In: Driver Behaviour and Training, Vol VI, Ed. by Dorn&Sullman
Anticipation as a Main Principle of Neural
Function and Mastering of Driving
Timo Järvilehto, Veli-Matti Nurkkala, Kyösti Koskela and Jonna Kalermo
Kajaani University of Applied Sciences, P. O. Box 52, FI-87101 Kajaani, Finland
Introduction
Anticipation is infrequently ascribed a special role in scientific explanations of behavior
despite of its abundance in everyday life. Anticipation may be seen when we approach a
closed door and have the keys ready in the hand; when we come to a meeting and think
about the presentation we are going to give; or when we open a book for reading and
wonder what the writer might have to say. Also, the number of words used for such
events is quite frequent in normal life, adjectives such as ready, proactive, or
prospective; substantives such as readiness, preparation, expectation, or attitude; and
verbs such as foresee, predict, or forestall. These words refer to events or processes
preceding the actual acts to be performed, events that are probably quite significant
when fast and skilled action is needed.
When teaching driving in the driving school the significance of anticipation is usually
stressed, but it is not always clear what a teacher exactly means by this concept. This is
understandable, because in the present scientific study of human behavior neither
cognitive psychology nor neuroscience has been much interested in the concept of
anticipation. Such a neglect is understandable in the framework of the mainstream
stimulus processing model as it is assumed that the most interesting and significant
processes in the nervous system start with the appearance or presentation of the stimulus,
the behavior being essentially a result of information processing in the nervous system
and in the brain. Even if the concept of anticipation is used, it is related to a process of
waiting for the presentation of the stimulus, either as activation of an inner model with
which the stimulus may be compared (see e.g. Rosen, 1985) or as a more or less general
process assumed to facilitate in advance the processing of the future stimuli.
However, when skilled and fast action is considered there are several problems with the
information processing model. If anticipation means only that there is an inner model
waiting for ”processing” of environmental events how fast action is possible?
Furthermore, if stimuli must always be processed before actions may be carried out there
is always a time lag between the environmental events and movements of the subject.
How then could synchronization with rapid environmental events be possible?
It is the main thesis of the present article that anticipation is not a factor related to the
expectation of the stimuli or modifying their processing, but it is the main principle of the
organization of the nervous system and the brain, determining the outline of the
prospective acts and the features of the environment that can be joined to the process
which leads to the results of behavior. In the state of anticipation the nervous system is
not waiting for stimuli, but it is actively organized with all necessary bodily and
environmental constituents for action results. This preceding organization will determine
which significant environmental constituents (e.g., traffic lights, signs) can be selected
for the realization of the actions of the subject. Thus, anticipation means that before the
execution of the components of the driving process (steering, using brakes, etc.), a) a
system is created for extracting relevant constituents from the environment, and b) the
system for realizing the movements is configured in advance in such a way that
synchronous action is possible at the moment when a critical environmental incident is
present.
Development of the anticipatory system in mastering driving
How then are such anticipatory systems formed?
In fact, anticipatory systems start to develop already during phylogenesis. The structure
of the newborn organism already anticipates the features of the environment that can be
used in the maintenance of its life process. Thus, every organism anticipates something
about its environment in the sense that it has a structure into which only certain parts of
the environment may be fitted in order to achieve useful results. In the ontogenesis,
anticipatory systems are created during learning and training that lead to determination of
environmental constituents that may be selected directly during the execution of the task.
It is this process that makes fast and skilled action possible.
Let’s illustrate this process by an example. In the beginning we have the environmental
events A, B, C, and D, and the corresponding neural processes a, b, c, and d that may be
considered as separate “reactions” to the respective environmental events, and which
occur with a delay after each event. The result of the whole process appears with some
delay after D. When the sequence is repeated during training the neural events a, b, c get
connected so that when A occurs the process proceeds from a to d in such way that the
neural events may be simultaneous or even precede the corresponding environmental
events, and the final result of the whole process may appear simultaneously with or even
preceding the final event D.
Thus, learning of driving doesn’t mean simple acceleration of the reactions of the driver
to the critical stimuli, but it leads to a complete reorganization of the neural processes
responsible for the driving action. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. In the beginning of the
training each component of the action is trained separately, and the action consists of
several results (e.g. pressing a pedal, R1, and turning the wheel, R2) leading to the final
accomplishment of the task (e.g. turning in the curve, FINAL RESULT). During the
training neural systems are formed that correspond to different possibilities of the
accomplishment of the task (“alternatives”), depending on the environmental
possibilities. When the subject masters the task, these alternatives are activated
simultaneously already in the beginning of the task (i.e, the driver has potential neural
systems simultaneously for pressing pedals and turning the wheel) and different
environmental “markers” only select from these potential alternatives the most suitable
one. Thus, during skilled action the subject is not making any decisions in respect to the
different parts of the performance, but he is simply carrying out one of the potential
alternatives, while all others are blocked when no suitable environmental event
corresponds to the organization of the organism-environment system.
A neural model for anticipation
How could then anticipation be realized by the nervous system?
In contrast to the neural processing model (stimulus-response model), the theory of the
organism-environment system (Järvilehto, 1998a) starts with the conception that the
nervous system is not a system for responding to stimuli in the environment, but it is a
system organized together with bodily elements and environmental constituents for
anticipated behavioral results.
According to the theory (for details, see Järvilehto, 1998b), a neuron is not an element for
information processing, but it is a living cell that has to maintain its metabolism. When
the metabolism of the neuron is disturbed the neuron starts firing which is its method to
restore its chemical conditions by influencing other neurons. Thus, starting already with a
single neuron, the activity of the neuron is not a response to a stimulus, but its firing is
rather a sign of a disturbance in its metabolism. By influencing other neurons and joining
to nets of neurons eventually influencing the muscles, and joining thus to environmental
constituents, the neuron may restore its state, which leads to the cessation of its firing. If
the activity of the neuron doesn’t lead to a useful result, it simply dies. Actually, this is
happening all the time in the nervous system. Thus, already at this level the activity of the
neuron is not a reaction to a ‘stimulus’, but its activity anticipates a future result, i.e. the
restoration of its metabolic conditions.
In the framework of this theory, an action potential of a neuron is not an “information
transmitter”, but a disturbance at its membrane, which is the way to influence other
neurons. Thus, the ”transmitters”, for example, do not convey any information from one
neuron to another over the synapse, as commonly thought, but they are simply chemicals
which may distort the metabolism of other neurons (excitatory synapses) or supply them
with useful metabolites (inhibitory synapses).
Furthermore, according to the organism-environment theory, sensory receptors or
receptor matrices (different senses) are not literally “receptive”, but they rather create a
direct connection to environmental constituents, which supports the formation of the
whole organism-environment system. In this process especially efferent influences on
receptors (see Järvilehto, 1999 for details) are of special importance, because they
condition the receptors for the selective use of environmental constituents that are needed
in the achievement of the result of action. Similarly, the muscles are not only efferent
organs, but they contain also afferents that have a special significance in the interplay
with the receptors. Thus, both the muscles and the receptors have a similar innervation
(afferent and efferent) and they act together in defining those parts of the environment
that can be used in the achievement of the result of action.
In conclusion, the present considerations mean that anticipation is not just a special factor
for making information processing more rapid or preparing the muscles of the organism
for quicker reactions to external stimuli. Anticipatory systems are traditionally considered
as systems that contain the model of the goal of the organism, whereas, according to the
organism-environment system theory, anticipation in immanent in all living systems, the
existence of which is dependent upon the results to be achieved. According to the theory
of the organism-environment system, anticipation is inevitable, because it follows from
the structure of the system. Anticipation is based on the general organization of the
living systems, and it became especially effective with the advent of the nervous system.
Is driving a ‘motor’ or a ‘sensory’ process?
Skilled behavior, such as driving, is traditionally divided in motor and sensory
components. However, on the basis of the theory of the organism-environment system,
there is in driving no “motor” activity as contrasted to “sensory” activity. Driving is a
process that involves always the whole organism-environment system, leading to specific
results of behavior. From the psychological point of view, there is nothing “motor” in the
motor cortex, as little as there is anything “sensory” in the sensory cortices. ‘Motor’ and
‘sensory’ are anatomical, not functional concepts. The units in the brain do not carry out
psychological operations; the neurons are only parts of a larger system, in which
psychological operations are accomplished. During driving there are, of course, changes
in the functioning of neural units, but these changes are related to the achievement of new
results, not to separate psychological “functions”. In this process both motor and sensory
components are always necessary.
When driving the perception of traffic signs, for example, is not a linear process
proceeding from the sign located at the road to the percept, but rather a circle involving
both the sensory and motor organs (e.g. head and eye movements) as well as the events in
the environment (see Järvilehto 1998a). A perceptual process does not start with the
stimulus, but the stimulus is rather an end of this process. It is the anticipatory process
that determines the environmental constituents that can be used as “stimuli”.
The “stimulus” is like the last piece in a jig-saw puzzle. The last piece of the puzzle fits
into its place only because all other pieces of the puzzle have been placed in a particular
way. It is just this joining of the other pieces, their coordinated organization that leaves a
certain kind of hole into which the last piece may be inserted. Thus, it is just the
preceding organization of the other pieces which defines a possible last piece with which
the puzzle may be finished. Exactly in the same way a stimulus is present only if there is
an anticipatory organization into which the “stimulus” may be fitted. Therefore, the
stimulus is as little in a causal relation to the percept as the last piece of the puzzle is to
the constructed picture (Järvilehto 1998a).
Thus, the event appearing after the stimulus (i.e. “reaction”) in the brain or in the
behavior (e.g. braking with the red traffic light) is the result of anticipatory organization
preceding the stimulus. It is not a “reaction to the stimulus”, but rather a transition from
one act to another, which is made possible by the anticipatory organization of the system,
and only triggered by the stimulus. Thus, the braking with the red light, for example,
reflects more the knowledge (and acceptance) of the driver of the traffic rules and his
experience of the relevant traffic situation than any simple driving “skill”.
Is then learning of driving a motor or a sensory process? One could stress its motor
aspects, because of the significance of steering and control of pedals as well as eye
movements when monitoring the events in the car and in the environment. However, one
could as well stress the perceptual point of view, because without vision it would be
difficult to control the vehicle properly in the traffic. From the present point of view,
neither description is accurate. If learning is defined as differentiation and widening of
the organism-environment system (Järvilehto, 2000) it is clear that learning cannot be
sensory or motor, only, but the process of learning involves always many systemic
constituents.
Learning to master driving consists essentially of development of prospective
organization of the organism-environment system for skilled sequences of results, in
which sensory and motor components are integrated. This process is not related to
movements or perceptions separately, but rather to the formation of sensory-motor
integration in the form of action systems for specific results, being the target of the
training process. Such systems are formed when the trainee acts in the real traffic, but
partially such systems may be formed also in a simulated driving situation. In the latter
case we may speak about “mental” training. This kind of training is not at all more
“mental” than the former one, but it is related to the formation of parts of the action
systems necessary in the final accomplishment of the object of training in the real
environment.
It is also important to stress that from the point of view of the organism-environment
theory human learning has essentially a social character and presupposes the existence of
consciousness (see Järvilehto, 2000). According to the organism-environment theory,
consciousness develops in cooperation with other people, the human learning being a
process exceeding the borders of the individual organism-environment systems. It is this
larger organization in which the human learning is realized, and therefore all efficient
learning presupposes the participation of the trainer and the trainee as well as all other
supporting people.
From this it follows that the task of the trainer in teaching driving is not that of
information transmission (“teaching” in the classical sense), but rather creation of the
cooperative organization in which the learning resources of the trainee may be realized.
An essential characteristic of this kind of process is the determination of the
developmental possibilities of the trainee, and finding out his personal style in the process
of achievement of the desired results in cooperation with the trainer.
Teaching driving is not a process of transmission; it is rather a process of organizing the
pre-existing skills of the trainee in a larger organization consisting, in the beginning, of
the trainer (and all other relevant people) and the trainee, but getting with continuing
training more differentiated and narrow, until the trainee develops personal skills and is
able to achieve the results also without the immediate support of the associated people.
In conclusion, the development of mastering of sensory-motor skill, such as driving, is
not a process of “motor” learning going on in the motor cortex of the trainee or a process
in the visual areas, for example, but rather a deeply social process which is directed
towards creation of an integrative organization consisting of many participants. The brain
is, of course, also an important aspect of the necessary conditions of such an
organization. However, the learning process is not confined to the brain only, but it
presupposes also many other necessary components, such as the body, environmental
possibilities, social relations, etc.
Discussion
Driving is often conceptualized as a complex system of behavioral adaptation (Summala,
2007). In the framework of the stimulus-response model, behavioral adaptation was
defined by Summala (1996): “the driver is inclined to react to changes in the traffic
system, whether they be in the vehicle, in the road environment, in road and weather
conditions, or in his/her own skills or states, and that reaction occurs in accordance with
his/her motives.”
From the point of view of the organism-environment system theory, such a conception of
driving arouses several questions: Does the driver really ’react’? How could one ‘react’
to his own states? What exactly is a‘motive’? Is it in a causal relation to behavior? What
then means “in accordance with motives”?
From the systemic point of view ”behavioral adaptation” means formation of the system
for useful results. Useful result is, e.g., the safe completion of the trip, and the factors
listed above (to which the driver is supposed to react) are constituents of the system. The
driver does not “react”, but the organization of the organism-environment system
anticipates certain configuration of the factors listed above. If some of the factors do not
fit into the organization, problems arise for the driver, and the driving system is
reorganized in order to facilitate the achievement of the result.
In order to illustrate this conceptualization in detail, let’s look at the process of getting
home from workplace (“result”). What factors in the formation of the organismenvironment system are important in making this result possible? First, we must look at
the history of the system, i.e., at the organization of the system that leads to the situation
that the driver ‘wants’ (i.e. has a ‘motive’) to go home. ‘Wanting’ (or motive) is based on
certain kind of preceding history, e.g., that the working day is over and the wife has
asked one to come home. ‘Wanting’ is not something that occurs in the head of the
person ‘freely’, but conscious wanting means linguistic description (to oneself or to
somebody else) of the active state of the organism-environment system.
Thus, we have in the beginning the anticipatory system for the expected result. Now, the
driving system is created by fitting the different factors together. There is no “reaction”
by the driver, but rather an anticipatory process, in which the different factors are used
for the achievement of the result. If some factors do not fit, the system must be
reorganized. For example, if the car doesn’t start, help must be sought. Or if the weather
conditions are very bad more time is needed for the achievement of the result, which may
also change the plans of the driver.
The quality of the formation of the system gets its expression in the emotions of the
driver. The deviance from the anticipatory conditions (e.g., the car doesn't start) may be
the basis for negative emotions, i.e. for the disorganization of the system (anger etc.) that
leads to the search of new possibilities. The emotions of the driver are not ‘separate’
from his actions or in a causal relation to the action, but they are an expression of the
state of the driving system (see Järvilehto, 2001). If the subresults are achieved in an
organized matter there is a ‘flow’ of action, i.e. transitions from one act to another are
smooth, which is consciously experienced as ‘comfort’ or generally as a positive emotion
(joy).
When looking at the process of the vehicle in the traffic we may use the zones described
by Hall (1966): personal, social, and public. According to the organism-environment
theory, these zones consist of objects that make different kinds of results possible:
personal zone – caring of the own body; social – contact to close people, manipulation of
objects; public – contact to strangers and manipulation of far objects. Certain results are
anticipated with objects in each zone; if an object intrudes into a wrong zone,
reorganization of the system happens. The optimal flow of action presupposes that the
objects with certain characteristics stay in the correct zone. When driving, if a tree, for
example, comes suddenly to the personal zone there is the danger of getting hurt, i.e.
distance to crash gets too short.
In driving the anticipatory system is continuously estimating the possibility of intrusion
of the given object into the wrong zone, i.e. the system is well equipped with an accurate
estimation of the time of the possible intrusion over the boundary of a given zone (cf.
Summala, 2007). This means also that the system continuously determines the properties
of the objects in the environment on the basis of its organization: The system has “holes”
that are filled with environmental possibilities that make the flow of action possible. If an
event (an object in the wrong zone, for example) suddenly occurs that doesn’t fit into the
anticipatory organization, the system must be reorganized and if this takes too much time
(as may be probable) a collision occurs.
A comfortable and efficient driving situation consists of optimal use of environmental
constituents in the process of achievement of results, i.e. the continuously changing
environmental parts must fit the anticipatory organization of the organism-environment
system. These environmental constituents may be such as straight road, curve, obstacles
on the road, other vehicles going either in the same or opposed direction, speed of
vehicles, landscape (looking around), other people in the car, pedestrians, etc. The
anticipatory system must have correct “holes” for such factors; otherwise disorganization
of the system occurs that may lead to accident.
Conclusion
It is simple common sense that we prepare for many acts we are going to perform. It is,
however, not so clear what happens during such preparation or anticipation of important
events. In the mainstream cognitive science, anticipation is seen as a process that makes
the processing of important stimuli more effective and faster. However, the present
considerations indicate that anticipation is not just a special factor for making information
processing more rapid or preparing the muscles of the organism for quicker reactions to
external stimuli. Anticipatory systems are traditionally considered as systems that contain
the model of the result, whereas according to the organism-environment system theory
anticipation in immanent in all systems, the existence of which is dependent upon the
results to be achieved. In the framework of the organism-environment system theory,
anticipation is not an empirical fact, but it is one of the cornerstones of the whole theory.
The present considerations indicate that in the training of driving it is not essential to try
to carry out the required movements quicker and quicker, but one should concentrate on
creating the anticipatory organization and the action alternatives under varying
circumstances. Here the use of a simulator might be very useful, especially for training
mastering of dangerous situations (accidents, bad weather conditions etc.). Also, as the
constituents of the anticipatory organization are created in relation to the final result to be
achieved, the training should not be directed towards mastering of separate components
as such, but it should always be related to the whole act, as it will be present under
normal conditions.
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Figure
Fig. 1. Change in the structure of action during training.