Public Opinion Polling and Presidential Responsiveness: Effects on
Policymaking and Democracy
LOUIS T. SHERNISKY
Gannon University
How does public opinion affect American presidential policymaking, and
what are the effects of such a relationship on the institution of democracy? This
paper will attempt to examine the irony that exists within the American publics’
perception of US democracy, which is the belief that the modern president
“panders” to the people, while the government is simultaneously accused of being
more unresponsive to the wishes of the public than ever. The argument put forth is
that, ironic in itself, the American public is collectively correct on both of these
points, as contradictory as they may appear on the surface.
A great deal of research and a large body of literature have been devoted to
the subjects of public opinion poll usage, presidential responsiveness, and the
dynamic relationship that exists between the two. Why? Before attempting to
analyze the political theory that exists concerning the subject, it might be
worthwhile to first look at the significance polling, and its subsequent effects on
leadership, for American democracy. Nearly 85% of Americans, policy leaders, and
members of the media agree that, while imperfect, polling is one of the best means
of conveying the publics’ views to the government.1 This statistic would indicate
that large majorities of both lay persons, the public, and policy professionals, policy
leaders and media members, see the science of polling as potentially useful to the
processes of American democracy. Further analysis will then be conducted of both
the positive and negative effects polling, as well as its relationship to presidential
responsiveness in both first and second terms, and the effects polling can have on
the institution of democracy and what steps might be taken to foster a more positive
association between the two.
Upon establishing the sufficiency of the argument that study of public
opinion polling and presidential responsiveness is indeed significant to the study of
democracy, the focus of this paper will then turn to the issues at hand. Limited time
and ability, as well as space within this paper, will not allow for an extremely in
depth analysis of all prior research that has been conducted, but perhaps a critical
examination of two popular studies on the matter, one qualitative and the other
quantitative, would be satisfactory in the attempt to draw several general
conclusions concerning poll usage and leadership. The studies to which the paper
will primarily refer are those conducted by Brandice Canes-Wrone and Kenneth
Shotts, as well as Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro.
In his work, “Rethinking Presidential Responsiveness: The Public
Presidency and Rhetorical Congruency, 1953-2001,” Brandon Rottinghaus notes
that while much of the study on the subject has advanced understanding of the
relationship between public opinion and presidential behavior, it has been limited in
explanatory power by constraints in appropriate measurement of public presidential
action and public opinion.2 This is something Canes-Wrone and Shotts attempt to
correct for in their statistical analysis of an earlier set of hypotheses they developed
in conjunction with Michael Herron, hereafter known as the CHS theory.3 The set
of hypotheses that comprise the theory were tested using annual presidential
budgetary proposals, as well as the prior year’s enacted budgetary authority, in
conjunction with information collected through the National Opinion Research
Center (NORC) and the Roper Organization on a set of eleven of the budgetary
issues.4
The Canes-Wrone and Shotts study as well as the CHS hypotheses will be
examined in far greater detail in the subsequent pages of this work, but for the
moment it is worth noting why their effort is so significant. The test examined data
on which there existed annual presidential proposals as well as annual and
consistent public opinion polls. While this quantitative analysis approach is not
bulletproof, it is far from imperfect either. It also makes for an interesting contrast
in methodology in comparison to the qualitative study conducted by Jacobs and
Shapiro.5
Herein lies the value of examining and reconciling the conclusions of each
of these works. Though they study different examples and use very different
methods of research to develop their conclusions, it appears as though some of the
conclusions drawn are similar in nature, albeit the manipulation theory of Jacobs
and Shapiro observes its finding through a somewhat negatively slanted, although
not entirely inaccurate lens. The hope is that by examining these theories, each
being seen as a very significant contribution to the debate on polling and
presidential responsiveness, certain points of contention within the debate can be
more generally agreed upon, allowing future students of the subject to bypass the
work required to explain why they make certain assumptions as to presidential
behavior in regards to opinion polls, elections, etc.
Before returning to the question of why the study of the relationship of
polling and presidential policymaking is significant to the debate on the quality of
democracy in America today, it would be worthwhile to briefly describe the
manipulation theory of Jacobs and Shapiro and examine the notion of pandering. In
the Jacobs and Shapiro study, the authors examine, in substantial detail, the
attempted health care reform initiatives of the Clinton Administration between 1993
and 1994 as well as the speakership of New Gingrich in the following years, as it
related to, and was defined by, the Clinton health care reforms. Using this period in
American politics as their case study, the authors’ work provides a large body of
evidence in support of their theory that public opinion’s influence on government is
less than in the past and much less than commonly assumed.6
“Pander” is a term much used within the current, popular debate on the issue
of poll influence on policymaking. It is overused even. Due to its negative
connotation, it is perhaps best to refrain from using the word within the contexts of
a scholarly assessment of the issue. But for clarification purposes, it is best to define
the action of “pandering,” and then address the connotation associated with it as
used in the public as well as mainstream media. For the practical purposes of this
paper, pandering might best be defined as an instance in which a president takes a
policy position due to its public popularity despite knowledge that said policy might
not be in the long term interest of the country.7 Jacobs and Shapiro take a much
more cynical view of the term. Rather than merely focusing on what actions define
pandering, they explain, “the term is deliberately deployed by politicians, pundits,
and other elites to belittle government responsiveness to public opinion and reflects
a long-standing fear, uneasiness, and hostility among elites toward popular consent
and influence over the affairs of government,”8 and trace the words’ lineage from
its sixteenth century use as a description for a pimp to its more common usage as a
disparaging term in politics, which they note as being widespread by the 1970s.9
With this in mind, the term will be avoided for the sake of preventing unwarranted
or unnecessary controversy.
A good segue into the issue of democracy and how polls and policymaking
relate might be an abbreviated explanation of the normative implications of the
conclusions drawn from prior research that has been conducted on the topics at
hand. Perhaps the most interesting findings have to do with the nature of the
presidential decision-making in relation to the period of time within the term that
the policymaking occurs. There is evidence that supports the claim that there are
indeed instances in which presidents will commit the sin of pandering by choosing
a policy position that is popular regardless of information that suggests the policy
will not be in the country’s best interest.10 Conversely though, there are many times
in which presidents will disregard public opinion on issues when they feel their
policy goals are more significant than their political goals of personal or party
reelection.11 What is interesting is the strong correlation between the election cycle,
more specifically the proximity of an imminent election, and a president’s decision
to either accept or reject popular opinion. This might suggest that there are
institutional factors that have a stronger influence on presidential policy positions
than the individual characteristics of the particular president.
If this analysis is correct then it suggests democratic accountability can
thrive despite political strategies developed to elude such answerability, which
would in turn suggest the study of polling’s influence on presidential policymaking
can lead to changes of the status quo that would not only strengthen American
democracy, but be beneficial to the health of the spirit of democracy in America. It
is the dire condition of this democratic spirit that has caused many students of
democracy a great deal of concern in recent years. Though the subject of how a lack
of responsiveness has attributed to such ill feelings within the American people will
later be discussed, the notion that this trend can be corrected and that leadership can
be of both the “trustee” and “delegative” models with real democratic
accountability working to ensure fluidity of the system is not only the goal of this
study and the hope of its author but a real possibility.12
This seems as though a good point to return to the discussion of just whether
or not polls and their effects, or lack thereof, are or can be useful, and therefore
intrinsically good, for the processes of democratic government. In his essay, “Why
Respond to Polls? Public Opinion Polling and Democracy,” Robert Shapiro argues
that polls are a public’s best means for balancing the power and influence on
Washington of interest groups and political action committees. “Polls, in principle,
can be stunningly democratic and, especially, egalitarian, because they attempt to
find out the opinions of a sample of everyone, not just those who have the
opportunity and economic or other interest in being engaged actively in politics.” In
making that argument he touches on another significant and positive aspect of
polling, the equality inherent in the notion of random sampling. A final, less
practical point Shapiro makes in this particular work is the idea that poll results
constitute data which can be assessed in the future by scholars in hopes of better
understanding US history and thus draw conclusions from such understanding. 13
These ideas are merely a summation of those presented in an earlier work in
which Shapiro, working with Benjamin Page, elaborates on the idea of collective
wisdom. The argument for collective wisdom seems to hold much weight and, if
accepted, would lend itself to the point that polls are in fact a legitimate and useful
means for harnessing the collective policy preferences of the public. If this point is
then accepted, a reader can subsequently see that the problems associated with
polling are not inherent in the science of polling itself, but rather the use of the polls
for illegitimate purposes, and that therein lays the detriment to democracy. From
this point it will be easier to ascertain how polls can be used to positively influence
democratic debate on policymaking and fulfill to greater extents the American
democratic process.
The concept of collective wisdom is based on the assumption that the
average person’s policy preferences are not fully informed and permanent, nor
completely uninformed and haphazard. Rather, the average person bases their
policy preferences on uncertain and incomplete information that tends to support
their personal beliefs. This lack of confidence in the individual’s own knowledge
disposes the average person to instances in which their opinion can be changed, but
over a long period of time a pattern of “long-term preferences” emerges. Thus, the
population can be said to have stable, collective policy preferences that can be
accurately measured, with those who deviate from their long-term opinions
canceling out over a large sample.14
This is not to say that the majority is always right in its assessment of policy
issues, far from it. Although a Kaiser study does suggest that Americans as well as
policy leaders and the media all tend to put a great deal of emphasis on the idea of
majority rule, and though they respect officials’ use of their own judgment, nearly
40% of the public still favored following the majority opinion despite
acknowledgement of occasions on which the majority was erroneous.15 The point is
that a collective opinion can be ascertained and used as representative of the will of
the people in policymaking decisions.
The above represent but a few of the reasons put forth by proponents of
polling and only serve as a general introduction to the claim that public opinion
polling is, in itself, a legitimate practice. While there are critics of polling, the
debate within this paper does not focus on this subject and therefore will not go into
further detail on it. So if a reader accepts that the practice of polling can be a useful
tool in the methods of democracy, from where then does the disdainful notion of
“poll-driven” leadership stem?
Jacobs and Shapiro would claim, “The irony of contemporary politics is that
politicians both slavishly track public opinion and, contrary to the myth of
“pandering,” studiously avoid simply conforming policy to what the public
wants.”16 In fact, one of the main points of the work by Jacobs and Shapiro is that
there has been a general decline in responsiveness of politicians since the 1970s, an
assertion supported not only by the work of Canes-Wrone and Shotts, but also a
1998 study that found government policies to be less consistent with the preferences
of the majority between 1980 and 1993, with a policy congruence of 55% on over
five hundred issues, than between 1960 and 1979 when the policy congruence on
the same set of issues was 63%.17
And what's more, the results of the aforementioned Kaiser study would also
suggest that Jacobs and Shapiro are correct in their analysis. Not only did the study
conclude that nearly half of those tested saw their own influence on decisions made
in Washington as negligible (in contrast to the majority of policy leaders who felt
public opinion had “a fair amount” to “a great deal” of influence) and felt the
government did not understand them, but 83% felt the main reasons public officials
employ polls is to, “stay popular,” “get reelected,” and “further their own ends.”18
And more than one study suggests this cynicism extends to the political elite, who
agree with the public that poll numbers can be manipulated a number of ways and
can be tailored to any pre-desired outcome.19
With so much evidence suggesting exactly the opposite of the idea of polldriven leadership, the question should be asked again, where does this perception
come from? From personal research of the subject there is no clear answer. While
some studies suggested that presidents do allow polls to influence policymaking,
sometimes significantly, not a single one suggested that there was a significant
increase in policy congruence.20 If anything, the trend is exactly the opposite.21 The
decline in responsiveness would perhaps account for much of the cynicism within
society on the subject of polling if one considers the significant increase in the
amount of polling that has taken place since the 1960s. While being simultaneously
“beat over the head” with polls and poll numbers by the national media, and seeing
the proliferation of polling within the White House, while feeling the effects of a
real, decreasing trend in democratic responsiveness in its government, the public
has lost confidence in its leadership and it would seem as though this effect has
translated into ill feelings.
In a paper explicitly titled, “Debunking the Pandering Politician Myth,”
Jacobs and Shapiro conclude, “[D]espite the nearly universal acceptance of the
notion that today’s politicians pander, no systematic evidence supports it. …The
notion that today’s politician panders to polls when making significant policy is a
myth built on scattered anecdotes and ungrounded presumptions.”22 While there is
debate over the reasons behind the popular perception of poll driven leadership, one
need not accept the theories of Jacobs and Shapiro to move beyond this debate.
There seems to be general consensus that policy congruence with public opinion
has decreased in the past thirty years, with statistical analysis supporting this
claim.23 That alone should be sufficient to continue past such debate over the origin
of negative public perception of polls, to the more important questions of how a
lack of presidential responsiveness and an American public disillusioned with its
leadership can have injurious effects on democracy and what can be done to reverse
such trends.
If presidential polling has indeed evolved away from responsiveness, toward
attempted use of policy polling to move public opinion, then this phenomenon
poses serious threats to American democracy. First, the cycle that has developed
lends itself to the depression of responsiveness by presidents to the publics’ policy
preferences as it has only become important for congruency when reelection draws
near, and to a lesser degree, the election following a president’s second term.
(Second terms will later be discussed separately) Second, audaciousness on the part
of the president in his ability to persuade public opinion, especially in the realm of
foreign policy, can lock the country into policies that lack the support of the public
or Congress. Finally, the institution of the president gives him an advantage
unparalleled by any other government leader to influence public opinion.24 An
example of this would be the notion of the “bully pulpit.”
Furthermore, if the basis for democratic society and government is an
informed public that actively participates in open discussion and reasonable debate
then communications between the government and the people are important.
Whether or not an informed citizenry is, in fact, the basis for such democracy can
be debated, although it seems reasonable to assume that it is most certainly at least
significant or advantageous to the process. If the vertical communication between
the public and the government is purposefully distorted by the administration to
persuade the public to agree with those policy goals already chosen by the White
House, then of course the quality of the public opinion will be diminished as it is
not truly independent thought based on well-informed, critical reasoning and
debate.25
The implications of such manipulation are not only troublesome in
consideration of policy and opinion making, but it is argued that these strategies of
manipulation are also directly responsible for the low levels of public trust in the
government. Thus, the effects of manipulation would account for the latter half of
the aforementioned paradox that exists in American politics today. In January 1999,
a study conducted by the Center on Policy Attitudes asked a question, used by the
American National Election Studies (NES) since the 1950s, as to whether
respondents trusted the government “to do what is right.” Only 19%, the lowest
level recorded in the forty years of polling data on the question, trusted the
government “just about always” or “most of the time.”26
Opposite this trend is an increase in the amount of citizens who feel as
though the government does not care about their views, or they are being
misunderstood, and therefore they do not have much say in policymaking decisions.
This is exemplified in the earlier referenced Kaiser study, where only 49% of
respondents felt as though the government understood them.27 These converse
tendencies are disturbing when one considers they have been simultaneous and, it
seems reasonable to assume, detrimental to the health of public reason, debate,
opinion, and relationship with its government.
While the arguments presented here as to the ill effects of manipulation on
policymaking and public opinion are not the only reasons for declining public trust
in the government, etc. they do serve as solid examples sufficient to establish the
point that, if manipulation does occur, then it is harmful to the spirit of democracy
as well as the institutions of democracy and solutions should be sought out to
remedy the situation. Such solutions will be examined in the final sections of this
paper. At this point, having established to at least a minimal degree that polling can
be useful for democracy, while its misuse can be harmful, attention must be given
to the theories on which this argument is based. Once these parameters are
understood, the points contained within this paper might become clearer to a reader,
allowing the conclusions drawn to more logically follow.
The first study examined and used for the purposes of this paper was that of
Canes-Wrone and Shotts. In their paper, “The Conditional Nature of Presidential
Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” they test their previous hypotheses of electoral
proximity and popularity. In an earlier work they theorized that a president would
be most likely to endorse a popular policy when his popularity is at such a level that
the decision may positively affect his chances for reelection. 28 As was mentioned
early on in the paper, the CHS hypotheses were tested by comparing presidents’
proposals and public opinion for a set of eleven budgetary issues between the years
1972 and 1999. A study such as theirs had not been conducted before and it is
considered to be an important addition to the study of presidential policymaking.
The advantages to the Canes-Wrone and Shotts test included: an ability to examine
presidential action on individual issues and whether those actions corresponded
with public opinion on said issues, whether presidential responsiveness varies
across policy domains, variations between presidents, and to control for outside
influences on responsiveness.29
The testing of their data showed that the overall level of congruence was
51%, and interestingly enough, remained relatively constant over the nearly thirtyyear period and six administrations. Although, this overall percentage is somewhat
skewed. Policy congruence was highest on the issues of crime, health, and social
security at over 90% and issues that follow the liberal-conservative ideological
spectrum at 71%, while being lower on foreign policy issues at 32%. This suggests
that presidents are more likely to take popular positions on “doorstep” issues that
the citizens are better informed about and on which they have stable preferences,
while often ignoring public opinion on those issues on which the public is less
informed.30
Realizing that factors such as elections, or lack thereof in a second term, and
public approval can influence a president’s decision to conform policy to public
opinion, Canes-Wrone and Shotts test their hypotheses of electoral proximity and
popularity. The Electoral Proximity Hypothesis states, “Policy congruence between
presidential positions and public opinion is more likely the sooner the next
election.”31 Their findings suggested this is indeed the case, and this puts their
research in line with that of Jacobs and Shapiro. In a four-year term, presidential
policy congruence was 45% in the first two years and 57% in the latter half.
Additionally, congruence was found to be highest in the final year at 66%.32
The authors of the study expound on this hypothesis in the CHS Popularity
Hypothesis, which challenges previous research on the subject. Their theory was
that when the next election is distant, essentially the first two years of a term, a
president’s policy choice is often unaffected by public approval. In addition, when a
president’s approval is sufficiently high he can choose unpopular policy without
fear of losing an imminent election and when it is sufficiently low he can ignore
public opinion if he feels it is best to do so for it is unlikely he will win the election
without a major policy success. Thus, it is at average levels, high or low, that a
president is most likely to choose policy that is publicly popular in hopes that it will
increase his chances of winning the upcoming election.33 Testing supported this
theory.
Figure 1. Monotonic Popularity Hypothesis
Source: Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004, Figure 1. This graph shows the results of prior
work on the subject.
Figure 2. CHS Popularity Hypothesis
Source: Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004, Figure 2. Do not read the graph linearly. Rather, the solid
lines representing Late term policy making move from opposite sides to come together in
the middle.
Canes-Wrone and Shotts is so important because it proves the significance
that electoral proximity plays in the decision of a president to follow or reject public
opinion on a particular policy issue. What’s more, it acknowledges the issue of
presidential popularity and explains its effects on the policymaking decision.
Finally, the study supports Jacobs and Shapiro in their analysis of a decline in
presidential responsiveness since the 1970s while simultaneously concluding that
many of the factors that affect policy congruence are institutional rather than
personal (though personal differences exist between presidents, only less
significantly) and it is perhaps the system that has changed. If this is the case, then
it can be reasoned that the system can be corrected, if there is the will to do so.
The other major theory that has been exceptionally significant in the study
of the relationship between presidential responsiveness and public opinion, as well
as to this particular paper, is that of Jacobs and Shapiro. Both have written
prolifically on the subject and their theory of manipulation takes into account the
complexities and contradictions within the prior and current research on the topic.
Taking this broad, qualitative, overriding theory into account with respect to the
results of Canes-Wrone and Shotts’ results of a quantitative test of the electoral
proximity hypothesis allowed for a synthesis of the two; the findings of which seem
to indicate that the most powerful device to correcting those instances in which
manipulation occurs, as this paper assumes it does, and those instances in which
pandering occurs, as this paper also assumes it does, is the election. But before this
point can be made, manipulation theory should be better understood.
The most basic tenet of Jacobs and Shapiro’s manipulation theory is that a
president’s policy goals will outweigh his political goals, and this will lead to a
disregard for public opinion.34 The most significant reason behind this belief is the
documented increase in ideological polarization of the American electorate and its
parties.35 Correlating to the results of Canes-Wrone and Shotts, Jacobs and Shapiro
note that there are periods of increased responsiveness that coincide with the
oncoming of imminent elections. Though they come to this conclusion on different
grounds, believing that in these instances it is easier for a president or other
politician to accept a popular opinion that does not correspond with his or her own
position due to the short amount of time before the election than it would be to
change public opinion.36
Their idea of “crafted talk” explains that with the increase in polling, as
politicians track public opinion they do so not to make policy, but to represent and
win support for their policies. Crafted talk is associated with the concept of
“staying on message.” Though they acknowledge and accept limitations on this
concept, such as that it is often times more effective in opposition than in promotion
of new policy or that it is difficult to affect people’s values or preferences on wellestablished programs. As crafted talk deals with communications, a significant
portion of the debate contained within the work deals with the fourth estate, the
media. It is through the media that the public forms its opinions. Unfortunately,
today’s press coverage is driven by polarization and the “horse-race” mentality of
electoral races, rather than critical debate on substantive policy issues. What’s
more, the press acknowledges the president’s attempts to institute his own policy
goals by changing public opinion and this leads to closer scrutiny by the press. This
scrutiny, in turn, leads to stronger, more widespread public distrust.37
Manipulation theory reasons that the motivations of politicians, in this case,
presidents, are enacting desired policies and securing their reelection. These are two
very basic political goals that have been researched for decades.38 The problem with
electoral accountability is that methods have been developed to shirk negative
opinion and evade punishment for unpopular policy choices. This presents a
problem for longstanding theories such as the median voter theory and retrospective
voting model, which suggest the personal benefits of electoral goals dominate the
calculations of candidates.39 While this consideration appears to remain true, if the
system does not cast out those who act in a manner inconsistent with the safeguards
that protect against such manipulation then there is little incentive to follow public
opinion when policy preferences are not already inline with those of the public
There are a number reasons for the dodging of centrist opinion. Foremost, a
president will likely believe in his policy goals and see them as important; he sees
his policy as good public policy. Less noble is the reality that, with the status quo of
the current system, a president often owes many people for their help in his election
and subsequently can be more sensitive and more easily influenced by a narrow
constituency that gave him significant support on the campaign trail.40
Finally, the advantages to simulating responsiveness and attempting to
change public opinion give a president further reason to attempt to do so. The
unsettled nature of public opinion, for example, makes it more susceptible to
manipulation. Such action does not require the president to modify his policy goals
or absorb the cost of compromise. Additionally, presidents have an unparalleled
ability to circulate their political messages widely and visibly via the bully pulpit.41
Such a brief interpretation of the theory of manipulation barely skims the
surface of the intricacies involved within it, as it is indeed a very complete and
complex theory. For the reasons of this discussion though, this serves as a basic
introduction to the arguments made based upon it. That is, while maybe not going
as far as to explicitly reward president’s for attempting to win public opinion for a
policy goal through the use of focus group tested phrases and the like, the system is
neither likely to punish a president when his policymaking is out of line with the
public’s preferences, except in those instances when it is so egregious that the
public cannot help but act in a manner consistent with prior democratic theories of
accountability.
Before returning to the issue of what can be done to correct the system, and
arguing that all it takes is a slightly more informed citizenry to strengthen the
abilities of electoral accountability, the question of second term presidencies should
be addressed. The tests conducted by Canes-Wrone and Shotts focused on
reelection seeking presidents, as do their hypotheses of electoral proximity and a
nonmonotonic popularity-congruence relationship. Neither theory explained
presidential action in a second term, although they do conclude that second term
presidents’ policy proposals will be more likely to correspond with public opinion
when the public agrees with his ideological leanings.42 This result seems hardly
surprising though and does not really address what motivates a second term
president other than his predisposition to a particular ideology. Jacobs and Shapiro
offer the idea that a second term president is expected to keep his policies in some
semblance of agreement with those of public opinion in order to preserve his
party’s control of the White House as well as gain seats in Congress.43 This seems
like a reasonable assumption and is supported by the conclusions draw by
Rottinghaus.
In his study he concludes that the second half of a president’s second term is
roughly equivalent to that of his first as the president attempts to campaign for his
party’s candidates in midterm and presidential elections. He reasons that a president
is concerned with his historical legacy and the election of a successor from his party
will allow his policy agenda to be perpetuated, and likens it to the notion of the
“permanent campaigning” of Congress.44 While his theories have yet to be tested,
he does conclude some excellent points, although it seems as if he may be guilty of
overreach. It seems likely that historical legacy and the continuation of policy to
achieve such legacy would influence the actions of an outgoing president, but the
idea that presidents cater policy decisions to midterm elections seems as though it
might depend mostly on the circumstances surrounding the elections, and in general
the president would be less concerned with such elections in comparison to major
policy initiatives.
So what then are the implications of all this research on the issue of
presidential responsiveness as it relates to public opinion polling? Shapiro offers a
very practical assessment of the situation. “What existing research shows is that the
opinion-policy relationship is very far from perfect. While we can debate many
aspects of the data, there is no support for the extreme claims in one direction or the
other: Policymakers do not purely respond to public opinion, nor do they purely
attempt to lead it… There [is] a fine line between leading and manipulating.”45 His
counterpart, Jacobs, offers a similar opinion. “[P]residential polling has important
consequences for the shifting democratic character of the public presidency. In the
abstract, polls are neither good nor bad for representative democracy. Polls can be
used as a tool to enhance substantive responsiveness… or to manipulate public
debate and move public opinion.”46
While these authors come to very pragmatic conclusions regarding the
public opinion-presidential responsiveness relationship, the criticism of
exaggeration could be leveled at their solutions as to how to correct the problems
that do arise within the current system. This paper concludes that Jacobs and
Shapiro are correct in their deductions that a healthy democracy requires a system
of rewarding presidents for legitimately considering public opinion in the
policymaking process, rather than discounting the preferences of the public and
attempting to persuade the people with what could be likened to a marketing
campaign. Additionally, if the public opinion is to be of value to the policymaking
process, its quality needs to be improved.47
As Jacobs and Shapiro write at length of an overhaul of the media and
public communications, they seem too quickly and too willing to dismiss those
processes already in place. This is not to downplay the difficulty inherent in
attempting to solve the problem of manipulation, but rather a more realistic goal
should be put forth. The question of how to better the quality of public opinion is a
tricky one and one that has been subject of much debate. There is little doubt that a
media, which focused less on the horse-race nature of polarized political races and
policymaking, and instead on substantive policy issues would make for a betterinformed public. Having little study of the media, how plausibly this change could
be implemented into the evening broadcasts of network and cable news shows
seems questionable, though not entirely unrealistic. It seems, though, that those
citizens who watch the news at all tend to more likely be the ones who will do
research on substantive policy issues. Of course the media would facilitate, but it
seems doubtful that a large percentage of the population that never cared to debate
public policy would suddenly take an interest even with this facilitation.
It tends to take the public, as a whole, a bit longer than those citizens who
study politics as profession or passion to come to conclusions on policy issues, and
the best hope for the quality of public opinion is the revolutions of modern
communications and the rise of alternative media outlets, as well as an awakening
of sorts of the population. On the first point, citizens are more interconnected than
ever before and the hope is that this connectedness will foster qualitatively better
and quantitatively larger debate on public policy. The rise of alternative news
sources, such as blogs and respectable news websites may perhaps put pressure on
the mainstream media to acknowledge there are issues in critical need of public
debate, and there is a desire within society to learn about such issues and thus a
market for this sort of substantive discussion. Finally, the last of the baby boomers
are a generation that has accomplished much, but has yet to really positively define
themselves within history. There are serious issues facing the nation both at home
and abroad in the very near future. Such issues include: social security, Iraq, health
care, terrorism, energy policy, globalization, and the list goes on. How the nation
handles these problems remains to be seen, but they are, assuredly, issues that affect
every US citizen. The question then becomes just how long it will take the public to
realize its position and whether it will do so in enough time to effectively evaluate
potential solutions.
The shorter answer for the restoration of a healthy balance within the public
opinion-presidential responsiveness correlation is, “elections.” We have seen
instances throughout history, twice in the past twelve years, that when policy is so
far out of line with the views of the people, the people will indeed come out to vote
and show their disapproval. As this relates directly to presidential elections, things
are a bit more complicated. Given the presidents ability to get his messages out and
having the support of winning a national election on his side (If discussing electoral
accountability and punishment it’s assumed the president is up for reelection in this
instance) the president is the most difficult incumbent to defeat. But if one
examines much of the research conducted on the nature of responsiveness to public
opinion they would see that everything from the electoral proximity hypothesis to
the manipulation theory’s notion of crafted talk is based on avoiding losing
elections. As was shown, increases in policy congruence coincide with approaching
elections, and all it would take for a bit more accountability is the public to vote in
larger numbers. Even if the public were not any better informed, just by showing up
on election day the a candidate would feel that much more responsible for winning
those voters. Recent elections have been marked with a strategy of base
mobilization that has proved itself effective in the short term but is now seen as
unlikely to survive. Come 2008 it will be interesting to see whether the country
shapes the candidates or they shape the country.
One final note, this paper has drawn on a significant amount of prior
research, most especially the studies of Canes-Wrone and Shotts, and Jacobs and
Shapiro. The CHS theory and the multiple works of each Jacobs and Shapiro are
extremely significant within this niche in public policy research. They were
personal favorites as well. Quoting a review of Politicians Don’t Pander that
applies adequately to the CHS theory as well as Jacobs and Shapiro’s book, “[They
incorporate and marry] the seemingly parallel scholarly universe of electoral
demands with the findings of disjunction between policy and public opinions since
the 1970s [essentially creating] a continuum of responsiveness. In this conception,
politicians do not pander all the time, nor can they ignore the public all the time.”48
Notes
1
Brodie, Mollyann, Lisa Ferraro Parmelee, April Brackett, and Drew E. Altman.
“Polling and Democracy.” Public Perspective. 12.4 (2001): 14.
2
Rottinghaus, Brandon. “Rethinking Presidential Responsiveness: The Public
Presidency and Rhetorical Congruency, 1953-2001.” Journal of Politics. 68.3
(2006).
3
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts. “Leadership
and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking.” American Journal of
Political Science. 45(July) (2001).
4
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. “The Conditional Nature of
Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion.” American Journal of Political
Science. 48.4 (2004): 691.
5
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Robert Y. Shapiro. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political
Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: U of Chicago
P, 2000.
6
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, xvi.
7
Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004, 702
8
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2001, xiv.
9
-- 359
10
Geer, John G. From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic
Leadership. New York: Columbia UP, 1996.
11
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Debunking the Pandering
Politician Myth.” Public Perspective. 8.3 (1997): 3.
12
Key, V. O. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf, 1961.
Geer, 1996.
13
Shapiro, Robert Y. “Why Respond to Polls? Public Opinion Polling and
Democracy.” Public Opinion Pros. (2004): 6 pp. 28 Oct. 2006
<http://www.publicopinionpros.com/features/2004/nov/shapiro.htm>.
14
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of
Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992.
15
Brodie et al., 2001, 11-12.
16
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2001, 8.
17
-- 7.
18
Brodie et al., 2001, 12-14.
19
See either Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Debunking the
Pandering Politician Myth.” Public Perspective. 8.3 (1997) or Brodie et al, 2001 as
examples.
20
Stimson, James A. “Tides of consent.” How public opinion shapes American
politics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004. Geer, 1996.
21
Jacobs and Shapiro, 1997, 5.
-- 3.
23
-- Rottinghaus, 2006.
24
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Melanie Burns. “The Second Face of the Public
Presidency: Presidential Polling and the Shift from Policy to Personality Polling.”
Presidential Studies Quarterly. 34.3 (2004): 553.
25
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, 306.
26
-- 314.
Kull, Steven. “Expecting More Say: A Study of American Public Attitudes on the
Role of the Public in Government Decisions.” Center on Policy Attitudes. 9
February (1999).
27
Brodie, et al., 2001, p. 13.
28
Canes-Wrone et al., 2001.
29
Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004, 691.
30
-- 693.
31
-- 694
32
-- 702.
33
-- 695
34
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, 10.
35
American National Election Studies (NES).
36
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, 3.
37
-- 27-34
38
-- 9
Fenno, Richard. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Addison-Wesley (1973).
39
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, 20
40
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, 19.
41
-- p. 45
42
Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004, 702.
43
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, 15.
44
Rottinghaus, 2006.
45
Shapiro, 2004.
46
Jacobs, 2004, 553.
47
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000, 325.
48
Heith, Diane J. “Book Reviews.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 31.4 (2001).
References
22
References
Brodie, Mollyann, Lisa Ferraro Parmelee, April Brackett, and Drew E. Altman.
“Polling and Democracy.” Public Perspective. 12.4 (2001): 11-24.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. “The Conditional Nature of
Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion.” American Journal of
Political Science. 48.4 (2004): 690-706.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, Michael C. Herron, and Kenneth W. Shotts. “Leadership
and Pandering: A Theory of Executive Policymaking.” American Journal of
Political Science. 45(July) (2001).
Fenno, Richard. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Addison-Wesley (1973).
Geer, John G. From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory of Democratic
Leadership. New York: Columbia UP, 1996.
Heith, Diane J. “Book Reviews.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 31.4 (2001).
Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. “Debunking the Pandering Politician
Myth.” Public Perspective. 8.3 (1997): 3.5.
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Robert Y. Shapiro. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political
Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 2000.
Jacobs, Lawrence R. and Melanie Burns. “The Second Face of the Public
Presidency: Presidential Polling and the Shift from Policy to Personality
Polling.” Presidential Studies Quarterly. 34.3 (2004): 536-556.
Key, V. O. Public Opinion and American Democracy. New York: Knopf, 1961.
Kull, Steven. “Expecting More Say: A Study of American Public Attitudes on the
Role of the Public in Government Decisions.” Center on Policy Attitudes. 9
(February) (1999).
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. The Rational Public: Fifty Years of
Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992.
Rottinghaus, Brandon. “Rethinking Presidential Responsiveness: The Public
Presidency and Rhetorical Congruency, 1953-2001.” Journal of Politics.
68.3 (2006).
Shapiro, Robert Y. “Why Respond to Polls? Public Opinion Polling and
Democracy.” Public Opinion Pros. (2004): 6 pp. 28 Oct. 2006
<http://www.publicopinionpros.com
/features/2004/nov/shapiro.htm>.
Stimson, James A. “Tides of consent.” How public opinion shapes American
politics. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004.