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Table of Contents
Index of tables
List of figures
List of graphs
List of Abbreviations
List of Country Abbreviations
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Part I:
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Introduction and Background
1. Introduction
1.1 Research question
1.2 The research design and outline of the study
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Part II: A theoretical framework for the analysis of social capital and
compliance
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2. Beyond state centered theories – Social capital as neglected explanatory
variable in the compliance literature
2.1 Introduction
2.2 What is compliance?
2.3 Social capital and non-compliance with European law
2.4 Social capital as a society-centered concept
2.5 Putnam’s way of understanding
2.6 Summary and discussion of the society-centered approach
2.7 Social Capital and the state: The institution-centered approach
2.8 Conclusion
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3. What makes state (and non-state) actors comply with EU law?
3.1 Introduction
3.2 What are non-state actors?
3.3 Theories about compliance
3.4 Conclusion
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Part III: The empirical analysis of social and political trust as dependent
variables
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4. Operationalization of hypotheses and indicators
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Measuring the society-centered concept
4.3 What comes first? The relationship between networks, norms, and
trust
4.4 Institution-centered approach: operationalization of the indicators
4.5 The impact of institutional fairness and effectiveness on political
trust
4.6 What is the relationship between social trust and political trust?
4.7 Conclusion
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Part IV: Using a combined research design for analysis
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5. Quantitative analysis: The consequences of social capital for
(non)compliance with EU law
5.1 Introduction
5.2 European regulation
5.3 Infringement proceedings as an indicator for non-compliance
5.4 Measuring the dependent variable – infringements of EU law by
member states
5.5 Data set
5.6 Non-compliance with EU law across member states
5.7 Quantitative testing of hypotheses
5.8 Conclusion
6. Qualitative analyis: Implementing EU environmental law in Italy
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The choice of policy sector and policy
6.3 Italy and the development of its environmental policy
6.4 The transposition of the habitats directive in Italy
6.5 Assessing non-compliance with the habitats directive in the
Italian regions
6.6 The operationalization of the independent variables
6.7 Summary and discussion of findings
6.8 Apulia
6.9 Conclusion
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Part V: Conclusion
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7. Summary of findings, conclusions and outlook
7.1 Introduction
7.2 The consequences of social capital on member state compliance:
The main findings
7.3 Contribution to the literature on social capital
7.4 Contribution to the compliance literature
7.5 Recommendations for political practice
7.6 The Outlook
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Appendices
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Literature
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Part I: Introduction and Background
1. Introduction
Research on compliance with European law has become an academic industry1on
its own as the increasing number of articles dealing with the topic demonstrate
(Giuliani, 2005: 3; cf. Mastenbroek, 2005).2 Most of the research is dominated by
theories of international relations and thus focuses on state-centered approaches in
order to explain the frequency of non-compliance between member states in the
European Union (Haas, 1998; Mbaye, 2001; Tallberg, 2002; Börzel, 2003; Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; Linos, 2007).3 European law formally addresses
member states. It affects national regulation and may strengthen the rights of private
actors or constrain their behavior (Davies, 2008). Examples range from the right
to environmental and consumer protection, to privacy and data protection (Cafaggi
and Watt, 2007). Accordingly, state actors are responsible for effectively enforcing
the implementation of European policies, oftentimes against domestic opposition.
Having an understanding of why non-state actors accept these rules can help to
explain how regulators can best achieve voluntary compliance (Murphy, 2004).
The latter aspect is particularly important for countries that cannot rely on strong
capacity and enforcement power of the state to reach compliance with European
law.
This study draws on social capital as a different path to explain why some member states comply with European law better than others (Commission of the European Communities, 2007). The study thereby constitutes a first attempt to systematically integrate the concept of social capital into the theoretical and empirical
research on compliance with European law. It thus develops an analytical framework through which the analysis and findings can be structured and compared.
Social capital has gained popularity in comparative politics4 and has been adopted
by different groups of scholars working on collective action problems (Spronk,
2001), while it has been mostly neglected in the compliance literature. The concept
of social capital adds important values to compliance research, as it introduces new
1 In his article on compliance studies, Guiliani uses the term “academic growth industries.” The
quote stems from Olsen and regards the growing interests of researchers in Europeanization
studies (Olsen, 2002: 921).
2 Guiliani refers in his article to research on compliance with law beyond the nation state including research on both compliance with international and European law.
3 Mastenbroek provides an extensive overview on different strands witihin compliance research
(Mastenbroek, 2005).
4 See, for example Barrios and Stefes (2006).
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solutions to the collective action problem oftentimes constituting non-compliance
(Scholz, 1998). It illustrates how solidarity and community-oriented thinking generated by social networks and norms facilitates collective action, which in turn
enhances compliance (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993; Putnam, 2001). Social
capital draws attention to non-state actors and became empirically famous from
Robert Putnam’s5 research on civic participation and institutional performance in
Italy and America (Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1993; Putnam, 2000). It refers to (a)
the norms of reciprocity and (b) networks of civic engagement (Putnam, 2001: 45).
Social trust is born from social capital and “therefore could be easily thought of as
a proxy” (Putnam, 2001: 45).
Embedded in relations of trust and predictability, social capital breeds civic
spirit, participation, and respect for law (Diamond, 2003: 5). While different approaches in the literature agree in general that “trust” as a concept amounts to
compliance with (domestic) law (Levi, 1988; Braithwaite and Makkai, 1994; Tyler
and Degoey, 1995; Scholz, 1998; Putnam, 2001; Kahan, 2002; Murphy, 2004), they
focus on different assumptions of the sources that generate it. They can be divided
into an institution-centered (a) and a society-centered aproach (b). The latter (b)
claims that social capital is produced by factors of civil society (Putnam 1993; 1995;
2000; Kahan 2002). The former (a) intends to link the concept to a set of formal
institutions (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985; Ostrom, 1995; Levi, 1998;
Murphy, 2004; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008: 278). Accordingly, these two approaches claim different causal mechanisms with distinct underlying logics of social action (logic of rational action vs. logic of appropriateness) that either enhance or
prevent the effective implementation of European law in the member states.
Hence, trust is a central concept upon which this study draws in order to explore
its causal relevance for compliance with EU law. The literature distinguishes between different forms and accounts of trust such as strategic or rational accounts
of trust and identity – or group-based accounts of trust, moral trust, and trust in the
state and political institutions (Stolle, 2002). The different approaches towards trust
are distinguished from each other by their assumptions about the definition of trust,
sources, and involved actors. Identity-based forms of trust include only people one
personally knows, and those individuals who fit into a certain social identity category that one holds: generalized social trust is concerned with individuals’ general
trust in others (Stolle, 2002: 409). Moral trust is based on the understanding that
people share underlying values (Uslaner, 2002). Some authors distinguish between
trust and confidence (cf. Job, 2005: 2). They understand “confidence as a passive
emotion” and trust as something which is based upon “beliefs and commitments”
(Sztompka, 1999: 27 as referred to in Job 2005: 2). In this study, trust is synony5 Robert D. Putnam is Peter and Isabel Malkin Professor of Public Policy at Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University.
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mous with the term confidence6 (c.f. Hardin, 2000: 35). In this sense, trust (political
and generalized social trust) is a belief or expectation actors have of others (Hardin,
2002; Farrell, 2005: 462). It is beyond the scope of this work to consider the different types of social trust and to explore its empirical relevance for compliance.
The focus of this study is placed on the most prominent strand of argumentation
on social trust and compliance, as discussed above.
1.1 Research question
When looking at the level of social and political trust of the member states of the
European Union (EU) compared with their compliance record, the correlation between these variables is in line with social capital theories (Commission of the
European Communities, 1999; World Values, 1999; Commission of the European
Communities, 2002; Commission of the European Communities, 2005; Commission of the European Communities, 2007). Countries performing best in complying
with EU law present high levels of political and social trust. Those with low levels
of trust, fail to comply. The central question of this study therefore asks: how does
social capital affect compliance with European law by member states? The independent variable is social capital measured by social and political trust. The dependent variable of this study constitutes compliance with EU law by member
states. The majority of the literature adopts the model of social capital as proposed
by Putnam to explore its effect on various outcomes, such as economic growth,
health or tax evasion (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Van Schaik, 2002; Van der Meer,
2003; Wollebak and Selle, 2003; Sabatini, 2005). A large part of the literature on
social capital is concerned with the relationship between social and political trust
(Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Van der Meer, 2003; Job, 2005). Few of the studies have
attempted to empirically investigate about the impact of institutional performance
on trust and compliance. The first researchers to attempt this were first and foremost
Levi (1998), Tyler (1990), Braithwaite and Makkai (1994), Rothstein and Stolle
(2008). This study asks about the relevance of both social capital research modes
- society and institution-centered - to compliance by member states. The purpose
of this study is to explore if and how social capital affects compliance by member
states. In this study I undertake a systematic application of social capital to compliance research which can serve as a guideline for future research.
A second goal of this study is to contribute to both the literature on social capital
and compliance beginning with a review of the literature on social capital, from
there, developing theoretical arguments about the effects of social capital on com-
6 Institutional trust is applied interchangeably with political trust.
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pliance. Most compliance research explains the inconsistent rule behavior of state
actors and thereby partly considering the role of non-state actors (Lampinen and
Uusikylä, 1998; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Mbaye, 2001; Koutalakis, 2004). Oftentimes these studies assign non-state actors a positive role in compliance (Börzel,
2003; Koutalakis, 2004; van der Vleuten, 2005). This study conceptualizes noncompliance with European law by member states as a result of the inconsistent rule
behavior of non-state actors.
A third goal is to provide empirical and theoretical insights into the effect of
social capital and non-state actors on compliance by using quantitative and qualitative research. Most studies conducted on social capital have worked with quantitative methods (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Scholz, 1998;
Slemrod, 1998; Gabriel, Kunz, Roßteutscher and Van Deth, 2002; Norris, 2002).
This study demonstrates a way how qualitative research can be conducted on social
capital. It shows to what extent qualitative research adds values to the analysis on
social capital and compliance. I shall come back to this point when explaining the
research design used in this study.
In summary, this work deals with two factors that have been largely ignored in
the compliance research: social capital and non-state actors. None of the “three
waves of scholarship on EU implementation” (Mastenbroek, 2005) have systematically analysed the role of society, as understood within the social capital
paradigm, in compliance with European law. The first wave of EU-related compliance research focused on legal and administrative procedures at the domestic
level in order to explain implementation deficits in the member states (Krislov and
Ehlermann, 1986; Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988; Demmke, 1994; Ciavarini Azzi,
2000; Demmke, 2001). The analyses cover the transposition, enforcement and application of European law. The variables these studies invoke to explain implementation deficits relate to legal and administrative procedures at the domestic
level. This is explained by the academic background of scholars in this field who
came either from legal or administrative science (Treib, 2008).
The second wave has analysed the degree of fit or misfit between European law
and existing domestic legislation (Duina, 1997; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; Börzel,
2003; cf. Kaeding, 2007; cf. Treib, 2008). The central claim is that existing domestic institutional arrangements and regulatory traditions are resistant to change
(Kaeding, 2007: 27). If the adaptation of EU law requires significant changes of
the regulatory traditions, implementation problems are most likely to occur. I will
discuss the misfit hypothesis at length in this study. However, the purpose of this
brief review is to underline that the focus was placed on national administrative
traditions rather than on (non-state) actor based factors. Later studies find that misfit
has only limited explanatory power and lacks empirical evidence and conceptual
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precision (Haverland, 2000; Héritier, Kerwer, Knill, Lehmkuhl, Teutsch and Douillet, 2001; Falkner, Treib, Hartlapp and Leiber, 2005; cf. Kaeding, 2007: 27).
The third wave emerged as a result of the theoretical and empirical problems
identified in the first and second waves and is eclectic in nature in terms of theory
and methods (cf. Treib, 2008). A first attempt was to theorize and research the role
of domestic politics in the implementation of European law (Treib, 2003a; 2003b;
Mastenbroek, 2005). Scholars in this research field showed that the political preferences of governments influence effective transposition (Treib, 2003a; Treib,
2003b). In this perspective, smooth implementation is not determined by the goodness of fit of European legislation with existing domestic regulatory traditions. The
implementation, here the transposition of European law, is successful if the required
reforms are in line with the political party preference of government (Treib, 2008).
Haverland explains implementation by the role of institutional veto players7
(Haverland, 2000). In the same vein, Lampinen and Uusikylä (1998), Mbaye (2001)
and Guiliani (2003) draw attention to the number of institutional veto players and
their impact on implementation. Some studies indirectly consider non-state actors
who facilitate compliance with European law (Lampinen and Uusikylä, 1998;
Mbaye, 2001; Linos, 2007). These authors conceptualize the role of non-state actors, for example, within support for the European integration.
Most quantitative studies define non-compliance as a dichotomous variable.
State actors do not comply either involuntary or voluntary. The main arguments
are developed in the international relations literature and refer to the enforcement
(voluntary non-compliance) and management schools (involuntary compliance).
This study analyses the impact of enforcement and managerial variables on implementation. I will therefore not explain them at length at this point. Steunenberg
introduces a policy-specific model based on rational arguments. In his model, veto
players act in policy-specific ways during the decision-making process (Kaeding,
2007: 28). All these studies of the third wave of compliance resesarch, quantitative
and qualitative, provide empirically and theoretically strong insights into implementation. As different as they may be from each other, for example, institutionalist
arguments vs. actor-centered ones, they all either ignore the role of non-state actors
in compliance or consider them to be just one factor among many in explaining
non-compliance by member states.
Given the lack of a coherent theoretical framework that systematically analysis
the role of non-state actors in compliance, this study will fill this gap by providing
a comprehensive theoretically informed, empirical analysis of how the two factors
- social capital and the role of non-state actors - influence member states’ compliance with European law. The analysis conceptualizes social capital as a variable,
7 The term institutional veto players refers to Tsebelis who calls them this way if veto players
are generated by the constitution (Tsebelis, 2002).
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and identifies the causal mechanisms that link social capital, non-state actors, and
member state compliance. I inquire into the role of social capital and non-state
actors in compliance by developing hypotheses which can be empirically investigated. The central findings of this study show that low political trust, rather than
low social trust, explains the non-compliant behavior non-state actors which in turn
lead to non-compliance with European law by member states. A second finding
suggests that two factors, fairness (administrative corruption) and state capacity,
determine the level of trust in national institutions and state compliance with European law. It thereby confirms other studies which have shown how low state capacity directly accounts for non-compliance by member states (Hille and Knill,
2006; Börzel et al., 2007).
The added value of this work to the compliance research is that it empirically
traces how limited state capacity also impacts the compliant behavior of non-state
actors, leading to compliance failure in member states. In particular, this holds true
if non-state actors already possess low capacities. Hence, the occurence of weak
states and weak societies goes together (Goetz, 2008; Sissenich, 2010). Weak state
capacities impair the capacity-building of non-state actors as it prevents, for example, the sharing of information on compliance requirements. In this analysis I
trace how inefficient and ineffective working institutions generate perceptions by
non-state actors that state actors are corrupt which in turn determines their feelings
of trust in them. The perception of institutions, and their trustworthiness, significantly influences the willingness of non-state actors to comply with rules. In sum,
weak state capacity causes both the non-compliant behavior of state and non-state
actors, at which one of the two causal mechanisms works through trust in institutions (political trust). Following this, I argue that social capital placed in the realm
of society contributes to a strong state. However, the building of social capital
requires state infrastructure in the first place which allows groups of individuals to
act collectively.
1.2 The research design and outline of the study
This study employs both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to empirically test a set of hypotheses derived from the social capital literature related to
compliance. The study is divided into five parts. After the introduction, the second
part introduces social capital as a neglected variable in the compliance literature.
First, it provides an overview on the body of literature that is most relevant to the
theoretical, methodological, and empirical focus of this study. I argue that social
capital constitutes an important variable that should be considered in the analyses
of the compliance literature. Second, the focus of part two moves on to the theo-
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retical arguments of social capital. It aims to define and conceptualize social capital
from above (institution-centered) and below (society-centered) as a variable. Third,
I derive hypotheses from competing explanations of the compliance literature that
can be tested against social capital variables in subsequent chapters.
In sum, the chapter develops and presents a theoretical framework through which
we can understand the effects of social capital variables on compliance. The society-centered approach8 derives its logic from game theory. Drawing on the main
research on the society-centered approach (Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1993; Brehm
and Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2001; Kahan, 2002; Putnam and Goss, 2002b), I identify
three ways through which compliance becomes effective. The first and second
mechanisms draw attention to non-state actors through which the compliant behavior of state actors becomes effective. The third effect focuses directly on the
compliant behavior of state actors. Following the literature on the institution-centered theory on social capital, I develop two hypotheses driven by the distinct logics
of social action (rationality vs. logic of appropriateness). One emphasizes institutional capacity (to sanction law breakers) to promote trust and compliance, and
draws as the society-centered approach of game theortical arguments. The second
mechanism refers to the moral intention of actors to comply with law. Here the
underlying logic of social action is based on the logic of appropriateness than on a
rational choice model.
The chapter highlights both conceptual weaknesses and strengths of both research modes (bottom-up and tow-down) applied in social capital. It shows how
social capital theories fail to define an underlying theory of social action. In this
chapter, I argue that the concept of social capital would be strengthened by integrating arguments from the compliance literature. This section underlines the
closeness between procedural legitimacy and social capital assumptions. While
society-centered approaches fail to define the causal mechanisms of how social
trust originates and distributes through society, procedural legitimacy may help to
define these by clarifying how social interaction generates both political and social
trust (Font and Blanco, 2007). Part Two concludes with a discussion of the most
prominent theories about compliance. I first develop hypotheses from the literature
and then modify them into more society- than state-centered variables. This allows
us to control their impact on compliance against social capital variables.
Part Three explores social capital as the dependent variable. First, the chapter
presents data that helps us make a systematic, empirical, and analytical study of
the factors explaining social and political trust. Social trust appears to be generated
by networks and norms. Political trust may be generated by both capacity and fairness. The quantitative analysis confirms the major claims of the social capital lit-
8 Hereafter also called bottom-up approach.
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erature. It first shows that the variables, norms, and networks are significantly correlated with social trust as predicted by the society-centered theory. In contrast to
Putnam's theory, norms and networks are not correlated with one another, which
is in line with the empirical findings of other studies (cf. Gabriel, Kunz et al., 2002).
I then conducted a second analysis of the explanatory variables of political trust.
The results support the theoretical predictions of both research modes applied to
political trust. Finally, Part Three concludes with an analysis of the relationship
between social and political trust. The findings support the assumption as proposed
by the literature that both types of trust are closely related to one another (Brehm
and Rahn, 1997; Rothstein, 2002). In this chapter I argue that the political trust
approach is more precise in its assumptions about how trust is generated by institutions, while the society-centered fails to theoretically define how exactly social
trust is generated by networks and norms. Following this, I conclude that the stock
of social capital from below (society-centered) requires a minimum of state infrastructure in the first place to prosper.
Part Four engages the analysis of social capital and compliance using a combined
research design. The purpose of the quantitative analysis is to assess the explanatory
power of social capital variables versus state-centered variables suggested by the
compliance literature. Moreover, it explores the effect of modified variables derived from compliance theories that aim to directly account for the behavior of nonstate actors. The quantitative analyses explore the correlations of explanatory variables with large-N data sets over time and across countries. It applies multivariate
linear regression. The data set this study uses contains over 6,000 cases the Commission opened against the member states for infringing on European law between
1978 and 1999. The data were provided by the research project ‘Compliance with
law beyond the nation state’, funded by the German Research Council (DFG) and
directed by Prof. Tanja A. Börzel.9 The question of whether these data are outdated
or not may appear reasonable to ask. I follow the arguments of other studies that
showed that the variation of compliance with European law between member states
remains constant over time (Börzel et al., 2007). Member states that performed
badly in the early years of European integration continued this performance
throughout the period under scrutiny.
The results of the quantitative research show that both social and political trust
matter for compliance by member states. They highly correlate with the compliance
variable, while the results for political trust are more robust than for social trust.
Another finding points to the relevance of administrative capacity (the managerial
9 The author participated in this research project, which used this database. The project is aimed
at analyzing the conditions under which member states of the EU comply (or not) with EC
rules on the basis of the dataset provided by the Commission. For further information on the
database, see http://www.fu-berlin.de/polsoz/polwiss/europa/forschung/compliance/index.
html.
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variable) for compliance with European law. Because of the results for social trust
revealed by the quantitative analyses, and due to conceptual vagueness implied by
the society-centered approach, I do not pursue this line of inquiry. Instead, I focus
on the causal relationship between capacity, political trust and compliance, employing qualitative research.
The case study focuses on Italy, which has gained notoriety for its poor compliance record with EU law (La Spina and Sciortino, 1993; Pridham and Cini, 1994;
Pridham, 1996; Giuliani, 2000; Fabbrini and Doná, 2002; Börzel, 2003: 15; Koutalakis, 2004; Borghetto, Franchino and Giannetti, 2006; Bugdahn, 2006). At the
same time, the country suffers from inefficient institutions and low social capital
(European Values Study, Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1993; 2000; Mbaye, 2001).
Hence the correlations work at the aggregate level in Italy. We can therefore expect
to observe the effects of capacity and trust on compliance will most likely occur in
this case. The qualitative case analysis is divided into two parts. The first part
compares and assesses the implementation of the habitats directive10 in the Italian
regions, towards identifying regional patterns of compliance, and controlling for
alternative explanations using different indicators than in the quantitative analysis.
The purpose is to find out whether we find regional patterns to conduct qualitative
analysis on. The findings point out two variables which have explanatory power
for compliance: capacity and moreover, institutional fairness (corruption), while
political trust is generally low among the regions. Fairness, thus, seems to determine compliance with European law in the Italian regions. Following this is the
question whether political trust does really matter for compliance since the findings
of the regional comparison underline ‘fairness of institutions’ as the explanatory
variable for compliance. I selected a case where high likeliness of observing the
effect of fairness on compliance. In other words, I decided against conducting an
outlier case study which would have been in line with a mixed-method research
design (Mastenbroek, 2005: 1113). The main arguments for not using an outlier
case have to do with the reliability of data used in the descriptive analysis of regional
comparison. The data used to measure political trust by regions present only crosssectional rather than time-series data, which would compare the level of political
trust by region over time. Unfortunately, such data were not available. Hence, we
do not know if the values of political trust may vary among the regions over time.
The second argument underlines the robust results for the estimated coefficient of
political trust presented in the quantitative analysis. I conclude that it is therefore
worthwhile to consider these results and proceed with a most likely qualitative case
study that would provide evidence of how fairness or corruption accounts for com-
10 The Habitats directive belongs to nature conservation policy. It protects animals, plant species
and ‘habitat types‘.
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pliance as suggested by the descriptive analysis. The analysis thereby also investigates if and how political trust is relevant for effective implementation.
The second part of the qualitative analysis is based on a single case study of the
implementation of the habitats directive in Apulia. Both the comparison of regional
compliance and the single case study conducted in Apulia should help us determine
if and how the proposed theoretical model can explain observed variation. A second
goal of the qualitative case study is to control for omitted variables. Apulia is an
ideal case to trace the effect of low capacity, high corruption and political trust on
compliance. The regional capacity of Apulia is comparatively weak and political
trust is low, while the data I use point to administrative corruption. Methodologically, I employ/use a backward looking research design, and process tracing, to
inquire whether the capacity, fairness and trust variables influence compliance
outcomes, or if the absence of one of the explanatory variables increases the likelihood of non-compliance with European law.
The empirical findings of the study show that non-state actors can be targeted
by European policies. They have to bear potential implementation costs. In this
case, state actors depend on the compliant behavior of non-state actors if they in
turn want to prevent state compliance deficits. The qualitative case study illustrates
how the oppositional behavior of non-state actors may have lead to infringements
of EU law in Italy. A second finding of this study points out that fairness and
capacity matter for compliance. Fairness, as measured by the degree of corruption,
determines the perception individuals have of responsible institutions and therefore
influences their trust in them. Several studies have shown how weak state capacities
result in poor compliance performance (Mbaye, 2001; Borghetto, Franchino et al.,
2006; Hille and Knill, 2006; Kaeding, 2006; Börzel, Hofmann et al., 2007). In this
study I show how low state capacity impacts on state non-compliance by affecting
the compliant behavior of non-state actors. The qualitative case study provides
empirical and theoretical insights into how a weak state or region fails to build the
capacity of non-state actors, which is required for compliance. Capacity does not
only directly influence the compliant behavior of non-state actors, which in turn
determines state compliance both directly and indirectly, as inefficient working
administrations are likely to be perceived as corrupt by the public.
Part Five synthesizes the findings of the empirical examination. It discusses the
general findings and their implications for future research. It highlights the need to
obtain data of adequate quality to improve the reliability and validity of quantitative
analysis. Furthermore, this final part of the study argues that some points remain
unexplained by social capital theories. Here it is argued that the social capital concept could benefit from the integration of sociological theories on social action in
order to develop causal mechanisms of the creation of norms. The same accounts
for the relationship between social networks and social trust. We still do not know
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how social networks create and distribute social trust throughout society. Until now,
studies on social capital (including my own) could only trace a significant correlation between social networks and trust (Putnam, Leonardi et al., 1993; Putnam,
1995a; Putnam, 1995b; Newton and Norris, 2000; Van der Meer, 2003). Finally, I
call for a separation of moral views on compliance from rational choice models. In
other words, the integration of non-rational factors into a rational choice model
supersedes alternative explanations and fails to explain why in the end most member states comply with European law (Börzel, Hofmann and Panke, 2005; Commission of the European Communities, 2005; Commission of the European Communities, 2007).
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