Motivational Bases of Prosocial and Altruistic
Behavior: A Critical Reappraisal
Todd D. Nelson
Philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and biologists have debated the
existence of altruism in humans for
years. Two predominant views across
these fields explained altruistic behavior in terms of
reinforcement or evolutionary genetics. Today, psychology still
adheres to the notion that pure altruism cannot be
demonstrated and is better explained through other egoistic
models (e.g., reinforcement). The evidence for and against each
of these perspectives is weighed. The focus of this review is
on the substantial findings accumulated over the past fifteen
years in psychology, supporting the idea that pure altruism
does exist and is causally linked to feelings of empathy for
the victim.
Abstract
It is more obvious that we learn to help or do good and
that we learn because of the consequences that follow….
By giving too much help we postpone the acquisition of
effective behavior and perpetuate the need for help.
(Skinner, 1978, pp. 250-251)
F
or decades, the dominant view on the concept of altruism in psychology and other
fields (such as sociology, philosophy and sociobiology) echoed the sentiment of Skinner
by contending that pure altruism doesn’t exist. Many believed that whatever appears
to be altruistic behavior always has, at some level, a reward component for the helper (Wallach
& Wallach, 1983). As Rushton (1980) put it, “Finally the behavioral definition also solves the
endless, and fruitless, debate as to whether such a thing as true altruism exists…” (p. 10).
Researchers believed that since it didn’t exist, why should anyone research a “non-phenomenon”?
Donald Campbell (1975, 1978), former American Psychological Association (APA) president,
perhaps encapsulated this view best in his presidential address at the 1975 APA convention.
He argued for the notion of a genetic predisposition of selfishness in humans which leads to a
“social personality of self-serving opportunism,” adding that "socialization and culture … are
necessary to counter this disposition” (Campbell, 1975, p. 1111).
In this article, I briefly review various analyses of the origins of prosocial and altruistic
behavior before turning to a discussion of research in social psychology that for the past fifteen
years has focused on the notion that empathy may be the motivational foundation for altruism.
Contrasting perspectives to the empathy viewpoint will be presented. A major thrust of the
present paper will be to contrast the evidence for and against the existence of altruism.1 The
evidence supporting all views will be weighed, highlighting the current state of the literature
on prosocial and altruistic behavior, and the article will point to some unanswered research
questions that await investigation.
Definitional Issues
Some investigators such as Wilson (1975) have taken an extreme view in defining altruism:
“...self-destructive behavior performed for the benefit of others” (p. 578). Lippa (1990) defined
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Nelson
altruism as “helping another person for no
reward, and even at some cost to oneself” (p.
480). Other researchers define altruism
somewhat vaguely, as in the case of Wispé
(1978): “Behavior to be designated as altruistic
must be directed to the well-being of another
person or group and must involve at least some
non-trivial self-sacrifice” (p. 305).
It is important to realize that precisely
which definition one employs will be an
important determinant of how an investigator
conducts research. For the purposes of this
article, it is necessary to distinguish between
prosocial behavior and altruistic behavior.
Prosocial behavior is defined as “voluntary,
intentional behavior that results in benefits for
another” (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 92) and
which may have either a positive, a negative
or a mixed positive/negative motive. Altruistic
behavior is a subset of prosocial behavior and
is “voluntary behavior intended to benefit
another, which is not performed with the
expectation of receiving external rewards or
avoiding externally produced aversive stimuli
or punishments” (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p.
92). According to this motivational definition,
altruistically motivated helping can be followed
by rewards (either external or internal) as long
as gaining those rewards is an unintended
consequence rather than the ultimate goal. It
is important to note that the research to be
discussed below was not intended to eliminate
the possibility of rewards for altruistic acts.
The issue under discussion is whether the
rewards are always the reason (motive) for
helping. I now turn to a brief discussion of the
early philosophical discussions of altruism, and
then I discuss the major theoretical viewpoints
from which altruism has been approached.
Early Views of Prosocial and
Altruistic Behavior
Philosophers have long debated the
existence of altruistic behavior in humans
(Comte, 1851/1875; Hume, 1740/1896; Smith,
1759). MacIntyre (1967) discusses the view
popular among contemporaries of Comte, and
which pervaded psychology for many years
(and, to some degree, is still evident), that the
notion of pure altruism is unfounded (see also
Hoffman, 1981; La Rochefoucauld, 1678/1977;
Milo, 1973). An altruistic act, following the
principle of hedonism, would at some level still
please the actor and thus eliminate the
possibility of the act being called a truly
“selfless” act.
Comte (1851/1875), who first used the term
“altruism,” divided prosocial motivation in
terms of “egoistic” and “altruistic” motives.
Attaining self-gratification and seeking to
increase one’s own welfare he called “egoistic
prosocial behavior.” Where the ultimate goal
is to increase another’s welfare, the behavior
is termed “altruistic.” For example, helping
other people by volunteering your time in a
rape crisis center would be considered truly
altruistic if your sole aim was to genuinely help
others. However, if you were volunteering in
order to have an impressive entry on your vita,
the ultimate goal would therefore be to increase
your own welfare, and, thus, the volunteering
would be considered egoistically motivated.
Many definitions of altruism also include
what is often considered a critical component
of such behavior: that the behavior must have
some cost for the actor. That is, there must be
an element of the behavior reducing the welfare
of the actor. Comte’s definition does not
explicitly include this criterion, and it is not
meant to. The crucial point to be made here is
that there are two types of altruistic acts which
are distinguished on the basis of the ultimate
goal of the actor. This important distinction has
effectively eliminated many of the problems
(e.g., definitional, methodological, theoretical)
that plagued researchers for years in that it
made the investigation of purely altruistic
behavior not only possible, but necessary.
The predominant perspective in psychological research and theory has focused almost
solely on situational determinants of behavior.
Todd D. Nelson is Assistant Professor of Psychology at California State University, Stansilaus.
This is the third article he has had published in the Journal of Research. He may be contacted
by email at tnelson@athena.csustan.edu or by telephone at 209/667-3442.
24
California State University, Stanislaus
Motives for Altruism
Piliavin and Charng (1990) note that, in the
research literature of the last ten years, there
has been a “paradigm shift” in psychology from
the traditional situational emphasis toward
considerations of the importance of the role of
empathy as a causal factor that precipitates
both egoistic and altruistic motivations behind
prosocial behavior. In the sections below, I
review the evidence for and against one such
perspective, known as the “empathy-altruism
hypothesis” (Batson, 1987, 1990, 1991; Batson,
O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983;
Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al., 1988; Dovidio,
Allen, & Schroeder, 1990; Fultz et al., 1986;
Schroeder et al., 1988).
The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis
There are many advocates of the position
that the motivation of the helper is an essential
element in determining whether the helper’s
act is truly altruistic or merely egoistic
altruism (Sober, 1988). These researchers
emphasize that truly altruistic behavior must
“a) benefit another person, b) be performed
voluntarily, c) be performed intentionally, and
d) be performed without any expectation of
reward” (Piliavin & Charng, 1990, p. 30). Recall
the distinction that Comte (1875/1851) made
between egoistic and altruistic motives for
prosocial behavior. Batson (1987; Batson &
Shaw, 1991) argues that this distinction nicely
accounts for the true altruism that exists in
human nature yet weeds out prosocial behavior
that appears altruistic but is actually guided
by expectations of reward or fear of negative
evaluation from others and is therefore egoistic
in motivation. This distinction also counters
the traditional egoistic argument that somewhere (i.e., internally or externally) the person
is getting a reward from helping. According to
Batson, all behavior that has a reward
component or some intentional benefit to the
actor is relegated to non-altruistic labels (viz.,
‘egoistic’).2
Batson (1987, 1991) proposes that a person
experiences two types of arousal when witnessing an emergency or the suffering of
another person: personal distress (general
unpleasant arousal that a person wants to
reduce by any means available) and empathy.
Batson et al. (1988) define empathy as an
“other-oriented emotional response congruent
with the perceived welfare of another person”
(p. 52). Personal distress, the hypothesis
assumes, can be easily eliminated by fleeing
from the aversive scene. Empathy cannot be
so easily reduced. The model suggests that
empathy evokes a motivation in the actor to
maximize the welfare of the other via altruistic, helping acts (Coke, Batson, & McDavis,
1978).
Batson et al. (1983) and Batson and Coke
(1981) gave evidence supporting the notion that
personal distress and empathy constitute
distinct emotional states. Batson and Coke
(1981) reported factor-analytic data that show
that each is comprised of separate groupings
of adjectives. This finding was replicated by
Archer et al. (1981). Batson and Coke (1981)
also successfully manipulated each construct
independent of the other (Experiment 2).
Tests of the model. More than a half dozen
studies conducted have used a similar paradigm to attempt to ascertain the nature of the
motive to help evoked by empathy (Batson,
1991; Fultz et al., 1986; Toi & Batson, 1982).
In a prototypical experiment, the participant
is asked to watch, via closed-circuit television,
another participant (the “target”) getting
shocked in a learning experiment (actually it
is a prepared video made by the experimenter
using confederates). The target clearly
experiences more distress as the experiment
progresses. The experimenter then pauses,
ostensibly to check on the target. The
experimenter then returns and asks if the
participant would be willing to trade places
with the target. Half of the participants are
led to believe that the target answered an
interest questionnaire quite similarly (“high
empathy” condition), while the rest are told the
target had quite different responses from the
participant on the questionnaire (“lowempathy” condition). Half of the participants
are also told that they can stop watching the
target if they wish (“easy-escape” condition),
while the other half are informed that they
must keep watching the target getting shocked
(“difficult-escape” condition).
Batson hypothesized that all participants
should feel personal distress in the experiment
but that only those who were in the “high
empathy” conditions should show a greater
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Nelson
tendency to volunteer to take the target’s
place, regardless of the escape condition. Those
who are in the “low-empathy/easy-escape” cell
should evidence the least amount of altruism.
The data (Batson et al., 1983; Batson et al.,
1988) support this hypothesis. These findings
provide a compelling basis upon which to make
the assertion that empathy plays a key role
in the motivation to help. When escape is easy
and empathy is low, helping behavior dramatically decreases. Batson et al. (1988) assert
that these data also effectively negate the
plausibility of egoistic assumptions regarding
motivation to help (i.e., that helping behavior
is performed solely to eliminate the distressing
arousal experienced by the helper).
Challenges to the
Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis
While the findings published by Batson
and others were quite compelling, other
hypotheses have been offered that attempt to
account for the motives behind altruistic
behavior. Batson et al. (1988) argued that
these new alternatives are egoistic. The
authors further refute the claim implicit in
these alternatives that empathy has some
accompanying specific rewards. Below, four of
the most notable alternatives are presented
along with the evidence supporting them.
These alternatives shall be rejoined by
Batson’s answer to each.
The empathy-specific reward hypothesis.
Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini et al.,
1987; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988) have proposed
that Batson’s results could parsimoniously be
accounted for by examining the reward history
of the individual. Specifically, this new
explanation asserts that whenever a person
feels empathy, he or she remembers being
reinforced for helping in the past. In addition,
the individual’s empathy may create a special
need for reinforcement from helping (Archer
et al., 1981; Dovidio, 1984).
Batson et al. (1988, Experiment 1)
designed a study to test whether those high
in empathy report greater positive affect when
they are the helper, as predicted from the
empathy-specific reward hypothesis. Participants were exposed to another in need;
then they were told that they could help the
26
California State University, Stanislaus
other person. Participants then completed a
self-report measure of empathy for the other.
Half were later told they would not be helping
the other person. Among those told they could
or could not help, half were also told the other
was still in need, and half were told that the
other person was no longer in need (i.e., the
need has been relieved by another means). The
main dependent measure was change in
participants’ reported mood after they were
or were not allowed to help.
The results of this experiment indicated
no difference between high-empathy participants who were told either that they were
the direct helper in relieving the other’s need
or that the other’s need had been relieved by
some other means. Batson et al. (1988)
concluded that the empathy-specific reward
hypothesis was not supported and, instead,
that the high-empathy participants were
directed toward reducing the need of the other
and worked hard to accomplish this, thus
supporting the empathy-altruism hypothesis.
The empathy-specific punishment hypothesis. Increased helping may be due to a fear of
empathy-specific punishments for failure to
help, according to another alternative
(Dovidio, 1984). Again, through reinforcement
history, people learn to associate guilt with
feeling empathy when they do not help.
Therefore, proponents of this position assert
that subsequent feelings of empathy evoke this
guilt (and attendant fear of punishment, or
negative social evaluation) and quickly
motivate the person to help.
In the second experiment reported by
Batson et al. (1988), the investigators set out
to test the hypothesis derived from the
empathy-specific punishment hypothesis: that
justification for failure to help can be found
by pointing to an earlier failure to help by
others who potentially could have rendered
assistance. In this design, participants were
exposed to either a high versus low empathy
condition, crossed with a high versus low
justification for not helping condition.
Participants were exposed to a broadcast
about another (fictitious) student whose
parents had been killed and who was struggling to make ends meet and support her
children. Participants were presented with a
card which asked students to volunteer their
Motives for Altruism
time and which had eight spaces for eight
potential volunteers to sign up. In the lowjustification condition, 5 of the 7 previous
participants had volunteered (i.e., five
fictitious participants’ names, ostensibly from
previous experiments, were written on the
card). In the high-justification condition, only
2 of the 7 previous participants had volunteered their assistance. Participants in the
low empathy condition were instructed to
focus on the technical aspects of the broadcast
and how it might be effective. Participants in
the high empathy condition were told to
imagine how the needy other feels about what
has happened to her and to try to feel the
impact of these events themselves.
Batson and his colleagues (Batson et al.,
1988) also tested further predictions from the
empathy-specific punishment hypothesis.
They investigated the idea that justification
for not helping may be due to attributional
ambiguity (Experiment 3) or to making it
difficult to qualify to help (Experiment 4). All
of these studies (Experiments 2 through 4)
showed that, for low-empathy participants,
the helping behavior was motivated in part
by a desire to avoid punishment. However, the
studies consistently supported the predictions
about high-empathy participants that were
derived from the empathy-altruism hypothesis. High-empathy participants, even when
justification for not helping was high, still
worked hard to relieve the distress of the other.
The negative-state relief model. In a
version of the empathy-specific reward
hypothesis, Cialdini (Cialdini et al., 1987;
Cialdini, Baumann, & Kenrick, 1981; Cialdini,
Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Schaller & Cialdini,
1988) has proposed that the motivation to help
another evoked by empathy is egoistic.
Specifically, he contends that seeing another
in need places one in a temporary negative
affective state and that helping occurs to
reduce or eliminate this negative affective
state. In short, Cialdini proposes that the
motivation to help evoked by empathy is not
altruistic but rather is a form of mood
management for the self.
Studies conducted to test this model have
been published by Batson et al. (1989), Dovidio
et al. (1990) and Schroeder et al. (1988).
According to the negative state relief model,
beliefs about the lability of one’s mood (e.g.,
temporarily fixed versus flexible/manageable)
should mediate the link between feelings of
empathy and prosocial behavior. That is, the
temporary negative affective state (sadness)
should mediate the relationship between
empathy and helping. Dovidio et al. (1990)
found no support for this claim: empathic
concern was a significant predictor of helping,
while sadness did not reliably predict subsequent helping behavior. Additionally, these
researchers found evidence to bolster the
previous findings testing the empathyaltruism hypothesis: “The findings of the
present study…add substantial weight to
Batson’s (1987) position that altruistic
motivation may exist under some conditions
and that all motivation for helping is not
necessarily egoistic” (p. 259).
Another experiment by Schroeder et al.
(1988) also pitted the negative state relief
model against the empathy-altruism hypothesis. These investigators told participants
either to imagine a victim’s feelings (empathic
concern) or to watch a victim’s reaction
(personal distress). Escape from the situation
was also made either easy or difficult.
Participants were led to believe that their
mood was either fixed or changeable. Consistent with several previous experiments
supporting the empathy-altruism model, these
results showed that participants in the easyescape, personal distress conditions helped
least. Those in the empathic concern conditions (across both escape conditions) tended
to help the most. Lability of mood did not
mediate the relationship between empathy
and helping behavior.
Further tests of the model were conducted
by Batson et al. (1989). Based on the negative
state relief model, Batson and his colleagues
conducted three experiments designed to test
the notion that those induced to feel sad would
help more when they expected to have their
mood enhanced in the near future while those
who did not expect to have their mood
enhanced should help less. Results showed
that high empathy participants did not differ
in amount of helping regardless of whether
they anticipated mood enhancement or not.
High empathy participants tended to help
more than low empathy participants. There-
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Nelson
fore, these findings did not support the
negative-state relief model.
The empathic-joy hypothesis. Smith,
Keating and Stotland (1989) proposed that
empathically aroused people help in order to
gain the good feeling of sharing vicariously in
the “resolution of the help recipient’s needs”
(p. 642). In other words, according to the
empathic-joy hypothesis, the ultimate goal of
the motivation to help evoked by empathy is
to attain the rewarding experience of empathic
joy. In contrast, in the empathy-altruism
hypothesis, empathic joy is viewed as a
consequence of the motivation to help, not the
ultimate goal for helping. When prospective
helpers do not anticipate receiving feedback
about the other’s condition, empathic witnesses should refuse to help as often as their
non-empathic counterparts.
Smith et al. (1989) had undergraduates
watch a video about a young woman having
difficulty adjusting to college life. High and
low empathy participants were asked to write
down answers to questions the woman had
about her difficulties. Half of the participants
were then told that they would come back for
a second session (no feedback condition). The
other half of the participants were given the
expectation that if they helped (by writing
helpful advice for the woman), they would
watch a video at the second session made of
the woman which would be made after the
woman tried the helpers’ advice. These
participants were led to believe that the video
would report her improvement as a result of
following their advice (feedback condition).
Contrary to their predictions, yet consistent with the empathy-altruism hypothesis,
Smith et al. found an empathy helping
relationship in the feedback and no-feedback
conditions. The authors downplayed this
finding and instead focused on other analyses
in which high and low empathy persons in
their experiment were differentiated by a
median split on a self-report measure of
empathy and personal distress. With this
analysis, the expected pattern of results (as
predicted by the empathic-joy hypothesis)
emerged: among those expecting feedback,
more helping was evidenced among those high
in empathy versus those low in empathy.
There was no difference in helping between
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California State University, Stanislaus
high and low empathy participants who did
not expect feedback.
Batson et al. (1991) conducted three
experiments designed to test whether empathy leads to an egoistic motive to share
vicariously in the victim’s joy (the empathicjoy hypothesis) or whether empathy evokes a
motive to increase the victim’s well-being (the
empathy-altruism hypothesis). In a conceptual
replication of Smith et al. (1989), Batson and
his colleagues (1991, Experiment 1) found
evidence contrary to the empathic-joy
hypothesis. Specifically, among those expecting no feedback, those high in empathy
helped more than those low in empathy.
In Experiments 2 and 3, Batson et al.
(1991) gave participants an opportunity to
experience empathic joy without helping a
victim about whom participants read: participants merely chose (or did not choose) to
get updated information about the victim.
Participants’ expectations that the victim’s
situation would be improved by the time of
the updated interview were also manipulated
(participants were led to believe that there was
either a 20%, a 50% or a 80% likelihood that
the victim’s plight would be decreased).
Results did not indicate evidence of a linear
increase in helping (as a participant’s
expectancy for the victim’s improvement
increased) that was predicted by the empathicjoy hypothesis.
A number of characteristics of the Smith
et al. (1989) study suggest that their design
and analysis of the data may have contributed
to their finding support for the empathic-joy
hypothesis and no support for the empathyaltruism hypothesis. First, the plight of the
woman in their video was quite similar to that
of situations the participants may have been
enountering (e.g., coping with transition to
college life). Second, participants may have
desired to present themselves as empathic and
therefore reported high empathy and helped
in order to meet these self-presentation needs
(Batson et al., 1991). Therefore, their results
supporting the empathic-joy hypothesis may
be more appropriately characterized as an
artifact of these design, analysis and participant self-presentation issues.
Motives for Altruism
Conclusion
Philosophers have long debated the
existence and possibility of a concept such as
altruism as part of human nature (Comte,
1875/1851). When psychology took up the
question, the behaviorist and sociobiological
viewpoints pervaded the thinking of the day,
thereby influencing many to believe that
altruism is non-existent since all prosocial
(altruistic) behavior has, at some level, a
reward component for the helper. The evolutionary perspective posited that helping
behavior came about through natural selection
of those who helped their kin, or who helped
those who helped them. Indeed, this perspective was promoted by the father of
American psychology, William James:
Each mind, to begin with, must have
a certain minimum of selfishness…in
order to exist. This minimum must be
there as a basis for all further conscious acts, whether of self-negation
or of a selfishness more subtle still.
All minds must have come, by the way
of survival of the fittest, if by no
directer path, to take an intense
interest in the bodies to which they
are yoked (James, 1890, cited in
Batson, 1990).
Today, the evidence against the behaviorist and sociobiological perspectives on
altruism is substantial (Batson, 1987, 1990,
1991; Piliavin & Charng, 1990). Yet, philosophers and psychologists still largely agree
that the concept of purely altruistic behavior
is a fantasy (Batson, 1990, 1991; see also,
Rand, 1961). There is now considerable
empirical evidence accumulated by numerous
researchers, using rigorous tests of different
models, varied methods and different population samples, that strongly supports the notion
that altruistic behavior in humans does exist.
This “pure” altruism is linked to feelings of
empathy for the victim. When the goal of the
helper is to enhance his or her own welfare, to
gain some form of self reward or to avoid
punishment, then the helping behavior is
egoistic in motivation. Empathy has been
causally related to pure altruism but not to
egoistic helping behavior.
Research on the motivational bases of
altruistic and prosocial behavior continues to
be a fascinating and fertile area of inquiry for
social psychologists. Although we know much
about altruism, many questions remain. Of
particular value will be investigations of
prosocial and altruistic behavior that focus on
exploring different ways of measuring empathy (Batson et al., 1991). Additionally, it
would be particularly theoretically important
to assess the degree to which implicit attitudes
(defined as “introspectively unidentified traces
of past experience that mediate favorable or
unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward
social objects” [Greenwald & Banaji, 1993, p.
9]) toward helping others affect an individual’s
propensity to feel empathy toward another in
need. These and other questions await
investigation. Until then, although further
tests of the empathy-altruism hypothesis are
necessary, increasingly it is difficult to find
egoistic alternatives to account for the
considerable evidence that when people feel
empathy, they are more likely to act solely for
the welfare of the victim.
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Notes
1
I do not attempt an exhaustive review of
the literature on altruism, nor do I cover
altruism from the perspective of the varied
fields from which researchers have approached the concept. Rather, the purpose of
this review is to examine the empirical
findings regarding altruistic behavior in the
psychological literature bearing on the
motivational basis of such behavior—that is,
whether altruistic behavior is ever truly
selflessly motivated. Elsewhere, one may find
comprehensive reviews of the reinforcement
theory perspective (Gelfand & Hartmann,
1982), the sociobiological literature (Wilson,
1975) and the sociological research (Piliavin
& Charng, 1990). Dovidio (1984), Krebs and
Miller (1985) and Batson (1987) each provide
a critical review of the psychological literature
as well.
2
Batson (1987) makes a strong case
against each of six views (Lerner, 1982;
Karylowski, 1982; Piliavin et al., 1981; Krebs,
1975; Hoffman, 1981a; Rosenhan, 1978) that
claim to support altruism. Upon closer
examination, however, it can be seen that each
has an egoistic foundation.
Journal of Research, Fall 1999
Volume 4, Number 1
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