Variations on an Equitable Theme:
Explaining International Same-Sex Partner Recognition Laws
M. V. Lee Badgett
Associate Professor of Economics
University of Massachusetts
Amherst, MA 01003 USA
lbadgett@econs.umass.edu
and
University of Amsterdam (2003-4)
For presentation at the conference on
“Same-sex couples, same-sex partnerships, and homosexual marriages”
Stockholm University
September 2003
Please do not quote or cite this paper without the author’s permission.
Comments welcome!
Introduction
As an historic political and policy innovation, the formal legal recognition of same-sex
couples has spread rapidly throughout Western Europe since 1989. The Netherlands and
Belgium now allow same-sex partners to marry, and Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France,
Germany, and several other countries have created a new partner recognition status alongside
marriage for same-sex couples and sometimes for different-sex couples (see Table 1). Other
countries in Europe have recognized same-sex partnerships for particular purposes, such as for
immigration rights, or in geographically limited jurisdictions. Much more limited change has
occurred outside Europe. In North America, Canada will soon expand marriage for same-sex
couples from Ontario to the entire country. But decentralization in family policy and powerful
political opposition have made the United States much slower to take action, with only a few
states providing even a limited form of recognition of same-sex couples.1
These cross-national legal innovations in family policy hold much promise for improving
the lives of lesbian, gay, and bisexual people who might enter same-sex partnerships,
strengthening the economic and social positions of their families. Furthermore, such policies are
an example of institutional change that varies across countries, presenting an opportunity for
studies that may shed light on the underlying causes of change. In my overall research project, I
seek to understand both aspects of this historical shift in the European context. First, why have
some countries adopted same-sex partner recognition (SSPR) laws while other countries have
not? Second, what impact will such policies have on the status and well-being of same-sex
couples’ families? I will use both qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze the
determinants of passage of SSPR laws and their impact on families. In this introductory paper,
though, I explore more specifically the first question, asking whether variations in social norms
about homosexuality, sexuality, and gender or other factors are likely candidates for explaining
whether a country has adopted an SSPR.
Literature on SSPR laws
To date, most work on this topic has been done by legal scholars, with most attention
going to the mechanics of the laws and relatively little to the reasons for the passage of such
laws. Kees Waaldijk posits a useful “law of small change” to account for the passage of samesex partner recognition laws in Europe (Waaldijk, 2001). Over time, he notes, European
countries have gradually, steadily, and mostly sequentially liberalized laws that place gay men
and lesbians in a second-class position. The standard path is decriminalizing sodomy, equalizing
the age of consent for same-sex sexual relationships, enacting anti-discrimination legislation, and
finally addressing partnership and parenting rights. The most recent step for Denmark, Norway,
Sweden, Iceland, and the Netherlands was to create a near-marriage relationship (or access to
actual marriage in the Netherlands and Belgium) for same-sex couples. The expanded
cohabitation rights encoded in partner recognition laws in France and Germany represent a less
advanced stage in the many possible small changes on the way to full equality. Table 1
summarizes the countries with such laws.
1
The state of Vermont has created “civil unions” that give same-sex couples the same rights as married couples
within the state’s borders. California and Hawaii also offer a less expansive form of recognition to same-sex
couples, but no other states appear close to recognizing same-sex couples.
1
Eskridge offers a similarly optimistic path for change (Eskridge, 2002). He argues that
cohort replacement and intra-cohort shifts in homophobic attitudes create a more liberal social
environment for gay and lesbian people. These environmental changes then encourage gay
people to be more open about their existence and to mobilize politically. The openness and
mobilization provide more information that falsifies the stereotypes and misinformation that
perpetuate homophobia, thus contributing to less homophobia and more progressive legal
changes that favor equality for gay people and same-sex couples. More progressive legal
changes then perpetuate the cycle of change.
Waaldijk, Eskridge, and others also note the importance of thinking about broader social
characteristics that might contribute to some nations’ more progressive policies for gay couples.
Henning Bech ascribes Denmark’s innovative 1989 registration law for same-sex partners to a
Danish tradition of “frisind” or broad-mindedness combined with a sense of social obligation to
be an innovator in matters of equality (Bech, 1992, p. 142; see also Wintemute, 2001). More
generally, same-sex partner recognition laws may have emerged in countries with a weaker
Christian or other fundamentalist political presence (Bech, Eskridge), strong gay and lesbian
social and political mobilization (Bech; Eskridge), strong traditions of tolerance for minorities
that include liberal attitudes toward gender nonconformity and sexuality (Waaldijk; Eskridge),
less religiosity (Waaldijk; Wintemute), less direct democratic decision-making institutions (i.e.
fewer opportunities to put the issue before voters; Waaldijk), and a declining importance of
marriage as an institution (Eskridge; Wintemute).
But the small steps taken by any given country actually constitute a set of outcomes of
larger political processes set in a particular economic, social, and cultural context. Seeing
change as incremental and perhaps even as inevitable does not answer why some countries have
started down the incremental path but others have not, nor why some countries have progressed
faster than others. One country’s path to change may be another country’s bloody ideological
battlefield. As Klawitter and Hammer suggest in their study of the spread of sexual orientation
antidiscrimination laws in the United States, a half-way position might be a final consolation
prize rather than a clear step in the direction of continued change (Klawitter and Hammer, 1999).
Each step toward passage of laws might require increasing political mobilization and might
engender increasing symbolic opposition, thus slowing or stopping the process of change in
some countries.
While the suggested routes to change identify likely factors that may well be linked to the
existence of SSPRs, the rather deterministic nature of the line of reasoning offered by legal
scholars is overly optimistic, if history is any guide. For instance, John Boswell’s historical
work demonstrates that same-sex couples had at least some forms of social and legal recognition
in medieval Europe, leaving a long gap of centuries of quite unequal treatment until 1989. A
longer historical perspective suggests that legal changes are neither inevitable nor necessarily
predictable continuations of current trends.
Conceptualizing Institutional Change
An alternative way of approaching the question draws on social science theories of
institutional change. In this more theoretical context, I would supplement and reorder the
influences suggested earlier within a discussion of the behavioral effects of institutions and of
institutional change. We can think of SSPR laws as institutions in the sense that they are a “set
of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways” (Knight, 1992, p. 2). Rules about
2
who is recognized as a significant other will influence the legal and economic relationships of
members of the family as well as the relationship of family members to non-family members and
the state. In earlier work, I outline the many ways that lack of access to marriage may influence
the behavior and economic status of same-sex couples in the United States (Badgett, 2001),
although the behavioral effects are not my interest in this paper.
Neoclassical economists tend to see formal (e.g. laws) and informal (e.g. cultural norms)
institutions as simultaneously being constraints shaping human behavior and constructs fulfilling
important social functions. Institutions evolve to make societies more productive, perhaps in a
Darwinian process of survival of the institutions that make for the fittest economies (e.g. North,
1991). In the context of family law, economists and other scholars have suggested several ways
that marriage enhances efficiency:
• Promoting specialization of labor: Becker argues that the marriage contract allows for
increasing household efficiency through a sexual division of labor that promotes higher
productivity through lifelong specialization (Becker, 1991). Without the presumed
permanence of the household that the marriage bond implies, specialization by either party
would not necessarily be efficient in the long-term.2
• Reducing transaction costs: Pollak (1985) argues that marriage promotes efficiency through
reducing transaction costs for couples, removing the need to renegotiate the terms of the legal
relationship as couples experience changed circumstances.3
• Providing social insurance: Pollak also notes that wealth and income pooling across
individuals and families provides insurance against bad times, such as the failure of a harvest
or the loss of a job.
• Signaling commitment: Eskridge (1996) argues that the willingness to marry is an important
signal of commitment to a relationship. The commitment to a long-term relationship
underlies the specialization, transaction costs, and social insurance functions of marriage.
• Taking advantage of economies of scale: By encouraging households made up of more than
one adult, marriage promotes situations in which economies of scale might be achieved, that
is, where doubling the inputs of time and other resources results in more than double the
output of family-related goods and servivces, such as meals or child development.
From these perspectives, the legal institution of marriage promotes efficiency at a social level
and at a couple level.4 Both individual couples and societies have an incentive to seek out and
utilize this relatively efficient institutions.
Other social scientists propose that institutions are less the outcome of an efficient
struggle for survival than an outcome of social and political bargaining in which the more
powerful are able to shape institutions that serve their own interests (e.g. Knight, 1992). From
this perspective, any larger collective value of the institutions is incidental rather than
intentional. Much feminist economic analysis shares this emphasis on power and conflict in the
structuring of institutions (e.g. Folbre, 1994; Agarwal, 1997; Badgett, Davidson, and Folbre,
2000). In this view, both the structure of institutions and the rules of access to institutions that
2
At least one economist has used this view of economic institutions to argue that the efficiency of existing marriage
laws justifies the continuing prohibition of same-sex marriage in Canada.
3
See a related argument for allowing same-sex couples to marry in Badgett (2001).
4
Some may argue that marriage is neither necessary nor sufficient to achieve the efficiencies outlined here. The
possibility of multiple “equilibria,” i.e. a variety of equally efficient social institutions, would certainly affect our
judgment about the efficiency impact of the creation or destruction of an institution. But for a given institution, the
efficiency impact of changing access to those institutions would always remain.
3
confer public benefits will be shaped by political competition at least as much as by economic
competition.
In thinking about how these two broad perspectives on institutions shed light on the
development of SSPR laws, we might well first question how to characterize those policies. Do
the SSPR laws represent the sort of monumental change that most discussions of institutions
entail, or are they simply a sort of technical correction to existing marriage laws, changing only
one of the conditions for entering a marriage and implying no fundamental change in the
structure or legal meaning of marriage? Some lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender advocates
clearly view the fight for marriage as assimilationist—that is, reflecting an acceptance of
mainstream heterosexual values--and at best a relatively minor change in the legal landscape that
shapes the quality of human life. However, I would argue that the tenacity of many other LGBT
advocates and their allies who push for the right to marry and the equal ferocity of the right-wing
(and even more moderate) efforts to prevent same-sex marriage suggest that we are talking about
a change of historic proportions, both for couples and for society.
Once we see SSPRs as examples of new institutions or radically changed old institutions,
applying the efficiency and social conflict perspectives give us a sense of why such institutional
changes might emerge. To the extent that different countries experience different economic and
political contexts, we can possibly explain the differential emergence of SSPRs and shed light on
the debate over institutional change.
From the broad perspectives, we can distill more specific hypotheses about causal
relationships, although these causal factors are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Existing
marriage laws may become inefficient and vulnerable to change for many reasons. First, the
emergence of a new family form—or at least a newly visible family form—such as gay or
lesbian couples might promote change in existing norms (informal institutions) and laws (formal
institutions) to accommodate the “newcomers.” Second, the development of state-provided
benefits and services might make marriage less necessary to assure the survival and well-being
of adults and children.5 The impact of such de-familializing policies (to use Esping-Andersen’s
phrase) is ambiguous, however. On one hand, if marriage has less functional value for creating
economically efficient family outcomes, then the demand for change by same-sex couples would
likely be reduced. On the other hand, to the extent that the state favors married couples (e.g. for
inheritance taxes) and as long as other contractual elements of marriage have meaning for the
couple (e.g. rules for the division of property when a marriage ends), entering marriage will
enhance the economic well-being of individual couples. On a political level, moreover, there
might be less resistance to changing marriage laws in such contexts, an effect that also fits into
the conflict perspective discussed below.
The explicit incentives for marriage to evolve to include gay couples is a bit murky here.
If marriage improves a couple’s economic well-being, then perhaps happier and healthier samesex couples and their children would improve the economic performance of a society. Thus
simply publicly proclaiming the existence of same-sex couples and their needs should be
sufficient to expand the access to marriage to include same-sex couples. From a different
perspective, the kind of mechanism hypothesized by Florida and Gates (2001) could fit into an
evolutionary perspective. Florida and Gates argue that places characterized by social diversity
and tolerance attract talented workers, explaining their finding of a positive correlation between
the proportion of same-sex couples in a metropolitan area and that area’s concentration and
5
Esping-Andersen calls this process of state provision of social insurance, child care, and other traditional
responsibilities of the family “de-familialization.” (Esping-Andersen, 1999)
4
growth of high-technology industries in the United States. If partnership recognition laws both
create and reflect national values promoting sexual or family diversity, then having those laws
might disproportionately attract more highly-educated migrants who value diversity.
Alternatively, SSPR laws might emerge because of shifts in the context for social
conflict, with this possibility adding two more hypotheses, labeled here as third and fourth. In
hypothesis three, groups that favor allowing same-sex couples to marry might gain in political
strength or social bargaining power. Fourth, perhaps the defined interests and goals of those who
maintain political power change. If an influential but relatively conservative group were to
decide that they favored allowing same-sex couples to marry, or at least no longer saw such
marriages as conflicting with the interests of that group, for instance, then such a change would
be more likely to occur. Certain political precursors, such as state provision of family-related
goods and services (as noted above), could reduce the resistance to changing marriage laws since
marriage provides less of a marker of social status.
While this model focuses on predicting change within a country—whether it adopts an
SSPR—the model should also help explain the pattern of SSPRs at a point in time. The same
hypotheses would apply to asking why some countries have an SSPR in 2003 while others do
not. In the next sections, I propose and carry out some simple tests to see which variables (that
correspond to the hypotheses) appear to explain the difference between countries that have and
do not have such laws.
Data and Explanatory Variables
In operationalizing measures that address these four specific different hypotheses, the
outlines of a rather large research project emerge.6 For purposes of this paper, however, I will
focus attention on a preliminary analysis of data from the World Values Survey and other data
sources that provide cross-national data. However, I also outline a few thoughts on additional
ways of capturing important explanatory factors, many of which I hope to accomplish in the
future.
The World Values Survey (Inglehart, et al., 2000) is an ambitious project that collects
cross-sectional, individual level data on values and norms about many different topics, including
sexuality, gender, and homosexuality, in fifty different countries. So far data from three separate
surveys is available, with first waves conducted in 1981-84 (24 societies), the second from 199093 (43 societies), and the third from 1995-97. (A fourth wave from 1999-2000 is not yet
publicly available.)
Survey language and concepts were translated for each country and were administered by
professional survey organizations in Western countries and elsewhere mostly by local survey
researchers (Inglehart, 1997). Not all questions were asked in each country’s survey. All but a
few countries have representative national samples of adults over 18 years old, selected through
stratified multistage random sampling. Data was collected in face-to-face interviews. Some
countries over-sampled particular subpopulations, such as younger age groups or racial groups,
and the WVS provides individual sampling weights used here to account for over-sampling
within countries. Sample sizes ranged generally from 1,000 to almost 3,000 in the twenty-seven
countries used in this paper. Because the unit of analysis here is the country, I aggregate
individual responses up to the country level.
6
My empirical methods will include detailed case studies comparing and contrasting the experiences of several
European countries.
5
With the exception of Denmark, all of the countries with SSPR laws enacted those
policies after 1990, so here I will focus mainly on measures from the 1990 WVS. All of the
countries with nation-wide SSPR laws are European, but for comparison purposes I have culled
data for all of the OECD countries represented in the WVS, plus South Africa, which is of
interest because of its rapid movement toward legal equality for gay men and lesbians. The
OECD collects data from different national sources on its member states, providing a supplement
to the WVS.
(1) Efficiency: The emergence of visible same-sex couples. Unfortunately, neither the
WVS nor the OECD data are helpful with this hypothesis. Some countries might collect data on
their own that allow estimating the number or percentage of same-sex couple families or
households, although such measures are unlikely to be available on an historical basis. To some
extent, gay and lesbian political mobilization may constitute the most important measure of
visibility for same-sex couples, but since couples could exist and even be highly visible without
being politically mobilized, I take up political factors below in relation to the conflict hypothesis.
Although other markers of visibility are more difficult to quantify, same-sex couples will also
become more visible as landmark legal cases related to partner rights or to parenting are brought
before courts, as corporate marketers seek to attract a gay and lesbian niche market for goods and
services, and as governments respond to the HIV epidemic among men who have sex with other
men. In future work, I will investigate the extent of these efficiency-related variables using
interviews and other qualitative research methods. These measures are not included in this
paper’s quantitative exercise.
(2) Efficiency: Declining social and economic value of marriage. The lower the value of
marriage in a country, the less the existing legal institution contributes to efficiency and the less
political resistance is likely to block dramatic change. To measure the economic value of
marriage to couples, I use data on various measures.
• Women’s labor force participation rate: This measure proxies the degree of individual
economic autonomy, especially for women.
• Gender wage gap: The percentage difference in the wages of women and men also
provide a perspective on the prospects for economic autonomy for individuals in the
marketplace (as well as, perhaps, social attitudes about women).
• Beliefs about marriage: The World Values Survey, discussed below, asks respondents
whether they agree that “marriage is an outdated institution,” providing a general crossnational measure of beliefs about the value of marriage.
• State provision of necessary social insurance benefits: To capture the economic need for
marriage, I use the percentage of public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP,
which captures the extent of state support for individuals and, to some extent, the degree
of de-familialization in a country.
• Actual choices to marry or not marry: I use OECD data on divorce rates and calculations
from the WVS measures of nonmarital cohabitation rates.
• Attitudes toward marriage: The WVS asks each respondent, “Do you agree or disagree
with the following statement? ‘Marriage is an out-dated institution.’” The measure is the
percentage of a country’s respondents who agree and may reflect whether respondents
believe that legal marriage still serves important social, economic, or cultural functions.
In each case, the conceptual framework implies a positive correlation between the explanatory
factor and the existence of an SSPR.
6
(3) Conflict: Shifts in political power and collective resources. The particular factors
that are likely to reshape the political landscape to favor SSPRs are the mobilization of a lesbian
and gay political movement, the existence of allies among left-wing political parties, the feminist
movement, and labor movements, and the salience of religiously motivated political opposition.
The WVS provides only one relevant measure of religiosity, which might predict the degree and
strength of religious-based opposition to SSPRs:
• Religiosity: The WVS asked each respondent: “Apart from weddings, christenings, and
funerals, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” The answer
options were: More than once a week, once a week, once a month, Only on special holy
days, once a year, less often, never. The summary statistic used here is the percentage of
respondents in a country who say they attend at least once a month.
• Union membership: The data on the percentage of people who are union members comes
from the OECD. The extent that union members are allied with left-oriented political
parties, and to the extent that those parties’power is enhanced by greater union
membership, I expect that the proportion of workers who are union members to be
positively related to the existence of an SSPR.
To further assess the role of shifts in group power, in the future I hope to conduct
interviews with key actors in these different political locations in the case study countries. I also
hope to collect data on other measures of political resources, including membership in and
budgets of gay political groups, feminist organizations, and conservative Christian organizations.
Data on parliamentary representation of legislators from the left and right will also be gathered to
assess collective resources.
(4) Conflict: Shifts in political interests and social norms about sexuality, gender, and
homosexuality. More tolerant social norms and public opinion about sexuality and gender, in
general, and homosexuality, in particular, might make institutional change more likely by
reducing opposition to change at an individual level for political decision-makers and for voters.
The WVS asks many questions about attitudes that could predict more liberal social normsa nd
therefore greater political support from voters and legislators for the concept of recognizing
same-sex partnerships:
• Homosexuality: The WVS has two ways of measuring attitudes about “homosexuality”:
o “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you
would not like to have as neighbors?” The measure is the percentage of
respondents in a country mentioning “Homosexuals.” (This option was not
available on the 1981 survey.)
o “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can ever
be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card.” (Scale
from 1—never-- to 10-always) The measure is the country’s average score for the
statement, “Homosexuality”.
• Gender norms: The WVS asks a number of questions related to gender norms. The two
used here capture norms related to children:
o “If someone says a child needs a home with both a mother and a father to grow
up happily, would you tend to agree or disagree?” The measure is the percentage
of respondents in a country who say they agree and might pick up on anxieties
that respondents might have about children raised by same-sex couples, which
could influence support for an SSPR law.
7
•
o “For each of the folowing statements I read out, can you tell me how much you
agree with each. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or disagree strongly? ‘A
working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her
children as a mother who does not work.’”
Sexual freedom: The WVS also asks, “If someone said that individuals should have the
chance to enjoy complete sexual freedom without being restricted, would you tend to
agree or disagree?” The measure is the percentage of respondents in a country who say
that they “tend to agree.” Since “complete sexual freedom” might reasonably include
having a same-sex sexual partner, this measure could pick up tolerance for gay people
and their relationships.
Findings
The Appendix presents the WVS-generated figures for each OECD country that was
covered by the WVS. In only a few countries is a question asked in all three waves, so measures
of change are not systematically available or calculated here. A quick look through the findings
shows that the measures occasionally bounce around in odd ways, such as the doubling of
frequent church attendance in South Korea from 1981 to 1990 and then a halving back to the
1981 values in 1995. (Such patterns of big fluctuations are rare, however.) However, in most
countries with data from two or more waves, attitudes towards homosexuality have become more
liberal over time.
I propose two simple ways of assessing the contribution of these measures of national
norms to the enactment of SSPR laws – comparing the means for groups of countries for each
variable and using a simple regression model to predict whether countries have an SSPR. With
such a small number of countries, the regression model will not have much power to distinguish
the various factors, so I use various parsimonious specifications to look for important
correlations.
Table 2 compares the average scores for several groups of countries defined by having an
SSPR law.7 Comparing the shaded first and third rows shows that countries with SSPR policies
often have different scores in the predicted directions from OECD countries without SSPRs.
Perhaps a better comparison is between the second row, which presents averages for the
European countries that do not have SSPRs, and the third row for European countries with
SSPRs, a comparison that controls to some extent for cultural similarities across European
countries. The fourth and fifth rows split the SSPR countries into those with quasi- or actual
marriage for same-sex couples (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden) and
those that allow same-sex cohabitors to register for a much more limited set of benefits (France,
Germany, and Belgium, which did not allow marriage when this analysis was undertaken).
Efficiency-related variables: Most of the efficiency-related variables show little
difference between countries with and without SSPRs. In Table 2, we see little difference in
women’s labor force participation, public expenditures on social benefits, the divorce rate, and
attitudes about marriage. Marriage remains an important modern institution, according to the vast
majority of respondents in every country. Only 14% of people in each country, on average,
agreed that marriage is outdated. The one striking difference is the percentage of cohabiting
7
Because the country is the unit of analysis, these averages are not weighted by population or sample size. Please
exercise caution in interpreting these averages, since the number of countries covered varies across waves, even
within rows. Also, Hungary is not included in the SSPR countries since there is no formal registration process.
8
couples. Respondents in the SSPR countries are more than five times more likely to report
“living together as married” in those countries.
Conflict-related variables: Many more differences emerge between the countries with
and without SSPRs in the conflict-related variables. Both the religiosity measures and the union
density figures are quite different for the two groups. People in countries with SSPRs attend
church less frequently and are more likely to be union members, supporting the idea that
conservative religious opposition is less powerful and left-oriented parties more powerful than in
non-SSPR countries. Overall, the sexuality and gender-related norms of respondents in SSPR
countries are more liberal, also supporting the conflict hypothesis. In non-SSPR countries, 46%
of people would not like to have a homosexual neighbor, while only 22% of people in SSPR
countries report a similar prejudice. People in SSPR countries also believe that homosexuality is
more likely to be justified. The gender attitude measures are a bit different in SSPR countries,
with those in countries with the quasi-marital relationships being much less likely to state that
children need a mother and father, and more likely to believe that working mothers can have
warm relationships with their children. Unexpectedly, people in those same countries are much
less likely to agree with complete sexual freedom. Respondents in France and Germany were
more like the respondents in non-SSPR countries with respect to attitudes about gender roles and
sexual freedom.
Multivariate analysis: The regressions reported in Table 3 allow several factors to vary
at once. The dependent variable is one if a country has an SSPR law, and zero if it does not.
Each column in Table 3 is a separate regression using just the variables with reported
coefficients. Each coefficient shows the impact of a change in the independent variable on the
probability of a country’s having an SSPR, holding the other variables in the equation constant.
For instance, in the first column, the coefficient of –0.012 means that a country with 40% of its
respondents saying that they would not like a homosexual neighbor is 12% less likely to have an
SSPR than a country where 30% of respondents do not want a homosexual neighbor. The small
sample size limits the power of these tests, but the regressions demonstrate, first, that some
explanatory factors are correlated with each other, and second, that some explanatory factors
appear to be closely related to having an SSPR.8
The regressions in Table 3 test first for the importance of tolerant attitudes about
homosexuality. The coefficients on the two attitudes toward homosexuality variables in the first
four specifications (i.e. columns) show that tolerance of homosexuality is positively related to
having an SSPR. A country’s respondents’ greater willingness to have a homosexual neighbor
and stronger belief that homosexuality can be justified are significantly and positively associated
with an SSPR. Notably, however, that effect disappears when the variable measuring the rate of
unmarried cohabitation is added. Countries with more cohabitors are more likely to have an
SSPR. Since cohabitation is positively correlated with positive attitudes about homosexuality
(the correlation coefficient is 0.6 and statistically significant with “homosexuality justified”), the
impact of tolerant norms becomes insignificant in column (5). Cohabitation continues to have a
statistically significant and positive impact no matter what other variables are included in the
regression, as revealed by reading along the row for the cohabitation variable.
Most other variables are not statistically significant in the bulk of the regressions, with a
few exceptions. The public social expenditures variable is positively related and significant in
many specifications, but adding back the tolerance of homosexuality variables reduces its
8
Some variables discussed earlier, such as the women’s labor participation rate and the divorce rate, were never
statistically significant, so they are left out of the regressions reported in Table 2.
9
significance. In some regressions, the church attendance measure of religiosity is negatively
related to having an SSPR, and union membership is sometimes positively related to an SSPR,
both effects as expected.9 Oddly, the gender wage gap has a positive and significant relationship
to having an SSPR—countries with higher wage gaps are more likely to have an SSPR after
holding cohabitation, social expenditures, and tolerance of homosexuality constant. In a simple
regression of the wage gap on SSPR, a specification not reported here, higher wage gaps were
associated with a decreased likelihood of an SSPR, however.
Tentative conclusions
The regressions are helpful in identifying correlates of SSPRs. The efficiency-related
hypotheses fared less well than the conflict-oriented hypotheses in the regressions, though.
Measures of de-familialization, that is the declining dependence on the family and the increasing
dependence on either the state or market for certain kinds of economic support, have mixed
effects on the likelihood of a same-sex partner recognition law. Neither a higher women’s labor
force participation rate nor a lower wage gap increases the likelihood of an SSPR. In most
countries, marriage remains a vital institution according to reported attitudes about marriage, but
that attitudinal variable does not vary systematically for countries with and without SSPRs. Two
other variables clearly support an efficiency-related hypothesis, though. The regressions suggest
that countries with SSPRs tend to devote a greater share of GDP to public social expenditures,
and higher rates of unmarried cohabitation are also associated with SSPRs. Both of those
variables capture the practical and the perceived economic and social value of marriage.
Interpreting these findings is complicated, however. Recall that the hypothesized causal
links of these “efficiency” related variables are through reduced political resistance to changing
the rules of access to a devalued institution, or at least to its rights and responsibilities. But a
devalued institution would be less attractive to those who are excluded, as well, unless important
benefits of marriage remain. In future work, I will attempt to create measures to better capture
the remaining economic significance of marriage for couples. Further investigation is also
important for understanding why higher cohabitation rates, in particular, are associated with
SSPRs. In some countries cohabitors have achieved access to certain marital rights through a
different legal status, perhaps making it easier to extend that more limited status to same-sex
couples than in other countries. Or perhaps cohabitors have more political power in countries
where they are numerous, giving them the ability to enact their more liberal beliefs in the context
of institutional change.
The more explicitly conflict-oriented variables tell a fairly straightforward and consistent
story in the regressions. People in countries with SSPRs are less likely to be regular church
attendees and are more likely to be union members, suggesting a stronger liberal presence and a
smaller conservative religious base for opponents of SSPRs.
The explicit normative measures also support the conflict hypothesis. People in SSPR
countries have more liberal attitudes toward homosexuality, as predicted. One might also
interpret the positive effect of public social expenditures as having a normative element, as well,
if those higher expenditures occur because of a national goal of greater equality in well-being
and that belief in equality is extended to same-sex couples. However, in other regressions not
reported here, including the Gini coefficient, an explicit measure of income equality, did not
9
Church attendance and union density are strongly negatively correlated, with a statistically significant negative
correlation coefficient of –0.64. Union membership and church membership are not signficantly correlated.
10
have a statistically significant effect on the probability of an SSPR (nor a consistent sign on the
coefficient).
Although these tests are fairly blunt at this point, the strength of the correlations is
surprising and encouraging. Developing better measures of key variables, as well as more
research into the underlying processes at work, should help to further clarify why some countries
have SSPRs while others do not. Understanding the factors promoting institutional change will
also assist policymakers and advocates in countries without SSPR laws in their strategizing about
the likely routes to change.
11
References
Agarwal, Bina. ""Bargaining and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household,"
Feminist Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1997.
Badgett, M. V. Lee. Money, Myths, and Change: The Economic Lives of Lesbians and Gay
Men, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001.
Badgett, M. V. Lee, Pamela Davidson, Nancy Folbre, and Jeannette Lim. “Breadwinner Dad,
Homemaker Mom: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Changing Gender Norms in the United
States, 1977-1998." Unpublished, 2000.
Bech, Henning. "Report from a Rotten State: 'Marriage' and 'Homosexuality' in 'Denmark'", in
Modern Homosexualities: Fragments of Lesbian and Gay Experience, ed. by Ken Plummer,
Routledge, 1992, 134-147.
Eskridge, William N., Jr. Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights,
Routledge, New York, 2002.
-----. The Case for Same-Sex Marriage. New York: Free Press, 1996.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economics. Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1999.
Florida, Richard, and Gary Gates. “Technology and Tolerance: The Importance of Diversity to
High-Technology Growth,” The Brookings Institution Survey Series, Center on Urban and
Metropolitan Policy, June 2001.
Folbre, Nancy. Who Pays for the Kids? Gender and the Structures of Constraint. London:
Routledge, 1994.
Inglehart, Ronald, et al. World Values Surveys and European Values Surveys, 1981-84, 199093, 1995-97 [computer file and codebook]. ICPSR Version, Ann Arbor, MI: Institute for Social
Research [producer], 2000. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research [distributor], 2000.
Klawitter, Marieka, and Brian Hammer. “Spatial and Temporal Diffusion of Local
Antidiscrimination Policies for Sexual Orientation,” in Ellen D. B. Riggle and Barry L. Tadlock,
eds., Gays and Lesbians in the Democratic Process, Columbia University Press, New York,
1999.
Knight, Jack. Institutions and Social Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
North, Douglass C. “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter
1991, pp. 97-112.
12
Pollak, Robert. “A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households.” Journal of
Economc Literature. Vol. 23, 1985, pp. 581-608.
Vaid, Urvashi. Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian Liberation. New
York: Anchor Books. 1995.
Waaldijk, Kees. “Small Change: How the Road to Same-sex Marriage Got Paved in the
Netherlands.” In Robert Wintemute and Mads Andenaes, ed., Legal Recognition of Same-sex
Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford,
Portland, OR, 2001. Pp. 437-464.
Wintemute, Robert. “Conclusion.” In Robert Wintemute and Mads Andenaes, ed., Legal
Recognition of Same-sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law,
Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland, OR, 2001, pp. 759-773.
Wintemute, Robert, and Mads Andenaes, ed., Legal Recognition of Same-sex Partnerships: A
Study of National, European and International Law, Hart Publishing, Oxford, Portland, OR,
2001.
13
Table 1: Countries with national recognition of same-sex partnerships
Country (year
enacted)
MARRIAGE
Netherlands
Marital rights and responsibilities
Marital rights not included
All
Presumption about legal status of
second parent to a child born to a
married woman in same-sex couple.
Belgium
REGISTERED
PARTNERS—
QUASIMARITAL
Almost all
Denmark (1989)
Norway (1993)
Sweden (1994)
Iceland (1996)
Finland (2001)
REGISTERED
COHABITATION
Liability for debts; common
property; joint taxation; housing;
insurance (France)
Support obligation; Joint tenancy;
inheritance; pension and health
Germany (2001) insurance; immigration (Germany)
France (1999)
UNREGIS.
PARTNERS
Some inheritance and common
property rightsuHu; pension rights;
housing rights
Right to church wedding (some
countries); adoption rights;
residence and/or nationality
requirements; access to artificial
insemination; not portable to other
countries
Inheritance rights; child-related
rights; alimony (France)
State-supported financial benefits
(Germany)
Joint adoption, artificial
insemination
Hungary (1996)
Sources: Eskridge (2001); Wintemute (2001)
14
Table 2: Comparisons of measures across country types
CONFLICT-RELATED
VARIABLES
EFFICIENCY-RELATED VARIABLES
Country
Non SSPR
Other Europe
All SSPR
Regis. Partners
Regis. Cohab.
Overall average
Gender Pub soc
Working Sexual
Marriage
Attend % trade No homo- Homo- Need
Women's wage
expend Divorce % Cohab outdated
mother
freedom
relig
union sexual
sexuality mom
LFPR
gap (%) % GDP rate
couples institution serv
rel w/kid OK
memb neighbor justified & dad
1990
1990
1995
1995
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
57.6
23.3
20.5
35.2
4.0%
12.7
43.5 18.6%
46.1
3.2
89.2
65.6
28.1
56.9
22.4
23.1
34.3
3.6%
13.7
46.8 13.2%
39.6
3.5
90.2
64.9
31.6
55.8
18.9
24.1
40.7
15.2%
15.9
18.5 23.0%
21.8
4.7
85.9
72.0
25.7
58.4
21.1
22.5
39.0
17.6%
13.4
13.9 28.5%
17.1
5.1
80.4
79.3
18.6
52.6
16.0
26.5
42.7
11.6%
19.5
25.3 12.0%
29.0
4.1
94.2
61.2
36.3
56.9
21.9
21.9
37.1
0.1
14.0
34.3
20.6%
36.0
3.8
87.7
68.3
15
27.1
Table 3: Regression Coefficients, Dependent Variable is Having an SSPR Law
Variable
Constant
Women’s LFPR
Gender wage gap
(1)
0.78**
(0.17)
(2)
-0.44*
(0.24)
(3)
-0.91*
(0.51)
(4)
-0.394
(0.49)
Marriage outdated
Cohabitation rate
(5)
-0.232
(0.41)
(6)
0.49
(0.65)
0.049**
(0.012)
Public social expend (%
GDP)
0.013**
(0.005)
Union membership
Church attendance
Attitudes:
Sexual freedom
Working women’s
relationship with child
Homosexual neighbor
not OK
Homosexuality justified
Adjusted R2
N
0.008
(0.005)
-0.009*
(0.005)
0.007
(0.007)
-0.003
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.01)
-0.009
(0.01)
0.198**
(0.07)
0.33
23
0.199**
(0.07)
0.57
20
0.067
(0.06)
0.63
23
0.183**
(0.062)
0.63
20
-0.012**
(0.004)
0.26
23
0.20**
(0.06)
0.29
26
16
Table 3, continued
Variable
Constant
Women’s LFPR
Gender wage gap
Marriage outdated
Cohabitation rate
(7)
-0.134
(0.09)
0.055**
(0.008)
Public social expend (%
GDP)
Church attendance
(8)
-0.360**
(0.17)
0.046**
(0.010)
0.014
(0.009)
(9)
-1.54**
(0.65)
(10)
-1.95**
(0.71)
(11)
-1.68*
(0.80)
(12)
-2.00**
(0.85)
0.026*
(0.014)
0.027*
(0.014)
0.008
(0.013)
0.041**
(0.014)
0.050**
(0.019)
0.028*
(0.016)
0.030*
(0.16)
0.049**
(0.014)
0.037**
(0.017)
0.053**
(0.018)
0.038*
(0.018)
0.001
(0.0064
0.052**
(0.018)
0.035*
(0.018)
0.003
(0.004)
(13)
-0.51
(0.84)
(14)
-0.30
(0.33)
(15)
-0.200
(0.62)
-0.001
(0.013)
0.043**
(0.018)
0.022
(0.18)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.001
(0.013)
0.040**
(0.013)
0.018*
(0.010)
-0.003
(0.003)
0.040**
(0.013)
0.018
(0.012)
-0.003
(0.004)
Attitudes:
Sexual freedom
-0.000
(0.006)
Working women’s
relationship with child
Homosexual neighbor
not OK
Homosexuality justified
Adjusted R2
N
Notes:
** stat signif at 5% level
-0.001
(0.007)
0.002
(0.008)
0.65
24
0.67
23
0.67
19
0.65
18
0.65
19
0.068
(0.062)
0.65
19
0.62
21
0.63
22
0.62
21
* stat signif at 10% level
17
Appendix: Data on norms from first three waves of the World Values Survey
Country
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
W Germany
E Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
US
S Africa
No homo
Homosexuality justified
Marriage outdated
Sexual freedom OK
Kids need a mom & a dad Attend relig serv
neighbor
frequently
1990 19951981
1990 1995-98
1981
1990 1995-98
1981
1990 1995-98
1981
1990 1995-98
1981
1990 1995-98
98
24.7
3.8
4.6
13.3
18.5
27.6
30.6
97.1
70.7
24.9
25.1
43.4
3.3
11.9
38.8
93.5
44.0
23.5
3.2
3.9
20.1
22.4
23.1
28.1
86.2
91.8
36.1
30.4
29.7
3.1
4.1
13.0
12.5
19.3
23.6
67.1
77.9
46.5
39.8
53.2
5.7
10.5
11.6
99.2
10.8
11.7
6.1
4.7
24.4
18.0
11.1
11.1
53.3
72.8
7.3
10.8
25.2 32.4
3.4
4.4
4.3
17.1
12.6
20.6
9.0
11.9
26.5
56.5
85.9
72.7
10.7
10.9
11.4
24.4
3.2
3.9
30.7
29.1
30.2
32.2
86.7
93.6
17.7
16.8
33.8 10.2
3.4
4.5
7.1
14.1
14.7
30.0
21.5
36.1
24.7
92.2
94.3
84.7
37.3
33.9
24.3
34.1 16.5
3.9
5.9
14.1
28.2
48.7
23.2
97.0
89.2
20.1
8.8
75.3
1.4
2.7
16.6
11.4
10.9
18.0
98.6
16.7
23.0
20.1
3.3
5.4
12.6
6.3
23.8
23.5
78.1
78.5
10.9
9.4
33.2
3.4
3.1
15.9
9.9
25.1
17.2
70.8
82.6
85.5
87.4
36.8
2.5
3.9
22.3
14.1
27.5
42.1
91.2
96.7
50.4
50.6
68.5
2.5
2.4
3.7
23.7
7.0
10.3
10.0
13.3
17.6
88.7
95.2
93.8
12.8
14.3
10.8
4.2
2.2
1.6
2.1
13.3
15.4
14.5
17.1
90.5
95.7
27.4
59.7
26.4
60.2 39.9
2.3
2.9
2.9
18.9
16.9
25.8
29.9
31.2
23.5
90.8
87.6
76.0
74.9
62.2
65.1
8.4
6.1
7.5
16.7
19.5
27.5
32.3
75.6
74.1
38.7
29.6
19.5 16.2
3.6
4.1
5.7
13.1
10.1
13.5
8.3
10.3
10.6
78.7
85.6
85.3
14.8
12.6
12.4
66.1
1.8
2.8
7.5
10.5
22.2
20.5
98.3
97.0
84.9
73.1
49.6
2.3
23.2
24.2
93.0
41.2
29.6 20.3
2.8
3.9
5.5
24.3
15.4
16.7
28.9
53.4
56.3
87.2
92.6
88.6
53.6
40.6
36.6
17.7 11.2
4.5
4.5
7.0
15.2
14.1
16.4
17.2
22.4
17.2
70.0
85.2
81.8
13.8
10.2
10.7
18.5
4.2
6.5
13.1
24.1
44.1
31.6
88.5
38.4
24.2
91.7 91.9
1.6
11.3
7.7
23.8
29.4
95.7
97.5
37.7
43.5
31.1 21.7
3.5
3.5
5.2
13.1
17.6
22.1
30.8
67.6
74.5
24.6
23.4
38.3 29.5
2.4
3.1
3.7
8.1
8.1
10.6
21.6
26.9
25.4
62.7
73.1
73.6
59.7
57.0
54.7
50.5
2.3
2.3
2.6
19.9
13.2
21.7
23.4
24.2
27.2
83.4
92.2
90.2
60.8
69.7
18