UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
THE BASIC SCHOOL
MARINE CORPS TRAINING COMMAND
CAMP BARRETT, VIRGINIA 22134-5019
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE
DEVICES (IED)
B3L4118
STUDENT HANDOUT
Basic Officer Course
B3L4118
Improvised Explosive Devices
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
Introduction
There is a very unique doctrine the United States has
adopted within recent years with regards to a specific tactic
enemy forces have begun to employ and continue to refine.
Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs) enable the enemy to
inflict catastrophic kills against friendly forces with easily
acquired explosives and materials while keeping a relatively
safe distance from the target. Our current doctrine consists
of reacting to IEDs and attempting to prevent their use but
not adopting the tactic ourselves.
Importance
You will be better able to defend against IEDs if you learn
about IEDs, stay current on enemy TTPs, and react
effectively to IED attacks. This class is the first step in
enabling you to do so.
In This Lesson
This class will provide the student with the necessary
information to effectively recognize, prevent, and react to
IEDs
This lesson covers the following topics:
Topic
IED Defined
Enemy IED Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
(TTPs)
IED Attack Preparation, Prevention, and
Effects Reduction
IED Encounter Response Procedures
Summary
References
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
Notes
Learning Objectives
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Terminal Learning Objectives
MCCS-IED-1001 Given an improvised explosive device
(IED) threat, observation aiding devices, during daylight and
limited visibility, identify indicators of improvised explosive
devices to recognize the IED threat.
MCCS-IED-1002 Given a mission, commander's intent,
rules of engagement, escalation of force criteria, and an
emplaced improvised explosive device (IED), while serving
as an individual in a small unit, react to an emplaced IED to
limit the effects of the IED on the mission.
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Learning Objectives
(Continued)
Improvised Explosive Devices
Terminal Learning Objectives (continued)
MCCS-IED-1003 Given a mission, a commander's intent,
rules of engagement (ROE), escalation of force criteria,
non-lethal deterrents, and a suicide improvised explosive
device (IED), while serving as an individual in a small unit,
react to a suicide IED to limit the effects of the IED on the
mission.
MCCS-IED-2101 Given a mission, a commanders intent,
and an improvised explosive device (IED) threat, operate in
an IED threat environment to accomplish the mission and
limit the effects of the IED threat.
Enabling Learning Objective
MCCS-IED-2101a Without the aid of references, describe
the responsibilities of a unit leader in response to an IED
attack without omission.
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IED Defined
Introduction. IEDs are a dangerous and effective weapon system that military forces
face. IEDs can be made from almost anything with any type of material and initiator.
They are an improvised device that is designed to cause death or injury by using
explosives alone or in combination with other materials, to include projectiles, toxic
chemicals, biological toxins, or radiological material. IEDs can be produced in varying
sizes and can have different types of containers, function, and delivery methods. IEDs
can use commercial or military explosives, homemade explosives, or military ordnance
and ordnance components. IEDs are primarily conventional high-explosive charges,
also known as homemade bombs. A chemical and biological (CB) agent, or even
radiological material, may be included to add to the destructive power and the
psychological effect of the device. They are unique in nature because the IED builder
has had to improvise with the materials at hand. Designed to defeat a specific target or
type of target, they generally become more difficult to detect and protect against as they
become more sophisticated. IEDs are becoming increasingly sophisticated and can be
fabricated from common materials. IEDs may range in size from a cigarette pack to a
large vehicle. The degree of sophistication depends on the ingenuity of the designer
and the tools and materials available. IEDs of today are extremely diverse and may
contain any type of firing device or initiator, plus various commercial, military, or
contrived chemical or explosive fillers. Cached or stockpiled munitions within the current
theater of operations may provide the explosive materials to “would be” enemy
bombers.
Definitions:
Improvised Explosive Device. A device placed or fabricated in an improvised
manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary
chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may
incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.
Also referred to as an “IED.” (JP 1-02)
Booby Trap. An explosive or non-explosive device or other material,
deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is
disturbed or a normally safe act is performed (JP 1-02).
Mine. In land mine warfare, an explosive or material, normally encased,
designed to destroy or damage ground vehicles, boats, or aircraft, or designed to
wound, kill, or otherwise incapacitate personnel. It may be detonated by the
action of its victim, by the passage of time, or by controlled means. (JP 1-02)
Components of an IED. IEDs can vary widely in shape and form. IEDs share a
common set of components that consists of the main charge, initiating system, and
casing.
Main Charge. The most common explosives used are military munitions, usually
122-millimeter or greater mortar, tank, and/or artillery rounds. These items are
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IED Defined (Continued)
the easiest to use and provide a ready-made fragmentation effect and they allow
for relatively easy “daisy chaining,” which is linking multiple main charges
together over long or short distances for simultaneous detonation. Other IEDs
have used military and commercial explosives, such as PE4, trinitrotoluene
(TNT), ammonium nitrate (fertilizer), and fuel oil (ANFO). Common hardware,
such as ball bearings, bolts, nuts, or nails, can be used to enhance the
fragmentation. Propane tanks, fuel cans, and battery acid can and have been
added to IEDs to propagate the blast and thermal effects of the IED.
Initiating System. The initiation system or fuse functions the device. It could be a
simple hard wire for command detonation to a cellular telephone or remote
controls to toy cars and airplanes for radio-controlled IEDs. The initiator almost
always consists of a blasting cap. Batteries are used as a power source for
detonators. Batteries of all types are the primary source of power for IEDs.
Batteries could be as small as 9-volts, AA, and those used in long-range cordless
telephones (LRCTs) to car and truck batteries. IEDs may even be wired into the
local power supply of a home or office.
Casing. Casings can range in size from a cigarette pack to a large truck or
airplane. The container is used to help hide the IED and to possibly provide
fragmentation. A myriad of containers have been used as casings, including soda
cans, animal carcasses, plastic bags, and vests or satchels for suicide bombers.
Initiation Methods. Most IEDs in Iraq are presently command-detonated and use
electric firing circuit systems. These IEDs generally have a power source, often
standard batteries or car or motorcycle batteries. Electric firing circuit systems are
either "hard-wired" with a firing wire (such as speaker wire), or they use a wireless
system. Wireless firing systems use radio transmissions from wireless items such as
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Radios
Pagers
Doorbell systems
Light-switch devices
Garage door openers
Car alarm receivers/unlocking devices
Toy car remote controllers
They also use cellular phone transmissions.
Time. Time IEDs are designed to function after a preset delay, allowing the
enemy to make his escape or to target military forces which have created a
pattern. Timers used include igniferous (fire producing), chemical, mechanical,
and electronic devices.
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IED Defined (Continued)
Command. Command-initiated IEDs are a common method of employment and
allow the enemy to choose the optimum moment of initiation. They are normally
used against targets that are in transit or where a routine pattern has been
established. The most common types of command-initiated methods are with
command wires or radio-controlled devices, such as LRCTs, cordless
telephones, and remote car openers and alarms.
Victim. A victim-actuated IED is a means of attacking an individual or group of
individuals. There are various types of initiation devices, which include pull or trip,
pressure, pressure release, movement-sensitive, light-sensitive, proximity, and
electronic switches. Trip wires have also been used and targeted for foot mobile
patrols or for turret gunners in convoys.
Enemy IED Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).
Introduction. Coalition Forces can more effectively prevent, mitigate, and respond to
IED attacks by better understanding enemy IED tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTPs). This section has three main objectives; at the end of this section, you will be
able to:
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Understand common IED target areas
Identify IED camouflage methods and hiding places
Understand how IEDs are employed in attacks
Enemy IED Placement, Employment, and Target Positioning. IEDs may be
emplaced anywhere that enough space exists or can be created to hide or disguise the
IED. Whenever possible, devices are located where employment can exploit known
U.S. patterns (such as the use of a main supply route [MSR]) or vulnerabilities (such as
soft-skinned vehicles or chokepoints). Common areas of IED emplacement include, but
are not limited to:
• Previous IED sites (past successes, laziness, exploiting Techniques, Tactics, and
Procedures [TTPs]).
• Frequently traveled, predictable routes, such as roads leading to FOBs and along
common patrol routes.
• Boundary turnaround points (pattern).
• Roadway shoulders (usually within 10 feet).
• Medians, by the roadside, or buried under the surface of any type of road, often in
potholes and covered with dirt or reheated asphalt.
• Trees, light posts, signs, overpasses, and bridge spans that are elevated.
• Unattended vehicles, trucks, cars, carts, or motorcycles (attached or installed in
them).
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Guardrails (hidden inside) or under any type of material or packaging.
Potential incident control points (ICPs).
Abandoned structures (sometimes partially demolished).
Cinder blocks (hidden behind), piles of sand to direct blast into the kill zone, or inside
disguised concrete items (fake curbs).
Animal carcasses and deceased human bodies.
Fake bodies or scarecrows in coalition uniforms.
Buildings.
Employed at the edge of town.
The enemy may also employ lures to draw friendly forces into an IED kill zone using
methods such as:
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Broken down motorist
Person in need of medical attention
Unaccompanied young child/children
Beware; booby-trapped IEDs are common, especially in weapons and munitions
caches.
Although the enemy puts forth a great deal of effort to keep the IED concealed from
friendly forces, the exact location of the weapon must still be known to the attacker for
reasons of detonating the IED at his choosing. Threat forces attempt to mark the IED in
such a manner that the marker itself does not look out of place and/or does not draw
unwanted attention. Some examples include:
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Piles of rocks
Arranged sticks
Paint markings
Cloth or plastic strips tied to branches
IED Indicators. There are numerous means of detection that can assist in locating
IEDs, however the best means of detection is your personal awareness of what is going
on around you. Below are a list of indicators, common locations of IEDs, Vehicular
Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) considerations, and the 5 to 25 meter
checks:
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Primary Indicators. The primary indication of an IED will be a change in the
environment (something new on the route that was not there yesterday). The enemy
may leave behind visual indicators of an emplaced IED by accident or on purpose
(to inform the local population). Vigilant observation for these subtle indicators can
increase the likelihood of IED detection by friendly forces before detonation.
Examples of possible roadside IED indicators include, but are not limited to:
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Enemy IED Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) (Continued)
o Unusual behavior patterns or changes in community patterns, such as noticeably
fewer people or vehicles in a normally busy area, open windows, or the absence
of women or children.
o Vehicles following a convoy for a long distance and then pulling to the roadside.
o Personnel on overpasses.
o Signals from vehicles or bystanders (flashing headlights).
o People videotaping ordinary activities or military actions. Enemies using IEDs
often tape their activities for use as recruitment or training tools.
o Suspicious objects.
o Metallic objects, such as soda cans and cylinders.
o Colors that seem out of place, such as freshly disturbed dirt, concrete that does
not match the surrounding areas, colored detonating cord, or other exposed parts
of an IED.
o Markers by the side of the road, such as tires, rock piles, ribbon, or tape that may
identify an IED location to the local population or serve as an aiming reference
(such as light poles, fronts or ends of guardrails, and road intersections or turns).
o New or out of place objects in an environment, such as dirt piles, construction,
dead animals, or trash.
o Graffiti symbols or writing on buildings.
o Signs that are newly erected or seem out of place.
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Friendly forces should be especially vigilant around:
o Obstacles in the roadway to channel convoys.
o Exposed antennas, detonating cord, wires, or ordnance.
o Wires laid out in plain site; these may be part of an IED or designed to draw
friendly force attention before detonation of the real IED.
Employment Techniques. The enemy will generally employ the IED in a fashion and
an area that allows the attacker to remain concealed and/or covered (such as a rooftop
or window, dirt mound, vehicle [to include motorcycles], vegetation, canal, defile,
alleyway, or even within a crowd) during the attack and to egress in a concealed or
protected fashion. While typically being within 30-500 meters of the IED kill zone,
attackers will generally locate themselves so that restrictive terrain is between them and
friendly forces, thereby making it more difficult for friendly forces to over take them.
There may be single or multiple IED placed in the kill zone with secondary IEDs, false
kill zones, and multiple zones to further confuse friendly forces making them more
vulnerable to the attack. Multiple IEDs are often daisy-chained together creating a linear
target area.
Below are some ways that IEDs can be used, whether they are emplaced by the enemy
or used as VBIEDs. Additionally, there are some TTPs included that the enemy has
used in order to hinder the mobility efforts of coalition forces. Keep in mind; TTPs
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Enemy IED Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) (Continued)
constantly change with the location and desired intent of the emplaced IED, threat or
obstacle. The enemy has also incorporated the use of small arms fire in conjunction
with the IED attack to harass forces in their attempts to conduct patrols and convoys
along any given route. IEDs can be used in the following manners:
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Disguised static IEDs can be concealed with just about anything (trash, boxes, tires,
and so forth) and can be placed in, on, or under a target or in or under unsecured
vehicles.
Disguised moveable IEDs (vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices [VBIEDs],
suicide bomber vests or victim-actuated IEDs).
Thrown or projected IEDs (improvised grenades or mortars). One example would be
as a convoy travels beneath an overpass, two threat individuals on top of the bridge
will attempt to drop IEDs on top of or into the back of vehicles as they pass under.
(One spots the approaching convoy, times it’s movement, and signals the other who
drops the IED as vehicles exit from the other side of the bridge.) Convoys must be
aware of the 360-degree threat while traveling. Changing speeds and dispersion will
help mitigate the threat to some extent.
IEDs placed in, on, or under a secured/unsecured object. Often times coalition
forces may want/need to clear the roads of abandoned or broken down vehicles or
debris from the side of the road that could pose a threat to convoys that travel along
a given route. Identifying possible enemy fighting or firing positions is paramount in
order to keep all friendly forces safe while removing hauling or pushing the debris
out of the way. If a remote investigative capability is available, use it to ensure that
the debris being moved is not rigged with explosives.
Hoax IEDs, which the enemy uses for myriad purposes, such as to learn our TTP,
entrapment, non-explosive obstacle, and development of identifying complacency for
future IED attacks. Hoax IEDs include something resembling an actual IED, but have
no charge or a fully functioning initiator device. A TTP that has been used before is
emplacing a fake IED (the distraction) along a given route that can be seen by the
lead vehicle in a convoy causing the convoy to halt at a “safe distance.” Actually, the
convoy has inadvertently stopped in the kill zone, for emplaced along the route
either before or after the hoax IED (at a distance the enemy probably learned by
observing repeated friendly reactions and TTPs) putting the convoy in the actual
attack zone.
Additional ways that IED have been employed are:
o The Basic IED Attack. The enemy will place IEDs along routes on either side of
the road awaiting foot patrols or convoys to approach in order to cause the most
damage to personnel or vehicles. When the convoy reaches the attack or kill
zone, the enemy detonates the IED. It is imperative that coalition forces be
vigilant and alert at all times to identify the many different locations an enemy
may possibly hide in order to trigger an IED or signal a trigger man.
o The “Broken Down” Vehicle Attack. The attack uses a simulated broken down
vehicle placed on the side of the road to cause convoys to change their intended
route. The broken down vehicle is staged in the road, either side, blocking one or
all of the trafficable lanes causing the convoy to be canalized between the broken
down vehicle and an emplaced IED. If the convoy chooses to pass, the IED is
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Enemy IED Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) (Continued)
detonated. Or as with the hoax IED, it has also been noted that Coalition Forces
have stopped prior to the broken down vehicle and found to have stopped in the
actual kill zone where a daisy chained series of IEDs is positioned on their flanks.
o Tag Team Attack. Numerous threat individuals work to emplace an IED along a
route, usually in an urban area. After the IED and initiation method has been
emplaced, one of them will stand by out of site of the convoy and wait to give the
signal to another who detonates the IED when the convoy enters the kill zone.
They are usually located where they have the best escape route.
o Ramming Convoys. The enemy has been known to ram their vehicle (possibly
an SVBIED) into the rear or the side of a convoy as it passes in order to get the
convoy to slow or come to a complete stop. As the convoy stops, an IED already
placed on the side of the road or the SVBIED is detonated causing damage to
personnel and equipment. The enemy has also been known to get in front of a
convoy slowing their speed in order to conduct a coordinated attack with another
VBIED.
o Motorcycles. Used by the enemy in areas of decreased mobility in order to
harass convoys and possibly throw IEDs or grenades into the rear of vehicles.
Once the IED or grenade was launched at the intended vehicle, the motorist
would escape using a pre-designated route that was severely restricted to trucks
of larger size. Ensure personnel are constantly watching the rear and flanks of
the convoy to keep this threat to a minimum.
Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED). The VBIED has been successful due to it’s mobility and
enabling the enemy to choose the time and place of the attack with much greater
flexibility. VBIEDs are like any other IED, they almost never look the same (from
bicycles to dump trucks) and there are countless different scenarios that can be set up
by the enemy. This unpredictability makes them difficult to identify. If the driver of the
VBIED is alone in the vehicle having direct control of the IED initiator, the initiator may
be visible to anyone looking into the vehicle from the outside. Particulars of VBIEDs
are:
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Driver
o The presence of a lone male driver in the vehicle. This is the historical standard
for VBIED operations; however, there could be any number of people in the
vehicle if an unsuspecting person is driving the VBIED. Some VBIEDs have two
to three people and females are sometimes used as a distraction.
o Ignoring orders to stop, attempting to circumvent a security checkpoint, or
attempting to maneuver too close to coalition assets.
o Unusual appearance. The enemy may be uncharacteristically clean-shaven and
have very short haircuts. (Cutting the hair is a part of the purifying ritual that
many follow prior to an attack.)
o Age in mid-twenties. The average Middle Eastern suicide terrorist is about 2425, but this may vary in your unique situation.
o Driving erratically; driving too slow or too fast.
o Wearing inappropriate dress for the environment.
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Vehicle
o Noticeable sagging of the vehicle; the top of the tire and the wheel well almost
touch.
o An additional antenna for radio-controlled devices.
o Darkened or covered windows to conceal either vehicle’s contents or actions of
the driver.
o Recent painting of vehicle to cover body alterations.
o Crudely covered holes made in the vehicle to hide explosives.
o New welding marks.
o No license plates.
o Escorted by unusual security detail for type vehicle.
o New tires on an old vehicle.
o Anything unusual in factory-built compartments.
o New or shiny bolts and/or screws.
o Unusual scratches, possibly made by screwdrivers, wrenches, or similar tools.
o Signs of tampering, such as broken parts or bent sheet metal.
o Areas and components cleaner or dirtier than surrounding areas.
o Wire and tape stored in vehicle.
• Local Signs
o Camera crew “hanging out” near your area.
o Vehicle observed more than once.
o Absence of normal routine for that area of operations (AO).
o Odd traffic patterns.
o Person or persons observed conducting reconnaissance.
o Vehicle testing local defenses, i.e., drives at a high speed towards traffic control
point (TCP) and then breaks off.
SBIEDs (Suicide Bombers). Most suicide attacks involve SBIEDs, and include
casualty rates from tens to hundreds. Recently, however, there has been an increasing
trend for suicide bombers to attack with an explosive vest, belt or baggage. Coalition
Forces have been attacked within the perimeter of a Firm Base; civilians have been
attacked at polling stations and at police recruitment drives; and a civilian contractor
was killed when a bomber exited his vehicle in traffic, approached the contractor’s
vehicle, and detonated his vest/belt. With effective techniques being used to reduce the
effectiveness of VBIEDs, the potential for the enemy to adapt to suicide bombers
increases.
If the charges used by bombers are effectively packaged and concealed, a suicide
bomber could carry up to 45 pounds of explosives; however, most suicide belts are
designed to hold smaller amounts, up to 12 pounds. The mass of this weight of
explosive promotes conformity of the belt to the individual, improving concealment. It
should be noted that fragment producing materials are often incorporated into the
design of these belts/vests.
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Enemy IED Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) (Continued)
Indicators of a potential suicide attack are:
• An individual who deliberately ignores orders to stop or attempts to circumvent a
security checkpoint.
• An individual wearing too much clothing for the prevailing weather conditions.
• A person with suspicious bulges in his/her clothing, carrying packages/bags or
wearing satchels/backpacks.
• An individual handling wires, switches, an actuator, or a “dead man’s” switch.
The enemy is smart, and their TTPs change! Threat forces continuously improve and
adapt their TTPs. They are clever, flexible, innovative, and deceptive. They seek to
exploit friendly forces weaknesses. They are constantly learning, changing tactics, and
improving their TTPs. Enemy scouts and spies observe and report on Coalition Forces
patterns, TTPs, SOPs, and battle drills and adjust their plans and TTPs accordingly.
They conduct pattern analysis, learning and planning around Coalition Forces’
movement, patrol, and convoy patterns, routes, and schedules.
IED Attack Preparation, Prevention, and Effects Reduction
Introduction. Obviously, preventing IED attacks is one key way to enhance your
personal safety and that of your unit. In addition, preventing IED attacks makes the
local populace feel more confident in your ability to provide a secure environment. This
increased confidence reduces the likelihood that they will provide assistance to the
enemy or passively ignore their activities. There are also measures you can take to
reduce the damage which can be caused by an IED detonation.
Measures to reduce the effects of IEDs begin with conducting a thorough METT-TC
analysis, gaining an understanding of the enemy, and comprehending the common
activities associated with an IED attack. Activities conducted by the enemy include
leadership, planning, financing, material procurement, bomb making, target selection,
recruiting, and attack execution. A holistic approach to understanding the requirements
of an IED attack assists commanders and planners in identifying vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities can be exploited to break the operational chain of events of the enemy,
but the main focus here is to know what to look for when conducting an Intelligence
Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and analyzing intelligence products.
In this section, you will learn:
• Tenets of IED defeat
• Ways to prevent IED emplacement
• Ways to avoid IEDs during movement
• Training and preparation that can enhance your safety
Tenets of IED Defeat. The IED defeat framework is enables commanders and staffs to
plan and take proactive measures to seek out and defeat IED events before they occur.
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It also provides a methodology for addressing IED events upon contact and subsequent
detonation. The IED defeat framework consists of the following:
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Predict. These activities are used to identify and understand enemy personnel,
equipment, infrastructure, TTP, support mechanisms, or other actions to forecast
specific enemy IED operations directed against U.S. interests.
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Identifying patterns of enemy behavior.
Identifying emerging threats.
Predicting future enemy actions.
Exploiting IED threat vulnerabilities.
Targeting enemy IED attack nodes (such as funding and supplies).
Disseminating alert information rapidly to specific users.
Analyzing forensics and enabling better on-the-scene technical analysis.
Detect. These activities contribute to the identification and location of enemy
personnel, explosive devices, and their component parts, equipment, logistics
operations, and infrastructure in order to provide accurate and timely information.
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Detecting and identifying explosive material and other IED components.
Detecting chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) material.
Recognizing suicide bombers.
Conducting forensic operations to track bomb makers and/or handlers.
Conducting persistent surveillance.
Training to improve detection of IED indicators by digital means.
Using detection means across the full range available (imagery, mechanicalclearance operations, search techniques, dogs, so forth)
o Recognizing individual Marine actions and awareness in all activities.
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Prevent. These activities disrupt and defeat the IED operational chain of events.
The actions focus on the target to interdict or destroy key enemy personnel (bomb
makers, leaders, and financiers), the infrastructure/ logistics capabilities (suppliers
and bomb factories), and surveillance/ targeting efforts (reconnaissance and overwatch operations) before emplacement of the device.
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Disrupting enemy operations and their support structure.
Denying critical IED-related supplies to the enemy.
Increasing awareness of enemy TTP and their effectiveness.
Denying the enemy the opportunity to emplace IEDs (through presence
patrols, observation posts, checkpoints, aggressive surveillance operations, and
so forth.)
o Rewarding local nationals’ cooperation in determining the locations of cashes,
bomb making, or emplacement activities.
o Denying easily concealed locations (such as trash piles and debris along sides of
primary routes) and removing abandoned vehicles along routes.
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Avoid activities. These activities keep friendly forces from IEDs when prevention
activities are not possible or have failed.
o Altering routes and routines.
o Marking and bypassing suspected IEDs.
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Neutralize. These activities contribute to the destruction or reduction of enemy
personnel, explosive devices, or supplies. They can be proactive or reactive in
nature.
o Proactive activities include conducting operations to eliminate or interrupt the
enemy’s leaders, suppliers, trainers, enablers, and executors responsible for the
employment of IEDs against coalition forces.
o Reactive activities include conducting controlled detonations or render safe
procedures (RSPs) against identified IEDs, cashes, captured enemy ammunition
(CEA), and so forth. Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) forces are the only
personnel authorized to render safe IEDs.
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Protect. These activities improve the survivability of IED targets through hardening,
awareness training, or other techniques.
o Disrupting, channeling, blocking, or redirecting enemy and fragmentation.
o Creating greater standoff distances to reduce the effect that IEDs have on their
intended targets.
o Using jamming devices.
o Reducing time and distance in which intended targets are within IED range.
o Accelerating processes and increasing the effectiveness by which reaction and
evacuation operations are conducted.
o Providing blast and fragmentation mitigation for platforms, structures, and
personnel.
o Avoid establishing patterns and predictable forms of behavior.
o Conducting proper pre-combat inspections (PCIs) and rehearsals for all
operations.
o Treating every operation as a combat mission (from a simple convoy to forward
operating base [FOB] security).
IED Defeat Framework. The IED defeat framework can be broken down into two major
sub-elements: Proactive (pre-detection) and Reactive (post-detection).
•
•
Proactive elements are actions taken by friendly forces to predict, detect,
prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect against IED events.
Reactive elements are actions taken by friendly forces to detect, avoid,
neutralize, and protect against IED events.
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IED Attack Preparation, Prevention, and Effects Reduction (Continued)
Proactive Efforts
Reactive Efforts
Focus on Battle Command and Awareness Training
(Left of Detection)
Focus on TTPs, Drills, SOPs, and Troop and System Protection
(Right of Detection)
Collection & Analysis
Not Detonated
Detonated
Not
Predict
Neutralize
Protect
Method
Avoid
Detect
Actor
Detect
Prevent
Enemy Reaction:
Develops new attack methods
•Financier
•Planner
•Builder
•Delivery/ Emplacer
Event
Avoid
Neutralize
Detection of
IED
IED
•Explosive
•Power Source
•Container
•Initiation Device
Protect
Enemy’s Desired Effect
•Public Opinion
Regional, National, International, America
•Erode Confidence
Local Populace, Coalition Forces
Feeds back into
Collection and Analysis
Investigation and Report
IED Defeat Framework
The small unit leader generally has the capability to affect four of the six tenets of the
IED-D framework. These are: predict, detect (detection is discussed in the previous
lesson), avoid, and protect.
•
Predict. Through analyzing the terrain, the planned route, and recent enemy activity
in the area, the small unit leader can predict likely areas for an IED attack. Though
many actions are involved within “Predict”, the small unit leader can likely execute
the following actions with limited assistance from the unit’s intelligence section:
o Identify patterns of enemy behavior.
o Predict future enemy actions.
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•
Avoid activities. “Predict” and “detect” aid the leader in avoiding IED attacks. The
following activities also aid in avoiding IED attacks:
o
o
o
o
o
o
•
Increasing situational understanding (SU) of the area of operations (AOs).
Constantly updating the common operational picture (COP)
Disseminating related accurate information about the AO in a timely manner.
Ensuring timely and accurate status reporting and tracking.
Altering routes and routines.
Marking and bypassing suspected IEDs.
Protect. The following actions should be considered when attempting to decrease
the effectiveness of IEDs:
o Disrupting, channeling, blocking, or redirecting energy and fragmentation. This is
primarily accomplished through use of armor kits on combat vehicles.
o Creating greater standoff distances to reduce the effect that IEDs have on their
intended targets. The minimum safe distance from any IED is 300 meters,
but this range increases as the size of the IED increases.
o Incorporating unmanned platforms. This would include unmanned aerial vehicles
or robotics to investigate likely attack areas prior to entering the area.
o Using jamming devices.
o Reducing time and distance in which intended targets are within IED range.
o Increasing the speed and effectiveness by which reaction and evacuation
operations are conducted.
o Providing blast and fragmentation mitigation for platforms, structures, and
personnel.
o Avoiding establishing patterns and predictable forms of behavior.
o Conducting proper personnel and equipment inspections and rehearsals for all
operations.
o Treating every operation as a combat mission (from a simple convoy, to daily
forward operating base [FOB] security or patrols).
Preventing IED Emplacement. The most effective way to enhance your security in
relation to the IED threat is to deny the insurgents the opportunity to emplace an IED.
Activities that reduce insurgent ability to emplace IEDs are to:
• Develop a good relationship and means of communicating with the community so
community members feel comfortable providing you with information.
o Advertise phone numbers to report insurgent activity or materials
o Offer incentives and consistently ensure anonymity.
•
•
Coordinate with local police and conduct joint patrols—local police can aid in
collecting information on insurgent actions and materials. (Maintain operations
security [OPSEC].)
Use patrols, observation points, and checkpoints to interdict and dissuade enemy
activities and deny enemy access to key terrain for IED emplacement.
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IED Attack Preparation, Prevention, and Effects Reduction (Continued)
•
•
•
Use counter IED-ambush teams and scout-sniper teams to interdict or kill enemy
insurgent teams.
Reduce availability of bomb making materials, especially the pervasively available
military explosives.
Clean routes of trash, brush/vegetation, abandoned vehicles, etc. from the sides of
the road. Select routes that are of the most concern in terms of IED threats.
Prepare For Movement. Follow these important points for movement:
Number and Type of Vehicles (combat, logistic, wheeled, tracked). Large convoys
consisting primarily of logistic vehicles carrying food, water, and numerous pilferable
items that the enemy would like to capture for financial gain are likely targets as they
are difficult to defend. These must contain robust security elements to present an
aggressive posture and prevent attack. The leader must balance the number and type
of vehicles in a movement to prevent the unit from becoming too cumbersome to
manage and to allow for a strong security posture. If there are four or more security
vehicles in a unit, two of them may scout ahead, maintaining communication and visual
contact.
Planned Speed of Movement. The speed of movement should be varied according to
the drivers’ level of experience, vehicles/load plan of each convoy, the actual mission
(e.g. supply convoy versus presence patrol), and the weather, time of day, and road
conditions. Some key considerations are listed below:
•
•
•
Driving fast may upset the enemy’s timing of command detonated IEDs, but it
decreases the ability to spot IED indicators. Leaders must be aware that driving too
fast may cause loss of control and can be potentially deadly.
Driving slow increases the probability of spotting IED indicators, but may make you
an easier target for command detonated IEDs or ambushes.
Speed should be varied within the capabilities of the vehicles and the operators.
This will help avoid setting patterns.
Weapons. Leaders must attempt to have a variety of weapons systems within their unit
during any movement. This should range from small arms (rifles, grenade launchers) to
medium and heavy machine guns. An effective mix of weapons systems will allow for
an aggressive posture with the ability to provide heavy suppressive fires and the ability
to conduct a dismounted assault. Either capability without the other exposes a critical
gap in a unit’s tactical capability that is easily exploited by the enemy. Leaders must
also ensure that Marines are proficient with their weapons systems prior to movement.
Route Selection. Before selecting the routes to be used in each mission, an analysis
of new information should occur:
•
Check when the routes you are considering using were last cleared or used by other
units.
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IED Attack Preparation, Prevention, and Effects Reduction (Continued)
•
Leaders should check for updated threat and route information with
o
o
o
o
o
o
•
•
•
Higher headquarters
MPs
Force protection teams
Intelligence and reconnaissance reports
The Mine Data Center
The IED Task Force, etc.
Choose routes that avoid chokepoints and other areas where traffic slows because
reduced speeds make the convoy more vulnerable.
Vary the times of movements, as well as the routes.
Maintain OPSEC regarding the timing and routes of convoys, patrols, and other
movements.
The figure shown on the following page is an example of a planned route that has been
analyzed to show likely areas for an IED attack.
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IED Attack Preparation, Prevention, and Effects Reduction (Continued)
Example of route denoting likely IED Attack sites
Communication Plan. Some movements (especially logistical convoys) cover a great
distance and can often pass through several units’ areas of operation. The following
considerations must be taken into consideration when developing a communication
plan.
•
•
Coordination with each unit whose AO you will be passing through to ensure that
your means of communication are compatible.
Preparation for emergency communications. All members of your unit must be
briefed on and able to communicate MEDEVAC requests (air and ground) and
Explosive Hazard Spot Reports. While this should be done for any movement, it is
especially important in an IED environment due to the particularly catastrophic
injuries and damage caused by IEDs.
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IED Attack Preparation, Prevention, and Effects Reduction (Continued)
Pre-Movement Rehearsals. Moving units must be prepared to react quickly and
efficiently to any attack--especially IED attacks. Once commencing the mission in the
IED environment, it is vitally important to maintain awareness. Maintain an offensive
mindset. Make all attempts to avoid setting patterns. One enemy TTP is to set decoy
IEDs in order to observe the immediate reactions of coalition forces. By studying our
tactics they can increase the lethality of their attacks, like setting up mortars and rockets
on the kill zone or safe area. Follow the map you updated carefully—75% of IEDs are
set up in the exact same location of previous attacks. Follow the below steps to react to
IED attacks. The below is not meant to replace initiative and ingenuity of the small unit
leader; it is intended to be used as guidance. Remember that the IED may be just one
part of the ambush. The unit must be prepared to react to any threat after the IED
detonates and move out of the kill zone as quickly as possible. In the fight against an
adaptive enemy, variations in TTPs are encouraged.
Leaders must be aware all details unique to their particular situation in order to make a
timely decision. The decision matrix on page 34 aids the unit leader in deciding how to
act/react according to their particular situation.
Pre-Combat Inspections. As with any other combat operation, unit leaders must
conduct pre-combat inspections. This is the leaders’ last opportunity to ensure that all
personnel and equipment are prepared for the movement. The following are a few key
concerns. A more detailed checklist is contained at the end of this outline.
•
Personnel. Inspect personnel for the follow (at a minimum).
o Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is present, serviceable, and worn properly.
o Weapons systems are operational and properly maintained.
o Personnel are familiar with movement order, rally points, immediate action drills,
and communication procedures.
•
Vehicles.
o Vehicles are in working order and properly maintained.
o If not armored, vehicles are properly hardened. Use creativity as the situation
dictates. One common example is to use sandbags. This may be especially
practical if your AO sees a great deal of large, on route, buried IEDs. Sandbagged floor boards can absorb fragmentation and add weight to the vehicle
(which decreases the vertical and horizontal acceleration as a result of the IED
detonation).
o Fire extinguishers are present on all vehicles and are in working order.
o All cargo is properly strapped down to ensure it does not become secondary
fragmentation.
o Strip maps are present on all vehicles.
o The vehicle load plan is adhered to.
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IED Attack Preparation, Prevention, and Effects Reduction (Continued)
After Action Report. For your intelligence section to be able to properly update
moving units, it is important that you provide a detailed after action report. Update your
maps with any IED attacks that occurred during your movement, and add any potential
IED attack locations. Strive to understand anything you may consider to be an enemy
TTP, and inform the S-2. Pinpoint where any indirect or direct fire came from, and the
location of any ambushes. Provide the S-2 with any other information that you think
may be relevant for future pattern analysis.
IED Encounter Response Procedures
Introduction. This section will provide you with information on how to react should an
IED be discovered and/or detonate. At the end of this section you should understand
•
•
Measures to be taken immediately after IED attack,
Follow on actions if
o No enemy is in the immediate area,
o The enemy is in the immediate area, and
•
General guidelines for the use of force. Units must drill these procedures and
develop SOP battle drills for reacting to enemy contact associated with IED attacks.
These tactics must be adaptive so that they keep the enemy off balance.
Reacting To Suspected IEDs. In order to mitigate the effects of an IED, there are
several things Marines can do regardless of the type of threat. Ensure that personnel
wear all protective gear available, to include ballistic eye protection, goggles, Kevlar
helmets, body armor with plates, and hearing protection. Wear seatbelts when moving.
During mounted movement, ensure that drivers, track commanders, and gunners have
as much of their body inside the vehicle as possible to reduce the possibility of being
struck by shrapnel or being exposed to the initial blast.
• Pre-Movement Rehearsals. Moving units must be prepared to react quickly and
efficiently to any attack--especially IED attacks. Once commencing the mission
in the IED environment, it is vitally important to maintain awareness. Maintain an
offensive mindset. Make all attempts to avoid setting patterns. One enemy TTP
is to set decoy IEDs in order to observe the immediate reactions of coalition
forces. By studying our tactics they can increase the lethality of their attacks, like
setting up mortars and rockets on the kill zone or safe area. Follow the map you
updated carefully—75% of IEDs are set up in the exact same location of previous
attacks. Follow the below steps to react to IED attacks. The below is not meant
to replace initiative and ingenuity of the small unit leader; it is intended to be used
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
•
as guidance. Remember that the IED may be just one part of the ambush. The
unit must be prepared to react to any threat after the IED detonates and move
out of the kill zone as quickly as possible. In the fight against an adaptive
enemy, variations in TTPs are encouraged.
Patrolling. One of the most important things you can do to protect yourself and
your unit against the possibility of an IED attack is to limit your predictability. This
is much more than varying the times of movement. You also need to consider
varying routes, movement techniques, and your TTP for dealing with different
situations. Remember, the enemy is always watching. For example, if you react
to a specific situation such as a disabled vehicle or suspected IED the same way
every time the enemy will quickly catch on and will use this knowledge to his
advantage. In an effort to counter route predictability, patrols should change
direction at seemingly random intervals, especially in areas of previous IED
attacks. Where practical and safe, move against the normal flow of traffic, turn
around at points not normally used, and move overland parallel to an established
route in order to vary your observable movement tactics. Additionally, these
techniques will present the patrol with a different and often more advantageous
observation angle that may reveal the “backside” of an IED that was poorly
camouflaged.
o Counter VBIED Techniques. The key to surviving a VBIED attack is
standoff and cover. Also, stress to security personnel that a VBIED can
come from any direction. Units have been attacked by vehicles turning into
a patrol from oncoming traffic. When moving in a convoy, make sure you
do not present a lucrative target for a VBIED. Maintain an aggressive
security posture and have a plan for dealing with civilian traffic. This can
include, but is not limited to, the use of signs in the local language,
formations that take up all lanes in the road, visual signals, use of an air
horn, and the use of flares to warn cars to stay back before firing disabling
shots.
•
•
•
•
•
Top gunners and security personnel should be alert and constantly
aware of any vehicle approaching their patrol or parked along the
route.
Within the ROE, any suspicious vehicle should not be allowed to
approach coalition forces. Employ warning signs to tell civilian
drivers to remain clear of a moving convoy.
Convoy and patrol members should know the authorized escalation
of force procedures.
Be aware of danger areas/choke points such as turnoffs that force
the patrol to slow down.
Watch merging traffic as VBIEDs have used on or off ramps to get
near coalition vehicles
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
•
•
If you are going to allow civilian traffic to pass your convoy, make
sure you have developed a technique to visually check cars and
drivers as they approach.
If you are not going to allow civilian traffic to pass your convoy,
make sure that you have a plan to let civilians know to stay back,
and have a plan for the escalation of force.
o Maintaining Standoff: Mobile. Escalation of force
techniques/ROE: The techniques used should be simple, clean,
and definite:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Aggressive/defensive vehicle maneuvers
Signs in the local language on the rear of vehicle (“Stay
Back, Do Not Pass”)
Hand and arm signals
Air horn/siren/bull horn/whistle
Spotlight (nighttime)
Green lasers
Non-lethal warnings
Chem-lites, water bottles
Use of pen flares
Flash bangs
40-mm TP round
Warning shots
Engage vehicle with weapon, if necessary (ROE)
Engage the driver/occupants, if necessary (ROE)
o Maintaining Standoff: Stationary
•
•
•
•
•
•
Recon site prior to occupation
Perform 5 to 25 meter checks upon halt
Maximize distance from roadway (mine and buried IEDs
may present a threat)
Make use of natural barriers
Maintain good dispersion
Quickly establish overt perimeter:
o
o
o
o
•
•
Cones
Barbed wire
Signs
Road spikes
Establish overwatch of primary position
Defend in depth
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
•
•
Position electronic countermeasure (ECM) devices for
maximum coverage
Keep roads clear of civilian vehicles
o Counter Suicide Bomber Techniques
•
Defensive Actions
o Evacuate the area immediately. Safe distances will depend on
the mass of explosive carried by the bomber and the amount
and type of fragmentation used.
o “Close and negotiate” tactics should not be attempted, as
suicide bombers are usually trained to avoid surrender at all
costs.
o A “fail safe” cell phone or radio-controlled initiator could be used
in the event that the bomber is incapacitated or hesitates. This
tactic would normally involve a second suspect with a line-ofsight view of the bomber and should always be considered.
o If a “deadly force” response is taken, bullet impact may
initiate/detonate the explosive charge(s). Firing on the suspect
should only be undertaken from protective cover.
o If the suspect is neutralized and there is no explosion, do not
administer first aid. Wait for EOD to render safe the explosive
charge.
o Actions at Halts. No one single set of procedures will work for all situations.
If a patrol or convoy must stop during movement, employ techniques to
create standoff. Remember to conduct 5 to 25 meter checks as described
below. In addition, establish your own local security every time the convoy
or patrol halts. Avoid clustering vehicles and vary the vehicle interval
between elements. If you will be stopped for any length of time, improve
your position constantly and consider contingencies (hasty and deliberate
defense) for the site you are occupying. Most importantly, do not remain at
one site too long. The enemy has planned and executed attacks against
units that remain in place too long.
•
5 to 25 Meter Checks at Halts. Any patrol or convoy halting for any
length of time must consider itself vulnerable to attack. At all halts,
Marines must clear the area around their vehicles. Depending on
the length of time at the halt, the area to clear varies from 5 to 25
meters. At every halt, no matter how short, the crew must clear 5
meters around the vehicle while inside. For extended halts, teams
must clear 25 meters around the patrol or convoy. Begin 5 to 25
before stopping to avoid stopping on top of an IED.
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
o 5 meter checks:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Identify a position to halt.
Visually check the area 5 meters around your vehicles .
Look for disturbed earth and suspicious objects, loose bricks
in walls, and security ties on streetlights or anything out of
the ordinary.
Start your search at ground level and continue up above
head height.
Then conduct a physical check for a radius of 5 meters
around your position. Be systematic, take your time, and
show curiosity. If the tactical situation permits, use a white
light or infrared (IR) light at night.
If in an armored vehicle, remain mounted during your 5
meter check to take advantage of the vehicle’s protection.
o 25 meter checks:
•
•
•
•
Add to the 5 meter check when the patrol or convoy leader
decides to occupy an area for any length of time.
Once 5 meter checks are conducted, continue visually
scanning out to 25 meters.
Conduct a physical search for a radius of 25 meters around
your position.
Look for IED indicators and anything out of the ordinary.
o Actions on Contact. An improvised explosive device (IED) is a form of
attack by the enemy. Any IED that detonates should be treated as an
enemy contact. Contingency plans and rehearsals are key to concluding
the contact, hopefully with the capture or death of the bomber. If you find
an IED before it explodes, you must treat it like it will explode at any
moment. The enemy at the firing point may be waiting for more Marines to
gather around the device before setting it off. He may be moving from an
observation point (OP) to the firing point. Training on basic tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) will enable you and your unit to win the
engagement.
•
IED Found Before Detonation.
o The Five "Cs". The five "Cs" represent a simple set of
guidelines that you should use when you encounter a suspected
IED:
•
•
Confirm
Clear
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
•
•
•
Cordon
Check
Control
•
CONFIRM. You should always assume the device will
explode at any moment. From a safe distance and using
a minimal number of personnel, look for IED indicators.
Use any hard cover you have available while attempting
to confirm the suspected IED, and never risk more
personnel than the tactical situation requires. Use all
tools at your disposal, to include moving to a better
vantage point. Use optics to look for tell-tale signs of an
IED: red detonating (det) cord, antennas, electrical wires,
or exposed ordnance. Never ask civilians to remove an
IED. You may solicit information regarding the suspected
IED, but do not ask them to go up and “take a look.” Stay
as far back as possible while looking for clues. When in
doubt, back away. Do not ever touch.
Let your higher headquarters know what you have found.
Submit an IED/unexploded ordnance (UXO) 9-line report.
When you move to a new location, always check for
secondary IEDs. Always assume that the found IED is a
bait round and that the real IED is near your “secure”
location. Team members should always scan their
immediate surroundings for more IEDs. Report additional
IEDs to the on-scene commander.
LINE 1. Date-time group (DTG): When the item was
discovered?
LINE 2. Report activity and location: Unit and grid
location of the IED/UXO.
LINE 3. Contact method: Radio frequency, call sign, point
of contact (POC), and telephone number.
LINE 4. Type of ordinance: Dropped, projected, placed,
or thrown; give the
number of items if more than one.
LINE 5. Nuclear, biological, chemical (NBC)
contaminations: Be as specific as possible.
LINE 6. Resources threatened: Equipment, facilities, or
other assets that are threatened.
LINE 7. Impact on mission: Short description of current
tactical situation and how the device affects the status of
the mission.
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
LINE 8. Protective measures: Any protective measures
taken to protect personnel and equipment.
LINE 9. Recommended priority: Immediate, indirect,
minor, no threat.
Note: Do not attempt to do the job of explosive ordnance
disposal (EOD) or engineers.
•
CLEAR. Evacuate the area to a safe distance (around
300 meters) but do not set a pattern. If it is a VBIED, you
will need more standoff. Get out of the IED’s line-of-sight.
Assess whether your distance and cover is adequate.
Direct people out of the danger area, and do not allow
anyone to enter other than those responsible for
rendering the IED safe, such as EOD. Question, search,
and detain as needed.
•
CORDON. Establish blocking positions to prevent vehicle
and foot traffic from approaching the IED. Immediately
search the safe area for secondary IEDs before
occupying it. Make maximum use of available cover.
Establish 360 degree security and dominate the area.
Scan close in and away from your position. Most likely,
the enemy is watching and waiting to make his move.
Randomly check people leaving the area to deter attacks.
Establish obstacles to control approaches to security
positions. Enemy may try to attack local security forces
using a VBIED.
•
CHECK. Check the immediate area around the IED and
cordoned positions for secondary devices using the 5/25
meter checks. Expand the search area as time/ threat
permit.
•
CONTROL. Control the site until EOD arrives. Clear and
set up an entry control point for first responders. Do not
let others go forward to “inspect” the IED. Make
contingency plans in case you are attacked by small
arms or rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
Should you be part of a patrol or convoy that finds an IED, the five
"Cs" will help to ensure that the situation can be dealt with quickly
and safely. Remember, an IED that is found is still an IED attack.
By finding the IED, you have just disrupted the enemy’s attack. Do
not forget about the enemy’s other forms of attack, RPGs, small
arms fire, mortars, and secondary IED. Enemy IED site = Enemy
ambush site. You are in the kill zone!
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
Kill and Danger Estimated Distances.
IED
Amount of
HE
Kill Distances
Danger Area
Frag
Danger Area
Blast
Coke Can
1 lb.
10 ft
500 ft
300 ft
Shoe Box
5 lb.
20 ft
850 ft
500 ft
Small
10 lb.
22 ft
1200 ft
650 ft
Footlocker
100 lb.
50 ft
2500 ft
1500 ft
Car
500 lb
82 ft
4000 ft
2400 ft
Van
4000 lb
164 ft
6500 ft
5000 ft
Delivery
10000 lb
225 ft
11000 ft
6300 ft
Semi Trailer
60000 lb
400 ft
20000 ft
12000 ft
Once you have completed the first five crucial steps (Confirm,
Clear, Assess, Cordon, and Control), follow the rest of the steps of
these response procedures:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Attempt to locate insurgents in the area and, if possible,
attempt to kill or capture.
Mark the IED using a reference point; determine grid
location and record DTG. Do not handle or approach
IED at any time.
Contact higher headquarters to report any IEDs or
possible IEDs using the nine-line IED/UXO report. A grid
and sitrep will suffice in the short-term.
Do not use radios, cellular phones, radars, or other
electronic devices within 100 meters of the suspected
IED, as these actions could set off radio-frequency IEDs.
Gather information about the IED area and threat
environment and interview witnesses.
Leave the area when the IED is secured or conduct a
battle hand over with EOD or other follow-on unit.
Restore site to state of normalcy if possible (restore
traffic flow, clear debris, treat local populace with respect,
etc.).
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
o Suspected IED — What Not To Do.
•
Never approach a suspected IED. Instead, use standoff optics like
binoculars and spotting scopes from multiple angles to attempt to
confirm the presence of an IED. When in doubt, back off and call EOD.
•
Do not pick up det cord. Det cord is an explosive and the presence
of it alone is enough to call EOD. Do not trace or pull on det cord.
•
Tracing command wire (CW). The enemy has placed trip wires and
other IEDs under/in the vicinity of command wires. When a command
wire is located, rather than walking parallel to the wire or over the wire
to locate the initiation point, work in an “S” pattern, crossing the CW
until the initiation point is located.
CAUTION! There has been at least one occasion where an IED was
located at the initiation point, in addition to the IED at the main
supply route (MSR). Do not focus on the “found” IED. An IED, once
found, is not going to move. Look for additional devices. Look for the
trigger man. Look for anyone trying to escape the area. Watch for
approaching VBIEDs. Scan for enemy moving into position to engage you
with small arms or RPGs. Focus outward. Again, once positive IED
indicators are found (det cord, wires, etc.), immediately move a safe
distance away; perform a search of your safe area (5 to 25 meter checks)
for secondary devices, and call EOD.
o IED Detonation. Immediate actions differ when an IED is actually
detonated. The enemy may often combine the IED attack with a direct fire
ambush to increase the lethality of the attack. In deciding the best course
of action following an IED detonation, the leader must first determine if the
IED attack is combined with an ambush. The 5 "Cs" are still applicable;
however, you must now incorporate your counter-ambush TTPs. Even
when you do everything right tactically, the enemy can sometimes surprise
you. For this reason, it is important to review some tactical principles for
post-explosion actions. Units should be proficient in actions on contact,
and team members should be cross-trained on other patrol member’s
duties. Remember, an IED attack is an ambush. It is important to note that
the results of an IED attack can range from catastrophic to no damage at
all. The enemy is not always successful with IED attacks. If you are
attacked, your reaction to contact drills will have to be modified based
upon vehicle damage and casualties.
Key points:
•
Quick, lethal and aggressive response in accordance with rules of
engagement (ROE)
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Immediately scan outward. The biggest mistake Marines can make is
focusing inwards toward the site of the IED detonation and forgetting
about the enemy. Obviously, some Marines will have to assess the
situation, communicate with higher, tend to wounded, and recover
vehicles. Every other patrol or convoy member should scan around the
location for the enemy.
Move out of kill zone
Search for/Clear additional IEDs (5 to 25)
-At the new location (5 to 25)
-At the location where the vehicle is disabled (5 to 25)
Treat/Evacuate casualties
Report situation
Expect follow on attacks
o IED Detonation: No Ambush; with or without casualties. After an IED is
detonated, the unit leader must be prepared to react immediately to a
number of potential scenarios. The method chosen will depend on the
mission and the circumstances following the attack:
• The unit leader may chose to continue movement.
• If there is a casualty the unit leader may chose to find a suitable
CASEVAC location
• Preserve forensic evidence
• Search the surrounding area
• Conduct vehicle recovery operations
• Dismount vehicles and seek out the trigger man
• Conduct 5 C’s. Be prepared to take additional action as your situation
develops.
Below is an example of a unit SOP-driven immediate action drill that uses
the acronym REACTER:
•
•
•
•
Report. Report contact to personnel internal to patrol/convoy; gain
situational awareness.
Evacuate. Able vehicles and personnel clear kill zone.
Area. Secure the area (ie; establish snap blocking positions using
contents of snap VCP kits, conduct 5 to 25 meter checks, establish
360 security, establish overwatch, establish cordon, scan/search for
possible triggermen/cameramen). Focus on enemy and control area.
Clear the kill zone. Conduct a sweep for secondary IEDs while
clearing to damaged vehicle/kill zone. ECM assets should be
integrated into sweep if available. First responders should move up
immediately behind sweep, but should not move to kill zone before
area is secure or sweep for secondary IEDs is conducted.
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
•
•
•
Treat casualties: initial lifesaving procedures only. Do not establish
Casualty Collection Point (CCP) in kill zone and do not linger in kill
zone.
Establish CCP and LZ away from kill zone ie; min 300 meters.
Conduct 5 to 25 meter checks at CCP and LZ.
Report/recover. Report situation to higher and Recover damaged
vehicles as required.
o IED Detonation With Direct Fire Ambush. When no ambush is present,
the priority is to determine if other IEDs exist in the immediate area. When
an ambush is present, the priority shifts slightly; the threat of a potential
IED is outweighed by the actual ambush, so the enemy must be
addressed first. The leader must employ the principles of reacting to near
or far ambushes, and then conduct the 5 Cs.
•
IED Detonation with near ambush. In a near ambush, the kill zone
is under very heavy, highly concentrated, close-range (within hand
grenade range) fires. There is little time or space for men to
maneuver or seek cover. The longer they remain in the kill zone,
the more certain their deaths. If attacked with a near ambush:
o Marines in the kill zone immediately assault the enemy’s
position without waiting for any order or signal. The assault
should be swift, violent, and destructive. Fire weapons at the
maximum rate, throw hand grenades, and yell as loudly as
possible- anything to kill as many enemy as they can, and
confuse enemy survivors. Once they reach the ambush
position, they either continue with their assault, or break contact,
as directed.
o Marines not in the kill zone maneuver against the ambush force,
firing in support of those assaulting.
o If the ambush force is small enough to be routed or destroyed,
the patrol members should continue with their assault and
supporting fire. If the force is well-disciplined and holds its
ground, then the patrol members should make every effort to
break contact as quickly as possible, and move to the last en
route rally point to reorganize.
o If the leader decides to break contact, he must be aware that
the unit may have to provide suppressive fire until any
WIA/KIA/disabled vehicles can be extracted from the kill zone.
o Consolidate and Conduct 5 C’s.
•
IED Detonation with far ambush. In a far ambush, the killing zone
is also under very heavy, highly concentrated fires, but from a
greater range (out of hand grenade range). The greater range
precludes those caught in the killing zone from conducting an
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
assault. The greater range does, however, permit some
opportunity for the men to maneuver and seek cover. If attacked
from a far ambush:
o Men in the kill zone immediately return fire, take the best
available cover, and continue firing until directed otherwise.
o Men not in the kill zone maneuver against the ambush force, as
directed.
o The unit leader either directs his unit and team leaders to fire
and maneuver against the ambush force, or to break contact,
depending on his rapid assessment of the situation.
o If the leader decides to break contact, he must be aware that
the unit may have to provide suppressive fire until any
WIA/KIA/disabled vehicles can be extracted from the kill zone.
o Consolidate and Conduct 5 C’s.
•
Attempting to Neutralize an IED with Organic Weapons. Depending on your
estimate of the situation and your commander’s intent, you may be required to
neutralize the suspected IED if EOD is not immediately available and the
situation is dire enough to warrant taking the risk. Neutralizing the IED is
generally not the preferred course of action as it destroys any forensic evidence,
may cause explosive waste to scatter without detonating, and could be
potentially deadly as these techniques are often conducted from within the
fragmentation radius of the IED. Also, you should note that an IED in the open
may be a detonator for a larger hidden device. Ensure that there is enough
safety standoff distance from the IED before detonating it. The only means that
most convoys/patrols will have to attempt to neutralize an IED is through direct
fire weapons.
o Stand-off Munitions Disruption (SMUD)/ ballistically breaching. Standoff
munitions disruption (SMUD) is remotely detonating, disrupting, or
deflagrating small ordnance at safe distances. Marines and soldiers have
attempted to modify this technique to ballistically breach IEDs. Although it
may be successful, there is a great deal of risk to ballistically breaching IEDs.
WARNING: Ballistic breaching can leave a fully functional IED or other explosive
hazard. It is difficult to verify that the hazard has been neutralized.
WARNING: If the ordnance used as the main charge is not identified, the use of
ballistic breaching may create a greater hazard by scattering sub-munitions or
worse, releasing chemical agents into the environment.
Attempting to ballistically breach potential IEDs can be extremely dangerous. It
can expose the unit to fragmentation hazards, chemical hazards, and the
potential of scattered ordnance. Further, unless conducted by a properly trained
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
EOD technician, the use of ballistic breaching may not destroy the IED. This is a
risk based decision that a leader must make only after all other alternatives
have been exhausted.
A LEADER’S DECISION CONSIDERATIONS MATRIX IS FOUND ON THE
FOLLOWING PAGE.
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
Detect a Possible IED
Yes
Move Out of the Danger
Area and Establish Standoff.
Is It a Threat?
No
Check for Other Threats:
IED, Sniper, RPG, VBIED,
Triggerman.
What is the Current
Situation’s Highest
Priority?
Safety/ Intelligence
OPTEMPO
EOD Assets
Immediately Available?
Yes
Unit Response
Execute 5- C’s
No
Neutralize It,
Report It,
Continue Mission.
Can Mission
Continue Without
Addressing IED?
Yes
EOD Responds,
Renders Safe IED,
Collects/ Reports Evidence.
No
Mark, Bypass (Avoid), and Report.
Provide Security Element (IF Available)
And execute 5- C’s.
Take Direct Action.
Conduct Breaching Operations:
•Remotely
•Mechanically
•Robotically
•SMUD
•By Explosive Charge
Continue Mission
Report It,
Continue Mission
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
General Guide to Responding with the Use of Force. When responding to an IED
attack with force, Marines should remember that intelligence is critical to defeating an
enemy force and should think about capturing IED enemy forces if possible. Captured
IED enemy forces can be a good source of intelligence—leading to the killing or capture
of key enemy leaders, planners, operators, and other organizers of the insurgency.
IED Hunting. IED hunting requires patience, practice, and proactive approaches to the
mission. IED hunters do much more than drive up and down the roads looking for IED
signs. Patrol members clear routes to ensure freedom of movement for coalition forces
(CF) and civilian traffic. Familiarity with the area to be cleared is one key element in
successful IED hunting teams. Looking at the route from the enemy’s perspective is a
second critical element. Teams must use all means available to find IEDs and to
prevent themselves from becoming a target.
Key points to IED hunting are
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
In depth knowledge of the area
Concentrate efforts on high threat areas
Clear the route often
Use combination of mounted/dismounted teams
Move slow enough to observe
Observe from multiple angles
Investigate every clue that tends to point to an IED
Take size of object into consideration
Look for other IED indicators
Use optics to maximize standoff
Elicit information from Iraqi citizens
Some IED hunting teams use specialized vehicles, which offer additional protection,
survivability, and equipment to search for IEDs. Other teams use simpler, common
equipment to observe changes in their assigned area such as binoculars, spotting
scopes, and white searchlights; thermal sights can assist IED hunters. The single most
important consideration for IED hunting teams is to vary their actions.
Based upon previous experiences, a few key principles for IED hunters have emerged.
While the equipment and enemy may vary, these guidelines can help organize counter
IED patrols.
•
•
Use every tool you have. Review daily intelligence reports and debriefs from
previous patrols.
Use the same personnel consistently. This is one point where you want to set a
pattern. Marines who are familiar with a route will know when changes have taken
place. They will know what the roads look like and what garbage and dirt piles are
new. They will also be able to detect changes in the population’s attitudes and
presence.
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Drive at slow speeds and use the center of the road. You must drive slowly enough
to detect IED indicators.
While convoys and other movements should go as fast as practical, IED hunters
should move slowly and deliberately while searching. Moving in the center of the
road gets the team further away from IEDs in the event of a detonation.
Solicit information. Ask locals if they have seen unusual activity (you will need an
interpreter).
Investigate anything that looks out of the ordinary. Consider any item suspect if it is
new, recently disturbed, or out of place. Look closely for other IED indicators such
as wires or detonating (det) cord.
Do not pick anything up. All of the good souvenirs were picked up long ago by other
coalition forces or local people. Something left on the ground that appears valuable
most likely was placed there deliberately.
Successful teams look at their route from the enemy’s perspective. Remember, the
enemy is trying to conceal the device from someone traveling on the route. IED
hunting teams that look at the route form potential enemy observation points often
find signs of IED preparations. Threat forces can get careless once they get out of
sight of the main route, and they may leave wires, camouflage, or even the IED itself
in plain sight. Offset teams searching parallel to the protected route can observe
these indicators.
Points to Remember.
•
•
•
The enemy adapts to your TTPs. To protect yourself and your units, think like the
enemy.
Prevent emplacement by collecting information about insurgent activities, deterring
activities through patrols and counter-IED ambush teams, clearing the roadsides of
debris, and reducing the availability of bomb making materials.
Avoid attacks while moving by
o Driving at 40 mph or more with a 50 m interval between vehicles whenever
possible
o Staying as far from the shoulder of the road as possible
o Being observant about key enemy IED attack threat indicators, like
− Areas where traffic slows or the terrain could conceal an IED
− Common items used to camouflage IEDs
o Choosing routes with as few visually obscuring or traffic slowing terrain features
as possible
•
•
•
Reduce effects of IED attacks by hardening vehicles.
Conduct training on all of these TTPs.
If there is an IED attack, Confirm, Clear, Call and Assess, Cordon, Control.
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IED Encounter Response Procedures (Continued)
Stay Alert! Stay Alive!
Summary
As can be seen, the IED, a simple design constructed from easily obtainable materials,
is a very formidable weapon. The enemy’s TTPs are effortlessly adaptable to friendly
responses. However, an IED is vulnerable. A deprivation of simply one of the necessary
items of its implementation, whether lack of materials or funding or friendly forces
knowing what to look for, diminishes the IED’s effectiveness dramatically.
References
FMI 3-07.22
GTA 90-01-001
MCIP 3-17.01
MCIP 3-17.02
No. 05-23 July 05
21-01(093-89D-01)
TTECG/MAWTS-1
CALL 04-27 Vol II
FM 3-34.210
Counterinsurgency Operations
IED and Vehicle Borne IED Smart Card
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Tactical IED Defeat Ops
Joint IED Defeat Task Force TC9Soldiers IED Awareness Guide
Convoy Battle Skills Handbook
Convoy Leader Training Handbook
Explosive Hazard Operations
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
Term or Acronym
5 to 25 Meter Checks
Booby Trap
Improvised Explosive
Device (IED)
The Five "Cs"
Definition or Identification
At all halts, Marines must clear the area around their
vehicles. Depending on the length of time at the halt, the
area to clear varies from 5 to 25 meters. At every halt, no
matter how short, the crew must clear 5 meters around the
vehicle while inside. For extended halts, teams must clear
25 meters around the patrol or convoy. Begin 5 to 25 before
stopping to avoid stopping on top of an IED.
An explosive or non-explosive device, deliberately placed to
cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is
disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner
incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or
incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate,
harass, or distract. It may incorporate military stores, but is
normally devised from nonmilitary components.
The five "Cs" represent a simple set of guidelines that you
should use when you encounter a suspected IED: Confirm,
Clear, Cordon, Check and Control.
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Glossary of Terms and Acronyms (Continued)
Mine
In land mine warfare, an explosive or material, normally
encased, designed to destroy or damage ground vehicles,
boats, or aircraft, or designed to wound, kill, or otherwise
incapacitate personnel. It may be detonated by the action of
its victim, by the passage of time, or by controlled means.
REACTER
An example of a unit SOP-driven immediate action drill:
Report, Evacuate, Area, Clear the kill zone, Treat
casualties, Establish CCP and LZ, Report/recover.
Remotely detonating, disrupting, or deflagrating small
ordnance at safe distances. Marines and soldiers have
attempted to modify this technique to ballistically breach
IEDs. Although it may be successful, there is a great deal
of risk to ballistically breaching IEDs.
Stand-off Munitions
Disruption (SMUD).
Notes
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Notes
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