Colonel House in Latin America
The Laboratory of Progressive Internationalism
Peter Russell
Junior
Greenwich High School
2013
Riverside, CT
pjr2442@gmail.com
Introduction
Not often in the study of American history does one find a character as intensely
interesting and unique as Colonel Edward Mandel House. House was, perhaps, the most
influential American statesman of his time, a private citizen who, as a close personal
friend and trusted confidante of President Woodrow Wilson, stood at the crossroads of
the 20th century’s most important and far reaching decisions.i Colonel House, as is
evidenced by his obscure legacy, was not in the business of politics for fame or notoriety.
Never having had a title or an official U.S. government position, Colonel House remains,
in many cases, a footnote in textbooks of American and European history, despite having
exercised significantly more influence than all but a few of his counterparts. The actions
taken by Colonel House, often understated by historians, had a major impact on the
course of history.ii Among his many achievements, House preserved the sovereignty of
Mexico from intrusive European hegemony, as the country struggled through the ten
years of its revolution. House then stood at the forefront of the modern Anglo-American
relationship, developing the necessary rapport with Foreign Minister Edward Grey which
strengthened the Anglo-American relationship in the days leading up to World War I and
ultimately blossomed into the “special relationship” of President Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill. House, as a diplomat, politician and advisor, complemented President
Wilson’s personality, acting as a levelheaded force to calm an often-bombastic and
occasionally ill-tempered Head of State. In this way, House saved Wilson from repeating
the political and diplomatic errors of his predecessors, the mixed legacy of Theodore
Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet and William Howard Taft’s “Dollar Diplomacy.” House
preserved the progressive image of Wilsonian diplomacy, helped to avert a number of
military adventures and worked unceasingly for peace right up to America’s entry into
World War I.iii House’s pioneering work on a Pan-American charter foreshadowed his
crowning achievement: his key role in the formulation and promulgation of the League of
Nations, a role far more critical than generally realized.iv In fact, he provided Wilson with
the idea for the policy, charted the League’s specifics, and provided Wilson and the world
with the cogent reasons and resolve to pursue this vision of international cooperation. In
effect, Colonel House transformed Woodrow Wilson into the President having the most
influence on hemispheric external policies since James Monroe. House’s contributions
ushered America unto the world stage and linked the domestic progressive agenda with
the nation’s foreign policy. House remains, to this day, frequently overlooked and underappreciated in the histories of American Foreign policy. Beyond a doubt, House ushered
American diplomacy onto the global stage, leading a new wave of internationalism that
would rise to dominate the progressive movement and 20th century foreign policy for
decades to come.
The Relationship Between House and Wilson
To understand Colonel House and his legacy, it is important to discuss the meaningful
and powerful rapport that House shared with Woodrow Wilson. In this respect, House is
arguably unique. He occupied a role in Wilson’s administration that blurred the lines
between advisor and friend, and more closely resembles a mentor and guiding hand.v
Colonel House advised Wilson on almost every aspect of his life, from personal
relationships to policy matters. He met Wilson in 1911, arriving on the scene with a
reputation as an incomparable campaign manager who had secured the election of several
Democratic governors in Texas.vi The two men bonded immediately, in complete
agreement on a wide range of issues and finding total comfort in each other’s company.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Wilson asked House to advise his Presidential
campaign. Upon Wilson’s victory, House was offered any position he desired in Wilson’s
cabinet, with the exception of Secretary of State (that position was reserved for
Democratic loyalist William Jennings Bryan).vii Colonel House declined the honor,
however, choosing instead to serve “wherever and however I am needed by the
President.” In this way, House chose influence over fame, real power over a title. He
always wanted to control things behind the scenes and have a profound impact on the
course of history. Having the President’s ear, and his confidence, enabled House to
influence the foreign policy of the United States. Often standing at the President’s side
and frequently living in the White House itself, he achieved a great deal of success. He
advised the President on a wide range of issues and was instrumental in seeing that the
most important parts of the President’s programs were implemented.
As George and George’s Personality Study points out, both House and Wilson brought
something to the partnership that each needed desperately.viii Wilson was erratic and
undiplomatic while House served to temper Wilson’s raw emotions. Yet, without access
to presidential power, House would have existed as an advisor without portfolio, a
kingmaker without the requisite king, making House’s dependency on Wilson equally
acute. The two were complementary, and were almost alter egos. Unfortunately, with the
passage of time, the Colonel’s contribution has received much less appreciation than it
rightfully deserves.ix
What needs to be re-examined and re-assessed is the scope of House’s influence in
encouraging Woodrow Wilson’s international aspirations and his role in executing the
President’s vision for the future of both the industrialized and the developing world. It
cannot be disputed that House had a great impact on Wilson’s policies, which, in turn,
made a great impression upon the developing world: stabilization of the Government of
Mexico, peace efforts in Europe, military intervention in World War I when all efforts at
peace had failed, proposing the creation of the League of Nations, and representing the
United States at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, House was ubiquitous on the
world stage, a private citizen, without an official capacity, molding foreign Heads of
State to American positions. He eclipsed the de jure Secretary of State, William Jennings
Bryan. It is undeniable that the President had placed plenipotentiary authority in House’s
hands, making him, in effect, the de facto Secretary. His legacy, no doubt, saved some of
the world from itself, at least temporarily, and forever changed the predominant currents
of international relations.
The Conflict of Ideals and Business in Revolutionary Mexico
Colonel House and President Wilson kept British oil interests from transforming Mexico
into a puppet state, while protecting United States commercial and political interests and
safeguarding American principles.
The Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) was an opportunist’s dream, with frequent changes
in the Federal Government, and with warlords outside the national capital controlling vast
territories and dispensing oil exploration and mining franchises to the highest bidder. The
Mexican people and their ineffective governments were the least important force driving
the revolution in its early stages. Foreign diplomats were, by far, more influential, as their
financial support and recognition were the keys to entrenched connections within
Mexico’s corrupt bureaucracy. These connections and resources also enabled them to
decide which upstart strongman would have the backing of the international community.
American Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson was one of these wheeler-dealer diplomats.
Ambassador Wilson had maintained a very close relationship not only with Mexican
dictator Porfirio Diaz but also with a number of revolutionary figures. It was generally
believed that Wilson had received his appointment as ambassador due to the influence of
the Guggenheim family.x The Guggenheim family held vast mining and smelting
interests throughout the world, including the largest copper mining and smelting
operation in Mexico. Having enjoyed the protection of President Porfirio Diaz (President
of Mexico 1884-1911), they amassed one of the largest fortunes in the world. The
overthrow of Diaz in 1911 by Francisco Madero (President of Mexico 1911-1913)
represented a real threat to their investments. Consequently, they were viscerally opposed
to President Madero and his reform policies. In addition, Madero competed directly with
the Guggenheims, as he owned a large copper smelting company at the time of his
election in 1910, making him an economic adversary as well as a political one. Therefore,
with these factors influencing his calculus, Ambassador Lane supported the overthrow of
Madero and the appointment of Victoriano Huerta as provisional President, with an
understanding that Felix Diaz, nephew of former dictator Porfirio Diaz, would become
president.xi
This plan of succession was agreed to by the ambassadors of the major powers at a
meeting at the American embassy. The “Pact of the Embassy” provided for the removal
from office and exile of Madero and Vice President Jose Maria Pino Suarez.xii In what
Mexicans call la decena tragica, both Madero and Suarez were assassinated by military
officers loyal to and subsequently promoted by Huerta.xiii There was no doubt that
Ambassador Wilson had blood on his hands. Nonetheless, his connections in such a
volatile country made him indispensable; without a suitable replacement at the time,
Wilson was forced to let him remain. In the meantime, however, Wilson sent a number of
Presidential advisors to keep him apprised of the situation, and dispatched Colonel
House, as well, to run diplomatic interference.xiv
These events took place during the lame duck presidency of William Howard Taft and
served as a source of major concern to President-elect Wilson who was forced to watch
from the sidelines. In fact, early in 1913, Wilson had sent Colonel House on a factfinding mission to Mexico for the sole purpose of evaluating Madero’s suitability as
President of Mexico. House had reported to Wilson, in January of that year, about
Madero’s good character, and his worthiness of receiving United States support and
sympathy.xv In many ways, Madero’s nationalist campaign represented many of the
progressive ideals which Wilson and House espoused. Madero’s anointed successor
Victoriano Huerta was just the opposite; he was corrupt and in fief to the economic
oligarchs. In addition, there was considerable evidence that he had been bought and sold
by British interests. Wilson and House feared that the British had exclusive access to the
man and, consequently, were not prepared to support a dictatorial, plutocratic regime well
within the United States sphere of influence. On a moral and a practical level, the United
States, as Edward Grey described, was resolved that “Huerta could not stay.”xvi
American fears that the British were conspiring to convert Huerta’s government into a
puppet regime can be traced to that modern root of all evils: oil. Weetman Pearson, an
Englishman and 1st Viscount Cowdray, had come to dominate the Mexican railway
system. He had come to Mexico in 1889 at the request of former dictator Porfirio Diaz,
who wanted him to build a railway across Mexico as part of his plans for
industrialization. After taking a wrong connection during one of his trips, Lord Cowdray
stumbled across a small town in Texas, wild with the oil craze. Thinking that the oil
could replace coal and power the Mexican railways, Lord Cowdray bought a vast amount
of acreage of land with promising geological structure. He eventually struck oil on the
Mexican portion of his holdings at Potrero de Llano in November of 1910.xvii And, from
that first wildcat well, he built the largest oil empire in Latin America. To some
sycophants, he was known as the Rockefeller of Mexico. Then, Madero appeared on the
scene, an implacable enemy of the old regime and its minions. As one of his first moves,
the revolutionary announced his plans to nationalize the oil industry, the railways, and
other critical industries in Mexico, many of which were foreign especially British, owned
or controlled.xviii Huerta, in the aftermath of the coup, was in the market to sell protection
and, in return, wanted British money and recognition. Ultimately, he did receive de facto
provisional recognition. In the early months of his regime, Huerta was already well
underway in the process of reversing Madero’s nationalizations. Added to the moral
outrage over Madero’s assassination was Washington’s fear that Great Britain and its
bailiff, Lord Cowdray, would get the biggest, if not the only, cut of the Mexican pie.xix
President Wilson saw that British business interests in Mexico, represented by Sir Lionel
Carden, British Ambassador to Mexico, and led by Lord Cowdray, were poised to hijack
the Mexican government.xx Fortunately for American interests, Britain had only extended
provisional recognition in an era when the term provisional had a strictly limited
meaning. There was still time to deter formal recognition. Recognition past the
provisional level would have serious consequences, primarily destroying the unified
diplomatic front that Wilson and House had managed to achieve. Up to that point, no
major power had yet extended the formal recognition that the Huerta government desired
and was prepared to pay for, and the Wilson administration wanted to keep it that way.
Wilson and House could not afford to have Britain break ranks and give Huerta what he
desperately wanted.xxi In Europe, legal recognition was never viewed as the equivalent of
moral approval, but rather was rooted in realpolitik. Wilson and House’s views were
radically different; they were convinced that formal recognition conveyed not only
approval but also carte blanche for business, mostly corrupt, as usual. The United States
believed it must prevent Britain from permitting the perversion of Mexican democracy in
return for oil concessions. The United States was not about to stand idly by and let that
happen.xxii
President Wilson sent Colonel House, a private citizen but with an unofficial role as
minister plenipotentiary, to stop the British lion in his tracks and he did nothing less.
After negotiations with the British foreign Ministry, House succeeded in defusing the
crisis. Britain agreed to withhold formal recognition, meaning that there would be no
preferential treatment of British companies at the expense of American competitors.xxiii It
had even greater significance; it would render Huerta’s government increasingly unstable
and subject to change. The President and Colonel House knew that, without British
support and with almost no other formal or informal international foreign backing, Huerta
was in no position to continue ruling Mexico. His days were numbered, which was
exactly what the United States wanted.
House and Wilson solved the dispute between the UK and the US over Panama toll
exemptions, breaking ranks with the Democrats by doing so, both to placate the British
for changing their policy on Mexico, and also out of righteousness, believing that such an
exemption violated a pre-existing treaty.
Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, had already made it clear that Mexico was
too important to Great Britain to allow it to blindly follow the United States demands.
The Empire, he decided, was in full right “take its own line” of approach.xxiv In order to
turn British policy into reality, Grey wanted to resolve a standing conflict that Britain had
with the United States over the Panama Canal. The United States Congress, with its
Constitutional responsibility for imports and import duties, had imposed a tariff on goods
passing through the Panama Canal in foreign vessels. American shipping was exempted
from the tax. Whether he knew it or not, Grey had an ally in the person of President
Wilson. While Wilson was very much against the exemption for American ships, he had
to deal with Congress, whose members, especially the Democrats, were strongly in favor
of the exemption.xxv Senators of Irish-American descent were especially vociferous in
their opposition to an exemption for Great Britain, while claiming, hypocritically, that
they supported an “open canal” policy.xxvi The exemption also appeared to be in direct
violation of the ratified Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, which promised equal treatment
of all nations’ trade with regards to the canal. Colonel House wrote about his concurrence
with Wilson: “I asked him concerning his views in regard to the Panama Canal tolls
controversy with Great Britain. I was glad to find that he took the same view that I have,
and that is that the clause should be repealed.”xxvii With the benefit of hindsight, it
appears that a diplomatic agreement was there for the making.
House set up a meeting with Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, at the first
possible opportunity in the sweltering summer of 1913. Their meeting led to a general
agreement on a number of important matters. Grey promised that the recognition
provided to Huerta was merely provisional, and that, given Huerta’s numerous assurances
that he would not run for President, if he did run for office, Huerta’s government would
not be recognized by Great Britain. House, in turn, guaranteed that the Panama tariff
issue was of utmost priority. However, given the small margin of support that President
Wilson was able to command in the U.S. Senate, the issue would possibly jeopardize the
progress of other important legislative measures. Therefore, House suggested that, for the
time being, the British stick to provisional recognition, and that, given some time, the he,
Wilson and their Congressional allies would repeal the tariff exemption after other
programs were legislated. Grey accepted the arrangement, and for the moment, the
United States and Britain were able to act with unity on an important matter of foreign
policy, and maintain the united American-European front on Mexican affairs.xxviii January
of 1914 saw Wilson bring the matter up with the Congress, and June saw the repeal of the
special exemption become law.xxix Meanwhile, the British Foreign Office instructed Sir
Lionel Carden (the pro-Huerta British Ambassador to Mexico), to “not take steps to
interfere in any way with Wilson’s anti-Huerta policy in Mexico,” upholding Grey’s end
of the bargain.xxx
On October 27, 1913, Woodrow Wilson gave a speech to the Southern Commercial
Congress in Mobile, Alabama. Here, he rallied once again against “interest groups” that
threatened progressive programs.xxxi However, in this speech, Wilson expanded his
definition to include international capitalist circles. In this instance, Wilson specifically
referred to European interests in Mexico, which had sought to pervert democracy for
profit.xxxii “Say no to Huartists” became part of his political rhetoric. This speech clearly
suggested that Wilson had won this fight. If Wilson and House had not acted, the British
were likely to have recognized the Huerta government in Mexico, destroying the united
front and crushing moral diplomacy in Mexico. It was also almost certain that control of
Mexican oil development would have fallen under the complete control of Lord
Cowdray’s mining operations, which would have proved disastrous for American oil
companies. President Wilson and Colonel House’s first diplomatic initiative had met with
complete success, a first step in the long road to democratic government in Mexico. As
expected, Huerta failed to maintain political power, and was ousted by armed insurrection
the following July of 1914. Progressivism had been extended beyond domestic policies,
and the support for democratic ideals in other countries defined a new approach to
international relations for the United States. Hints of the principle of “selfdetermination,” a concept destined to dominate U.S. foreign policy in the aftermath of
World War I, date to these day of American diplomacy in Mexico. House did not allow
personal ambition or interests to influence his positions at the negotiating table.xxxiii xxxiv
Rather, he stood for American ideals of freedom and democracy.
Houses ABC’s: Pan-America and the Creation of Article X of the League
House found himself obsessed with the possibility of a Pan-American Treaty, the treaty
that had eluded his predecessors despite their determined efforts. The Secretary of State,
William Jennings Bryan, as well as former Secretary of State James Blaine, both had
unsuccessfully pursued a super-national government for the countries of North and South
America. Their efforts had met with little success because of determined opposition in the
United States, primarily from isolationists who unwilling to commit U.S. military and
economic power to promote the sovereignty of its neighboring countries. A PanAmerican Union, at least in name, surprisingly had resulted from this three decade long
effort; however, the Union itself was largely powerless, and U.S.-South American
relations, in general, had deteriorated after an 1891 US invasion of Chile as retaliation for
treatment of US military personnel at Valparaiso. The invasion itself and the peace terms
that followed solidified the opinions of South American governments and citizens who
were already convinced that the United Sates had replaced Spain as an imperialist power.
To them, this episode was but further confirmation that their northern neighbor was
nothing more than an unjust, aggressive bully.
In the aftermath of the Mexico crisis, Colonel House saw a genuine need for the United
States to intervene to prevent neo-colonial adventures on the part of European powers. —
in short a re-assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. The true motives for this renewal from the
US-side remain a subject of debate. Nonetheless, ideas of a Pan-American Union were
undoubtedly renewed, with Colonel House leading the charge.
In 1914, House had called for the “ABC Powers,” Argentina, Brazil and Childe, to
mediate a dispute. The Niagara Conference, as it is now known, narrowly avoided war
between the US and Mexico over an incident earlier in the year, the Tampico Incident.xxxv
The successful mediation provided the US government much needed credibility among
the South American nations, and partially ameliorated the discredited US image. As
indication of this success, the Chilean Minister wrote to Colonel House of “the
President's success in the Mexican difficulties-turning, as he did, a situation fraught with
difficulties and danger to our American relations into a triumph of PanAmericanism.”xxxvi
It was about this time in August 1914 that the Great War broke out, a failure of European
diplomacy of monumental consequences that House blamed largely on a lack of
transparency, dialogue and cooperation amongst the imperial powers. Looking to keep
the Americas from experiencing the same unfortunate fate as Europe, House felt a new
sense of urgency to pursue permanent Pan-American policies and erect permanent
instruments of Pan-American cooperation. In the summer, House met with Wilson and
urged him, “to pay less attention to his domestic policy and greater attention to the
welding together of the two western continents.”xxxvii Wilson immediately agreed, almost
without hesitation, confirming his commitment to a legacy of American involvement in
maintaining world peace.
While House had advised Wilson of this change in course verbally, he now sent Wilson a
letter reinforcing his points.xxxviii Still unwilling to let matters rest without complete
agreement and immediate adoption on the part of President Wilson, House drew up a
plan to present to the President later that month at the White House. House, as he
recounted in his diary, sought “nothing less than a rather loose league of American states
which should guarantee security from aggression and furnish a mechanism for the pacific
settlement of disputes.xxxix This “league” would be led chiefly by the United States and
the ABC Powers, and would agree to two things in particular: first, unquestionable
sovereignty over national territory; second, government ownership of “munitions of war.”
At the urging of House, the President wrote these ideas down by hand, and immediately
typed them out, “excited in his enthusiasm,” before providing the document and its
wording to the Colonel for immediate use in negotiations with South American
ambassadors.xl
The wording of these resolutions bears resemblance with what would become Article X
of the League of Nations charter.xli While historians have credited Wilson for conceiving
the creation of the League of Nations, the idea and, perhaps, even the wording of the
most critical and historic articles of the League of Nations charter were a product of
Colonel House, a private US citizen.
From this time onward, House focused on negotiations, and did so with surprisingly
furious efficiency. A meeting was held immediately, and the Argentine Ambassador fell
in love with the proposal, even asking to keep the original copy that Wilson had
typewritten, convinced it would become an important historical document. The Brazilian
Ambassador, da Gama, was equally convinced and almost immediately embraced the
covenant that House had constructed and Wilson had typewritten.xlii The Chilean
Ambassador, however, was reluctant to sign on, as they stood in the midst of border
dispute with Peru.xliii The agreement implied renouncing war as a means to solve conflict
within the proposed League, which meant that Chile would not be able to enforce its
claim to land disputed with Peru. However, House was able to convince the ambassador
that such claims would be settled quickly, as there were other disputes in territory
between Costa Rica and Peru, and that all disputes would be worked out before Chile
surrendered its right to wage war on Peru.xliv As a result, within the day, House had won
over the representatives of the ABC powers, doing so masterfully. As a testament to his
work and to the extent to which persuasion had won over the diplomats, the normal rules
governing the speed of diplomatic response did not apply; the Brazilian Ambassador
secured the approval of his government to the treaty less than a week after the initial
meeting with House, with the Argentine Ambassador following not long after.xlv
The treaty required a certain degree of political stability to be had in all participatory
nations, so that the provisions concerning munitions control could be enforced. This was
a sort of “Catch-22,” as much of Central and South America at the time was composed of
smaller, independent states still in the process of chartering their future government, and
were not necessarily in a position to ratify a Pan-American Treaty so radical as the
Colonel’s. Furthermore, while it was officially supported by the State Department as a
consequence of the President’s complete endorsement, Secretary of States William
Jennings Bryan himself did not find the treaty to be necessary.xlvi Bryan had recently
adopted accords with the South American nations, which, while not as inclusive, he
thought were sufficient to stave off conflict. They provided for a “cooling off” period
before military action could commence, during which neutral arbiters would be brought
in to get both sides to the negotiating table. Anything more, Bryan thought, was
superfluous.xlvii As a result, even though the treaty negotiations had received
ambassadorial approval, the respective governments did not actively pursue them. When
House turned the negotiations over to the U.S. State Department, there was no further
progress and the fact that he was a private citizen came home to roust.
The Original “Special Relationship”
The Colonel established the special relationship through his cordial approach to
diplomacy, which was appreciated by Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, and gave
the Anglo-American relationship an openness, frankness and efficiency which it had
never before contained.
The agreements concerning Mexico and the Panama Canal tolls inaugurated a new
awareness of mutual interests between the United States and Great Britain. Prior to
Colonel House’s involvement, British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey and his
associates at the Foreign Office were unsure of American resolve on these issues. After
all, Ambassador Lane Wilson’s involvement in the removal of Francesco Madero clearly
demonstrated that he had far different political connections and goals than President
Wilson. In fact, prior to the agreements made by House and Foreign Minister Grey, the
British government had every reason to be skeptical about American policy, and was
quite skeptical in actuality.xlviii These doubts, however, quickly evaporated. Grey and
House immediately became friends. House’s frankness and openness, his clearly
demonstrated lack of ulterior motives, all played a major role in the development of
Grey’s confidence and trust. Their very first meeting is described in the Intimate Papers
as one in which the two men expressed their views on diplomacy “as a means by which
the representatives of different states could discuss frankly the coincidence or the clash of
national interests and reach a peaceable understanding...like a personal business.”xlix
This frank discourse between the two men who were friends and remained so is
remarkable. In a meeting between Sir William Tyrrell, one of Grey’s confidants, Colonel
House and the President, the Panama tolls came up spontaneously as a topic of
conversation. Wilson candidly acknowledged that the current state of affairs was a
flagrant violation of treaty on the part of the United States; Wilson assigned the blame to
“Hibernian patriots who always desired a fling at England,” emphasizing that the one
person behind most of the opposition was New York Senator O’Gorman. The President
caricatured him as “an Irishman contending against England rather than as a United
States Senator upholding the dignity and welfare of this country.” Later, Tyrrell said to
House that, if “veteran diplomats had heard us, they would have fallen in a faint,” all the
while thanking House for the interview. Tyrell had “never before had such a frank talk
about matters of so much importance.”l A new level of openness and trust had emerged
from the prior days of unproductive bickering, an unquestionably novel epoch of AngloAmerican relations.
This cordiality, shared by diplomats of both Great Britain and the United States, led
ineluctably to the development of a special relationship between the two nations. While
their primary responsibility was to represent the positions of their respective
governments, empires, these diplomats were kind, respectful and friendly with their
counterparts, which made innate trust come all more naturally. For the first time, nations
were working not just out of nationalist interests, but out of the feeling of a common
bond, which has influenced Anglo-American relations to this day. From the repeal of the
special exemption in June of 1914, “the United States Government could count upon the
sympathy of Sir Edward Grey.”li The “special relationship” long predates the cooperation
of Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt; rather, it had its initiation in the
early days of the Wilson administration and at the behest of a remarkable private citizen,
Colonel Edward House.
The Bottom Line: How House and Wilson Changed the Progressive Image
President Wilson’s tenure marked the end of the progressive era. While this implies that
the ideas of the Age of Wilson were not immediately continued by his conservative
Republican successors, it signifies that Wilson, and to a great extent Colonel House, had
the last opportunity to define the core of the progressive movement. The Federal Reserve
entered the financial sector as an organ separate from Congress to regulate all-important
monetary policy, promote opportunity, equality and stable growth in American markets.
While the Federal Reserve System and other regulatory agencies of the era limited the
pace at which rapid capital growth could take place, they also assured that this growth
was stable and not the inevitable boom/bust. The Federal Reserve Act, in large measure,
a product of Colonel House’s input continues to fulfill its purpose, regulate monetary
policy and stabilize the economy one hundred years after the final negotiations to
establish it.
House provided the inspiration for the foundation and structure of the League of Nations,
even going so far as to directly influence Article X, the most famous section of the
charter. It was Article X that would lead to the eventual failure of the ratification battle in
the Senate. Yet Article X also re-emerged in spirit in the United Nations, the more
successful successor to the short-lived League of Nations. No matter your view, the
modern UN attempts to and has even succeeded in defusing some a number of later
conflicts, many of which might have led to war, an unachievable result as recently as a
century ago. While it has many limitations, still, the UN has saved countless lives
through peace-keeping operations and economic assistance. In this way, the legacy of
Colonel House continues to benefit mankind to this day.
Perhaps one of House’s more interesting contributions to the development of President
Wilson’s political philosophy and to the progressive movement in general was his novel
Philip Dru: Administrator, written and anonymously published in 1912.lii The book can
be read as House’s political dream, and was largely adopted by Wilson as one of his
favorite titles after House provided a copy for his 1912 Bermuda vacation.liii In the novel,
the main character, Philip Dru, leads a democratic Western United States in a second civil
war against the corrupt plutocratic Eastern seaboard, delivering the nation from the
tyranny of big business in the process. Dru, upon seizing power, names himself
Administrator of the Republic, institutes a number of reforms that resemble the Bull
Moose platform of 1912, and vanishes.liv The novel embodies the Colonel’s progressive
thinking, and foreshadows the crusade he and Wilson undertook in his later years as a
warrior preacher of progressive ideals. It places emphasis, especially, on the altruistic
side of progressive policy and the progressive reform movement, a message that
resonated with Wilson. Dru, clearly the protagonist of House’s own views, was presented
as selflessly looking to expand democracy to those areas of the world that did not have it,
a cause seamlessly adopted by Wilson as well. The progressive movement was, by
connection, equally influenced by the Colonel since its leader had been irreversibly
indoctrinated.
Yet to the Colonel and President, this altruism that comes with the progressivism of
Philip Dru has a different definition relative to contemporary morality. While both men
looked to promote democracy throughout the world, they looked to do so on their own
terms. Each can be accurately portrayed as racist, as can be expected of many men of
their era; Wilson would call the Germans “the Huns” in World War I, a popular term
amongst American and British diplomats and officers during the War. House became so
frustrated with Latin American affairs that he advocated intervention to teach the CentralAmericans how to self-govern and “create order out of chaos.”lv (Wilson too once
remarked to a British diplomat that it was his responsibility to “teach the Latin Americans
to elect good men.”lvi) Undoubtedly, each looked to further their own self-interest and
beyond racial tendencies. Colonel House, despite his denials, owned land, silver stock
and possessed other in Mexico, may explain his brief advocacy of intervention.lvii
President Wilson undoubtedly had to temper his lack of sympathy for Latinos. Wilson
had ambivalent feelings about capitalism, alternating between distaste and distrust, and
admiration for corporations that looked beyond profit and projected what he felt were
“American ideals overseas.”lviii In reality, the last progressive administration hedged their
approach to foreign policy by defining self-determination as democracy on American
terms. The effects this policy outlasted 1921, when the Age of Wilson came to an official
electoral end, with House’s progressive foreign affairs policies, in one form or another,
continuing to the present day.
Conclusion
Progressivism defied and re-defined the goals of politics in terms of ideals and moralistic
reform. While, domestically, it struck against the inherent moral and fiscal corruption in
big business, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House expanded progressivism and their
interpretation of its moral message to the international arena as well. Mexico provided the
perfect testing ground for these new policies. Through Wilson and House’s diplomacy,
American idealism, for better or worse, prevailed against the interests of international
business in Mexico. As a consequence of this experience, House envisioned and
presented to Wilson the framework for the Pan-American Treaty embodying a Congress
to settle regional conflicts. The conduct of the Wilson administration, strongly influenced
by Colonel House’s style of diplomatic negotiation, led to the construction of a bond of
unprecedented cordiality and trust between the British Foreign Office and the United
States, the inauguration of the famous “special relationship” between the United States
and the United Kingdom. Mexico was a critical success for “Wilsonian” ideals and
diplomacy, perhaps even providing Wilson and House with the necessary international
savoir-faire for the looming conflict developing across the Atlantic. Above all, House’s
experience with the Pan-American negotiations created the foundations of the League of
Nations, his signature legacy. These policies were the beginnings of what Wilson would
later characterize as an attempt to make the world “safe for democracy.” Ironically, it is
this lofty goal for which Wilson is now famous—while House remains without the credit
that is due him. Such is the fate that Colonel House himself probably would have chosen.
i Robert H. Butts, "An Architect of the American Century: Colonel Edward M. House and the Modernization of United States
Diplomacy" (PhD diss., Texas Christian University, 2010), 1, accessed June 4, 2013, ProQuest (UMI No. 3443311).
ii George Sylvester Viereck, The Strangest Friendship in History: Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (1976; repr., Praeger, 1976). iii Ibid.
iv Ibid. v Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, Dover ed. (John Day
Company, 1956; New York: Dover Publications, 1964), [Page #]. vi Arthur D. Howden Smith, "Mr. Smith's 'The Real Colonel House.,'" The New York Times (New York), June 23, 1918, accessed
September 14, 2013, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10615FD3C5A11738DDDAA0A94DE405B888DF1D3.
vii Robert H. Butts, "An Architect of the American Century: Colonel Edward M. House and the Modernization of United States
Diplomacy" (PhD diss., Texas Christian University, 2010), 1, accessed June 4, 2013, ProQuest (UMI No. 3443311).
viii Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, Dover ed. (John Day
Company, 1956; New York: Dover Publications, 1964).
ix Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, Dover ed. (John Day
Company, 1956; New York: Dover Publications, 1964). x Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2008), 87. xi Ibid.
xii Ibid. xiii
Staff Presidencia, "Decena Trágica" [The Ten Tragic Days], Mexico: Presidencia de la Republica, last modified September 2,
2013, accessed September 15, 2013, http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/decena-tragica/.
xiv
xv
Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, 88.
David S. Foglesong, America's Secret War Against Bolshevism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 15.
xvi
Edward Grey, K.G, Twenty Five Years: 1892-1916 (New York, USA: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), 2:96-97. xvii
Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, 88.
xviii
xix
Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, 87.
Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, 88.
xx House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 200.
xxi
Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, 88. xxii Edward Grey, K.G, Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916 (New York, USA: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925), 2:100. xxiii Woodrow Wilson, "Address Before the Southern Commercial Congress in Mobile, Alabama," The American Presidency Project,
accessed September 14, 2013, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65373.
xxiv Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008), 87.
xxv Edward Mandell House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, comp. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1926), 196, 203-205. xxvi Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008), 89.
xxvii Edward Mandell House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, comp. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1926), 193.
xxviii Ibid. xxix House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 206. xxx House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 202.
xxxi Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008), 88.
xxxii Woodrow Wilson, "Address Before the Southern Commercial Congress in Mobile, Alabama," The American Presidency
Project, accessed September 14, 2013, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65373.
xxxiii Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand: The Life of Colonel Edward M. House (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008), 87.
xxxiv Grey, Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916, 2:97.
xxxv Edward Mandell House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, comp. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1926), 208.
xxxvi Ibid, 218.
xxxvii Ibid, 207.
xxxviii Ibid, 208.
xxxix Edward Mandell House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, comp. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, MA: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1926), 210.
xl Ibid, 209-210.
xli House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 209. xlii House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 213.
xliii Ibid.
xliv Ibid, 213-214.
xlv
Ibid, 214-218.
xlvi
xlvii
House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 211.
Ibid.
xlviii
xlix
l
Grey, Twenty-Five Years: 1892-1916, 2:94-99.
House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 195.
House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 201.
li
House, The Intimate Papers of Colonel, 206.
lii Butts, "An Architect of the American," 58.
liii Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, 53.
liv Ibid.
lv
Foglesong, America's Secret War Against, 15.
lvi Williams, The Tragedy of American, 70.
lvii William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, new edition ed. (New York: W.W Norton and Company,
1972), [Page #]; Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, 87.
lviii
Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, 88.
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