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Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective
Author(s): Jerel A. Rosati
Reviewed work(s):
Source: World Politics, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jan., 1981), pp. 234-252
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Research5N'ote
DEVELOPING A SYSTEMATIC
DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK:
BureaucraticPoliticsin Perspective
By JEREL A. ROSATI
INPresidentialPower:The PoliticsofLeadership,RichardNeustadt's
recurringthemeis that "Presidentialpower is the power to perin orderto be morethanjusta clerk-a leadersuade."1A President,
of
mustmake use of his influence.
Accordingto Neustadt,the efficacy
a President'sinfluenceis derivedfromthreerelatedsources:the bargainingadvantagesinherentin the job, his professionalreputation,
and his public prestige.Thus, power does not automaticallyexude
froma President;he mustworkto promotehis influence.
Presidential
Power was one of the earliestworksof significance
to describethe
governmental
processas one of inherentbargaining.2
Since i96o, manyresearchers
have describedthe bargainingnature
ofthegovernmental
decision-making
process.Studieshavebeenparticularlyconcernedwith the intricaciesof makingforeignpolicydecisions.Samuel P. Huntington,WarnerSchilling,and Roger Hilsman
have depictedpolicyas a resultof negotiating
and bargainingamong
themajorparticipants.3
However,it was GrahamAllisonwho solidifiedthebargainingnatureof governmental
policyintoa decision-making model.
Using the Cuban missilecrisisas a case study,Allison formalized
threedecision-making
Two of these-organizational
paradigms.4
proc1 Neustadt,PresidentialPower:
i960),
i0.
The Politicsof Leadership(New York: Wiley,
2 Althoughearlierstudieshad also been concerned
withthe natureof intragovernmentalpolitics,it was not untilPresidentialPower that the notionof intragovernmentalbargainingbegan to gain popularity.See Gabriel Almond,The American
People and ForeignPolicy (New York: Praeger,1950), and CharlesE. Lindblom,
"The Science of MuddlingThrough,"Public Administration
Review,xix (Spring
1959), 79-88.
The CommonDefense(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
,3Huntington,
Press,i96i);
Schilling,"The Politicsof NationalDefense:Fiscal 1950," in Schilling,Hammond,and
Snyder,eds.,Strategy,
Politics,and DefenseBudgets(New York: ColumbiaUniversity
Press,I962); Hilsman,To Move a Nation (New York: Doubleday,I967).
Modelsand theCuban MissileCrisis,"AmericanPoliticalSciAllison,"Conceptual
enceReview,Vol. 63 (Septemberi969), 689-7i8.
o i98i
University
by theTrusteesof Princeton
WorldPolitics0043-8871/81/020234-19$00.95/I
see contributor
page.
For copyinginformation,
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SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
235
becomeknownas the
essand governmental
politics-have
popularly
"bureaucratic
politics"modelof decisionmaking.Allison'sformulationshavebeenfurther
complemented
by theworkof MortonHalAllisonandHalperinhavebeenthemajorproponents
perin.5
ofthebureaucratic
politics
decision-making
approach.
since
The bureaucratic
modelhas achievedgreatpopularity
politics
itsinitialpresentation.
According
to RobertP. Haffa,Jr.,"Allison's
analytic
approach
to decision-making
theory
has recently
becomeone
of themostwidelydisseminated
conceptsin all of socialscience."'
Numerous
works,particularly
thoseconcerned
withU.S. foreign
policy,haveutilizedthebureaucratic
politicsapproachin theirdescriptionandexplanation
ofthepolicyprocess.7
As is typical
muchcriticism
has beenleveled
of a popularconcept,
at themodel.A greatdeal of debateconcerning
theapplicability
of
bureaucratic
has
In
politicsto policy-making
behavior resulted. this
paper,I intend
toclarify
someoftheassertions
andcorresponding
confusionregarding
thecontroversy.8
First,I will definethefoundation
-Allison and HalperincombineModel II (organizationalprocess) and Model III
(governmental
politics)in theirformulation
of bureaucratic
politics.See their"BureaucraticPolitics:A Paradigmand Some PolicyImplications,"
in RaymondTanterand
Richard H. Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, I972), 40. See also Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, i974).
6 Haffa,"Allison'sModels: An Analytic
Approachto Bureaucratic
Politics,"in John
E. Endicottand Roy W. Stafford,
eds.,AmericanDefensePolicy,4th ed. (Baltimore:
The JohnsHopkins Press, I977), 224.
7 See I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of
Organization Reform (Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, i974); William I. Bacchus, Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process: The State Department's Country
Director System (Princeton: PrincetonUniversityPress, I974); Francis E. Rourke, ed.,
Bureaucratic Power in National Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, I978); John Spanier
and Eric M. Uslaner, How American Foreign Policy is Made (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, I978); Stephen D. Cohen, The Making of United States International
Economic Policy (New York: Praeger, I977); Chris L. Jeffries,"Defense Decision-
makingin theOrganizational-Bureaucratic
Context,"in Endicottand Stafford
(fn. 6),
227-39; Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organiza-
tionalConnection(New York: Basic Books,I976); and CharlesW. Kegley,Jr.,and
Eugene R. Wittkopf,American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (New York: St.
Martin's Press, I979). Although the latter two works never formally mention the
bureaucratic
politicsmodel,theydo utilizea bureaucratic
politicsapproach.
8 Some attempts
have been made to determinethe applicability
of the bureaucratic
politicsmodelby comparingit withotherdecision-making
models.However,further
confusionhas been the result,forthe modelswere not presentedand analyzedin a
clear,systematic
fashion.See WilfredL. Kohl, "The Nixon-Kissinger
ForeignPolicy
Systemand U.S.-EuropeanRelations:Patternsof Policy Making," World Politics,
xxviII (October I975), I-43; John C. Donovan, The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making
Elite (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, I974); Barry B. Hughes, The Domestic Context
of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, I978); Cohen (fn. 7),
78-Io2; and William B. Quandt, Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the
Arab-IsraeliConflict,1967-1976 (Berkeley: Universityof California Press, I977).
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
236
WORLD POLITICS
ofthebureaucratic
politics
model.Second,thepolicy-making
behavior
is presented
forSALT I undertheJohnson
andNixonadministrations
to serveas an illustration
of themodel'sdecision-making
relevance.
I willdevelopa systematic
forintegratFinally,
framework
conceptual
ing muchof thedecision-making
in orderto promote
literature
the
advancement
ofdecision-making
theory.9
THE
BUREAUCRATICPOLICS
MODEL
The bureaucratic
politics
modeldescribes
decision
makingonlyas it
occursintheexecutive
branch.
AllisonandHalperinarenotconcerned
withdecisions
involving
instithelegislative
branchor otherexternal
tutions:
"Herewe focusonlyon partof thisprocess-that
involving
thebureaucracy
andthePresident
as he dealswiththebureaucracy.'"10
The primary
sources
ofthebureaucratic
politics
modelareAllison's
"Conceptual
ModelsandtheCubanMissileCrisis"(fn.4) andEssence
ofDecision,1"
AllisonandHalperin's
"Bureaucratic
Politics,"
andHalperin'sBureaucratic
Politicsand ForeignPolicy(bothfn.5). From
thesefoursources,
I haveextracted
fourpropositions
the
thatexpress
essential
ingredients
ofthebureaucratic
politicsmodel,without
some
ofthemodel'slimiting
rigidity.12
Proposition
i. Foranysingleissue,theexecutive
branchofthegovernment
is composed
ofnumerous
individuals
andorganizations,
with
various
differences
ingoalsandobjectives.
Anyoneissuewilldrawthe
concernand involvement
of a numberof diverseindividuals
and orin theexecutive
ganizations
branch.The divergent
goalsoftheinter9In the initialdevelopment
of the decision-making
approachduringthe I950s and
earlyI96os, the primaryemphasiswas on the development
of a comprehensive
conceptualframework.
The earlierworksattemptedto locate the principalcomponents
of thesystem-clusters
of variables-thatinfluenced
foreignpolicybehavior.Although
the I970s have witnessedadvancement
in the development
of decision-making
models
and theoretical
scholarshave focusedonly on one or two clustersof
formulations,
in the recentliterature
decisionvariables.This lack of comprehensiveness
has resulted
in an oversimplification
of policy-making
behavior.See RichardC. Snyder,H. W.
as an Approachto the Studyof InternaBruck,and BurtonSapin,"Decision-Making
An Approach
tionalPolitics,"in Snyderand others,ForeignPolicyDecision-Making:
to theStudyofInternational
Politics(New York: Free Pressof Glencoe,i962), 14-i85;
and James
JamesA. Robinsonand R. RogerMajak,"The Theoryof Decision-Making,"
and Promisesof Decision-Making
N. Rosenau,"The-Premises
Analysis,"in JamesC.
PoliticalAnalysis(New York: Free Press, i967),
Charlesworth,
ed., Contemporary
I75-88, i89-21I.
10Halperin (fn. 5), 5.
11GrahamT. Allison,Essence of Decision: Explainingthe Cuban Missile Crisis
(Boston: Little,Brown,I971).
12 I am attempting
to allow as muchflexibility
as possibleforthe bureaucratic
policontainthe notion "whereyou
tics model. For instance,none of my propositions
forthemodel.In this
constraint
standdependson whereyousit"-whichis a definite
way the applicability
of themodelis maximized.
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SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
237
overtheissue; at a minimum,theparticiestedpartiesresultin conflict
regardingmethods:
pantsare not in agreement
decisionpolicyis nota singlecalculating
The "maker"ofgovernment
and political
of largeorganizations
maker,butrathera conglomerate
shoulddo
aboutwhattheirgovernment
substantially
actorswhodiffer
both
to affect
issueand who competein attempting
on anyparticular
and theactionsoftheirgovernment."3
decisions
governmental
manyof them
Each government
consistsof numerousindividuals,
to be sure,by theshared
Constrained,
in largeorganizations.
working
haveverydiffernevertheless
theseindividuals
imagesof theirsociety,
withverydifand are concerned
priorities,
verydifferent
entinterests,
questions.14
ferent
individualor organizationexists;
Proposition2. No preponderant
althoughhis inthe President,if involved,is merelyone participant,
politicsperspecfluencemaybe the mostpowerful.In thebureaucratic
Allisonbelieves
in influence.
tive,thePresidentis farfromomnipotent
the Presidentis only one of
thatin the United Statesgovernment,
many chiefs:"the President,the Secretariesof State,Defense,and
Treasury,the Directorof the CentralIntelligenceAgency,the Joint
Chiefsof Staff,and, since i96i, the Special AssistantforNational Seevenif thePresidentwereto exercisehis
Furthermore,
curityAffairs."
binding:"When a
a Presidentialdecisionis not necessarily
authority,
or Presidentialdecisionis reached,the largergame is
governmental
not over.Decisionscan be reversedor ignored."'5Thereforefor any
involvedis dominant,includingthe Presisingleissue,no participant
dent.
Proposition3. The finaldecisionis a "politicalresultant"-theoutcome of bargainingand compromiseamong the variousparticipants.
Sinceno one participant
is powerfulenoughto forcea decisionthrough
the eventualdeciwhen disagreement
existsamong the participants,
sionis a resultof consensus.Policiesare
in thesensethatwhathappensis notchosenas a solutionto
resultants
and confusion
fromcompromise,
results
butrather
conflict,
theproblem
and unequalinfluence;
politicalin the
withdiverseinterests
ofofficials
and actionsemergeis best
fromwhichdecisions
sensethattheactivity
channelsamongindividas bargaining
characterized
alongregularized
ofthegovernment."6
ual members
13
Allisonand Halperin(fn. 5),
14Halperin (fn. 5), 311.
15 Allison(fn. ii),
161bid.,i62.
42.
i64, 172.
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238
WORLD POLITICS
A decisionis the resultof the "pullingand hauling"among the varas theyattemptto advancetheirconceptsof personal,
ious participants
group,organizational,
and nationalinterests.
Proposition
4. A considerablegap usuallyexistsbetweenthe formulated decision and its implementation.
Once a decision has been
reached,the decision-making
processdoes not come to an end; the
decisionmuststillbe implemented.'7
Due to the lack of centraldirectionand control,considerable
slippagecan occurbetweentheformulationand theimplementation
of a decision:"Whatis donewill be heavilyinfluenced
bythestandardoperatingprocedures
and interests
of the
implementers."1Allisonand Halperinmaintainthatdeviationoccurs
because"decisionsare rarelytailoredto facilitatemonitoring.
As a rein checkingon the faithful
sult,seniorplayershave greatdifficulty
implementation
of a decision."' The implementation
of a decision,
consequently,
will usuallyproducesomeunintendedvariation.
These fourpropositions
comprisethe essentialelementsof the bureaucraticpoliticsmodel of decisionmaking.The firsttwo formthe
of the decision-making
"structure"
model: numerousindividualsand
withvaryinginterests,
are involvedforany singleissue,
organizations,
withoutthepredominance
of any participant.
The lattertwo propositionscomprisethe decision-making
"process":the decisionis formulated throughbargainingand compromise,
and considerableslippage
occursduringimplementation.
The bureaucratic
politicsmodel,hence,
focuseson thedecision-making
structure
and processin describingand
explainingforeignpolicybehavior.A description
of decision-making
behaviorduringthe firstStrategicArmsLimitationTalks (SALT I)
in theJohnsonand Nixon administrations
will serveas an illustration
of themodel'sapplicability
in policymaking.20
17 Unless,of course,it is a "negative"decision-one in whichno actionor impleis required.
mentation
18 Halperin(fn. 5), 313.
19Allisonand Halperin(fn. 5), 53.
20The bureaucratic
supportedthroughthe use
politicsmodel has been principally
of defensepolicycase studies.(On thisbasis I chose SALT I as a case study.)See
Connection:Explainingthe SkyboltDecision,"
KennethN. Ciboski,"The Bureaucratic
in Endicottand Stafford(fn. 6), 374-88;GrahamT. Allison,"QuestionsAbout the
in RobertL. PfaltzPerspective,"
ArmsRace: Who's RacingWhom?A Bureaucratic
graf,Jr.,ed., ContrastingApproachesto StrategicArms Control(Lexington,Mass.:
D. C. Heath,I974); MortonH. Halperin,"The Decisionto DeploytheABM: BureauWorld Politics,xxv
craticand DomesticPoliticsin the JohnsonAdministration,"
(October 1972), 62-95; Michael H. Armacost,The Politicsof WeaponsInnovation:
Press, 1969); and
The Thor-Jupiter
Controversy
(New York: Columbia University
Politics(New York:
EdmundBeard,Developingthe ICBM: A Studyin Bureaucratic
ColumbiaUniversity
Press,1976).
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SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
SALT
239
I AND THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION"
DuringtheJohnson
administration,
numerous
individuals
and organizations
withcontrary
viewpoints
wereinvolvedin makingdecisionsconcerning
SALT I. President
Johnson,
however,
playedonlya
minorrole;he rarely
tookan activepartin thedecision-making
process.The resultant
SALT I proposal
waspresented
byan ad hocgroup
thatincorporated
theviewsofthevariousparticipants,
andthusanticipatedthebargaining
andcompromise
thatwouldbe required.
Mostofthemajororganizations
concerned
withforeign
policyissues
in generalwereinvolved
in theformulation
oftheU.S. government's
positionon SALT-the DefenseDepartment,
StateDepartment,
the
ArmsControland Disarmament
Agency(ACDA), and theCentral
Intelligence
Agency.22
The latter
wasparticularly
withforce
concerned
postures
andcapabilities,
andwiththeissueofverification.
Armslimitationsweretheprincipal
concernof ACDA and theStateDepartment.WithintheDefenseDepartment,
a conglomeration
oforganizationsbecameinvolved:
themilitary
wasrepresented
bytheJoint
Chiefs
of Staff(JCS) and bytheindividual
Air
and
services-Army,
Navy,
Force.On thecivilianside,therewereInternational
Affairs
Security
DefenseDepartment
Analysis,
Research
andEngineer(ISA), Systems
ing (DDR&E), andtheDefenseIntelligence
Agency(DIA).
As a resultof thevariety
theSALT decisionof theparticipants,
severeintragovernmental
conflicts.
makingprocess
produced
"Narrow
interests
fromtwo
organizational
aside,muchoftheconflict
proceeds
attitudes
drivenfarapartbysomeSALT-related
issues,lessso byothers."23
One sidefavoredrestricting
thedevelopment
and deployment
of
strategic
The otherside-normally
considered
weaponry.
more"hard
line"-feared
thatanyarmslimitation
wouldundermine
due
security
21Sourcesforthedecision-making
behaviorconcerning
SALT I duringthe Johnson
are: JohnNewhouse,Cold Dawn: The Storyof SALT (New York:
administration
forSALT," in
Holt, Rinehart& Winston,I973); AltonFrye,"U.S. Decision-Making
and
eds.,SALT: The MoscowAgreements
Mason Willrichand JohnB. Rhinelander,
The Vantage
Beyond(New York: Free Press,1974), 66-ioo; LyndonBainesJohnson,
i963-I969 (New York: Popular Library, 1971);
Point:Perspectives
of the Presidency,
on ForeignRelations,
SovietDiplomacyand NegoU.S., Congress,Senate,Committee
Print(WashtiatingBehavior:EmergingNew ContextforU.S. Diplomacy,Committee
PrintingOffice,I979); JeromeH. Kahan,Securityin
ington,D.C.: U.S. Government
the NuclearAge: DevelopingU.S. StrategicArmsPolicy (Washington,D.C.: Brookings, 1975); BurtonR. Rosenthal,"FormulatingNegotiatingPositionsfor SALT:
on the Organization
in Commission
I968, I969-I972,"
forthe Conof the Government
D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing
ductof ForeignPolicy,IV, Appendices(Washington,
Office,1975), 325-43; and Thomas W. Wolfe,The SALT Experience(Cambridge,
Mass.: Ballinger,1979).
23 Newhouse(fn. 21), 35.
22Newhouse (fn. 21), 36; Wolfe(fn. 21), 24.
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240
WORLD POLITICS
andaccelerated
to cheating
development
bytheSovietUnionin areas
notcovered
byanyagreement.
"In thebroadest
sense,theorderofbatand ACDA againstthePentagon."24
tlepitstheStateDepartment
In
general,
theformer
weresympathetic
to armsnegotiations
whilethe
wasskeptical.
Forthemostpart,theCIA wasin agreement
latter
with
theviewsoftheStateDepartment
andACDA. The WhiteHousewas
in thedecision-making
rarelyinvolved
processbeyondtheactualinitiation
oftheSALT talks.
Duringi966 andi967, theJohnson
administration
hadmadea numberofovertures
totheSovietUnionconcerning
thepossibility
ofa discussion
butMoscowhadnotresponded
on armslimitations,
favorably.
in a speechbefore
theUnitedNationson May20, i968,the
However,
thattheywerenowinterested
Russians
intakingstepstoreach
signaled
an agreement
on armslimitations.
Johnson
reactedsoonafterwards:
whilesigning
theNon-Proliferation
he acknowledged
Treaty,
thatthe
UnitedStateswas willingto meetwiththeSovietUnionin thenear
future
to discusslimitations
on strategic
weapons.25
Once thetalkshad beenagreedupon,a U.S. negotiating
position
hadtobe developed.
President
Johnson
refused
tobecomeinvolved
in
thedecision-making
He wantedto present
process.
a consensus
positiontotheU.S.S.R.:
norhisstaff
Neither
Johnson
wouldtakepartin bureaucracy's
epic
struggle
toproduce
notjusta simple,
clearproposal,
butonethatwould
makea serious
matter
ofSALT.In Johnson's
actually
daythere
wasno
inlineandtoforce
toholdthebureaucracy
HenryKissinger
up Presifrom
dential
thepreferences
ofthevarious
options,
as distinct
partsof
in government
thegovernment.
UnlikeNixon,Johnson-as
everyone
knew-wanted
Thismeant
thattheJoint
Chiefs
notoptions.
agreement,
hadtobeonboard.26
thattheU.S. SALT
he alsoinsisted
WhileJohnson
soughtconsensus,
left
late
summer-which
be readyby
position
verylittletimeforthe
bargaining
processto developwithinthebureaucracy.
wastakenbyMorton
Hala SALT position
The initiative
topresent
of DefenseforPolicyPlanning
perin,theDeputyAssistant
Secretary
ofmilitary
andcivilianarmsthestaff
He ignored
andArmsControl.
24bijd.
483-89.
26Newhouse(fn. 2i), io8. For an in-depthdiscussionof Johnson'sforeignpolicy
see Destler(fn. 7), chap.4; HenryGraff,The TuesdayCabinet:Deliberamachinery,
tion and Decisionon Peace and War underLyndonB. Johnson(EnglewoodCliffs,
Fred Geyelin,LyndonB. Johnsonand the World (New
1970);
N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
York: Praeger,I966); and KeithC. Clark and LaurenceJ. Legere,The Presidentand
theManagement
of NationalSecurity(New York: Praeger,i969).
25 Johnson
(fn. 21),
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SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
241
he organizedan
controlspecialists
directly
assignedto him;instead,
hisownpersonnel
fromwithinand
ad hocworking
group,recruiting
outsidethegovernment.
This group-whichbecameknownas "the
SALT committee"-consisted
ofmiddle-level
bureaucrats:
Thetiny
ISA Halperin
unitbecame
thenucleus
ofa Pentagon
commitad hocbandidentiteethatcontrolled
theSALT process....Thislittle
often
fiedtheissues,
analyzed
them,
andsolicited
estimates,
independently,
from
various
partsoftheintelligence
community.27
SincetheStateDepartment
and ACDA weresympathetic
toward
SALT, theHalperingrouphad littletroublein getting
themto approvethebypassprocedure.
The JointChiefs,however,
weresuspiciousof thearmsnegotiations.
was very
Thus,theSALT committee
deliberate
theminimum
in meeting
demandsoftheJCS.28
fora consensus
Pressed
toimplement
thePresident's
directive
position,
ofdisputed
theDefense
participants
joinedin a fruitful
prenegotiation
points.
Questions
werenotpresented
formally
toJCSuntiltheycould
beframed
ina manner
calculated
toelicitconcurrence.29
Thus,before
makinga formalpresentation
the
to theJointChiefs,
fortheproposal
Halperin
groupsolicited
support
amongthelower-level
of thePentagon.In thisway,the "pullingand hauling"
personnel
neededtoreachconsensus
wascircumvented.
The proposal
wassenttotheJCSonlyoneweekbefore
it wouldbe
to
the
presented
Committee
of Principals,
thegroupwho woulddiThe essenceoftheprorectly
passtheproposalon to thePresident.30
in thedevelopment
of antiballistic
posalwas a broadpermissiveness
missiles(ABM) and a freezeon long-range
offensive
missiles-both
Newhouse(fn. 2I), I20.
Actually,the processwas considerably
more complex.ACDA was the agency
forpresenting
theinitialproposal.However,themembers
thathad formaljurisdiction
of theHalperingroupwereable to convincemembersof ACDA and theStateDeparttheproposalwas preferable.
The problemwas
mentthattheirmethodof formulating
thatthePentagonperceivedACDA as the "super-dove"
agency.AdrianFisher,Deputy
thesepositions.Nevertheless,
Directorof ACDA, playeda crucialrole in reconciling
in the end, it was ACDA whichformallypresentedthe proposalto the JCS. See
Rosenthal(fn. 2I), 329, and Newhouse(fn. 2I), II4-i6.
29 Frye (fn. 2I), 77.
30 The Committee
of StateDean Rusk.It also
of Principalswas chairedby Secretary
includedthe Directorof ACDA, William Foster; the Secretaryof Defense,Clark
Clifford;the Chairmanof the JCS,GeneralWheeler;and the President'sSpecial Ashad beencreatedto superWalt Rostow.The Committee
sistantforNationalSecurity,
viseworkon theNon-Proliferation
Treaty.Accordingto Newhouse,theCommittee
of
Principalswas not theforumforSALT I becauseof therecentdepartureof Secretary
of DefenseMcNamara,withoutwhom Rusk was not capableof managingthe Joint
ACDA was constrained
Chiefs.Furthermore,
by the suspicionsof the JCS towardit.
Halperinand his groupfilledthevoid. Newhouse(fn. 2I), II0-II.
27
28
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WORLD
242
land
(IcBM)
POLITICS
and sea
(sLBM)-at
SALT I
AND THE NIXON
existinglevels.3"Afterone week of
theJointChiefsagreedto theproposal:theyonlysugdeliberation,
whichwerequicklyincorporated
gestedminorrevisions,
bytheHalPresident
received
and
Johnson
peringroup."
approvedthe entire
packagein lateAugust.The talksbetween
and Moscow
Washington
werescheduled
tobeginon September
30.
Newhouse
forSALT hadmuch
pointsoutthat"littleofpreparation
reference
toMoscow'sattitudes;
Washington
didnotknowwhatthese
were.The concern
withMoscow,
was,notwhatmightbe negotiable
butwhatcouldbe negotiated
withinthePentagon."33
of
Regardless
theviability
thetalkswerecalledoffwhen
oftheU.S. SALT package,
in Czechoslovakia.
Sovietmilitary
unitsintervened
ADMINISTRATION3
evidence
ofthebureaucratic
modelwas occasionAlthough
politics
ally visible,a totallydifferent
decision-making
patternfor SALT
emerged
duringtheNixonadministration.
The WhiteHousebecame
in thestrategic
armslimitation
actively
involved
talks.
Nixoncameto thePresidency
witha stronginterest
in foreign
affairs.He preferred
to considera variety
of information
and options
whichenabledhimto analyzeall facetsof an issuebefore
himself,
The WhiteHousewas to be themajorinstruat a decision.
arriving
mentofforeign
policymaking:
nottoendorse
He arrived
inpower
determined
decisions
largely
shaped
talent
fornarrowing
bybureaucracy's
choice;instead,
he sought
toextendtherangeofchoice
andtomakeindependent
decisions.
He would
31Kahan (fn. 2i), I26; Rosenthal(fn. 2I), 331.
32 It is Newhouse'sbeliefthatthe
JointChiefsboughtthe proposalat the priceof
excludingbotha MIRV (MultipleIndependently
TargetedRe-entry
Vehicle)ban and an
ABM limit.Newhouse(fn. 2I),
I2; see also Wolfe (fn. 21), 25.
33 Newhouse(fn. 2I),
125.
34 In addition
tothesourcescitedinfn.2I, othersforthedecision-making
behaviorduringtheNixonadministration
include:Marvinand BernardKalb,Kissinger(New York:
Dell, i974); HenryBrandon,The Retreat of American Power (Garden City,N.Y.:
Doubleday,
I973);
Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American
ForeignPolicy (New York: Harper & Row, I977); JohnP. Leacacos, "Kissinger's
Apparat,"and I. M. Destler,"WhatCan One Man Do?" ForeignPolicy,No. 5 (WinterI97I-72), 3-27 and 28-40; SamuelC. Orr,"DefenseReport/National
SecurityCouncil NetworkGives WhiteHouse Tight Rein over SALT Strategy,"
NationalJournal,
iII (April 24, I971),
877-86; RaymondGarthoff,
"NegotiatingSALT," The Wilson
Quarterly,I (AutumnI977), 76-85,and "Negotiating
withtheRussians,"International
Security,I (SpringI977), 3-24; RichardNixon,The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New
York: Warner,I978); WilliamSafire,Before the Fall: An Inside View of the PreWatergate White House (GardenCity,N.Y.: Doubleday,I975); Tad Szulc, The Illu-
sion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (New York: Viking, 1978);
HenryKissinger,White House Years (Boston:Little,Brown,I979).
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and
SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
243
ofplayers,
albeitthekey
one ofa number
notbe,likesomePresidents,
he would make of the
player.Instead,workingthroughKissinger,
instrument
and thesolitary
ofinitiative
WhiteHousethefountainhead
fordecision.35
of the
by therejuvenation
was accomplished
This centralizedstructure
underthe direction
NationalSecurityCouncil,and especiallyits staff,
of HenryKissinger.
by issuinga National
The White House activatedthe bureaucracy
SecurityStudy Memorandum(NSSM), which instigatedrigorous
studyof a topicin orderto promotevariouspolicyoptions.Once the
to thePresident,he would
studyhad been completedand transmitted
decideon a particularcourseof action.At thispoint,a NationalSecurityDecisionMemorandum(NSDM) would be issued,whichformuas to the
thebureaucracy
latedthePresident'sdecisionand instructed
This processwas coordinatedand diprocedureof implementation.
rectedby HenryKissingerthroughuse of theNationalSecurityCouncil staff.
In i969, theWhiteHouse utilizedthismethodto gain control
of the foreignpolicyprocess.
Nixon and KisIn the firstfewmonthsof the new administration,
singerallowed the bureaucracyto administerthe studyon SALT.
NSSM 28 was issued,licensingACDA to launchan elaborateand comstudyfocusingon all facetsof armslimitation."It soonbeprehensive
came evidentthatthe decentralizedbureaucracywas not capable of
and policyaltermeetingNixon'sdemandfora varietyof information
natives.
Debateensuedoverthecompletedstudyafteritsformalpresentation
to theNationalSecurityCouncil.The JointChiefsdisagreedwiththe
The mainissueconcernedtheSovietss-9misofverification.
treatment
arguedthatthe ss-9had only
siles.ACDA, relyingon CIA estimates,
Vehicle) capabilityforthe nearfuture.The
a MRV (MultipleRe-entry
JointChiefsdisputedthispoint,assertingthe ss-9'sMIRV capability.37
chairedby HenryKissinger,was set up to exAn ad hoc committee,
issue.
aminethe ss-9verification
of Nixon's foreignpolicy
35Newhouse (fn. 2I), I44. For an excellentdescription
National SecurityCouncil
apparatus,see ChesterA. Crocker,"The Nixon-Kissinger
System,i969-i972: A Studyin ForeignPolicyManagement,"in Commission on the
Organization of the Governmentfor the Conduct of Foreign Policy, VI, Appendices
(Washington,D.C.: U.S. Government
PrintingOffice,I975), 79-99; Kalb (fn. 34),
chap.4; Leacacos (fn. 34); and Destler(fn. 7), chap.4.
36 Rosenthal(fn. 2I), 333.
37 The Joint
Chiefsarguedthateach warheadon themissilecould be independently
targeted(unlikeMRVS), thereby
makingthess-9a moredevastating
weapon.Frye(fn.
2I), 8i; Rosenthal(fn.2I),
334.
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244
WORLD POLITICS
This committee
becameknownas the Verification
Panel. "Very
quickly,
thestyleoftheMIRV panelconvinced
Kissinger
and his staff
thattheyhadhiton therightdeviceforhandlingSALT." The panel
functioned
through
lower-level
working
groupschairedbyseniorKissingeraides,and drewon thetechnical
skillsof thebureaucracy.
Accordingto Newhouse,
"thesenewgroupswouldestablish
thecentral
WhiteHousecontrol
ofSALT thathadbeenlacking."38
Once thecentralization
of theprocesshad beenestablished
by the
Verification
Paneland itsvariousworking
groups,
exhaustive
studies
nineoptions
werepresented
to thePresibeganon SALT. Eventually,
dentas a resultof thisdecision-making
procedure.
They spanneda
spectrum
ofpositions
forthearmstalks-from
no ABMS to unlimited
ABMS, from
a ban on MIRVs to no ban,andfroma freezeon strategic
offensive
missilesto unlimited
deployment.39
These optionsbecame
knownas "building
blocks."
No singleoptionwas to be presented
to theSovietUnion.Instead,
all theelements
ofeachoptioncouldbe combined
in a variety
ofways,
thereby
allowinga multitude
of possiblenegotiating
packages."The
buildingblocks,in short,
wouldpermitswiftreaction
to theSoviets,
The building
whileminimizing
in Washington.
bureaucratic
conflict
blockswere,moreover,
devicebywhichWhiteHouseconyetanother
trolofSALT wouldbe assured."40
thenineoptionswerenarrowed
downto four-titled
Eventually,
reducedtotwo-C andD. Sincethe
A, B, C, andD-and thenfurther
WhiteHousewasnotcompletely
withthesetwo,a newaltersatisfied
hadbeenmethodically
native,
E, emerged:
"Whereas
theotheroptions
shapedandhonedbytheentire
SALT apparatus;
Kissinger,
consulting
was
of his staff,
closelywiththePresident
and one or twomembers
thearchitect."'"
whenoptionE beThe bureaucracy
wascircumvented
camethenegotiating
oftheU.S. SALT delegation.42
position
SevenSALT negotiating
between
sessionswereheld,alternating
in
Helsinkiand Vienna,beginning November
of i969. The compositionoftheU.S. delegation
theSALT bureaucracy,
replicated
consisting
of fivemembers
theOffice
of theSecretary
of Defense,
representing
theJCS,theStateDepartment,
thescientific
and ACDA;
community,
was thedesigtheArmsControland Disarmament
AgencyDirector
Newhouse(fn.2i), i6i, i62. See also Rosenthal(fn. 2I), 334.
39Brandon(fn. 34), 3IO-II.
40 Newhouse(fn. 21), I71.
41 Ibid., i86.
42 OptionE set a limitof i900 offensive
missiles;eitherIOO ABMS forthe capitalor
no ABMS at all; MIRV was completely
excluded;land mobilemissiles,the modification
Brandon(fn. 34), 3II.
of silos,and new hardenedsiloswereforbidden.
38
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SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
245
natedchairman.
The U.S. delegation
was authorized
to discussall Sovietproposals,
butall decisions
weretobe madebythePresident.43
The principal
methodusedbyPresident
Nixonforcontrolling
the
implementation
process
was"thebackchannel."
WhiletheAmerican
and Sovietdelegations
metformally,
("the frontchannel"),Henry
Kissinger
wouldquiteoftenbe meeting
withSovietAmbassador
Anain secret.
In thisway,President
tolyDobrynin
Nixonwasabletocommunicate
hisposition
moredirectly
totheSovietleaders.
The useofthe
backchannelresulted
in a breakthrough
in thetalksin I97i, andwas
in setting
instrumental
up Nixon'ssummit
tripto Moscow."
WhenNixonarrived
in Moscowin Mayof I972, therewerestilla
numberof pointsof contention
concerning
SALT. The remaining
problems
ABMradars,
involved
land-based
offensive
missilelimitations,
submarine-based
missile
limitations,
andthequestion
ofa "trade-in"
of
old ICBMS fornew SLBMS. None of themwereresolveduntilthe final
dayof thesummit;thedirectparticipation
of President
Nixonand
GeneralSecretary
Brezhnevwas necessary
beforethe firststrategic
armslimitations
couldofficially
be signed.45
agreements
APPRAISAL
As we haveseen,twodifferent
decision-making
patterns
occurred
withregardtothestrategic
armslimitation
talks.DuringtheJohnson
thebureaucratic
of
administration,
politicsmodelwas representative
structure
thedecision-making
andprocess.
DuringtheNixonadminisoncetheWhiteHouseachieved
control
ofSALT, thebureautration,
modellostitsapplicability.
It appearsevident,
craticpolitics
therefore,
is thecritical
levelofinvolvement
thatthePresident's
factoraccountin decision-making
behavior.
ingforthedifference
Mostofthecritiques
ofbureaucratic
TheDecisionStructure.
politics
withPresidential
The President
attention.46
areconcerned
the
appoints
43
(fn. 34), 76-79;Wolfe (fn. 21), 33-34.
Garthoff
in
betweenthe U.S. and the U.S.S.R. stipulatedthat limitations
44The agreement
and defensiveweaponswould be discussedin one package; that the
bothoffensive
Systo thecapitalcity;thatU.S. Forward-Based
ABM sitewould notbe limitedstrictly
temsin Europewould not be discussed;and thattherewould be no quantityequiva"Negotiating
lence in missiles,simplya freeze.Kissinger(fn. 34), 820; Garthoff,
SALT" (fn. 34), 8o-8i.
45Kalb (fn. 34), 358-78; Kissinger (fn. 34), I202-57.
46 See RobertArt,"Bureaucratic
Politicsand AmericanForeignPolicy:A Critique,"
PolicySciences,iv (DecemberI973), 467-90; StephenD. Krasner,"Are Bureaucracies
(Or Allison'sWonderland),"ForeignPolicy,No. 7 (Summer1972), 159-79;
Important
Politics
D. J. Ball," "The Blind Men and the Elephant:A Critiqueof Bureaucratic
'The
Theory,"AustralianOutlooksxxviii (April 1974), 71-92; Amos Perimutter,
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WORLD POLITICS
246
withintheexecutive
branch:he selectsthemen
higher-level
personnel
He alsosetstherulesof thegame,
whoheadthelargebureaucracies.
whichparticipants
willhaveaccessto himand thedecidetermining
thebureaucracy
mustalwaysbe
sion-making
process.Furthermore,
awareofthePresident's
pointofview,forhe is capableofsuppressing
canbe an omnipotent
mostplans.In otherwords,a President
playerif
"The ability
he so desires.
ofbureaucracies
to independently
establish
ofPresidential
attention.
Presidential
attention
is
policiesis a function
a function
values."47
ofPresidential
two different
DuringtheSALT I negotiations,
Presidential
styles
was heavilyinterested
in SALT, butdid not
wereprevalent.
Johnson
thedecision-making
wantto dominate
process:he wantedconsensus
in arriving
at a U.S. negotiating
amongthe bureaucracy
position.
Nixonwantedoptions:thebureaucracy
wasusedtoprovide
thenecesIn thisway,theultimate
and alternatives.
saryinformation
decision
he woulddetermine
wouldrestwiththePresident:
theU.S. position.
in whichthesePresidents
manners
The different
approached
decision
makingaredescribed
byNewhouse:
TheWhite
Housenormally
likestokeepoptions
open,butwhatitdoes
ofthePresident.
UnderLyndon
onthestyle
thetenddepends
Johnson,
thrash
outmostSALTencywastostandaloofandletthebureaucracy
evenif thissometimes
riskedstalemate-a
related
no-decision
issues,
UnderRichard
foroptions
contest.
runsmuch
Nixon,thefondness
andthetendency
is to exploit
thebetter
to
divisions
deeper,
existing
control.48
exercise
and involvement-is
The President's
the
style-hislevelof attention
thedecision-making
mostcritical
factorin determining
structure.
A
PoliticalCenterand ForeignPolicy: A Critiqueof the Revisionistand
Presidential
Orientations,"World Politics,xxvii (October i974), 87-I06;
Bureaucratic-Political
MiriamSteiner,"The ElusiveEssenceof Decision:A CriticalComparisonof Allison's
xxi (June
StudiesQuarterly,
International
Approaches,"
and Snyder'sDecision-Making
Politics:
I977),
389-422; and JamesH. Nathan and JamesK. Oliver,"Bureaucratic
Pitfalls,"Journalof Politicaland MilitarySociolAcademicWindfallsand Intellectual
ogy, vi (Spring I978), 8i-9i.
47 Krasner(fn.48), i68. This factis occasionally
evenby bureaucratic
acknowledged
politicstheorists:
standsat thecenterof theforeignpolicyprocessin theUnitedStates.
The President
over decisionsare qualitatively
different
than thoseof any
His role and influence
In anyforeignpolicydecisionwidelyperceivedat the timeto be
otherparticipants.
the Presidentwill be a principalif not the principalfiguredetermining
important,
of actions.
thegeneraldirection
thedecision-making
patternis notconsideredto be bureauHowever,in theseinstances
Perspective:
craticpolitics.MortonHalperinand Arnold Kanter,"The Bureaucratic
in Halperin and Kanter,eds., Readings in American
A Preliminary
Perspective,"
Perspective
(Boston:Little,Brown,I973), 6.
ForeignPolicy:A Bureaucratic
48 Newhouse(fn. 2I), 36.
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SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
247
secondfactor
oflessimportance
is thelevelofindividual
and organizationalinvolvement.
Not all issuesnecessitate
involvement
by thesameindividuals
and
As theissuevaries,
organizations.
so do thenumber
andtypeofparticia minorissueis likelyto drawtheattention
pants.For instance,
of
onlya minimum
number
ofparticipants-the
issuedoesnotcrossover
thejurisdiction
of numerous
organizations,
nor are the stakeshigh
enoughformanyindividuals
to becomeconcerned.
Muchof thedayto-daypolicythatis setby theexecutive
branchinvolves
onlya few
persons
fromoneortwoorganizations.
In suchcases,thestructure
proposedbythebureaucratic
modeldoesnotapply.Whenonlya
politics
fewparticipants
areinvolvedand Presidential
attention
is at a minimum,thedecision-making
structure
becomes"localized."49
In sum,twofactors
areprincipally
forthestructure
responsible
of
decision
makingthatoccurswithintheexecutive
branch:thelevelof
Presidential
attention
andinvolvement,
andthelevelofindividual
and
organizational
attention
andinvolvement.
Fromthesetwofactors,
we
cangenerate
threehypotheses
delineating
theexistence
ofthreedifferentdecision-making
structures:
Hypothesis
I: "Presidential
Dominance"
is prevalent
whenPresidential
involvement
is high.
2: "Bureaucratic
Hypothesis
Dominance"
is prevalent
whenindividual
andorganizational
involvement
arehigh,andPresidential
involvement
is low.
whenindividual
andorHypothesis
is prevalent
3: "LocalDominance"
arelow,andPresidential
involvement
is low.
involvement
ganizational
aredepicted
in Figurei.
structures
The threedecision-making
is likelyto occur
structures
At leastone of thesedecision-making
deals
withintheexecutive
branchforanyissue.Sincethegovernment
withhundreds
ofissuesat a time,all threestructures
maybe continstructure
a particular
uouslyoperative.
Although
decision-making
may
the
hence
applytoan issue,tracesoftheotherstructures
maysurface;
is used.
term"dominance"
49BarnettRubin'scase studyon the I97I JVP (JanataVimuktiPeramuna) insurgencyin Sri Lanka providesan excellentexampleof a "localized"decision-making
NationalSecu"Althoughit tookplace at a timewhen the Nixon-Kissinger
structure.
was
rityCouncil (NSC) systemdominatedAmericanforeignpolicy,the emergency
wherethe regionalbureaustaffhad the
mainlyhandledwithintheStateDepartment,
of theBureauforNear East and SouthAsia
action."No agencyopposedtheleadership
withinNEA, at the Country
Affairs(NEA). As a result,U.S. policywas formulated
Directorlevel. Rubin, "The U.S. Responseto the JVP Insurgencyin Sri Lanka,"
Commission on the Organization of the Governmentfor the Conduct of Foreign Pol-
icy, VII, Appendices(Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,I975),
I79"9I.
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248
WORLD POLITICS
PRESIDENTIAL
L
O W
INVOLVEMENT
H I G H
H
O
Z
Bureaucratic
Dominance
Presidential
Dominance
Local
Presidential
I
zJo
>0
-IF
N
< _J
0
Dominance
Dominance
FIGURE I
THE DECISION STRUCTURE
TheDecisionContext.
The external
setting
orenvironment
canhave
important
on thedecision-making
consequences
structure.
"The situationnotonlydetermines,
in part,who willparticipate
in a decision,
andthus,whoseimagescount,
butalsoaffects
theselection
andformationofimages."50
the
can be a majordeterminant
Therefore, context
ofdecision-making
andparticularly
behavior,
ofthedecisionstructure.
The typeofthedecisionstructure
on thecritical
dependslargely
or
noncritical
natureoftheissue.5'The contextual
variables
includethe
levelofpriorplanning
forreaching
a decision,
thetimeavailablefor
deliberation
andchoice,andtheimportance
ofvaluesas perceived
by
thedecisionmakers.CharlesHermannhas hypothesized
thatduring
a timeofcrisis-involving
littletime,and threat-"the
surprise,
high50JamesA. Robinsonand RichardC. Snyder,"Decision-making
in International
Behavior:A Social-Psychological
Politics,"in HerbertC. Kelman,ed., International
& Winston,i965), 456.
Analysis(New York: Holt,Rinehart,
51For otherpotentially
fruitful
uses of the concept"issue area," see William C.
in "Issue Area and ForeignPolicyAnalysis,"InternaPotter'sreviewof the literature
xxxiv (Summeri980), 405-27.
tionalOrganization,
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SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
249
estlevelof government
officials
will makethedecision(s)."52
Thus,
whentheissueis extremely
critical,
thePresident
and his closestadvisorsarelikelyto becomeheavilyinvolved.
Likewise,
fornoncritical
issues-routine
situations-the
President
and hisadvisors
willbe least
involved.
"The bureaucracy
playsitslargest
rolein routine
day-to-day
affairs,
itssmallest
duringcrises.""
As a result,
we canoffer
thefollowing
hypotheses:
Hypothesis
theissue,themorelikely
itis thatthe
4: Themorecritical
"Presidential
Dominance"
structure
ofdecision
making
willoccur.
Hypothesis
5: The lesscritical
theissue,themorelikely
it is thatthe
"LocalDominance"
structure
ofdecision
making
willoccur.
Hypothesis
6: The "Bureaucratic
Dominance"
structure
of decision
making
occurswhenan issueis ofmoderate
importance-not
critical
but important
enoughto attract
theinvolvement
of thePresident,
toinvolve
a number
enough
ofindividuals
andorganizations.
The DecisionProcess.
The bureaucratic
modelis dependent
politics
linearrelationship
decisionstructure,
upona simple,
two-step,
between
decision
andforeign
In otherwords,thestructure
behavior.
of
process,
thedecisional
unitdetermines
thedecision-making
process;thereafter,
theprocess
determines
thedecision
theexistence
of
outcome.
However,
a decision-making
theexactnature
structure
doesnotsolelydetermine
ofthedecision
process.54
For instance,
the decision-making
to the
processcorresponding
"Presidential
Dominance"structure
be
may highlyanalytical
(or rational),as itwasinthecaseofSALT I underPresident
Nixon,whena
widerangeof information
to thePresiand alternatives
was brought
dentsohe couldmaximize
hischoice.55
On theotherhand,U.S. policy
in Vietnamwas anything
was the
butanalytical.
President
Johnson
52Hermann, "International
Crisisas a SituationalVariable,"in JamesN. Rosenau,
ed.,International
Politicsand ForeignPolicy(New York: Free Press,i969), 4i6.
53JohnSpanier,GamesNationsPlay: AnalyzingInternational
Politics(New York:
Praeger,
I975),
4IO.
he acknowledges
54Although CharlesHermannmakes use of such a relationship,
the existenceof numerousothervariablesthatcan affectthe decisionprocess.Thus,
it is "veryunlikely"thatknowledgeof thestructure
alone can determine
the decisionor the implementation
makingprocess,eitherin the formulation
phase. Hermann,
"DecisionStructure
and Process:Influences
on ForeignPolicy,"in MauriceA. East,
PerspecStephenA. Salmore,and CharlesF. Hermann,WhyNationsAct: Theoretical
tivesfor ComparativeForeignPolicyStudies (BeverlyHills, Calif.: Sage, 1978), 8I.
55See Allison(fn. ii), fora discussionof the "rational-actor"
model,and JohnD.
The Cybernetic
Steinbruner,
Theoryof Decision:New Dimensionsof PoliticalAnalysis
(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, i974), for a descriptionof the "analytic"
paradigm.
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
250
WORLD
POLITICS
dominant
playerafter
theUnitedStatesbecameheavily
in the
involved
warin Vietnam.
Although
decisions
weremade,a variety
ofinformationandalternatives
wasconstantly
lacking.As notedabove,Johnson
wantedconsensus;
therefore
degreesof escalation
weretheonlyoptions.IrvingJanisarguesthat"groupthink,"
rather
thanan analytical
appraisal
ofall theoptions,
bestdescribes
thedecision-making
process
thatoccurred.56
Thus,although
a dominant
decision-making
structure
theactualprocess
mayexist,
canvaryenormously.
In the"Bureaucratic
Dominance"
decision-making
structure
numerousparticipants
areinvolved
andinfluential.
Quiteoftentheexactnatureof theprocessmayfollowthebureaucratic
politicsmodel,with
andcompromise,
in execution,
bargaining
andslippage
beingthedominantfeatures.
Although
theimplementation
phaseof theprocessfor
SALT I didnotoccurundertheJohnson
theformulaadministration,
tionofthedecision
wasa resultofbargaining
andcompromise.
However,a different
process
willresultifsomeparticipants
do notdemonstrate
"analytical
thinking,"
as JohnSteinbruner
notes:
Itisnatural
tosuppose,
bycontrast,
thatcognitive
actors
(thosewhodo
notthinkanalytically)
willnotdisplay
thesamedegreeofdeliberate
accommodation,
willactmoreindependently,
andwillby-pass
bargains
which
under
analytic
assumptions
wouldappeartobeobvious.57
In suchan instance,
compromise
will notbe achieved:anydecision
arrived
at willnotsatisfy
all theparticipants.
The decision-making
process
mayalsovaryunderthe"LocalDominance"structure,
in whichonlya minimalnumber
and
ofindividuals
are involved.
In thiscase,policycouldresultfromthe
organizations
"grooved
thinking"
oftheparticipants-promotion
of theirorganizationalmissionthrough
and alternalimitedscanning
of information
tives."However,individuals
mayalso displayothermodesof thinking: analytical,
ideological,
or uncommitted.59
Furthermore,
thepar56
Janis,Victimsof Groupthink(Boston: Houghton-Mifflin,
I972),
57Steinbruner(fn.55),
I47.
IOI-35.
58 See Allison(fn. ii),
on "organizational
process,"and Steinbruner
(fn. 55), concerningthe "cybernetic"
paradigm.
59 Ibid., I24-36. Still other modes of thinkingare possible.For a discussionof
"boundedrationality,"
see HerbertA. Simon,Models of Man: Social and Rational
(New York: Wiley,I957). Lindblomdiscusses"incrementalism"
in "The Scienceof
MuddlingThrough,"(fn.2). PatrickM. Morgan,in Deterrence:A ConceptualAnalysis (BeverlyHills, Calif.:Sage, I977), suggeststhe notionof "sensible"decisionmaking. For a generaldiscussionof the importance
of the thinkingprocessesof decision
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SYSTEMATIC DECISION-MAKING FRAMEWORK
251
and beliefsysticipants
involvedareboundto havediversepersonalities
impacton theirbehavior.The retemswhichmay have a substantial
structure
witha varietyof possibleprocesses.
sultis a decision-making
In sum, to actuallydeterminethe natureof the decision-making
mustbe considered.
process,knowledgebeyondthe decisionstructure
The beliefs,personalities,
and modes of thinkingof the participants
process.In addition,
will have a directeffecton the decision-making
of theparticion theperceptions
externalforceswill have an influence
pants.These two clustersof variables-decisioncontextand decision
in orderto
participants-must
be analyzedforeach decisionstructure
Since
process.60
determinethe exact natureof the decision-making
impactwithinthe decisionstructure,
thesefactorshave a different
theresultant
decisionprocesswill vary.61
CONCLUSION
The bureaucraticpoliticsmodel does not apply to policy-making
In thisarticle,I have hybehavioras oftenas is popularlyportrayed.
Bustructures-Presidential,
pothesizedthat three decision-making
reaucratic,
and Local Dominance-are possible,dependingupon the
Incorporating
thedecisionconinvolvement.
degreeoftheparticipants'
have been generatedwhichdelineate
text,threeadditionalhypotheses
do not
theoccurrence
These threestructures
of the decisionstructure.
resultin a particularprocess;rather,the processvariesas differences
It is throughthe
existin thecontextand thestylesof theparticipants.
interaction
and processthata deciof context,structure,
participants,
sion outcomeis produced(Figure 2 summarizesthe relationships).62
makers,see G. MatthewBonhamand MichaelJ. Shapiro,"Thoughtand Actionin
Viewed PsychoForeignPolicy,"and Ole R. Holsti,"ForeignPolicyDecision-Makers
in Bonhamand Shapiro,eds., Thoughtand
logically:CognitiveProcessApproaches,"
Birkhauser,
Actionin ForeignPolicy(Basel and Stuttgart:
I977), i-8 and 9-74.
60 A detaileddiscussion
of thesevariablesand theirimpacton the decisionprocess
is beyondthescopeof thispaper.For a workon the decisioncontextas a situational
on thedecisionprocess,see Linda B. Brady,"The Situationand
variableand its effect
ForeignPolicy,"in East and others(fn. 54), I73-90. Also see MargaretG. Hermann,
of PoliticalLeaderson ForeignPolicy,"in East and
of PersonalCharacteristics
"Effects
of decisionparticiothers(fn. 54), 49-68,fora generaldiscussionof the importance
pants'attributes.
"decisionprocess"does not lend itselfto
61 This is not to implythatthecomponent
theorybuilding.The decisionprocesscan be classifiedinto a numberof fundamental
can be hywithotherdecisioncomponents
types(e.g., "bargaining")and relationships
CharlesHermann(fn.54), 83-go,has alreadymade a stepin thisdirection.
pothesized.
62 The fivedecisional
are derivedfromRobinsonand Majak (fn.9), I78.
components
This content downloaded on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 22:50:33 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
CRISIS
D
P
DECISION
PARTICIPANTS
DECISION
STRUCTURE
DECISION
CONTEXT
Presidential
Dominance
Personali
ty
BureaucraticL;
ROUTINE
L
Fo
Dominance
FIGURE 2
SUMMARY
OF PROPOSED RELATIONSHIPS
DECISIONAL
COMPONENTS
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
FOR ANY
BETWEEN
SINGLE ISSU