Hedonism
Pleasure
The word “hedonism” derives from the Greek hedone, literally translated as “pleasure”. In everyday
language it is often used to condemn certain kinds of excess: rock ’n’ roll stars trashing hotel rooms,
raucous holidaymakers on Ibiza, and so on. On the other hand, hedonism is also sometimes used
generally to refer to more innocent activities, such as the practice of occasionally spoiling yourself.
In philosophy, hedonism has a different meaning. Most commonly, we talk about two kinds of claim:
1. Psychological hedonism: the claim that human motivation can ultimately be explained in terms
of pleasure and pain alone.
2. Ethical hedonism: the claim that our judgments about what is right and good can ultimately be
explained in terms of pleasure and pain alone.
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), for example, held both of these positions:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It
is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.
(Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1780-9, p.1)
It may be useful to keep in mind that philosophers have offered different conceptions of the nature of
pleasure. Bentham thought that pleasure was a physical sensation – a raw feeling that we desire and
enjoy (and pain a sensation we dislike and seek to avoid). Some philosophers have agreed with this
opinion, but sought to distinguish between higher (e.g. more intense, sustainable, etc.) and lower
pleasures. Others have claimed that pleasure relates less to immediate sensations and more to the
significance we place on an experience: if you would like an experience to go on and on for its own sake,
rather than for the sake of attaining some end, then that was a pleasurable experience.
Although these two kinds of hedonism have much in common, it will be helpful to consider them
separately.
1. Psychological Hedonism
Psychological hedonism is a descriptive theory, which claims that all people do in fact pursue pleasure.
This theory holds that this is the way people actually are—they naturally seek pleasure. It is a
generalisation from experience (an example of inductive reasoning).
This makes it seem as though our assessment of psychological hedonism is merely empirical. However,
the position is philosophically interesting, because it offers an extremely simple account of the evidence
regarding human motivation. Bentham aimed to convince us that the burden of proof rested with people
who opposed psychological hedonism; it was for them to show what other factors than pleasure and
pain might motivate human behaviour.
How might one shift the burden of proof back onto psychological hedonism? One approach might be to
cite examples of people behaving deliberately in ways that appear not to bring them pleasure, but
involve pain or suffering: a classic example would be a soldier jumping on top of a grenade in order to
prevent his comrades from being injured when it explodes. In that case, the hedonist might reply that
the soldier could have been motivated by the pleasure of acting honourably, or by a desire to avoid
painful reproaches for not doing his duty, or by the sense that avoiding his comrades’ pain outweighed
his own suffering.
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Another approach would be to question the conceptual plausibility of the psychological hedonist’s
position. Bishop Joseph Butler made a famous argument to this effect in 1726 (in Fifteen Sermons,
Sermon XI); he maintained that if we assume that pleasure arises from the satisfaction of a desire, then
pleasure cannot be the only thing that motivates our behaviour – the desire is what motivates us, and
pleasure is a product of the desire being satisfied. If I am motivated to drink a cup of tea, it’s not because
the tea gives me pleasure; rather, I get pleasure because my desire to drink has been satisfied.
The psychological hedonist has a cunning answer to this argument, however. It may be true that the
pleasure I get from a cup of tea shows that I had a separate, preceding desire to drink. However, this
desire itself may ultimately merely reflect a deeper impulse for pleasure (e.g. to avoid the painful
experience of being dehydrated). By appealing to ultimate desires, the hedonist can take some the sting
out of Butler’s argument.
Question 1
Are we ultimately motivated only by pleasure and pain?
2. Ethical Hedonism and the Experience Machine
Ethical hedonism claims that our judgments about what is right and good can ultimately be explained in
terms of pleasure and pain alone. This is because, it is further claimed, only pleasure can be regarded as
“intrinsically” good (and pain as intrinsically bad). A thing is intrinsically good if we value it for its own
sake only, and not because it helps us to do something else (in which case it would be instrumentally
good – money is an example of something we value as a means to an end, rather than for its own sake).
One of the most interesting modern attacks on ethical hedonism, offered by the late Harvard
philosopher, Robert Nozick (1938-2002), criticises the notion that pleasure is the only thing we value
for itself. The argument focuses on a thought experiment, known as the “Experience Machine”.
Nozick explains the idea of the experience machine as follows:
Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired.
Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you
were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you
would be floating in a great tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this
machine for life, preprogramming your life’s experiences? (Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974, p.42)
Nozick thinks that we should refuse to use the experience machine, for a number of reasons:
• We want to do certain things for their own sake, not for the sake of experiencing doing them.
• We want to make a difference in the world, but we cannot actually do this while we are in an
experience machine (though we can have the experience of making a difference in the world).
• We want to be certain kinds of people (courageous, creative, loving, etc.) – a person in an
experience machine is none of those things.
• Being in the experience machine limits us to an artificial reality, it gives us no actual contact with a
deeper reality.
Question 2
Should you plug into the experience machine for life?
What does this tell us about ethical hedonism?
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