9/21/2015 1 LL.M. in Intellectual Property 21-25 September 2015 Professor Craig Allen Nard Galen J. Roush Professor of Law Director, Spangenberg Center for Law, Technology & the Arts Case Western Reserve University Some Opening Quotes 2 “The patent system added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius” -Abraham Lincoln (1859) “If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.” - Fritz Machlup (1958) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 1 9/21/2015 The Course Road Map 3 History & Economics of Patent Law Obtaining Patent Rights and the Patent Document Claiming and Disclosing the Invention Statutory Subject Matter & Utility Novelty Non-Obviousness Statutory Bars Enforcing Patent Rights Defenses © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Remedies (lecture) T d S t (l t ) Chapter One 4 History and Architecture of the Patent System © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 2 9/21/2015 What is a patent? 5 -Derived from literae patentes, meaning “open letters” -No such thing as common law patent rights. Rather, a patent is a government issued grant conferring the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale the claimed invention throughout the U.S. or importing the claimed invention into the U.S. -A patent does not give its owner a right to use the claimed invention. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Right to Exclude and Freedom to Operate 6 Claims A, B, and C Patent A – Back B – Bottom Support Competing Product – Infringement or Free to Operate? A – Back A – Back No A B – Bottom Support D - Arm Rests B – Bottom C - Legs Support C - Legs C - Legs © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 3 9/21/2015 The Patent Document 7 Prior Art References © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Specification Description: description of the technical problem faced by the inventor and how the inventor solves the problem. Drawings: attached Preferred Embodiment (Best Mode) Claim(s): • preamble • transition • body 8 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 4 9/21/2015 Specification Description: description of the technical problem faced by the inventor and how the inventor solves the problem. Drawings: attached Preferred Embodiment (Best Mode) Claim(s): • preamble • transition • body © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 9 Specification Description: description of the technical problem faced by the inventor and how the inventor solves the problem. Drawings: attached Preferred Embodiment (Best Mode) Claim(s): • preamble • transition • body 10 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 5 9/21/2015 Specification Description: description of the technical problem faced by the inventor and how the inventor solves the problem. Drawings: attached Preferred Embodiment (Best Mode) Claim(s): • preamble • transition • body Independent vs. Dependent 11 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents A Patent is a Property Right 12 - There are similarities between, on the one hand, real and personal property; and, on the other hand, intellectual property -The right to exclude is a key similarity -But there are important differences between, on the one hand, land, olive oil or a pen and, on the other hand, information © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 6 9/21/2015 13 Economics of Patent Law © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Nature of Information 14 Two relevant qualities: 1. Non-rivalous: “He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.” 2. Non-excludable: You cannot build a fence around your idea as you can your backyard or ranch. These two traits are common in what economists call public goods © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 7 9/21/2015 Arrow’s Information Paradox and the Free-Rider Problem 15 Inventors often need to disclose their ideas to secure venture capital, to arrange for manufacturing capabilities, or otherwise efficiently utilize their invention But absent a property right, the inventor will likely be reticent to disclose information for fear of inducing competition. Thus, there is an inherent conflict between the desire to disclose information and the need to limit access and use to those whom the © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents inventor has authorized. Arrow’s Information Paradox and the Free-Rider Problem, cont. 16 The two distinctive features of information goods (non-rivalrous and non-excludable) can lead to a free-rider problem ― that is, consumers who exploit the information without sufficiently contributing to its creation. As such, information will tend to be under produced, or not produced at all, due to the riskiness associated with disclosing information or others discovering the information © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 8 9/21/2015 Addressing the Free-Rider Problem 17 A common response to this problem is government intervention, which can ― for example ― take the form of research grants (subsidies), or using the taxing power to fund production or create incentives. National defense ― a classic public good ― is provided for through tax revenue. Another form of government intervention is to create a private property right to induce the production of information goods, which has been a government response ©inC. Nard the- Fallform of 2015 - Law of Patents patent legislation since 1790. Patent Law and the Marketplace 18 The patent system works hand-in-hand with the marketplace It is the private market that signals to innovators where to channel their inventive energies The patent system provides a property right as an inducement to innovate, but does not channel the direction of the innovation Thus, the patent system and the marketplace work hand-in-hand to foster innovation in a © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents decentralized setting 9 9/21/2015 Economic Theories of Patent Law 19 A patent system, however, is not a costless enterprise. With exclusivity comes the risk of reduced output, excessively high prices, and therefore less access to the patented product, because some consumers who value the good at a competitive price will not buy it at a supracompetitive price. This is referred to by economists as deadweight loss But to the extent these costs are cause for concern, they are thought to be offset by the benefits engendered by a patent system, which leads us to the economic theories for the existence patent © C. Nard of - Falla 2015 - Law of Patents system. 20 What are the Economic Theories (Justifications) for a Patent System? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 10 9/21/2015 21 Economic Theories of Patent Law, cont. Incentive to Invent 22 Focuses on efficiency gains and the internalization of externalities This theory seeks to address the effects of Arrow’s paradox, and holds that ― due to the public goods nature of information ― without the prospect of a property right, inventors would be unable to recoup (internalize) their research and development costs because third parties could simply copy the invention and compete with the inventor unencumbered by the need to recover fixed costs. In an increasingly competitive market, prices will be driven down, resulting in an under-investment in invention. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Economic Theories of Patent Law, cont. Incentive to Disclose This theory, which is informed in part by the availability of trade secret protection, posits that the prospect of a property right will induce inventors to seek patent protection, and thereby disclose their inventions in accordance with patent law’s disclosure requirements Without the availability of patent protection, this theory holds that inventors are more likely to opt for trade secret protection, thus depriving competitors (and the public generally) of a technical disclosure ― that is, information that can be used by competitors to improve the patented technology or design around it © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 11 9/21/2015 23 Economic Theories of Patent Law, cont. Incentive to Innovate An innovation is different from an invention The incentive to innovate focuses on the role of patents in inducing the transformation of inventions into downstream, commercialized products by serving as a signal to relevant parties, namely investors (e.g., venture capitalists), potential licensees, and downstream players (e.g., entities with marketing, distribution, advertising, and manufacturing capabilities). © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Weaknesses of These Theories 24 The incentive to invent theory assumes the inventive act is driven by the prospect of a patent, rather than reputational gains, monetary prizes or rewards With respect to the incentive to disclose theory, an “enabling” disclosure seldom suffices for potential licensees to practice the claimed invention. This results in licensees asking the licensor/patentee to provide them with an “enabling package,” which includes technical know-how and other forms of tacit knowledge not required to be disclosed under § 112. Moreover, this theory does not fully take into account that ― because of reverse engineering concerns or other issues associated with confidentiality ― trade secrecy is sometimes not a viable option. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents In contrast, trade secret is the preferred option 12 9/21/2015 Weaknesses of These Theories, cont. 25 The incentive to innovate theory loses some of its force when one considers that oftentimes patentees neither commercialize, nor license their patented technology. In other words, the development and realization of downstream products may not be consistent with the preferences of the patentee Why do firms patent? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Economic Welfare Problem 26 Our understanding of patent law’s relationship to economic welfare is incomplete as is the the question of whether stronger patents increase or decrease innovation. “If we did not have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time, it would be irresponsible on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.” Fritz © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Machlup (1958) 13 9/21/2015 27 Patents and Applications Held by Start-Ups: The Importance of Patents to VCs Biotechnology Medical Device Software IT Hardware Companies holding patents/apps (share) 39% 75% 76% 24% ----- Average # patents/apps held 4.7 9.7 15.0 1.7 ----- Average # filed by company 8.1 8.5 13.0 5.0 ----- Average # from founders 1.9 2.0 3.0 0.9 ----- Average # acquired 2.1 2.4 3.7 0.9 ----- 28 Source Population of companies (D&B) Industry All Respondents © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Venture-backed companies Companies holding patents/apps (share) 82% 97% 94% 67% 91% Average # patents/apps held 18.7 34.6 25.2 5.9 27.4 Average # filed by company 15.8 22.9 16.1 7.1 23.6 Average # from founders 2.5 3.8 3.8 0.7 3.1 Average # acquired 4.2 9.0 6.5 0.7 3.5 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 14 9/21/2015 What is Venture Capital? 29 VC investment strategy typically has the following attributes: 1. Emphasis on new technology; 2. Active (and sometimes controlling) participation of the VC in actual management of the business; 3. Investment in outstanding people (entrepreneurs) at least as much as in outstanding business plans; 4. Investment in an early stage of development, but after IP (typically patents) has been secured; 5. A time horizon ranging from a year or two to as long as ten years, followed by an “exit” through an IPO or sale of the entire enterprise; and 6. Investments where the VC can add value through © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents technical, financial, and management expertise Seeds and Rounds: The Financing Cycle 30 “Friends, Family, and Fools” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 15 9/21/2015 Fewfinancing Home Runs, Lotsa of Strikeouts.... many But VC remains very important And part of the U.S. economy: According to one survey, U.S. companies that have relied on venture capital financing at some point in their history generate revenue equal to approximately 21% of GDP. See Missed National Venture Capital Assoc, Venture ImpactOpportunities 2 (6th ed. 2011) Patents are DURABLE assets 31 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 32 History of Patent Law © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 16 9/21/2015 Filippo Brunelleschi - The First Patentee 33 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Marble From the Mountains of Carrara 34 Carrara CROATIA What is this country? Pisa © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 17 9/21/2015 Loaded on Il Badalone (“the Monster”) 35 Badalone Article © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents From Pisa Up the Arno River to…. 36 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 18 9/21/2015 … the Duomo in Florence 37 Khan Academy lecture © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents But Il Badalone Sank Near Empoli 38 Carrara Florence Empoli Pisa © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 19 9/21/2015 BTW, What Other Famous Work (Sculpture) is Made from Carrara Marble? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni Michaelangelo 39 The Venetian Statute of 1474 40 Be it enacted that, by the authority of this Council, every person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it to the office of our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being forbidden to every other person in any of our territories and towns to make any further device conforming with and similar to said one, without the consent and license of the author, for the term of 10 years. And if anybody builds it in violation hereof, the aforesaid author and inventor shall be entitled to have him summoned before any magistrate of this City, by which magistrate the said infringer shall be constrained to pay him hundred ducats; and the device shall be destroyed at once. It being, however, within the power and discretion of the Government, in its activities, to take and use any such device and instrument, with this condition however one- Law butofthe author shall operate it. © C. that Nard - no Fall 2015 Patents 20 9/21/2015 The Venetian Patent Statute of 1474 41 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Administrative Procedure (“General Welfare Board”) Utility Novelty Non-obviousness Disclosure Requirements Reduced to Perfection Non-literal infringement DOE Term Geographic Restrictions Remedies Eminent Domain © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 42 England and the “Odious Monopolies” -Royal abuses of the monopolistic privilege led to the Statute of Monopolies in 1624 Elizabeth I James I Sir Walter Raleigh © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 21 9/21/2015 Statute of Monopolies 43 - The SOM outlawed all monopolies except - - “new” manufacture[s]” and re-affirmed the common law’s role Specifically, Section II of the SOM “declared and enacted … that all monopolies… shall be forever hereafter heard, tried, and determined by and according to the common law” By relocating decision making authority over the validity of particular patents, Parliament created a binding constraint on the issuance of patents, © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents limiting them to cases of invention One View of the SOM 44 Douglass North and Robert Thomas argue the SOM, particularly the shift of granting power to Parliament, played an important role in the development of Britain’s Industrial Revolution. See North and Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (1973) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 22 9/21/2015 The American Experience 45 - - - During the colonial era and the Articles of Confederation, several states granted patents. As domestic technology developed and national markets formed, these patents resulted in conflicts among the states The most famous conflict was the Fitch-Rumsey steamboat dispute © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents John Fitch James Rumsey Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 46 Congress shall have the power… “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times toJames Madison Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” Charles Pinckney © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 23 9/21/2015 The Constitution’s IP Clause – Three Virtues 47 Decentralized Patent-Market dynamic Exclusive Rights Why not opt for another form of protection? Incentives Drafters understood the power of incentives © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents One View of the IP Clause 48 “The Constitution gives an incentive to discover new practical ideas and to bring them to the realistic service Of one's neighbors. Perhaps no other practical device in history has so revolutionized the daily conditions of life. It has brought about a higher level of the common good than any people ever experienced before.” Michael Novak, Business as a Calling: Work and the Examined Life 144 (1996). © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 24 9/21/2015 Congressional Action: The Noteworthy Patent Acts 49 1790: First patent act and the birth of the examination system. Applications were reviewed by the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, and the Attorney General 1793: Repeal of the examination system, and introduction of a registration regime 1836: Reintroduction of examination and codification of the claiming requirement. This act also created the: Patent office (more on this office later) Commissioner of patents Present day numbering system © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Congressional Action: The Noteworthy Patent Acts, cont. 50 1870: Largely a re-codification of the 1836 Act, with one important addition – more emphasis on the patent claim The 1836 Act required an inventor to “particularly specify or point out” what he regards as his invention. The 1870 Act required the inventor to “particularly point out and distinctly claim” his invention © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 25 9/21/2015 Congressional Action: The Noteworthy Patent Acts, cont. 51 The 1952 Patent Act Principal authors were Giles S. Rich and Pasquale J. (P.J.) Federico The first full-scale revision on the patent code since 1836 Remains the statutory backbone of the modern patent system Tweaks in 1984, 1988, ©and C. Nard1999 - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Giles Sutherland Rich, pictured here in 1994 at the age of 90. He is widely regarded as one of the most influential figures in modern patent law P.J. Federico was the Examiner-in-Chief of the USPTO from 1947 to 1970 Congressional Action: The Noteworthy Patent Acts, cont. 52 2011 – The America Invents Act (“AIA”) The most significant statutory changes to patent law since 1952 From first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file system Redefined some types of prior art and statutory bars in section 102 – Effective March 16, 2013 Added various mechanisms to challenge validity of patent post-issuance See AIA Q&A at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/faq.jsp# heading-5 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 26 9/21/2015 Abe Was Also an Inventor and Patentee 53 Lincoln called the introduction of patent laws one of the three most important developments “in the world’s history,” the other two being the discovery of America and the perfection of printing. U.S. Patent # 6469, “A Device for Buoying Vessels Over Shoals” – May 22, 1849 (only pres to hold patent) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Not everyone was impressed…. 54 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 27 9/21/2015 The Common Law of Patents 55 There have been relatively few statutory changes over a 220 year period. Thus, the predominant force in the development of patent law has been the federal courts, particularly through the exercise of their common law powers Over the past 30 years, two courts have played a dominant role: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit The U.S. Supreme Court (especially the past 15 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents years) 56 The Creation of the Federal Circuit Created in 1982 The U.S. Court of the Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over patent cases as well as other areas of the law © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Jurisdiction is national in scope 28 9/21/2015 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 57 Stated Reasons for the Court’s Creation 58 Rampant forum shopping Disparate circuit court treatment of patents Accompanying dis-uniformity of patent law H.R. Rep. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22 (1981): “Patent litigation long has been identified as a problem area, characterized by undue forumshopping and unsettling inconsistency in adjudications” S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1981): “The creation of the … Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of … [patent] law. Such uniformity will reduce forum-shopping that is © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents common to patent litigation” 29 9/21/2015 The Federal Circuit’s Impact 59 The court has had a significant impact on the patent landscape Recent empirical studies have shown the court has strengthened patent rights w/r/t validity The court affirms district court invalidity findings significantly less often that validity findings See Henry & Turner, 35 J. Leg. Stud. 85 (2006) But while finding more patents not invalid, the court has adopted a narrow approach to claim scope See © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Lunney, 11 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (2004) The SCT’s Increased Presence 60 Some view the Court’s recent push into patent law as an “anti-patent” initiative This is not a correct assessment. The Court, historically has intervened to “correct” what it viewed as trends gone too far in one direction or another You can see this in the 19th c. and now. But Congress has also intervened when it viewed the SCt as moving too far in one direction. An example would be the motivation of the 1952 Act, which sought to “correct” the SCt’s jurisprudence in misuse and what is now called obviousness © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 30 9/21/2015 61 Obtaining Patent Rights: The USPTO and the Patent Document © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 62 The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office The USPTO is a federal agency under the Department of Commerce, and is located in Alexandria, VA, just across the Potomac River from Washington D.C. The agency’s mission is: “Fostering innovation, competitiveness and economic growth, domestically and abroad to deliver high quality and timely examination of patent and trademark applications, guiding domestic and international intellectual property policy, and delivering intellectual property information and education worldwide, with a highly skilled, diverse workforce ” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents -2012 Performance and Accountability R 31 9/21/2015 The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, cont. 63 The patent office was created by Congress in 1836, with a very small staff. The agency is led by the “Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property” – currently The patent code states the “Director shall be responsible for providing policy direction and management supervision for the Office and for the issuance of patents….” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 64 USPTO Organizational Structure © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 32 9/21/2015 The U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, cont. 65 The examination of patent applications is divided among eight technology centers, which are under the general supervision of the “Deputy Commissioner for Patent Operations” Each center is led by a group director and subdivided into units staffed by patent examiners At end of fiscal year 2013, the USPTO employed 8,051 patent examiners © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 2015 Average Pendency Rates 66 For Patents -First Office Action: 17.8 months as of June 2015 (18.3 in June 2013) Biotech: 15 months (2014) Mechanical Eng/Mfg & Products: 21.3 months -Total Pendency: 26.6 months as of June 2015 (29.8 in June 2013): -Biotech: 26.2 months -Mechanical Eng/Mfg and Products: 31.1 months © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 33 9/21/2015 The Arcana of Obtaining Patent Rights 67 By Lord Frederick Leighton Daedalus would be proud…. Patent Application Process © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Patent Institutions Director Federal Circuit Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) Patent Patent Application Application 68 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Complaint Patentee v. District Alleged Court Infringer 34 9/21/2015 The Patent Attorney 69 There is a reason patent attorneys are in demand. Patent Bar Info can be found at: http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/ oed/exam/registration.jsp Patent bar members can be found at: https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/ query.jsp © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Utility Patent Filings 70 U.S. Utility Patent Applications Filed and Granted, 1980-2015 578,802 300,678 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 35 9/21/2015 71 Costs of Obtaining Patent Rights A recent survey of patent attorneys shows that the median costs for preparing and filing a patent application in the biotech/chemical arts is $12,393. for electrical/computer arts $10,993, and for mechanical, 9,412. As these are median costs, some applications, depending on the complexity of the technology and geographic location of the law firm, can be considerably more. And there are, typically, after-filing costs that have a median range $2,000-4,000. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Some Terms Relating to Process 72 Patent Prosecution Office Action Amendment Title 35 (the patent code) 37 C.F.R. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) Prior Art and Prior Art Search © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 36 9/21/2015 Some Important Terms Relating to the Patent Document 73 The Claim (Rex) Specification (written description) Prosecution History © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Issued Patent 74 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 37 9/21/2015 Comparative Perspective: The European Model 75 European Patent Convention Created in 1973 Came into effect in 1977 38 Contracting States Not an EU institution Created European Patent Organization (EPO) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents European Model, cont. 76 The European Patent Organization European Patent Office Administrative Council EPO HQ Munich, Germany © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 38 9/21/2015 Some Data 77 In 2001, there were 1,458,000 patent applications filed worldwide; in 2012 that number rose to 2,347,000 In comparison, the European Patent Office (EPO) received 257,744 applications in 2013 (142,941 applications were filed in 2000) and issued 66,700 patents. In the United States, the USPTO received 571,612 applications in 2013 (334,445 Patent Apps in Europe applications were filed in 2002) and issued by Country of Origin © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 277,835 patents Top Ten Patentees at EPO 78 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 39 9/21/2015 Patent Applications by Country at EPO (per million inhabitants) Denmark 241.7 7 Germany 265.6 6 Finland 217.7 7 Sweden 306.7 7 Switzerland 379.1 1 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 79 EPO Designations 80 The top designation countries for patent protection: 1. Germany (98.9%) 2. France (95%); and 3. U.K. (94%). Only these three countries had a designation rate of over 90%. Other countries with significant designations include Italy (83.3%), Spain (76.7%), the Netherlands (76.4%), Sweden (75%), Switzerland and Lichtenstein (74.7% each), Belgium (73.7%), Austria (73.6%), Finland (73.3%), Denmark and Ireland (73.2% © C. Nardeach), - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents P t l (72 7%) dG (72 7%) d 40 9/21/2015 European Model, cont. 81 No such things as a European Patent that has legal effect throughout the EU or EPC countries Obtainment is centralized, but then patent turns into a series of national patent rights Very expensive: translation costs, procedural costs, and renewal fees paid to each state Much more expensive than a U.S. or © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Japanese patent European Model, cont. 82 Proposal: Community Wide Patent (Unitary Patent) Legal effect throughout the EU Single renewal fee paid to EPO Application can be filed into one of three languages: English, German, or French After Grant, no translation is required into other languages © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 41 9/21/2015 83 End of Chapter One © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Chapter Two 84 Claiming and Disclosing the Invention © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 42 9/21/2015 Chapter Two 85 A. Claim Interpretation © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Claim Construction 86 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 43 9/21/2015 The Importance of Claim Interpretation 87 The “claim is the name of the game” Giles S. Rich, Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims — American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990). Claim interpretation ― which precedes a determination of validity and infringement ― is the most important part of patent litigation because “to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to decide the case.” Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Phillips v. AWH 88 Claim language at issue: “further means disposed inside the shell for increasing its load bearing capacity comprising internal steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls.” DCt interpretation: a “baffle must extend inward from the steel shell walls at an oblique … angle to the wall face.” < 90° © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 90° - 180° 44 9/21/2015 Phillips v. AWH (The Interpretive Road Map) 89 Interpretive approaches and sources of evidence What principles of claim interpretation did the court identify? The intrinsic/extrinsic divide What is the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic evidence What is the role of the PHOSITA and specification? Claim language is given its “ordinary and customary meaning” as understood by a PHOSITA “Importantly, the person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” What is the role of dictionaries and expert testimony? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Phillips v. AWH, cont. 90 Intrinsic Evidence Claim Language: Claims define the property right, but do not stand alone. They are part of a fully integrated document Specification: Acts as “a concordance for the claims” – that is, “an alphabetical index of all the words in a text or corpus of texts, showing every contextual occurrence of a word” – Sec 112, para 1 anchor Prosecution History: Complete record of PTO proceedings, but represents an ongoing © C. Nard - Fall 2015product) - Law of Patents and is therefore negotiation (not a final less useful than spec 45 9/21/2015 Phillips v. AWH, cont. 91 Extrinsic Evidence Experts: Provide background of how invention works Ensure that court’s understanding of technical aspects of patent is consistent with PHOSITA understanding Establish that particular term in patent or prior art has a particular meaning BUT NO conclusory and unsupported statements OR statements at odds with claim construction mandated by claims, spec and PH…. Isn’t claim language to be given its ordinary and customary meaning as understood by© C.aNard PHOSITA? - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents A ’t t PHOSITA ? Phillips v. AWH, cont. 92 Extrinsic Evidence Dictionaries and Treatises: Assist in understanding commonly understood meaning of words Unbiased source accessible to public in advance of litigation But primary concern is that focus is on meaning in the abstract rather than on meaning in the context of the patent Dictionary is subservient to patent, particularly spec © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 46 9/21/2015 Phillips v. AWH, cont. 93 Extrinsic Evidence Dictionaries and Treatises: A canon of claim construction holds that while claims are interpreted in the light of the spec, limitations cannot be imported from the spec to the claims Dictionaries guard against improper importation of limitations from spec to claims But court noted the line between interpretation and improper importation can be clarified by focusing on PHOSITA’s understanding of claim © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents terms…. Huh? Phillips v. AWH, cont. 94 Dictionaries and Treatises: Some guidelines for the PHOSITA and competitors of patentee Patentee is not limited to embodiments specifically described in spec, even though spec may contain only one embodiment PHOSITA would rarely confine their definitions to exact representations depicted in spec Why? The spec teaches and enables PHOSITAs to make and use the claimed invention When spec viewed in context, it will become clear whether patentee is setting out specific examples © C. Nardand - Fall 2015 - Law of (teaching) or whether patentee intends claims Patents embodiment to be co extensive (proper importation of 47 9/21/2015 Phillips v. AWH 95 Federal Circuit reversed: 1. 2. Baffles must be pointed inward from the walls Patent discloses baffles have different functions: A. Deflecting projectiles (must be disposed at certain angle) B. Structural support C. Intermediate barrier wall 3. All agree that a baffle refers to “objects that check, impede, or obstruct the flow of something” 4. If the baffles recited in claim 1 were inherently placed at specific angles … other claims would be redundant 5. A PHOSITA would not interpret the disclosure and claims to mean that a structure extending inward from one of the wall © C. Nard - Fall 2015 Patents faces is a ‘baffle’ if it is an an acute or obtuse angle, but- Law is ofnot Phillips v. AWH, cont. (Some questions on “context”) 96 What did the court mean by “context” of the patent? As counsel for a competitor of a patentee, how confident are you – in the light of Phillips – in rendering a “non-infringement” or “freedom to operate” opinion for your client? If you would prefer a more rule-oriented approach to claim interpretation, what do you think the court should have emphasized to lend greater certainty claim interpretation? Unique Concepts (the next principal case) may © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents be helpful in answering these questions 48 9/21/2015 Unique Concepts v. Brown 97 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents -The ‘260 patent: an “assembly of border pieces” used to attach a fabric wall covering to a wall - Relevant language in claim 1 reads: “assembly comprising linear border pieces and right angle corner border pieces which are arranged in endto-end relation to define a framework that follows the perimeter of the area to be covered each piece Unique Concepts v. Brown 98 Unique sued Brown for patent infringement Brown maintained that its accused products do not infringe [because] the accused products do not have corner pieces which were preformed at a right angle, but instead employ two linear pieces which are each mitered, i.e., cut at a 45 degree angle, and then placed together to form a right angle Brown won at DCt b/c court held the mitered linear pieces used by Brown do not meet the claim language “right angle corner border pieces.” That is, “right angle corner pieces” of of Patents © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law Cl i 1 i li it d t f d i 49 9/21/2015 Unique Concepts v. Brown 99 The Majority: “The language right angle corner border piece is too clear to encompass linear pieces that are not right angle corner pieces…. [T]he claim separately recites both linear border pieces and right angle corner border pieces. Such an interpretation would run counter to the clear meaning of the language. Both types of pieces are required by the claim.” A contrary reading “would encourage an applicant to escape examination of a more broadly-claimed invention by filing narrow claims and then, after grant, asserting a broader scope of the claims based on a statement in the specification of an alternative never presented in the © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents claims for examination.” Unique Concepts v. Brown 100 The Dissent: “Beyond question … the specification discloses two species of right-angle corner border pieces: (1) preformed one-piece and (2) mitered, short, linear pieces, arranged at right angles and properly spaced at their junction. The latter are to be joined to longer linear pieces. No drawing is needed to make (2) clear.” Regarding cancelled claim 9, “The majority seems to start with an a priori assumption of what the “clear” language of claim 1 means. On the other hand, I am looking at the genealogical record of that claim to find out what it means…. I see no significance to the fact that claim 9 was cancelled because it is part of the prosecution history, all of which is clearly before us.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 50 9/21/2015 Unique Concepts v. Brown 101 The majority What evidentiary sources did the majority emphasize? The claim and §112, ¶2 Why? The dissent What evidentiary sources did the dissent emphasize? The specification and prosecution history (cancelled claim 9) Why? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Unique Concepts v. Brown, cont. 102 Whom do you agree with? Judge Lourie or Judge Rich? What policies are at play? Both focus on the intrinsic record. Judge Lourie emphasizes: The claim Certainty and notice (but also Brown’s “expert”– is reliance on the expert consistent with the notice function?) Judge Rich emphasizes The claim, spec, and prosecution history © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Context … the “genealogical record" 51 9/21/2015 Disclosure Requirements 103 The “big picture” – quid pro quo in patent law There are four disclosure requirements: (1) Enablement; AIA Patent Description; Reform Alert rt (2) Written (3) Best Mode; and (4) Definiteness Specification Claims Also, the relationship between the specification and claims is of critical importance © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Chapter Two 104 B. Enablement § 112, ¶ 1 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 52 9/21/2015 Chapter Two 105 B.1 - Enablement and Claim Scope © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents O’Reilly v. Morse 106 Samuel F.B. Morse Telegraph Register Patent Model, patented May 1, 1849 - Patent No. 6,420 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 53 9/21/2015 The Infamous Claim 8 107 “I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts of machinery, described in the foregoing specifications and claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electromagnetism, however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, letters of signs, at any distances, being a new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Opinion 108 “If this claim can be maintained, it “His invention may be process less matters not by what or complicated – less liable to get out of machinery the result is orderaccomplished. – less expensive in construction, For aught that we now know some and in its operation. But yet if it is future inventor, in the onward march covered of by this patent the inventor science, mode [improver] may coulddiscover not use it,a nor theof writing public have the benefit of itby without the or printing at a distance means of permission of this patentee.” Page. 92 the electric or galvanic current, without © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents using any part of the process or 54 9/21/2015 The Opinion, cont. 109 “And when his patent expires, the public must apply to him to learn what it is. In fine he claims an exclusive right to use a manner and process which he has not described and indeed had not invented, and therefore could not describe when © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents he obtained his patent. The court is of the The Dissent 110 Justice Grier “An improvement in a known art is as much the subject of a patent as the art itself; so also, is an improvement on a known machine. Yet, if the original machine be patented, the Patentee of an improvement will not have a right to use the original. This doctrine has not Nard - Fall the 2015 - Law of Patents been found to© C.retard progress of invention ” 55 9/21/2015 The Dissent, cont. 111 “But in its primary and literal significance of writing, printing, or recording at a distance, it never was invented, perfected, or put into practical operation till it was done by Morse…. It is not only ‘a new and useful art,’if that term means anything but a most wonderful and © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Dissent, cont. 112 “If it be the use of the words ‘however developed’ that the claim is to be adjudged too broad, then it follows that a person using any other process for the purpose of developing the agent or element of electro-magnetism, than the © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents common one now in use, and described in 56 9/21/2015 Unpacking Taney and Grier’s Opinions 113 Taney Ex post incentives more important than ex ante – See Comment 2 More robust improvement activity Unjust reward to Morse, who sought to reap beyond where he sowed – See Comment 1 Grier Ex ante incentives. Economic argument based on blocking patents – See Comment , second paragraph Moral and instrumentalist argument based on Morse’s “wonderful and astonishing invention” – See © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Comment 1, last paragraph Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co. (The Incandescent Lamp Case) 114 Sawyer and Man discovered that carbonized paper could be used as a conductor for the filament in a light bulb They sued Thomas Edison, who discovered bamboo was a superior conductor But Sawyer and Man claimed: (1) An incandescing conductor for an electric lamp, of carbonized fibrous or textile material, and of an arch or horseshoe shape, substantially as © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of hereinbefore set forth. Patents 57 9/21/2015 The Incandescent Lamp Case, cont. 115 Sawyer and Man claimed a genus, but discovered a species – the first to do so. While they were entitled to protection of the species (which they claimed in claim 3), the enablement requirement prevented them from extending their patent protection to all “fibrous or textile material.” Why? Justice Brown wrote: “the fact that paper belongs to the fibrous kingdom did not invest them with sovereignty over this entire kingdom,” particularly © C. Nard - Fall 2015102. - Law of Patents Edison’s bamboo. Page The Incandescent Lamp Case, cont. 116 Echoing Justice Taney’s concern in Morse, Justice Brown continued: “[T]o hold that one who had discovered that a certain fibrous or textile material answered the required purpose should obtain the right to exclude everybody from the whole domain of fibrous and textile materials, and thereby shut out any further efforts to discover a better specimen of that class than the patentee had employed, would be an unwarranted extension of his monopoly, and operate rather to © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents discourage than to promote invention.” Page 58 9/21/2015 Patent Law’s Delicate Balance “Whilst the remuneration of genius and useful One is of a the most important upon the public, ingenuity duty incumbent questions in patentof law: the rights and welfare the community must be How much protection is fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.” Kendall enough? v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (1858) Broad patent protection Strong ex ante incentives “The problem introduced for incentive Efficient allocation of mechanisms is how to make sure that earlier resources innovators are compensated for their Narrow patent protection contributions, while ensuring that later innovators Strong incentive for improvement activity also have an incentive to invest” SUZANNE Increased pace of C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND©INCENTIVES technological innovation 127 (2006) 117 Chapter Two 118 B.2 - Enablement and “Undue Experimentation” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 59 9/21/2015 Cederapids, Inc. v. Norberg, Inc. 119 The Invention: “A method to increase productivity of rock crushers by simultaneously increasing speed and throw.” District Ct held patent claim invalid for failure to meet the enablement requirement. Specifically, the patent did not disclose values for increases to speed and throw for crushers of various sizes Only values to© C.the seven foot crusher were Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents disclosed Cederapids, Inc. v. Norberg, Inc., cont. 120 Federal Circuit reversed: 1. Test for enablement: The disclosure must enable a PHOSITA to make and use the claimed invention without “undue experimentation” – experimentation cannot be “unduly extensive.” 2. There is a difference between predictable (e.g., mechanical) and unpredictable (e.g., chemical) arts. 3. For predictable arts a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment. 4. Disclosure need not provide mass-production details (optimum levels) 5. Here, PHOSITA could ascertain values for crushers of various sizes – PHOSITA knowledge part of disclosure © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 60 9/21/2015 What is “Undue Experimentation?” 121 1. The adjective “undue” implies that a disclosure that requires some experimentation can still satisfy enablement; 2. Multi-factored test – See p. 122, Comment 1, second para and In re Wands case; 3. Predictability of art is a consideration. The more unpredictable the art, the greater the disclosure and vice versa; 4. Compliance with enablement is measured at the time of filing. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Technology involves a side-impact, velocity-type crash sensor for deployment in an airbag or other “occupant protection” devices; 122 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 61 9/21/2015 Automotive Tech. Int’l v. BMW 123 Prior art related to “crash sensors” that deployed when crushed – but these sensors would not deploy on a side door if side door was not directly hit; Was thought that velocity-side sensors would deploy too slowly during side impact collision; Inventors of velocity-type sensors of ‘253 patent discovered that sensors could successfully and timely deploy in a side © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents collision 124 Automotive Tech. Int’l v. BMW, cont. The claim language at issue was” “means responsive to the motion of said mass upon acceleration of said housing in excess of a predetermined threshold value…” Ct construed claim to be “means + function” (see sec 112, para 6), which requires the spec to sufficiently disclose corresponding structure Specification disclosed mechanical and electronic side sensor switch assemblies; But parties disagreed on sufficiency of disclosure for electronic side impact sensor © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 62 9/21/2015 125 Automotive Tech. Int’l v. BMW, cont. ATI argues: DCt should have followed line of cases that hold enablement is satisfied when one mode of invention is enabled; Spec does enable electronic sensors and discusses specific disclosure; Delphi PHOSITA never addressed issue; Electronic sensors were widely known at time of filing (at least for frontal impact) and therefore no need for spec to describe them in detail © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 126 Automotive Tech. Int’l v. BMW, cont. Delphi argues: Spec must enable full scope of claims Full scope here includes both mechanical and electronic sensors Spec only enabled mechanical sensors, and therefore, full scope of claims not enabled. Short recitation of electronic sensors required “undue experimentation” Spec specifically states electronic sensors are new field and hence ATI could not rely on PHOSITA knowledge Delphi expert testified that spec did not enable © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - (1) Law of Patents how to sense the motion of the mass to properly 63 9/21/2015 127 Automotive Tech. Int’l v. BMW, cont. Federal Circuit affirms invalidity holding: 1. Two full columns and five figures describe mechanical sensors; only one short paragraph and one figure (11) relate to electronic sensor; 2. Short paragraph provides little detail concerning how electronic sensor is built or operated; no mention of circuitry or of structure of any technologies involved re to electronic sensor; 3. PHOSITA knowledge not enough to supplement spec. in the light of ATI remarks in spec and novel aspect of using velocity-type sensors for side impact sensing © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 128 Automotive Tech. Int’l v. BMW, cont. Federal Circuit affirms invalidity holding, cont: 4. According to Fed Cir: The inadequacy of the description of an electronic side impact sensor is highlighted by comparison with the extensive disclosure of how to make and use a mechanical side impact sensor, consisting of two full columns. If such a disclosure is needed to enable making and using a mechanical side impact sensor, why is not a similar disclosure needed to enable making and using an electronic side impact sensor, which is an essential part of the invention? Page 120. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 64 9/21/2015 129 Automotive Tech. Int’l v. BMW, cont. 5. Ct’s reliance on Liebel-Flarsheim, which held that full scope of claimed invention must be enabled. The Dct in ATI held (and parties agreed) that claim scope included both mechanical and electronic sensors: “Disclosure of only mechanical side impact sensors does not permit one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention as broadly as it was claimed… Electronic side impact sensors are not just another known species of a genus consisting of sensors, but are a distinctly different sensor compared to the well-enabled mechanical side impact sensor…” Page 121. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Some Questions and Points 130 What result in ATI if disclosure of two types of sensors were reversed? That is, the electronic sensor was disclosed adequately, but the mechanical sensor was the subject of a paragraph – See Comment 2, pages 124-25. Can ATI be reconciled with the rule that an inventor need not disclose every embodiment of the invention to satisfy the enablement requirement? See Cedar: A broad mechanical claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment. *Enablement is measured at time of filing. Why? See Comment 3, page 125. And keep this point in mind when we cover non-literal infringement in© C.Chapter aof Patents Nard - Fall 20157, - Law d i h h ld i f i i d h i 65 9/21/2015 131 Written Description § 112, ¶ 1 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Ariad Pharma. v. Eli Lilly and Co., cont. 132 Policy implications for universities Patent law has always been directed to the “useful Arts” – but what does that mean? Practical use Universities engage primarily in basic research, more upstream Patents are not awarded for academic theories. “[A] patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.” Page 131. WD is focused on the conception of the complete and final invention and subsequent disclosure.© C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 66 9/21/2015 WD v. Definiteness 133 Why have a WD requirement when there is a claiming requirement? 1. Historical explanation WD pre-dates definiteness requirement of §112, ¶2 2. Policy-based rationale WD guards against inventor overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original creation Definiteness shapes the future conduct of competitors by insisting they receive notice of the claim scope © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 134 Definiteness § 112, ¶ 2 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 67 9/21/2015 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 135 According to Federal Circuit Sec 112, para 2 language “particularly point out and distinctly claim” is satisfied “so long as claim is ‘amenable to construction,’ and the claim, as construed, is not ‘insolubly ambiguous’” SCt test: Sec 112, para 2 is not met if the claims “fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc. 136 Patent relates to heart-rate monitor for use during exercise Patentee asserts invention is improvement over prior art because it eliminates EMG signals (filters them) that mask ECG signals, thereby present invention provides more accurate reading Claim term: live electrodes [9 and 13] and common electrodes [11 and 15] “mounted … in “spaced relationship with each other” is at issue DCt held this term does “not tell [the court] or anyone what precisely the space should be,” or even supply “any parameters” for determining the appropriate spacing. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 68 9/21/2015 137 Section 112, Para 2 Analysis – A “Delicate Balance” 1. Definiteness is evaluated from the perspective The reasonable-certainty standard balances the inherent of a PHOSITA limitations of language, and the modicum of uncertainty 2. Claims are to be read in the light the to apprise that comes with such limitations, with theof need patent’s specification and prosecution history for the public of what is claimed and to reduce incentives patent applicants to measured inject ambiguity their 3. Definiteness at theinto time theclaims. patent is filed 4. Some ambiguity is tolerated – Why? 5. But not too much – Why? Zone of uncertainty Powerful incentives into claims © C. Nard to - Fallinject 2015 - Law ambiguity of Patents On Remand 138 Federal Circuit again reversed the district court’s decision on essentially the same grounds articulated in its prior opinion. Federal Circuit concluded – for all practical purposes – that the “reasonable certainty” standard did not render prior precedent inapplicable. Federal Circuit stated the Supreme Court “modified the standard by which lower courts examine allegedly ambiguous claims; we may now steer by the bright star of ‘reasonable certainty,’ rather than the unreliable compass of ‘insoluble ambiguity.’” “Reasonableness is the core of much of the common law, © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents and ‘reasonable certainty has been defined in broad 69 9/21/2015 139 Best Mode § 112, ¶ 1 REFORM ALERT: AIA ELIMINATED BEST MODE AS BASIS FOR CHALLENGING VALIDITY © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Best Mode Test 140 Two-part test: 1. Subjective: whether, at the time the patent application was filed, the inventor knew of a mode of practicing the claimed invention that he considered to be better than any other. 2. If yes, whether the specification adequately disclosed what the inventor contemplated as the best mode so that those having ordinary skill in the art could practice it © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 70 9/21/2015 Chapter 3 141 Utility and Eligible Subject Matter © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 142 Eligible Subject Matter © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 71 9/21/2015 Eligible Subject Matter 143 Biotechnology Medical Device Software IT Hardware Companies holding patents/apps (share) 39% 75% 76% 24% ----- Average # patents/apps held 4.7 9.7 15.0 1.7 ----- Average # filed by company 8.1 8.5 13.0 5.0 ----- Average # from founders 1.9 2.0 3.0 0.9 ----- Average # acquired 2.1 2.4 3.7 0.9 ----- 144 Source Population of companies (D&B) Industry All Respondents © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Venture-backed companies Companies holding patents/apps (share) 82% 97% 94% 67% 91% Average # patents/apps held 18.7 34.6 25.2 5.9 27.4 Average # filed by company 15.8 22.9 16.1 7.1 23.6 Average # from founders 2.5 3.8 3.8 0.7 3.1 4.2 9.0 6.5 0.7 3.5 Average # acquired © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 72 9/21/2015 145 1. Biomedical-Related Inventions © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Diamond v. Chakrabarty 146 What does Chakrabarty seek to patent? Three Oil eating bacteria types of claims: 1.process for producing the bacteria 2.an inoculum comprised of a carrier material floating on water, and the new bacteria 3.bacteria themselves © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 73 9/21/2015 Diamond v. Chakrabarty 147 Does § 101 say anything about living matter? What are the strongest and weakest arguments for patentability? Broad statutory construction “Anything under the sun that is made by man” “the patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility – REMEMBER THESE WORDS How does the Court handle the dissent and the plant patent statutes of 1930 and 1970? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Diamond v. Chakrabarty 148 What are the limits of §101? Laws of nature Physical phenomena Abstract ideas What are the reasons for these exclusions? Are there arguments for eliminating the statutory subject matter requirement? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 74 9/21/2015 Mayo v. Prometheus Labs 149 Process claims in which a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or naturally occurring relation or correlation is a limited element or step. Laws of nature are unpatentable, but… “[T]o transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents words “apply it.” The patent claims correlations between thiopurine Mayo v. Prometheus Labs metabolite levels and the toxicity and efficacy of 150 thiopurine dosages The patentdrug claims embody findings that concentrations The Court demanded the presence of an of certain metabolites in the patient’s blood beyond a “inventive concept sufficient to ensure certain level indicate the thiopurine drugs will that likelythe patent in practice amounts to significantlytoo more cause harmful side effects and concentrations low thanthe a patent upondosage the natural law itself.” indicate thiopurine will be ineffective In the end, held the SCt concluded the patent Federal Circuit the “administering” and claims do not “addsteps enough to their statements of the “determining” involved a “transformation of the correlations allowtaken the processes they describe human body or oftoblood from the body,” thereby to qualify as patent-eligible processes apply satisfying the machine or transformation testthat of 101 natural laws.” There was no “inventive concept” eligibility. beyond what occurs naturally. What is enough? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 75 9/21/2015 Mayo v. Prometheus Labs 151 According to SCt, unlike the ‘623 patent in The Court also remarked how the additional steps Prometheus, of the additional steps of the recited in thenone claimed invention “consist of wellDiehr claimedroutine, invention “were in activity contextalready obvious, understood, conventional engaged by the scientific community.” How already in in use, or purely conventional.” Thus the different did is Diehr case? to preempt the use of the” patentee not “seek Arrhenius equation. Can the issue also be characterized as one concerned Is this an scope eligibility orimpeding novelty/obviousness argument? with claim and improvement activity? SeeSCt U.S. Gov’t position. If a lawnot of inhibit naturediscovery is part of aby The noted “that patent law claim, Prometheus — despite its recognition that “all improperly tying up the future use of laws of nature.” inventions can be reduced to underlying principles of Citing Morse. nature” — seems to suggest that eligibility requires the © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents patentee to set forth the law’s application in a novel and Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Federal Circuit case) 152 The Issue: Are human genes patentable? YES according to the majority. 1.Chakrabarty and precedent require a distinction between a product of nature and a human-made invention for purposes of 101. The distinction turns on a change in the claimed compositions identity compared with what exists in nature. In other words, do the compositions have similar characteristics or has human © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents intervention given “markedly different,” or “distinctive ” characteristics 76 9/21/2015 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad BRCA gene patent case) 153 2. Isolated DNA is a distinctive chemical compared to native DNA A. Native DNA exists in the body as one of 46 large, contiguous DNA molecules B. Each DNA molecule is itself an integral part of a larger structural complex, a chromosome C. In each chromosome, the DNA molecule is packaged around histone proteins into a structure called chromatin © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad BRCA gene patent case) 154 3. By contrast, isolated DNA: A. Is a free-standing portion of a native DNA B. Isolated DNA has been cleaved (i.e., had its covalent bonds in its backbone chemically severed) to consist of just a fraction of a naturally occurring DNA molecule “Accordingly, BRCA1 and 2 in their isolated state are not the same molecules as DNA as it exists in the body; human intervention in cleaving a portion of a native chromosomal DNA imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical identity from © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents that possessed by native DNA” 77 9/21/2015 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad BRCA gene patent case) 155 156 Structure, not function, matters 4. While it is true that the isolated DNA and native DNA have the same information content, this is but one similarity; 5. “It is the distinctive nature of DNA molecules as isolated compositions of matter that determines their patent eligibility rather than their physiological use or benefit.” 6. “The claimed isolated DNA molecules are distinct from their natural existence as portions of larger entities, and their informational content is irrelevant to that fact.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad BRCA gene patent case) POLICY 7. It is the difference between knowledge of nature and reducing a portion of nature to concrete form, the latter activity being what the patent laws seek to encourage and protect; 8. w/r/t the dissent’s “snapping a leaf from a tree” analogy, “no one would contemplate that snapping a leaf from a tree would be worthy of a patent, whereas isolating genes to provide useful diagnostic tools and medicines is surely what the patent laws are intended to encourage and protect.” 9. Settled expectations of the inventing community – C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Congress is best to© bring about change; not the courts 78 9/21/2015 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad BRCA gene patent case) 157 Dissent 1. Majority holding will have “broad consequences” Preempting method for whole-genome sequencing “Myriad’s contribution to the filed is not remotely consonant with such effects” What is Myriad’s contribution? Myriad discovered the nucleotide sequence of the BRCA gene; but it neither discovered its chromosomal location, nor a new method of nucleotide sequencing. Does Bryson’s position remind you of some other case? 112? 2. The process of extracting (isolating) a human does not convert the gene into patentable subject matter. 3. An isolated gene has the same genetic code as a native gene, even though the molecular structure different © C. Nard - Fall 2015 -may Law ofbe Patents 158 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad BRCA gene patent case) Dissent, cont. 4. Chakrabarty importantly held that artificial life is patentable if it is a product of human ingenuity “having a distinctive name, character, [and] use” – a product with “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility.” 5. “The only material change made to the BRCA genes from their natural state is the change incidental to the extraction of the genes from the environment in which they are found in nature” 6. In this regard, genes are like a new mineral or new plant found in nature. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 79 9/21/2015 159 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad BRCA gene patent case) Dissent, cont. 7. Simply breaking a bond does not transform an otherwise unpatenable product into a patentable product. For example: “Weaker interatomic forces will be broken when a dirty diamond is cleaned with water or another solvent, but that does not make the clean diamond a human-made invention.” 8. The same holds true for lithium, which the majority admits is not patentable once isolated. How are isolated atoms different than isolated molecules? 9. Not all isolated/extracted substances are ineligible: baseball bat v. gene. 10. Purification does not change matters unless the purified natural substance results in a product with such distinct characteristics that it becomes “for every practical purpose a new thing commercially and © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents therapeutically.” 160 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad BRCA gene patent case) Dissent, cont. 11. Chakrabarty demands us to two focus on two things: A. The similarity in structure between what is claimed and what is found in nature; and B. The similarity in utility between what is claimed and what is found in nature. “What is claimed in the BRCA genes is the genetic coding material, and that material is the same, structurally and functionally, in both the native gene and the isolated form of the gene.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 80 9/21/2015 161 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (Supreme Court reverses CAFC) Are Genes Patentable? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 162 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (Supreme Court reverses CAFC), cont. Court held an isolated DNA sequence are not eligible for patent protection under 35 U.S.C. sec 101because it is a “product of nature” But cDNA is eligible for patent protection because it is not naturally occurring Court did not decide several items, and made a point of letting us know © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 81 9/21/2015 163 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (Supreme Court reverses CAFC), cont. Decided in the context of patent law’s incentive dynamic “The rule against patents on naturally occurring things is not without limits,… , for ‘all inventions at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas,’ and ‘too broad an interpretation of this exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.’ As we have recognized before, patent protection strikes a delicate balance between creating ‘incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery’ and ‘imped[ing] the © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents flow of information that might permit indeed spur 164 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (Supreme Court reverses CAFC), cont. The Role of Chakrabarty and Invention v. Discovery “The Chakrabarty bacterium was new ‘with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature,’ due to the additional plasmids and resultant “capacity for degrading oil.’ In this case, by contrast, Myriad did not create anything. To be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.” …. “Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by itself satisfy the § 101 inquiry.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 82 9/21/2015 165 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (Supreme Court reverses CAFC), cont. The Role of Chakrabarty and Invention v. Discovery, cont. In contrast, “creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring.” And although “‘[t]he nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab technician,’ the lab technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made.” 1.cDNA retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from which it was derived. 2.As a result, cDNA is not a “product of nature” and is © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents patent eligible under § 101” 166 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (Supreme Court reverses CAFC), cont. What the Court Did Not Decide 1. No Method Claims Before Court: “Had Myriad created an innovative method of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought a method patent.” 2. No New applications of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Judge Bryson aptly noted that, “[a]s the first party with knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an excellent position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its unchallenged claims are limited to© C.such Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents applications ” 83 9/21/2015 167 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (Supreme Court reverses CAFC), cont. What the Court Did Not Decide 3. Altering Nucleotide Order: “Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we express no opinion about the application of § 101 to such endeavors.” A Modest Approach: “We merely hold that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under § 101 simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 168 Asso’c of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (Supreme Court reverses CAFC), cont. Questions 1.Did the Court assume a compromise position that is fair-minded, supported by current patent law doctrine and policy, and retains important incentives for biotechnology players; 2.On what basis could the Court have affirmed the Federal Circuit’s decision in its entirety; reversed in its entirety? 3.What effect on the biotechnology industry? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 84 9/21/2015 Myriad Undeterred…. 169 A few months after the Myriad decision, Myriad filed suit against Ambry Genetics, writing in its complaint: “As of the morning of June 13, 2013, Plaintiffs collectively had 24 patents containing 520 claims concerning two genes (BRCA1 and BRCA2), and methods of use and synthetic compositions of matter related thereto. On June 13, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that five patent claims covering isolated naturally occurring DNA were not patent-eligible, thereby reducing the overall patent © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Lawpatent of Patents estate to 24 patents and 515 claims. This case involves none of those five rejected claims ” 170 2. Business Methods and Process-Related Inventions © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 85 9/21/2015 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l 171 Patent claims a computer-implemented scheme for mitigating “settlement risk” by using a thirdparty intermediary “method of exchanging obligations as between parties… Held: Patent claims an “abstract idea” of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent eligible invention © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l 172 The concern that drives the “exclusionary principle” is one of pre-emption Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas “Monopolization of those tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it,” thereby thwarting the primary object of patent law But must be careful to prevent exclusionary principle from swallowing all of patent law Thus, must distinguish between patents that claim building blocks of human ingenuity and those that integrate the building blocks into something more, © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents thereby transforming them into a patent eligible 86 9/21/2015 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l 173 Mayo Two-Step: 1. Determine whether claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. If yes, what else is there in the claims before the us? To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and “as an ordered combination” to determine whether the additional elements “transform the nature of the claim” into a patent-eligible application. 2. Search for an “inventive concept” – i.e., an element or combination of elements that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents t] it lf ” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l 174 Step 1: What is an “abstract idea?” need not labor to delimit the precise contours on the “abstract ideas” category. It is enough to recognize Is “a fundamental economic practice” that there is no meaningful distinction between the always of anrisk abstract idea? concept hedging in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here….” “We Step 2: Was there an “inventive concept” Adding conventional steps are not “enough” to supply an inventive concept -- What is enough? Not introducing a computer or adding the words “apply it” Not limiting the use of an abstract idea © C.“to Nard -aFallparticular 2015 - Law of Patents t h l i l i t” 87 9/21/2015 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, Int’l 175 So: Compare Diehr 1.Stating an abstract idea “while adding words ‘apply it” is not enough to Invention satisfy sec. 101 was eligible for patent protection “not 2.Limiting the useitofinvolved an abstractaidea “to a particularly because computer.” Thetechnological claim environment” is not enough to satisfy sec. 101 employed a well-known mathematical equation, but it used that equation in a process designed to solve a technological problem in “conventional industry practice” The “claims in Diehr were patent eligible because they improved an existing technological process, not because they were implemented on © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents a computer” Are Matters Out of Control? 176 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 88 9/21/2015 177 Utility © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents In re Swartz 178 Cold Fusion © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 89 9/21/2015 In re Swartz 179 Modern Utility Test: two-step: 1. The PTO has the initial burden of challenging a presumptively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure; 2. Only after the PTO provides evidence showing that a PHOSITA would reasonably doubt the asserted utility does the burden shift to the applicant to prove utility Brana © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Brenner v. Manson 180 Biotechnology Chemistry How useful must the invention be to satisfy §101? In other words, how substantial? This feature of the utility requirement is typically applied to the fields of biotechnology and chemistry © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 90 9/21/2015 Brenner v. Manson 181 The invention was for a process The PTO denied Manson’s request for an interference because the claimed process failed “to disclose any utility for” the chemical compound produced by the process What was the CCPA’s basis and rationale for reversing the PTO? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Brenner v. Manson 182 How did Manson attempt to show utility for the claimed process? 1. An adjacent homologue of the steroid yielded by his process has been demonstrated to have tumor-inhibiting effects in mice 2. The compound produced by the claimed process is the subject of serious scientific investigation 3. The process works – produces its intended product and is not harmful © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 91 9/21/2015 Brenner v. Manson 183 The Court looked to: 1. General intent of Congress Manson’s reading of 101 “places such a special meaning on the word ‘useful’ that we cannot accept it in the absence of evidence that Congress so intended” 2. Purposes of the patent system One purpose of patent system is dissemination of technical information, but….? Compare Harlan’s dissent 3. Implications of a decision one way or another Until the process has “substantial utility… there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad field…. A patent is not a hunting license” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents For applications filed after March 16, 2013 184 Chapter 4 – Novelty REFORM ALERT: AIA CHANGED DEFINITION OF NOVELTY © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 92 9/21/2015 “Old” (but still very much relevant) Section 102 185 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a) (b) The invention was known or used by others in this country [U.S.A.], or patented or described in a printed publication is this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent [before the invention date]; The invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for in- Lawthe United States © C.patent Nard - Fall 2015 of Patents Atlas Powder v. IRECO 186 Anticipation Test: To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently – the claim “reads on” the prior art If granting patent protection on the disputed claim would allow the patentee to exclude the public from practicing the prior art, then that claim is anticipated, regardless of whether it also covers subject matter not in the prior art. When a patent claims a chemical composition in terms of ranges of elements, any single prior art reference that falls within each of the ranges anticipates the claim. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 93 9/21/2015 Atlas Powder v. IRECO 187 ‘727 and ‘788 patents – relating to explosive compositions - anticipated by Egly and Butterworth patents What about: “sufficient aeration ... entrapped to enhance sensitivity to a substantial degree.” Dct found this limitation inherent in the prior art by interpreting “sufficient aeration” through the eyes of a PHOSITA to include both interstitial air (between oxidizer particles) and porous air (within the pores of oxidizer particles) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Atlas Powder v. IRECO 188 Inherency “Because ‘sufficient aeration’ was inherent in the prior art, it is irrelevant that the prior art did not recognize the key aspect of Dr. Clay's alleged invention - that air may act as the sole sensitizer of the explosive composition.” “Once it is recognized that interstitial and porous air were inherent elements of the prior art compositions, the assertion that air may act as a sole sensitizer amounts to no more than a claim to the discovery of an inherent property of the prior art, not the addition of a novel element.” “[I]nsufficient scientific understanding does not defeat a © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents showing of inherency.” 94 9/21/2015 Comment 1 Following Atlas 189 1. Identity of Invention A single prior art reference must disclose each and every limitation of the claimed invention either explicitly or inherently – References cannot be combined 2. Anticipatory Enablement The single prior art reference must enable a PHOSITA how to make and use the claimed invention PHOSITA knowledge adds to the picture 3. Claim Limitation Arrangement Matters Anticipation arranged requires how the claim limitations are © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Gayler v. Wilder 190 From the 3117 patent © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents “Salamander Safe” made of heavy iron plates and filled with a three-inch layer of plaster of Paris in liquid form 95 9/21/2015 Gayler v. Wilder 191 Why should Fitzgerald get the patent? And BTW, why the name “Salamander” for Fitzgerald’s safe? Hasn’t Conner invented first? How did the court interpret “known or used?” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Gayler v. Wilder 192 Who is “them?” “It is the inventor here that brings it to them, and places it in their possession. And as he does this by the effort of his own genius, the law regards him as the first and original inventor, and protects his patent, although the improvement had in fact been invented before, and used by others.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 96 9/21/2015 Gayler v. Wilder 193 “The knowledge has been lost for ages. Yet it would hardly be doubted, if any one now discovered an art thus lost, and it was a useful improvement, that, upon fair construction of the act of Congress, he would be entitled to a patent. Yet he would not literally be the first and true inventor. But he would be the first to confer on the public the benefit of the invention.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Gayler v. Wilder 194 Lastly, regarding the present case: “The public could derive no benefit from it until it was discovered by another inventor. And if Fitzgerald made his discovery by his own efforts, without any knowledge of Conner’s, he invented an improvement that was then new, and at that time unknown; and it was not the less new and unknown because Conner’s safe was recalled to his memory by the success of Fitzgerald’s.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 97 9/21/2015 Gayler v. Wilder 195 BUT! “We do not understand the Circuit Court to have said that the omission of Conner to try the value of his safe by proper tests would deprive it of its priority; nor his omission to bring in into public use. He might have omitted both, and also abandoned its use, and been ignorant of the extent of its value; yet if it was the same with Fitzgerald’s, the latter would not upon such grounds be entitled to a patent, provided Conner’s safe and its mode of construction were still in the memory of Conner before they were recalled by © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Fitzgerald’s patent.” Gayler v. Wilder 196 What happened to: “It is the inventor here that brings it to them, and places it in their possession. And as he does this by the effort of his own genius…” If Conner had a better recollection, Fitzgerald’s patent would have been invalidated for lack of novelty! Why? How has Conner (with a better memory) benefitted the public? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 98 9/21/2015 Non-Secret = Public Knowledge/Use US Patent Application Rosaire 1935 1936 Oct 1936 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 197 Rosaire v. National Lead Co., 218 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 916 (1955) Rosaire v. Baroid Sales 198 What is the argument of Rosaire and Horvitz? Gulf did not apply for a patent until 1939, did not publish Teplitz’s ideas, and did not give the public the benefit of Teplitz’s work Teplitz’s work was an incomplete experiment. According to the court: “An unsuccessful experiment which is later abandoned does not negative novelty in a new and successful device.” Nevertheless, the existence and operation of a machine, abandoned after its completion and sufficient use to demonstrate is practicability, is evidence” of lack of novelty. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 99 9/21/2015 Rosaire v. Baroid Sales 199 Where the work was done “openly and in the ordinary course of the activities of the employer, a large producing company in the oil industry,” court will not modify the statute “to require some affirmative act to bring the work to the attention of the public at large.” But how public was Gulf’s work? Was it “known” in the 102(a) sense? What is difference between Horvitz/Rosaire and Fitzgerald? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents “Old” (but still very much relevant) Section 102 200 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a) (b) The invention was known or used by others in this country [U.S.A.], or patented or described in a printed publication is this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent [before the invention date]; The invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for in- Lawthe United States © C.patent Nard - Fall 2015 of Patents 100 9/21/2015 New Section 102 201 (a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.--A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents New Section 102, cont. 202 (b) EXCEPTIONS.-(1) DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE FILING DATE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION.--A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if-(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject 101 9/21/2015 Comparative Point ― NEW §102(a) 203 Under new sec. 102(a) prior art (including knowledge and use) can be located anywhere in the world. There are no geographic distinctions, thus the AIA is comparable to European countries, Japan, and Canada. The AIA has implications for developing nations and issues of “biopiracy.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 204 Novelty-Defeating Patent Disclosures Under NEW §102(a)(2) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 102 9/21/2015 “Old” Section 102(e) 205 A person shall be entitled to a patent, unless… (e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents applicant for patent….. Alexander Milburn v. Davis 206 1/31/11 3/4/11 2/6/12 6/4/12 Clifford Filed Whitford Filed Clifford Issued Whitford Issued © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 103 9/21/2015 Alexander Milburn v. Davis 207 “The delays of the patent office ought not to cut down the effect of what has been done.” What “has been done?” Claimed invention lacks novelty Justice Holmes © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Alexander Milburn v. Davis 208 Keep in mind, the issue is not who invented first As the court noted, “The question is not whether Clifford showed himself by the description to be the first inventor.” Rather, the “question is whether Clifford’s disclosure made it impossible for Whitford to claim the invention at a later date.” Concludes the court, “It is not necessary to show who did invent the thing in order to show that Whitford did not.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 104 9/21/2015 Alexander Milburn v. Davis 209 Concludes the court, “It is not necessary to show who did invent the thing in order to show that Whitford did not.” Is it fair for the court and PTO to use Clifford as prior art? 102(e) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Novelty – “Old” § 102(e) § 102 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -but not claimed* (e) the invention was described in -^ (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for the patent; or a patent granted… 18 months US Patent Application Claimed Invention 210 Effective date of reference © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents US Patent Granted §122 publication Secret Prior Art Edwards US Patent Application Jones Edwards Edwards * If claimed, then §102(g) applies. 105 9/21/2015 Should Published Apps be Treated Differently than Issued Patents w/r/t Effective Prior Art Date? 211 “The delays of the patent office ought not to cut down the effect of what has been done.” Justice Holmes Should this statement apply with equal force to published patent applications and issued patents? It seems the PTO can easily publish an application the same day it is filed, whereas examination takes months if not years. If true, why should a published application’s filing date serve as the prior art effective date? Why wouldn’t the effective date be the publication date? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents AIA – Section 102(a)(2) 212 (a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.--A person shall be entitled to a patent unless … (2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 106 9/21/2015 213 Novelty-Defeating Patent Disclosures Under §102(g)(2) REFORM ALERT: AIA eliminated Section 102(g) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Thomson v. Quixote 214 MCA was a non-party actor that developed an anticipatory, unpatented invention Court requires corroboration only when testifying inventor is asserting a claim of derivation or priority of his invention and is a named party, or in a position to benefit directly and substantially by his invention being found to have priority over the patent claims at issue Here, the inventors were non-parties and their testimony concerned an unpatented prior invention But doesn’t MCA have self-interest here? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 107 9/21/2015 Thomson v. Quixote, cont. 215 Footnote 3: “…. The first to invent who has invested time and labor making and using the invention ― but who might have opted not to apply for a patent ― will not be liable for infringing another’s patent on that same invention, while the public will have benefited because the invention was not abandoned, suppressed or concealed.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Thomson v. Quixote, cont. 216 Does the rationale in footnote 3 make sense? What about the patentee who brought the invention to the public in a much more explicit manner? What is the difference between ¶¶ 102(a) and (g)(2)? Why isn’t MCA’s activity considered concealment © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 108 9/21/2015 Is MCA more Sympathetic than Teplitz and Conner (with a good memory)? 217 Compared to Teplitz (and Gulf) and Conner, MCA is still providing a benefit to the public Irony is that although MCA activity is more secret, MCA is benefitting the public by continuously use of the claimed invention What is the difference between 102(g)(2) and 102(a) prior art? See Comment 3 following Thomson Continuity! Why isn’t section 102(g)(2) activity considered “concealment”? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Prior User Rights Under AIA 218 The AIA seeks to avoid the zero-sum game by eliminating § 102(g) prior art (secret prior invention), which means that secret prior invention like MCA’s will not qualify as prior art w/r/t patents issued on or after 9/16/2011 But the AIA also created a prior user right, which, if he qualifies under the statute, will enable the secret prior inventor/user to continue commercially exploiting his invention. Thus, the prior user provision allows courts to find a patent not invalid, while also protecting the secret © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents prior inventor/user from an infringement finding. 109 9/21/2015 Prior User Rights Under AIA, cont. 219 220 According to the USPTO Report on Prior User Rights: “ Providing limited prior user rights in a firstinventor-to-file system addresses the inherent inequity such a system creates between an earlier commercial user of the subject matter and a later patentee. A prior user rights defense is promanufacturing and pro-jobs, as it rewards businesses that put new technology promptly into commercial use, and provides protection for early C. Nard - Fallchallenged 2015 - Law of Patents by the later filing commercial use ©when of patent applications by other entities ” The Prior User Rights Mechanism The AIA amends § 273 and expands the prior-user right to include any “process, or consisting of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter used in a manufacturing or other commercial process.” A party must prove that it commercially used the patented invention for at least one year prior to the earlier of the (1) “effective filing date of the claimed invention;” or (2) “the date on which the claimed invention was disclosed to the public in a manner that qualified for the exception from prior art under section 102(b).” The commercial use has to be in the United States and “either in connection with an internal commercial use or an actual arm’s length sale or other arm’s length commercial of © C. Nard - Falltransfer 2015 - Law of Patents f l d lt f h i l ” § 273( )(1) 110 9/21/2015 Other forms of “commercial use” 221 273(c): (1) Pre-marketing regulatory approval (e.g., FDA); (2) Use is a non-profit research laboratory (e.g., university or hospital) for which the public is the intended beneficiary. Section (2) only applies for continued and noncommercial use by the lab or non-profit entity © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Questions 222 The one-year requirement seeks to prevent prior users from learning of an imminent patent filing and racing to establish a prior user right. 1. But does the one-year commercial use requirement favor only those prior users (who are also oftentimes prior inventors) who have the foresight to opt for a long-term commercialization plan based on trade secret protection? A prior user/inventor who does not engage in commercial use prior to the specified time frame will be an overnight infringer because he does not qualify for the prior user defense; and the AIA eliminates § 102(g) prior art that the defendant was able to take advantage of in Thomson v. Quixote. 2. Will the prior user will be less inclined to seek patent protection (thus disclosing the invention), knowing it can seek refuge as a prior user? 3. Relatedly, would the second inventor also be disinclined to file for patent protection because the prior user would be beyond his legal grasp? In other words, is the prior user defense simply a compulsory, royalty-free license by another name? 4. Would a prior user defense disproportionately favor entities © C.larger Nard - Fall 2015 - Lawat of the Patents expense of smaller concerns and individuals? 111 9/21/2015 223 Foreign-Based Activity as Prior Art Under ¶¶ 102(e) and (g) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents In re Hilmer (I) 224 Habicht Priority Date Habicht Swiss FD 1/24/57 Hilmer Priority Date Hilmer German FD 7/31/57 Habicht Prior Art Date Habicht U.S. FD 1/23/58 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 112 9/21/2015 In re Hilmer (I) 225 Why doesn’t the court permit the use of a foreign priority date for prior art purposes under 102(e)? Statutory Interpretation: 102(e)(2) “We think it follows that section 119 must be interpreted as giving only a positive right or benefit to an applicant who has first filed abroad to protect him against possible intervening patent-defeating events in obtaining a patent” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents In re Hilmer (I) 226 Is Hilmer I consistent with Alexander Milburn? Recall, “The delays of the patent office ought not to cut down the effect of what has been done” Aren’t there delays in foreign patent offices? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 113 9/21/2015 In re Hilmer (II) 227 Sections 119 and 104 relate, respectively, only to what an applicant or patentee may and may not do to protect himself against patentdefeating events occurring between his invention date and his U.S. filing date.” Page 223 Congress intended “that knowledge and acts in a foreign country are not to defeat the rights on an applicant for a patent, except as the applicant may become involved in a priority © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents entitled to dispute with another applicant [section] 119 benefits” Page 223 In re Hilmer (II) 228 Why doesn’t the court permit the use of a foreign priority date for prior art purposes under 102(g)? Statutory Interpretation: 102(g)(2) “[Section] 119 does not remove the limitation of § 102(g) found in the phrase ‘in this country.’ … Thus, § 119 and § 104 relate, respectively, only to what an applicant or patentee may and may not do to protect himself against patent-defeating events occurring between his invention date and his U.S. filing date.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 114 9/21/2015 REFORM ALERT: AIA – New Section 102(d) overruled Hilmer 229 (d) PATENTS AND PUBLISHED APPLICATIONS EFFECTIVE AS PRIOR ART.--For purposes of determining whether a patent or application for patent is prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2), such patent or application shall be considered to have been effectively filed, with respect to any subject matter described in the patent or application—… (2) if the patent or application for patent is entitled to claim a right of priority under section 119, 365(a), or 365(b), or to claim the benefit of an earlier filing date under section 120, 121, or 365(c), based upon 1 or more prior filed applications for patent, as of the filing date of the earliest such ©application the subject C. Nard - Fall 2015 -that Law of describes Patents matter. REFORM ALERT: AIA – New Section 102(d) overruled Hilmer 230 § 102(d) allows the foreign priority date to serve as the effective prior art date of a foreign application. This provision, therefore, overrules In re Hilmer, which held that a foreign filing date can serve as a priority date for purposes of obtaining a patent, but the same filing date could not be used for prior art purposes to defeat patent rights — only the application’s U.S. filing date could serve that function. Under the new §102(d), if an inventor files a foreign application and claims priority to that filing date, the U.S. patent’s effective date as prior art will be the filing date of the foreign patent, not the U.S. filing date. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 115 9/21/2015 231 “Printed Publication” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents In re Klopfenstein 232 Printed slide presentation at AACC conference and AES at KSU 14 slides printed onto poster boards The slides disclosed every limitation of the ‘950 patent No disclaimer or notice to intended audience prohibiting note-taking or copying the presentation No copies of presentation were distributed at the AACC or AES Presentation never catalogued or indexed in library or database © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 116 9/21/2015 In re Klopfenstein 233 Key inquiry is whether the reference has been made “publicly accessible” to persons interested in the art Dissemination and public accessibility are keys Here: Expertise of audience: Slides shown to wide variety of viewers who were largely PHOSITAs Length of time: Presentation was over a three-day period Expectation and ease of copying: No expectation that information would not be copied; and very easy to take notes – only eight substantive slides of the 14 Footnote 4 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 234 Priority REFORM ALERT: AIA – Section did away with priority and 102(g), but The first-inventor-to-file provisions become effective on March 16, 2013. Thus, an application filed before that date would not be subject to the first-inventor-to-file provisions. The application will be treated under the first-to-invent provisions of the law. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 117 9/21/2015 Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc. 235 How do you prove date of invention? Conception + Corroboration Formed in his mind “a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in practice” Reduction to Practice Actual RTP: “Must demonstrate the invention is suitable for intended purpose” Testing may or may not be required depending on sophistication and complexity of technology Reasonable Diligence When: Party first to conceive but second to RTP. Why the delay? Party must demonstrate reasonable diligence toward RTP from a date jus prior to the other party’s conception to its RTP © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Why is RTP Required? 236 “It is a mistaken idea with many, that the invention of an improvement consists in the first vague idea of it. It takes far more than that to entice one to the merit of an invention, for between the bare conception of an idea, and the demonstration of the practicability and utility of the thing conceived, there is almost always a vast amount of labor to be performed, time and money to be spent, and innumerable difficulties and prejudices to be encountered, before the work is accomplished.” -Charles Slack, Noble Obsession 199 (2002) (quoting from © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Charles Goodyear’s 1853 book, Gum-Elastic and Its Varieties, With a Detailed Account of Its Applications and Uses, and of the Discovery of Vulcanization) 118 9/21/2015 Griffith v. Kanamaru 237 Griffith Conception 6/30/81 6/15/83 – 9/13/83 Admitted period of inactivity Kanamaru U.S.F.D. 11/17/82 Griffith RTP 1/11/84 Reasonable Diligence Period Thus, Kanamaru’s constructive RTP (i.e., invention date) is earlier than Giffith’s RTP. But Griffith can prove an earlier invention date if he can show that he was reasonably diligent “from immediately before Kanamaru’s filing date … until Griffith’s reduction to practice.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Griffith v. Kanamaru 238 Policy of the diligence requirement: Prompt Disclosure! Griffith’s reasons for delay between June 15, 1983 and September 13, 1983: 1. It was reasonable to wait for Cornell to require Griffith to obtain funding from outside the university 2. Waiting for Ms. Jenkins Why was Griffith unsuccessful? Is three months too short a time to base a C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents finding of lack©of reasonable diligence? 119 9/21/2015 Reasonable Diligence Valid Excuses Invalid Excuses • need to develop a closely related invention to test the primary invention • extended vacation/hiatus • insufficient money • serious illness • company relocates • laboratory burns down © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 239 Fujikawa v. Wattanasin 240 1984 1979 1st Phase begins 1985 1/87 Synthesized 3 comp’ds in Vitro testing F’s pd 8/87 W’s interest revived 10/87 12/87 In Vivo Testing 4 comp’ds tested in vitro First Phase – W Conceived 1/88 W was diligent 5/88 8/88 ? Data Collection In vivo completed Invention ‘A’ rating “ripe for filing” 3 “most active” comp’ds tested in vivo Unexplained Un Delay Data collection Completed – end of May 11/88 3/89 Drafting Geiser began drafting application/ Completed in Nov. Application filed © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 120 9/21/2015 Policy of Abandonment 241 Abandonment is consistent with the foundational policy of early disclosure that is built into several other patent law doctrines. As the Federal Circuit has noted, while § 102(g) does not require an explicit disclosure, “the spirit and policy of the patent laws encourage an inventor to take steps to ensure that the public has gained knowledge of the invention which will insure its preservation in the public domain or else run the risk of being dominated by the patent of another.” Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents F 3d 1031 1038 (Fed Cir 2001) 242 Book © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 121 9/21/2015 Chapter Five 243 Nonobviousness © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Hotchkiss v. Greenwood 244 “But in the case before us, the knob is not new, nor the metallic shank and spindle, nor the dovetail form of the cavity in the knob, nor the means by which the metallic shank is securely fastened therein. All these were well known, and in common use; and the only thing new is the substitution of a knob of a different material from that heretofore used in connection with this t” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 122 9/21/2015 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood 245 A clay or porcelain knob may be better or cheaper. “But this, of itself, can never be the subject of a patent. No one will pretend that a machine, made, in whole or in part, of materials better adapted to the purpose for which it is used than the materials of which the old one is constructed, and for that reason better and cheaper, can be distinguished from the old one; or, in the sense of the patent law, can entitle the manufacturer to a patent.” “The difference is formal, and destitute of ingenuity or invention. It may afford evidence of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes intended, but nothing more.”© C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Defining the “Invention” Threshold: Ingenuity Prior Art wood Claimed Invention [U]nless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of fastening the shank and the knob were required in the application to it to the clay or porcelain knob than porcelain were possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of the degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of metal the skilled mechanic, not that of the inventor.” 246 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 2 U.S. 248 (1850) 123 9/21/2015 Graham v. John Deere 247 Justice Tom Clark (1899-1977) John Deere (1804–1886) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents ‘798 and ‘811 Comparison 248 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 124 9/21/2015 Graham v. John Deere Upper Plate Improved Design Hinge Plate Enhanced flexibility Is it obvious to move the hinge plate from under the shank to above the shank? 249 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Graham v. John Deere 250 The Obviousness requirement as a Constitutional mandate? “Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available. Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of * * * useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light that patent validity ‘requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution.’” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 125 9/21/2015 Graham v. John Deere 251 Did the Court understand what § 103 sought to accomplish? “The major distinction [b/t Hotchkiss and § 103] is that Congress has emphasized‘nonobviousness’ as the operative test of the section, rather than the less definite ‘invention’ language of Hotchkiss that Congress thought had led to a ‘large variety’ of expressions in decisions and writings.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Graham v. John Deere, cont. 252 The Test: 1. Scope and content of prior art 2. Differences b/t prior art and claims 3. Level of ordinary skill in the art 4. Obviousness or not is determined 5. Secondary considerations considered “This is not to say, however, that there will not be difficulties in applying the nonobviousness test. What is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to be uniformity of thought in every given factual context.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 126 9/21/2015 253 Determining Obviousness (or Not) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc. 254 KSR challenges the Federal Circuit’s “teaching, suggestion, motivation” test (TSM test) Recall that unlike §102 novelty determination, references can be combined under §103 The test holds: A patent claim is only proved obvious if “some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art teachings” can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of a person having in the art. © C.ordinary Nard - Fall 2015 -skill Law of Patents 127 9/21/2015 KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc. 255 The Engelgau patent relates to adjustable pedals, namely “a position-adjustable pedal assembly with an electronic pedal position sensor attached to the support member of the pedal assembly.” “Attaching the sensor to the support member allows the sensor to remain in a fixed position while the driver adjusts the pedal.” A claim broader than claim 4 was rejected because it did not include a sensor placed on a fixed pivot point. Claim 4 was allowed because it the fixed pivot point limitation © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Importantly, Asano was not before the PTO KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc. 256 According to the DCt, claim 4 was obvious: Asano taught everything in claim 4 except the use of a sensor to detect the pedal’s position and transmit it to the computer controlling the throttle. This feature was shown in the ‘068/‘811 patents and the Chevrolet sensors The Fed Cir reversed based on the failure of the DCt to properly apply the TSM test © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 128 9/21/2015 KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc. 257 SCt reversed Fed Cir based on several grounds: 1. Fed Cir erred by holding that courts and examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying to solve 2. Fed Cir erred by assuming that a PHOSITA attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem 3. Fed Cir drew wrong conclusion from the risk of courts and examiners falling prey to hindsight bias © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents KSR Int’l v. Teleflex, Inc. 258 Factors for an obviousness determination: 1. inter-related teachings of the patents 2. demands known to the design community 3. scientific literature and market demand 4. background knowledge of PHOSITA and inferences/creative steps he would employ 5. Any need or problem known in the field of endeavor 6. Uses of items beyond their primary purpose © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 129 9/21/2015 Perfect Web Tech. v. InfoUSA, Inc. 259 Post-KSR 1-3 + 4-7 Pre-KSR A reason, suggestion, or motivation to combine may be found explicitly or implicitly: 1. in the prior art references themselves; 2. in the knowledge of the PHOSITA that certain references, or disclosures in those references, are of special interest or importance in the field; 3. from the nature of the problem to be solved; 4. market forces; 5. design incentives; 6. any known problem in the field of endeavor at the time of the invention and addressed by the patent; and 7. background knowledge, creativity, and common sense of the PHOSITA © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 260 Constructing the PHOSITA © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 130 9/21/2015 Daiichi Sankyo v. Apotex, Inc. 261 ‘741 patent relates to method for treating bacterial ear infections DCt concluded that PHOSITA “would have a medical degree, experience and use of antibiotics – a pediatrician or general practitioner – the first line of defense in treating infections” Apotex argues PHOSITA should be “a person engaged in developing pharmaceuticals, formulations and treatment methods, or a © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents specialist in ear treatments” Daiichi Sankyo v. Apotex, Inc. 262 Constructing a PHOSITA: Factors 1. educational level of the inventor; 2. type of problems encountered in the art; 3. prior art solutions to those problems; 4. rapidity with which innovations are made; 5. sophistication of the technology; and 6. educational level of active workers in the field © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 131 9/21/2015 Daiichi Sankyo v. Apotex, Inc. 263 According to the Federal Circuit: The inventors of the ‘741 patent were specialists in drug and ear treatments—not general practitioners or peds Inventor Sato was a university prof specializing in otorhinolaryngology Inventor Handa was a clinical development manager, involved in new drug development and clinical trials Inventor Kitahara was a research scientist engaged in R&D of antibiotics Others in the same field were at the same skill level Nature of the problem—testing on guinea pigs Difference b/t prescribing and developing © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 264 Available Prior Art and the Analogous Art Doctrine © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 132 9/21/2015 In re Icon Health & Fitness 265 ‘624 patent claims a treadmill with a folding base, allowing the base to swivel into an upright storage position The only limitation at issue is the gas spring “to assist in stably retaining” the tread base in the upright position Examiner combined Damark ad and Teague ‘766 patent Damark discloses a folding treadmill but not the gas spring Teague discloses a gas spring in the context of a © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents bed that folds into a cabinet or recess In re Icon Health & Fitness 266 Section 103 requires analogous prior art. Art is analogous if: 1. the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed, or 2. the art is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, but the reference is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved A reference is reasonably pertinent if it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an © C. Nard - Fall - Law of Patents inventor’s attention in2015 considering his problem 133 9/21/2015 In re Icon Health & Fitness 267 1. The Teague springs produce a force always urging the tread base towards the closed position – exactly the type of mechanism that Icon argues its claims require; 2. Icon’s application discusses the gas spring in connection © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 268 Secondary Considerations © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 134 9/21/2015 Transocean Offshore v. Maersk 269 The patents-in-suit recite a derrick with both a main and an auxiliary advancing station, each of which can separately assemble drill strings and lower components to the seafloor. This advancement ins the art makes the process of creating a borehole and drilling more efficient because each component does not have to be assembled and disassembled each time a component is lowered © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents “Evidence of secondary considerations may often Transocean Maersk be the most probativeOffshore and cogent v. evidence in the record. It may often establish that an invention The establishment of a prima facieincase appearing to have been obvious lightofof the obviousness is notPage a conclusion prior art was not” 429. on the ultimate 270 issue of obviousness. By definition, the existence of a prima facie case simply means that the party challenging a patent has presented evidence “sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption [of obviousness] unless disproved or rebutted.” The prima facie inquiry is based on the first three Graham factors A patentee is free to introduce evidence of the fourth factor, secondary considerations © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 135 9/21/2015 The Factors 271 Commercial Success Nexus required because commercial success may be due to factors unrelated to claimed invention (e.g. marketing/advertising) Industry Praise and Unexpected Results Praise must be tied to claimed invention Long-Felt Need Competitors may have different R&D priorities “Transocean presented evidence that royalties paid under the Copying licenses exceed any litigation costs” – why is this an important point? Competitor may think patent is invalid Licensing/Acquiescence Settlement or licensing can be a result of a cost/benefit © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents analysis; less expensive to settle than litigate 272 Chapter 6 Statutory Bars REFORM ALERT: AIA MERGED STATUTORY BARS INTO A NOVELTY RULE © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 136 9/21/2015 The Anatomy of § 102 273 Novelty (a), (e) & (g)(2) Statutory Bars (b) Public Use On-Sale © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 274 § 102(b) Statutory Bars: Public Use & On-Sale Activity Trigger Date Filing Date One Year Grace Period © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 137 9/21/2015 Policies Underlying § 102(b) 275 Removing Inventions from the public that the public has come to believe are free for all to use Prompt and widespread disclosure Prevent commercial exploitation beyond the statutory term of patent Economic or market trial balloon for inventor © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The On-Sale Bar 276 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 138 9/21/2015 277 The Developmental State of the Claimed Invention © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents On-Sale Bar Texas Instruments US Patent Application Purchase Order Vendor: Pfaff 30,100 chip carriers Drawings shown to TI April 8, 1981 Critical Date To: TI Pfaff One Year Grace Period March 17 Apr 8 Apr. 19, 1981 278 July 1981 Apr. 19, 1982 An invention is barred under §102(b) if, more than one year prior to the date of application: 1.The invention is the subject of a commercial offer for sale, and 2.The invention is “ready for patenting” • An invention is ready for patenting when it has been reduced to practice or described sufficiently to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention (in other words, actually or constructively reduced to © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents practice) Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998) 139 9/21/2015 Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, cont. 279 Why is developmental stage of invention important for an on-sale analysis? At what stage was Pfaff’s invention at time of triggering event? RTP Substantially complete What did the SCt court adopt? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 280 Space Systems v. Lockheed Martin ‘375 patent relates to attitude control system for maintaining position and orientation of satellite ‘375 in particular employs “pre-bias” techniques for station keeping © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 140 9/21/2015 Space Systems v. Lockheed Martin 281 1. Ford sent French company document entitled “Engineering Change Proposal” (ECP) that described prebias idea and how Chan proposed to achieve it – technical steps 2. Drawings were included in ECP and costs of developing system 3. DCt held this submission was an invalidating on-sale event, citing Pfaff v. Wells Electronics © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 282 Space Systems v. Lockheed Martin Ford ECP 19 March 1982 Critical Date 21 April 1982 ‘375 Filing date one year 21 April 1983 What two on-sale criteria must Lockheed prove were present at this time point? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 141 9/21/2015 Space Systems v. Lockheed Martin 283 Lockheed argues: 1. On-Sale event attaches when inventor offers for sale a product that has reached the “conception stage” 2. There was conception on 19 March 1982, and therefore, invention was ready for patenting because patent application could have been filed SSL argues: 1. As of 19 March 1982, Chan’s idea was not ready for patenting (no feasibility study) and not enabled © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 2. Chan supporting testimony Space Systems v. Lockheed Martin 284 At what developmental stage must the invention be for the on-sale clock to begin to run? DCt held “legal conception” CAFC reversed, stating SCt in Pfaff defined “ready for patenting” as either ARTP or enablement No enablement present on 19 March 1982, particularly since pre-bias technique was a complex invention © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 142 9/21/2015 285 What Constitutes an Offer for Sale? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Plumtree Software v. Datamize 286 Timeline: 1994: MA completed development of authoring tool that could be used to create kiosks 1/17/95: MA gave presentation to reps at Ski Industry of America (SIA) – a trade show. Invention RTP already 1/25/95: SIA sent letter to MA confirming MA would provide kiosk at trade show in exchange for SIA’s waiving the 10K sponsorship fee 27 February 1995 – CRITICAL DATE March 1995 trade show held in Las Vegas where © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents MA kiosk was displayed 143 9/21/2015 Plumtree Software v. Datamize 287 DCt held MA patents invalid as on sale based on DCt view that at 1/17/95 meeting MA offered to provide kiosk system during March 1995 trade show MA received consideration in the form of waived 10K SIA fee and granted a “prime” location Kiosks at trade show embodied all of the claim limitations © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Plumtree Software v. Datamize 288 Two alternative theories for Plumtree to meet the first prong of Pfaff: 1. Before critical date MA made a commercial offer to perform patented product (even if performance itself occurred after the CD) 2. Demonstrate MA performed the patented method before CD for a promise of future compensation © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 144 9/21/2015 Plumtree Software v. Datamize 289 Theory One: Did MA make a commercial offer? How is commercial offer defined? One which the other party could make into a binding K by simple acceptance MA made a commercial offer b/f the CD, but the offer did not unambiguously require use of the patented method The reference to the software/hardware package is ambiguous as to whether it required MA to provide the kiosk system software or perform the patented method © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Plumtree Software v. Datamize 290 Theory Two: Did MA actually perform the patented method steps b/f the CD? Selling a product made by the patented process constitutes a sale, and performing the patented method constitutes a sale Kiosk system, which employed patented method, was not made until after CD. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 145 9/21/2015 Offer or No Offer? 291 have developed a machine which can curl and shred ribbon so that Hallmark can produce the product you see enclosed – a bag of already curled and shredded ribbon…. We could provide the machine and/or the technology and work on a license/royalty basis” Is this an offer? Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding language NOT a commercial offer) “We © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 292 So What Constitutes an “Offer?” “Contract law traditionally recognizes that mere advertising and promoting of a product may be nothing more than an invitation for offers, while responding to such an invitation may itself be an offer. Restatement (Second) of Contracts sec. 26 (1981). In any given circumstance, who is the offeror, and what constitutes a definite offer, requires looking closely at the language of the proposal itself. Language suggesting a legal offer, such as “I offer” or “I promise” can be contrasted with language suggesting more preliminary negotiations, such as “I © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of quote” or “are you interested.” Differing phrases are Patents f ff ”G O 146 9/21/2015 293 Public-Use Bar © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Egbert v. Lippmann The “Corset Case” 294 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 147 9/21/2015 Egbert v. Lippmann, cont. 295 A minimalist approach: To constitute the public use of an invention 1. Not necessary that more than one of the patented articles should be publicly used 2. Does not depend on number of person to whom the invention’s use is known 3. Some inventions by their character are only capable of being used where the cannot be seen by the public eye © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Egbert v. Lippmann, cont. 296 Why did the court adopt such a minimalist approach to public use? What result if Frances were the inventor and, while not disclosing or showing the corset to anyone, wore and used the corset for its intended purpose? What result if Frances were the inventor and disclosed the corset to Samuel, who comprehended its design, but never used the corset for its intended purpose © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 148 9/21/2015 Egbert v. Lippmann, cont. 297 What about the Dissent? “If a little steep spring inserted in a single pair of corsets, and used by only one woman, covered by her outer-clothing, and in a position always withheld from public observation, is a public use of that piece of steel, I am at a loss to know the line between a private and a public use.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 298 Motionless Keyboard v. Microsoft ‘477 and ‘322 patents related to ergonomic keyboard designed to accommodate the architecture of the human hand © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Mr. Gambaro, our attic inventor 149 9/21/2015 Motionless Keyboard v. Microsoft 299 What do we know? Mr. Gambaro entered into business relationship with Mr. Coulter, and then sought to obtain financial backing Gambaro demonstrated the Cherry Model 5 to potential investors and a friend, Ms. Roberts Potential investors signed a two-yr NDA, some of which expired in 1989; Mr. Coulter and Ms. Roberts did not sign an NDA Gambaro also disclosed the Cherry Model 5 to Ms. Lanier to conduct typing tests Only Ms. Lanier used the device to transmit data to a computer © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Motionless Keyboard v. Microsoft 300 Was the ‘322 patent claimed invention in public use prior to the critical date of 11 January 1992? Although Cherry Model 5 embodied the claimed invention, CAFC found no public use According to court: “Public use includes ‘any [public] use of [the claimed] invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.’” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 150 9/21/2015 Motionless Keyboard v. Microsoft 301 All disclosure, except for Lanier’s typing test, only provided a visual view of the keyboard design without any disclosure of the Cherry Model 5’s ability to translate finger movements into actuation of keys to transmit data. In short, the Cherry Model 5 was never connected to be used in the normal course of business to enter data into a system – thus, never used for its intended purpose. On this © C. Nard - Fall - Law of Patents ground, Motionless is2015distinguishable from Egbert and Electric Storage 302 Third-Party Activity © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 151 9/21/2015 Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive 303 Lorenz filed on 24 January 1920 Lorenz communicated substance to Ittner Ittner and Colgate said no thanks PTO rejected Lorenz application & Lorenz abandoned application Patent issued to Ittner on 18 July 1933 on application filed in 1931 Lorenz files new application on 8 Nov 1931 Interference declared and Lorenz wins © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive, cont. 304 Why was Lorenz patent in public use? Was it the intention of Congress that public use by one who employs a process in breach of a fiduciary relationship, who tortiously appropriates it or who pirates it, should bar the inventor from the fruits of his monopoly? “[T]he defense of public use in reality is asserted on behalf of the public…. The prior-public-use proviso … was enacted by Congress in the public interest.” Is it also in the public interest if patent law were to prevent third-party disclosures from acting as potential statutory bars? “He [i.e., the inventor] is master of the situation and by prompt action can protect himself fully and render the defense of prior public use impossible.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 152 9/21/2015 Evans Cooling v. GM 305 John Evans claimed he reduced the invention to practice in 1986 but failed to file an application for some six years GM had overwhelming evidence that it offered the claimed invention for sale before the critical date But Evans asks court to rule that an otherwise invalidating offer for sale does not invalidate a patent “where a third party surreptitiously steals an invention while it is a trade secret and then, unbeknownst to the inventor, allegedly puts the invention on sale [more than one year] before the inventor files a patent application covering the stolen invention.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Evans Cooling v. GM 306 Evans cites three SCt cases: Pennock, Shaw, and Kendall How does the Fed Cir address these cases? Dicta What about Lorenz? Dealers and Mr. Najarian engaged in innocent use © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 153 9/21/2015 Public Use under §102(b) Informing Use Non-Informing Use Secret Use (public use or sale of product made from secret process) Metalizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing, 153 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1946) Inventor Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881) Third Party 307 ? No W.L. Gore v. Garlock,, 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents AIA Review 308 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 154 9/21/2015 Pre-AIA Section 102 309 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -(a) The invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication is this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the application for patent, or (b) The invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or … (g)(1) during the course of an interference … another inventor involved therein establishes … that before such © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents person’s invention thereof the invention was made by h th i t d t b d d d 310 New Section 102(a) (a) NOVELTY; PRIOR ART.--A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention; or (2) the claimed Prior invention was described in a patent Art Events issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed Date published under section Critical 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents invention. 155 9/21/2015 102(a) sets forth the priority 102(a) – A person shall be entitled to a rule patent unless: 1. The rule: critical date for priority is now the (1) the claimed invention wasv. patented, effective filing date – inventor inventor; described in a printed publication, or in public 2. Prior art consists of all statutory references prior the critical available date (i.e., effective use,available on sale, or to otherwise to the filing date) –the inventor v. priorfiling art; date of the public before effective 3. Statutory prior art references include: claimed invention; … References Include Statutory Prior Art - Patents and printed publications that disclose the 311 - claimed invention before effective filing date; Claimed invention was in public use, on-sale, or otherwise known to the public before effective filing date © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 102(a) - Important Points 312 1. Change from First-to-Invent to FirstInventor-to-File; 2. Novelty and Statutory Bars (Prejudicial Disclosures) are unified in one section under the heading “Novelty; Prior Art” 3. Geographic distinction for prior art eliminated; 4. Several terms from 1952 Patent Act retained (e.g., “public use” and “on-sale”); 5. A significant (but incomplete) step toward © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents harmonization…. Why incomplete? - 156 9/21/2015 New Section 102(b) 313 (b) EXCEPTIONS.-(1) DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE FILING DATE OF THE CLAIMED INVENTION.--A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if— (A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor j i ti t th h bt i d th bj t 314 102(b) sets forth the exceptions to the priority rule of 102(a) 1. Exception One: Inventor files within 12 months of his own disclosure; no intervening competitor disclosure 12 month Grace Period Inventor disclosure date (e.g., publication or © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents non-informing public use) Inventor filing 157 9/21/2015 Questions about Exception One Sec. 102(b) DISCLOSURES MADE 1 Question 1: What typeBEFORE of inventor disclosure YEAR OR LESS THE qualifies under 102(b)(1)? EFFECTIVE FILING DATE THE Answer: Any type of “disclosure” as OF defined in 102(a)(1), namely patents, publications, public CLAIMED INVENTION. A disclosure use, on-sale activity, etc. This includes confidential made 1 year or less before the effective sales and non-informing public uses. filing date2:ofWhy a claimed invention shall Questions does prior art in 102(a) equate withbe “disclosure” 102(b)? not prior artin to the claimed invention Answer: Section 102(b)(1) specifically equates the under subsection (a)(1)… 315 term “disclosure” with the the prior art in 102(a)(1). © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Linkage between “disclosure” and (a)(1) Questions about Exception One, (b) EXCEPTIONS.-cont. (1) DISCLOSURES MADE 1 YEAR OR LESS BEFORE 316 THE EFFECTIVE FILING DATE OF THE CLAIMED Question 3: Why are confidential sales and non-informing INVENTION.--A disclosure made 1 year or less before public uses included in definition of disclosure? the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not Answer: be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection 1. Prior to AIA, it was well understood that an inventor’s (a)(1) if— disclosure confidential sale or non-informing public use were prior art (A) The that triggered was the made by thegrace inventor or joint events one-year period; inventor or by who obtained the subject matter 2. By using theanother terms “public use” and “on-sale” in the disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint AIA, Congress meant for the pre-AIA common law interpretations to carry over; inventor; or publicly disclosed 3. Section 102(b)(1)(B) includes the (B) the subject matter disclosed had,modifier before “publicly” such before the word “disclosed” – the word “publicly” isby notthe disclosure [by a third party], been used in 102(b)(1)(A).© C.Thus, the term “publicly” must be Nard - Fallor 2015another - Law of Patents who obtained the inventor or a joint inventor given meaning subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the 158 9/21/2015 317 102(b) sets forth the exceptions to the priority rule of 102(a) 2. Exception Two: Inventor publicly discloses prior to a third-party disclosure and files within 12 months of Inventor’s public disclosure 12 Month Grace Period Inventor public Competitor discloses* Inventor filing date disclosure (e.g., publication) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents *Competitor disclosure must be public to qualify as prior art event Questions about Exception Two 318 Question 1: What type of inventor disclosure qualifies under 102(b)(2)? Answer: Same as under 102(b)(1), BUT inventor’s disclosure must be public. Non-informing public uses and confidential sales DO NOT qualify because they are not public. Question 2: Why would Congress use the term “publicly” in section 102(b)(1)(B) but not 102(b)(1)(A)? Answer: To take advantage of the grace period when a third-party intervenes (thus disclosing the claimed invention to the public), patent law requires the inventor to also give the public something of equal or greater value © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 159 9/21/2015 319 Questions about Exception Two, cont. Question 3: Why must competitor disclosure be public to act as prior art? Answer: Consistent with pre-AIA caselaw. The policy reflects the need to provide an inventor with certainty as to when he needs to file his patent application within the oneyear grace period. Also, “[a]s between a prior inventor who benefits from a process byisselling its product but suppresses, conceals, or otherwise It difficult for an inventor to discover a third party prior art keeps the process from the public, and a later inventor event that is not public (even public disclosure arewho difficult promptly filessometimes). a patent application the public will gain to discover This isfrom whywhich an inventor’s own a disclosure of the process, the law favors the latter.” W.L. Gore confidential sale or secret commercial exploitation does & Assoc.the v. Garlock, Inc., 721 period F.2d 1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. trigger one-year grace – the inventor can1983) control © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents these and obviously has knowledge of such. Absolute Novelty Scenario 320 Inventor discloses or files after a third-party disclosure One Day Competitor discloses* Inventor filing -102(b)(1)(B) the subject matter disclosed had, date before such disclosure [by a third party], been publicly disclosed *Competitor disclosure must be public to qualify as by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who prior art event © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or i di tl f th i t j i ti t 160 9/21/2015 102(b) - Important Points 321 1. Absolute novelty attaches if third party publicly discloses claimed invention prior to inventor disclosing or filing patent application. Compare Art. 54 EPC. This is new to U.S. - 2. But grace period triggered if: - A. Inventor discloses and files application within one year from his disclosure (same as old 1952 grace period in sec. 102(b)); OR - B. Inventor publicly discloses prior to third-party public disclosure or filing of patent app AND Inventor files patent app within one year from Inventor disclosure - 3. This is why it is more accurate to describe American system as first-inventor-to-file - An Inventor who publicly discloses first but files second (as long © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents as within 12 months from disclosure) will be the inventor entitled to the patent - Practical Considerations 322 1. An inventor must anticipate a third-party public disclosure to protect against a prior art event. Recall, the only way to prevent an absolute novelty situation is for the inventor to publicly disclose the claimed Response: File to a the provisional patent application invention prior third-party disclosure; to buy time, and –perhaps a immunize non-provisional within 2. An inventor seeking to himself from a disclosure – who publicly 12 potential months third-party of provisional to buy more time and discloses prior to filing may sacrifice foreign patent preserve tradeon secrecy rights based absolute novelty provisions outside the U.S. 3. Early public disclosure also potentially sacrifices trade secret rights at a very early stage when © C. Nard - Fallpotential 2015 - Law of Patents uncertainly as to market and funding is high 161 9/21/2015 323 Experimental Use © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson 324 Mr. Nicholson and his new and improved wooden pavement The specification read: “ the nature and object of the invention consists in providing a process or mode of constructing wooden block pavements upon a foundation along a street or roadway with facility, cheapness, and accuracy” and it shall be comparatively permanent and durable, … as to provide against the slipping of the horses' feet, against noise, against unequal wear, and against rot and consequent sinking away from below © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 162 9/21/2015 City of Elizabeth, cont. 325 According to the court: “[I]f use under the surveillance of the inventor, and for the purpose of enabling him to test the machine, and ascertain whether it will answer the purpose intended, and make such alterations and improvements as experience demonstrates to be necessary, it will still be a more experimental use, and not a public use, within the meaning of the statute. So long as he does not voluntarily allow others to make it and use it, and so long as it is not on sale for general use, he keeps the invention under his own control, and does not lose his title to a patent. C. Nardinvention - Fall 2015 - Law ofthat Patents “ It is not a public knowledge of ©his precludes the inventor from obtaining a patent for it, but Experimental Use 326 75 feet - Number of prototypes andv.duration the testing City of Elizabeth Americanof Nicholson Pavement Co., 97 U.S. 126 (1877) - Whether records or progress reports were made concerning the testing - The existence of a secrecy agreement between the patentee Factors: and the party preforming the testing - •Whether patentee received compensation for the useto of practice goodthe faith effort to reduce invention the invention invention in private - •Extent of control cannot the inventorfeasibly maintainedbe overtested the testing • due diligence Lough v. Brunswick Corp. (Fed. Cir. 1996) • under control of inventor Testing the invention vs. testing the market © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 163 9/21/2015 City of Elizabeth, cont. 327 What is the significance of Mr. Nicholson’s cane for Justice Bradley? Control: As the court stated, Nicholson “kept it under his own eyes.” But why is control important for a public use claim? More generally, what is the policy of the public use exception? Mr. Nicholson © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Lisle Corp. v. A.J. Mfg. 328 Patent related to inner a tie rod tool; In particular, the invention sought to alleviate the need for auto mechanics to completely dismantle steering control systems and keep multiple prior art tie rod tools for various inner tie rod designs. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 164 9/21/2015 Lisle Corp. v. A.J. Mfg. Co. 329 What is A.J.’s principal argument? Lisle lacked control Lack of a formal confidentiality agreement Lack of restrictions placed on the use of the prototype tool by the mechanics The absence of any documentary evidence regarding the actual testing of the prototype tool © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Lisle Corp. v. A.J. Mfg. Co. 330 What are Lisle’s arguments? Williams needed to know how well the wrench disc would fit on the inner tie rod socket and whether the prototype tool would fit in the confined location of the tie rod in different automobile models Under company protocol, he and other engineers at Lisle would have contacted the mechanics who were given the prototype tool every two to four weeks by telephone or in person to receive testing feedback He modified the design of the retainer in the prototype tool and added additional wrench disc sizes based on comments he received from the outside mechanics Although there was no formal confidentiality agreement between Lisle and the mechanics who were given the prototype tools, Lisle had prior working relationships with those mechanics General Meeting Reports © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 165 9/21/2015 331 Chapter 7 – Enforcing Patent Rights © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents A Big Player’s Game 332 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 166 9/21/2015 333 Calvin’s Dad Was a Patent Attorney © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 334 The Right to Exclude: §154(a)(1) “[A] patent shall contain … a grant … of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 167 9/21/2015 § 271(a) 335 “[W]hoever, without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Enforcement Roadmap 336 1. Claim Interpretation a. b. 2. Direct Infringement a. b. 3. Who Interprets? Tools of Interpretation and Interpretive Methodologies Literal Non-Literal Infringement / Doctrine of Equivalents (DOE) Indirect Infringement a. b. Contributory Active Inducement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 168 9/21/2015 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 337 Compare European Model 338 Enforcement resides in national jurisdictions There is no federalized system of courts for patents Can be expensive, lead to forum shopping, and fractured rulings Creation of Unified Patent Court that will have validity and infringement jurisdiction over all unitary patents and traditional European Patents Translation is required if infringer is from member state with language other than three © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents official EPO langauges 169 9/21/2015 Unified Court Structure 339 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents London: Chemistry and Pharma Munich: Mechanical Eng Paris: Everything else Jurisdiction of UPC 340 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 170 9/21/2015 341 Number of patent cases filed in U.S. 2013 PWC Patent Litigation Study © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Success rates: bench v jury trial 342 Highest Success Rates: Telecom, Software, Hardware, Medical Device, Consumer Services Lowest Success Rates: Biotec/Pharma, Chemicals, Automotive 2011 PWC Patent Litigation Study © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 171 9/21/2015 Median Time-to-Trial (Complaint to Trial) 343 2013 PWC Patent Litigation Study 344 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Most Favorable Venues of Patentees Based on: 1. time-to-trial; 2. awarded damages; and 3. overall success rate 2013 PWC Patent Litigation Study © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 172 9/21/2015 345 346 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Success rate based on industry 2012 2013 PWC Patent Litigation Study © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 173 9/21/2015 347 But… when it comes to damages 10th most cases, but highest damages awarded Most cases, but small damages Number of identified decisions (e.g. 15 for chemicals; 21 for telecommunications) 2013 PWC Patent Litigation Study © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 348 A. Claim Interpretation © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 174 9/21/2015 Markman v. Westview 349 Who interprets claim language? Judge or Jury What is the Court’s rationale for holding claim interpretation is the province of the judge? What are the functional considerations? “The construction of written instruments is one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors unburdened by training in exegesis.” The judge, from his training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation to such instruments than a jury; and he is, therefore, more likely to be right, in performing such a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.” How is uniformity served by having the judge as arbiter of claim meaning? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Standard of Review Issue 350 The Federal Circuit held in Markman I that claim interpretation is a question of law subject to de novo review Did the Supreme Court in Markman II affirm the Federal Circuit’s characterization? Claim interpretation is a “mongrel practice” that “falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical fact” The Federal Circuit Cybor decision and high reversal rates The persistence of de novo review © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 175 9/21/2015 351 B. Infringement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 352 1. Literal Infringement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 176 9/21/2015 Larami Corp. v. Amron 353 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Does the SUPER SOAKER 20 of Larami literally infringe claim 1 of the ‘129 patent? Claim 1: “[a] toy comprising an elongated housing [case] having a chamber therein for a liquid [tank]” Spec: “a chamber or tank 2 for liquid within the confines of the barrel” Larami Corp. v. Amron 354 Proving Infringement: “[B]ecause every element of a claim is essential and material to that claim, a patent owner must, to meet the burden of establishing infringement, “show the presence of every element or its substantial equivalent in the accused device.” If even one element of a patent's claim is missing from the accused product, then “[t]here can be no infringement as a matter of law SUPER SOAKER does not infringe because its chamber is not “therein” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 177 9/21/2015 355 2. Non-Literal Infringement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Graver Tank v. Linde Air 356 What is the policy underlying non-literal infringement? Fairness Maintaining Incentives Without the DOE, a patent would be converted into a “hollow and useless thing” and encourage the “unscrupulous copyist” and “pirate” to make “unimportant and insubstantial changes,” and place the inventor “at the mercy of verbalism” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 178 9/21/2015 Graver Tank v. Linde Air 357 The DOE test under Graver: Does the accused device “perform[] substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result” “What constitutes equivalency must be determined against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular circumstances of the case. Equivalence, in the patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not an absolute to be considered in a vacuum. It does not require complete identity for every purpose and in every respect. Consideration must be given to the [1] purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, [2] the qualities it has when combined with the other ingredients, and [3] the function which it is intended to perform. [4] An important factor is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Graver Tank v. Linde Air 358 Was the Lincolnweld accused flux an equivalent in the present case? In other words: “The question which thus emerges is whether the substitution of the manganese which is not an alkaline earth metal for the magnesium which is, under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the technology and the prior art, is a change of such substance as to make the doctrine of equivalents inapplicable; or conversely, whether under the circumstances the change was so insubstantial that the trial court's invocation of the doctrine of equivalents was justified.” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 179 9/21/2015 Graver Tank v. Linde Air 359 Justice Black’s Dissent: 1. Statutory clear claiming requirement – definiteness “What is not specifically claimed is dedicated to the public” A claim is “not like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more than, or something different from, what its words express” 2. Administrative reissue proceeding 3. Separation of powers “And Congress was careful to hedge the privilege of reissue by exacting conditions. It also entrusted the Patent Office, not the courts, with initial authority to determine whether expansion of a claim was justified” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The Notice Argument 360 Primary argument against the DOE It is inconsistent with clear notice of claim boundaries – fuzzy boundaries Which speed limit do you prefer? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 180 9/21/2015 Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chemical Prior Art Booth Patent 361 PTO ‘746 Patent Ultrafiltration process operating at a pH above 9.0 Patent Application In a process for the purification of a dye . . . In a process for the the improvement purification ofwhich a dye comprises: . . . the subjecting improvement which comprises: subjecting an aqueous an aqueous solution to ultrafiltration through solution to ultrafiltration throughhaving a membrane having a membrane a nominal pore diameter a nominal diameter of purification 5-15 Angstroms under In apore process for5-15 the of a dye . . a. the of Angstroms under a hydrostatic hydrostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400200 improvement which comprises: subjecting antoaqueous pressure of approximately 400 at a p.s.i.g. to therebytocause of saida impurities solution ultrafiltration through membrane having pHseparation from approximately 6.0 to 9.0 p.s.i.g. from said dye. a nominal poretodiameter 5-15separation Angstroms thereby of cause ofunder said a hydrostatic pressure of approximately 200 to 400 impurities from said dye. at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0 p.s.i.g. to thereby cause separation of said impurities from said dye. Claim Amendment > pH 5.0 Accused Process © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis 362 Supreme Court revisits the DOE nearly 50 years after Graver Tank was decided Why? Was Justice Black correct in his Graver dissent when he wrote: need not be a prophet to suggest that today's rhapsody on the virtue of the ‘doctrine of equivalents’ will, in direct contravention of [precedent], make enlargement of patent claims the ‘rule’ rather than the ‘exception.’” “One © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 181 9/21/2015 Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis 363 Patentee added the phrase “at a pH from approximately 6.0 to 9.0….” WJ developed a process that utilized a pH of 5 There was no literal infringement, so the quesiton became: Is a pH of 5 equivalent to a pH of 6? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis 364 WJ argues: 1. DOE is inconsistent with §112, ¶2 definiteness requirement 2. DOE circumvents the reissue process 3. DOE violates the primacy of the PTO – separation of powers argument 4. DOE implicitly rejected by Congress in 1952 when it enacted §112, ¶6 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 182 9/21/2015 Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis 365 The Court’s analysis: The All-Elements Rule was adopted Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that “any surrender of subject matter during prosecution, regardless of the reason, precludes recapturing any part of that subject matter during litigation under the DOE You always look to the reason behind an amendment, but what if – like here – a reason cannot be discerned? The Court created a rebuttable presumption: The burden is on the patentee to provide a reason; where no explanation is given, the court should presume the PTO had a substantial reason related to patentability for including the limiting element and bar application of the DOE © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis 366 Court’s analysis, cont. Court also rejected the arguments that: 1. DOE should be limited to equivalents disclosed in the patent itself, OR 2. DOE should be limited to equivalents known at the time the patent issued, thus not extending to after-arising technologies According to the Court, equivalence is measured at the time of infringement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 183 9/21/2015 Modern Approach to DOE 367 Measuring equivalents at time of infringement After-arising technology (post-issuance) Patent issues Infringing activity Litigation After-arising technology © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 368 2. Limitations on the Doctrine of Equivalents © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 184 9/21/2015 Limitations on the DOE 369 1. Prosecution History Estoppel 2. Public Dedication Rule 3. All-Limitations and Specific Exclusion Rule 4. Prior Art © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 370 A. Prosecution History Estoppel © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 185 9/21/2015 Festo v. Shoketsu 371 Language is a blunt tool: nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a patent application” “The language in patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty” “[T]he Two principal issues: What kinds of amendments may give rise to PHE? If PHE applies, does it act as a complete bar to the DOE or can the patentee still capture equivalents? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Festo v. Shoketsu, cont. 372 Issue One: Kinds of Amendments “We agree with the [Federal Circuit] that a narrowing amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an estoppel.” Issue Two: Effect of PHE Federal Circuit overruled; flexible bar reinstated The presumption: “We hold here that the patentee should bear the burden of showing that the amendment does not surrender the particular equivalent in question” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 186 9/21/2015 Festo v. Shoketsu, cont. 373 “A patentee’s decision to narrow his claims through amendment may be presumed to be a general disclaimer of the territory between the original claim and the amended claim” But presumption will be rebutted if: Equivalent unforeseeable at time of filing Amendment bears tangential relation to equivalent Some other reason suggesting patentee did not describe insubstantial substitute © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Festo v. Shoketsu, cont. 374 In short, where patentee narrowed his claim, he can rebut the presumption if: “at the time of amendment one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 187 9/21/2015 Festo and the Devolution of Responsibility 375 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Festo – Warner-Jenkinson Flow Chart Did the amendment narrow the literal scope of the claim? If NO, then PHE does not apply If YES, then ask: Was the reason for the amendment related to patentability? If NO, then PHE does not apply If NO reason is revealed in prosecution history and patentee is unable to provide reason, then Festo presumption applies If YES, Festo presumes patentee surrendered all territory between original claim limitation and amended claim limitation Presumption can be rebutted if patentee can show that either: 1. Equivalent was unforeseeable; 2. Rationale underlying amendment was merely tangentially related to equivalent; or 3. There was another reason why the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question. 376 C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents If patentee successfully rebuts presumption, PHE does not apply and the question whether the accused element is equivalent to claim limitation is reached on the merits 188 9/21/2015 Is the SCt anti-patent? 377 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 378 B. Public Dedication Rule © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 189 9/21/2015 Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. Service 379 The specification reads: aluminum is currently the preferred material for the substrate, other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel alloys, may be used….” “While The claim reads: laminate constructed of a sheet of copper foil which, in a finished printed circuit board, constitutes a functional element and a sheet of aluminum which constitutes a discardable element” “A © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents The accused products used steel Johnson & Johnston v. R.E. Service 380 “When a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter… this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public” P. 489. Strong emphasis on the claims and public notice function of patent law Also, the court was concerned with encouraging broad disclosures and narrow claims © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 190 9/21/2015 Claim Scope and Claim-Scope Limiting Tools 381 Public Dedication Rule All-Limitations Rule DOE Literal Claim Language Enablement Prior Art DOE Claim-Scope Limiting Tools Prosecution History Estoppel © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 382 3. Indirect Infringement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 191 9/21/2015 Lucent Tech. v. Gateway, Inc. 383 Day patent directed to method of entering information into fields on a computer screen without using a keyboard; Lucent accused Microsoft of indirect infringement based on the latter’s sell and use of Money, Outlook and Windows Mobile. Jury found Microsoft infringed indirectly © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Lucent Tech. v. Gateway, Inc. 384 Contributory Infringement – 271(c) 1. Direct infringement 2. Sold component had material part of claimed invention 3. Knowledge that combination for which components were especially made was both patented and infringing; 4. Components have no substantial non-infringing use (Non-Staple Article Doctrine) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 192 9/21/2015 Lucent Tech. v. Gateway, Inc. 385 Contributory Infringement – 271(c), cont. Microsoft argued that it accused product has substantial non-infringing uses Microsoft defines product as its entire software package Lucent counters that the product is the datepicker tool (e.g., calendar date-picker). If Microsoft offered date-picker as a separate component, there is little doubt Microsoft would infringe © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Lucent Tech. v. Gateway, Inc. 386 The “the main issue reduces to whether the ‘material or apparatus’ is the entire software package or just the particular tool (e.g., the calendar date-picker) that performs the claimed method.” The significance is: if “material or apparatus” is defined as the entire software package, there would be substantial non-infringing uses, and therefore no contributory infringement. But if defined an individual component – then no © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents substantial non-infringing uses. 193 9/21/2015 Lucent Tech. v. Gateway, Inc. 387 Contributory Infringement – 271(c), cont. Court: “An infringer should not be permitted to escape liability as a contributory infringer merely by embedding the infringing apparatus in a larger product with some additional, separable feature.” Citing Ricoh Here, the infringing feature for completing the forms, i.e., date picker too, is suitable only for an infringing use. Inclusion of the date-picker feature within a larger program does not change the date-picker’s ability to© C.infringe. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Lucent Tech. v. Gateway, Inc. 388 Active Inducement – 271(b). Patentee must show that the alleged infringer’s actions induced infringing acts and the the alleged infringer knew or should have known his actions would induce actual infringements Inducement requires culpable conduct, directed to encouraging another’s infringement, not merely that the inducer had knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 194 9/21/2015 Lucent Tech. v. Gateway, Inc. 389 Active Inducement – 271(b), cont. Where is Microsoft’s encouragement to infringe? Not strong evidence, but… Pop-up tool functionality is pervasive in accused products Normal and intended operation of those products used the infringing functionality; Microsoft encouraged direct infringement Expert testimony was key © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 390 Chapter 8 – Defenses to Patent Infringement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 195 9/21/2015 391 A. Rights and Limitations on the Use of Contract in Exploiting Patent Rights © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 392 1. The Scope of Patent Exhaustion and the Repair-Reconstruction Doctrine © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 196 9/21/2015 Jazz Photo v. ITC 393 Fuji sued several defendants for patent infringement based on the doctrine of impermissible reconstruction The ITC agreed, but the Fed Cir reversed finding the appellants’ acts to be permissible repair © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Jazz Photo v. ITC 394 Appellants assert: 1. the LFFPs have a useful life longer than singe use proposed by Fuji 2. the patent right has been exhausted as to these discarded cameras 3. the patentee cannot restrict appellants’ right to refit the cameras with new film by the procedures necessary to insert the film and reset the mechanism © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 197 9/21/2015 Jazz Photo v. ITC 395 Underlying the repair/reconstruction dichotomy is the principle of exhaustion of the patent right. The unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the patentee, “exhausts” the patentee's right to control further sale and use of that article by enforcing the patent under which it was first sold. The purchaser of a patented article has the rights of any owner of personal property, including the right to use it, repair it, modify it, discard it, or resell it, subject only to overriding conditions of the sale. However, the rights of ownership do not include the right to construct an essentially new article on the template of © C. Nardremains - Fall 2015 - Law with of Patents the original, for the right to make the article Under Aro I 396 A patentee cannot prevent repair because that would “extend the patent monopoly beyond the terms of the grant.” Aro Mfg. at 342. “[T]he combination patent covers only the totality of the elements in the claim and . . . no element, separately viewed, is within the grant. … No element, not itself separately patented, that constitutes one of the elements of a combination patent is entitled to patent monopoly, however essential it may be to the patented combination and no matter how costly replacement may © C. Nardor - Falldifficult 2015 - Law of Patents be.” Id. at 344-45. 198 9/21/2015 Jazz Photo v. ITC 397 Precedent has classified as repair the disassembly and cleaning of patented articles accompanied by replacement of unpatented parts that had become worn or spent, in order to preserve the utility for which the article was originally intended. “Reconstruction,” precedent shows, requires a more extensive rebuilding of the patented entity To invoke the protection of the first sale © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents doctrine, the authorized first sale must have occurred under the United States patent Jazz Photo v. ITC 398 In the present case, the refurbishing of the cameras was not a “second creation” of the patented article Precedent places the acts of inserting new film and film container, resetting the film counter, and resealing the broken case-the principal steps performed by the remanufacturers-as more akin to repair A license to use a patented combination includes the right to preserve its fitness for © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents use. 199 9/21/2015 Three Repair-Reconstruction Scenarios 399 1. Entire patented article is spent, and alleged infringer reconstructs to make it usable again 2. Spent part is replaced – Aro I (“mere replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts, is no more than” repair 3. Part is not spent, but is replaced to enable the machine to perform a different function (“kin to repair” © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Morton Salt v. Suppiger 400 Patentee Suppiger engaged in a tying arrangement: patented device for depositing salt tablets and the salt tablets themselves Court did not decide antitrust (Clayton Act) issuse Rather, the Court focused on whether “a court of equity will lend its aid to protect the patent monopoly when [patentee] is using it as the effective means of restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented article [i.e., salt © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents tablets].” 200 9/21/2015 Morton Salt v. Suppiger, cont. 401 The public policy that includes inventions within the patent grant excludes from it all that is not embraced in the invention Patentee is acting in a manner contrary to the public interest. How? Why doesn’t patentee have clean hands, according to the Court? See Comment 4 on p. 612 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 402 b. Field-of-Use Restrictions © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 201 9/21/2015 Mallinckrodt v. Medipart 403 “For Single Patient Use Only” K for medical device Mallinckrodt sold device to hospitals, which after initial use of the devices, sent them to Medipart for reconditioning Medipart sent the reconditioned medical device back to hospitals for re-use © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Mallinckrodt v. Medipart 404 The intersection between contract law and patent law DCt held no restriction whatsoever could be imposed under the patent law, whether or not the restriction was enforceable under some other law, and whether or not this was a first sale to a purchaser with notice. Even if the K notice was sufficient to constitute a valid sale, violation of that condition cannot be remedied under the patent law Fed Cir reversed: “If Mallinckrodt’s restriction was a valid condition of the sale, then in accordance with GTP it was not excluded from enforcement under the patent law. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 202 9/21/2015 Mallinckrodt v. Medipart 405 “Unless the [K] condition violates some other law or policy (in the patent field, notably the misuse or antitrust law), private parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of sale…. The appropriate criterion is whether Mallinckrodt’s restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent grant and into behavior having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of reason…. i.e., that it relates to subject matter within the scope of the patent claims.” p. 635-36 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics 406 LGE had cross-license arrangement w Intel (LGE Portfolio 1 - microprocessors & chipsets ) Intel made microprocessors & chipsets under LGE Portfolio 1 – “Intel Products” Intel sold Intel Products to Quanta Quanta combined Intel Products with buses and memory Quanta combination infringed LGE Portfolio 2 – systems patents © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 203 9/21/2015 Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics 407 License Agreement does not alter usual rules relating to patent exhaustion But there are limitations: 1. No license to any third party for the combination by a third party of Intel Products with items, components, or the like acquired from sources other than Intel or LGE 2. Intel was required to give written notice to its own customers informing them that, while it had obtained a broad license, the license does not extend to any product made by combining an © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Intel Product with any non-Intel product Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics 408 Did sell of Intel Products to Quanta exhaust rights in LGE Portfolio 2 (systems patents)? Key Issue: The extent to which a product must embody a patent to trigger exhaustion? Exhaustion is triggered when the “only reasonable and intended use was to practice the patent” and the products sold © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents “embodied the essential features of the t t di ti ” 204 9/21/2015 Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics 409 Intel Products are analogous to blank lens in Univis. How? 1. No reasonable use for Intel Products other than incorporating them into computer systems that practice LGE Portfolio 2 patents. 2. Intel Products constitute a material part of LGE Portfolio 2 patents and “all but completely practice the patents” – “Everything inventive about each patent is embodied in the Intel Products… Quanta was not required to make any creative or inventive decision when it added buses and memory.” Does this mean that for exhaustion not to apply, Quanta would have to make an inventive or creative contribution? Or, for exhaustion to apply, the other combined features must be noninventive. What would the test be? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics 410 3.. How can the sale of Intel Products exhaust patents in LGE’s Portfolio 2? “The sale of a device that practices patent A does not, by virtue of practicing patent A, exhaust patent B. But if the device practices patent A while substantially embodying patent B, its relationship to patent A does not prevent exhaustion of patent B. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 205 9/21/2015 Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics 411 Justice Breyer Hypo re a patentee who has patents on bicycle pedals and method of inserting pedals on bike: “Imagine that I want to buy some bicycle pedals, so I go to the bicycle shop. These are fabulous [patented] pedals. The inventor has licensed somebody to make them, and he sold them to the shop…. I go buy the pedals. I put [them] on my bicycle. I start down the road. Now we don’t want 19 patent inspectors chasing me… [W]hy can’t I look at this as saying the patent is exhausted, the patent on the pedals and the patent for those bicycles says I have a patent on inserting the pedal into a bicycle?” Is Breyer correct? How would you analyze this hypo in the © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patent light of Quanta? What if patentee had other patented Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics 412 What remedies are available? 1. Breach of license restrictions leads to patent infringement and accompanying remedies (Mallinckrodt) 2. Breach of license restrictions leads to K remedies only; not patent infringement – See FN 3. (But what about General Talking Pictures?) 3. Breach of license restrictions leads to patent misuse, and therefore, no remedies © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 206 9/21/2015 Quanta Computer v. LG Electronics 413 How does Quanta affect Mallinckrodt? 1.No effect: license restrictions in Quanta would have been valid if drafted better. A. Eliminate exhaustion clause B. Retain written notice obligation, but keep in main license agreement; not separate agreement C. Eliminate or modify authorization of Intel to “make, use, sell … etc” Intel Products practicing LGE patents 2. All post-sale restrictions are patent misuse, and therefore, patentee can never contract around exhaustion 3. Patentee can contract around exhaustion (i.e., no misuse), but remedy resides in K, not patent law. See © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents FN 3 of Quanta Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 414 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 207 9/21/2015 Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 415 Monsanto invented a genetic modification that enables soybean plants to survive exposure to glyphosate, the active ingredient in many herbicides. (ex. Roundup) Farmers can plant that seed and use glyphosatebased herbicide to kill weeds without damaging their crops. Growers can obtain Roundup Ready seeds for planting only by purchasing them from an authorized seed dealer and signing a licensing agreement. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Under that agreement, a grower is authorized to make one generation of soybeans and sell them to Bowman’s argument 416 Mr. Bowman claimed that because he bought soybeans from the grain elevator, he was entitled to make copies of Monsanto’s patented invention without separately obtaining authorization from Monsanto to do so. He argued that in growing new generations of Roundup Ready® soybeans he did not actually create copies of the technology in the seeds but simply “used” a technology that is “self-replicating.” Bowman argued that, after the first time such seeds were sold (in this case, to the grower who sold the crop to the grain elevator), Monsanto no longer had patent rights to them under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, which operates under certain circumstances to limit a patent-holder’s right to control a patented article. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 208 9/21/2015 Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 417 Mr. Bowman appealed the case to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which again rejected his claims. It reasoned that “[e]ven if Monsanto’s patent rights in the commodity seeds are exhausted, such a conclusion would be of no consequence because once a grower, like Bowman, plants the commodity seeds containing Monsanto’s Roundup Ready technology and the next generation of seed develops, the grower has created a newly infringing article.” Mr. Bowman therefore infringed Monsanto’s patents because he made new copies of the company’s patented invention without its authorization. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents U.S. Supreme Court 418 One issue is whether, under the patent exhaustion doctrine, the sale of a patented seed or plant— here, a grower’s sale of Roundup Ready soybeans to a grain elevator—permits later purchasers like Mr. Bowman to create, use, and sell an unlimited number of new generations of that seed or plant without authorization from the patent owner. The second issue is whether the patent exhaustion doctrine permits later purchasers to circumvent the restrictions on replanting in Monsanto’s license agreements, which Monsanto requires buyers to accept before any sale of Roundup Ready seeds by its authorized dealers. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 209 9/21/2015 U.S. Supreme Court Ruling 419 The doctrine of patent exhaustion does not allow the purchaser to make copies of a patented item. Because the product in question is a seed, using the seed to grow a crop and then harvesting those seeds for future use constitutes creating copies of a patented item. In this case, Bowman’s one-time purchase of Monsanto’s product allowed him to take advantage of their patented product over the course of many seasons without respecting the rights of the patent holder. © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Lexmark v. Impression 420 © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 210 9/21/2015 Lear v. Adkins 421 Lear, Inc. hired Adkins in 1952 to develop an innovative gyroscope Adkins obtained a patent and licensed Lear Lear seeks to invalidate the patent As a licensee, is Lear precluded from trying to invalidate Adkins’s patent? SCt California: Yes – “licensee should not be permitted to enjoy the benefits afforded by the [license] agreement while © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of simultaneously urging that the patent … is void” Patents Lear v. Adkins 422 The common of contracts v. federal law of patents K law forbids repudiation of promises Patent law demands ideas not patented remain in the public domain Patent policy outweighs K policy Patent prosecution is ex parte Public has strong interest in invaliding improperly granted patents Licensees are the most incentivized to challenge validity © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 211 9/21/2015 Lear v. Adkins 423 Should Lear be required to pay royalties while he is challenging the patent’s validity in litigation? No – Such would lead to dilatory tactics by the patentee Litigation is expensive But Lear benefited from Adkins’s ideas prior to patenting Should Lear have to pay pre-1960s royalties when the Adkins’s idea was not yet patented? © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Antitrust Issues in Patent Law 424 Noerr-Pennington immunity Important antitrust issues in patent law: Walker Process Fraudulent Procurement and Subsequent Enforcement Handgards Sham Litigation Refusals to Deal Settlement Activity © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 212 9/21/2015 Nobelpharma v. Implant Innov. 425 Walker Process claim Obtain patent by “knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts” to PTO; Sought to enforce patent knowing that it was obtained fraudently Handsgard/PRE claim Lawsuit objectively baseless; Subjectively motivated to impose anti-competitive injury, rather than secure justifiable remedy © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents FTC v. Actavis 426 Can “reverse” settlements “sometimes unreasonably diminish competition in violation of the antitrust laws? Generic company promises not to enter patentee market until a mutually agreed specified time prior to patent expiration or after expiration Route to settlement begins with a Paragraph IV certification of invalidity or non-infringement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 213 9/21/2015 FTC v. Actavis, cont. 427 Solvay settled with generics Actavis, Par, and Paddock Generics agreed: 1. Not to enter market until August 31, 2015 – 65 days prior to Solvay’s patent expiration; 2.To promote AndroGel ($400m-1.2b market) 3.Solvay paid approx $100 millions to generics FTC asserted true purpose of payment was to compensate generics for agreeing not to compete until 2015 Accordingly, FTC asserts parties violated sec 5 of FTC Act “by unlawfully agreeing to share in Solvay’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and refrain from launching their low-cost generic © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents for nine years.” products to compete with AndroGel FTC v. Actavis, cont. 428 11th Cir held reverse settlement was not anticompetitive because Solvay owned a patent A key distinction from the typical market exclusion settlement is that here, the patent holder has a legal right to exclude others from the market Moreover, public policy encourages settlement, even though it is possible for court to invalidate patent © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 214 9/21/2015 FTC v. Actavis, cont. 429 According to SCt: Patent and antitrust policy must be considered A patent may be invalidated or not infringed Traditional antitrust factors such as: Likely anticompetitive effects Redeeming virtues Market power Offsetting legal considerations (e.g., existence of a patent) © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents FTC v. Actavis, cont. 430 SCt’s Five Sets of Considerations: 1. 2. Adverse effects on competition; settlement payment may reflect strong evidence that the patentee seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of patentee’s profits that would otherwise be lost in a competitive market; Anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes be unjustified; where payment reflects traditional settlement considerations such as avoiding litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the same concern that a patent is using its market position to avoid the risk of invalidation or non-infringement. Antitrust may show © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Lawdefendants of Patents legitimate reasons 215 9/21/2015 FTC v. Actavis, cont. 431 SCt’s Five Sets of Considerations: 3. Where reverse payments threaten to work unjustified harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring about the harm. The FTC has referred to studies showing that reverse payment agreements are associated with the presence of higher-than-competitive profits – a strong indication of market power; 4. Antitrust action more feasible administratively as patent’s validity does not need to be litigation. A large reverse payment indicates a lack of confidence in patent’s validity or, at least, bring about anticompetitive effects. An unexplained reverse payment provides a surrogate for a patent’s weakness, without forcing ct to © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents explore patent’s validity FTC v. Actavis, cont. 432 SCt’s Five Sets of Considerations: 5. Parties may still settle, but not in a way that is anticompetitive. Parties may prefer reverse settlements, but must provide reasons that are not anticompetitive Take Away: No presumptive rule; rather, rule of reason applies, taking into consideration: A. Size of agreement B. Its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs; C. Its independence from other services for which it might represent payment D. Lack of any other convincing justification © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 216 9/21/2015 FTC v. Actavis, cont. 433 The Dissent A patent carves out an exception to the applicability antitrust laws; innovation Antitrust competitive markets Does Solvay’s monopoly power extend beyond what the patent already gave it? Two exceptions Settle sham litigation Litigation involves a patent obtained through fraud on the PTO “Scope of patent forms zone within which patent holder may operate without facing antitrust scrutiny” Solvay paid a competitor©to its -patent – conduct that did not exceed C. respect Nard - Fall 2015 Law of Patents the scope of its patent. In re Independent Service Organizations 434 Xerox manufactures, sells, and services copiers Xerox adopted a policy of not selling parts and new products to its Series 9 and 10 copiers to ISOs, unless the ISO was also an end-user of the copier CSU argues Xerox illegally sought to leverage its dominance in the equipment market into the service market – relying on Eastman Kodak DCt held Xerox’s unilateral refusal to sell did not violate antitrust laws, even if refusal impacts competition in more than one market Fed Cir affirmed © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 217 9/21/2015 In re Independent Service Organizations 435 A patent alone does not confer market power No duty of a patent owner to sell or license its patented product in markets within the scope of the statutory patent grant Absent exceptional circumstances, a patent may confer the right to exclude competition altogether in more than one antitrust market Exceptions: Walker Process Sham litigation Tying © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 436 C. Inequitable Conduct © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 218 9/21/2015 437 ‘551 patent related to disposable blood glucose strips for diabetes management The patent was rejected in the light of the ‘382 patent, which discussed protective membranes as “optional[], but preferable[]” To overcome the ‘382 prior art, Abbott presented new claims based on a new sensor that did NOT require a protective membrane for whole blood Examiner required an affidavit from Abbott showing the prior art did indeed require a protective membrane for whole blood Abbott’s head of R&D – Dr. Sanghera – and patent counsel © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents – Mr. Pope – provided a declaration to the PTO that a 438 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickenson Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickenson Prior to PTO declaration, Abbott also made representations to the European Patent Office – these representations were not disclosed to the PTO Was the failure to disclose the EPO representations to the PTO inequitable conduct (“IC”)? IC requires both a finding that the applicant misrepresented or omitted material information with the specific intent to deceive A finding of IC renders the patent unenforceable – the “atomic bomb” of patent law © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 219 9/21/2015 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickenson 439 Intent prong: For non-disclosure of information, the party asserting IC must show the applicant made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference. Material prong: A reference will be deemed material if the PTO would not have allowed a claim had it been aware of the undisclosed reference In other words, the applicant knew of the reference, knew it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it. Clear and convincing evidence standard Preponderance of the evidence standard Exception for Egregious Conduct: Such as filing an “unmistakenly false affidavit.” This conduct will be deemed material even if but-for standard is not satisfied © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents Remedies Lecture 440 Money Damages 1. 2. Lost Profits Reasonable Royalty Equitable Relief 1. Preliminary Injunction 2. Permanent Injunction Willful Infringement © C. Nard - Fall 2015 - Law of Patents 220 9/21/2015 Trade Secrets Learning Curve 221 9/21/2015 The Definition Information, including, but not limited to, technical or non-technical data, a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, drawing, process, financial data, or list of actual or potential customers or suppliers, that: (1) is sufficiently secret to derive economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure; and (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy or confidentiality The Factors – Restatement § 757 1. Extent concept was known by others outside owner’s business 2. Extent to which concept was known by owner’s employees and others involved in owner’s business 3. 4. Measures taken to maintain secrecy Value of the concept to owner and competitors 5. Amount of time, effort, and money expended by owner in developing concept 6. Ease or difficulty with which owner’s concept could have been properly acquired or duplicated by others 222 9/21/2015 BondPro “A trade secret that becomes public “Although it is awkward to license a trade secretknowledge because theis no longer a trade secret” patent negotiation necessarily reveals the (e.g., secretpublished to the prospective application) licensee, the revelation, as well as the revelation to suppliers and licensees, is obviously not the kind ofwithout disclosure that “But to disclose a trade secret forfeitsauthorization the protection is of unlawful” trade-secret law.” Neither BondPro nor Siemens used the process commercially An inference of no commercial value; therefore no damages What about an injunction against Siemens? BondPro, cont. Did Siemens commit a breach of K or a tort in obtaining BondPro’s secret? What is BondPro claiming as a trade secret? Where is the detail in the disclosure to Siemens? “One expects a trade secret to be rich in detail, because a process described in general terms … will usually be widely known and thus not worth incurring costs to try to conceal and so not a trade secret.” 223