Environmentalism
Elliott Sober criticizes environmentalism for claiming that we have obligations to protect
entire species or ecosystems. The environmentalist, Sober claims, is faced with what
what he calls “The Demarcation Problem”:
The Demarcation Problem: In order for the environmentalist position to be a
sensible one, it must do 3 things: (1) Identify which things matter, morally, and
which do not, (2) Explain which properties or features those individuals have that
give rise to our moral duties toward them, and (3) This must not result in the
conclusion that we have moral obligations toward ALL things.
For instance, if the environmentalist wants the conclusion that we have moral reasons to
preserve a mountain range, but not a parking garage, they will need to provide a theory
which provides REASONS for this, and accurately delivers this conclusion. So, let’s now
continue the conversation begun in the Russow article, and ask, “Why do species or
ecosystems matter, morally?”
1. Suffering: One reason to protect nature is that, by failing to do so, SUFFFERING will
occur. For instance, destroying ecosystems causes animals to suffer and die.
Reply: But, environmentalists are typically not concerned with suffering overall. Perhaps
PART of what environmentalists call for can be explained by harm (e.g., not using animal
traps that cause pain to animals, or refraining from factory farming), much of what they
claim cannot be so explained.
First, much of the environment cannot feel pain; for instance, forests, mountains, and
rivers do not feel pain. And yet, environmentalists promote their preservation.
Second, even with animals that DO feel pain, an environmentalist might think it is FAR
worse to kill an animal of an endangered species than it is to kill that of another, even if
doing so causes equal amounts of pain. Consider, for example, this story, about killing
off non-threatened barred owls to provide habtitats for threatened spotted owls.
Clearly, the environmentalist position for preservation of species is not really grounded
in the pain and suffering that occurs when a species is lost.
2. Ignorance: In the last section, we saw that many species have proven themselves to
have instrumental value (e.g., leading to medicinal benefits, or as keystone species, etc.).
Many environmentalists claim that, even if we cannot NOW point to any particular
benefits of a certain species or ecosystem, by failing to preserve them, there is a chance
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that we will forever lose this great benefit that they provide. We simply cannot KNOW
for certain what the effects of extinction or ecological destruction will be.
Reply: Elliott Sober claims that it is irrational to believe that we ought to protect
something when we have no reason to think that doing so would be beneficial. The
mere POSSIBILITY of a benefit is not enough—especially when the possible benefit is
very UNLIKELY. In short, it would be irrational to forego a CERTAIN benefit based on the
possibility of a very UNLIKELY cost.
We take calculated risks like this all the time. To illustrate, consider that, even though
there is the very small chance that the plane you are about to take will crash, you ride it
anyway. The benefit of flying is great enough that it is not irrational to ride on one.
He writes,
“We are prepared to accept a small chance of a great disaster in return for the
high probability of a rather modest benefit. If this is rational, no wonder that we
might consistently be willing to allow a species to go extinct in order to build a
hydroelectric plant.”
Furthermore, in real life examples, environmentalists are often fighting to preserve some
endangered species that we are fairly certain has NO benefits, who inhabit a very small
area, and whose population is very small—such that the probability of some disaster is
not unknown, but rather known to be almost zero. Consider, for instance, the fight to
save the California condor, or this story about spending $1.25 million to build a rope
and tube bridge system over a highway in near Mount Graham, Arizona, in order to save
about 5 red squirrels per year from roadkill (an endangered species, of which there are
only about 250 individuals remaining).
So, environmentalists do not really rely on the ignorance argument in many actual cases
(i.e., they do not say, “we should save them because, for all we know, not saving them
will be the loss of the next cure for cancer, or the collapse of an entire ecosystem, etc.”).
3. The Slippery Slope: If I eat one potato chip, I’ll probably want another. And then
another. And then another. Until they’re all gone. With potato chips, it’s either all or
nothing. If you’re like me, then you can’t have just one. You can have none, or you can
eat an entire bag.
Some environmentalists claim that the destruction of species is like that; a slippery
slope. They argue something like:
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1. If it is morally permissible to destroy one species, then it is morally permissible to
destroy ALL of the species.
2. Clearly, it is not morally permissible to destroy ALL of the species.
3. Therefore, it is not morally permissible to destroy ONE species.
Why would this be? The first premise is grounded in a problem of vagueness. The idea
is that, if killing one species would be permissible, then surely killing two would be
permissible. But, then, surely killing THREE would be permissible. And, since there is no
exact line to be drawn at which it goes from permissible to IMpermissible, it must be
permissible to kill ALL of them. The abortion debate contains a similar premise. Antiabortionists point out that, clearly it is morally wrong to kill a newborn baby. But, then,
surely it is also wrong to kill an unborn baby a few minutes before birth. But, then, surely
it is wrong to kill it a few minutes before that; and so on, until we conclude that it must
be wrong to kill a fertilized egg that is a few minutes old, because there is no clear
place to draw the line.
Reply: This is a mistaken line of reasoning. It is often the case that, even if we cannot
find the dividing line between where something changes from one extreme to the other,
this does not entail that the extremes themselves do not exist. Consider:
Stage 1: I have a full head of hair, with 100,000 hairs
Stage 2: I pluck one hair, so that I have 99,999 hairs on my head.
Stage 3: I pluck another hair, so that I have 99,998 hairs on my head.
Stage 4: I pluck another hair ….
…
Stage 100,000: I have no hairs at all. I am bald
Ask this question: At what stage did I go from being not-bald to bald? It seems
impossible to locate the specific point at which this occurred—i.e., there is no clear LINE
to be drawn between not-bald and bald—but we should not conclude from this that
there is NO DIFFERENCE between having a full head of hair and baldness.
Similarly, if we admit that killing off one species is permissible, we should not conclude
from this that killing ALL of them is also permissible. Just because there is no clear line
to be drawn does not entail that there is no moral difference between killing off one
species, and all 8.7 million species on the planet. At most, Sober suggests that what we
need to do is assess each extinction on a case-by-case basis. While it might be deemed
permissible to cause the extinction of the snail darter now in order to reap the benefits
of more jobs and renewable energy, in the future, as fewer and fewer species remain,
the destruction of a similar small fish might be seen as too high a price to pay for a
similar benefit.
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4. Natural vs. Unnatural: Many environmentalists imply by their actions that so-called
“natural” species and habitats are of greater value than “unnatural” ones. For instance,
they would put up less of a fuss over the extinction of some domesticated breed or subspecies of household dog than they would about a sub-species of wild rhinoceros (such
as the black rhino subspecies).
[Is this true? Some have taken tremendous efforts to re-establish the populations of dog
breeds that were nearly lost.]
No matter the case, it is certain that environmentalists favor preserving and restoring
“natural” habitats and environments. But, there seem to be only two good candidates:
 Natural = Without human intervention. But, then, any attempt to intervene to
prevent “natural” death or disease is bad. What is more, “restoration” projects
would be fundamentally misguided (since restoration is a human activity).
 Natural = Whatever occurs in nature. But, then, this would not rule out ANY
human activity, since human beings themselves (and their activity) occur in
nature.
As we have already seen, this distinction is a notoriously slippery one.
5. Needs and Interests: Another proposal that we have already looked at is that which
says that species and ecosystems have “interests” or “needs”, which must be fulfilled in
order to flourish. For instance, it is common to say things like, “Your lawn needs some
water. It is not doing so well.” And perhaps endangered species, and mountain ranges,
and so on have needs and interests in this way as well.
But, first, what is it that species and ecosystems WANT? To continue to exist? To remain
unchanged from its original state? Or what? Second, whatever the answer to our first
question, what would make it the case that my car, or a slum, or a business LACKS these
sorts of “needs” or “interests”? For instance, we might say, “Your car needs a tune-up. It
is not doing so well.” Does my car “want” to continue to exist? Does it have an “interest”
in remaining in its pristine original state? If so, then I must have a moral obligation not
to destroy it, and not to put any wear and tear on it by driving it. But, that is absurd.
Sober claims that this proposal is just a mis-interpretation of Darwinism. Darwin
constantly speaks of species striving to survive, and competing, and wanting things. But,
natural selection is not REALLY goal-directed. Ultimately, natural selection is just an
undirected, goal-less natural process. Species do not REALLY have “needs” or “desires”.
Those terms are just an antrhopomorphization of the process.
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6. Intrinsic Value: It is easy to see how preserving our environment is likely to benefit
US. If we destroy the environment that we live in, then we are sure to suffer. But, many
propose that we ought to preserve the environment FOR IT’S OWN SAKE, such that,
even in cases where we cannot point to any known tangible benefits in preserving
nature (e.g., nutritional, medicinal, economic, or recreational), we nevertheless have a
duty to preserve it. This is true because the various species and ecosystems themselves
have INTRINSIC value.
But, what SORT of value do species and ecosystems have? Let’s consider 2 cases:
 Last Man on Earth (Art): Far in the future, the human race is about to go extinct.
Even all sentient creatures (animals) have already gone extinct, and there is one
man remaining, among all of the plants, lakes, rivers, and mountains (and empty
cities). He plants bombs in all of the world’s famous museums and landmarks
(e.g., the Louvre, the Acropolis, the pyramids, the Metropolitan Museum of Art,
and so on). Then, he rigs a device to his chest which, when it no longer detects
his heartbeat, will set off all of the nuclear warheads in the world. The moment he
dies, these bombs are detonated, and all of the world’s famous art is obliterated.
 Last Man on Earth (Nature): Far in the future, the human race is about to go
extinct. Even all sentient creatures (animals) have already gone extinct, and there
is one man remaining, among all of the plants, lakes, rivers, and mountains (and
empty cities). He rigs a device to his chest which, when it no longer detects his
heartbeat, will set off all of the nuclear warheads in the world. The moment he
dies, these warheads are detonated, and the entire Earth—with all of its plants,
lakes, rivers, and mountains) is obliterated.
Let us stipulate two additional things: (1) It is certain that no alien species will ever
discover or visit Earth. (2) It is certain that, no matter what, no sentient life will ever
evolve on the planet again.
So, the last man is TRULY the last sentient creature to ever experience Earth. Now ask,
does the last man do anything WRONG in either of these stories? Note that the
environmentalist MUST answer “yes” in the second case. For, mountains and lakes and
rivers have intrinsic value—therefore, we have a moral obligation not to destroy them
for no reason. If you share this intuition, then it is possible that you too think there is
some VALUE to nature, in and of itself—and it ought to be preserved, not because of
the good that such preservation would LEAD TO, but rather because it is inherently
good for nature to exist. It is VALUABLE (and this not to be confused with “has a
MONETARY value”).
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But, what is more, typically the environmentalist wants to say that what the last man
does in the first case is NOT wrong; or at least that it is much LESS wrong than what he
does in the second case. Elliott Sober finds this odd. WHY, he asks, would it be the case
that destroying, say, Delicate Arch in Utah is morally wrong, while destroying the Roman
Colosseum is not?
Like Russow, Sober suggests that perhaps nature is only valuable for AESTHETIC
reasons. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 stated that endangered and threatened
species of wildlife and plants “are of aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.”
If there are moral reasons to preserve of nature FOR IT’S OWN SAKE, then, perhaps these
are the same sorts of reasons that we have to preserve famous works of art; namely,
because they are all beautiful. The idea that nature has intrinsic value for aesthetic
reasons has intuitive appeal, for there are many parallels between nature and art:
(1) We consider it to be a more valuable experience to see an original work of art,
rather than a mere copy, even if they are identical. Similarly, we derive more value
from seeing a species “in the wild”, or in its natural habitat, rather than in a zoo.
(2) The aesthetic value of a work of art increases with rarity (e.g., of that artist, that
style, or that period, etc.). Similarly, the aesthetic value of an organism or
ecosystem increases with rarity (e.g., we derive more pleasure from seeing rare
creatures than we do from seeing common ones).
(3) Clearly, you would be a monster for saving a van Gogh from a burning building
instead of your Mom. Similarly, you would be a monster for saving a rare snail
darter from a burning building instead of your Mom. So, the value of art and
nature is easily overridden by human interests.
If that is the case, then we can give the same answer about what the last man does in
BOTH cases above. Either (1) he is wrong in BOTH cases, or (2) he is wrong in NEITHER
case—depending upon whether or not beautiful things need valuers to be valuable.
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