoetter, Memorandumforthe President,March 16, 1948, ibid.,box 249; Chamberlin,Memorandumto the Chiefof Staff,March 14, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret);Thomas B. Inglis,Memorandumof Information, March16,September28, 1948,NHC, SPD, central files,1948,A8 and EF30; Smithto Kennan,June 11, 1948,ML, GeorgeF. KennanPapers[hereafter, GFKP], box 28; and CarterClarketo theChiefof Staff,August6, 1948,RG 330, CD 2-2-2,box 4. 41 For reports on Sovietmobilization capabilities and conventional strength on the land,see, forexample, Chamberlin, Memorandumto the Chiefof Staff,March 14, 1948; CarterClarke,"PresentCapabilityof the U.S.S.R. ArmedForces,"September16, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 091 Russia(topsecret);and P&O, "Capabilities (Ground)and Intentionsof the USSR forOverruningNorthernand WesternEurope in 1947, 1948, and 1949,"February28, 1947, ibid.,350.05 (top secret).The war plans of theJointChiefsof Staffoutlinethe extensivegroundcapabilities of Sovietforces.See especiallythedocumentsin RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 361 Even so, Americanmilitaryanalystswere mostimpressedwithSovietweaknesses and vulnerabilities. The Soviets had no long-rangestrategicair force,no atomic bomb, and meager air defenses. Moreover, the Soviet navy was considered ineffective except for its submarineforces.42The JointLogisticPlans Committee and the MilitaryIntelligenceDivisionof the War Departmentestimatedthat the SovietUnion would requireapproximatelyfifteenyearsto overcomewartimelosses in manpowerand industry,ten yearsto redressthe shortageof technicians,fiveto ten yearsto develop a strategicair force,fifteento twenty-five yearsto constructa modern navy,ten years to refurbishmilitarytransport,ten years(or less) to quell resistance in occupied areas, fifteento twentyyears to establish a military infrastructure in the Far East,threeto tenyearsto acquire theatomicbomb,and an unspecifiednumberof yearsto removethe vulnerability of the Sovietrail-netand petroleumindustryto long-rangebombing.43For severalyearsat least,the Soviet capabilityfor sustained attackagainst North America would be verylimited.In January1946 theJointIntelligenceStaffconcluded that"the offensivecapabilities of the United Statesare manifestly superiorto those of the U.S.S.R. and any war betweenthe U.S. and the USSR would be farmore costlyto the SovietUnion than to the United States."44 Key American officialslike Lovett, Clifford,Eisenhower,Bedell Smith and Budget DirectorJames Webb were cognizantof prevailingSovietweaknessesand potentialAmerican strength.Despite Soviet superiorityin manpower, General Eisenhowerand Admiral ForrestE. Sherman doubted thatRussia could mounta surprise attack, and General Lincoln, Admiral Cato Glover, and Secretaries Pattersonand ForrestalbelievedthatSovietforceswould encounteracute logistical problemsin tryingto overrun Eurasia-especially in the Near East, Spain, and Italy.Even Forrestaldoubted reportsof acceleratingSovietair capabilities.American expertsbelievedthatmostSovietplanes were obsolescent,thatthe Sovietshad insufficient airfieldsand aviationgas to use theirnew planes,and thattheseplanes had seriousproblemsin theirinstrumentation and construction.45 (3-2-46);forinformation on Sovietuse ofGermanscientists, see,forexample,JIS,"Capabilities and Intentions oftheUSSR in thePostwarPeriod,"July9, 1946,ibid.,ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS 80/26;MID, "Ability Enemiesto AttacktheContinental ofPotential UnitedStates,"August8, 1946,RG 319, P&O 381 (topsecret); andJIC,"SovietCapabilities to LaunchAirAttacks againsttheUnitedKingdom,"November29, 1946,RG 218, in Sovietair power,see, for ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC 375/1.For assessments of the improvements example,Pattersoin to Truman,June 23, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 157; JIC, MoscowEmbassy,"Soviet Intentions," April1, 1948,RG 330, box 4, CD2-2-2. 42 See, forexample,JIS,"RussianMilitary Capabilities," October25, 1945;JIS, "Estimateof SovietPostwar Military Capabilities and Intentions," November8, 1945,RG 218,ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS80/14;JIS, "Military Capabilities ofGreatBritainand France,"November13,1945;JWPC,"Military PositionoftheUnited Statesin Lightof RussianPolicy," January8, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JWPC416/1;anid Inglis,Memorandumof Information, January21, 1946,ML, JFP,box 24. 43JLPC,"RussianCapabilities," November15, 1945;and MID, "Intelligence EstimateoftheWorldSituation fortheNextFiveYears,"August21, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (topsecret).Fora contemporary analysisof the Soviettransportnietwork, also see Paul Wohl,"Transportin the Developmentof SovietPolicy,"Foreign 24 (1946): 466-83. Affairs, 44JIS, "SovietPost-WarMilitary Policiesand Capabilities," January15, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIS 80/24;MID, "Ability of PotentialEnemiesto Attackthe Continental UnitedStates,"August8, 1946; and P&O, "Estimateof the SituationPertainingto the NortheastApproachesto the UnitedStates," August12, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 381 (top secret). 45For theviewsof Eisenhowerand Sherman,see S. W. D., Memorandumforthe Record,June 12, 1946; Galambos,PapersofDwight DavidEisenhower, to the President," 7: 1012-13, 1106-07; Sherman,"Presentation 362 AHR Forum In general,improvementsin specificareas of the Soviet militaryestablishment did not mean thatoverallSovietcapabilitieswere improvingat an alarmingrate. In July 1947, the MilitaryIntelligenceDivision concluded, "While there has been a slightoverallimprovementin the Sovietwar potential,Sovietstrengthfortotalwar is not sufficiently greatto make a militaryattackagainstthe United Statesanything but a mosthazardous gamble."This viewprevailedin 1946 and 1947, even though the American nuclear arsenal was extremelysmall and the American strategic bombing force of limited size. In the spring of 1948 the Joint Intelligence Committeeat the Americanembassyin Moscow explained whythe United States ultimatelywould emerge victoriousshould a war erupt in the immediatefuture. The Soviets could not win because of their "inabilityto carry the war to U.S. territory. Afterthe occupationof Europe, the U.S.S.R. would be forcedto assume the defensiveand await attacksby U.S. forces which should succeed primarily 4 because of the abilityof the U.S. to outproducethe U.S.S.R. in materialsof war."4 Awarenessof Sovieteconomic shortcomingsplayed a key role in the American interpretationof Soviet capabilities. Intelligence reports predicted that Soviet leaderswould investa disproportionateshare of Russianresourcesin capitalgoods industries.But,even ifsuch Herculean efforts enjoyedsome success,theSovietsstill would not reach the pre-WorldWar II levelsof the UnitedStateswithinfifteento twentyyears. Technologically,the Soviets were behind in the criticalareas of aircraftmanufacturing, electronics,and oil refining.And, despiteRussia'sconcerted attemptsto catch up and to surpass the United States,Americanintelligence expertssoon startedreportingthatSovietreconstruction was laggingbehind Soviet ambitions,especiallyin the electronics,transportation, aircraft,constructionmachinery,nonferrousmetals,and shippingindustries.Accordingly,throughoutthe years 1945-48 American militaryanalystsand intelligenceexpertsbelieved that Soviettransportation bottlenecks, industrialshortcomings, technologicalbackwardness,and agriculturalproblemswould discouragemilitaryadventurism.47 January 14, 1947, NHC, Forrest E. Sherman Papers, box 2; for the views of Lincoln, Glover, Patterson, Forrestal,and others on Soviet logisticalproblems, see JPS, Minutes of the 249th meeting, May 22, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); Glover to Lincoln and Kissner,June 24, 1947, NHC, SPD, ser. 4, box 86; Louis Denfeld, Memorandum, March 29, 1948, ibid.,central files, 1948, A16-3 (5); and Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, 272. For assessments of Soviet air power, see, for example, JIS, "Estimate of Soviet Postwar Military Capabilities and Intentions," November 8, 1945; JIC, "Soviet Capabilities to Launch Air Attacks against the United Kingdom," November 29, 1946; Office of Naval Intelligence [hereafter, ONI], "A Study of B-29 Airfieldswith a Capacity in Excess of 120,000 Pounds" [Spring 1948], NHC, General Board 425 (ser. 315); General Board, "National Security and Navy," Enclosure B, June 25, 1945, ibid., page 16; Forrestal and Clarence Cannon, Excerpt of Conversation, April 9, 1948, ML,JFP, box 48; Inglis to Op-30, December 1, 1948, NHC, SPD, central files, 1948, A8; and Robert Lovett, Diary Entry,December 16, 1947, New York Historical Society, Robert Lovett MS Diaries. For a recent assessmeiit of Soviet conventional strength,see Matthew A. Evangelista, "Stalin's Postwar Army Reappraised," Inter tionalSecurity,7 (1982-83): 110-38. 46 MID, "Estimate of the Possibilityof War between the United States and the USSR Today from a Comparison with the Situation as It Existed in Septenmber1946," July 21, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret); and JIC, Moscow Embassy, "Soviet Intentions,"April 1, 1948. 47 For assessments of the interrelationshipsbetween the state of the Soviet economy and Soviet military capabilities, see, for example, JIS, "Postwar Economic Policies and Capabilities of the USSR," November 1, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JIS 80/12; JIS, "Soviet Postwar Economic Capabilities and Policies,"January 8, 1946, ibid.,JIS 80/22;JIS, "Soviet Post-War MilitaryPolicies and Capabilities,"January 15, 1946; W. B. Shockley, "Relative Technological Achievements in Weapons Characteristicsin USSR and USA," January 30, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file, box 6; MID, "Abilityof Potential Enemies to Attack the United States," August 8, 1946; U.S. MilitaryAttache (Moscow) to Chamberlin, March 21, 1947, NHC, Operations TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 363 IF AMERICAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS DID NOT EXPECT a Sovietmilitary attack,why,then, were theyso fearfulof losingcontrolof Eurasia? The answerrestsless in American assessmentsof Sovietmilitary capabilitiesand short-term military intentionsthanin appraisalsof economicand politicalconditionsthroughoutEurope and Asia. Army officials in particular,because of theiroccupationrolesin Germany,Japan,Austria, and Korea, were aware of the postwarplightof these areas. Key militarymenGenerals Clay, Douglas MacArthur,John Hilldring,and Oliver P. Echols and Colonel Charles H. Bonesteel-became alarmed by the prospects of famine, disease, anarchy,and revolution.They recognizedthat communistpartiescould exploitthe distressand thatthe Russianscould capitalizeupon it to spread Soviet influence.As early as June 1945, Rear Admiral Ellery Stone, the American commissioner in Italy,wrotethatwartimedevastationhad createdfertilesoilforthe growth of communism in Italy and the enlargement of the Soviet sphere. MacArthuralso feared that,if theJapanese economyremainedemasculatedand reformswere not undertaken,communismwould spread. Clay, too, was acutely aware thatGermancommunistsweredepictingthemselvesand theirbeliefsas their country'sonly hope of salvation.In the springof 1946 militaryplanners,working on contingencyplans for the emergencywithdrawalof American troops from Germany,should war with Russia unexpectedlyoccur, also took note of the economic turmoil and political instabilityin neighboringcountries,especially France. Sensitivity to the geopoliticaldimensionsof the socioeconomiccrisisof the postwarera impelled Chief of StaffEisenhowerto give high priorityin the army budgetto assistanceforoccupied areas.48 Civilianofficialsin the War, Navy,and Statedepartmentsshared theseconcerns. In theautumnof 1945, McCloywarned Pattersonthatthe stakesin Germanywere immenseand economicrecoveryhad to be expedited.During the firsthalfof 1946 SecretaryPattersonand AssistantSecretaryPetersoncontinuallypressed the State Departmentto tacklethe problemsbeleagueringoccupationauthoritiesin Germanyand pleaded forStateDepartmentsupportand assistancein gettingtheTruman administration to provide additionalreliefto the devastatedareas of Europe. On Peterson'surging,Acheson wroteTruman in April 1946, "We have now reached themostcriticalperiod of theworldfood crisis.We musteitherimnmediately greatly increasetheexportsof grainfromthe UnitedStatesor expectgeneraldisorderand politicalupheaval to develop in [mostof Eurasia]."49Forrestalhad alreadypressed Division,ser. 2 (secret and under), box 33, EF 6 1; JIC, "Soviet MilitaryObjectives and Capabilities,"October 27, 1947; and JIC, Moscow Embassy, "Soviet Intentions,"April 1, 1948. 48Stone to Admiral H. R. Stark,June 25, 1945, NHC, double zero files,1942-47, folder 23. For MacArthur's view,see J. W. Dower, Empireand Aftermath: YoshidaShigeruand theJapaneseExperience(Cambridge, Mass., 1979), 292-303; for the situation in Germany, see Patterson to Byrnes, February 25, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, general decimal file, box 8; materials in RG 165, ser. ABC 387 Germany (12-18-43), sects. 4D, 4E; Smith, Papers of GeneralLuciusD. Clay, 1: 165-66, 184, 187-89, 196-98, 201-02, 207-08, 217; Galambos, Papers ofDwightDavid Eisenhower,7: 892; and, for the relationship betweenithe situation in France and American war planning, see, for example, JPS, Minutes of the 249th and 250th meetings, May 22, 29, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46). For evolving war plans in the Pincher series, see ibid.,sects. 1, 2; also see Forrestal,"French Situation," May 6, 1946, ML, JFP, box 20; and FRUS, 1946, 5: 434-40; and, for Eisenhower's concern, see Galambos, Papers ofDwightDavid Eisenihower, 8: 1516-20. 49 Acheson to Truman, April 30, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, general subject file, box 1. Also see McCloy to Patterson,November 24, 1945, ibid.,RPPP, safe file,box 4. For pressure on the State Department, see Patterson 364 AHR Forum for a reassessmentof occupation policies in Germanyand Japan. In May, Clay suspended reparationpaymentsin order to effectan accord on Germaneconomic unity.In June,Pattersonbegan to supportthe mergerof the Americanand British zones. The man most responsiblefor thislatterundertakingwas WilliamDraper, Forrestal'sformerpartnerin Dillon, Read, and Co., and Clay's chief economic assistant.Draper firmlybelieved that "economic collapse in either [France or Germany] with probable political break-down and rise of communism would seriouslythreatenAmericanobjectivesin Europe and in the world."50 American defense officials,militaryanalysts,and intelligenceofficerswere extremelysensitiveto the politicalferment,social turmoil,and economicupheaval throughoutpostwarEurope and A%ia.In theirinitialpostwarstudies,the Joint Chiefsof Staffcarefullynoted the multiplicity of problemsthatcould breed conflict and provide opportunitiesfor Soviet expansion. In the spring of 1946 army planners,includingGeneral Lincoln,were keenlyaware thatconflictwas mostlikely to arise fromlocal disputes (for example, in Venezia-Giulia)or fromindigenous unrest(for example, in France), perhaps even againstthe willof Moscow. A key War Departmentdocumentsubmittedto the State-War-Navy CoordinatingCommitteein April 1946 skirtedthe issue of Sovietmilitary capabilitiesand argued that the Soviet Union's strengthemanated fromtotalitariancontrolover its satellites, fromlocal communistparties,and fromworldwidechaoticpoliticaland economic conditions.In October 1946 theJointPlanningStaffstressedthatforthe next ten yearsthe major factorinfluencingworldpoliticaldevelopmentswould be the EastWest ideologicalconflicttakingplace in an impoverishedand strife-torn Europe and a vacuumof indigenouspower in Asia. "The greatestdanger to the securityof of economic the United States,"the CIA concluded in mid-1947,"is the possibility collapsein WesternEurope and the consequentaccessionto power of Communist "51 elements. to Byrnes,December 10, 1945, RG 165, Civil AffairsDivision [hereafter,CAD], ser. 014 Germany; Pattersonto Byrnes, February 25, 1946; OPD and CAD, "Analysis of Certain Political Problems Confronting Military Occupation Authorities in Germany," April 10, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, 091 Germany (classified); and "Combined Food Board" file,spring 1946, ibid.,HCPP, general subject file,box 1. 5() William Draper, Memorandum [early 1947], RG 107, HCPP, 091 Germany (classified); and Forrestal to Acheson, January 14, 1946, ML, JFP, box 68. For Clay's initiative,see Smith, Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, 1: 203-04, 213-14, 218-23; JohniF. Gimbel, The AmericanOccupationof Germany:Politicsand the Military,1945-1949 (Stanford, 1968), 35-91; John H. Backer, The DecisiontoDivide Germany:AmericanForeign Policy in Transition(Durham, N.C., 1978), 137-48; and Bruce Kuklick, AmericanPolicy anrdthe Division of Germany:The Clash wit/iRussia overReparations(Ithaca, N.Y., 1972), 205-35. For Patterson's concerns and his suppoit of Bizonia, see Pattersonto Byrnes,June 11, 1946, RG 107, HCPP, 091 Germany (classified); Patterson to Truman, November 20, 1946, ibid.,RPPP, safe file,box 4; Minutes of the War Council meeting,December 5, 1946, ibid.,box 7; and Patterson to Palmer Hoyt, December 27, 1946, ibid.,box 4. For the merger of the zones, also see FRUS, 1946, 5: 579-659; Smith, Papers of GeneralLucius D. Clay, 1: 245, 248-49; and, for Draper's importance, also see Carolyn Eisenberg, "U.S. Social Policy in Post-War Germany: The Conservative Restoration," paper delivered at the Seventy-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Organization of American Historians, held in April 1981, in Detroit. 51 CIA, "Review of the World Situation as It Relates to the Security of the United States," September 26, 1947. Also see, for example, JCS, "Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States Armed Forces," Appendix A, September 19, 1945; JPS, Minutes of the 249th and 250th meetings; Lincoln to Wood, May 22, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 381 (9-1-45); [Giffin(?)] "U.S. Policy with Respect to Russia" [early April 1946], ibid.,ser. ABC 336 (8-22-43); JPS, "Estimate of Probable Developments in the World Political Situation up to 1956," October 31, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 (10-9-46), JPS 814/1; MID, "World Political Developments Affectingthe Securityof the United States during the Next Ten Years," April 14, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret). TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 365 In brief,during 1946 and 1947, defense officialswitnesseda dramaticunravelling of the geopoliticalfoundationsand socioeconomicstructureof international affairs.Britain'seconomic weaknessand withdrawalfromthe eastern Mediterranean, India's independence movement,civilwar in China, nationalistinsurgencies in Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, Zionistclaims to Palestineand Arab resentment,German and Japanese economic paralysis,communistinroads in France and Italy-all were ominous developments.Defense officialsrecognized but believedthatSoviet thatthe SovietUnion had not created thesecircumstances leaders would exploit them. Should communiststake power,even withoutdirect Russian intervention, the Soviet Union, it was assumed, would gain predominant controlof the resourcesof these areas because of the postulatedsubservienceof communistpartieseverywhereto the Kremlin.Should nationalistuprisingspersist, communistsseize power in underdeveloped countries,and Arabs revoltagainst Americansupport of a Jewishstate,the petroleumand raw materialsof critical areas mightbe denied theWest.The imminentpossibility existedthat,even without Soviet militaryaggression,the resources of Eurasia could fall under Russian control.With these resources,the Soviet Union would be able to overcome its chroniceconomic weaknesses,achieve defense in depth,and challengeAmerican power-perhaps even by militaryforce.52 Americanassessmentsof Sovietlongtermintentionswere transformed.When World War II ended, militaryplanners initiallylooked upon Soviet aims in foreignaffairsas arisingfromthe Kremlin's view of power politics,Soviet strategicimperatives,historicalRussian ambitions, and Soviet reactionsto moves by the United Statesand Great Britain.American discussedSovietactions intelligenceanalystsand strategicplannersmostfrequently in EasternEurope, the Balkans,the Near East,and Manchuriaas efforts to establish an effective securitysystem.Despite enormous Sovietgains duringthe war, many assessmentsnoted that,in fact,the Sovietshad notyetachieveda safesecurityzone, especiallyon theirsouthernperiphery.While Forrestal,Deane, and most of the planners in the army's Operations Division possessed a skeptical,perhaps even viewof Sovietintentions, the stillprevailingoutlookat theend of 1945 was sinister, to dismissthe role of ideologyin SovietforeignpolicyyetemphasizeSovietdistrust of foreigners;to stress Soviet expansionismbut acknowledge the possibilityof accommodation;to abhor Sovietdominationof EasternEurope but discussSoviet policieselsewherein termsof power and influence;and to dwell upon the Soviet preoccupationwith securityyet acknowledgedoubt about ultimateSoviet intentions.53 IN THIS FRIGHTENING POSTWAR ENVIRONMENT 52 See, for example,JIS, "SovietPostwarEconomicCapabilities," January8, 1946; MID, "Intelligence EstimateoftheWorldSituation," June25, 1946;JCS,"Presidential RequestforCertainFactsand Information RegardingtheSovietUnion,"July25, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JCS 1696; H. D. Rileyto Op-30,February7, 1947,NHC, SPD, ser.5, box 111,A16-3(5); MID, "Capabilities (Ground)and Intentions of the USSR for OverruningNorthernand WesternEurope,"February28, 1947; P&O, "StrategicStudyof Westernand NorthernEurope,"May21, 1947,RG 319,P&O, 092 (topsecret);and WooldridgetotheGeneral Board,April30, 1948. 53 For assessments of Sovietintentions, see, forexample,JIC, "Estimate of SovietPost-WarCapabilities and Intentions," February2, 1945,RG 218, ser.CCS 000.1 USSR (10-2-44),JIC250/2;JohnS. Wiseto Hull,April 366 AHR Forum This orientationchanged rapidlyduring 1946. In January,theJointWar Plans Committeeobservedthat"the long-termobjective[of the SovietUnion] is deemed to be establishment of predominantinfluenceover the Eurasian land mass and the strategicapproaches thereto."Reportsof the new militaryattachein Moscow went further,claimingthat "the ultimateaim of Soviet foreignpolicyseems to be the dominanceof Sovietinfluencethroughoutthe world"and "the finalaim ... is the Kennan's"longtelegram"was destructionof thecapitalistsystem."Soon thereafter, widelydistributedamong defense officials,on whom it had considerableimpact. Particularlysuggestivewas his view that Soviet leaders needed the theme of capitalistencirclementto justifytheirautocraticrule. Also influentialwere Kenauthority nan's convictionsthatthe Sovietleadersaimed to shattertheinternational of the United Statesand were beyond reason and conciliation.54 During the springand summerof 1946, defense officialsfound these notions persuasive as an interpretationof Soviet intentionsbecause of the volatile international situation,therevivalof ideologicalfervorwithinthe SovietUnion,and the domesticpoliticalatmosphereand legislativeconstraintsin the United States. PresidentTruman wishedto stop "babyingthe Soviets,"and his predilectionfora tougherpostureprobablyled his subordinatesto be less inclinedto givethe Soviets thebenefitof any doubt when assessingRussianintentions.55 Forrestalbelievedthe Sovietcommunistthreathad become more seriousthan the Nazi challengeof the 1930s; GeneralJohn E. Hull, directorof the OperationsDivision,assertedthatthe Sovietswere "constitutionally incapable of being conciliated";and Clark Clifford and George Elsey considered Soviet fears "absurd." A key subcommitteeof the State-War-Navy CoordinatingCommitteedeclared thatSovietsuspicionswere "not susceptibleof removal,"and in July 1946 the JointChiefs of Staffdeclared the Soviet objectiveto be "world domination."By late 1946 it was commonplacefor intelligencereportsand militaryassessmentsto state,withoutany real analysis,that the "ultimateaim of Soviet foreignpolicyis Russian dominationof a communist 3, 1945, RG 319, P&O, 350.05, State Department red file(top secret); JSSC toJCS, April 5, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45); Deane, "Revision of Policy with Relation to Russia," April 16, 1945 (UCS 1313); Secretary of War to Secretary of State [early July 1945], RG 165, ser. ABC 093 Kiel (7-6-45); Marshall to McCloy, July 3, 1945, ibid.,OPD 336 (top secret); OPD, "Soviet Intentions,"July 6, 1945, ibid.,ser. ABC 092 USSR (11-15-44); JCS, "United States Policy concerning the Dardanelles" July1945]; JCS, "MilitaryPosition of the United States in the Light of Russian Policy," October 8, 1945, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JCS 1545; JIS, "Soviet Postwar Foreign Policy," October 25, 1945, ibid.,JIS 80/9; JIS, "Russian Military Capabilities," October 25, 1945; Ritchie,"Report of the United States Mission to Moscow, 18 October 1943 to 31 October 1945" [October 31, 1945], RG 165, OPD 336 (top secret); ONI, "Basic Factors in World Sittuation," December 1945, NHC, SPD, ser. 5, box 106, A8; JIS, "Capabilities and Intentionsof the USSR in the Post-War Period,"January 2, 1946, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JIS 80/20; Forrestal,Notes for remarks to the Harvard Club, January 18, 1946, JL, JFP, box 29; Inglis, Memorandum of Information,January 21, 1946; Stoler, "Continentalismto Globalism," 315-21; and Sherry,PreparingfortheNext War, 159-90. 54JWPC, "Military Position of the United States in Light of Russian Policy,"January 8, 1946; and U.S. MilitaryAttache (Moscow), "Estimate of the Situation as of February 1," February 18, 1946, RG 165, ser. ABC 381 Germany (1-29-43). For Kennan's telegram, see FRUS, 1946, 4: 696-709; and, for the distributionof Kennan's telegram,see R. L. Vittrup,Memorandum for Craig, February 26, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 5; Vittrupto Lincoln, March 1, 1946, RG 319, P&O, 350.05, State Department red file (top secret); and Bruce Hopper to Kennan, March 29, 1946, ML, GFKP, box 28. 55 Robert L. Messer, ThleEnd of an Alliance:JamesF. Byrnes, Roosevelt,Truman,and theOriginsof theCold War (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1982), 152-94, and "Paths Not Taken," 297-319. TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 367 world."56There was, of course, plentifulevidence for this appraisal of Soviet ambitions-theSovietconsolidationof a sphereof influencein EasternEurope; the incendiarysituation in Venezia Giulia; Soviet violation of the agreement to ofJapanesearmsto the Chinese withdrawtroopsfromIran; Sovietrelinquishment communists;the Soviet mode of extractingreparationsfromthe Russian zone in Germany;Soviet diplomaticoverturesfor bases in the Dardanelles,Tripolitania, and the Dodecanese; Sovietrequestsfora role in the occupationofJapan; and the of Kremlin'srenewed emphasis on Marxist-Leninist doctrine,the vulnerability capitalisteconomies,and the inevitability of conflict. evidence. Yet these assessmentsdid not seriouslygrapple with contradictory While emphasizingSovietmilitarycapabilities,strategicambitions,and diplomatic intransigence, reportsliketheClifford-Elsey memorandumof September1946 and memorandum theJointChiefsof Staffreport1696 (upon whichthe Clifford-Elsey heavilyrelied) disregardednumeroussigns of Soviet weakness,moderation,and circumspection.During 1946 and 1947 intelligenceanalystsdescribed the withdrawalof RussiantroopsfromnorthernNorway,Manchuria,Bornholm,and Iran (from the latter under pressure, of course). Numerous intelligencesources reported the reductionof Russian troops in Eastern Europe and the extensive demobilizationgoing on withinthe Soviet Union. In October 1947 the Joint IntelligenceCommitteeforecasta Soviet army troop strengthduring 1948 and 1949 of less than two million men. Soviet militaryexpendituresappeared to and moderate.Other reportsdealt withthe inadequacies of Soviettransportation bridgingequipment for the conduct of offensiveoperationsin Eastern Europe. And, as already noted, assessmentsof the Soviet economy revealed persistent problemslikelyto restrictSovietadventurism.57 hostile Experiencesuggestedthatthe SovietUnion was by no means uniformly 56Forrestal to ClarenceDillon,April11, 1946,ML,JFP,box 11; Hull to TheaterCommanders, March21, 1946,RG 165,ser.ABC 336 (8-22-43);fortheClifford-Elsey Yearson the viewpoint, see Krock,Memoirs: Scxty Firing Line,428; and SWNCC,"ResumeofSovietCapabilities and PossibleIntentions," August29, 1946,NHC, SPD, ser. 5, box 106,A8. For the SWNCC estimate,see JCS, "PoliticalEstimateof SovietPolicyforUse in ConnectionwithMilitary Studies,"April5, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), JCS 1641/4;andJCS "Presidential RequestforCertainFactsand Information RegardingtheSovietUnion,"July25, 1946.Someof themostthoughtful studieson Sovietintentions, likethatof theJointIntelligence Staffin earlyJanuary1946 (JIS80/20),werewithdrawn fromconsideration. See theevolutionof studiesand reportsin RG 218, ser.CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),sects.5-7. 57 For the withdrawal of Soviettroops,see, for example,MID, "SovietIntentionsand Capabilitiesin Scandanaviaas of 1July1946,"April25, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05(topsecret);and [Giffin (?)] "U.S. Policy withRespectto Russia"[earlyApril1946].For reportson reductions ofRussiantroopsin EasternEuropeand demobilization withinthe SovietUnion,see MID, "Reviewof Europe,Russia,and theMiddleEast,"December 26, 1945, RG 165, OPD, 350.05 (top secret);Carl Espe, weeklycalculationsof Soviettroops,MaySeptember1946,NHC, SPD, ser. 5, box 106,A8; MID, "SovietCapabilities in Germanyand WestEurope," December26, 1946,RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (topsecret);JIC, "Movement of RussianTroopsOutsideof USSR exceptin the Far East,"December31, 1946,RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45),JIC Memorandumof Information no. 237; MID, "Estimateof the Possibility of War,"July21, 1947; and JIC, "SovietMilitary Objectives and Capabilities," October27, 1947.Forreferences to Sovietmilitary expenditures, see Patterson to JuliusAdler,November2, 1946, RG 107, RPPP, safe file,box 5; and AbramBergson,"RussianDefense Expenditures," Foreign Affairs, 26 (1948): 373-76. And,forassessments oftheSoviettransport system, see R. F. Ennis,Memorandumforthe P&O Division,June 24, 1946,RG 165, ser. ABC 336 (8-22-43);U.S. Military Attache(Moscow)to Chamberlin, March21, 1947;Op-32 to theGeneralBoard,April28, 1948,NHC, General Board425 (ser.315); and Wohl,"Transportin theDevelopmentof SovietPolicy,"475-76, 483. 368 AHR Forum or unwillingto negotiatewiththe United States.In April 1946, a fewdays aftera State-War-Navy subcommitteeissued an alarmingpoliticalestimateof Sovietpolicy (for use in American militaryestimates),Ambassador Smith reminded the State Departmentthatthe Soviet press was not unalterablycriticalof the United States, thatthe Russianshad withdrawnfromBornholm,thatStalinhad givena moderate speechon the UnitedNations,and thatSovietdemobilizationcontinuedapace. The next month General Lincoln, who had accompanied Byrnes to Paris for the meetingof thecouncilof foreignministers, acknowledgedthattheSovietshad been willingto make numerousconcessionsregardingTripolitania,theDodecanese, and Italian reparations.In the spring of 1946, General Echols, General Clay, and SecretaryPatterson again maintained that the French constitutedthe major impedimentto an agreementon unitedcontrolof Germany.At the same timethe Sovietsceased pressingforterritorial adjustmentswithTurkey.Afterthe diplomatic exchangesover the Dardanelles in the late summerof 1946 the Sovietsdid not again ask for eithera revisionof the MontreuxConventionor the acquisitionof bases in the Dardanelles. In early 1947 centralintelligencedelineatedmore than a half-dozeninstancesof Soviet moderationor concessions.In April the Military IntelligenceDivision noted that the Soviets had limitedtheirinvolvementin the Middle East, diminished their ideological rhetoric,and given only moderate supportto Chinese communists.In the monthsprecedingthe Truman Doctrine, Sovietbehavior-as noted by Americanmilitary officials and intelligenceanalystshardlyjustifiedthe inflammatory rhetoricAcheson and Truman used to secure congressionalsupportforaid to Greece and Turkey. Perhaps thisis whyGeneral Marshall,as secretaryof state,refrainedfromsuch language himselfand preferred to focuson the socioeconomicaspectsof the unfoldingcrisis.58 In their overall assessmentsof Soviet long-termintentions,however,military planners dismissed all evidence of Soviet moderation,circumspection,and restraint.In fact,as 1946 progressed,these planners seemed to spend less time analyzingSoviet intentionsand more timeestimatingSovietcapabilities.59 Having accepted the notion thatthe two powerswere locked in an ideologicalstruggleof 58 FortheSWNCC estimate, seeJCS,"Political EstimateofSovietPolicy," April5, 1946;forSmith'sdespatch, see Smithto theSecretary of State,April11, 1946,RG 165,Recordsof theChiefof Staff, 091 Russia;and, for Sovietnegotiating concessions, see Lincoln,MemorandumfortheChiefof Staff,May20, 1946,USMA, GLP, WarDept.files;JamesF. Byrnes,Speaking Frankly (NewYork,1947),129-37; PatriciaDawsonWard,TheThreat of Peace: JamesF. Byrnesand theCouncil of ForeignMinisters(Kent, Ohio, 1979), 95-102. For the situation in Germany,see OPD and CAD, "Analysisof CertainPoliticalProblemsConfronting MilitaryOccupation Authorities inGermany," April10,1946,RG 107,HCPP,091 Germany Patterson toTruman,JuneI 1, (classified); 1946,RG 165,Recordsof theChiefof Staff,091 Germany.For Clay'sreferencesto Frenchobstructionism, see, forexample,Smith,PapersofGeneral LuciusD. Clay,1: 84-85, 88-89, 151-52, 189-90,212-17, 235-36; forAmericanperceptions ofthesituation inTurkey,see MelvynP. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and theCold War:The UnitedStates,Turkey,and N.A.T.O.," paperdeliveredat theSeventy-Fifth AnnualMeetingof the Organization ofAmericanHistorians, heldin April1983,in Cincinnati; foroverallintelligence see assessments, CentralIntelligence Group[hereafter, CIG], "RevisedSovietTacticsin International 6, 1947, Affairs," January HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 254; MID, "WorldPoliticalDevelopments Affecting theSecurity of the UnitedStates duringthe NextTen Years,"April 14, 1947; and WalterE. Todd to the Directorof P&O, April25, 1947, RG 319,P&O, 350.05 (topsecret);forbackground on theTrumanDoctrine, see Joseph Wees jones, TheFifteent (NewYork,1955),esp. 138-70; and, forMarshall'semphasison theeconomicrootsoftheEuropeancrisis,see ibid.,203-06, 220-24; and Charles Bohlen, The Transformation of AmericanForeignPolicy (New York, 1969), 87-89. and thequalityofJCS studieson Sovietintentions 59 Boththequantity seemto havedeclinedduring1946. In "Military PositionoftheUnitedStatesin Lightof RussianPolicy"(January 8, 1946),strategic plannersofthe JointWarPlansCommittee maintained thatitwasmoreimportant to focuson Sovietcapabilities thanon Soviet TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecuri4) 369 indefinitedurationand consciousof the rapid demobilizationof Americanforces and the constraintson Americn defense expenditures,theyno longer explored waysof accommodatinga potentialadversary'slegitimatestrategicrequirementsor pondered how Americaninitiatives mightinfluencethe SovietUnion'sdefinitionof its objectives.60Informationnot confirmingprevailingassumptionseither was ignoredin overallassessmentsof Sovietintentionsor was used to illustratethatthe Sovietswere shiftingtacticsbut not alteringobjectives.Reflectiveof the emerging mentality was a reportfromtheJointChiefsof Staffto the presidentin July1946 thatdeleted sectionsfrompreviousstudiesthathad outlinedSovietweaknesses.A memorandumsent by SecretaryPattersonto the presidentat the same time was designedby General Lauris Norstad,directorof the War Department'sPlans and Operations Division, to answer questions about relationswith the Soviet Union "withoutambiguity."Truman, Clark Cliffordobserved many years later, liked thingsin black and white.61 DURING 1946 AND EARLY 1947, the conjunctionof Soviet ideological fervorand socioeconomicturmoilthroughoutEurasia contributedto the growthof a myopic viewof Sovietlong-termpolicyobjectivesand to enormous apprehensionlest the SovietUnion gain controlof all the resourcesof Eurasia, therebyendangeringthe nationalsecurityof the United States.Americanassessmentsof Soviet short-term military intentionshad not altered;Sovietmilitarycapabilitieshad not significantly increased,and Soviet foreignpolicypositionshad not greatlyshifted.But defense officialswere acutelyaware of America'sown rapidlydiminishingcapabilities,of Britain'sdecliningmilitary strength, of the appeal of communistdoctrineto mostof the underdeveloped world,and of the opportunitiesopen to communistparties throughoutmostof Eurasia as a resultof prevailingsocioeconomicconditions.War Departmentpapers, studiesof thejoint chiefs,and intelligenceanalysesrepeatedly describedthe restivenessof colonial peoples thathad sapped Britishand French strength, the opportunitiesforcommunistpartiesin France,Italy,and even Spain to capitalizeupon indigenousconditions,and the abilityof theChinesecommunists to defeatthe nationalistsand make the resourcesand manpowerof Manchuriaand NorthChina availableto the SovietUnion. In thisturbulentinternational arena,the survivalof liberalideals and capitalistinstitutions was anythingbut assured. "We intentiorns. During a key discussion at the White House, Admiral Leahy also was eager to dismiss abstract evaluations of Russian psychologyand to focus on Russian capabilities; S. W. D., Memorandum for the Record, June 12, 1946. My assessment of the quality ofJCS studies is based primarilyon my analysisof the materials in RG 218, ser. CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45); ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret); and NHC, SPD, central files, 1946-48, A8. 60 During 1946 it became a fundamental tenet of American policy rnakersthat Soviet policyobjectiveswere a function of developments within the Soviet Union and not related to American actions. See, for example, Kennan's "long telegram,"in FRUS, 1946, 4: 696-709; JCS, "Political Estiinateof Soviet Policy,"April 5, 1946; JCS, "Presidential Request," July 25, 1946; and the Clifford/Elseymemorandum, in Krock, Memoirs,esp. 427-36. 6' For Norstad's comment, see Norstad, Memorandum, Jtly 25, 1946, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret). For references to shifting tactics and constant objectives, see Vandenberg, Memorandumn for the Pr-esidlenit, September 27, 1946, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; CIG, "Revised Soviet lFactics,"January 6, 1947; and, for the JCS report to the president, compare JCS 1696 withJIC 250/12. Both studies may be founidin RG 218, ser CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45). For Clifford'srecollection,Clark Clifford,HTL, oral history,170. 370 AHR Forum could point to the economic benefitsof Capitalism,"commentedone important War Deprtmentpaper in April 1946, "but these benefitsare concentratedrather thanwidespread,and, at present,are genuinelysuspectthroughoutEurope and in manyotherpartsof the world."62 In thisenvironment,therewas indeed no room for ambiguityor compromise. Actionwas imperative-actionaimed at safeguardingthose areas of Eurasia not alreadywithinthe Sovietsphere.Even beforeKennan's "long telegram"arrivedin withthe Soviet Washingtonthejoint chiefsadopted the positionthat"collaboration Union should stop shortnot onlyof compromiseof principlebut also of expansion of Russian influencein Europe and in the Far East."63During the spring and summerof 1946, GeneralLincolnand AdmiralRichardL. Conolly,commanderof Americannaval forcesin the easternAtlanticand Mediterranean,workedtirelessly to stiffenByrnes's views, avert American diplomaticconcessions,and put the squeeze on the Russians.64"TheUnitedStates,"armyplannersexplained,"mustbe able to prevent,by forceif necessary,Russiandominationof eitherEurope or Asia to the extentthatthe resourcesof eithercontinentcould be mobilizedagainstthe United States." Which countriesin Eurasia were worthfightingover remained unclear during 1946. But army and navy officialsas well as the joint chiefs programof foreigneconomicassistancecoupled withthe advocateda far-reaching refurbishment of Americanmilitaryforces.65 During late 1946 and early 1947, the Truman administrationassumed the initiative by creatingGerman Bizonia, providingmilitaryassistanceto Greece and Turkey, allocating massive economic aid to Western Europe, and reassessing 62 [Giffin] Draftof Proposed "U.S. PolicywithRespectto Russia" [earlyApril 1946]. Also see Giffin, CommentsforAssistantSecretaryof War on "ForeignPolicy,"[earlyFebruary1946]; MID, "Intelligence October in theWorldPoliticalSituation," Estimate," June25, 1946;JPS,"Estimateof ProbableDevelopments of SWNCC,"Studyon U.S. 31, 1946,RG 218, ser.CCS 092 (10-9-46),JPS 814/1;SpecialAd Hoc Committee Assistanceto France,"April9, 1947, RG 165, ser. ABC 400.336 France(3-20-47);MID, "WorldPolitical April 14, 1947; JWPC,"The SovietThreatagainstthe IberianPeninsulaand the Means Developments," 465/1;and CIA, "Reviewofthe Requiredto MeetIt,"May8, 1947,RG 218,ser.CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JWPC September26, 1947.Withregardto China,theJointChiefsofStaffstressedtheimportance WorldSituation," were fully of Sovietaid to Chinesecommunistforcesin late 1945. But both naval and armyintelligence forcesand of the indigenousappeal of theChinese and ineptnessof nationalist cognizantof thecorruption wasthatChinese of Americandefenseofficials, point,fromtheperspective communist party.The important victories wouldoffertheSovietscontrolovercriticalresourcesand enablethemto achievegreater communist Noteson CabinetMeeting,August2, defensein depthin partsof AsiaticRussia.See, forexample,Patterson, of State,War,and Navy, 1946,RG 107, RPPP, safefile,box 2; Minutesof the meetingsof the Secretaries forthe SeptemberI1, 1946,February12, 1947,June20, 1947,ibd.,box 3; Lincoln,ProposedMemorandum of War and Navy[September1946],NHC, SPD, ser. 12, box 158,C2 (4); RichardM. Phillips. Secretaries of Information, June3, 1947,ibid., Memorandum, September6, 1946,ibid.;CharlesJ.Rend,Memorandum 16,1947,RG 218, ser.5, box 110,A8; NimitztoJCS,June9, 1947,ibid.,box 109,A1;JWPC,"Moonrise,"June ser.CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JWPC476/1;MID, "SovietInfluencein China,"June 16, 1947,RG 319, P&O, 350.05(topsecret);and SWNCC,"UnitedStatesPolicyTowardChina,"June11,1947,FRUS,1947,7: 838-48. 63JCS,"ForeignPolicyof theUnitedStates,"February10, 1946. 64 Lincolnto Hull [April1946],RG 59, Office forthe box 17; Lincoln,Memorandum of EuropeanAffairs, Record,April16, 1946; Lincolnto Hull,April16, 1946,RG 165,ser.ABC 092 USSR (11-15-44);Lincolnto (Columbia,1960),293-304; Cohen,June22, 1946,ibid.,ABC 381 (9-1-45);RichardL. Conolly,oral history Lincoln,MemorandumforChiefof Staff,May 20, 1946; and Lincoln,MemorandumforNorstad,July23, files. 1946,USMA, GLP, War Department 65 Giffin, "Draftof ProposedComments"[earlyFebruary1946].Alsosee,forexample,JCS,"ForeignPolicy "U.S. PolicywithRespectto Russia"[earlyApril19461;JCS, of theUnitedStates,"February10, 1946; [Giffin] March17, 1946, forForrestal, April5, 1946;and Sherman,Memorandum ofSovietPolicy," "Political Estimate ML,JFP,box 24. TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 371 economicpolicytowardJapan. These initiatives were aimed primarilyat tackling the internalsources of unrest upon which communistpartiescapitalizedand at rehabilitatingthe industrialheartlands of Eurasia. American defense officials supportedtheseactionsand acquiesced in the decisionto givepriority to economic aid rather than rearmament. Service officersworking on foreign assistance programsof the State-War-NavyCoordinatingCommitteesupported economic aid, showedsensitivity to the socioeconomicsourcesof unrest,and recognizedthat economicaid was likelyto be the mostefficaciousmeans of preservinga favorable balance of power in Eurasia.66Because theyjudged Americanmilitary powerto be superiorand war to be unlikely,Forrestal,Lovett,and Webb insistedthatmilitary spendingnot interferewiththe implementation of the MarshallPlan,rehabilitation of Germany,and revivalofJapan. "In the necessarilydelicateapportioningof our availableresources,"wroteAssistantSecretaryof War Peterson,"thetimeelement permitspresentemphasison strengthening the economicand social dikes against Sovietcommunismratherthanupon preparingfora possiblyeventual,but notyet inevitable,war."67 Yet if war should unexpectedlyoccur, the United States had to have the capabilityto inflictincalculable damage upon the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Truman shelved (after some serious consideration)proposals for international controlof atomicenergy.The Baruch Plan, as itevolvedin thespringand summer of 1946, was heavilyinfluencedby defenseofficials who wished and serviceofficers to avoid any significantcompromise with the Soviet Union. They sought to perpetuateAmerica'snuclearmonopolyas long as possiblein order to counterbalance Sovietconventionalstrength, deterSovietadventurism, and bolsterAmerican negotiatingleverage. When negotiationsat the United Nations for international controlof atomicenergylanguishedforlack of agreementon itsimplementation, the way was clear for the Truman administration graduallyto adopt a strategy based on air power and atomic weapons. This strategywas initiallydesigned to destroythe adversary'swill and capabilityto wage war by annihilatingRussian industrial,petroleum,and urban centers.68Aftercompletingtheir studyof the 66 See, forexample,SWNCC, "Policies, and Costsof Assistance Procedures, bytheUnitedStatesto Foreign to Other Countries," April21, 1947,FRUS, 1947, 3: 204-20; ibid.,1: 725-34; JCS,"UnitedStatesAssistance Countries," ibid.,734-50, 762-63; and Lincolnto Peterson,May2, 1947,RG 165,ser.ABC 400.336(3-20-47). Alsosee themanySWNCC subcommittee reportson individual countries, ibid.:Reportof theWorkingGroup on EconomicAid to the Special Ad Hoc Committeeof the SWNCC, "ForeignNeeds for UnitedStates EconomicAssistanceduringthe Next Three to Five Years" [July1947],RG 353, box 134; and Reportof Rearmament Subcommittee toSpecialAd Hoc Committee, July10,1947,RG 165,ser.ABC 400.336(3-20-47). 67 Peterson, as quotedin ChiefofStaff, MemorandumJuly1947],RG 165,ser.ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45). Alsosee,forexainple,Lovettdiaries,December16, 1947,January 5, 15,1948;BaruchtoForrestal, February 7, 1948, ML, JFP,box 78; Forrestalto Baruch,February10, 1948,ibid.;and Excerptof Phone Conversation betweenForrestaland C. E. Wilson,April2, 1948,ibid.,box 48. 68 These generalizations are based on the following materials:Stimson,Memorandumforthe President, September11, 1945,RG 107,RPPP,safefile,box 1; Forrestal, Memorandum, September21, 1945,ML,JFP, box 48; MathiaF. Correa to Forrestal,September27, 1945,ibid.,box 28; Forrestal,Memorandumforthe President, October1; 1945,HTL, HSTP, PSF,box 158;documents in HTL, HSTP, PSF,box 199;RG 165,ser. ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45);"Briefof LettersAddressedto Mr. BaruchbyEach of theMembersof theJCS" June1946],BernardBaruchPapers[hereafter, BBP], ML, box 65; Dennison,DraftReplyto LetterfromMr. oftheSecretaries of Baruch,June 4, 1946,NHC CNO, doublezerofiles,folder31; and Minutesofthemeeting at the United State,War,and Navy,January29, 1947,RG 107,RPPP,safefile,box 3. For the negotiations Nations,see FRUS, 1947, 1: 327-614; also see Herken,Winning Weapon;LarryG. Gerber,"The BaruchPlan 372 AHR Forum 1946 Bikini atomic tests,the Joint Chiefs of Staffin July 1947 called for an enlargementof the nuclear arsenal. While Truman and Forrestalinsistedon limitingmilitaryexpenditures,governmentofficialsmoved vigorouslyto solve problemsin the productionof plutonium,to improvenuclearcores and assembly devices,and to increasethe numberof aircraftcapable of deliveringatomicbombs. the GeneralAdvisoryCommitteeto the Aftermuch initialpostwardisorganization, AtomicEnergyCommissioncould finallyreportto the presidentat theend of 1947 that"greatprogress"had been made in the atomicprogram.FromJune 30, 1947, toJune 30, 1948, the numberof bombsin the stockpileincreasedfromthirteento fifty. Althoughat the timeof the BerlincrisistheUnitedStateswas notpreparedto launch a strategicair offensiveagainstthe Soviet Union, substantialprogresshad been made in the developmentof the nation'sair-atomiccapabilities.By the end of 1948, the United States had at least eighteennuclear-capableB-50s, four B-36s, and almostthreetimesas manynuclear-capableB-29s as had been availableat the end of 1947.69 also respondedto pleas of During late 1947 and early 1948, the administration theJointChiefsof Staffto augmenttheoverseasbase systemand to acquirebases in to the SovietUnion. Negotiationswere conductedwiththe British closerproximity to gain access to bases in the Middle East and an agreementwas concludedforthe acquistionof air facilitiesin Libya. AdmiralConolly made a secretdeal withthe French to secure air and communicationrightsand to stockpileoil, aviationgas, and ammunitionin NorthAfrica.70Plans also were discussed forpostoccupation and constructbases inJapan,and considerableprogresswas made in refurbishing ing airfieldsin Turkey.During 1948 the Turks also receivedone hundredeighty C-47 cargo planes.The thirtyB-26 bombers,and eighty-one F-47 fighter-bombers, F-47sand B-26s,capable of reachingthevitalPloestiand Baku oil fields,weremore likelyto be used to slow down a Sovietadvance throughTurkeyor Iran, thereby and theOriginsoftheCold War,"Diplomatic 6 (1982): 69-95; Bernstein, "QuestforSecurity," 1033-44; Histoiy, and Rosenberg, "HydrogenBomb Decision,"66-71. 69For theviewsof theGeneralAdvisory Committee, see RobertOppenheimerto Truman,December31, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 200; forthe viewsof theJCS, see, forexample,JCS, "Guidanceon Military Aspectsof UnitedStatesPolicyto Be Adoptedin Eventof Continuing Impassein Acceptanceof International ControlofAtomicEnergy,"July 14, 1947,RG 165,ser.ABC 471.6 Atom(8-17-45),JCS1764/1;and Leahyto theSecretaries ofWarand theNavy,August13, 1947,NHC, CNO, doublezerofiles,1947,folder13; and,for the size and qualityof the stockpileand the numberof nuclear-capable aircraft, see especiallyDavid Alan Rosenberg, "U.S. NuclearStockpile,1945to 1950,"Bulletin ofAtomic 38 (1982); 25-30. The numberof Scientists, nuclear-capableB-29s grew withgreat rapidityat the end of 1948. One memorandumin early 1949 enumeratedeighty-three such planes;see 0. S. Picher,MemorandumforColonelPage, February14, 1949, RG 330, box 126, CD 33-1-4.Both Borowskiand Rosenberghave stressedthe problemsbeleagueringthe StrategicAir Commanduntilthe Korean War, but theirworkalso illustrates the significant changesand improvements thatbegan to occur late in 1947 and especiallyduring1948. See Borowski,HollowThreat; David Alan Rosenberg,"The Originsof Overkill:NuclearWeaponsand AmericanStrategy, 1945-1960," International 7 (1983): 11-27. Security, 70 For negotiations withthe BritishoverMiddleEast strategy and bases,see FRUS, 1947, 5: 485-626; and Sullivanto theActingSecretary of State,September26, 1947,NHC, SPD, ser.5, box 110,A14; forfacilities in Libya,see,forexample,LeahytotheSecretary ofDefense,March18,1948,RG 319,P&O, 092 (topsecret);and FRUS, 1948, 3: 906-07; and, fornegotiations withthe French,see Spaatz to Symington, [October1947], to Spaatz,October RG 107,Officeof theAssistant of War forAir,1947,090, box 187B; Symington Secretary 30, 1947,ibid.,Wooldridge, MemorandumforOp-09,October13, 1948,NHC, CNO, doublezerofiles.1948, box 4 (29); and Wooldridge, MemorandumforOp-09,October25, 1948,ibid.,SPD, centralfiles,1948,A14. For bases in NorthAfrica,see Forrestalto Truman,January6, 1948,HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 156; also see FRUS, 1948, 1: 603-04, 674-76. TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurit 373 affordingtime to activatea strategicair offensivefrom prospectivebases in the Cairo-Suez area.71 Despite these developments,thejoint chiefsand militaryplannersgrewincreasinglyuneasy with the budgetaryconstraintsunder which they operated. They realized thatAmericaninitiatives, howevernecessary,placed the Soviet Union on the defensive,createdan incendiarysituation,and made war more likely-though still improbable. In July 1947, intelligenceanalysts in the War Department maintainedthat the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had resultedin a more aggressive Soviet attitude toward the United States and had intensified tensions."These tensionshave caused a sharperline of demarcationbetweenWest and East tending to magnifythe significanceof conflictingpoints of view, and reducingthe possibilityof agreementon any point." Intelligenceofficersunderstood thatthe Sovietswould perceiveAmericaneffortsto build strategichighways, constructairfields,and transferfighterbombers to Turkey as a threatto Soviet securityand to the oilfieldsin the Caucuses. The latter,noted the directorof naval intelligence,"lie withineasy air strikingrange of countrieson her southernflank, and the Sovietleaders willbe particularly sensitiveto any politicalthreatfromthis area, howeverremote."Intelligenceanalystsalso recognizedthatthe Sovietswould viewthe MarshallPlan as a threatto Sovietcontrolin EasternEurope as well as a death-knellto communistattemptsto capturepowerpeacefullyin WesternEurope. And defenseofficialswere well aware thatthe Sovietswould reactangrilyto plans forcurrencyreformin German Trizonia and to preparationsfora West German republic. "The whole Berlin crisis,"army planners informedEisenhower,"has arisen as a resultof. .. actionson the part of the WesternPowers."In sum, the Sovietclampdownin Eastern Europe and the attemptto blockade Berlin did not come as shocks to defense officials,who anticipatedhostileand defensiveSoviet reactionsto Americaninitiatives.72 civilian The real consternation of theJointChiefsof Staffand otherhigh-ranking and militaryofficialsin the defense agencies stemmed from their growing convictionthat the United Stateswas undertakingactionsand assumingcommitmentsthatnow required greatermilitarycapabilities.RecognizingthatAmerican initiatives, aimed at safeguardingEurasia fromfurthercommunistinroads,might 71 For references to Japanese bases, see, for example, "Discussion of Need of Obtaining Long-Term Rights for a U.S. Naval Operating Base in Japan" (approved by Nimitz) [Autumn 1947], NHC, SPD, ser. 4, box 86; Nimitz to Under Secretaryof the Navy, December 12, 1947, ibid.,ser. 5, box 110; and Denfeld, Memorandum for Schuyler, February 20, 1948, ibid.,central files, 1948, box 245, EF37; for the transferof planes to Turkey, see Report No. 29, March 12, 1949, RG 59, 867.00/5-1249; and, for the uses of militaryassistance to Turkey, see Leffler,"The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-52." 72 MID, "Estimate of the Possibilityof War," July 21, 1947, RG 319, P&O, 350.05 (top secret); Op-32 to General Board, April 28, 1948, NHC, General Board 425 (serial 315); and "National MilitaryEstablishment Views on Germany" [appended to memorandum for Maddocks], June 30, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret). For the repercussions of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, see Chamberlin to Chief of Staff, July 9, 1947, RG 165, Records of the Chief of Staff,091 Greece; and Hillenkoetter,Memorandum for the President,November 7, 1947, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; and, for a similarview in the State Department, see FRUS, 1947, 1: 770-75. For prospective Soviet reactions to American assistance to Turkey, also see General Board, "National Securityand the Navy," enclosure D,June 25, 1948; and Conolly to CNO, December 4, 1947, NHC, Operations Division, ser. 1, A4/FF7. For assessments of Soviet reactions to Westerin initiatives in Germany, also see Hillenkoetter, Memoranda for the President, March 16, 1948, and June 9, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 249; CIA, "Possible Program of Future Soviet Moves in Germany," April 28, 1948, ibid.,box 255; and Inglis, Memorandum of Information,April 3, 1948, NHC, Operations Division, ser. 1. box 3. 374 AHR Forum be perceivedas endangeringSoviet interests,it was all the more importantto be readyforanyeventuality. Indeed, to theextentthatanxietiesabout theprospectsof war escalatedin March and April 1948,thesefearsdid notstemfromestimatesthat the Sovietswere planningfurtheraggressiveactionafterthe communistseizureof apprehensionsthatongoingAmericaninitiatives powerin Czechoslovakiabut fromn mightprovokean attack.On March 14 General S. J. Chamberlin,directorof army intelligence,warned the chief of staffthat "actions taken by this countryin opposition to the spread of Communism ... may decide the question of the outbreakof war and of its timing."The criticalquestion explicitlyfaced by the intelligenceagencies and by the highestpolicymakerswas whetherpassage of the SelectiveServiceAct,or of universalmilitarytraining,or of additionalappropriationsfor the air force,or of a militaryassistanceprogramto WesternEuropean countries,or of a resolutionendorsing American support for West European Union would triggera Soviet attack.Chamberlinjudged, for example, that the Sovietswould not go to warjust to make Europe communistbut would resortto war if theyfeltthreatened.The great imponderable,of course, was what,in the Sovietview,would constitutea securitythreatjustifyingwar.73 but fearingSoviet Recognizingthe need to move ahead withplanned initiatives countermeasures,the newlyformedstaffof the National SecurityCouncil undertook itsfirstcomprehensiveassessmentof Americanforeignpolicy.During March 1948, after consultingwith representativesof the army, navy, air force, State Department,CIA, and National SecurityResources Board, the National Security Council staffproduced NSC 7, "The Positionof the United StateswithRespectto Soviet-DominatedWorld Communism."This studybegan withthe commonplace assumptionthatthecommunistgoal was "worldconquest."The studythenwenton to express the omnipresenttheme behind all conceptionsof American national securityin the immediatepostwaryears."Betweenthe UnitedStatesand the USSR thereare in Europe and Asia areas of greatpotentialpower whichifadded to the existingstrengthof the Sovietworldwould enable the latterto become so superior in manpower,resources,and territorythat the prospect for the survivalof the United Statesas a freenationwould be slight."Accordingly, the studycalled, first, forthe strengthening potentialof the UnitedStatesand, second,for of the military the armingof the non-Sovietworld,particularlyWesternEurope. Althoughthis staffstudywas neverformallyapproved,the nationalsecuritybureaucracyworked during the spring and summer of 1948 for West European unity, military assistanceto friendlynations,currencyreformin Trizonia, revitalizationof the Ruhr,and the foundingof the Federal Republicof Germany.74 73 For Chamberlin's views, see, for example, Chamberlin, Memoranidum to the Chief of Staff,March 14, 1948; and Chamberlin, Memorandum for Wedemeyer, April 14, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret). For the view from Moscow, sce JIC, "Soviet Intention-s,"April 1, 1948 (extracts of this report are printed in FRUS, 1948, 1: 550-57); also see, for example, Hillenkoetter,Memorandum for the President,March 16, 1948; CIA, Special Evaluation No. 27, March 16, 1948; Inglis, Memorarndum of Information, March 16, 1948; CIA, "Possibilityof Direct Soviet MilitaryAction during 1948," April 2, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; and CIA, "Review of the World Situation," April 8, 1948, ibid.,box 203. 7- For NSC 7, see FRUS, 1948, 1: 545-50; for reactions and reservationsof the State Department and the JCS, see ibid., 557-64; and, for the support of Western Union, see ibid., 3: 1-351. Also see, for example, materials in R(; 218, Leahy Papers, boxes 5, 6; ibid., ser. (,(C,S 092 Western Europe (3-12-48). For military TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 375 The priority accorded to WesternEurope did not mean thatofficials ignoredthe restof Eurasia. Indeed, the sustainedeconomic rejuvenationof WesternEurope made access to Middle Eastern oil more importantthan ever. Marshall,Lovett, Forrestal,and other defense officials,including the joint chiefs, feared that Americansupportof Israel mightjeopardize relationswithArab nationsand drive themintothe hands of the SovietUnion. AlthoughTruman acceptedthe partition of Palestineand recognized Israel, the United Statesmaintainedan embargo on armsshipmentsand soughtto avoid too close an identification withtheZioniststate lest the flowof oil to the West be jeopardized.75At the same time,the Truman administration moved swiftlyin June 1948 to resuscitatethe Japanese economy. Additional funds were requested from Congress to procure importsof raw materialsforJapanese industryso thatJapanese exportsmightalso be increased. Shortlythereafter,Draper, Tracy S. Voorhees, and other armyofficialscame to believe that a rehabilitatedJapan would need the marketsand raw materialsof and SoutheastAsia. They undertooka comprehensiveexaminationof the efficacy utilityof a Marshall Plan for Asia. IntegratingJapan and SoutheastAsia into a viable regional economy,invulnerableto communistsubversionand firmlyensconced in the Westerncommunity,assumed growingsignificance, especiallyin viewof the prospectof a communisttriumphin China.76But communistvictories in China did not dissuade policymakersfromsupporting,for strategicas well as domestic politicalconsiderations,the appropriationof hundreds of millionsof dollarsin additionalaid to the Chinese nationalistsin the springof 1948. And the Americancommitment to preservethe integrity of South Korea actuallyincreased, despitethe planned withdrawalof occupationforces.77 assistance, see FRUS, 1948, 1: 585-88; also see materialsin RG 330, boxes22 and 24, CD 6-2-46and 6-2-49; RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret);LawrenceS. Kaplan,A Community ofInterests: NATO andtheMilitary Assistance Program, 1948-1951 (Washington, 1980); Condit,History oftheJCS,2: 409-36; and ChesterJ. Pach,"Arming theFreeWorld:The OriginsoftheUnitedStatesMilitary Assistance Program,1945-1949"(Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1981). For Germany,see especiallyFRUS, 1948, 2: 1-1340; and Smith,Papersof General LuciusD. Clay,2: 527-969. 75See,forexample,FRUS, 1948,5: 545-54, 972-76, 1005-07,1021-22,1380-81; CNO to theSecretary of theNavy,January 24, 1948,NHC, CNO, doublezerofiles,1948,box 2; Leahy,Memorandum fortheSecretary of Defense,October10, 1947,RG 330, box 20, CD 6-1-8;Millis,Forrestal Diaries,344-49, 356-65, 376-77; Bain,MarchtoZion,137-213; and Miller,Search forSecurity, 173-203. 76 For therehabilitation ofJapan,see SpecialAd Hoc Committee [ofSWNCC],CountryReporton Japan, August8, 1947,RG 353, box 109; Blum to Ohly,December22, 1947,RG 330, box 9, CD 3-1-9;Blum to Forrestal, December29, 1947,ibid.;Royallto Forrestal, April28, 1948,ibid.;Royall,Memorandumforthe Secretary of Defense,May 18, 1948,HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 182; and CIA, "Strategic ImportanceofJapan," May24, 1948,ibid.,box 255, Alsosee FRUS, 1948,6: 654-56, 694-95, 712-17,733-34, 750-51,964-65. For Japanand SoutheastAsia,see Ad Hoc Committee, "Studyof a UnitedStatesAid ProgramfortheFar East," February16, 1949,RG 319, P&O, 092 Pacific(topsecret);and Schaller,"SecuringtheGreatCrescent," 392414. 77 In recentyearsscholarshave shownthatthe limited aid to China was notsimplya consequenceof the influenceof the China lobbyand the administration's concernwiththe legislativefateof the European Recovery Program.Some policymakers (especially military officers) also weremotivated byfearofthestrategic and geopoliticalconsequencesof a communisttakeoverin China,even thoughtheyfullyrecognizedthe ineptitude of theChinesenationalists. See, forexample,JohnH. Feaver,"The ChinaAid Billof 1948:Limited Assistance as a Cold War Strategy," Diplomatic 5 (1981): 107-20; RussellD. Buhite,"MajorInterests: History, AmericanPolicytowardChina,Taiwan,and Korea, 1945-50,"Paciflc 47 (1978): 425-51; and Historical Review, ThomasG. Paterson,"If Europe,WhyNotChina?The Containment Doctrine,1947-49,"Prologe,13 (1981): 19-38. Fora fineanalysisofdevelopments 31-1 10; in bothChinaand Korea,see Stueck,RoadtoConfrontation, and, foraid to China,also see FRUS, 1948, 8: 1-269,442-601. 376 AHR Forum The problemwithall of these undertakings,however,was thattheycost large and necessitated sums,expanded the nation'sformaland informalcommitments, larger militarycapabilities.Yet on March 24, 1948, just as NSC 7 was being finished,Truman's Council of EconomicAdvisorswarnedthatacceleratingexpenditures might compel the president "to set aside free market practices-and substitutea rathercomprehensiveset of controls."Truman was appalled by this possibilityand carefullylimitedthe sums allocated for a build-up of American forces.78Key advisers,like Webb, Marshall,Lovett,and Clifford,supported this budget,expectedthe approach because theyperceivedtoo much fatin the military Sovietsto relyon politicaltacticsratherthan militaryaggression,postulatedlatent U.S. militarysuperiority over the SovietUnion, and assumed thatthe atomicbomb trump card. For many American constituteda decisive,if perhaps short-term, policymakers,moreover,the Iranian crisisof 1946, the Greek civilwar, and the ongoing Berlin airliftseemed to demonstratethatRussia would back down when confrontedwithAmericandetermination,even if the United Statesdid not have superiorforces-in-being.79 As secretaryof defense, however, Forrestal was beleaguered by pressures emanatingfromthe armed servicesfora build-upof Americanmilitaryforcesand by his own apprehensionsover prospectiveSovietactions.He anguishedover the excruciatingly difficultchoices that had to be made between the imperativesof assistance,domesticrearmament,and fiscal foreigneconomicaid, overseasmilitary orthodoxy.In May,June, and July1948, he and his assistantscarefullypondered intelligencereportson Sovietintentionsand requesteda special State Department studyon how to plan Americandefenseexpendituresin viewof prospectiveSoviet policies. He also studied carefullythe conclusionsof an exhaustivestudyof the navy'scontributionto national securityundertakenby the General Board of the navy under the direct supervisionof Captain Arleigh Burke. Still not satisfied, Forrestalasked the presidentto permitthe National SecurityCouncil to conduct another comprehensive examination of American policy objectives. Forrestal clearly hoped that this reassessmentwould show that a larger proportionof resourcesshould be allocated to the militaryestablishment.80 78 Edwin G. Nourse, Leon Keyserling,and Clark to Truman, March 24, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 143; Truman to Nourse, March 25, 1948, ibid.; Statement by the President to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretariesof the Three Departments, and the Three Chiefs of Staff,May 13, 1948, ibid.,box 146; and Truman to Forrestal,July 13, 1948, RG 330, box 18, CD 5-1-20. 79 For the views of Lovett and Webb, see Lovett diaries, December 16, 1947, January 15, 1948, April 21, 1948; for Clifford's view of the importance of the atomic bomb, see Clifford,Oral History, 88; and, for Marshall's reliance on the atomic bomb, see McNarney, Memorandum for the JCS, November 2, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 114. Also see Policy Planning Staff[hereafter,PPS], "Factors Affectingthe Nature of the U.S. Defense Arrangements in the Light of Soviet Policies,"June 23, 1948, RG 330, box 4, CD 2-2-2; and Lovett to Forrestal,June 25, 1948, ibid. For the lessons derived from crisis decision making over Iran, Greece, and Turkey, see John R. Oneal, ForeignPolicyMaking in Timesof Crises(Columbus, 1982). 80 For the conflictingpressures on Forrestal and his own uncertainties,see, for example, Excerpt of Phone Conversation between Forrestal and C. E. Wilson, April 2, 1948, ML, JFP, box 48; Excerpt of Phone Conversation between Forrestal and Cannon, April 9, 1948, ibid.; and Forrestal to Ralph Bard, November 20, 1948, ibid., box 78; for Forrestal's intense interest in the assessments of Soviet intentions,see Forrestal to Charles A. Buchanan [July1948], RG 330, box 4, CD 2-2-2; and John McCone to Forrestal,July7, 1948, ibid., for Forrestal'srequest for a State Department study,see Lovett to Forrestal,June 25, 1948; for the naval study and Forrestal's interest therein, see General Board, "National Security and Navy," June 25, 1948; Arleigh TheAmerican Conception ofNationalSecurity 377 The PolicyPlanningStaffof the Departmentof State prepared the initialstudy that Forrestalrequested and Truman authorized.Extensivelyredraftedit reappeared in November1948 as NSC 20/4and was adopted as thedefinitive statement of American foreignpolicy. Significantly, this paper reiteratedthe longstanding estimatethattheSovietUnion was notlikelyto resortto war to achieveitsobjectives. But warcould eruptas a resultof "Sovietmiscalculation of thedetermination of the UnitedStatesto use all the means at itscommandto safeguarditssecurity, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions,and through U.S. miscalculationof Soviet reactionsto measures which we mighttake." Immediatelyfollowingthis appraisal of the prospects of war, the National SecurityCouncil restated its conceptionof American national security:"Soviet dominationof the potential power of Eurasia, whetherachieved by armed aggressionor by politicaland subversivemeans,would be strategically and politically unacceptableto the United States."8' Yet NSC 20/4did not call fora largermilitary budget.Withno expectationthat war was imminent,the report emphasized the importanceof safeguardingthe domesticeconomy and leftunresolvedthe extentto whichresourcesshould be devoted to militarypreparations.NSC 20/4 also stressed"that Soviet political warfaremightseriouslyweaken the relativepositionof the United States,enhance Sovietstrengthand eitherlead to our ultimatedefeatshortof war,or forceus into war under dangerouslyunfavorableconditions."Accordingly, the NationalSecurityCouncil vaguelybut stridently propounded the importanceof reducingSoviet powerand influenceon the peripheryof the Russianhomelandand of strengthening the pro-Americanorientationof non-Sovietnations.82 Language of thissort,whichdid not defineclear prioritiesand whichprojected Americaninterestsalmost everywhereon the globe, exasperatedthejoint chiefs and othermilitaryofficers.They, too, believedthatthe United Statesshould resist communistaggressioneverywhere,"an overall commitmentwhichin itselfis allinclusive."But to undertakethisgoal in a responsibleand effective fashionit was necessary"to bringour militarystrengthto a levelcommensuratewiththe distinct possibility of globalwarfare."The JointChiefsof Staffstilldid notthinktheSoviets wantedwar. But, giventhe long-termintentionsattributedto theSovietUnion and givenAmerica'sown aims,the chances forwar,thoughstillsmall,weregrowing.83 Particularlyworrisomewere studies during 1948 suggestingthat,should war Burke,Oral History,NHC, 2: 30; and, forForrestal's requestand fora comprehensive studyof American policyand Truman'sresponses, see Trumanto Forrestal,July 13, 1948,RG 330,box 18,CD 5-1-20;Trumanto Forrestal, July15, 1948,HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 150; and FRUS, 1948, 1: 589-93. 81 NCS 20/1and 20/4maybe foundin Gaddisand Etzold,Containment, 173-211 (thequotationsappearon page 208). Also see FRUS, 1948, 1: 589-93, 599-601, 609-11, 615-24, 662-69. 82 Gaddisand Etzold,Containment, 209-10. 83 NSC 35, "ExistingInternational Commitments Involvingthe PossibleUse of ArmedForces,"November 17, 1948,FRUS, 1948, 1: 656-62. For assessments and the prospectsof war,see the of Sovietintentions of DirectSovietMilitary Actionduring in note 74, pages 374-75, above; also see CIA, "Possibility citations 1948-49,"September16, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; CIA, "Threatsto the Securityof the United States,"September28, 1948,ibid.,box 256; COMNAVFORGER, Intelligence Report,September30, 1948, NHC, SPD, centralfiles,1948, box 245, EF61; JSPC, "RevisedBriefof Short-RangeEmergencyPlan: Fleetwood," October14, 1948,RG 218,ser.CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46),JSPC 877/23;and FRUS, 1948, 1: 648-50, and 5: 942-47. 378 AHR Forum occur, the United States would have difficultyimplementingbasic strategic undertakings.Although the armed servicesfoughtbitterlyover the divisionof funds, they coincurredfullyon one subject-the $15 billion ceiling on military spending set by Truman was inadequate. In November 1948, militaryplanners argued that the $14.4 billionbudget would jeopardize Americanmilitaryoperations by constrictingthe speed and magnitude of the strategicair offensive, curtailingconventionalbombing operations against the Soviet Union, reducing America'sabilityto provide naval assistanceto Mediterraneanallies,undermining the nation's abilityto control Middle East oil at the onset of a conflict,and weakeninginitialoverall offensivecapabilities.On November 9, the joint chiefs informedthe secretaryof defense that the existingbudget for fiscal 1950 was "insufficient to implementnationalpolicyin any probablewar situationthatcan be foreseen."84 From the viewpointof the national militaryestablishment,the deficiencyof forces-in-being wasjust one of severalproblems.ForrestaltoldMarshallthathe was more concerned about the absence of sufficient strengthto supportinternational negotiationsthan he was about the availabilityof forcesto combat overt acts of aggression,whichwere unlikelyin any case. During 1948, thejoint chiefsalso grew and increasingly agitatedover the wideninggap betweenAmericancommitments interestson the one hand and American militarycapabilitieson the other. In Novemnber, the JointChiefs of Staffsubmittedto the National SecurityCouncil a thatalreadyhad been comprehensivelistof the formaland informalcommitments incurredby the United Statesgovernment.Accordingto thejoint chiefs,"current possible use of armed United States commitmentsinvolvingthe use or distinctly themeitherpromptly forcesare verygreatlyin excessof our presentabilityto fulfill or effectively." Limitedcapabilitiesmeant that the use of Americanforcesin any specificsituation-for example, in Greece, Berlin, or Palestine-threatened to emasculatethe nation'sabilityto respond elsewhere.85 HAVING CONCEIVED OF AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY in termsof Westerncontrol and of American access to the resources of Eurasia outside the Soviet sphere, American defense officialsnow considered it imperativeto develop American militarycapabilitiesto meet a host of contingenciesthat might emanate from 84JCS, Denfeld, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, November 8, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS 370 (8-19-45), JCS 1800/14. For the impact of the $14.4 billion budget on strategicplans, see JCS, "Allocation of Forces and Funds for the FY 1950 Budget," November 22, 1948, RG 330, box 16, "Draper: BuLdgetFile," JCS, 1800/18; for overall problems facing strategic plan-ners,see the voluminous studies in RG 218, ser. CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46); and, for a few examples of the problems in implementingstrategicplans, see JLPG, "Quick FeasibilityTest of JSPG 496/4," March 19, 1948, ibid.,jLPG 84/5; ICS, "Ihe Logistic Feasibilityof Doublestar," August 12, 1948, ibid.,JCS 1844/15; JLPG, "SuLpplyPriorities,for Fleetwood," October 15, 1948, ibid.,JLPG 84/31; and JLPC, "The Correction of Deficiencies Revealed by the LimnitedFeasibilitytest of ABC 101," December 23, 1948, ibid.,JLPC 416/36. In late 1948 and 1949 the navy challenged fundamental aspects of the strategic air offensive. See the studies in ibid., ser. CCS 373 (10-23-48); also see Rosenberg, "HydrogeniBomb Decision," 71-75. For service rivalriesarid the budgetary process, see, for example, Warner R. Schillinig,"The Politics of National Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Schilling et al., Strategp,Politics,anidDefense Budgets(New York, 1962), 5-266. 85 For the position of the JCS, see NSC 35, "Existing International Commitments," November 17, 1948, FRUS, 1948, 1: 656-62. For Forrestal's view, see ibid.,644-46. For background, see William A. Knowlton, TheAmenican Conception ofNationalSecurity 379 furtherSovietencroachmentsor fromindigenouscommunistunrest.Such contingencieswere sure to arise because Americanstrategydepended so heavilyon the rebuildingof Germanyand Japan, Russia's traditionalenemies,as well as on air Such contingencies power,atomic weapons, and bases on the Soviet periphery.86 also were predictablebecause American strategydepended so heavily on the restorationof stabilityin Eurasia, a situationincreasinglyunlikelyin an era of Althoughthe nationalistturmoil,social unrest,and risingeconomicexpectations.87 desire of the national militaryestablishmentfor large incrementsin defense expendituresdid not prevailin the tightbudgetaryenvironmentand presidential electionyearof 1948, the mode of thinkingabout nationalsecuritythatsubsequentin Asia was ly acceleratedthe arms race and precipitatedmilitaryinterventionismi alreadywidespreadamong defense officials. Indeed, thedynamicsof theCold War after1948 are easierto comprehendwhen one grasps the breadthof the Americanconceptionof nationalsecuritythathad emergedbetween 1945 and 1948.88 This conceptionincludeda strategicsphere of influencewithinthe WesternHemisphere,dominationof the Atlanticand Pacific oceans, an extensivesystemof outlyingbases to enlarge the strategicfrontierand projectAmericanpower,an even more extensivesystemof transitrightsto facilitate the conversionof commercialair bases to militaryuse, access to the resourcesand marketsof mostof Eurasia, denial of those resourcesto a prospectiveenemy,and it must the maintenanceof nuclearsuperiority. Not everyone of theseingredients, be emphasized,was considered vital. Hence, American officialscould acquiesce, howevergrudgingly,to a Sovietsphere in EasternEurope and could avoid direct interventionin China. But cumulativechallenges to these concepts of national securitywere certainto provokea firmAmericanresponse.This occurredinitially in 1947-48 when decisionswere made in favorof the Truman Doctrine,Marshall Plan,military assistance,Atlanticalliance,and Germanand Japanese rehabilitation. Soon thereafter, the "loss"of China, the Sovietdetonationof an atomicbomb,and the North Korean attackon South Korea intensifiedthe perceptionof threatto prevailingconcepts of national security.The Truman administrationresponded withmilitaryassistanceto southeastAsia, a decision to build the hydrogenbomib, directmilitaryintervention in Korea, a commitmentto stationtroopspermanently in Europe, expansionof the Americanalliancesystem,and a massiverearmament program in the United States. Postulatinga long-termSoviet intentionto gain Memorandum for the Chief of Staff,October 21, 1948, RG 319, P&O, 092 (top secret); for the reference to Greece, see JCS, "'The Position of the United States withRespect to Greece," April 13, 1948, RG 218, ser. CCS 092 Greece (12-30-47), JCS 1826/8. 86 See, for example, the citations in notes 72-73, pages 373-74, above. 87 See, for example, CIA, "The Break-Up of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for U.S. Security," September 3, 1948, HTL, HSTP, PSF, box 255; CIA, "Review of the World Situation," Septemiber 16, 1948; and Inglis, Memorandurrm of Information, February 16, 1949, NHC, SPD, central files, 1949, box 249, All. 88 The view presented here of the expansive Arnerican conception of national securityconflictsin part with A CriticalAppraisalofPostwarAmericanNational the one presented byJohn L. Gaddis's Strategiesof Containment: Security Policy(New York, 1981), 3-88. Gaddis's argument is thoughtf'uland insightfulbut relies too heavilyon the recommendations of Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff. Indeed, the adoption of NSC 68 and the massive militarybuild-up that accompanied the Korean War are miucheasier to undeistand( if one grasps the expansive conception of national securitythat was pervasive in defense circles after WorldlWar II. 380 AHR Forum based on geopolitworlddomination,theAmericanconceptionof nationalsecurity, ical and economic imperatives,could not allow for additional losses in Eurasia, could not risk a challenge to its nuclear supremacy,and could not permitany infringement on its abilityto defend in depth or to projectAmericanforcefrom areas in close proximityto the Soviet homeland. To say this is neither to exculpate the Soviet governmentfor its inhumane treatmentof its own citizensnor to suggestthatSoviet foreignpolicywas idle or benign. Indeed, Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe was often deplorable; the Sovietssought opportunitiesin the Dardanelles, northernIran, and Manchuria; the Sovietshoped to orientGermanyand Austriatowardthe East; and the Soviets sometimesendeavored to use communistparties to expand Soviet influencein areas beyondthe peripheryof Russian militarypower. But, then again, the Soviet Union had lost twentymillion dead during the war, had experienced the thousand factories,and one destructionof seventeenhundred towns,thirty-one hundred thousandcollectivefarms,and had witnessedthe devastationof the rural economywiththeNazi slaughterof twentymillionhogs and seventeenmillionhead of cattle.Whatis remarkableis thatafter1946 thesemonumentallossesreceivedso littleattentionwhen Americandefense analystsstudiedthe motivesand intentions of Sovietpolicy;indeed, defenseofficials did littleto analyzethethreatperceivedby the Soviets. Yet these same officialshad absolutelyno doubt that the wartime experiencesand sacrificesof the United States,thoughmuch less devastatingthan thoseof SovietRussia,demonstratedthe need forand entitledthe United Statesto oversee the resuscitationof the industrialheartlandsof Germany and Japan, dominatethe Eurasian establisha viablebalance of power in Eurasia, and militarily rimlands,therebysafeguardingAmericanaccess to raw materialsand controlover all sea and air approaches to NorthAmerica.89 To suggesta double standardis importantonlyinsofaras it raises fundamental questionsabout the conceptualizationand implementationof American national securitypolicy.If Soviet policywas aggressive,bellicose,and ideological,perhaps America'srelianceon overseasbases, air power,atomicweapons,militaryalliances, and the rehabilitation of Germanyand Japan was the bestcourse to follow,even if the effectmay have been to exacerbateSoviet anxietiesand suspicions.But even when one attributesthe worstintentionsto the Soviet Union, one mightstillask whetherAmerican presuppositionsand apprehensions about the benefitsthat would accrue to the SovietUnion as a resultof communist(and even revolutionary nationalist)gains anywherein Eurasia tended to simplifyinternationalrealities, magnifythe breadth of American interests,engender commitmentsbeyond American capabilities,and dissipate the nation's strengthand credibility.And, 89 For Soviet losses, see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky,A History ofRussia (3d edn., New York, 1977), 584-85. While Russian dead totaled almost twentymillion and while approximately 25 percent of the reproducible wealth of the Soviet Union was destroyed,American battlefieldcasualties were three hundred thousand dead, the index of industrial production in the United States rose from 100 to 196, and the gross national product increased from$91 billion to $166 billion. See Gordon Wright,The Ordeal ofTotal War (New York, 1968), 264-65. For an analysis of Soviet threat perception in the aftermathof World War II, see Michael McGwire, "The T hreat to Russia: An Estimate of Soviet MilitaryRequirements" (manuscript in preparation at the Brookings Institution [titletentative]). TheAmerican ofNationalSecuiity Conception 381 perhapseven more importantly, ifSovietforeignpoliciestended to be opportunist, reactive,nationalistic, and contradictory, as some recentwritershave claimedand as some contemporaryanalystssuggested, then one might also wonder whether American capabilities,and dissipate the nation's strengthand credibility.And, engender anxietiesand to provoke countermeasuresfrom a proud, suspicious, insecure,and cruelgovernmentthatwas at thesame timelegitimately apprehensive about the long-termimplicationsarising from the rehabilitationof traditional enemies and the developmentof foreignbases on the peripheryof the Soviet homeland.To raise such issues anew seems essentialin the 1980s, when a correct understandingof an adversary'sintentions,a shrewd grasp of an adversary's perceptionsof vitalinterests,and a sound assessmentof America'sown national securityimperativesseem to be indispensableprerequisitesfor the avoidance of nuclearwar and the establishment of a saferclimateforgreatpower competition.