THE
NAVAL
REVIEW
TO PROMOTE THE ADVANCEMENT AND SPREADING WITHIN
THE SERVICE OF KNOWLEDGE RELEVANT TO THE HIGHER
ASPECTS OF THE NAVAL PROFESSION.
Founded in October, 1912, by the following officers, who had formed
a Naval Society:
Captain H. W. Richmond R.N.
Commander K. G. B. Dewar R.N.
Commander the Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett R.N.
Lieutenant R. M. Bellairs R.N.
Lieutenant T. Fisher R.N.
Lieutenant H. G. Thursfield R.N.
Captain E. W. Harding R.M.A.
Admiral W. H. Henderson (Honorary Editor)
It is only by the possession of a trained and developed mind
that the fullest capacity can, as a rule, be obtained. There
are, of course, exceptional individuals with rare natural
gifts which make up for deficiencies. But such gifts are
indeed rare. We are coming more and more to recognise
that the best specialist can be produced only after a long
training in general learning. The grasp of principle which
makes detail easy can only come when innate capacity has
been evoked and moulded by high training.
Lord Haldane
Issued quarterly for private circulation, in accordance with the
Regulation printed herein, which should b e carefully studied.
Copyright under Act of I91 1
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any mean\, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording
or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission from the
Editor in writing.
Vol. 84
No. 4
OCTOBER 1996
Contents
Page
EDITORIAL
.............................................
ARTICLES:
...............
............
IT IS NOT MANOEUVRE VERSUS ATTRITION
........................
ETHOS .
IV
..........................................
ETHOS -- V -- AN OFFICER O F THE 1990s
........................
THE CASE FOR THE OPERATIONAL WATCH
........................
NEVER MIND T H t COST, FEEL THE PRODUCTIVITY!
..................
HARKING BACK
.......................................
AVAILABILITY -- DOUBLE OR QUITS'!
...........................
PHOENIX UNWANTED .
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RNZN -- II
...........................
LAUNCHING THE FLAGSHIP -- A PARTNERING MADE IN FOTR
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ARMED FORCES
FORTY YEARS ON: THE ORIGINS AND SUCCESSES O F THE UK NAVAL NUCLEAR
..............................
.................................
BALLADE O F THE MIDDLE EAST
..............................
THE YANGTZE RIVER, 2 I APRIL 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OH, RATS!
..........................................
BLIND APPROACH -- I1
....................................
FORMATION O F THE ELECTRICAL AND TAS BRANCHES
..................
INCIDENT OFF THE BELGIAN COAST
...........................
HMS GOLIATH'S FULL POWER TRIAL IN 1908
........................
THE SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY IN THE GLILF -- 1797 T O 1820
...............
PAWS FOR THOUGHT
....................................
PROPULSION PROGRAMME -- 111
SUEZ .
FORTY YEARS ON
'-ORRESPONDENCE
.......................................
COMMANDING THE FLEET IN THE PJHQ ERA .
CORPORATE MADNESS .
OPEN REPORTING
AND PROMOTION .
FORTY YEARS ON .
RETIRED OFFICERS IN WORLD WAR I1 .
MINES IN
MIND, AN11 OTHER MATTERS .
HOW WE WON THE WAR .
THE SUBMARINE AND THE
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
E W MEMBERS
..........................................
299
Editorial
This issue
S usual, 1 have allowed the October issue
to go overweight, but not I hope into
obesity. By custom we give more space to
history and reminiscence in this issue, but
students of the contemporary scene will find
plenty to interest them. The Ethos discussion
is continued, but not exhausted, by two
articles from officers of very different
seniorities, but just as important is a related
and much longer report of a Ditchley Park
Conference on the State and the Armed
Forces. This owed a good deal to its Service
participants (only one from the RN, by the
way) but probably more to its civilian element,
and it is that from which, I suggest, we have
most to learn.
Other contemporary topics include a paper
on Doctrine from the other side of the Atlantic
which is well up to Commander Jim Tritten's
usual high level of abstraction and, if he will
forgive me, exegesis; there is an all too rare
discussion of how business is now done at sea
in the 'Operational Watch'; and Steam Trap
continues to stimulate us with his views on
design and management. Finally, it is good to
see a contribution from the Maritime
Volunteer Service; Part 11, 1 am assured, will
explain exactly why it cannot be regarded as a
replicated RNXS, but something new in kind.
It is by all accounts doing very well, and all
success to it.
As for history, yes there is a lot. Members
do, I know, find much of it of absorbing
interest in its own right, and I would not want
to labour too much the point that lessons may
be learnt relevant to the present day. It is a
fact, though.
A
National Maritime Museum
Dynamic programmes continue, and there are
so many that space cannot be found to
mention all of them. Two stand out:
The Bark Endeavour, a full-size and
faithful replica of Cook's ship, is due to
arrive in March 1997 for a seven-month,
fifteen-port tour of the UK. The Museum,
which is the UK focus for the event,
invites applications for passenger and
crew berths. Anyone interested should
ring 0181 858 4422; the Press Officer is
Michael Barrett.
The Neptune Court Project will create
a great deal more exhibition space 2,500 square metres roofed in. It will be
funded largely by the Heritage Lottery
Fund, but as with all these projects there
must be a substantial proportion from
public subscription - £4 million in this
case. There is a scheme to 'Put your
Name in History', to be displayed at a
suitable point in the atrium. The contact
here is David Williams, 0181 3 12 6718.
The Institute of Marine Engineers
Two two-day Conferences in 1997 are worth
noting: 'Marine Risk Assessment' in London
on 7-8 May, and 'Marine Propulsion: Turbinia
and beyond' in Newcastle upon Tyne on
26-27 June. Contact is Fleur Heapy, Events
Co-Ordinator, The Institute of Marine
Engineers, 76 Mark Lane, London EC3R 7JN,
tel: 0171 481 8493.
Arleigh Burke Essay Contest
Anyone may enter for this contest, which is
sponsored by the US Naval Institute. The First
Prize is $3,000; essays, which may be on any
naval subject, must not exceed 3,500 words
and must be postmarked on or before 1
December 1996. There are other rules, and
anyone intending to enter should contact
Kimberly Park, US Naval Institute, telephone
(USA) 4 10-268-61 10 or FAX 41 0-269-7940.
Victory's Foretopsail
Finally, I make no apology for the appearance
of my current hobbyhorse as Chairman of the
Society for Nautical Research. The
foretopsail, the biggest single Thing that has
come down to us from Trafalgar, has been
restored to a state where, given suitable
surroundings, it could be exhibited to the
public. It is huge; mounted on replica mast and
yard, it would have a stunning impact. We
have to find a home for it in the Portsmouth
heritage area, and that is not easy. If you want
to know more, and maybe help, please get in
touch with me.
RICHARD
HILL
Subscriptions 1977
Members whose subscriptions are not paid automatically by Direct Debit or Banker's Standing
Order are reminded that subscriptions for 1997 are due on or before 1 January 1997. (The
subscription rate remains unchanged at £15 for Lieutenants and above: £7.50 for SubLieutenants and below.) Payment in sterling please (or currency notes but not overseas cheques)
is requested without further reminder. (For address, see 'Membership' page at the back of this
issue.)
Deeds of Covenant
Many serving officers, quite understandably, claim their subscription to The Naval Review as an
allowance against tax. This no longer applies when you have retired unless your next job is
connected to your profession as a Naval officer. All members are asked, if they do not already
subscribe under a Deed of Covenant, to examine their circumstances, and if appropriate, to
consider making a Deed of Covenant in favour of The Nuvul Review (a form can be found at the
back of each issue).
Launching the Flagship - a Partnering
made in FOTR
M
IN(AF), The Honourable Nicholas
Soames, was in excellent form as he lent
his support to the highly professional,
convincing and frank presentations by Rear
Admiral J. H. S. McAnally, LVO,
FOTRINRTA and Mr George Cameron,
General Manager Flagship Training Limited
(previously of Vosper Thornycroft) at the
Partnering Launch on 9 Sep 96. FOTR
recognised that the savings wedge he had
inherited, reducing his cash budget by 25% in
the first five years, could not be met by the
bright ideas meant to generate them and that
market testing offered little. In essence he had
no choice but to develop a partnering initiative
or close up to three Establishments, including
Dyad. In response, Mr Cameron outlined the
strategic reasoning for Flagship, representing
GEC-Marconi, Vosper Thornycroft and
Procord (a facilities management company),
and the way in which Flagship aimed to
market RN Training in this country and
abroad.
The key financial measures were noted to
be Income Generation (IG), from training
sales, Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) and
Value for Money Savings (VMS), where
Flagship has already taken the lead in the
provision of hotel services in the four largest
NRTA Establishments. Risks and expenditure
will be met by both Flagship and NRTA at an
agreed 40160 split and the need to retain the
RN's widely recognised, but poorly defined,
ethos in a highly competitive market place
was acknowledged. Nevertheless, a cautious
start has meant that some of the marketing
strategies are not yet in place, whether to loss
lead, quality versus quantity etc. Recently, a
Portsmouth based training contract was lost to
a local training college by a significant
financial margin. On the other hand, the
ability for Flagship competitively to market
customised training from English Language
through academic and professional teaching,
PJTs to operational experience at sea, should
enable Flagship, NRTA and the RN to
establish a unique niche for the UK PIC in the
international market place. If there is a downside it is that the savings wedge remains to be
met, if not by IG and PFI then by VMS; there
is a delicate balance to be struck between
VMS, which also generates income for
Flagship, and asset consolidation.
FOTR had little choice but to develop this
courageous initiative and it is now up to the
next generation of RN. Civil Service and
Flagship personnel to take up the
opportunities that will be provided. For better
or worse there is no turning back; RN Training
will never be the same again.
The Minister finished by enthusiastically
recognising that the Royal Navy had stolen a
march and welcomed the sales opportunities
that the marketing of the 'world's best naval
training' would bring. Mr Soames considered
that the 'Government was waking up' to the
new opportunities presented by the Flagship
initiative and noted that the Army was being
kept informed of developments by FOTR.
SRA
Relationships between the State and the
Armed Forces
An essay on a Ditchley Foundations conference held at Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, England
on the weekend of 31 May-2 June 1996: reproduced by permission.
M
ILITARY service in democracies has
always reflected something of a bargain
or contract between the state and the armed
forces. The metaphor of a contract refers to an
agreed-upon set of implicit moral obligations
between the two: in return for pay and other
material support - and society's reasonable
respect - service members have forfeited
personal freedom, undergone stressful
training and unpleasant living conditions, and
on occasion sacrificed their lives in defence of
what was perceived, at least at the time, to be
the national interest. For a mix of reasons
elements of this bargain have been questioned,
and in some cases altered, over the past
several decades.
This contract has been more deeply
questioned, however, since the thawing of
age-old rivalries frozen by the Cold War has
required soldiers to serve, often at great risk
and usually as part of multinational coalitions,
in numerous operations falling outside the
realm of traditional combat. The end of the
bipolar standoff has also led to a precipitous
decline in defence spending by western
democracies, substantial reductions in the size
of their militaries, and a growing
unwillingness among their governments to
allocate resources or military forces to costly
and politically hazardous military operations.
In the light of the changes brought by this new
era, several specific questions may be raised.
How have these changes affected the contract
- the expectations of the state, society, and the
armed forces about their responsibilities
toward one another? How have they
influenced the expectations of governments
concerning the utility of military force in
international affairs? And, in response to these
changes, how should democratic militaries be
raised, treated, managed and trained?
These questions were the subject of a
conference at Ditchley Park on the first
weekend of June 1996. The composition of the
conference should be noted; it had significant
implications for the perspectives brought to
bear. Approximately half the group were
academic analysts; roughly one third were
senior military officers, presently serving or
recently retired; the remainder, aside from one
journalist, were former or current civilian
policymakers. The richness of the dialogue
was enhanced by the first-hand experience of
many members as participants or observers in
the deployment of military forces to the
Persian Gulf, Haiti, and Bosnia. But it should
also be noted that the substantial number of
senior military officers in the group ensured
that its consideration of the contract was
weighted heavily in favour of what the
military (at the institutional and the individual
level) expected, desired and required from the
state to be an effective instrument of national
policy, rather than the armed forces'
responsibilities to the state or the expectations
of the state or society. Finally, among this
diverse group it was evident that the manner in
which nations raise, maintain and use their
armed forces is significantly shaped by
political and cultural legacies. Thus, while it is
possible and useful to make general
observations about the contract within
democratic states, it is also clear that the
nature of the contract varies substantially
across states.
Several members of the conference had
reservations regarding the utility of the
metaphor of 'contract', but the majority
concluded
that it was useful - f i r
conceptualising the triangle of interdependent
relationships between state, society and armed
forces. Though individual working groups
each focused on distinct elements of this
contract, the findings of these groups
overlapped significantly and were oriented
broadly along two central themes. First, the
bulk of our effort was devoted to considering
the contract as it related to the use of force. We
deliberated when, where, for what purpose
and in what form military forces should be
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ARMED FORCES
used, and what the military have a right to
expect when governments commit them to
action. We also examined political and social
changes in democratic societies which from
the standpoint of the military appear to be
undermining aspects of the contract. The
remainder of this essay is devoted to these two
themes.
Military operations for a new era
The nature of military operations in the postCold War era has been dramatically affected
by two overarching trends. First, the world has
changed. For all its dangers, the Cold War
brought consistency and stability to
international relations. It has been replaced by
a wholly different world - complex,
dangerous, unpredictable - faced with a
plethora of small-scale wars waged as often by
terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and ordinary
citizens as by traditional armies. Changes in
the world have been accompanied by
accelerating advances
in
technology.
Developments in precision-guided weaponry,
for example, permit modern militaries to
conduct combat from a distance and have
arguably blurred the distinctions between
front lines and rear areas. Concurrently,
instantaneous communication capabilities
have led to greater and more influential media
scrutiny of military activities around the
world.
Though these trends obviously have
significant implications for the conduct of
military operations, the group was somewhat
divided over the likely effects of technological
advances. While one participant suggested
that technology could, in time, eliminate the
need for the classic infantryman and reduce
the probability of death or injury within the
military profession, this suggestion provoked
an immediate and emotional outburst from
numerous participants who warned against
being seduced by technology. Success in
future combat, the majority concluded, will
continue to depend most on the ability of
highly-trained infantrymen to take ground and
hold it.
There was substantially more accord over
the types of operations in which militaries are
like to engage. We noted that the use of
303
military forces for a wide variety of operations
is hardly a new phenomenon, as the British,
French and American experiences illustrate.
Yet while the spectrum of activities - from
great power war to nonmilitary domestic
functions - that can be asked of modern
militaries remains the same, there has been a
notable shift in the frequency and importance
of certain tasks. The prospect of major war has
receded greatly and a middle range of
activities such as peace enforcement,
peacekeeping
and
the
humanitarian
intervention have become more prominent.
Likewise, militaries are increasingly required
to participate in non-military operations such
as civil affairs, policing, nation-building,
liaison with non-governmental organisations,
drug interdiction and migration control.
Intervention: new challenges, enduring
truths
When and how military forces are used for
these kinds of operations is of course a crucial
element of the contract. Debates within
democratic states about military interventions
revolve around three central questions whether to intervene, why to intervene and
how to intervene. The manner in which
civilian and military leaders grapple with and
agree upon the answers to these questions
dictates the extent to which they fulfil one
another's expectations. Predictably, the
military desire clear public support, unclouded
military objectives and sufficient resources as
prerequisites for intervention. At the same
time, our discussions revealed that post-Cold
War military operations raise a multitude of
intractable and unprecedented issues that may
make these prerequisites increasingly difficult
to satisfy.
States of course intervene for a variety of
motives. Their purposes may be largely
ideological, as with the US intervention in
Central America in the 1980s; altruistic, as
was the case with the UN intervention in
Somalia in 1993; due primarily to domestic
pressures, as with the US intervention in Haiti;
or the result of outside pressure, as was the
case when a number of Arab states joined the
US-led coalition in the Gulf. Regardless of the
motive, however, the degree of domestic
304
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ARMED FORCES
public support is an obvious and important
consideration. There is some evidence that
this support will be increasingly difficult to
obtain in the post-Cold War era. Some
commentators have noted among the public
'compassion fatigue' - a growing callousness
to human suffering that makes the public less
likely to support humanitarian interventions.
In addition, while attitudes on intervention
vary widely by country, we noted a general
increase in the unwillingness of developed
countries to shoulder the risks of failure or
casualties, though several participants were
quick to assert that the 'no casualties' reflex
among democratic publics is grossly
overstated. W e also concluded that the media
both reflect and affect public attitudes. And
though participants were somewhat divided
on this point, media images of starving
Somalis or Haitian boat-people, for example,
do appear to influence policy, at least in the
United States. Regardless of the public's
general disposition towards interventions, its
willingness to deploy military forces in a
particular situation depends on whether it
considers the purpose of the operation as
legitimate and worth the cost in blood and
national treasure.
Despite the capricious nature of public
support, there was agreement among most
participants that it should be a prerequisite for
intervention. In other words, armed forces
should not be required by civil authorities to
intervene unless the public supports such
action. This view was based on the notion that
the military need public support lest they be
seen as the tool of some partisan purpose.
Moreover, professional soldiers particularly
noted the importance of the military being
seen as representing the will of the nation, and
not a praetorian guard. As one remarked: 'We
need to be treated in a way that keeps us
connected.' The participants also observed
that as national interests become more diffuse
in the post-Cold War era, there will be an
added burden on civilian policymakers to
communicate in a skilled and timely manner
the logic behind military interventions and to
prepare their populations for the possibility of
casualties.
In retrospect, however, this aspect of our
discussion overlooked several important
points. First, public opinion is of course
interactive; that is to say, the willingness of
the public to support intervention depends on
how clearly civilian policymakers articulate
the objectives and how persuasively they
make their case. Public opinion scholars have
documented well the 'rally around the flag'
effect - the propensity of the public to support
decisions to intervene once such decisions
have been made. It is possible that by placing
too much emphasis on the need for 'public
support' policymakers may preclude the use
of force altogether. Second, as one senior
soldier observed during the proceedings: 'The
military must not be seen as catering to public
opinion or as being overly concerned about
polls'. One might take this statement a step
further by arguing that to engage in public
debate over the wisdom of a particular
intervention inevitably politicises the military,
an outcome most would agree is undesirable.
Though the military have a responsibility to
both the society and the state, society's views
are reflected in the democratic process. Thus,
as the group acknowledged, the military must
be absolutely prepared to carry out the state's
mandate, regardless of whether it runs counter
to public opinion and even when they view
such operations as misguided. This is a crucial
component, perhaps the most crucial
component, of the military's side of the
contract.
There was also a general consensus among
the participants that civilian policymakers
need to be more sensitive to the exigencies of
military operations. In particular, they must
better articulate national interests and clear,
specific objectives that the military is capable
of accomplishing. The conference observed
that the absence of clear objectives has, in
recent years, been a source of great frustration,
and often at the root of failure in military
operations when failures have occurred. To
overcome this problem several participants
suggested that military leaders be better
integrated into the political decision-making
process, some advocating more sophisticated
staff structures as a potential solution.
Additionally, several senior officers noted that
it is the responsibility of professional soldiers
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ARMED FORCES
to be forthright in pressing civilian leaders for
specific guidance and informing them when
the guidance given is inadequate. Several US
participants observed that the US had become
more successful recently in integrating
military leaders into the decision-making
process. as evidenced in relatively clear
mandate provided to US forces in
deployments to Haiti and Bosnia.
These examples notwithstanding, the
conference was sceptical of the possibility of
policymakers being any more empathetic or of
military leaders receiving guidance as clear
and specific as they would like. First, a
diminishing number of civilian decisionmakers have military experience, and the
cultivation of defence expertise is no longer a
well-travelled path to political prominence.
Additionally, domestic politics often militates
against clarity of purpose; ambiguity is a
political device used to gain consensus.
Similarly, states may sometimes deploy forces
simply 'to do something', a course of action
uniformly opposed by the members of the
conference, but one on which they did not
elaborate with examples. In addition, within
multilateral coalitions the need for consensus
in decision-making often leads to the lowest
common denominator, diminishing the
potential for clarity and unified purpose.
Finally, it is particularly difficult to define
tangible objectives and success criteria for the
middle range of military tasks - peace
enforcement,
peacekeeping,
and
humanitarian interventions - which have
become increasingly prevalent. Success in
alleviating
human
suffering, creating
conditions for peace, and even stopping the
continuance or spread of violence, for
example, is more difficult to measure
objectively than the outcomes of more
traditional combat operations. Moreover, it is
inevitable that even the most clearly defined
objectives may change in these types of
operations where the balance between peace
and war often hangs by a thread.
Several additional points regarding the
clarity of military objectives deserve mention.
Though the conference lamented the failure of
civilian policymakers to define the vital and
non-vital national interests that justify
intervention, we devoted little attention to
considering how, if at all, national interests
may have been altered by the end of the Cold
War. National interests may be viewed on a
continuum with those which are vital to
national survival (such as sovereignty and
robust nuclear deterrence) at one end and
those which are non-vital (such as the
promotion of human rights, the spread of
democracy, the mitigation of human
suffering) at the other. There are of course a
range of interests in between (such as nonproliferation or free trade), and the divide
between what is vital and what i s not is murky,
varying considerably across nations.
These interests generally do not change.
What does change however is the magnitude
and nature of the threat to these interests and
the capacity and willingness of nations to
intervene with military forces on behalf of
them. The end of the Cold War has permitted
Western democracies to intervene on behalf of
non-vital interests around the world without
fear of provoking global confrontation.
Though some members of the conference
were optimistic, the jury is still out on how
capable (and appropriate) military forces are
for promoting certain non-vital interests
through humanitarian efforts, nationbuilding,
policing functions, monitoring human rights,
election support and the like. How effective
these operations prove to be will help to define
the objectives for future military operations.
Regardless of these objectives. however,
national interests remain the same. It is the
willingness of nations to deploy forces to
advance these interests that is subject to
change.
Second, it is reasonable to ask once again
whether the military's quest for certainty and
clarity in military objectives may preclude the
use of force altogether. As one of the
participants noted, militaries have perpetually
complained about woolly guidance and
uncertain purpose on the part of civilian
policymakers and have periodically called for
better integration of military professionals
into the political decision-making process. For
the reasons already suggested, however,
ambiguous military objectives may be even
more inescapable in the post-Cold War era
306
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ARMED FORCES
than in the past. It is therefore not
unreasonable to ask whether military
institutions must adapt, at least in some
degree, to the ambiguous guidance and limited
successes that are probably characteristics of
many post-Cold War interventions. Indeed, a
certain amount of flexibility in this area may
be a necessary amendment to their part of the
contract.
Finally, the conference also discussed the
character of future military interventions. We
agreed that multinational frameworks,
comprised of 'coalitions of the willing', would
be indispensable for future operations as they
not only spread the expense of interventions
across nations but also help build domestic
and
international
consensus,
thereby
conferring legitimacy upon the undertaking.
This observation was juxtaposed with the
perception that public opinion within some
developed countries is increasingly hostile to
multinational operations, regardless of how
compelling the case for such operations. The
disapproval of multilateral operations is
resonant in the United States, particularly
when interventions are proposed under the
auspices of the UN and US soldiers might be
placed under foreign control. There was also
the realisation among our ranks that the
success of multinational coalitions depends
most on US participation, and that the
prospects for such participation have
diminished significantly with the advent of a
Republican majority in the US Congress
hostile to the United Nations.
Participants were divided over the role of
the UN in future multinational operations.
Some argued that only NATO provided the
political-military command structure needed
and that UN-led operations (as opposed to
NATO-led or UN-subcontracted activities)
seriously compromised the effectiveness of
military interventions. Several members even
went so far as to conclude that as a coordinator
of multinational interventions 'the UN is
broken beyond repair'. Conversely, others
were more sanguine about the future role of
the UN and the possibility of significant and
profitable reform to address its welldocumented shortcomings. Those who were
more optimistic about the UN's prospects
pointed
to
'successful'
traditional
peacekeeping operations during the Cold War,
as well as to a relatively effective string of
'second generation' UN operations in El
Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti.
As important as the overall content of
multinational coalitions are the specific kinds
of forces that should be deployed for this
'middle range' of military operations. In his
1957 classic The Soldier and the State the
American
political
scientist
Samuel
Huntington observes that: 'The military man
desires forces capable of meeting every
contingency. The limitations of human
foresight make it dangerous to assume that
security threats will necessarily take one
particular form.' This observation was echoed
by many throughout the weekend. The
majority of participants agreed that the
military
too
often suffer from a
resourcelstrategy gap resources inadequate for
accomplishing established military objectives.
Several
participants
highlighted
the
humiliating response (or lack of response) to
genocide by a poorly armed and understrength
Dutch battalion in Szrebrenica to illustrate this
point. The group's solution was a simple one:
military forces deployed for a given operation
must be capable of high-intensity conflict or
as one person put it, "out-escalating the other
guy". To do otherwise, observed one senior
officer, jeopardises military units by inviting
escalation. We also agreed on the importance
of well-conceived and clearly articulated rules
of engagement and escalation criteria.
Many of the participants concluded that
operations other than war would degrade the
capabilities of military organisations for
combat operations. While combat troops are
certainly capable of carrying out both
traditional
and
non-traditional
roles
effectively, the latter require unique and more
sophisticated training. Preparation for the one
is thus inevitably at the expense of the other,
and this suggests that military and civilian
leaders must take care to ensure that priority
rests with preparing the armed forces for highintensity combat. An issue which the
conference did not consider, but perhaps
should have, is the effects that non-traditional
roles may have on military professionalism.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ARMED FORCES
Do professional
soldiers view drug
interdiction or migration control, for example,
as legitimate military tasks'! If not, to what
extent are these types of missions likely to
chip away at the esprit de corps and
corporateness within the military calling that
make it distinct among professions? And, how
are the state, society and the military to deal
with the individual soldier who refuses to
participate in these types of operations? These
questions, which strike at the heart of the
bargain between soldier and state, are being
resolved haphazardly, as world realities force
them unexpectedly on military and civilian
decision-makers.
The conference also agreed that the
complexity of post-Cold War operations
requires more intelligent, highly trained and
sophisticated soldiers than in the past. Active
duty
combat
units,
not
specialised
'peacekeeping units', should be deployed for
these sticky tasks, but only after appropriate
mission-specific training. These units are
comprised of some of the brightest soldiers and
the best leaders. They are well-suited for the
ambiguities associated with 'middle-range'
interventions and are capable of immediate
escalation. However, the 'go heavy' approach
has two disadvantages. First, it is expensive. It
costs a great deal, for example, to send a fullyequipped US armour division to Bosnia. While
the logic for deploying such large, heavily
armed forces is compelling, it should be
acknowledged that the decision to do so is
made at the expense of doing other, less
ambitious operations elsewhere. Second, it is
possible that having the ability to escalate on
hand could conceivably lead to 'mission creep'
- a situation in which the military's role in a
given conflict consciously or unconsciously
expands as the situation evolves. This
possibility reinforces the importance of clear
escalation criteria before an operation begins,
and of the continuous and relentless
assessment of operational means and ends to
ensure they are consistent with the overarching
national intent.
Downsized militaries, less sympathetic
societies
The participants agreed that the individual
307
contract which exists between the soldier and
the state is also essential to military
effectiveness. In return for accepting the
rigours and the dangers of military life, service
members have a right to expect that society
and the state will provide a reasonable
modicum of employment security, adequate
compensation, health care, facilities for living,
all necessary equipment, and the confidence
that in the event of injury or death they, and
their families, will be cared for. W e observed
however that the commitment of the state and
the society to this aspect of the contract
appears to be waning. Though the participants
were far more successful in describing these
changes than prescribing what should be done
about them, their conclusion was as
straightforward as it is alarming: declining
resources and social changes and challenges
will make it increasingly difficult, perhaps
prohibitively so, to man the modern military
effectively.
First, the vitality of armed forces within
most democratic countries (with perhaps the
exception of Israel) is being strained by
dramatic reductions in their size as well as
their budgets. Though the military's standing
remains relatively high in most societies,
support for defence spending has declined
abruptly, and this has made the state's ability
to fulfill its part of the contract increasingly
suspect. In some countries there is already
undeniable evidence that the quality of
military life - as measured for example in
compensation, health care and living
conditions - is beginning to be eroded.
Concurrently, the growing number of military
retirees has imposed additional financial
burdens on democratic states. There is also the
widespread perception that the armed forces
are 'no longer hiring' and that opportunities
for those who have stayed in the military have
diminished significantly. This transition has
serious implications, not only for morale but
also for the willingness of a nation's most
qualified young people to serve.
Additionally, there are a multitude of social
changes and challenges - some already in full
view, others lurking beneath the surface - that
are likely to strain the relations between
society and the armed forces in the future.
308
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ARMED FORCES
First, within democratic countries a shift away
from mass conscript forces is manifest in the
recent adoption of volunteer forces in France,
Belgium and the Netherlands as well as the de
jucto abatement of conscription (that is,
anyone who wishes can opt out) in Germany.
In the short term this transition will contribute
to turmoil and uncertainty within these arrned
forces, as nations struggle to find the
appropriate balance of economic and noneconomic incentives necessary to recruit and
retain a quality force. Moreover, reasonable
material conditions and society's respect, even
more important for a volunteer force, will be
increasingly difficult to muster in the postCold War era. The conference also considered
the
expanding
'civilisation'
of
the
occupational structure within modern
militaries. This trend cuts two ways. On one
hand, as one participant observed, the promise
of technical, transferable skills aids volunteer
arrnies in attracting topnotch recruits. This
trend may also make it more difficult,
however, for modern militaries to maintain a
healthy professional ethos and 'warrior spirit'.
As one member remarked: 'The more soldiers
are asked to behave like civilians the more
prone they will be to act like civilians' - a
prospect certain to send chills down the spines
of professional soldiers.
In addition, democratic militaries are under
increasing pressure to reflect society in terms
of social representation and conformity with
liberal social values. Recent controversies
within Western democracies over the
inclusion of homosexuals and the role of
women in the armed forces are indicative of
this pressure. This issue provoked a lively
discussion within the group, with the vocal
majority concluding that this trend
undermines
military
effectiveness.
Recognising however that this may be a
political reality, the challenge to the military is
two-fold.
They
must
define
their
organisational culture in a way that retains the
distinctive military ethos that sets them apart
from other professions, while still complying
with externally-mandated change. Also,
military leaders must take pains to explain the
profession's
distinctive
institutional
characteristics to society at large. Finally, the
changing demographics of armed forces, and
within societies more generally, impose
special challenges. A growing number of
service members have families; at the same
time, as the number of 'middle-range'
multinational commitments around the world
has exploded, democratic armies have been
asked to deploy more often, for longer
periods, with increasing uncertainty. Not
surprisingly, this too has strained morale and
commitment across military organisations,
making it increasingly difficult to recruit and
retain quality soldiers, airmen, and sailors,
even under the best of circumstances.
The
conference
agreed
that
the
relationships between society and the armed
forces are for the moment sound, though
members suggested at least three reasons why
the situation may worsen in the future. First,
Western militaries are now functioning in a
low-threat environment which diminishes
their salience in the national discourse.
Second, they are in the initial stages of a
profound transition. Though dramatic
downsizing has already taken place, it is not
yet clear whether the end to these reductions in
resources and personnel is in sight. Third,
across societies, substantially fewer people
have served in or are familiar with the
military. Similarly, the number of civilian
policymakers with military experience has
declined rapidly during the post WW I1
period. This suggests that both society and the
state are likely to be less sympath'etic to, or
appreciative of, the special needs of
democratic armies in times of war, as well as
in periods of 'peace'.
An evolving contract
No conference, whether at Ditchley or
elsewhere, could hope to resolve the myriad of
complex issues involved in a survey of the
changing relationships between state, society
and the armed forces. This topic does not lend
itself to easy answers or pithy policy
recommendations. Our weekend discussions
did contribute significantly, however, to an
understanding of the stresses imposed on these
relationships by a new generation of post-Coid
War military operations and an array of
domestic social changes and challenges.
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE ARMED FORCES
For the most part our consideration of the
contract was from the military perspective and
our views reflected those of professional
military, those who study the professions
military, and those who are sympathetic
toward the professional military. Collectively,
our insights were conservative, cautious and
pessimistic. From this viewpoint there are
certain aspects of the contract - clear public
support, unclouded military objectives and
adequate resources - that must be preserved,
perhaps even be emphasised in this new era.
Have we overlooked the possibility, however.
that in the post-Cold War era the public is
most likely to be divided over the possibility
of intervention, that military objectives will
inevitably be murky, and that bountiful
resources and clearly defined criteria for
success are less likely? In short, is it possible
that military professionals are defining the
terms of contract so narrowly as to preclude
the use of force altogether? This question
warrants reflection and additional discussion.
The conference also painted a somewhat
alarming picture of democratic societies in
which declining resources combined with
309
social changes and challenges are making it
increasingly difficult, perhaps prohibitively
so, to sustain viable volunteer forces.
Particularly disconcerting is the fact that
civilian policymakers, and democratic
societies in general, have increasingly less
experience with and understanding of their
armed forces. Indeed, future parliamentarians,
defence ministers and members of Congress,
preferably those without military experience,
would perhaps have benefited significantly
from our weekend of discussion. Alexis de
Tocqueville wrote that within democratic
polities during periods of peace 'the career of
arms immediately ceases to be respected and
military men drop down to the lowest rank
among public officers. They are neither
greatly esteemed or greatly understood'. Over
time, he suggested, this poses a 'danger for the
country as well as for the Army'. While
members of our group were quick to point out
that the current situation does not yet
constitute a 'crisis', the proceedings at
Ditchley Park suggest that such dangers may
well lie ahead.
DAVID
MCCORMICK
It is not Manoeuvre versus Attrition
'Ritterkreuz oder Tritt in Kreuze'
('It's either medals or a court martial')
Introduction
H E Fundumentu1.s of British Maritime
Doctrine (BR1806) does its best to
separate the concepts of mobility and
manoeuvre from manoeuvre from the sea and
Manoeuvre Warfare and all of the above from
attrition.' Mobility and manoeuvre are about
moving things. Manoeuvre from the sea is
about the battlefield employment of sea-based
naval forces in a shore manoeuvre.
Manoeuvre Warfare is a style of warfare
which is often, and incorrectly, contrasted
with attrition. This essay will seek to explore
why it is so important to understand the
concepts of Manoeuvre Warfare being
debated in navies today and to understand why
it is not an alternative to attrition.
T
Origins of manoeuvre warfare
The original philosophy underlying the
concepts of modern Manoeuvre Warfare
comes from China and the Roman empire of
Julius Caesar. Some Western military
Services, such as the US Marine Corps, have
explicitly embraced the concepts of Sun Tzu
contained in The Art of War, written around
400 BC.' Additional concepts of what we now
call Manoeuvre Warfare can be found in other
classical Chinese literature such as Lao Tzu's
Tao Te Ching', the Ssu-ma Fa, Wu-tzu, Wei
Liao-tzu, T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings,
the Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung, and
the medieval Questions and Replies between
T'ang T'ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung.'
Manoeuvre Warfare is generally cast today
in more recent descriptive terms as being that
style of warfare of the German Army versus
the 'attritionist' strategies of France, in World
Wars I and 11, and the Soviet Union in World
War 11. German Army doctrine during the
inter-War years emphasised manoeuvre,
mobility, the offensive, surprise, tempo, and
the penetration of enemy defences. German
Army doctrine called for one continuous battle
with the commitment of reserves to ensure
that the enemy was overwhelmed and
momentum was not lost.
German Army doctrine also emphasised
decentralisation and initiative at the lowest
levels of the chain of command - an area of
interest to American 'maneuverists' today and
one near and dear to the hearts of most navy
officers. German Army doctrine emphasised
the auftrugstaktik, or task-oriented tactics that
permitted the lower-echelon commander to
operate within his senior's intent. French
Army doctrine, on the other hand, was
centralised and emphasised control. As a
result of their doctrine, the Germans could
count on locally-initiated counterattacks while
fighting on the defensive. The French Army
needed to be ordered into a counterattack.
The catastrophic and unexpected failure of
the French Army in the early days of World
War 11 can be, in great part, attributable to
their strategy and doctrine for war. Simply
put, the French Army attempted to fight an
attrition-based war based upon defence,
firepower, centralisation, and control in a
series of sequential methodical battles. The
German Army, on the other hand, had adopted
a doctrine of Manoeuvre Warfare of one
continuous battle that made the French
response inadequate and self-defeating.
The implied message in all of this is that if
you are associated with Manoeuvre Warfare,
you will be on the winning team. Citing dead
Germans is extremely important to American
'maneuverists'. Hence the recent American
interest in jirzgerspitzengqfuhl, or finger-tip
feel for the battlefield, by the combat leader.
Championed by General Hermann Balck and
General Major Friedrich von Mellenthin, the
commander's ,fitzgerspitzengefuhl would
appear to be a Teutonic version of Napoleon's
concept of coup d'ueil,' or the inner eye.
Citing dead Frenchmen, on the other hand,
is decidedly not fashionable for Western
'maneuverists' whose lack of knowledge of
the hundreds of years of warfare between
England and France is most astounding. Even
to raise the idea that a Frenchman could
possibly have said something interesting
about manoeuvre warfare raises the hackles of
the most ardent supporters of Manoeuvre
Warfare. Unlike American supporters of the
concept, one would hope that the British have
IT IS NOT MANOEUVR!E VERSUS ATTRITION
retained their excellent knowledge of their
erstwhile enemy and have read the excellent
works of Admiral Raoul Castex, if not in the
original French then at least in its
Americanised condensed v e r ~ i o n . ~
Annihilation, attrition and manoeuvre
A major complication to the concept of
Manoeuvre Warfare is the improper
juxtaposition of this form of warfare against
attrition warfare by the US Marine Corps and
US Navy. This results from the 1980's posing
of 'Maneuver' Warfare as the smarter way to
face the then-Soviet threat in Europe. The
'bad' way to face the Soviet Union was to
stand firm at the border and not exploit
territorial depth when it was smart. The 'good'
way to fight was to use territory to NATO's
advantage. The then-'bad' way to fight was
associated with doctrine in the US Army.
The Marines embraced 'maneuver' as a part
of an overall US military reform movement
which sought to do more with less. 'Maneuver
Warfare' was US Marine Corps doctrine when
it was signed by General A1 Gray.' The US
Navy bought into this concept when Chief of
Naval Operations Admiral Frank Kelso
approved and the Naval Doctrine Command
published the naval Service's first recent
doctrine pamphlet.Wradually 'Maneuver
Warfare' has become associated with Marine
Corps programmatics and therefore subject to
the most ardent bureaucratic defences and
only recently been subject to internal
challenge.
The result of this advocacy of 'Maneuver
Warfare' has been intellectual gymnastics as
the American sea services attempted to ignore
the lessons of history. It has also been
confusing to allies who want to follow the
American lead but are confused with the
semantics and nuances of the use of these
phrases. Let us first set the records
straight.
Manoeuvre Warfare is not an alternative to
attrition warfare" it is a method of warfare
that can be used either as a part of attrition
warfare or as a part of warfare of annihilation.
A short review of the history of the theory of
these two basic forms of warfare (attrition and
annihilation) is in order.
31 1
The first division of warfare into
annihilation and attrition was by Italian
lieutenant general Raimondo Montecuccoli."'
Montecuccoli fought in the 17th Century as a
field marshal for the Austrian Hapsburg
empire. Montecuccoli wrote a great deal on
military art and strategy and was a skilled
tactical general on the battlefield. He gave
equal weight to wars of annihilation and those
of attrition and he practised combat in which
manoeuvre was equally important as the clash
itself. Montecuccoli's theories were accepted
by Frederick the Great. Prussian General, and
world renowned military theoretician, Karl
von Clausewitz also accepted this bifurcation
and was in the middle of revising Vorn Krieg
to encompass the theory when he died.
More recent acceDtance of these theories of
warfare of attrition vs. warfare of annihilation
was by the Prussian Generals Helmuth von
Moltke [the Elder] and Alfred von
Schlieffen." While Chief of Staff, Moltke
developed the concept of the continuous
strategic-operational sequence which would
defeat the enemy in one great and decisive
battle of annihilation - the vemichtungsschlacht
for those who need to see the original German.
Schlieffen further developed the concept of
the rapid decisive campaign of annihilation in
his campaign planned for Europe prior to
World War I.
This concept of annihilation and attrition as
two opposite poles was further refined by
Hans Delbriick, who termed the two types of
niedenue fungsstrategie
warfare
(annihilation)
and
errnattungsstrategie
(exhaustion).12Perhaps a better German word
for attrition warfare is ahnuetzungschlacht.
The point is that the separation of warfare into
annihilation and attrition has a long history in
German military theory and American
'maneuverists' seem to respect the opinion of
German military theoreticians - except to
ignore this major point.
The most complete treatment of the two
styles of warfare is to be found in the postWorld War i lectures and writings of Soviet
General and Professor Aleksandr A.
Svechin." His book Strategy was essentially
devoted to advocating attrition war over that
which he termed 'destruction'. Svechin wrote
312
IT IS NOT MANOEUVR .E VERSUS ATTRITION
probably the most exhaustive treatise of the
two different types of warfare with numerous
'~
it is decidedly
historical e ~ a m p l e s .Although
unfashionable to cite dead Russians, Svechin
deserves a great deal of credit. He (and not
some dead German) originated the concept of
operational art and the operational-level of
warfare based upon his experiences in the
Russo-Japanese War (1905).
In annihilation warfare, victory follows a
decisive engagement against the centre of
gravity. An example of an annihilation
campaign was the basic strategy (War Plan
Orange) developed by the US Armed Forces
for warfare in the Pacific prior to World War
11. It was also the basic form of combat under
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) doctrine."
Annihilation warfare subordinates all actions
to a single supreme purpose. Under
annihilation, withdrawal is normally not
considered an honourable alternative. Warfare
by annihilation ashore has been successfully
practised by relatively few commanders Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar,
and Napoleon Bonaparte - but it has been an
accepted way of war at sea for centuries.
The navy counterpart to attrition warfare is
the well-known French Navy concept of guerre
de course. Examples include convoy defence
practised in the World War I1 Battle of the
Atlantic and other forms of warfare where one
single engagement or battle is not crucial to the
outcome. Despite the plan to fight a war of
annihilation in the Pacific during World War 11,
Admiral William Halsey, USN, actually
engaged in a war of attrition against the
Japanese - although he was continually seeking
a decisive battle of annihilation.I0 Attrition
warfare is still realistic under today's
environment and allows the commander a
higher degree of flexibility. Under attrition,
withdrawal is regularly considered an
honourable alternative. Warfarc ashore by
attrition has been successfully practised by
many more commanders than has warfare of
Pericles
during
the
annihilation
Peloponnesian Wars, Frederick the Great in
the Seven Years' War,]' Britain during the
World War 11 air defence Battle of Britain, and
by the Russians in their Second Great Patriotic
War.
What to do about manoeuvre vs. attrition?
The obvious question is what then to do about
this current incorrect juxtaposition of
Manoeuvre Warfare to attrition in US
doctrinal publications? Captain Wayne
Hughes, USN (Ret.), author of the noted book
Fleet Tactics, writes on the pages of the US
Naval Institute Proceedings that the
alternative to Manoeuvre Warfare is 'power
warfare."* BR 1806 comes to the conclusion
that Manoeuvre Warfare is the 'intelligent use
of force', thus implying that the opposite is
stupidity." This is probably the best answer to
those who continue to ask if attrition is not the
opposite of Manoeuvre Warfare then what is?
Manoeuvre Warfare is a philosophy of
warfare that can serve to support either
warfare of annihilation or attrition. Since
modern warfare will still embrace aspects of
annihilation and attrition warfare, we need to
focus on the contributions that can be made by
Manoeuvre Warfare to both. Enough with the
debate and attempts to purge attrition from the
lexicon.
Enemy air and subsurface forces probably
cannot be eliminated in any future combat
with one quick decisive strike of annihilation
and will thus have to be dealt with in attrition
warfare over time. This will include battles,
the planned engagement as well as the
unplanned meeting engagement, strikes, and
raids. Naval forces will have to make use of
Manoeuvre Warfare concepts, such as the
temporary massing of firepower to deal with
weaker enemy forces when and where we
choose, within an overall attrition approach to
combat. Attrition sequential combat actions
will be needed carefully to select the main
areas for combat activity to pit strength
against the principal objective (weakness) at
the decisive time.
When dealing with an enemy force that
cannot be defeated with one main effort,
annihilation, it is well to remember the
example of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN).
IJN doctrine called for the destruction of a
significant part of the enemy battle fleet in a
first strike raid followed up by a subsequent
decisivc battle between enemy battle fleets.
Japan did this against the Russians in 1905
and attempted to do this against the US in
IT IS NOT MANOEUVR!E VERSUS ATTRITION
1941. The Japanese success in the Battle of
Tsushima was not to be repeated in World
War 11. The lesson here is that, if one must
plan for more than one strike to attain the
desired end state, there is no guarantee that the
opportunity or success will follow once the
enemy is warned. Hence again we will need to
use Manoeuvre Warfare concepts even if
attempting to engage the enemy in
annihilation warfare.
A major lesson to be learned from the
doctrine of the IJN prior to World War I1 was
that good doctrinal concept development gave
way to sloganeering and the use of catchy
phrases which were not subject to analysis and
criticism. These included: 'using a few to
)
conquer many' (ka o motte, shLi I ~ U - s uand
'fight the enemy on sight' (kenteki hissen);
that had the distinction of being a mantra that
was accepted on faith and was not allowed to
be questioned.'" This mystical approach to
naval doctrine did not serve the IJN well Japan fought the coming war with faulty
doctrine. The failure to open up 'Maneuver
Warfare' to scrutiny by outsiders will not
serve the US Marine Corps well either."
Why manoeuvre warfare is important for
the US Navy
Does all of this mean that the concept of
Manoeuvre Warfare has no place in combat at
sea? Given the development of Manoeuvre
Warfare doctrine as a means for a weaker
force to engage a superior force, one might ask
why the world's only 'superpower' Navy
should even consider adopting a concept
whose major historical naval practitioners
have not won the wars. Even though the US
Navy is the largest Navy in the world,
Manoeuvre Warfare doctrinal concepts are
warranted for a number of good reasons.
First, although the US Navy is the world's
most powerful navy, it may not be permitted
fully to exercise its capabilities in future
contingencies against less developed military
forces. We have seen this in Korea, Vietnam,
and in the more recent Persian Gulf War. It
may now have to operate under political
guidance that includes few, if any, military
casualties. The world's most powerful Navy,
and her allies, may have to operate as if it had
313
less capability, hence making Manoeuvre
Warfare concepts extremely important.
Second, although the US Navy is the
world's most capable navy, it is not deployed
as one fleet. The US Navy routinely sends
small naval task units and task groups into
regions of the world which may become
volatile at virtually a moment's notice.
Although these units and task groups belong
to a greater whole, they may have to fight as a
force equal to that of the regional enemy.
Hence Manoeuvre Warfare concepts may
improve the combat potential of deployed
units.
Third, the current national security and
national military strategies of the United
States are to deploy forward smaller force
levels than in the Cold War era. All US forces
today are stretched thin. The US backs up
those forces with the ability to project
from the continental United States. These
forces from North America will have to
manoeuvre from their home bases into distant
regions that place them in harm's way. Forces
that are sent into harm's way today will have
to fight 'smarter' and Manoeuvre Warfare is a
method of ensuring that they do so.
Fourth, it is always sound to perform good
planning before any combat and Manoeuvre
Warfare doctrine emphasises threat evaluation
and sound planning in advance of the battle.
Despite our best efforts to understand
potential enemies, we are not always sure
about our ability to control potential threats.
Any actions that are taken by naval Services to
improve their preparation for combat are
worthwhile. We cannot simply afford to field
a force that can 'bully' its way into any
situation using 'brute force'. Mental agility is
required of our operational commanders and is
central to Manoeuvre Warfare.
Fifth, current US joint and multinational
doctrine have yet to fully reflect or embrace
Manoeuvre Warfare. Yet the militaries of the
world are being asked to consider concepts of
warfare based upon the information
'revolution' or some new 'wave' or style of
war. Should, or can, the armed forces skip
over the Manoeuvre Warfare stage and
advance directly into some new epoch?
Although this is tempting, the risk is that one
314
IT IS NOT MANOEUVRE VERSUS ATTRITION
cannot fully exploit the benefits of the
information age without having first mastered
the concepts of Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine.
After all, Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine is
mostly about how to think about war and plan
combat actions. If the next era is informationbased, we would be unable to fully exploit this
stage unless we had first learned how to
manoeuvre through the information highway,
matching strength against weakness and
denying information to the enemy. Our recent
efforts to improve intelligence capabilities are
a natural precondition for both Manoeuvre
Warfare ddctrine and information warfare.
Conclusions
Parts of the US military accepted the concept
of 'Maneuver Warfare' over a decade ago. It
has officially been adopted by the US Marine
Corps and, through the publication of Naval
Warfare, NDP-1, by the US Navy. Manoeuvre
Warfare concepts have been embraced by the
US Army, but the term has not. The US Air
Force has just begun to explore the term and
come to grips withwhat it will mean. Joint and
multinational doctrine - which determines
how the American Armed Forces will actually
fight - have not yet embraced Manoeuvre
Warfare. This strongly suggests that
'Maneuver Warfare' is more US Marine
Corps programmatic doctrine than combat
doctrine. If it were combat doctrine for
warfighting at the joint and multinational
strategic and operational-levels of war, then
the Marines would have had to ensure that it
was accepted as joint or multinational doctrine
as well. 'Maneuver Warfare' is currently not
accepted as US joint or multinational
warfighting doctrine.
Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine is a
warfighting doctrine that should continue to
be developed by supporters of the concept
regardless of current US joint or multinational
doctrine and programmatic considerations. It
is up to supporters to take the lead on this
doctrinal concept and flesh it out so that it can
be understood by other services, the joint
system, and multinational partners, The
typical Navy officer is not going to embrace
Manoeuvre Warfare until such time as the
concept can be expressed in maritime and
maritime aviation terms understandable by
them, no matter what the doctrine publications
or the flag and general officers say. 22
'Maneuver Warfare' doctrine in the US
Naval Services is, at the current stage, only a
set of organising principles for doctrinal
development. The US Naval Services have
embarked on a journey of discovery which
should include widespread debate and
discussion, especially on the pages of
professional journals. Once the open debate is
over, then the US Navy and Marine Corps
should internally develop official concepts for
'Maneuver Warfare'. If these concepts prove
to be of value to the fleet and Fleet Marine
Force, only then they should be advanced into
combat doctrine development. Perhaps the
introduction of a Manoeuvre Warfare doctrine
into the naval Services will be of such
importance that it will constitute a 'revolution
in military affairs.'
J. J. TRITTEN
Commander, USN (Ret.)
References
'The Fundunzentals of Brifish Maritime Doctrine, BR
1806, London, UK: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1995, p.72-76, 110-1 11, 222-223.
?Sun Tzu, The Art of' War, Brigadier General Samuel B.
Griffith, USMC (Ret.), trans., New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 1963.
'Lao Tzu, Tuo Te Ching, Stephen Mitchell, trans. and
ed., New York, NY: Harper Collins, Pubs, 1988.
*The Seven Militan. Classics of Ancient Chincr, Ralph
D. Sawyer, trans., Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
'Karl von Clausewitz, On War, 0 . J . Matthijs Jolles,
trans., New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943,
p.33-35. German Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von
Moltke referred to this Fame phenomenon as hlick,
literally a glance. German military literature frequently
used this term to mean the ability to make a quick
estimate of the situation. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., LField
Marshal Helmuth Graf vonl Moltke on the Art of War:
Selected Writings, Harry Bell and Daniel J. hug he^,
trans., Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1993, p. 196.
OAdmiral Raoul Castex,
stratigiques, in
vols., paris: ,y,,;itp
d 2 ~ d i t i O n s~ ..~ . ~.
)
Muritimes et Coloniales, 1929-1935. Volume 2 is the
source of Castex's principal thoughts on Manoeuvre
Warfare. The only English-language version of Castex
is found in Strategic Theories, selections translated and
edited, with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling,
~
~
MD:
~
~~~~l
~
~Institute
~ Press,
l 1994.
i
~
,
7
~
~ united
~
dstates~ ~~~i~~
~
corps,
~
~
Warjighting, FMFM [Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1,
IT IS NOT MANOEUVRE VERSUS ATTRITION
Washington, DC: 6 March 1989, p. 28-30, 59.
Waval Doctrine Command, Naval Warfhre, NDP
[Naval Doctrine Publication]-I, Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office, 28 March 1994, p. 3 1-33.
yThis point h a also been made by Major General
Edward B. Atkeson, US Army (Ret.), 'Maneuvering
Past Maneuver Warfare,' US Naval Institute
Proceedings, 122, no. 1 (January 1996): 34.
Yiunther E. Rothenberg, 'Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus
Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and'the 'Military
Revolution' of the Seventeenth Century,' Makers of
Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear
Age, ed. Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986, p.55-57.
'Gunther E. Rothenberg, 'Moltke, Schlieffen, and the
Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,' Maker.\ of Modern
Strategy: Frorn Muchicrvelli to the Nuclear Age, ed.
Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986, p.296; David H. Zook, Jr. and Robin Higham, A
Short History qf Wa&re, New York, NY: Twayne
Publishers, 1966, p.238.
I2GordonA. Craig, 'Delbriick: The Military Historian,'
Makcr.~of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986, p.341-342; and Michael Geyer,
'German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare,
19 14-1945,' Makers of Modern Strategy: From
Machiavelli ro the Nuclear A R ~ ,ed. Peter Paret,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p.531.
"Condoleezza Rice, 'The Making of Soviet Strategy,'
Makers of Modern Strcitegy: From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1986, p.665.673.
"Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee,
Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992
315
[translation of 1927 original Russian-language edition],
p.239-250.
"Imperial Japanese Navy, Kaisen ybmurei [Battle
Instructions], Part I1 'Battle,' Chapter 1 'The Essentials
of Battle,' paragraph 3, circa 1934, contained in
Sanematsu Yuzuru, Kaigun daigaku k.y:yRiku, Tokyo,
Japan: Kojinsha, 1975, p.210-241, translated by David
C. Evans and provided to the author in February 1995.
I6Thomas B. Buell, 'Oral Histories Help Tell the Tale,'
US Naval Institute Proceedings, 120, no. 7 (July 1994):
47.
"Hans D e l b ~ c kHistorj
,
qfthe Art of War, Volume IV:
The Dawn qf Modern Warfare, Walter J. Renfroe, Jr.,
trans., Lincoln, NE and London, UK: University of
Nebraska Press, 1985 [original German version
published in 19201, p.375, 378-380.
'"Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (Ret.), Comment and
Discussion on 'Maneuvering Past Maneuver Warfare,'
US Naval Institute Proceedings, 122, no. 3 (March
1996): 16.
"The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, BR
1806, London, UK: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1995, p.73.
")David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun [Navy 1:
Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial
Japanese N a v , 1887-1941, August 1994 draft book
manuscript, chapter 2.
"See LTC G. Stephen Lauer, USMC, 'Warfighting: A
Leap of Faith,' Marine Corps Gazette, 79, no. 4 (April
1995): 52-53.
"An excellent example of this is Captain Jerry
Singleton, USN, 'Say It in Pilot Talk,' US Naval
Institute Proceedings, 122, no. 2 (February 1996):
39-41.
Author's Note: This article has been cast, and the examples chosen, in terms ~f the qualities
developed by technical men as a result of their naval experience. This is not intended to suggest
that they possess any monopoly of the naval virtues but merely arises because they are the men
with whom I am most familiar. If the reader protests that they are a comparatively new breed
whose qualities cannot be truced in a direct line of descent from their,forebears in the sailing
navy I would point out that they act in an equivalent role to the men who maintained the rigging
in all weathers. Climbing the mast o f a modern warship in heavy weather to attend to a radar
aerial or trying to rectifj, machinery in the bilge may be less hazardous than wrestling with sail
aloft in a fifth-rate in an icy gale but they are all part of the unending tusk needed jbr ships to
keep the sea as effective fighting units. If the hackles of politically correct readers are already
rising because there is no mention of women, nor will there be, I defend myself on the grounds
that there were no women at sea in my day which will fortunately, in what follows, relieve the
strain on my already precarious syntax.
I
N the interesting articles about the naval
ethos in the past three issues of The Naval
Review I have been struck by the extent to
which the authors seem to assume that the
naval ethos is a selection of qualities arrived at
by our naval forebears by a process of trial and
error and handed down to their successors.
Indeed Lieutenant MacDonald (NR, Jan '96)
ends on the sombre note that '. . . once lost it
will be almost impossible to recreate our
ethos'. I believe the truth is otherwise and
rather more encouraging.
I would argue that the naval ethos is not, on
the whole, man made although it is embodied
in men. Instead I believe that it derives
directly from the circumstances and the
environment in which we operate: viz ships
and the sea, with the added ingredient of the
need to fight as well as to stay afloat and to
move. The sea is an unforgiving medium
which doesn't wait on the convenience of man
and either demands qualities of him which his
shorebased brethren do not need or demands
them in a higher degree.
In a fairly extensive reading of naval history
I am constantly struck by how remarkably
little the naval character has changed over
time despite the vast changes in the
technology with which maritime war is
conducted. This is in sharp contrast to the
national character which has undergone
massive change since I grew up, let alone
since my parents and grandparents were born.
Blame it on the welfare state, increasing
affluence, or whatever, we seem almost alien
creatures by the standards of even our recent
forebears. I should hasten to add that not all of
this change has been for the worse but it does
contrast with the naval case where our
predecessors were different, but not that
different.
Having gone to Dartmouth at the age of 13
and thus being steeped in the naval tradition
from an early age I assumed at first that the
qualities that made a good naval officer (or
rating) were absorbed by a combination of
precept, example and osmosis from one's
seniors and in turn handed down to posterity.
To some extent this must be true but after forty
years' service I believe this aspect is a good
deal less important than most imagine and 1
now take the view that our ethos primarily
derives from the environment in which we
work.
My faith in the benefits of training, and the
idea that it is simply a matter of handing on the
torch, was first shaken when 1 realised how
very different life at sea was from the
impressions we had derived at Dartmouth.
Moreover it was noticeable how rapidly, once
at sea, a bunch of boys who were, frankly,
fairly useless, turned into useful men. I speak
for myself, (at least in the first part!), but I
believe by extension for others and allude to
deficiencies in character and attitude rather
than of knowledge. The reader may say: 'Well
they had just reached that stage in life. . .'
While there is obviously something in this,
looking back one can see clearly how people
grew in stature during their early years at sea;
ETHOS
it wasn't simply a case of boys turning into
men. We went to sea at the age of 17, today
naval officers go to sea for the first time as
comparatively mature men but the same
transmutation is evident, though perhaps
slower because being older they are less easily
moulded.
At sea I discovered that it was very difficult
to learn to lead from the example of fine
officers. They made good leadership seem as
easy and natural as breathing. By contrast bad
officers taught one a great deal about how to
lead, even if it was only of behaviour to be
avoided at all costs. This tends to suggest that
the worse this generation of naval officers, the
better the next. As this defies common sense I
began to reflect on why the navy has such a
remarkable capacity for 'making silk purses
out of sows' ears'. Without wishing to
denigrate the efforts and example of those
who inspired and impressed us in our salad
days I thjnk the way we turned out has less to
do with them than with the nature of ships and
the sea.
In the popular consciousness discipline was
imposed in the eighteenth century navy by the
lash. N. A. M. Rodger brilliantly exposes this
fallacy in The Wooden World, showing how
survival at sea depended on strong innate
discipline. Unpopular officers may have
needed a 24-hour head start when proceeding
on leave (to escape retribution from their
ratings) but onboard their orders were obeyed,
not in general for fear of the lash, but because
it was recognised that disobedience placed the
ship, and the lives of the ship's company, in
jeopardy. In other words the discipline was
self-imposed, or if you prefer, imposed by the
job.
This to me is the first ingredient of the naval
ethos: discipline, which, by the standards of
the outside world, is held in an exceptional
degree and which responds primarily to what
the job demands rather than to what 'Sir' says,
(the Nelsonian blind eye being applied on
occasion to the greater benefit of the service).
I have been astonished by the extent to which
technical ratings will cheerfully sacrifice their
spare time at home in a dockyard port (often
for weeks on end) to preparing their
equipment for Harbour and Sea Acceptance
Trials; for which in general they receive little
thanks as few are around out of normal
working hours to recognise their prodigious
efforts. Similarly at sea, admittedly when
there are few other distractions, technical rates
will voluntarily work 'well above and beyond
the call of duty'. I'm sure most technical
officers have, as I have, been obliged to order
their men to stop work and turn in for the sake
of their own health and safety.
Manv of these men have little or no
prospects of promotion, they may for example
be leaving the service in a couple of years, but
they are still prepared.to bust a gut, '. . . for the
Queen' in popular parlance, but more
accurately their pride in themselves won't
allow them to give of less than their best. With
such men it is not so much a case of needing to
be an inspiring leader but of how bad does one
have to be to demotivate them?
In civilian life people can conduct
themselves with a measure of selfishness
which causes no undue friction in society but
translate such habits to the messdeck and life
becomes intolerable. This difference is I
believe nowhere better portrayed than in Very
Ordinary Seamen where J . P. W. Mallalieu
paints a vivid picture of an assorted bunch of
men called up in wartime who learn to live
together on the lower deck. Pressure of
circumstance gradually makes them abandon
their habits of selfishness and learn the
advantages of mutual support.
Looking out for one's 'oppo' is a very
characteristic naval trait and a very necessary
one to survival in the confines of a ship. Thus
a consciousness of interdependence and a
are parts of the naval
strong sense of lovalt~~
ethos derived from our environment.
A ship does not allow commitment for less
than 24-hours a day, defects or hazards can
arise at any hour and demand immediate
attention despite the fact that the person(s)
concerned may be suffering the miseries of
sea-sickness or extreme fatigue, or both. Thus
the demands of the seagoing life command
total dedication to the job, we cannot rely on
the luxury of being able to put off until
tomorrow what we cannot conveniently do
today.
Often in these circumstances it will be
318
ETHOS - IV
found that the right tools or spare parts are not
to hand to effect the necessary repair. This can
lead to some extraordinary feats of ingenuity
which in turn breed an attitude that if a thing is
possible the navy can do it, however
impossible it may appear. Thus dependence
on own resources without the possibility of
outside help fosters the navy's can do attitude.
The navy is unique in that its weapon
system is also its home for long periods of
time. Unless one has the misfortune to belong
to an unhappy family (or ship) it is a normal
human emotion to feel affection for one's
home even if one would at times rather be
somewhere else! A home is a place for shared
enjoyment, and celebration when excuse
offers. Thus cohesiveness and a sense qf,fun
are natural elements of the naval ethos. A
sense of fun bespeaks a sense of proportion
and a refusal to be unduly overawed by
authority which I would describe as
independence of spirit and which I think was
(and I hope still is) a distinctively naval
attribute. It is often lamented that a sense of
fun is being lost in the modern navy and I
think that this is certainly true as far as overt
displays of levity are concerned. An uncle of
mine served in a flotilla pre-World War I1
where the leader entered and left harbour with
FF flying from one yard arm and FN from the
other. These meant 'Follow Father' and 'F***
the Navy'. In a similar spirit: when he was on
the China Station an Able Seaman got into a
scrap ashore which resulted in the death of a
Chinaman. The C-in-C sent a signal ordering
appropriate action and a report when this had
been taken. In due course the reply came: 'AB
Jones advanced today to Leading Seaman.'
One cannot imagine such an irreverent
approach today but the nation as a whole has
grown more serious and judged in these terms
I believe the navy has managed to hang on to
its sense of fun, it still flourishes between
decks. [Perhaps there has long been a sense of
humour failure on a wider stage vide the
response to Lt Cdr Roake's contribution
'Some Mistake, Surely. . .' (NR, July '96)]
The fact that our ship is our weapon, (on
whom our very survival may depend), and our
home, means that it deserves and needs our
best shot. For the civilian who falls down on
the job it is someone else's car which breaks
down on the motorway or some other guy in
the airliner which catches fire because the
wrong size circuit breaker has been fitted.
Without suggesting that civilians are
habitually careless or skimp their work, it is
obvious that the prospect of being the victim
of any ineptitude concentrates the mind
wonderfully cf the practice of sending
dockyard mateys to sea for a submarine's first
dive after refit. Thus accepting only the best,
or excellence, is another part of our ethos.
It is nice to be appreciated and valued by
politicians and the public but this regrettably
is not the normal state of affairs in times of
peace. Public adulation very quickly turns to
indifference as we have seen since the
Falklands War. Rudyard Kipling's poem
Tommy shows that similar attitudes prevailed
even when pride in the British Empire was at
its height. I can recall going to parties in
London when I was a junior officer where the
public's attitude could only be described as
downright hostile to all the armed services; at
best they thought a navy was a complete
irrelevance in the newly dawned nuclear age.
Although the public often display a
sentimental affection for what the Royal Navy
once was, vide the growing interest in
maritime history, large sections of society
today regard us as a useless drain on the
taxpayer. A neighbouring farmer told me just
this a few years ago and described us (the
Royal Navy) as 'a bunch of parasites', (it
didn't occur to me until sometime after this
outburst that he has almost certainly received
more in subsidies from the government than I
received in pay and allowances in a lifetime's
service to the Queen!). Therefore pace
Lieutentant MacDonald I do not believe we
can afford to allow our morale to depend on
high regard from the public.
It is part of human nature that one values
highly those things for which one has worked
long and hard. The conditions of sea service
demand a considerable commitment from the
crew even to keep a ship operating wfth
minimal efficiency. I question whether the
average junior officer, however keen and
enthusiastic he is about the navy feels all that
sense of commitment to the service in general.
In most cases, if he sees 'a better hole' he will
go to it. However with the passing years he
will feel more and more committed, not
necessarily because he feels that the navy has
treated him well, though one hopes that he
does, but because he has put too much in to
walk away. This process may be irrational but
it is a fortunate one for the navy. Who doesn't
feel an enduring affection for that maddening,
exhausting and contrary structure of grey
painted steel that he served in, even though
she went to the breaker's yard decades ago'?
I once read a comment by a pilot to the
effect that, in learning to fly, he had learnt a lot
of things about his character that he would
rather not have known. I take this to mean that
the air, like the sea, being an unforgiving
medium, it is quick to discover a want of
judgment,
determination,
courage
or
competence and to blow away self deception.
An ability to dissemble may be a positive
virtue in a second hand car salesman but while
in a ship or aircraft you may fool your boss or
your subordinates, or both, for a while, sooner
or later events will find you out. Thus honesty
or integrity breed naturally in a naval
environment.
We have all met men determined to get to
the top even if it means treading on their
comrades to do it but they are soon found out
by their colleagues and subordinates if not
always by their superiors. Happily in the navy
they stand out because of their rarity and few
if any achieve their aim. They are also
cordially loathed which cannot make the navy
a very enjoyable experience for them, unless
they have exceedingly thick hides. These few
men stand out in sharper relief in my memory
because of the extraordinary degree of
selflessness shown by the majority of naval
personnel. As it seems improbable that the
average person joining the navy is endowed
with unusually saintly qualities, I feel it would
be easier to make the reverse case more
plausibly (I once had the pleasure of serving in
a ship with a delightful officer who was an exBorstal boy!); we need to look elsewhere for
an explanation. We live at such close quarters
in a ship that the motivation of our colleagues
is pretty transparent. Therefore those men who
act in a selfish way quickly incur the dislike
and contempt of their fellows. We are also told
that most men value the judgment of their
peers above all. Thus conduct which may be
enforced initially simply because of peer
pressure soon becomes the instinctive way to
act, especially if men are caught young
enough.
Because of this very close quarters living,
most, even those not naturally solicitous for
their fellow man, can hardly avoid taking an
interest in their fellows. In life, what starts as a
duty or necessity often ends up as an
absorbing interest. As a young divisional
officer 1felt quite inadequate to cope with the
personal problems of the hoary stokers in my
charge. They came mostly from backgrounds
completely beyond my ken and I was
particularly baffled by their wives' more
arcane gynaecological symptoms, and
therefore averse to the whole business of
being a divisional officer, but, being forced to
take an interest in your fellow man ultimately
leads to a genuine interest and, with increasing
maturity and the realisation that you actually
have something to offer, a great sense of
reward. Thus interest in your men springs
naturally from the most infertile soil. Interest
is of course repaid with loyalty which thus
develops vertically, between superiors and
subordinates, both up and down, as well as
horizontally
among
messmates
and
colleagues.
By the same token modesty is a quality bred
naturally in those who go to sea. You may
speak loudly of your prowess but sooner or
later in the seagoing environment you will be
put to the test and exposed for an empty
braggart. Conversely those of real worth, who
may pass unnoticed at first, will prove their
value in the stress of circumstance. The
tradition of the 'silent service' is one I am
sorry to see pass. In a world where a babel of
voices is selling things, including most often
themselves, it tends to be assumed that those
who don't join in have nothing to sell. It may
therefore be necessary for the navy to blow its
own trumpet as loudly as possible but it will
be a sorry day when members of the Royal
Navy do not display modesty on a personal
level. I suspect it will also be a Royal Navy in
which hardly anyone ever goes to sea!
320
ETHOS
I am sure others can develop these ideas
more comprehensively and elegantly but I
hope I have said enough to persuade readers
that as long as man goes down to the sea in
-
IV
ships, and more specifically warships, the
naval ethos we value will flourish.
OTH
Ethos V - An Officer of the 90s
HE subjects o f ethos and junior officers collective identity is no longer that o f green
have been documented by more senior gilt buttons. Finances have taken their toll and
members o f the officer corps in preceding we are left with a 5s uniform somewhat akin in
issues. I would like to tie the two together by quality to the suit I wore at BUPA prior to
putting forward the view o f a sibling who joining. 'Stretch' in the commercial world
wholeheartedly believes in 'the characteristic means long hours for corporate and personal
spirit o f the community', but is cutting his gain, in the RN it means longer hours because
teeth on a service which is different from that we haven't enough personnel to do the job.
o f his predecessors. Well aware o f the political Attempts to rationalise spending have o f
their aim, but at what cost?
and financial constraints that have been c~urs~achieved
W e must proceed with caution as we
imposed upon our service in recent years, I
will not dwell upon them. However, I joined at attempt to keep pace with changing times.
the same time as these changes and have Whilst modernisation and accountability are
therefore had my thinking weaned vital, the Service needs to maintain its original
ethos. Working for the Navy does not hold the
appropriately.
Dartmouth remains the bedrock for same attraction as being part o f it. Bushy
instruction and education in the attributes tailed junior officers o f the 90s thrive on
required to produce the leaders and managers tradition and aspiration, just as their
o f the future. Spit and polish and the teaching predecessors did before them. However, they
o f the mundane through to the more subtle do not possess the same esprit de corps. They
vagaries o f etiquette is and should continue to are born into a service life o f harmony rules,
be imparted to those cadets, who walk through cost efficient and even cost dependent
the gates wide eyed and eager to shine in the running; that is the ethos they will take with
them as they advance. Consequently the Navy
Senior Service.
It is fair to say that the attributes required by runs the risk o f losing the ethos it has always
officers o f today's Navy are the same as that striven to uphold.
I wish, as do we all, that in this present
o f our predecessors; however, the ethos is
changing. W e are in danger o f no longer being world o f domestically dominated politics, the
in the Royal Navy, but o f working for it. The Services could maintain a greater position o f
ethos behind the way we go to sea and carry strength rather than fighting for the best they
out duties will hopefully never change, neither can get. I lay this article open to the readers o f
will the attributes required. As a service the NR and have hopefully challenged the
though, we have started to assume the ethos o f views o f a few and encouraged others.
S I M OBLACK
N
corporate industry.
SUBLIEUTENANT,
KN
The uniform we don for recognition and
T
The Case for the Operational Watch
M
ANPOWER and manning are issues of
the moment and, while now may not be
the time to throw in the curved ball, the
subject of the Operational Watch is a long
term issue that may have some short term
palliative effectiveness.
Since time immemorial warships have
operated in one of three watch systems; State
3 - Cruising Watches (1 in 4), State 2 Defence Watches (1 in 2), and State 1 Action Stations (All on). Intrinsic to the
Scheme of Complement is the necessary
ability to fight (defend) the ship in Defence
Watches, and ships are manned accordingly.
When entering an Operational Environment
ships operate in State 2, with the Defence
Watch providing the ability to defend against
an unexpected, short notice attack; given
sufficient warning time or anticipation of an
attack, this is countered by assuming State 1.
The US Navy has long worked a 3 watch
'defence watch' system and, as the Royal
Navy takes on more and more 'operational'
patrols in peacetime where a real threat exists,
Commanding Officers are seeking ways of
achieving readiness and defence in 3 watches
so that the peacetime niff-naff and trivia
(personnel reporting, liaisons, visits etc.) can
be sustained. It may be time. therefore, to look
hard at the traditional ways of manning ships,
to see if perhaps there is something to be
gained from a new approach that ratifies this I
in 3 system.
Firstly, why change? There are distinct
disadvantages to operating in Defence
Watches ( 1 in 2) , foraying to Action Stations
to meet significant threats. When operating I
in 2, it is axiomatic that all personnel except
key day workers will be on watch for 12 hours
in 24. There are a number of watch keeping
routines capable of achieving this; 6 hour
watches, 7-5-5-7, or 'West Country' routine
6-4-4-4-6. However, all are a compromise
between achieving a long enough period of
rest to ensure personnel can continue to
function effectively over long periods, against
a short enough watch to ensure continued
alertness. For some reason we deem 6 hours
too long a period to maintain alertness on the
OOWs
are
bridge,
and
therefore
complemented 1 in 3 throughout. We are
happy, however, for an operator to watch a
display for 6 hours without relief - a period of
time that would have, say, a civil air traffic
organisation walking out in disbelief. It is this
operator who must spot an incoming missile if
the ship is to defend itself; a typical time from
maximum possible detection range to impact
being perhaps in the order of 60 seconds. Not
much time there for blinking, yawning, and
rubbing the eyes. Excursions to Action
Stations exacerbate the problem by waking up
the off-watch team, who are then denied their
rest period making them more tired when they
are on watch. If key personnel are additionally
required to deal with peace time paper work
and management, the problem increases. Most
ships during the Falklands Conflict simply
ignored the paperwork until the whole thing
was over.
In order to improve alertness watches must
be kept short, with sufficient time between
watches for proper rest. Rest is most easily
achieved if set bio-rhythms are maintained
(scratch West Country routine). A possible
compromise is to seek a 1 in 3 defence watch
posture. By reducing the on-watch time from
12 hours per day to 8 (2 x 4 hours), two 8
hours periods off-watch are generated, one in
which proper rest can be taken, and the other
in which work and play achieved. Periods at
Action Stations will not be so debilitating
because of the reduced watch time overall. To
achieve this I in 3 state without adding one
third to a ship's complement, it is necessary to
examine which personnel are actually
required to provide the first line, defence
watch, defence.
Since defence of the ship lies with the
operators, this is best illustrated with Warfare
Branch examples. Point defence systems and
surveillance systems would need increased
manning in order to remain at immediate
readiness; however offensive systems need
only be manned when required. For example;
with the demise of gun chaff as an ASMD
reaction, it is most unlikely that the 4.5 gun
will be required by the defence watch team
(one might question the sanity of the CO who
conducts NGS, or surface gun engagements at
322
THE CASE FOR THE OPERATIONAL WATCH
anything less than action stations). If this is the
case, then only one 'action' gun's crew need
be borne. To use a T42 example, all ships have
a Sea Dart Director (SDD), and two Sea Dart
Controllers (SDC) but can revert to the former
system of one of each, the SDC controlling
both trackers. By training one SDC to SDD
level, three watches of two (a SDD and a
SDC) are generated; probably sufficient to
counter the leaker that has managed to sneak
past the warning system that would have
resulted in the ship going to action stations.
One final T42 example that will evoke cries of
heresy: by training all Warfare officers to
AAWO standard only three Warfare officers
need be carried. Only one needs to be on
watch to take 'single threat' defence watch
reactions, and at Action Stations both seats are
filled with a third available as Duty Staff.
Our patterns of operations have changed
since the end of the Cold War where the Royal
Navy principally trained to operate in one
theatre against a massive multithreat. Peace
time operations are now the vogue, and a
slightly de-tuned defence watch capability
may be acceptable if it provides longer term
sustainability. It may not be possible to revise
the manning of T22s, T23s, and T42s
overnight, and onboard the transition from
Defence to Action manning may need to be
quickened, but CNGF (the new Daring Class!)
could be designed and complemented to
provide comprehensive 1 in 3 defence.
Never mind the Cost, feel the Productivity!
Introduction
IX years ago as I took the first tenuous
steps in self employment I invested in my
first portable computer. It weighed about 20
Ibs in all and filled a large 'pilot' sized
briefcase. It was however state of the art and
frightened me to death. Interestingly it had the
same power as the CAAIS computer in the
modernised 'Leander' in which I was M E 0
and which took up the same 'footprint' as the
Operations Room so I considered this to be
real state of the art!
Today 1 have that level of processing power
in my 'personal organiser' which is the same
weight and size as a spectacle case! I have just
upgraded my computer again for the sixth
time (you have to keep pace). This time I have
a pentium processor equipped portable with a
huge RAM, nice big hard disk, an active
colour screen that nearly fills the lid, the
footprint is smaller than A4, the battery lasts
four hours and it weighs 4.5 lbs. Someone
recently remarked that my new pride and joy
has more computing power than the AEW
Nimrod. It is however about to be overtaken
after about six months by one with faster
processing, bigger capacity, larger and higher
definition screen etc.
It is not only in computing that such
amazing advances have been made. In the 50s
cars still required a quite heavy service every
3,000 miles, steam engines puffed about our
railway system with a thermal and manpower
efficiency hardly changed since Stephenson's
Rocket and aircraft had two pilots, a navigator
and flight engineer carrying about a hundred
privileged passengers and took two days and
three refuellings to get to Singapore which
now is 13 hours non stop for 300+ flown by
two crews of two.
Maybe in a couple of hundred years our
amazing technology advances will be seen as
positively primitive and even as 'late middle
ages' in a thousand or so. Time moves on and
at the moment the pace of change seems to
accelerate continuously. Constant adaptation
is now a way of life.
S
Adaptation and productivity
Adaptation is one of the main preoccupations
in the oil and gas industry (worldwide) at
present. Cost reduction is the flavour of the
month as the $40 barrel seems to be as likely
to be sighted off the coast of Aberdeen as the
mass shoals of 'silver darlings' of the old
herring industry. This is leading to all sorts of
bright ideas springing up, usually in saving
capital costs for new construction and
operating costs for existing ones, the latter
principally aimed at cheaper labour. Few, until
recently, looked at the cost per barrel and
focused on better productivity. That 'recently'
was the McKinsey Report which found that
the difference between the best and the worst
production costs ranged from £3.50 to under
f1 per barrel. At 50,000 barrels per day
upwards that is a lot of bread.
The same type of people, the same design
disciplines, the same environment but
different management styles and focus.
McKinsey found that there was a clear
distinction in profitability between those
companies with an asset based management,
where assets were seen as 'profit centres' to be
nurtured and steered towards better
performance with management with no other
brief; and those with functional organisations
which dictated standards and practices to the
asset teams which were seen as 'cost centres'
with managers reporting to them for answers
to problems and approval for action. Even the
best organised of the latter could not break
through a lower limit of around £2.50. Those
readers who have got used to my ramblings
may guess the tenor of this tome!
Qualifications
Since berating them in my last dit I have
become a management consultant and it is in
life cycle cost management that I specialise. I
make the excuse that we are a small outfit and
no one has an MBA and no one holding one
need apply. I reckon they are marginally more
useful than an auxiliary watchkeeping
certificate but less so than a Boiler Room
watchkeeping one, especially in a hand
steaming 'Leander' manoeuvring in a choppy
sea with Portland Seariders exercising their
perverted senses of humour or worse still a
South American Country! That to me
324
NEVER MIND THE COST, FEEL THE PRODUCTIVITY!
embodies every principle of management
taken to the extreme as does much of what the
Service gets up to. In charge of the 24 year old
in the boiler room was a 23 year old 'tiff in the
engine room. Parallels exist in all the branches
and MEOs of course equate to the Dean of
Harvard (incredibly some dispute that!)
Possibly because the Service was not rooted
in academia we have tended to be in awe of
qualifications; though I would never dispute
the advantages of continued learning, I took a
second degree part time, but we must not fall
into the trap of seeing them as the panacea to
all ills. Paper qualifications themselves solve
nothing - it is the application of them in
achieving performance that counts. The
functionally based organisations that are
throwing away £2.50 per barrel have no
shortage of MBAs and other very highly
qualified and motivated people. They simply
had an inappropriate management structure
for maximising the potential profit.
I also detect a degree of awe in which the oil
and gas industry is held by some serving
officers, I know I did once. Perceived
decisiveness and sweeping away barriers to
achieving objectives, especially the flash end
of the business with hundreds of gold card
toting 'executives' displaying go-getting
macho effectiveness fuelled by unlimited
goodies on 747 upper decks, moving heaven
and earth in no expense spared solutions to
massive problems, is envied by the
MEOIWEO filling out the S2022. One
anonymous company (not in the UK) has an
almost AEW Nimrod sized cost in sorting out
platform piling that went wrong and has a
display in the foyer telling the world how it is
solving the problem. Many of these
magnificent rectification efforts would have
been avoided if some more thought had been
given to staffing the potential problems in the
first place.
I wonder if my frigate Captains F, both
contributors to this learned tome (that is where
I caught it!), given control of the design of
their ships would have tolerated the ridiculous
state of affairs in the turbo alternators and
diesel generators with their maximum life of
two months between major failures and a very
very high cost involved in maintaining them.
(We also resorted to making our bits as we
could never get them.) He would have
commissioned design mods pronto. To say
that a serving officer in the design authority is
more capable than a serving officer in the
squadron of pushing design mods through is
ridiculous too; after all many of them in that
position often have come from and go back to
doing the M E 0 bit at sea and no magic mantle
of awareness descends upon them when they
ease themselves into their chairs at Abbey
Wood, (Foxhill R.I.P. I presume - that is
assuming it hasn't already disappeared into an
old collapsed stone mine under the weight of
paper) - they just get access to the filing
cabinet and go to meetings and write minutes.
The truth is that although there have been
some spectacular engineering successes and
achievements in offshore engineering there
have been some complete shambles that have
only been solved by the ability to hide under
the $40 a barrel umbrella. Its blowing away in
1986 has not been welcome at all. The other
fact is that a very great proportion of the real
movers and shakers iri the industry have a
background in the services, (not just ours I
might graciously admit - at present one (non
UK) client has an ex REME tiff and he stands
out amongst the rest of his group), dockyards
and defence related industries where the
disciplines learned in their training have
conditioned a real thought process that
extends beyond reaching for the airline
booking number.
False and true cost control
The whole ethic of centralised cost control,
obsession with minutiae of accounting (which
I suspect originated from Mr Pepys needing to
know precisely how much his 'cut' would be)
and especially the functional management
systems which are concerned how much the
'cost centres' i.e. ships are spending rather, as
it should be, the 'business centres i.e. ships'
driving the amount of support they need and
being able to control the process of evolution
from generation to generation, should be
'binned'. In its place should be a structure of
management that is geared to achieving a
stated aim.
This is especially important with constantly
NEVER MIND THE COST, FEEL THE PRODUCTIVITY!
accelerating technological changes. Any
engineering system needs a constant
interactive activity of observe, analyse and
improve and that must be a seamless flow of
information if gross inefficiencies are not to
occur. Ideally everything should be under one
management structure which is rather like the
way in which the Oil and Gas Industry are
gripping their problems (and give them their
due, moving is what they are good at thinking maybe not so good).
I worked in one offshore business unit
where everything ashore from the General
Manager,
platform
operations
and
maintenance support, planning, costing,
personnel 'drafting', accounting, design
modifications and procurement, including the
team designing the rebuilding of three of the
biggest in the North Sea down to the
draughtsman designing a new pipe, were (and
still are) in the same building. They did not
outnumber those employed offshore even at
the height of the design effort.
I can testify that this works. People are
unable to hide from reality when the
'customer' can walk downstairs and bang the
table - every day if necessary and also when
the procurement person can show the whites
of the eyes of the true costs to the 'bar chit
experts'. It tends to keep the focus on the
major problems. No one would pretend that
life is suddenly perfect but it is getting better
all the time.
Type specialisation
All the old objections about flexibility of
movement between ship types are really
getting less viable and where it is feasible to
cross-employ without considerable re-training
(in the ME and Supply worlds mainly) there
should be no real problem within reason, but I
do not see many Ops and WEs going from a
Trident Submarine direct to a Sandown Class;
so why not acknowledge the existence of
different tribes and develop them into
specialised squadrons?
If all the squadron operational, logistics and
design support operated from the same
building (and there is no reason why it cannot
be at the dockside) then decisions are made
faster and there is less chance of the patently
325
unreliable equipment being allowed to
continually drain funds. Most of the blindness
to these problems at the present is because
those with the power to change things cannot
see them, not because they do not want to,
indeed there are plenty of people way down
the support chain who would like to get closer
to their customers: see the MOD staff
enthusiasm for ship visits and the way in
which they welcome personal contacts on the
rare occasions that they get a chance.
It would follow that the SquadronRype
commander would have full responsibility for
all budgets, procurement, training, operations
and as well as the operational role. This
concept cuts two ways however and means
that the Squadron staff will have to take more
responsibility and accept the limitations
(financial and technological) that inhabit the
real world. This could ultimately extend to an
organic plans and operational requirements
capability currently centralised.
There will be those who will say that the
aim cannot be laid down as clearly as it can be
in producing oil and gas; perhaps so but that is
no excuse for not trying at all. Surely a remit
to provide a type of capability (or mix of
them) at a level of risk, availability and
reliability at a range of threat levels can be
determined and a 'business' objective set and
managed. I am sure that a SquadronRype
Commander charged with achieving specific
aims, with upper and lower bounds of
uncertainties (Targets and budgets do not have
to be deterministic, the whole point of a
business plan is to assess probabilities and risk
- not simple arithmetic) would succeed.
This would be a better means of managing
the assets than the rather Stalinist monolith
that exists at present. The current six monthly
pattern of meetings around which most of the
work is structured almost exactly mirrors the
time it takes for another generation of
computer to emerge! How on earth do we
expect to manage a high tech 'business' like
that?
Devolving the responsibility of providing
the assets in an operational condition to the
Squadrons enables the Commander in Chief
Fleet to be free to concentrate on operations
and using the assets he supports rather than
326
NEVER MIND THE COST, FEEL THE PRODUCTIVITY!
being piggy in the middle of the S2022
process as they wend their weary way up and
down the line 'twixt ship and desk. Like the
oil companies he sets his requirement to the
business units, and is quoted a price to do it for
- that is the real world.
A project and design cycle
The cycle of new projects and designs would
start with the formation of an embryo
squadron in Whitehall which would develop
via the PE into the full blown operational
squadron based in the ports recruiting from the
predecessor
squadron and on open
competition. It would also invite tenders for
support and training as well as for the front
end hull construction. A seamless project life
until the last ship goes to recycling!
I am afraid we have got the opposite where
asset procurement and management is seen as
a central function and seems set to take on an
even more vigorous life of its own now that it
is to be centralised; with the ships (and the
people in them) as cost centres. I glanced
through the document 'Front Line First'
recently but it all seemed to be about the MOD
and I got very bored - do you see what I
mean?
One of our problems is that we have been
conditioned to think that everyone else,
politicians, civil servants, management
consultants (the ones with MBAs) and bankers
know much more than we do, and yet I am
utterly convinced that we have and really have
always had the very best form of management
as well as leadership training that exists today
- anywhere.
Training
The value of this training that all the Services
and indeed their related industries (continue
to) give is probably one of the most
understated aspects of our vocation. Yes, there
are bits that could be done better, and it is sad
!o see so called commercial pressures
seemingly eroding it. I protested when
Caledonia was closed but there were reasons,
and time heals, and like most other things the
spirit still goes on. I missed Manadon
completely, apart from a thinly disguised
recruiting exercise called a summer workshop
course and some NCS weekends several years
later, so I really cannot comment on being
there, but it was the place where engineers
were trained as well as educated and possibly
it was insular and self satisfied but most
probably the biggest fault was that more
officers did not go there; higher technical
education for Seaman, Pussers and others
there would not have been a bad thing.
We have a training that continues to be
recognised as being second to none, an ethic
of commitment and team building the envy of
most and yet suffer from a management
system that if applied to the oil and gas
industry would probably succeed in pushing
the cost per barrel into double figures!
Although the Service is not wholly
blameless for the inefficiencies it finds itself
in I might suggest that possibly the only real
sin it has been guilty of over the past couple of
decades is to devalue the standards of its
officers and consequent weakening of the
'presence' that the corporate body presents.
Often it is cited that academic qualifications
are not all - quite - but a certain level of
academic standard is a basic essential if an
Officer is to have any chance at all in gaining
respect. One of my former bosses at sea and
ashore, very sadly recently dead, used to
emphasise
that
the
average
entry
qualifications of his 'tiff apprentices were
higher than many officers, and the former
went on for four years training that included
quite demanding academic training. He was a
former apprentice himself as were a couple of
others I served under who made Flag Rank.
There are exceptions to every rule but can
we really justify Officers with just O Levels1
GCSE? I saw this very clearly as Senior
Watchkeeper in a Cruiser some years ago
tasked with giving the officers under training
their two weeks of hell down below (most
admitted later they enjoyed it - perhaps it was
the potmess). The 'presence', attitude and
aptitude of the better qualified stood out a
mile.
I think we also underrate the 'home grown'.
My chief 'tiff is now a GL Commander and
my deputy a 2'12 SD, having been a Stoker
when I got my original tickets; another who
did the M E 0 Desig with me was a SD-GL
NEVER MIND THE COST, FEEL THE PRODUCTIVITY!
Transfer with a First Class Honours Degree.
Were they any less or more 'officer material'
then? Granted they were not trained as
Officers until later but we should recognise
the continuity of talent and organise ourselves
around it. If we viewed every tenth tiff as
potentially a Commander we should be doubly
sure of the quality of the officers. We should
be moving towards a continuous structure
where officers are drawn from those who have
hacked what is expected of a rating not bypassed it. We should take a look at how the
Royal Marines do things and learn from them
- after all they are part of the same firm. If the
degree becomes the norm for Officers it is also
time that artificer standards of training should
be the norm for Chief Petty Officers.
If this is taken to heart then we would
devolve more to Senior Rates, need fewer
Junior Officers and therefore have fewer and
better all round. The perception of the Officer
corps would be enhanced and people would
then be less willing to mess us about.
Rethinking assumptions
Developments in technology should similarly
challenge many of the basic assumptions for
our ships and the way we operate them should
also be reviewed. Operations rooms evolved
from a hut at the back of the bridge and grew
to the great dark caverns they have become
because of the cumbersome nature of
equipment needed to crunch the numbers and
display the plots etc. Now with reduced size,
greater computing
power,
distributed
networks and much better displays the Captain
could take his portable ops room anywhere
and could get back on to the bridge where he
no longer would be faced with the awesome
decisions between the visual and operations
pictures. As one who 'knew his place' near the
bilge I shall leave the potential for deciding
how the specifics could evolve to others to
identify. (Suffice to say I did venture on the
bridge, especially when watchkeepiing many
years ago in carriers when I would often spend
a couple of hours in the first when I was off
with the oppos who used to ring up for baked
potatoes on the supposed 'hot line' within five
minutes of starting the middle - I liked to get
the feel for their perspective or find out what if
327
anything they actually did!)
If the Ops Room goes back on to the bridge
so could HQ1 and the MCR move there. If it
did then a radical think of the manning could
be undertaken. The current Ops Officer could
regain his position as OOW and devolve more
to higher trained senior ratings to drive the
plots. Although it sticks in the throat a little he
should have direct control over the whole
picture, both external and internal and
including direct control over machinery and
the ship state. HQ2 becomes a carbon copy
somewhere in the bowels.
A structure of continuous progression
would be based on performance and merit
from junior seamen to First Sea Lord with
technician standard CPOs replacing the 'old
salt retired PO' and Officers who have
mastered the system as they progress upwards.
Care must be taken to make each step change
quite marked, just as there should be a positive
difference between junior rate and tiff so the
same should be between 'tiff and officer.
(Indeed many SD officers can teach many GL
and SL colleagues a lot about conduct and
bearing.)
Officer and Rating Structure
I do not believe one word of the old argument
about young tiffs not being proper chiefs certainly not those that can master a MEOOW
post. Just as we must not compromise Officer
standards, those of CLOS are just as vital and
intelligence and motivation are better than
mere time served and bluster. It does prompt
the question of XIWE amalgamation though.
Merge the two and you have at a stroke solved
many problems, numbers of officers (a little),
rating numbers and the 'proper chief' bit. We
never had that problem as the young ME had
to take charge of a watch so if the WE 'tiff also
had to prove himself in operational leadership
while also having the deep understanding of
the systems you have the combination you
want.
One difficulty always raised is that a
smaller number of higher quality officers
would mean too many would be left 'passed
over' as the numbers of senior posts are
limited (and may be even more so if the
change in management focus is embarked
328
NEVER MIND THE COST, FEEL THE PRODUCTIVITY!
upon) but I think that ignores two factors
which in themselves could lead to better
effectiveness and reduced costa.
First, bringing sea service into line with the
RFA, in squadrons where more would be
employed in the front line and bring
opportunity to serve at this level to more and
for longer. The pressures on people at sea I
believe are even worse than they were the
relatively few years ago that I was at sea and I
do not think two years at that level of stress is
a very good way of employing anyone. Nor is
'making up' shore jobs that cannot be really
justified.
A six month cycle of crews 'en bloc' with
more team training and dry land simulator 'pre
work ups' (as crews) would provide better
utilisation of the assets and the people. During
their shore cycle they could be used for the
liaison with procurement and shore training,
and also enable more 'corporate' activities
like ceremonial which everyone pretends to
hate. Each squadron would have its own Royal
Marine Band and then due attention can be
given to public relations without detracting
from operational roles. Crews would stay
together for longer and squadrons would be
self sufficient to encompass all the assigned
support tasks down to the in service design
support and perhaps contract training to the
'schools'. 'Fleet' would be the customer and
auditor. This is rather like the business units
that the better organised oil companies have
developed.
Second, extension of ratings' normal
service from 22 to 27 years and officers' sea
service to 50 subject to fitness, professional
ability and aptitude reduces the training load
by 25% instantly, let's say 20% to allow for
wastage and promises massive savings but
more importantly better continuity and
professionalism. One of the prime reasons for
losing trained people is basically fatigue,
emotional as well as physical, and the
demands of spouses and families unwilling to
put up with the life. Regular shore time for
training or secondment to projects, defence
contractors, even special duties such as Royal
Tournaments and Wimbledon instead of
perpetuating the current need to provide
sometimes not very justifiable 'shore jobs' to
preserve the sealshore ratio. Usually what this
means in practice is that many of the best get
worn out at sea while some get shunted aside
to less demanding roles.
There may be more who would like to
continue in this cycle for longer and if
competent and fit why not? Why this constant
'move on' ethic - we only need a few to soar
to the heights yet many very competent COs,
MEOs. Pussers and WEOs may be very happy
to spend longer at this stage. They could be
rewarded by performance pay as well as
length of service. More intensive use of the
ships means that perhaps a squadron may have
two or three crews for each, plenty of
opportunity and no dead man's shoes.
Sabbaticals with 'marking time' as Reservists
could also be an option.
With a dramatic reduction in overhead (ie
central management organisations) we would
be able to afford more new ships and keep
existing ones for longer, suitably modernised.
We should also perhaps re-introduce a more
overt system of specialist 'second career
posts' (like the Royal Naval Engineering
Service used to be 'for RN engineers until this
was hijacked by the Civil Servants when the
supply dried up) who wished to concentrate on
design posts as civilians (or better still
reservists) within the squadron structure.
Shore jobs in the squadron support would thus
be occupied by people who have earned it by
good service at sea (this should be a
prerequisite to prevent it becoming a second
class option) and bringing knowledge and
continuity. They would be on renewable
contracts (yes it is the real world).
The vocational training schools should be
privatised. I cannot see why they have to be
manned by serving personnel but of course
they would probably recruit mainly from those
who have had recent operational experience or
being committed to the RNR could be part of
the conditions of tendering.
The tricky bit is getting the politicians to
play ball. All this requires a setting of
objectives and budgeting to meet them. The
biggest use of our Officer resource is actually
geared to supporting the politicians, either
overtly or implicitly and satisfying the
information
chain
of
accountability.
NEVER MIND THE COST, FEEL THE PRODUCTIVITY!
Spreadsheets can do that. We should be
re-gearing to use the assets, people and ships,
more effectively. We have a lot to be proud of
and given a better management framework
329
with those assets clearly central we can drive
our 'productivity' up.
STEAM
TRAP
Harking Back
A
LMOST every issue of the NR throws up
some incident less 'one off' than
previously imagined: jellyfish clamping a
cruiser or destroyer and such like. The recent
July issue was no exception. 'Midshipman 42'
related an episode when Musketeer was nearly
run down after a hiccup switching fuel tanks.
Something similar happened to Inconstant
in 1942. Imagine a hot afternoon in the
Mozambique Channel: OOW sunning himself
on the bridge of a destroyer zigzagging at
quite high speed ahead of the Dutch liner
Nieuw Amsterdam with several thousand
troops aboard.
All of a sudden, start to lose headway: two
black balls hoisted: siren blasted for all it was
worth: course set end on and steady: fingers
crossed. The Nieuw Amsterdam swept up on
our starboard side less than fifty yards out.
The cause of the trouble? The Chief Stoker
had mistakenly changed the fuel supply to an
empty tank. I don't recall any disciplinary
upshot. And until the July NR had thought the
incident a rarity. Now I wonder.
The July NR also had the fascinating piece
from Derek Howse about Boadicea with
Winston Churchill on board: minebusting etc.
Its reference to sub-calibre firing also
triggered old recall.
Early in the war I was a green as grass
midshipman in supposed charge of the
forward 7.5" gun in the old cruiser Hawkins.
We went out from Portland for subcalibre
firing. Returning to harbour, jackstaff already
back up, I said to the PO of the gun, 'I suppose
it is unloaded.' 'Oh yes Sir', he replied and
slapped the breech and off went the round in
the general direction of Portland, nicking the
jackstaff on the way. Again, I don't recall any
witch hunt: one young officer had learnt a
lesson. But it took a bit of living down and I
later found out that the subcalibre breech was
a sensitive object.
It is easy to hark back and recall the slip ups
and banana skins of service and chuckle over
them. Banana skins are a fact of life: always
there are hiccups around to trip the unwary.
But keeping a weather eye open can
sometimes save a hiccup developing into heart
failure.
During the war years, the RAF used to
publish as awful warning the disastrous
exploits of Pilot Officer Prune. But of course
hiccups and the blind spot are not respecters of
rank. It could be Lieutenant Prune or
Commander Prune or Admiral Prune.
Everyone who has served can think of
umpteen examples. But this one from almost
fifty years ago may bear repetition. Arthur
Power, then C-in-C Mediterranean, had a
thing about mental alertness. And one day
taught the fleet a lesson.
In the late 1940s, the Mediterranean Fleet
was at Aranci Bay in Sardinia for the Summer
Regatta. One evening the C-in-C issued a
warning to the fleet highlighting the
importance of mental alertness.
In the morning, most of the fleet woke up to
find that during the night the flagship - a
despatch vessel - had slipped off without
them. I forget the aftermath. But a point had
been made. Pay attention and keep an eye
open.
JAD
Availability - Double or Quits?
I
F it was suggested to an audience that it
should be possible to double the size of the
submarine flotilla at sea for less than 5% of the
annual operating costs and to increase the
surface flotilla at sea by SO%, for 10-15% of
the annual operating costs, the speaker wot~ld
probably be laughed off the podium.
This article discusses a series of questions
examining
platform
availability
and
maintenance policy and is an edited version of
a much more detailed paper. The discussions
are based around the Submarine (SSN) Marine
Engineering aspects of platform availability
and maintenance. The principles of these
discussions apply equally to submarines and
surface ships, only the amounts of money
involved differ.
Platform availability
The nation has under the direction of the
Ministry of Defence (Navy) procured a
number of nuclear powered submarines of
which 12 SSNs are currently in service. To
build, today, each of these platforms would
cost in the region of BOOM (Department of
Defence Economics, York University). The
platform currently has a life of 20-25 years.
The usage of these platforms amounts to
approximately 33% through life (for a surface
ship this increases to approximately 50%). For
an item of capital equipment this represents a
fairly low utilisation and is probably not a cost
effective use of an BOOM asset. It could be
argued that although the platform is not at sea
it is in fact in harbour available for sea; this is
analogous to a car parked on the owner's
driveway. In reality the car has its bonnet up
and the driver is asleep catching up on some
much needed rest. The time spent in harbour is
not idle and the submarine is either in
maintenance, harbour training or the ship's
company are on leave. In reality the boat is not
available to the programmers. The current
'stretch on the fleet' is well documented with
no obvious solution and the planners would
welcome any increase in platform availability.
The introduction of the New Management
Strategy, Options for Change and Front Line
First have done much to identify and quantify
actual amounts of money spent in the various
areas of defence. They have also made serious
savings in the infrastructure of defence.
However, our product, namely platforms at
sea, trained, manned and equipped, remains in
high demand. Indeed the stretch on the Fleet
has been recognised as possibly the single
most important factor affecting operational
units. Over the last five years it has been much
talked about but no solutions to the problem
have been forthcoming. Essentially our
product is the platform's 'days at sea'. In a free
market economy the forces of supply and
demand have made these days at sea very
valuable. In fact the demand for these 'days at
sea' has meant that the Current Military Tasks
for the DDIFF force has jumped from 5.5 in
1988 (Broadsheet 95/96) to 12 in 1996
(Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996).
As a businessman one would be delighted with
a surge in demand of over 200%. Plans would
be made to expand to meet the new demand
and charges for our product could be raised to
control the demand! However, we do not
'charge' the government for our services and
we must manage our resources in the most cost
effective manner possible.
The period of financial austerity we have
faced has meant that we have had a great many
changes forced upon us, and in many cases has
seen an improvement in efficiency. Major
reductions in the costs of overheads and
improvement in the efficiency of the support
services have done much to meet Government
spending targets. At each stage the reduction in
costs has to be searched for and is not
necessarily driven by the demand for a better
product. However, one important factor has
been lacking. The product of 'days at sea' from
each individual platform has not risen above
that achieved during the Second World War.
After fifty years of continuous technological
advancement the efficiency of our platforms to
produce the product ie 'days at sea' has not
improved.
Now that a period of stability has been
declared by the Government for the Armed
Forces, a change in philosophy needs to be
adopted. Instead of efficiency drives aimed at
doing the same with less we should be striving
to do more with the same resources ie 'leaner
and fitter'. The Merchant Navy have made
great advances in the availability of their ships
AVAILABILITY
- DOUBLE
in spite of the stringent requirements of the
classification societies for dockings and
surveys. This problem of stagnated availability
has been influenced by two factors: A lack of
appreciation of the value of a day at sea
(coupled with the cost of keeping a platform
alongside) and leaving the platform alongside
whilst the crew takes its leave.
The value of a day at sea
The value of a day at sea is an important figure
used by many commercial shipping lines to
make financial decisions. The value of a day at
sea can be used for maintenancelrepair
decisions and determining the optimum
routine docking time. It is determined by the
current charter rate. Unfortunately the Royal
Navy is not chartered by the Government to
provide its vessels. So how can a value be put
on a day at sea? In a commercial world the
value of a day at sea is fixed by the current
charter rate; against this the potential investor
would be looking to recover the capital outlay,
the operating costs and generate a profit.
For an SSN with a 20 year life, 7.2 years are
available for sea (Using an availability of 113).
The SSN has to generate in those 7.2 years, its
build cost (as its scrap value is zero), operating
costs, (say) 10% profit and sufficient to cover
decommissioning costs. This leads to the
following figures:
Value of I duy at sea ,for SSN (33%
availability) = f0.89M
If the availability is increased to 75% then
the figures become:
Value of 1 day at sea for SSN (75%
availability) = f 0.47M
For an FFIDD which costs E240M (at 50%
availability) the figures are:
Value o f I day at sea for DD/FF (50%) =
£0.23M
If the availability is increased to 75% the
figures become:
Value c$ 1 day at sea ,for DD/FF (75%
availability) = f0.2M
By comparison the current Navy operating
cost is made up from the following (SDE 96):
f 1,128 M
CINCFLEET
£ 638 M
2SL
CFS
& 1,998 M
TOTAL
£3,764 M
This is used to provide 114 front line ships
OR QUITS?
33 1
(excluding RFAs and assuming commando
and air groups embarked) giving an average
cost per unit of E34M per year or f0.2M per
day (at 50% availability). The figure of f34M
as an average for all units compares favourably
with the figure of E24M for the operating cost
of one D D F F quoted above.
Berthing costs
These are 'hidden' costs, i.e. they are not
exposed to the user. At present the costs are
hidden because they are regarded as an
overhead for the operation of the fleet. The
commanding officer of the platform is not
presented with a bill for his stay in a Naval
Base. In other UK Ports and foreign ports the
charges are forwarded to the MOD (berthing1
sullagelpilotage/tugs/generator hire etc). These
costs need to be exposed so that each unit is
'charged' by its respective Naval Base for the
services it is using. These charges become
important later on. From the current budget
management system these charges could be
calculated on an average basis and then
exposed to those with a vested interest.
Platform availability: the operating cycle
The availability of platforms is currently
decided by the operating cycle. The
introduction of the 'Harmony Rules' has
capped the maximum number of days spent at
sea per year by a platform on a routine basis.
This has two effects:
a) The platform has to be in harbour
for the crew to take leave.
b) There is no real incentive to reduce
the time spent alongside in maintenance
because the platform has to be there
anyway.
Clearly to double the availability of the
submarine requires the reduction in cycle time
of alongside activities yet:
a) Maintenance cannot be reduced in
the short term.
b) Harbour training is an essential end
of shut down period activity, allowing the
crew to become familiar with operation
and to test defects rectified during the
maintenance period.
The only activity remaining is leave. If the
time spent on leave is removed and devoted to
time at sea the availability is increased by a
332
AVAILABILITY -DOUBLE OR QUITS'?
minimum o f six weeks. By loclung both the
ships and submarines into the same operating
pattern the availability between refits can be
pushed into the 70.75% region.
as the platforms have never functioned at such
a level before. The effect on upkeep effort
could only be accurately measured and hence
forecast by incrementally working up to the
increased availability.
At the increased availability some will
Manning and leave
instantly
query
the
increased fuel
What to do about leave?
I f the boat is not able to remain alongside to consumption costs. I f this line o f thought is
allow the crew leave then the crew must be carried through then we would never put to
increased to allow some changeover. The sea because it is cheaper to keep the platforms
deterrent submarines operate a two crew in harbour, rather than at sea burning
system to maintain at least one boat at sea at all expensive fuel. What is the current cost o f fuel
times. With a flotilla o f 12 SSNs this is not for the fleet? What percentage does this
quite so important compared with 4 SSBNs. represent o f the CINCFLEETl2SLlCFS
Increasing the size o f the crew by 33% would budget? Once the increased availability is
allow the submarine to increase its availability taken into account does the increase in the
and create sufficient leave for the crew. combined budget represent an unreasonable
Increasing the size o f the crew for SSNs would amount for the gain achieved? I f an increase in
not be a new idea. In the early 1970s a 'Fifth budget cannot be found it will certainly focus
Watch' was added to the scheme o f efforts to free o f f the required money to pay
complement. The purpose o f this was to allow for the extra fuel.
those who could not take leave during
What action is currently in hand to reduce
alongside periods (due to the high work load) the support burden'? The Review o f
to proceed on leave when the boat deployed. In Maintenance, continued improvements in the
the early 1990s this was removed as part o f application o f Condition Based Maintenance
manpower efficiencies. Subsequently it was and the forthcoming introduction o f UPKEEP
found that the efficiency o f the alongside strive to continually reduce the maintenance
periods was impaired and it became necessary burden. The 1980s and early 1990s have seen
for 'Add Backs' in certain key billets.
the time spent by platforms in maintenance
show a downward trend. The trend is set to
continue and in turn will increasingly apply
Defects and maintenance
Having increased the availability o f the pressure to the periods when the platform is
submarines would the greater operation result alongside the wall for dedicated leave periods.
in higher defect rates leading to a reduction in At present maintenance and leave are parallel
activities, but a situation could be envisaged
the availability o f the submarine?
There is evidence to suggest that increasing where the maintenance is finished before the
the time spent at sea for SSNs would actually crew has completed leave.
achieve a reduction in the defect rates. The 'S'
Class have demonstrated a significant drop in Additional sea going manpower
defects corresponding to a rise in the time How many personnel does 133% manning o f
spent at sea. This downward trend would vessels in commission require?
probably reach an optimum and then start to
Maximum manning nunzbevs for all
rise again as the operation o f the boat was seagoing units = 17,058 (RN personnel only,
increased further. The ramifications o f finding based on Broadsheet 95)
this operating point by empirical means o f a
Total strength o f RN = 41,100 (Excluding
series o f iterative trials are huge and would RM)
take years to show conclusive results.
In practice this is an exaggeration o f reality
With the information currently to hand it as it is a worst case manning requirement
would be imprudent to make any kind o f based on the assumption that all vessels are
forecast regarding the effect o f increased available for sea. In practice not all vessels are
availability on upkeep effort.Operating at such available for sea due to refits and so the
an increased availability is unknown territory numbers in actual sea going billets are
AVAILABILITY
-
reduced. Deterrent submarines are not
included due to the two crew system:
Manning levels ofthose unifs avuilahle ,fir
sea = 13,197
Of all the tleet units only those major
fighting units need have their crews increased
(Carriers, LPD, 22s, 23s and 42s):
Personnel required,for major,fighting units
= 11,014
One third qf this ,figure, to provide 133%
manning = 3,67 1
The provision of 133% manning also has a
distinct advantage for regeneration. In the
event of needing to regenerate, a number of
trained crews would be readily available. The
extra third of the crew would be permanently
attached to the shiplsubmarine. The creation
of a general manpower pool to form the extra
crews is not the most effective means of
managing the personnel and leads to a
degradation of fighting efficiency.
There are two ways in which to generate the
additional manpower required to man vessels
in commission to 133%. The first (and the one
which is the simplest in its execution) is to
attempt a straight forward increase in the
strength of the Royal Navy. To justify an
increase in manpower would to some seem an
impossible task. Since before the introduction
of the New Management Strategy manpower
has continuously been earmarked as an
expensive part of any budget, the cost of
which is to be actively reduced. This policy is
now one of the foundation stones of NMS. To
accommodate the increase in manpower
requires a global view of the Naval
Expenditure. It may well be asked if it's that
simple why has it not been suggested before'!
The answer to this lies in the way budgets are
divided up amongst the TLB holders. A
proposed increase in manpower would require
the staffs of two or three TLBs to work
together; this is unlikely and so the idea never
gets off the ground. Initially it would always
appear that one TLB would bear all of this
increase which clearly is a nonstarter. How
can the statements made in the first paragraph
be justified then? By examining the 1996
Statement on the Defence Estimates and some
additional information, then what seemed as
outlandish becomes a possibility.
DOUBLE OR QUITS'?
333
Naval expenditure
The current CINCFLEETlCFSl2SL budget
stands at &3,764M (SDE 96). Breaking down
the above figure to reveal the cost of
manpower, and increasing it by a third, does
produce an unrealistic increase in the total
manpower budget. However it will not be an
across the board increase in manpower. To get
the true picture further analysis is required.
Using SDE 96 to generate a manpower
budget (29% of budgets spent on service
personnel) leads to the following costings:
40 Service personnel = f l M
Cost ofcrews,fi,rfleet units = 5275.35M
One third qfthisfigure = £9 1M.
Total increase in expenditure required =
f91M (annually).
Is this a large amount of money? taken in the
context of CINCFLEET's budget, yes as it
represents some 8% of the annual budget and it
would be this budget which would normally
bear the cost. As part of the CINCFLEETI
CFSl2SL budget it represents 2.4% and as part
of the defence budget as a whole a mere 0.5%.
For the potential gain this represents, &91M is
hardly a significant expenditure. This half of
one per cent of the defence budget is probably
the Navy's share of the 95/96 underspend.
The second method for generating the
additional manpower required is vastly more
complex and would take a great deal of
planning to achieve. The manpower is
generated from the current uniformed strength
of the Royal Navy. An examination of the
current numbers of personnel employed in non
sea going billets represents some 68% of the
uniformed strength. From this figure 13% of
those in non seagoing billets are required to
produce 133% manning. By setting targets to
release this manpower a great deal of
restructuring would need to be carried out.
What of the sea shore ratios and having shore
billets for personnel to fill'? - the return of
some of the civilianised posts back to
uniformed posts would redress this imbalance.
This process would also help to reduce the
impact of the costs of additional manpower.
The restructuring would have to encompass
both officers and ratings.
Conclusion
The current strain on the tleet is well
334
AVAILABILITY - DOUBLE OR QUITS?
documented and has been a growing problem
for several years. Successive Admiralty
Boards have been unable to address the
problem due to the balance to be struck
between units available and Current Military
Tasks. The key to alleviating this problem is to
separate the need for the platform to be in
harbour whilst the crew takes its leave. The
only reason for the platform to be in harbour
will be for logistical purposes and not to
achieve a 'Harmony Target'. The current
NMSITLB division does not lend itself to 'big
picture' thinking. NMS should be regarded as
the first attempt in an iterative process of
gaining the best from the finances available.
We have now nearly discovered what we
spend our money on but the 'how' of
expenditure needs improving. The current set
up will only result in the situation worsening as
the Treasury seeks to impose further cuts and a
series of 'salami slices' are taken from each
area. A cut in the budget will mean a direct cut
in all budgets and the consequent reduction in
force levels. The areas reduced in budget are
made on the perception of the staffs and the
impact they believe it will have on the
frontline. By focusing on the availability of the
fleet, any budget cut will have a direct,
immediate and measurable effect on the days
at sea. To solve the problem the TLB staffs
need to work together, rather than defending
their own position.
The Secretary of State for Defence in his
letter published in the Winter 9.516 issue of
Navy Life has stated:
'The Prime Minister has made it clear
that the Government is committed to a
period of stability for the Front Line. The
necessary resources will be made available
to achieve that object. But we must make
best use of the resources available to us.
Indeed, we must aim to enhance our
fighting capability within those resources.
Front Line First showed that can be done.
If we are to succeed, it will be
necessary for all of us to strive for greater
effectiveness in all that we do. We must
ensure that the money provided by the
taxpayer for our National Defence is spent
as efficiently as possible so that we can
achieve our primary objective: the
maximisation of our fighting capability.'
What better way to enhance our fighting
capability, and to spend taxpayers' money
efficiently, than to increase the number of days
which the fleet can permanently sustain at sea?
The solution outlined above gives every one
a readily measurable goal to achieve an
increase in the number of days at sea. It does of
course assume that this is the ultimate goal to
achieve, but it may not be and other
considerations may need to be taken into
account. Coupled with this target is the very
real reward of increased leave once the
platform leaves the wall (currently any
increase in sea time results in greater strain on
the crews and families). Any number of
incentives could be introduced to encourage
the shore side organisations to reduce the
length of time spent in harbour. This whole
effort, focused on increasing the availability of
the fleet, will reveal any shortcoming and
inefficiency within the entire operations area.
The reason for a platform not being able to put
to sea will be readily visible.
There is an alternative view to be taken of
this solution and what it could be used to
achieve. To consider that view would be to
take a politically motivated stance and an
exceedingly short term one at that. To suggest
it would be wholly against the best interests of
the Service and to demonstrate a completely
negative attitude about the future of the Royal
Navy. To avoid such a prospect, the demand
for the time that the ships and submarines
spend at sea must be driven up so that the
availability of the platforms can rise to meet
the demand.
The net result is a five to ten year 'business
development' plan for the Royal Navy. The
customer/provider relationships between the
TLBs would change radically and the 'doers'
will be controlling expenditure. The customer
will demand more days at sea from the
provider. The plan will put in place the
management methods to gain the best
availability of the fleet from the resources
currently available, creating a truly leaner fitter
fleet. It could ultimately lead to the doubling in
size of the submarine flotilla and increasing the
size of the surface flotilla by 50% at potentially
a minimal increase in cost.
S. J. H. FOSTER
LIEUTENANT,
RN
Phoenix Unwanted
Part 1: The End
Introduction
HE Royal Naval Auxiliary Service
T w v x s ) was disbanded at the end of
March 1994 as a casualty of the then current
round of defence cuts. The first part of this
paper discusses the effectiveness of the RNXS,
its organisation and operation together with its
weaknesses and the reasons for its closure.
The Maritime Volunteer Service (MVS)
was formed by former members of the RNXS
in April 1994 and has successfully fought for
survival against significant opposition from
sectors of the Ministry of Defence
establishment. The second part of this paper
describes the creation of the MVS, its
objectives and current status.
Having passed out of BRNC Dartmouth in
1964, the author left the Royal Navy to pursue
a civilian career as a management consultant
and spent 18 years in the RNXS of which the
last 14 were in command of RNXS vessels
and the last five as volunteer officer in charge
of afloat training for six units. Travel with the
day job enabled the author to visit a number of
different units around the country to provide
comparisons of attitudes and competency.
As a trustee of the MVS and a member of
the management committee the author is well
placed to describe its development to date and
its realistic plans for the future. The views
expressed within this paper are entirely those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect
RNXS or MVS opinions.
Aim
By describing the end of the RNXS and the
beginning of the MVS, the aim of this paper is
to question the attitude of the naval
establishment to volunteer reserves.
RNXS skills
The RNXS was a uniformed, civilian 'noncombatant' organisation formed in 1962 from
the Royal Naval Minewatching Service which
had itself been created ten years earlier. The
roles of the RNXS had evolved over the years
until, at closure, they were to:
a) Provide trained ratings, and some
junior officers, to support the Naval
Control of Shipping (NCS) organisation
within the UK. (RNXS members were
not expected to serve abroad)
b) Crew and operate patrol craft in
support of the Defence of Ports and
Anchorages (DEFPA) organisation.
c) To man the DEFPA plot in the Post
Headquarters (PHQ)
Until about 1990191, the national NCS
organisation was totally dependent upon
RNXS volunteers who provided plotting,
reporting, communications, message handling
and computer skills. The volunteers were
possibly over-trained for the tasks required by
the various Wintex and similar exercises for
they were fully capable of organising convoys
with joiners and leavers together with sailing
folders and associated communications,
plotting and reporting. It was apparent,
however, that the numerous RNR NCS
officers and regular dual appointees
frequently had but a hazy idea of their duties
and of the skills required.
With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact,
changing technology and tactical reviews, the
need for NCS was perceived to be much
reduced and the residual requirement could be
met by a limited number of officers with laptop computers. The circular debate about the
mkrits of escorted convoys versus single ship
sailings and roving hunter-killer groups will
form no further part of this paper other than to
refer to the empirical experience of centuries
and the solid statistical research of recent
years.
The DEFPA organisation was formed in the
mid-1980s - allegedly at the request of the
Army who were concerned at the lack of
effective defence arrangements for UK ports.
The RNXS contribution was to train crews
capable of operating patrol vessels with
embarked, armed boarding parties. On a
number of exercises, the vessels patrolled the
approaches to ports, reported suspicious
movements and, when authorised by NOIC in
the PHQ, would board, search and perhaps
arrest a suspect vessel which would be
escorted to a quarantine anchorage for detailed
investigation. The aim being to prevent a
336
PHOENIX UNWANTED
hostile vessel from scuttling itself in the
approaches to Portsmouth, Harwich or
similar.
By 1993, the RNXS had become very
proficient in DEFPA and had adopted its new
skills of secure communications, Tactical
Command with Rules of Engagement in a
similar manner as ducks to water. The
interesting and unworkable concept of
uniformed, civilian, non-combatants was
never resolved but it was assumed that hostile
forces would spot the RNXS ensign and shoot
to miss!
Embarked boarding parties were initially
scraped together from untrained cooks and
bottle washers taken from local training or
reserve establishments. It was realised that
this may not be appropriate when such a
boarding party led by a bewildered RAF
officer on secondment failed to find five
hidden crew members aboard an RNXS
'Archer' Class patrol craft. A new Port
Defence Party (PDP) branch was formed
within the RNR who were trained for the task,
were very competent and worked very well
with the RNXS crews. The command
responsibility was clearly defined in that the
PDP officer had military command but the
RNXS skipper retained sea command at all
times. When the PDPO was transferred to a
suspect vessel, local tactical command was de
facto transferred to the RNXS skipper who
was in contact with PHQ, had back up
personnel on board and could call on other
defence resources.
To achieve the levels of skills required,
RNXS volunteers were required to attend
evening training sessions at least twice a
month at their local unit. The training was to
formal syllabuses issued by the RNXS
training school with marked examinations at
the end of each module. All examinations for
Petty Officer and above were carried out by
the RNXS Training School which included
assessments at sea for Watchkeepers and
Command Endorsements. Training standards
were high and continually improving.
RNXS Organisation
The head of the RNXS was a Captain, Royal
Navy and he was supported within the staff of
CINCNAVHOME by a staff Captain RNXS, a
Lieutenant Commander RNXS and a clerical
assistant. The service as a whole was divided
into three commands: Plymouth, Portsmouth
and FOSNI each with a Commander, RNXS
as Area Staff Officer supported by a Training
Officer and an Engineer Officer with clerical
assistance. There were approximately 50
RNXS units around the coasts of the UK, each
commanded by a Volunteer Officer and units
were organised into groups of five or six with
each group commanded by a full-time staff
officer - the Group Naval Auxiliary Officer
(GNXO). Each GNXO was supported by
volunteer staff officers representing the three
branches of seamanship, engineering and
operations.
The RNXS Training School was
commanded by the National Auxiliary
Training Officer in the rank of Commander,
RNXS with a deputy and an assistant. A
National Engineering Officer was responsible
for engineering training and the serviceability
of the fourteen RNXS vessels -Fleet Tenders
and 'Archer' Class.
By December 1993, after a two-year
moratorium on recruiting, the RNXS
consisted of about 2,600 volunteers plus
permanent staff. The average age of the
volunteers was between 43 and 44.
The costs of the service were difficult to
ascertain precisely since different items
appeared under different budgets - vessels, for
example, were included within RMAS
budgets. The total cost per annum on closure
for 2,600 volunteers, fourteen vessels plus
permanent staff was believed to be around £5
million.
Strengths and weaknesses
The major, sustaining strength of the RNXS
was undoubtedly the commitment and
enthusiasm of the volunteers. The quality of
the training achieved by the various units was,
however, variable and was a reflection upon
the quality of local permanent and volunteer
staff. When they were good they were very,
very good and when they were bad they let the
rest down. None of the problems were
widespread and all of them, once identified.
were easily fixed. In the 95% majority of
PHOENIX UNWANTED
cases, volunteer\ were well trained, highly
motivated and worked well with other
reserves and regular forces. As we all know,
Sod's Law operates universally, so when very
senior officers observed the RNXS in action
they too often saw the less proficient and the
less well led!
Drill was a regular source of grief for the
RNXS since it formed no part of any of the
training syllabuses. Members in their smart
uniforms were keen to parade but too often
failed to train for the event so that there were
far too many reports of parade ground
shambles. Again these reports were always
made by senior officers who happened to be
visiting. Volunteers were just beginning to
accept the need for basic drill practice when
closure was announced.
The RNXS as a civilian organisation was
not subject to the Naval Discipline Act. This
was seen to be of some significance by the
uninformed. Those who had experienced the
RNXS in operation had seen the power of peer
pressure in successfully operating small
vessels to RN standards and in PHQs where
duty watches turned up on time every time.
Peer pressure does not imply committee
meetings for decisions but requires true
leadership skills without recourse to defaulters
or disciplinary sanctions.
Very few regular officers or MOD civil
servants ever came into contact with the
RNXS whose volunteers were valued by the
men in grey suits according to their RNXS
qualifications with no account taken of
qualifications obtained during the 'day job'.
Many of these were of inestimable value and
ranged from Extra Masters MN through
nuclear physicists, information technology
professionals, teachers, builders, and almost
all known skills.
Disbandment and closure
The official reason given for the disbandment
of the RNXS was that the specialist skills of
NCS and DEFPA, were no longer required in
the changing political requirement since the
threat no longer existed. (A residual NCS role
is fulfilled by a small number of RNR
personnel.) The author attended a Reserve
Officers War Course at RNC Greenwich
337
where the clear impression was gained by
manv of the students that threats defined bv
the intelligence services were massaged to fit
the available budget.
The argument that the roles were no longer
required and nor was the RNXS was
interesting since RN reserves have historically
been used for roles other than those for which
they trained. The Naval Brigades on the
Western Front in 1914 are the most obvious
example but the RNVSR Bomb Disposal units
in 1940 must not be forgotten. One can only
assume that future patterns of maritime
warfare are entirely predictable and that
contingency plans offer 100% levels of
confidence. If this is really so, future wars
need not be fought since computer sinlulation
will soon define the winner!
The consultation period between the
announcement of the proposed closure and its
confirmation was remarkable for its cynical
failure to consult. A number of well-reasoned
papers were submitted suggesting other ways
of achieving significant cuts whilst retaining
the RNXS as a viable service. Each paper
received a bland acknowledgement and the
promise of a detailed response. No detailed
responses ever materialised! Of the 40
members of parliament who promised to
speak up for the RNXS in the defence debates,
only two kept their word.
Thus the RN - or was it the Treasury? apparently had no use for trained, committed,
mature (average age 43/44) seamen,
navigators, engineers, con~municators and
operations room volunteers with a collective,
unrivalled knowledge of local ports, local
organisations and small ship operation around
the busy or the more obscure reaches of the
UK and adjacent European waters.
RNXS units closed down from January to
March 1994 with much sadness but with some
anger when it was realised that all records
were to be destroyed and no lists would be
retained of volunteers willing and able to help
in times of emergency. The impression was
given of an intention to wipe out all record of
the RNXS as if it had never been. This caused
considerable offence to volunteers who had
given up much of their free time to the service
with significant risks to the stability of their
338
PHOENIX UNWANTED
home life and marriage.
So, saving around £5 million per annum roughly equivalent to the cumulative daily
cost over-runs on mismanaged major
procurement projects - the RNXS faded into
history on 31 March 1994.
Fortunately for the volunteers, the grief and
bitterness was given no time to fester when the
formation of the Maritime Volunteer Service
was announced in April 1994.
The birth pangs of the new service will be
described in the second part of this paper.
HAYDN
CHAPPELL
Developments in the RNZN - I1
T
HE materiel health of New Zealand's
Navy continues to improve, as our second
'Anzac'-class frigate Te Marza (and the fourth
in the transTasman project), had her keel laid
(or rather, a hull module emplaced) on
Transfield's slipway at Williamstown, in
June. Te Mana (Maori for status, authority)
will be launched in mid-May, 1997, about six
weeks after Te Kaha is due to be delivered to
the RNZN.
Te Kaha's first CO, Cdr Steve Streefkerk, is
now in Melbourne and his ship's company is
slowly increasing as they arrive to undertake
the array of training courses for the new ship.
Obviously HMAS Anzac's sea trials were
followed with close interest; the unplanned
highlight being a succession of mechanical
teething troubles (to a diesel and one of the CP
propell& shafts) which actually proved the
versatility of the frigate's CODOG power
plant. Anzac herself is now operating from
Sydney undergoing first of class trials and a
work up; two RNZN ships will be her work-up
consorts.
Related to the frigate project is the decision
on replacement naval helicopters. New
Zealand's timetable was to have been ahead of
the RAN's, in order to have the new helos in
service for Te Kaha (as well as a desire to
bring our Wasps' 30 year career to a safe end).
Westland's Super Lynx and the resurrected
Kaman S2G Sea Sprite are the two contenders.
But in mid-year Cabinet decided to defer the
RAN's
own
decision, pending
the
deliberations. This non-decision means Te
Kaha is likely, initially, to embark a Wasp,
while the first of our new Observers remains
in limbo, flying with the RNZAF's P-3
Orions. Of course for the politicians, it takes
an apparently expensive defence purchase off
the agenda while they campaign for October's
general election.
The other materiel issue was the entry into
service of the Phalanx close in weapon system
on HMNZS Canterbury. We have mounted
the weapon on the hangar roof, in place of the
Seacat system (Seacat has completely gone we sold our remaining missiles to Chile).
Babcocks, who now manage the dockyard at
Devonport, designed and manufactured a new
hangar portal to both cany the weapon and
also lengthen the hangar (in anticipation of the
new helos).
Canterbury has just completed her life
extension refit, with the Ops Room totally
rebuilt: Nautis-F C2 system, Link 1I, IFF MK
XII, a Track Management System, and HF
communications upgrades, for example.
Externally, LWO-8 radar is now in place of
965, as well as the Close in Weapon System
(CIWS) on the hangar. In my opinion she is
now more handsome than ever. Wellington is
now in Babcocks' hands to complete her life
extension (she already has Nautis-F and the
LWO-8, for example) including mounting the
CIWS.
Canterbury is deploying with the MultiNational Interception Force in the Gulf,
enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq. She is
our second contribution to the force,
Wellington having deployed there at the end of
'95. Waikato has become our training ship;
while she has had a communications upgrade,
her Ops Rooms, gunnery control and radars
are still in essence as originally fitted. She will
pay off in conjunction with Te Mana's
delivery in 1998.
Meanwhile our other new acquisition, the
military sealift ship Charles Upham, is
proving popular with the Army. At this stage
only limited modifications have been done, so
she is only a vehicle and store carrier, but in a
couple of years she will have an extensive
refit,
including
additional
internal
compartments to both improve damage
stability and allow the ship to embark a
'company group' of 150 soldiers. The new
accommodation will impact on total vehicle
capacity, but in conjunction with a proposed
flight deck should make for a much more
versatile ship.
Our other prospect is for an ex US T-AGOS
to replace both Monowai and Tui in the
hydrographic and oceanographic roles.
Monowai was a former island trader converted
to Hecla standards, while Tui is ex-American.
Our Defence Scientific Establishment used
Tui for extensive towed array work, but she
ended her career in a blaze of publicity as our
'silent sentinel' protesting last year's French
nuclear weapon tests. With only one
replacement ship, it is hard to see how the
340
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RNZN
competing
demands
of
hydrographic
surveying and oceanography can be
reconciled. Earlier, a long government review
process of naval and civilian research ships
was very critical of the operating efficiency of
Monowai, in comparison to civilian (and nearnew) fisheries research ships. The reviewers
initially proposed a new government agency
to operate all the research ships - but even
Treasury saw that as empire building. Now
Hydrography is under a new threat with
proposals to open the field to competitive
bidding - ugh!
On shore the new Maritime Operations
School has opened, on the former rugby field
at Philomel (a serious sacrifice). The new
building contains a Nautis trainer, the Combat
Systems Support Facility for the 'Anzacs'
Celciustech combat system and all the
necessary radio, radar and electronic schools.
It will do wonders for our training.
But retention of people is our primary
concern - a familiar story to NR readers. This
year CNS, Rear Admiral Jack Welch,
introduced a retention bonus for senior Marine
Engineering ratings, while similar incentives
are being assessed for other critical branches.
Cooks and stewards for example, have been
under particular pressure due to the array of
hotel and casino construction in Auckland. A
new approach to management and leadership
(called Project Amorangi) has been
introduced fleet-wide and into the training and
divisional systems; drawing on Situational
Leadership theory, the project has ensured that
compatible leadership standards are taught
across all rank levels. Sea-going COs have
stated that already there is a marked positive
change in the attitudes and approaches to
responsibility among junior ratings and junior
-
11
officers. The old paternalistic approach to the
divisional system is fading fast, and the self
motivation of our people is growing.
As well, CNS is striving to improve our
public image with: a reinforced public
relations effort, a focus on fleet input into PR,
and a conscious effort to get the ships back
into our own ports. In recent years our ships
have been more visible in Sydney, Singapore
and the islands of the South Pacific than to our
own taxpayers. Next year, the government is
faced with the decision on the next two
'Anzac' frigates, ie do we take up our option
for two more (under the existing contract) or
seek some other option for the replacement of
Cunterbury and Wellington? Of course
opponents of the Navy (including a few within
Defence Headquarters) don't want any
replacements.
What clouds that decision is the fact of the
October election, the first to be held under the
West German-style electoral system of MMP.
It is probable that a coalition government will
be formed, and that implies that defence will
be one of the easy items for the inevitable
horse trading of coalition building. The
political paradigm shift of MMP has meant
that the long-standing labour-conservative
two party system has crumbled, so at the time
of writing there are four major parties and over
six viable minor parties. In fact the pessimists
predict an unstable coalition and an early
election before the new system settles down.
So the commitment of the future Cabinet to
defence in general and two new frigates in
particular is simply unpredictable, until the
dust settles and a new government is formed.
Forty years on: the origins and successes of the
UK naval nuclear propulsion programme - I11
Primary plant developments
RIMARY Plant developments have been
very well covered in a recent paper by
Tony Roulstone, the Managing Director of
Rolls-Royce and associate^.'^ Suffice it,
therefore, for me to say that as well as seeking
noise reduction the reactor plant designers had
to respond to pressing requirements for reactor
core designs with ever longer lives. In the
whole of the defence field there can be few
better examples of value for money than is
represented by the work of the reactor core
designers of Rolls-Royce and Associates. Over
the years they have done a superb job which,
because of security constraints, will only ever
be fully appreciated by a small number of
people in the company and in the MOD.
P
PWR2
Up to and including the 'Trafalgar' Class the
power and the reactor core lifetime
requirements of successive classes of
submarine could be met, while retaining
reactor plant equipments of much the same
size as the original Dounreay prototype. With
the decision in the early 1980s that the Polaris
strategic weapon system would be replaced by
the US Trident weapon system this had to
change. The submarine would be a lot bigger
and would need more power.
Following well ordered procedures the
Primary Plant developments were undertaken
by Rolls-Royce and Associates and its
subcontractors, while much of the preliminary
Secondary Plant equipment design and
develovment was carried out within the SIP
programme, although the overall plant layout
was by VSEL. Virtually all the steam plant
equipments had to be completely redesigned
for the new power, within tight space
envelopes. No end to the Cold War was in
sight, and it was recognised that the new plant
for the Trident SSBNs would be needed for
the next generation of SSNs also, if best value
was to be had from the design and
development costs of the new plant. Space
was not an allowable luxury in that context.
A new prototype
It was clear that a new submarine propulsion
prototype was needed. The original plant at
Dounreay had done magnificent service,
having evaluated successive reactor cores,
successive designs of Manoeuvring Room,
and many individual components, equipments
and procedures proposed for use in submarine
propulsion plants. Since the very beginning of
the nuclear propulsion programme the
prototype has been managed, operated and
maintained by Rolls-Royce and Associates,
providing another example of successful
contracting out. Responsibility for the naval
site at Dounreay has, over the years, given the
company operating experience of Pressurised
Water Reactors (PWR) which, until recently
with the commissioning of Sizewell B, was
only otherwise gained by naval nuclear
submarine plant operators.
The cost of the new prototype was a matter
of detailed scrutiny and concern. It was one of
Rickover's fundamental principles that every
new plant design would have a shore based
prototype, and every prototype would be a
complete submarine plant, primary and
secondary. That way the bugs would get
ironed out before submarines were built. After
much debate it was decided that for the new
prototype we would have to forego the 'whole
plant' principle in order to save money. There
was a very good facility at VSEL for testing
most of the main propulsion machinery and it
would have to suffice. The new prototype
would be a complete reactor plant, with a
secondary plant sufficient to absorb, condense
and return the steam that was generated.
The first submarine prototype had, with
some difficulty, been assembled on site by
teams of Rolls-Royce and Vickers
Engineering people spending many months
away from h o k e and company. All steelwork,
equipments
and
components
were
individually transported to site for assembly.
For PWR2 VSEL management believed that
there had to be a better way. A series of studies
in the late 1970s were inconclusive but led the
342 THE ORIGINS AND SUCCESSES OF THE NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAMME-I11
company to Smit International (UK) Ltd.
Working together the two companies
developed proposals that indicated cost
savings initially estimated conservatively at
f 112M, which on further development grew to
expected savings of some f9M. The key
which opened the possibility of such dramatic
savings was the proposed use of air bags as
rollers for the last overland part of the route,
after sea passage from Barrow to the Pentland
Firth.
The primary unit, consisting of the
completed reactor compartment, virtually
fully tested but without the reactor core, would
be built at VSEL, Barrow-in-Furness,
reaching a weight of some 1300t. It would
then be shipped to the nearest suitable landing
on the Scottish North coast, namely Sandside
Bay, whence it would be transported overland
and installed in the newly constructed building
at the Naval Nuclear Reactor Test
Establishment. Four further units comprising
the secondary plant would likewise be
transported from VSEL to Dounreay . I 7
S& thorough were the planning and
preparations that the operation went virtually
without a hitch. The stages of the operation,
from information supplied by the VSEL
Project Manager, Commander Len Wills, are
illustrated at Fig. 1. It was a superb operation
which amply justified the effort and the
potential risks. We all had a different idea as
to what these were. Director General
Submarines at the time was Mr Tony Warren
RCNC. His fear was that the unit would be
lost at sea and would have to be recovered
from the bottom. A buoy was mounted on top
to assist such an operation.
A number of people feared that the air bag
system would simply not do the job. As
Director of Nuclear Propulsion when the
operation became known around the trade (but
not when it took place), I had to answer letters
from other companies pouring scorn on Smit's
proposals and taking advantage of the MOD'S
newly announced Competition Policy to ask
Ministers to be allowed to bid for the work.
My own belief was that Greenpeace would
harass and harry the operation at sea and on
shore. Escorts and police cover were provided.
I have recently watched the sort of operation I
had in my mind being conducted against
the Brent Spar oil rig on its way to sea
disposal.
The PWR2 prototype has now been on site
at Dounreay for 10 years, proving the core and
the reactor components well ahead of
submarine plant operations.
H M S Vanguard
In the fullness of time HMS Vanguard, fitted
with PWR2, was completed by VSEL, went to
sea, completed sea trials and took her place on
Strategic Deterrent patrol, in a sequence
which has continued unbroken since it started
with Resolution in 1969. She is followed by
three further submarines of the Class.
Many players
In an address such as this it is simply not
possible to do adequate justice to the hundreds
of people and organisations whose dedicated
work and support have been essential to the
many successes of the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Programme throughout its 40
years. I hope that none will feel aggrieved at
being omitted and that my few words will stir
proud memories, for it is a story of which all
can feel proud. Three further aspects of the
programme merit special mention, although
time and space prevent a detailed account of
the work of the organisations involved, well
merited though it would be:
I. For careful, assiduous scrutiny of
nuclear safety cases and procedures, and
for advice on these matters: the Safety
and Reliability Directorate (formerly of
the UKAEA) SRD.
2. For educating and training
generations of nuclear submarine plant
operators, health physics staff, and
dockyard personnel: the Department of
Nuclear Science and Technology at the
Royal Naval College, Greenwich; and
HMS Sultan, at Gosport.
3. For successfully completing the
refuelling and refitting of the Navy's
nuclear submarines, under stringent
procedural controls: all who have been
involved at the Royal Dockyards of
Rosyth, Devonport and, formerly,
Chatham.
THE ORIGINS AND SUCCESSES OF THE NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAMME-I11 343
Final thoughts
I have no doubt that everyone entering the
Nuclear Submarine Propulsion Programme
shares the same sense of excitement and awe
that inspired me and my generation. Equally, I
have no doubt that today's operators have a
harder job, because the rule book has grown so
much fatter over the years as everyone strives
to build on experience. Nor is this all that has
changed:
1. The story began with the Royal
Naval Scientific Service - but that no
longer exists. Its work is done in the
Defence Engineering Service and
Defence Research Agency, the DRA.
2. For much of the early work their
partners were the Royal Corps of Naval
Constructors and the Royal Naval
Engineering Service - both now merged
into the Defence Engineering Service, the
DES.
3. At the outset of the programme the
practice was for the MOD to deal with
preferred contractors for key aspects of
its business. Hence it was not at all
strange for Rolls-Royce, Vickers and
YARD to be selected and appointed to
their sepjrate roles in the programme,
along with many other firms to theirs.
Now, in an age of MOD(PE) competition
policy, that has changed and the SIP
contract, for instance, has changed hands
twice in just under 10 years. For the
successor to the Trafalgar Class the
whole submarine design, build and
support is subject to competitive tender.
4. Nuclear refits were conducted by
MOD personnel in MOD Dockyards. For
some years the Dockyards have been
under commercial management, and now
the assets themselves are for sale as
confidence has grown in the commercial
arrangements.
5. The Royal Naval Engineering
College, Manadon, which was so
successful in gaining volunteers for the
submarine service from among the
officers under instruction, and which
passed on so many fine officers for
nuclear training at Greenwich, has
closed.
6. As for the Royal Naval College at
Greenwich itself, the Staff Colleges are
leaving and advertisements and a
brochure have been published seeking a
new occupant. The Department of
Nuclear Science and Technology, and the
reactor Jason too, will have to move.
7. And soon C Block Foxhill, for all
this time the home of DPT, which started
life as the Dreadnought Project Team and
became the Director Project Team
(Submarines), will close; and DPT will
move to the new Procurement Executive
site at Abbey Wood, Bristol.
These days there is much emphasis on the
three
Armed
Services
losing
their
individuality, and doing things together and in
similar fashion. At a time of so much change it
is well that people in the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Programme are keeping their eyes
firmly on the ball. They do not forget that the
Navy is unique in having nuclear reactor
safety and strategic deterrent responsibilities.
The principles instilled in our programme by
the early exposure to training in the USA, and
to Rickover's influence, are still firmly in
place and it is appropriate that I should end
with two Rickover quotations:
'Advice to power station managers
Require rising standards of adequacy
Be technically self sufficient
Face facts
Respect even small amounts of
radiation
Require adherence to the concept of
total responsibility
Develop the capacity to learn by
experience';
and on Responsibility":
'Responsibility is a unique concept: it
can only reside and inhere in a single
individual. You may share it with others
but your portion is not diminished. You
may delegate it but it is still with you.
Even if you do not recognise it or admit
its presence, you cannot escape it. If
responsibility is rightfully yours, no
evasion, or ignorance, or passing the
blame can shift the burden to someone
else. Unless you can point your finger at
the man who is responsible when
344 THE ORIGINS AND SUCCESSES OF THE NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAMME-111
G l A H I 2 BEIICH LA
l D J A C E N 1 10SWT
STEERING IRACIORS
something goes wrong then you never
had anyone really responsible.'
Acknowledgements
For much of the information in this address 1
am indebted to previous papers. In particular a
paper by Professor Jack Edwards, who held a
key post at the outset of the naval programme
and who then formed the Department of
Nuclear Science and Technology at the Royal
Naval College, Greenwich. He read an
outstanding paper to this Institute, in this
building, on 23 January 1962.
A second invaluable source was a paper by
Admiral Sir Ted Horlick, who broke a 20 year
silence (and risked instant censure from across
the Atlantic) with a paper to the Institution of
Mechanical Engineers on 27January 1982. As
recently as December 1994, UK naval reactor
technology development was reviewed by
Mr Tony Roulstone, Managing Director of
Rolls-Royce and Associates, in the British
Nuclear Energy Society Annual Dinner
Lecture at the Royal Lancaster Hotel, and his
paper was published in the April 1995 Edition
of Nuclear Energy. Happily that has provided
me with a valuable framework, while
relieving me of the responsibility of dealing to
any great extent with the nuclear plant itself.
My longest involvement has been with the
associated marine engineering machinery and
its development
I am also indebted to the United States
Office of Naval Reactors in Washington for its
great assistance with a lecture about Admiral
Rickover that I prepared on leaving the Navy
in 1993. Naturally, I use some of that
information in this address. My thanks also to
Commander Len Wills, Fellow of the
Institute, and formerly VSEL Project Manager
THE ORIGINS A N D SUCCESSES O F THE NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAMME
for the build of the prototype of the Trident
submarine reactor plant, for the material about
that programme that features at the end of my
address.
Finally, my thanks to the Secretary and staff
of the Institute for their help not only with the
preparation of this paper but throughout my
period of office. They are a pleasure to work
with, and I am extremely grateful for all that
they do.
(Concluded)
ROBERTHILL
References
'Prof J. Edwards, 'Initial problems of the submarine
pressurised water reactor design and the related
experimental programme', paper read at The IMarE (23
January 1962).
'D Irving, The Virus House, p.99, William Kimber
(1967).
'Prof J. Edwards, n. I .
4N. Battle, 'PWR plant development for marine
propulsion', The Nuclear Engineer, Vol. 25, No. I
(1984).
'Prof J. Edward$, n. I.
"N Battle, n.8.
'Vice Admiral Sir Ted Horlick, 'Submarine propulsion
in the Royal Navy', The Institution of Mechanical
345
Engineers Proceedings, Vol. 196, No. 7 (1982).
FF.
Duncan, Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The
Discipline of Technology, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis (1990) and, with R. G. Hewlett, Nuclear
Navy 1946-1962, University of Chicago Press, Chicago
(1974). Letter to author dated 5 May 1994.
'P. Ziegler, Mountbatten The OfSicial Biography, p.558,
William Collins (1985).
"IF. Duncan, n.8.
"Prof J. Edwards, n. I.
"F. Duncan, n.8.
"Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Amending the
Atomic Energy Act, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, p.166,
Washington DC, as quoted by F. Duncan, n.8.
14Quotationfrom biography, in preparation, of Admiral
H. G. Rickover by F. Duncan. F. Duncan, n.8.
"Prof J. Edwards, n.1.
'OA. R. M. Roulstone, 'Improving the breed: naval
reactor technology development to PWRZ', Nuclear
Energy, Vol. 34, No. 2 (April 1995).
"Cdr L. Wills, 'PWR2 at Dounreay transport to site
operation', Journal ofNaval Engineering, Vol. 29, No.
3 (June 1986).
"T. Rockwell, The Rickover Effect How One Man
Mude a Difference, p.360 United States Naval Institute,
Annapolis, Maryland (1992).
''Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Radiation Safety
and Regulation, 87th Congress, 1st Session, p.366,
Washington GPO, as quoted in F. Duncan, Rickover
and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline o f Technology,
Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland (1990).
-
Suez - Forty Years On
I
T was a shock to read in the papers last July
that it is now forty years since Nasser
'nationalised' the Suez Canal. I was there
when we carried out Operation MUSKETEER
to try and get the Canal back, as we not
unreasonably believed we were entitled to do,
considering that, thanks to Mr Disraeli, we
owned 51% of the Suez Canal Company's
shares.
I was then assistant damage control officer,
in the carrier Eagle. Firefighting, pumping,
counter-flooding, ventilation, water-tight
integrity, were all my part of ship, and, as it
turned out, they were all to play a much more
important part in events than I ever
anticipated.
Even now, looking back over all those
years, I cannot find it in my heart to feel the
least affection for Eagle. She was built by
Harland & Wolff, in Belfast, and her sailors
were convinced that the shipbuilders must
have locked a black leprechaun up somewhere
inside her when they launched her.
Eagle was chronically accident-prone on an
almost operatic scale. There were always
enough fires and floods to keep my
department on their toes, with the occasional
catapult 'cold shot' which launched some
hapless aircrew into the sea. Even 'goofing'
was fraught with dangers. One of her
squadrons, 830, was equipped with the
Westland Wyvern S.4 strike aircraft. If a
Wyvern tipped on its nose while landing,
which it was prone to do, its two contrarotating propellors would shatter into
fragments and sweep the flight deck with a
storm of lethal shrapnel. One of my abiding
memories of Eagle is the seemingly
interminable number of warning pipes
clearing goofers from exposed positions
because Wyverns were landing on.
Everything in Eagle seemed to be designed
to work in the most awkward, time-consuming
and labour-intensive way. For example, the
only method of getting about the ship was
along the upper deck, at quarterdeck level.
Thus, to go from one section of the ship to
another meant climbing up and down half a
dozen steep steel ladders every time. The
ship's motto was Arduus ad Solem, which the
sailors translated as 'Ard on the Feet'. For
myself, 1 always thought of the Red Queen in
Through the Looking Glass, who had to run
like hell just to stay in the same place, and if
she wanted to get to somewhere else had to
run at least twice as fast. That was us, in
Eagle.
Eagle had a fortnight's maintenance in
Grand Harbour, Malta, in July 1956 and then
joined the US Sixth Fleet for the annual
defence of Malta exercise, Maltex 56, with the
carriers USS Intrepid and Ticonderoga, and
the cruiser USS Northampton. On the last day
of Maltex, US Navy Banshees, Cougars,
Skyraider 5s and 6s and Cutlasses made
'touch and go' passes on Eagle's flight deck.
Eagle then went to Naples for a jolly and
was still there on Thursday 26 July when
Nasser seized the Canal. As I recall, he made a
speech to an ecstatic Egyptian people, saying
that if the imperialist powers did not like what
he had done, they could 'choke to death on
their fury'.
Most of us expected some immediate
Anglo-French retaliation, and were puzzled
when nothing much happened. I still feel that
if we had taken some action at once, in a spirit
of righteous retribution (as, I suspect, Nasser
himself expected us to do), no matter how
hurriedly it was mounted, it would have stood
a reasonable chance of success and,
furthermore, world opinion would very
probably have been on our side.
As it was, there was Captain's Rounds of
messdecks as usual on Saturday forenoon, the
Captain addressed the ship's company on the
situation in Egypt on Sunday, and Eagle sailed
on Monday morning, 30 July. 892 Squadron,
flying Sea Venom FAW 21s, who had just
come out from the UK, did 'touch and goes'
and deck landings on 2 August. Meanwhile,
Eagle did intensive night flying work-ups in
the Malta area. Both Sea Hawk Squadrons,
897 and 899, qualified in night deck landings,
leaving only the Wyverns unable to operate
from the deck at night.
There was another ten-day maintenance
period in Malta in August, during which
Bulwark, with three Sea Hawk squadrons,
804,810, and 895, arrived from the UK. Eagle
SUEZ - FORTY YEARS ON
sailed on 14th, embarking 892 that day, and
893, also with Sea Venoms, three days later, at
the expense of 812's Fairey Gannets who,
because ground attack and army support were
to be the main roles, had to disembark to Hal
Far. Eagle also had 'A' Flight of 849
Skyraiders.
Both carriers then underwent intensive
armament training, including armed night
strikes, which formed up successfully using an
airborne device known as 'Nobby's Light'.
Eagle lost a Sea Hawk pilot of 897 on 16
August. He crashed into the sea while night
flying, and his body was picked up at dawn.
However, the ship anchored at Marsa Xlokk
on 17th for the Med Fleet Regatta. Ecigle's
hard-trained wardroom whaler (for which I
pulled the bow oar) were disappointed to be
beaten a quarter of a length by Duchess.
In September, although the squadrons did
more intensive flying, exercising the support
of amphibious operations around Malta, the
Canal seemed to retreat further and further
from our minds as the weeks passed.
Meantime, there were the usual Eagle alarms
and excursions. An unattended Lansing
Bagnall truck ran off the flight deck into the
sea. There was a flood in a bofors magazine,
when a valve was opened by a Damage
Control HQ One patrol -whose specific job it
was to prevent such floods. On 5 September,
Lt L. E. Middleton of 897 (and of later
Falklands Herrnes fame) had a fire in his Sea
Hawk on take-off and ditched ahead of the
ship, but was picked up safely.
Midway through September, Eagle and
Bulwurk went to the Gulf of Lyons for
exercises with the French carriers Lafuyette
and Arromunches, meeting Albion, out from
the UK and now on her way to Malta with 800
and 802 Sea Hawks, 809 Sea Venoms and 'B'
Flight of 849 Skyraiders.
There was much cross-decking with the
French, followed by a visit to Toulon, and
Anglo-French staff conferences. But even
then, I cannot recall any particular feeling of
urgency, or any realisation in the ship that we
might be about to go to war.
For a week in October, Eagle, Bulwark and
Albion operated together off Malta, and then
Eagle and Bulwark went to Gibraltar for a
347
self-maintenance
period.
This
was
unexpectedly cut short on 20 October, when
Eagle sailed somewhat in haste at midday,
landing on her aircraft that afternoon. For the
very first time, there was a tingling sense of
anticipation on board that something unusual
was about to happen, especially as we set off
eastward at an uncommonly high speed.
In Grand Harbour on 26th, there was a sight
not often seen - four carriers, Eagle, Albion,
Bulwark and Theseus (with the Whirlwind
helicopters of 845 Squadron). There was also
a fifth carrier in the Squadron, Ocean, with the
Whirlwinds and Sycamores of the Joint (Army
and RAF) Experimental Helicopter Unit,
known as JEHU, although the 'Experimental'
was later dropped, 'to reassure the customers'.
Both carriers had been doing helicopter drills
in October.
By now, there could be no doubt that
tensions in the Near East were rising. An
Egyptian destroyer passed close down Eagle's
side on her way out of Grand Harbour, and
nobody was impressed by her rather
bedraggled, almost apologetic, appearance. If
that is our opponent, we thought, we don't
have much to worry about.
The three carriers sailed on the morning of
29 October, and flying started at once. Eagle
had two catapults, which were just about the
largest
possible
hydraulically-powered
design, before the advent of the steam
catapult. In one of the first launches that day,
the main reaving wire on the starboard
catapult broke and pitched a Sea Hawk into
the sea ahead of the ship. Below in Eagle's
ram room, several tons of hydraulic ram
machinery were left free to career unchecked
across the compartment and crash into the
ship's side. I was on the quarterdeck at the
time, and heard it clearly, and actually felt the
bump through the soles of my feet. The
catapult watch-keeper was discovered
standing at the top of the ram room access
hatchway gibbering, understandably, with
fright.
The pilot was, once again, the unfortunate
Middleton, who sdrfaced after being
underwater for more than three minutes,
which must have been a record of some sort,
and was picked up.
348
SUEZ - FORTY YEARS ON
Eagle's starboard catapult was put out of
action, beyond the capacity of ship's staff to
repair. All now depended upon the port
catapult, which was known to be reaching the
stage when its wires would have to be
replaced - an eight-day task. So, from the very
outset of MUSKETEER, it was possible that
the flagship of the British Carrier Squadron
Commander, Vice Admiral Sir Manley
('Lofty') Power, with her large, balanced and
fully worked-up air group, might not be able
to operate her aircraft.
As Eagle thundered eastwards towards
Cyprus at very high speed, ostensibly on a
'communications exercise' (I can even
remember its codename - 'Boathook'), to
form a group with Bulwark, Albion, Duchess
and Diamond, at 5 pm on 29th Israeli
paratroopers dropped at the eastern end of the
Mitla pass, the gateway into Sinai. During the
night, Israeli armoured columns crossed the
border into Egypt in two places.
The British and French governments denied
any foreknowledge of the Israeli attacks. In
view of Eagle's hurried and otherwise
inexplicable departure from Gibraltar, and her
ominously high speed passage across the
Mediterranean, I doubted these denials even at
the time, and the later excuses have always
been unconvincing.
Years afterwards, I read in 'Lofty' Power's
memoirs that as early as 26 October Admiral
Sir Guy Grantham, the C-in-C Mediterranean,
had told him 'that the Israelis were going to
invade Egypt and we and the French are going
to intervene to stop the war and use it as an
excuse to occupy the Canal Area. I was
astounded and said so: "The Government must
have gone raving mad. If we are in any way
mixed up with Israeli action we shall upset the
whole Moslem world and I think we shan't
have the rest of world opinion behind us
either. It is daft".
"I don't know about that," Grantham said.
"It'll be a good show if we bring it off'.'
On 30 October, the aircrew were issued
with special equipment, pistols, escape and
evasion packs, and khaki clothing. From that
day, we all wore action working dress, and we
were issued with anti-flash gear, although I
cannot actually remember ever putting it on in
anger. We were also given a lecture by a very
warlike-looking Royal Marine Major on
survival if we were shot down.
Many of Eagle's wardroom agreed with me
that the flight deck was a very dangerous place
and seldom went near it, let alone boarded an
aircraft, if they could avoid it. However, the
lecture was compulsory, and we listened to
some very helpful hints on edible fruit and
berries, collecting firewood, telling which
way was north if we didn't have a compass by
noting which side the moss was growing on
tree trunks, grid references, flares etc.
But the Major's main point was that if we
were ever captured we were only to give our
names and ranks (this was before officers had
service numbers) and, if very hard-pressed,
the name of our ship. Nothing else, the Major
emphasised. Name, rank and possibly ship.
Nothing else. No matter what they do to you.
There was a long, thoughtful silence. At
last, almost inevitably, a voice piped up from
the back. 'Please, sir, what happens if they cut
off your privates?'
The Major looked at him. 'Well,' he said, 'it
would be a pity to let the occasion pass
without comment.'
On 31 October, which became known as
D-Day, operations against military targets in
Egypt were authorised and all our aircraft
were painted with Allied recognition
markings of black and yellow stripes. We flew
CAPS and reconnaissance flights all day, but
the signal for action never came and there was
a somewhat anti-climactic delay. In the
evening, the radar plots began to show
formations of contacts, at great heights, of
RAF Canberras and Valiants from Cyprus and
Malta on their way to bomb airfields in the
Nile Delta and along the Canal. I remember
how irritated we all were by later RAF claims,
published by the BBC and the newspapers, of
how devastating these raids had been. In fact,
they did very little damage, for the effort
involved.
The first Sea Hawk and Sea Venom strikes
flew off early next day, 1 November, D+l, to
begin the process of grinding down the
Egyptian Air Force. Only pure jets were sent
inland, because air opposition was expected.
But there was only light flak.
SUEZ - FORTY YEARS ON
Later in the day, when the carriers had
established a steady cycle, turning into wind
and flying off strikes every sixty-five minutes,
the attacks were extended further inland and
the turbo-prop Wyverns also took part. Eagle
flew 138 sorties during the day, and the carrier
squadron estimated they had destroyed 71
aircraft and damaged 92.
That evening, just before dinner, there came
the rather terrifying sound of the General
Alarm. My action station was in Damage
Control HQ Two. It duplicated the
instrumentation,
incident
boards
and
personnel in the main Damage Control HQ
One, so that if some catastrophe should befall
HQ1, then we in HQ2 could take over.
We sat there in a state of some apprehension
for some time, having heard - not from the
main ship's broadcast, or from HQ 1 , but from
a stoker who had arrived from aft - that we
were about to be attacked by a flotilla of fast
Egyptian E-boats.
Eventually, when nothing happened, we all
fell out from action stations, feeling rather
sheepish. It later transpired that the fastmoving radar echoes of 'E-boats' were, in
fact, flocks of migrating Arctic terns.
By noon on 2 November, D+2, all the main
airfields had been bombed and strafed, and
from photographic evidence and debriefing it
was decided that the Egyptian Air Force had
been virtually eliminated. Targets were shifted
to transport depots, camps, vehicles, and oil
storages.
Air opposition was non-existent, that day
and throughout MUSKETEER, but the
Egyptian gunners improved with practice. A
Sea Venom of 893 was hit by flak, the
observer was injured and the hydraulic supply
to the undercarriage severed. The pilot, Lt Cdr
Wilcox, made a copy-book 'wheels-up'
landing on board Eagle but his observer,
Flying Officer Olding, later had his left leg
amputated above the knee. On 3 November, a
Wyvern was hit and the pilot, Lt MacCarthy,
had to eject, landing in the sea only 4,000
yards from a shore battery. Eagle and Bulwark
put up a CAP over him until a helicopter
anived from Eagle, some 70 miles away.
On Sunday 4 November, Eagle replenished
with fuel and ammunition, and flew on
349
replacement aircraft. The next day, British and
French paras dropped on Port Said, and had
the town virtually sealed off by the evening,
Eagle lost another Wyvern when Lt Cdr
Cowling, leading a strike on Port Said, was hit
and had to eject. He, too, was picked up by
helicopter.
By now, American disapproval of our Suez
venture was making itself apparent at sea,
where ships of the Sixth Fleet were operating
just over the horizon, at times so close it
appeared they were trying to impede us (two
US submarines, Cutlass and Hardhead, were
actually shadowing us from a discreet but
much closer distance).
Our CAPS were constantly encountering
American CAPS, and for a time it did seem
likely that American aircraft, which looked
very like Egyptian MiGs, would soon be doing
much more than 'touch and go' on Eagle. At
one point, the task force commander, Admiral
Durnford-Slater, had to ask the American
admiral to move over. He refused, but he did
signal to the Pentagon: 'Whose side am I on?'.
My memories of this time are of towering
columns of black smoke rising from oil tanks
ashore, the wardroom notice-boards festooned
with billowing signals (I wish I had kept some
of them), and the sticky heat despite air
conditioning, all bulkhead doors shut, while
Eagle pounded to and fro, looking for enough
wind for flying.
I also recall my astonishment, when I did
get a chance to read a newspaper or hear a
news bulletin, at the lack of interest in the
Soviet invasion of Budapest, compared with
the political hornet's nest Suez was stirring up
at home and on the international front. There
was a sterling crisis, with the Americans
selling pounds at knockdown prices. The
chattering classes were at full chat, with
demonstrations in Trafalgar Square. There
were reports of Soviet missiles on their way to
the Middle East, and Soviet submarines
sighted off Alexandria.
On 6 November, after a bombardment by
cruisers and destroyers, the Royal Marine
Commandos, the Royal Tank Regiment, and
the French Foreign Legion went ashore in Port
Said. The whole of 45 Commando, some 435
men and 23 tons of stores, were landed from
350
SUEZ - FORTY YEARS ON
Ocean and Theseus, in 90 minutes, in the first
ever helicopter-borne assault landing.
That day we lost a Sea Hawk of 897, when
the late Donald Mills (he died at home on
Christmas Day 1993) had to eject, and landed
in the desert east of the Canal. He was a friend
of mine. When I was a Benbow cadet at
Dartmouth, there came a terrible day when 1
was nominated to be Chief Cadet Captain at
next Sunday's divisions. Donald, who was a
Dart and thus a real C.C.C., stood behind me,
and told me what orders to give, for which I
will always be very grateful.
The British and French put up a CAP over
him until Eagle's helicopter arrived, and all
was well. But the episode made me think: to
have a particular friend among the air crew
was to give a hostage to fortune. What if we
had been at war, and the air group were
constantly flying operationally? Would one's
heart be in one's mouth every time he took off,
and how would one bear up if he failed to
come back?
By all reports, operations on land were
going well, indeed MUSKETEER as a whole
was well done, whatever the politicians said,
then and afterwards. But all day on 6th there
were rumours of a cease-fire, which in fact
came into effect at 11 pm that night. Although
I shared in the general sense of relief that it
was all over, I remember also feeling at the
time - a feeling which has grown stronger
over the years - that whatever the rights and
wrongs of starting the Suez venture, it was
definitely wrong to stop just then. It left us
with the worst of both worlds, with
international opprobrium - and no Canal.
The port catapult had done 631 launches
since leaving Malta and was now somewhat
'frayed'. 'Lofty' Power and his staff
transferred by helicopter to Bulwark on 7th,
and Eagle went to Malta, sailing again for an
extended period at sea off Suez on 13th.
Just after tea on 19 November, the General
Alarm sounded again. This time, I knew by
some instinct that it was for real. But, as
always in a real emergency, it was almost
impossible to find out what was going on. We
sat in HQ2, listening to mutterings over the
broadcast. Eventually, it filtered through that
someone had been working on a Sea Venom
when its guns fired, blowing up two Wyverns
and two more Sea Venoms next door, and
before anybody could say 'Jaggers Troup'
there was a major fire raging in the forward
end of the lower hangar. I was told to go and
investigate.
The moment I reached the lobby leading to
the hangar access air lock doors, I knew this
was the real thing. The sheer vicious intensity
of a big fire, when fittings are jumping off the
bulkheads and one can feel the heat in one's
throat with every breath, cannot really be
reproduced in an exercise.
There was a fire and emergency party
already in the lobby. I could see from their
faces that they did not like the look of things,
and frankly I could not blame them. The heat
seemed to be increasing all the time, and
suddenly there was a terrific crash from inside
the hangar, possibly a cannon shell hitting the
bulkhead.
Below where I was standing was a
compartment, known as Hell's Kitchen, with
the flood and spray cabinets for several
magazines. Beyond that was a bomb room,
and then the Avgas storage (high octane petrol
for the piston-engined Sky Raiders) with its
cofferdam. Outboard of me were two bofors
magazines and, just forward, a compartment
containing the plant for generating oxygen highly inflammable and volatile. As the
temperature went on rising, and each breath
became more like a blast from an oven, it
struck me that we were fast approaching a
situation where we might well blow most of
the forward end of the ship off.
I suppose everyone in the Navy has had a
moment when he said to himself 'You've
been drawing the Queen's money all these
years, now's your chance to earn it'. I think
that was my moment. I told the fire and
emergency party to get their gear together,
because we were going to put the fire out. We
would start by spraying the hangar. I had no
idea whether HQ1 had already ordered it, but I
knew something had to be done, and quickly.
The hangar sprays were my department.
There were six huge pumps in the bottom of
the ship, delivering I forget how many
hundreds of tons of waterlhour. A
mechanician - Hodge was his name - had
SUEZ - FORTY YEARS ON
maintained and cherished those pumps for
nearly two years. They were started by pulling
down on a chain in the access air lock and then
opening a large valve handwheel which
admitted water up to the sprays in the hangar
deckhead.
It was even hotter inside the airlock. I
fancied I could actually smell paint burning.
There was another terrifying crash against the
inner door, right by my elbow. I pulled the
chain down and then found that the handwheel
was too hot to hold. I got out a handkerchief,
bound it round, but the wheel would not
budge. Possibly the heat had warped the rod
gearing. I tried again, and still it stuck. Dear
God, I thought, it is not going to work, after all
that. I lifted my foot and kicked down on the
handwheel spoke, whereupon the valve began
to spin open~sorapidly it nearly took my shoe
off. At once I could hear the sound of the
water drumming, like a mighty monsoon in
the hangar. and soon the temperature dropped
dramatically.
It all made a fearful mess in the hangar, but
we were flying again next day. We also held
the funeral of the Naval Airman of 893
Squadron who had been killed in the hangar.
I thought our damage control had been all
right on the night. There had only been one
casualty, when there could have been many
35 1
more. I particularly hoped for some praise for
Hodge - perhaps not as high as a C-in-C's
commendation, but at least something from
within Eagle. But nobody had a good word to
say to us. So, I let it be known discreetly that I
thought Hodge had done extremely well, and
on a certain day at a certain time in the dog
watches in HQ2, I proposed to tell him so.
When I arrived at HQ2 that evening, I could
not get in through the door. The place was
packed. The whole off-watch department was
there - the patrols, the seamen, stokers, engine
room artificers, electricians and shipwrights.
The Jack Dusties were there, and the hangar
sentries. The flight deck and all the squadrons
were represented. There was no room for me,
so I stood at the door, to say my little piece.
Whereupon, an amazing thing happened.
They all began to clap, politely at first, but
then working up to a storm of applause. Poor
Hodge, I can see him now. He went red. He
went white. For one awful moment, I thought
he was going to burst into tears. Some of them
shook his hand as they filed out. Hodge had
had the praise of his peers.
I shook his hand, too. After all, if it had not
been for Hodge's professional skill and
dedication, I might not be writing this.
Ballade of the Middle East
They say that Nasser's had a nasty knock;
Some say that Israel's heading for a fall.
They say that bombing's pushed up England's stock,
While others say our backs are to the wall.
Hussein of Jordan's getting out of hand,
While up in Cyprus, Greek meets brother Greek,
And 'midst the barren wastes of oil and sand
The old Superb is up the Gulf - or creek!
In Syria the troops are on the march,
But when they've shown the Israelites their backs,
In Mecca Saud will build a triumph arch,
And celebrate by burning Cadillacs.
They're throwing stones at Britons in Bahrein;
The reason isn't very far to seek:
The Navy's pride and joy has gone again Superb is further up the Gulf - or creek.
From Muscat in the south to Abadan,
The Arabs all are coming out on strike.
Friend Nasser said, 'Break everything you can,
And blow up all the oil wells as you like.'
But rumour says, though I don't know the source,
The English, just this once, aren't being meek.
They've sent an expeditionary force:
The old Superb is up the Gulf - or creek.
Envoi
My dear old Prince, you ask us what we lack?
We haven't had our letters for a week.
And now, with soldiers filling every crack,
Superb is once more up the Gulf - or creek.
This was written in SeptemberIOctober 1956. Superb was the flagship of the East Indies station,
and was ordered up the the Gulf in a hurry at the start of the Suez crisis, to reinforce the three
'Loch' class frigates which formed the Persian gulf squadron. After a spell at Bahrein, waiting
for our mail to catch up with us (it had gone to Trincomalee, and was sent on in an ancient BARboat, 5 knots, downhill with a following breeze), we embarked the first battalion of the
Gloucestershire Regiment, and went to swing round an anchor at the top end of the Gulf,
equidistant from Kuwait, Abadan and Bandar Abbas, waiting for something to happen.
A. J. W. WILSON
The Yangtze River, 21 April 1949
Transcript oj'a letter from Captain D. E. Bromley-Martin Royal Navy dated March 1966 to the
Executive Ojficer, HMS London.
M
Y contemporary account of the Yangtze
action has been lost and what follows is,
therefore, an account from memory and may
well be faulted on detailed historical accuracy.
I commend Escape rf the Amethyst by
C. E. Lucas Phillips and published by
Heinemann in 1957 to those who want the
wider picture.
On 20 April 1949 HMS London, flying the
flag of Admiral Madden, the Flag Officer
Second in Command, Far East Station was
approaching the mouth of the Yangtze River,
bound for Shanghai on a flag showing visit.
Shanghai lies a few miles up the Whangpoo
River, a tributary running into the Yangtze
from the south at Woosung, not many miles
from the sea.
It has been said that a fortnight in Shanghai
could exhaust any ship's company physically,
financially and morally and, therefore,
although this was truer before World War 11,
everyone in London was looking forward to
the visit.
The ship herself was of the 10,000 ton
'County' class and had been reconstructed just
before the war to give her two funnels instead
of the well known arrangement of three in the
rest of the class. Nevertheless, she was
virtually obsolete and nearly due for the
scrapyard.
She was armed with eight 8" guns but, due
to a current manpower shortage, Y turret was
not manned. She also mounted four 4" guns on
each beam and a number of pompoms.
During the afternoon the hands were busy
preparing illuminating circuits.
To the westward, in China, much was
happening. The Communists had overrun all
North China, including Peking, and were
advancing on a broad front towards the north
bank of the Yangtze River. It was thought that
they were still some way off and that this
considerable water barrier could be made to
hold them up for some time.
The Yangtze is one of the greatest rivers of
the world and is navigable at all times by
ocean going ships at least as far up as
Nanking. This city is 200 miles from the sea
on the south bank and was, at the time, the
Nationalist Chinese capital.
In the summer the river rises and ships as
large as London could reach Hankow, 615
miles from the sea.
On 20 April HMS Amethyst, a frigate, was
nearly 100 miles up the river on her way to
Nanking to relieve the guardship there, HMS
Consort. She was covered with Union Jacks
but, just short of Chingkiang, she came under
entirely unexpected, heavy and accurate
artillery fire from the north bank at a range of
a few hundred yards.
The guns were communist, the gunners
probably had never seen a Union Jack in their
lives and they no doubt believed her to be
hostile.
She was driven ashore with heavy
casualties but later refloated and anchored just
upstream of Rose Island. Many of her
wounded and some of her unwounded reached
Shanghai overland in due course but the
remainder remained or returned on board to
start a weary period of arrest under the
communist guns.
In London work was switched from the
illuminating circuits to fuzing 8" shells, the
frigate Black Swan was ordered to join from
Shanghai and both ships proceeded up the
Yangtze to anchor that night off Kiangyin, a
strongly held Nationalist city on the south
bank some 30 miles downstream from
Amethyst.
The Admiral was faced with an appalling
problem. We could not do nothing to help but
to take a large ship upriver under the noses of
clearly hostile shore batteries was asking for
trouble. An expedition by ships' boats up a
narrow southern arm of the river was
considered and rejected. No air support was
available, there being no carrier on the station
and the nearest strike aircraft were in Malaya.
The Admiral decided to weigh at 0930 on
21 April and to proceed upriver with Black
Swan in company at maximum safe speed,
flying white flags as well as British colours
354
THE YANGTZE RIVER, 21 APRIL 1949
and keeping all guns trained fore and aft. He
hoped to reach Amethyst in about two hours
and escort her downstream.
It was a still cloudless but misty morning
with the great brown river looking at its most
peaceful. Thick green reeds lined both shores
and, beyond them, one caught glimpses of the
great earth dykes that aimed, not always
successfully, at keeping the Yangtze in its
place. Junks and sampans were everywhere.
The sun was just breaking through astern of us
and there seemed complete silence except for
the noise of the ship, doing revolutions for
twenty knots, and her considerable wash.
We were still some way from the first
battery that had fired on Amethyst and,
although we felt properly apprehensive, it did
not seem that anything could happen to disturb
the peaceful scene.
Something very soon did.
I was standing on the starboard wing of the
bridge, keeping a wary eye on the north bank
when suddenly there was the most appalling
clang and a jagged hole appeared in the bridge
plating about ten feet aft of me. I got an
impression of a puff of smoke in the reeds 400
yards away before I dived behind the no doubt
illusory shelter of the 8" director stalk.
There were more clangs almost at once and
what seemed an interminable wait (but which
was doubtless quite short) while the 8"director
and our three operational 8" turrets trained on
the beam.
The shudder and the noise of the first
broadside and the darkening as the cloud of
cordite smoke from A and B turrets swept
over the bridge gave us courage to look and
see the effect of 8" shells at close range. It was
certainly impressive, particularly when
backed up by the 4" guns and the pompoms. I
doubt whether we hit many guns but the
general effect must have been fairly stunning.
Anyway, the hostile fire slackened and we
also drew away upstream.
Our problem was clearly greater than we
had feared, for here were Communist batteries
many miles downriver from the first that had
fired on Amethyst the day before. Moreover,
they were clearly in no mood to respect white
or British flags.
The hits had been fairly accurately grouped
on and near the bridge structure and, although
they appeared to be of 3" or below and had not
detonated inside the ship, they were making
things very untidy.
The Admiral wisely decided to establish a
command post in the unmanned Y turret at the
after end of the ship and, with some relief, I
accompanied him there. It was not a very good
command post as it lacked essential
communication facilities but these I provided
by proceeding in person to the bridge and the
main wireless office (abreast the mainmast)
from time to time.
I was on my way forward when we came to
the second battery and the previous pattern
repeated itself. A hail of accurate fire and a
massive reply which, combined with our
progress upstream, provided relief and
eventual silence from the shore.
It seems astonishing that we lost only
fifteen killed in the whole day but blood was
beginning to appear about the decks and
everyone, from the Admiral downwards, was
torn between the need to succour Amethyst
and the danger of being reduced to her
condition.
We were now past Bate Point and half way
to her. We came to a third battery and, as
before, suffered more damage and casualties
in those few moments before our return fire
took effect. The 8" director circuits were cut
and the turrets went into local control. We
ploughed on and waited for the fourth battery.
By this time the bridge were pretty adept at
spotting that first telltale puff of smoke in the
reeds - eerily silent because the shell arrived
before the report.
This time a shell detonated on or very near
the compass platform. It blew off the
Navigating Officer's head, killed both
Chinese river pilots, wounded the Captain and
put the forward steering out of action.
The after steering position, under the
Commander, took over and, unable to see
ahead, endeavoured to control 10,000 tons
doing 20 knots up a winding river less than a
mile wide. We were still under fire, so it was
not a healthy place to stop or even slow down.
The Admiral decided with reluctance that
enough was enough and, in the face of the
Communist attitude, he must not go on. He
THE YANGTZE R1\ 'ER, 2 1 APRIL 1949
signalled to Amethyst 'Am sorry we cannot
help you today. We shall keep on trying. Stay
where you are unless forced to move, in which
case go upstream. Further instructions will
follow . . .'
The after steering position was told to turn
the ship. Although firing had ceased, the
process seemed interminable. The water was
shallow. The whole hull shuddered. The
Yangtze boiled to a darker brown. W e seemed
to have chosen a place with no guns, but
perhaps they were slow off the mark. They
might be loading that instant.
The reeds along the bank, however,
remained pretty inscrutable as they crept past
the turning bow until, at last, we were pointing
downstream. Forward steering was restored,
the compass platform cleaned up, revolutions
for twenty knots were rung on and we reapproached our latest opponents with some
trepidation.
They were still there. But we got past them
with more damage but no serious rise in
casualties; And past the others as well until, in
the early afternoon, action dinner was laid on.
1 was sucking a most welcome orange when it
all started again and the orange rolled under a
grating never to be recovered in an edible
condition.
Clearly the Communist army was
deploying along the north bank very rapidly
indeed, with new batteries arriving all the
time. I made a drawing later purporting to
show London passing Kiangyin and under fire
from a battery commanding her actual
355
anchorage of the night before. Black Swan
follows astern. London looks relatively
undamaged except for a lot of sinister
punctures near the bridge. But, inside, there
were few electrical circuits left intact.
There was, as I recollect it, one more
engagement after this and then a most
welcome peace until, in the evening, we
arrived off Woosung and made our way up the
Whangpoo to Shanghai. Here an American
hospital ship took over our wounded and we
landed and buried the dead. Immediate repairs
were made and in a few days we were ready
for sea.
In the meantime the Nationalist defence of
the line of the Yangtze had collapsed, the
communists were on the south bank in
strength, had cut communications between
Shanghai and Nanking and were advancing on
both cities. It even seemed possible that we
might meet their advance guards on the banks
of the Whangpoo as we steamed out. In the
event all was quiet and London and Black
Swan, the last of a long succession of western
warships to exhaust their crews in Shanghai
for many years, passed unmolested to the open
sea.
London, already near the end of her useful
life, was never repaired but was steamed home
to pay off and be scrapped.
Amethyst remained captive in the Yangtze
for over three gruelling months before
breaking out and making her epic escape.
But that is another story.
Oh, Rats!
A
MONGST all the fleetingly sensational
revelations which our newshounds have
sniffed out from the files released this year
under the 30-year rule, it is unlikely they will
have detected much to interest them - if
indeed it still exists - in a file containing the
following letter which those of us serving in
Singapore received early in April 1966: OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
FAR EAST FLEET
SINGAPORE
1 st April 1966
THE COMMANDING OFFICERS OF
HM SHIPS OF THE FAR EAST FLEET
RODENT PREVENTION
1 . The rising incidence of rodent life in HM Ships of the Far East Fleet is becoming a matter
of increasing concern, as it represents a threat to the health, hygiene, and morale of Ship's
Companies. To eliminate this threat it has been decided to institute the post of Fleet Rodent
Prevention Officer (FPRO).
2. The Fleet Rodent Prevention Officer will be responsible to the Commander Far East Fleet
for:
a. The co-ordination of attempts to exterminate rodent life.
b. The administration of the Fleet Rodent Prevention Team.
c. The provision of equipment for rodent prevention.
d. The training of selected officers and ratings in methods of rodent extermination and
prevention.
e. To advise the staff of the Commander Far East Fleet on matters concerning rodent
prevention.
3. It is intended that the Fleet Rodent Prevention Officer and his team shall give a basic
training demonstration in the Sultan Cinema, HMS Terror, on Tuesday 5 April 1966 at 0900.
Commanding Officers of ships in harbour are requested to ensure that their Rodent Prevention
Teams are enabled to attend.
4.
The Ship's Rodent Prevention Team should be constituted as follows:Carriers and Commando Ships
1 officer plus 6 ratings
DLGs and Leaders
1 officer plus 4 ratings
Frigates and Destroyers
1 officer plus 3 ratings
Small ships
1 officer plus 2 ratings
Ratings should be selected for their initiative and ability to work unsupervised. They should be
physically fit.
5. Further to these instructions, ships are to ensure that rat guards are fitted to all berthing
wires and ropes (A.P.6272-5), and that Rat Traps Back Breaking (A.P.6271) are used. These
items, if not already held, should be demanded using this letter as authority. The allowance for
particular ships can be obtained from the FPRO.
6. FES Form 45 has been instituted, a proforma of which is enclosed. This form is to be
rendered by 10th April, and by 5th of each month until further notice. Nil returns are required.
OH, RATS!
357
7. As an incentive to encourage rat-consciousness among ship's companies, it is intended to
institute a prize each month to the rating who has shown most zeal in the Rodent Prevention
Campaign. Recommendations for this award are to be made under Section IV of FES-Form 45.
J. P. Waddilove
(J. P. Waddilove)
FLEET RODENT PREVENTION OFFICER
Enclosure:
Copies to:
FES Form 45
The Flag Officer Second-in-Command, Far East Fleet
The Superintending Naval Stores Officer, HM Naval Base, singapore"
(As an aside, it may be remembered that at that time the 'Commander Far East Fleet' had quite
recently been rebaptised from the somewhat infelicitous 'Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief
Far East Fleet', known in signalese as FOCINFEF).
FES FORM 45
RETURN OF RODENTS
Sh~p
Period from
Per~odto
SECTION I (to be completed by all ships)
1. Rats detected during the period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Other rodents detected during the period . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Rats killed during the period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Other rodents killed during the period . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(if NIL, write NIL)
SECTION I1 (if 1 and 2 in Section I both NIL, this section is to be omitted)
Insert full details of rodents detected, with particular emphasis on the following points:
a. Location
b. Condition
c. Length and diameter
d. Droppings found
e. Damage done
f. Sex
358
OH, RATS!
SECTION 111 (if 3 and 4 in Section I both NIL, this section is to be omitted)
Insert full details of rodents killed, including the following:
a. Location
b. State of rodent at death
c. Method used (if by natural causes write "By natural causes")
d. Doctor's post-mortem report.
SECTION IV (to be completed by all ships)
Rodent Prevention Officer's report. Full details of all Rodent Prevention Exercises should be
given.
(Rodent Prevent~onOfficer)
Attached to this letter was a sheet of errata,
inviting the reader to see 'FPRO' rather than
'FRPO' in various places.
1 April 1966 was a Friday. However, in
those days we worked on a Saturday forenoon,
and the denizens of Sleepy Hollow, the Fleet
Headquarters, had clearly almost immediately
been stung into furious reaction, possibly by
the Fleet Public Relations Officer objecting to
his name being taken in vain, or equally by the
bemused and luckless owner of extension 9320
having his quiet little corner summarily
invaded by rumours of rodents. Just after
midday local time on the Monday the
following hit the airwaves:
'From COMFEF
To Far East Fleet General
1. 289/FEF96/9247/4.Z of 1 April is a
hoax and is to be ignored.
2. If still held envelopes in which this
was received are to be returned to
office of COMFEF as soon as
practicable.'
It has to be said in all seriousness that
unwanted animals, above all rats and mice, but
not excluding snakes, were something of a
problem away from the well-regulated
ambiance of the HM Naval Base, Singapore,
but this cat, if not rat, was out of the bag:
authority was most definitely not amused, and
the heavy mob, in the shape of the MODPolice
CID, was sent in to test every typewriter in the
Fleet to match the printing idiosyncrasies with
those of the offending letter. This took time, of
course, so that even receipt of the signal did
not prevent one or two of the more credulous
ships sending their Rodent Prevention Teams
fruitlessly to attend the fictitious basic training
demonstration on the Tuesday. One can see the
scene: Captain, jaded after a weekend down
Bugis Street, and looking forward to a beer and
a swim at the club:- 'No.], here's another
bloody stupid letter from COMFEF, I suppose
we'd better do something about it, get the
Midshipman to organise something', what
time the First Lieutenant doubles smartly away
and details said Midshipman off 'Don't ask
bloody stupid questions, just get on with it!'
The CID's investigations bore fruit: the
typewriter was identified in one of the ships of
the Inshore Flotilla, and polite mention of
rubber truncheons or some similarly vague
threat elicited from her Correspondence
Officer the names of three other Sub
Lieutenant authors, including, significantly, a
pusser on the staff of a senior officer, whose
training had clearly reached the stage of his
being able to ape the official style of his
superiors with verisimilitude.
Fortunately for the miscreants, by now in a
state of considerable trepidation, authority had
come to see the funny side of their hoax COMFEF was himself known as a most
amusing raconteur - and having been given a
OH, RATS!
severe dressing-down, their bluff was called by
their being required to give a presentation on
Rodent Prevention in the Sultan Cinema.
History does not relate how this eventually
went, and perhaps it is up to the hoaxers, now
safely in retirement, to round the story off: our
359
Editor has been sent an original copy of the
letter and a list of those responsible, so that The
Naval Review's archives, if no others, preserve
the details of one of the better jokes perpetrated
on the Royal Navy.
D'ASCIA
Blind Approach - I1
An investigation of Britain's ignorance of the Imperial Japanese Navy in December 1941: I1
THE STATE OF JAPANESE RELATED
INTELLIGENCE IN DECEMBER 1941
Assessment of Japanese dispositions and
intentions
N 1934 it was decided that section 8 of NID,
also known as the Operational Intelligence
Centre (OIC), should establish
'Arrangements made for watching
Japanese merchant shipping with a view
to
detecting
any
extraordinary
movements which might be made in
anticipation of early hostilities'.'"
To this end the Reporting Officers (ROs)
made their weekly reports to the Far East
Combined Bureau (FECB), who forwarded the
information to the OIC. This is the area in
which the ROs proved themselves most useful,
giving an overall picture of the movements of
Japanese merchantmen and warships.
Complementary to the ROs was the FECB's
communications intercept organisation. In
1934 there was an embryo signals intelligence
setup in the Far East, and it was decided to
build the system up; Singapore, Hong Kong,
London and HMS Falmouth were each
allocated two Japanese cryptographers. At the
outbreak of the Japanese war there were High
Frequency Direction Finding stations at
Singapore, Hong Kong and North Borneo, and
a 'Y' intercept and cryptanalysis station at
Singapore. The 'Y' section would detect
traffic and alert the HFDF stations, which
would then be able to give bearings of the
transmitter. The 'Y' section would then pass
the content of the transmission to the
cryptanalysts, and in an ideal intercept the
coordinating authority would be able to
provide users with the decrypted
content of
-.
the message, an analysis of its importance, and
the identitv and location of the originator.
The identity of the originator could not
always be determined by callsigns alone, so a
technique known as Radio Finger Printing
(RFP), was developed. Close analysis of the
characteristics of a transmission could reveal
the type of transmitter being used and,
eventually, the individual ship which was
transmitting.
I
L,
Between them the ROs and the intercept
organisations were able to keep a good plot of
the whereabouts of Japanese merchantmen
and warships, as well as having a good idea of
the IJN's tactical organisation. Admiral Noble
wrote in late 1939 that 'Since June 1939 it has
been ~ossiblefor me to know with reasonable
accuracy the position of the Japanese
Combined Fleet.'"
The real testing of the system came in late
November 1941, when it was able to predict
the outbreak of hostilities. The recall of the
Japanese merchant fleet to home waters and
an increase in submarine activity were
reported in mid November2', and Major R. G.
Gates RM, SO(I), in Hong Kong, states that
intelligence knew for ten days that some form
of Japanese activity was imminent. During
this period the IJN undertook an extensive
exercise in communications spoofing, and the
FECB's possession of RFP technology
enabled them to penetrate the spoof more
effectively than did the Americans.
Assessment of Japanese military hardware
In 1929 publication of statistics on most
Japanese industries was prohibited,?' in the
1930's no Japanese Officer below the rank of
Admiral dared discuss any Naval question
with foreigners," and details of new ships
were closely guarded. The level of secrecy
that surrounded Naval building programmes
made it virtually impossible to gain any
information about warships or aircraft under
development.
To illustrate this difficulty a brief case study
has been made of the construction of the
battleship Yumuto. In 1937 the keel was laid
down in Kure yard of a battleship that was to
carry nine 18.1" guns and displace 70,000
tons. This was to be the Yamato, the first of a
class of four that would be the most powerful
in the world. In 1940 she was launched and on
16 December 1941 entered commission. Her
construction had been conducted in conditions
of secrecy that seem extreme, but were not far
from the norm in 1930s Japan; the yards
already had 20 foot high fences around them,
BLIND APPROACH - I1
no foreigners, even Germans, were allowed
into the yards and access to ships under build
was severely restricted even for Officers of the
IJN.Z At the same time Japanese agents were
putting about a story of five ships building, of
40,000 tons and armed with nine 16" guns
each. The first of these mythical ships was
called the Nissin.
In the West there was little or no idea of
what was happening in the Japanese yards.
Editions of Jane's Fighting Ships published in
1941 and 1942, hardly a definitive intelligence
source, but used by the RN, show ships
commenced from 1937 to be completed from
1941, displacing 40,000 tons, carrying nine
16" guns each, the first called Nissin. An NID
report dated March 1942 indicated a large ship
launched in 1939 which had joined the Fleet
by 1942, and stated that it was 'reasonable to
presume that she had completed trials by
November 194 1 '."' Another document dated
23 August 1942 lists the Yamato as having
been 'entirely unknown to the FECB until US
sources mentioned her as the new Fleet
flagship', though the same paper talks of the
Nissin as a different ship." There is, then, little
doubt that an effective smoke screen was put
up around the 'Yamato' class.
After their withdrawal from the Second
London Conference in 1936, the 1JN
undertook an ambitious programme of
modernisation and development; numbers of
serviceable ships rose dramatically fro1111936
to 1941, and older ships were wholly
modernised.'"t was of these modernised ships
that the RN was so ignorant in 1941. The pre1936 ships were in design and construction
markedly inferior to those of the RN, so the
Admiralty might be forgiven for having
assumed that the post 1936 ships and those
which had been updated were similarly
deficient.
Given the secrecy that surrounded the IJN,
the achievements of the FECB in studying
hardware are worthy of praise. Although the
resources were not available to keep a
submarine
continuously
on
station,
intelligence patrols were occasionally
undertaken in Japanese home waters, and
some valuable information was gained. HMS
Regulu.~, for instance, penetrated the Fleet
36 1
anchorage in 1940, and took a number of
photographs. Merchant vessels which sighted
IJN units were encouraged to submit reports,
and the ROs came up with some valuable
intelligence.
Assessment of the IJN's aircraft is an area
in which intelligence was demonstrably weak,
and this failing can be clearly shown to have
contributed to the loss of HMS Prince Of
Wales and HMS Repulse.
The underestimation of the IJN's aircraft
sprang from what must at the time have
seemed a perfectly reasonable assumption: if
you know nothing about the enemy's aircraft,
assume them to be similar to yours. In respect
of the ranges at which the Japanese could
strike, Goodenough gives us an account of
contemporary thinking:
'Kuantan was, 1 seem to recollect;
about 450 miles from the nearest airfield
in Indo China. This was further by a good
deal than our own naval aircraft could
have operated in a successful strike. It
therefore seemed unlikely that the
Japanese would be able to deliver a heavy
air strike at this distance.""
This also evidences a disturbing simplicity
in assuming that a strike against a ship must
come from shipborne aircraft, whereas the
bulk of the damage was in fact done by land
based multi engined aircraft.
The RN made similar assumptions about
the tactics of the IJN's air arm. RN aircraft
launched their torpedoes at speeds of around
100 knots, so RN gunners practised against
sleeve targets flown at these speeds. In the
event the Japanese launched at speeds of 150
to 190 knots, for which the gunners were
totally unprepared. Even the thinnest of
intelligence, down to a single photograph,
should have indicated that the IJN torpedo
bombers were likely to have higher attack
speeds than the RN's Swordfish.
In 1935 the DNI (Director of Naval
Intelligence, head of NID), commissioned
Captain Vivian, then Naval Attach6 in Tokyo,
to write a report on the efficiency of the IJN,
and many of his conclusions are telling.
Captain Vivian's report is especially
significant as, although the IJN underwent
great modernisation between 1936 and 1941.
362
BLIND APF'ROACH
it was not considered necessary to commission
another study to update Vivian's.
It is interesting to note that, while
discussing the issue of the IJN's efficiency at
gunnery Captain Vivian quoted Admiral
Takusu of the IJN as saying that 'Not one in
five attacking torpedo planes would be
disabled by gunfire'. Vivian, with typical
optimism, interpreted this as a slight against
IJN gunnery, but hindsight opens up another
more ominous interpretation; Japanese
torpedo bombers flew so fast as to be almost
immune to defensive gunnery.
Aside from the difficulties described
elsewhere in this paper that were common
with other areas of intelligence, work against
the IJN air arm suffered at the hands of the
inter-war uncertainties in the RAFIFAA
relationship and the low priority given, within
the RN, to the FAA. In crude terms, both the
RN and the RAF thought that the other side
was, or should have been, spying on the IJN
air arm, and neither actually did the job.
Further evidence of poor coordination is
given by the apparent failure to disseminate
intelligence about Japanese fighter aircraft;
the Air section of the FECB received good
intelligence in May 1941 from a Zero which
had been captured after making an emergency
landing in China, and the Air Attach6 in
Chungking is said to have had, in September
1941, reliable performance figures for the
Zero."' Neither of these coups, which revealed
details of the finest fighter aircraft of its time,
caused any shift in the opinion voiced in May
1941 that
'The Buffalo appears to be eminently
satisfactory and would probably prove
more than a match for any Japanese
aircraft'."
The Buffalo proved to be antiquated and
outclassed.
Assessment of Japanese personnel3"
Assessment of the IJN's fighting ability was
probably the RN's weakest field. The widely
held and erroneous belief that the Japanese
could not operate at night was mentioned in
the introduction, but deserves further
discussion.
In the 1920's the IJN adopted a practice of
- 11
exercising, especially at night, in closely
simulated battle conditions. In 1924 there
were two collisions between unlit ships
exercising at night; a destroyer and 133 men
were lost. Commanding Officers were
gathered and told by their Commander in
Chief 'not to be demoralised by the disaster',"
so similar exercises continued, as witnessed
by Admiral Little in 1937. There remained,
however, a conviction in the RN that the
Japanese could not see in the dark.
The IJN's Officers were similarly trained to
those of the RN, though the Japanese tended to
lack initiative or fluidity of thought. The
enlisted men, mostly volunteers before the
war, were generally of a higher standard than
those of the RN, and the Petty Officers were
exceptionally good. Captain Vivian's report,
mentioned earlier, commented extensively on
the training and mentality of the men of the
IJN, and while generally accurate, he fell wide
of the mark on some fundamental points,
tending to underestimate their capabilities.
The ships of the IJN worked a demanding
cycle of exercises that lasted most of the year
and often took place in the punishing northern
waters to harden the men up; one Officer is
recorded as having said that 'war is so easy
compared to peacetime exercises'. The result
was a highly efficient and war-ready Navy.
There is no doubt that Officers of the RN
were exposed to evidence of the IJN's
efficiency, but not all interpreted the evidence
as well as might have been hoped. We have
already heard of Admiral Little's perception
of their thoroughness as 'theatrical' and he
goes on record as thinking that
'There is usually a tendency to overrate
the enemy, and I fear that this may have
been the case with our own estimation of
the Japanese Navy in recent years'.'"
The authorities in London seem to have
subscribed to Little's point of view, the
Admiralty Eastern War Plan in 1937 saying
'If, as may well be the case, they prove
to be lacking in enterprise, skill, resource
or fighting qualities, we should be
prepared immediately to exploit our
advantages in these respects'."
which analysis it is tempting to ascribe to
racial arrogance, particularly when set against
BLIND APPROACH - I1
DNI's note on Captain Vivian's paper that
'Against the weakness of the Japanese
Navy pointed out in this paper must be set
a very high morale and a fighting spirit of
the very highest order'.'"
Other Commanders-in-Chief of the China
Station, Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton
and Vice Admiral Sir Frederic Dreyer, had
high opinions of the Japanese. Dreyer even
wrote a memorandum to the Admiralty in
1939 warning of the professionalism of the
IJN and the threat they represented. Admiral
of the Fleet Sir Roger Backhouse, then First
Sea Lord, noted
'It will be realised that Admiral Dreyer
has made a great study of the Pacific
problem and his views are therefore of
great value' ."
Under this a long minute written by the
Director of Plans concluded, broadly, that
Dreyer, in his own words, had a 'bee in his
bonnet' about Japan, and no action should be
taken based on his findings. After being
circulated the paper did return to the First Sea
Lord's office, but this was during
Backhouse's illness, and it received no further
attention.
Dreyer floated a number of possibilities to
counter the threat, but although he made
repeated reference to the RN's lack of
knowledge about the IJN, he at no point
suggested that the intelligence effort against
them be built up. This can be accounted for by
the general atmosphere of the time that did not
give intelligence a high priority.
The Air Arm, similar in training philosophy
to the rest of the IJN, but with the added
advantage of having participated in the Sino
~ a ~ a n e war,
s e had its efficiency written off as
being
'not more, but possibly slightly less
than that of the Italians'.'"
while in reality, Japanese pilots could
expect to fly for some 300 hours before their
first appointment to a front line squadron,
against the 100 to 150 hours flown by their RN
counterparts. "
As well as the sources already mentioned, a
number of missions were sent to Japan to
assist with military training, many of whom
reported back of the quality of their trainees.
363
There were also two Englishmen at Etajima
until 1938 teaching English to IJN cadets; they
must have had a good idea of the standards
demanded of IJN Officers. There is indeed
reference to them in Vivian's paper, but the
only one of their comments that he saw fit to
enter in the paper was an opinion that the
training was so hard as to render the
graduating Officers 'thoroughly over tired
human beings'. The tragedy is that such a lot
of readily available intelligence was ignored
in the racist belief that little men from the
orient could be no match for Jack.
Conclusion and lessons
The RN, without doubt, was ill prepared in
intelligence terms to fight the Japanese in
1941. Diplomatic signal intercepts revealed
strategic intentions, but the timescale of
decryption meant that little tactical advantage
could be obtained from 'Y' material, the
Colombo raid illustrating the dangers of an
incomplete intercept.
The RN had a fair appreciation of the older
hardware that was to be ranged against them,
but of the more modern equipment,
specifically naval aircraft, torpedoes, and the
modernised surface ships, they were
disturbingly ignorant, with occasionally
disastrous results. At the outbreak of war the
OIC cells in the Far East were able to track
Japanese warships and merchantmen with
reasonable accuracy, and were in fact able to
report the positions of the main IJN forces as
they approached Malaya. On the quality of
IJN personnel, though supplied with good
data, the Admiralty failed to draw the right
conclusions.
Intelligence as a whole was not a highly
regarded asset in the inter war years, and the
effort put into the SIS in particular was
minimal. The Japanese were not, up to the mid
30's, a target worthy of attention; they were an
old ally with no obviously aggressive
ambitions. As time passed and Tokyo took on
an expansionist slant, it was hoped in London
that friendly approaches would incline them to
move north into Russian and Chinese
territories, rather than south into British,
French and Dutch colonies. At this time it
might have been possible to conduct
364
BLlND APPROACH
espionage in Japan, but the risks to
appeasement precluded it. Too late, it became
obvious that a war was likely, but by this time
Japan had erected barriers which could only at
great hazard be scaled by an espionage
organisation with little or no experience in the
Far East. The Foreign Office, the only
department mandated to drive such an effort,
was not prepared to risk compromising its
diplomatic approach. Throughout this period
Fascism in Europe was a more direct threat,
and was thus allowed to monopolise the
attention of British intelligence.
In brief, then, the inter war years can be
summarised as follows: at first the Japanese
were not a threat, were then too risky to spy
on, and throughout were too likely to be
offended if they found London spying on
them.
If history is to have a purpose other than as
an academic exercise, we must use it to draw
from the past lessons for today; this study
seems to cover one area which might have
been improved upon, and which may still be
relevant; the lesson that today's Navy must
take away is that racial arrogance, though
useful to motivate a fighting man, can be
appallingly blinding. In the conclusion to his
paper Captain Vivian felt it appropriate to
make some comments on the Japanese
character, and though it might hurt him to see
his words turned against his own service, the
events of 1941 do lay them open to reversal:
'The Japanese people have an
extraordinary
ability
to
deceive
themselves and are quite ready to believe
that something exists merely because
they approve of it existing such as the
superiority of their naval material over
those of all other nations or visa versa.
Both the above are somewhat
dangerous attitudes of mind in a fighting
service and until the J~~~~~~~has the
experience of contending with a naval
power technically equal or superior to its
own it will be unable to realise that there
- I1
may be a weakness in its organisation or
technique'."'
Few people in Britain, in or out of the RN,
knew anything of Japan in the 1930s, and
Naval Officers were ready to believe whatever
prejudiced nonsense was put in front of them;
the Japanese were stupid, irresolute,
inflexible, undisciplined, overdisciplined,
lacked fighting spirit and, absurdly, were
frightened of the dark.
Absurd, yes, but any more so than the
proposition that men who come from the
desert can not operate submarines because
they are afraid to go underwater?
(Concluded)
References
"'PRO ADM 2231464, 'History o f NID 1939- 1942'.
'PRO ADM 2231494.
?'ibid.
"War With Japan, vol 11, p.59.
'TRO ADM 1 1613862. p. 102.
"Marder, Old Friends, p.355.
'"PRO ADM 2231347, NID Reports, IJN General 19411944.
"ibid. The same document, extraordinarily, concludes
of another major warship that it 'Must be in existence
somewhere if not already sunk'.
: W a r With Japan, vol I, appendix C.
"Goodenough in a letter to Roski 11, 8 May 195 1.
"'Marder, Old friend.^, vol I, p.308.
'PRO CAB 7011 1, COS(41), 230, 1 l May 1941.
'?Though primary source5 in this section have been
traced, the author has leant heavily on Marder's Old
Friends, especially the chapter 'Royal Navy Looks at
the Imperial Navy', which contain\ an excellent and
wider discussion.
"Marder, Old Frierl~ls,pp.292-294.
'TRO ADM 11613862, paper titled 'Strategical
problems on the China Station Remarks' by Vice
Admiral Sir Charle\ Little dated 19 Sep. 35, p.21 1.
"PRO CAB 5317 COS 209th meeting, I June 1937.
'TRO ADM 11613862, p.92a. minute by DNI dated 20
May 1935.
"PRO ADM 111 1326 'Some Strategical Notes Western Pacific', Dreyer, I0 Feb 1939.
'TRO CAB 7911 1 Annex to COS(41). 159th meeting,
May 1941,
o l d ~ ~ i ~, vol
, ~1, dp..iOs.
, ~
"'PRO ADM 11613862, p.124.
Formation of the Electrical and TAS Branches
Background
FTER successful trials of the Whitehead
torpedo in 1870 the Admiralty bought a
licence to manufacture. In 1872 the frigate
Vernon, then acting as a coaling hulk, was
fitted out and commissioned as a torpedo
instructional ship at Portsmouth as a tender to
the Gunnery School in HMS Excellent. In
1876 the Vernon became an independent
command and the Torpedo Branch was
founded. It was responsible for all matters
connected with underwater warfare, including
the development of weapons and their tactical
use. Electricity, first introduced into ships for
lighting, became the responsibility of the
Torpedo Officer, presumably because he was
the only officer whose duties, in connection
with mines, required a knowledge of the
subject. As one writer wryly observed, had
this not been so electrical duties might well
have become the responsibility of the Pursers
or the Engineers, responsible for the provision
of lamps and candles. The Torpedo Branch
was part of the Executive Department, its
officers and ratings being seamen.
During the late 19th and early 20th
Centuries ele'ctricity on board ship, despite
early scepticism as to its value, became of ever
increasing importance. Its uses included
supplying the motive power for the hydraulic
systems of heavy guns, fire control and firing
circuits, hoists, capstans, cranes, searchlights
and signalling projectors, and telephones and
other forms of internal communications. The
Torpedo Officer remained responsible for all
electrical appliances, and in the early days of
Wireless Telegraphy this also fell within his
ambit; it was not transferred to the Signal
Branch until 1917. A branch of semi-skilled
electrical mechanics, Wiremen, was formed
during the First World War but lapsed at the
end of hostilities. However, the Torpedo
Officer's electrical responsibilities ended with
electrical equipment installed on board ship
and the higher direction of Naval electrical
engineering lay in the hands of the Electrical
Engineering Department (EED) of the
Admiralty. This was an entirely civilian
manned organisation under the Controller of
the Navy, responsible, inter alia, for research
A
and development, installation of electrical (but
not wireless) equipment on board ship and
liaison with, and supervision of, contractors,
manufacturers and shipbuilders. Its senior
staff were all qualified electrical engineers.
The First World War saw the start of
unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany,
and the development of countermeasures.
These took the form of ad hoc arrangements
by a mixed team of Naval Officers, scientists
and Civil Technical Officers to meet the
growing threat. The principal developments
used operationally were the depth charge as
the anti submarine weapon and the
hydrophone for detection. The experiences of
the War had clearly demonstrated the need for
more efficient submarine detection apparatus
and Asdic was developed during the inter-war
years. For technical reasons the development
of the Asdic equipment was made the
responsibility of the Signal Branch whilst the
Torpedo Officer had control of the depth
charges. There were thus, from the beginning,
two different branches responsible for A / S
warfare. The embryo Anti Submarine Branch
came into being in 1924, but the division
between the A/S and Torpedo Branches
remained, emphasised in such superficialities
as the titles of the Warrant Officers
being respectively Boatswain ( N S ) and
Gunner (T). A 1920 Committee had
recommended the formation of an Electrical
Branch to relieve the Torpedo Branch of its
electrical duties and to allow it to concentrate
on underwater warfare but although this
recommendation was endorsed in 1924 no
action was taken.
The Second World War
At the beginning of the 1939-45 War the
situation was that the Torpedo Branch was
responsible for electrical supply and
distribution in ships, for all underwater
weapons including mines, and for carrying out
the normal seaman duties appropriate to
officers and ratings of the Executive Branch.
The Anti-Submarine Branch was responsible
for the detection of submarines and the
associated equipment and for advising the
command on the direction of the ship to a
366
FORMATION OF THE ELECTRICAL AND TAS BRANCHES
position where the weapons, initially depth
charges, could be fired by the Torpedo
Branch. There were considerable overlaps in
the work of the two branches, particularly in
the realm of underwater acoustics.
Maintenance of Wireless Telegraphy
equipment was largely in the hands of the
operators, the Telegraphist Branch, Chief and
Warrant Telegraphists being highly trained in
the technical maintenance of their sets. They
could, however, call on the Torpedo Officer
for skilled assistance in major electrical tasks.
In 1939 there were no technical junior rates
dealing with the maintenance of wireless and
allied equipment, and the Radio Mechanic
was a wartime introduction.
Whilst Torpedo Officers, as officers of the
Executive Branch, were eligible for and
frequently achieved promotion to the highest
ranks of the Service, electrical expertise in the
Fleet stopped at the rank of Lieutenant
Commander, the senior rank to be employed
even in capital ships on electrical duties. The
only dedicated electrical personnel in the Fleet
were Electrical Artificers, and Warrant and
Commissioned
Electricians
promoted
therefrom. In the sphere of the mechanical
design, maintenance and repair of weapons,
expertise lay in the hands of officers of the
Marine Engineering branch, but there was no
formal Ordnance sub specialisation until
much later. Dedicated expertise was confined
to the Ordnance Artificers and Ordnance
Warrant Officers, the only true specialists,
who were responsible to the Gunnery Officer.
The higher direction of naval electrics
continued in the hands of the civilian manned
Admiralty Electrical Engineering Department
whose Director was the electrical engineering
adviser to the Board of Admiralty. His
responsibilities did not, however, include
radio', and radar, which were covered by the
Signal Department.
The use of electricity was greatly expanded
during the 1939-45 War by the introduction of
totally new equipment, such as radar, a major
increase in the use of radio and allied
equipment and the improvement of many
existing weapons and systems. There were
practically no electrics, other than HF radio
communication by morse key, in the aircraft
of the Fleet Air Arm in 1939. Tactical voice
communication in both ships and aircraft was
in its infancy, as was Electronic Warfare. The
expansion in the use of radio equipment alone
was enormous. It covered not only
communications, which included VHF and
tactical voice communication essential in, for
example, close AIS operations, amphibious
landings and aerial warfare, but also allied
matters such as radio interception, jamming,
and direction finding. Radar, probably the
single most important innovation of the War,
required its own operators and maintainers
and in addition to its basic search and range
finding capabilities transformed naval
gunnery, where it superseded the optical
range-finder and led to considerably more
complex fire control systems. A vast number
of new ships and aircraft, many of completely
new types, entered service, and the complexity
of radio and electrical equipment, particularly
that installed in naval aircraft, grew out of all
recognition. Both the tactical use and material
maintenance and operation of ahead throwing
A/S
weapons
e.g Hedgehog,
were
considerably more complex than that required
for depth charges and underlined the problems
of A/S warfare being the responsibility of two
branches.
The requirements for skilled manpower to
deal with this vast increase in technology were
met, piecemeal, by training and employing
Hostilities Only (HO) personnel to maintain
and operate each new type of equipment as it
entered service. Officers joined either the
RNVR Electrical Branch or the RNVR
Special Branch. They wore respectively dark
and bright green branch distinguishing cloth
between the gold lace of their rank and tended
to specialise in narrow fields such as radar and
air radio. Many had civilian electrical
qualifications. In addition to Seamen
Torpedomen, ratings were recruited as
Electrical Artificers, Wiremen (a revival of
the branch formed in the First World War) and
into a new technical branch of Radio
Mechanics to maintain radar and radio
equipment.
To summarise the situation as it existed in
1943, reponsibility for electricity in the Royal
Navy was divided between:
FORMATION OF THE ELECTRICAL AND TAS BRANCHES
a. at the Admiralty
(1)The
Electrical
Engineering
Department, responsible for electrical
(but not radio and radar) matters. An
entirely civilian department.
(2) The Director of Naval Ordnance,
responsible for fire control apparatus.
(3) The
Signal
Department,
responsible for the design of all radio and
radar apparatus. Although responsible for
the design of radar, the Signal
Department was not the 'user' branch at
sea.
(4) The
Torpedo
and
Mining
Department, responsible for underwater
weapons,
mining
and
mine
countermeasures.
(5) The Anti-Submarine Department,
responsible for submarine detection
apparatus.
b. in the Fleet
( I ) The Torpedo Officer, responsible,
with a few minor exceptions, for the
maintenance of all High and Low Power
Electrical apparatus. He was assisted by
HO Electrical Officers of the RNVR,
Electrical Warrant Officers and Artificers,
Seamen Torpedomen and Wiremen. In
addition to his electrical duties the
Torpedo Officer was responsible for the
tactical use of underwater weapons and
was required to carry out the normal
functions of an Executive Officer, eg
bridge watchkeeping.
(2) The Radio Mechanic Branch, a
wartime introduction comprising almost
entirely HO ratings. Radio mechanics
were responsible for the maintenance of
all radio and radar equipment on board,
but tended to become highly specialised.
They had taken over the maintenance of
general radio from the previous 'user
maintainer', the Senior Telegraphist
Rating. Radio Mechanics (Air) were a
separate specialisation.
(3) Radar was maintained by specially
trained RNVR officers employing
specialised Radio Mechanics. Operation
was in the hands of seamen with Radar
Control and Radar Plot non substantive
rates.
367
(4) Asdic apparatus was maintained
by Higher Submarine Detector ratings
under the AIS officer.
The need for change - the Phillips Report
The somewhat muddled
organisation
described above had grown piecemeal, partly
as a result of long standing historical factors
and partly from the exigencies of war, and
worked reasonably satisfactorily. However,
looking ahead to the future, it was very
evident to the Board of Admiralty that it could
not continue to do so for very long. The main
problem was that the use of electrical and
radio equipment would clearly continue to
expand and the ad hoc arrangements which
had developed would not be capable of coping
with the expansion. Three particular
difficulties were identified. Firstly, there was
the lack of any uniformed expertise in the
administration of naval electrics above
shiplfleet level. Secondly, the growing
electrical responsibilities of the Torpedo
Branch were to the detriment of its Executive
duties. Torpedo Officers were not trained to a
sufficiently high technical standard to deal
with the increasing complexities of electrical
equipment, which were considered to have
grown beyond the scope of an officer
primarily borne for Executive duties.
Considerable problems were also being
experienced in training Torpedomen to a
sufficiently high standard in seamanship,
underwater weapons and modern electrical
systems. Thirdly, almost all the technical
expertise in new equipment was concentrated
in the hands of HO personnel who would
leave the Navy at the end of the War.
These problems were addressed by the
Board of Admiralty, and on 9 August 1943
Rear Admiral H. C. Phillips was appointed to
formulate detailed proposals for the formation
of an Underwater Warfare Branch combining
the responsibilities of the Torpedo and Anti
Submarine Branches, to state the functions of
a proposed new Electrical Branch and to
report on the desirability of relieving
Executive Officers of responsibility for
material matters. Admiral Phillips completed
his report on 15 March 1943?. After outlining
the
situation
described
above.
he
368
FORMATION OF THE ELECTRICAL AND TAS BRANCHES
recommended:
a . t h a t the Torpedo and Anti
Submarine
Branches
should
be
amalgamated into a TorpedolAnti
Submarine (TIAS) Branch, responsible
for all matters concerning underwater
warfare, including torpedoes, mines and
countermeasures thereto, anti submarine
warfare and demolitions. The Torpedo
Branch would lose all its electrical
responsibilities. The slightly cumbrous
style of 'TorpedolAnti Submarine
Branch' was chosen because both
Torpedomen and A/S personnel were
proud of their titles and history and it was
considered that a number of other
proposed names would cause offence to
one, other or both of the source branches.
b. the formation of an Electrical
Branch to be responsible for all the duties
now undertaken by the (civilian)
Electrical Engineering Department, for
the electrical work of the Torpedo
Branch, for the electrical work of the
Marine Engineering Branch and for the
research,
design,
development,
production and maintenance of Radar,
WIT and Fire Control apparatus.
c. the formation of an Ordnance
Branch responsible for all mechanical
matters connected with guns and their
mountings,
directors and control
equipment, and for shells, propellants and
high explosives.
d. the formation of a Torpedo
Mechanical Branch to deal with the
technical aspects of underwater weapons
and equipment.
The general thrust of Admiral Phillips's
report was to transfer the current materiel
loading on the Executive Branch to specialist
technical branches. This involved moving
away from the existing 'userlmaintainer'
concept to an organisation where there was a
clear cut division between the Executive
operator and the technical non Executive
maintainer. It seems that the wheel is currently
being reinvented.
Admiral Phillips's report was considered by
a Committee of the Board of Admiralty' His
proposals for the formation of the TIAS and
Electrical branches were generally agreed and
were of course, closely linked and
interdependent. The Torpedo Branch could
not relinquish its electrical responsibilities
until there was an Electrical branch to assume
them. It was decided that there was no
requirement for a separate Ordnance Branch,
although Ordnance Artificers would continue
to be recruited and would be eligible, as
heretofore, for promotion to warrant rank.
However, the Engineering Branch, the Navy's
mechanical experts, had for many years been
employed on duties outside the Engine Room,
such as design of gun mountings and torpedo
tubes, maintenance of FAA aircraft, technical
assistance to the Director of Armament
Supply etc, and some marine engineers, after a
period of cross training, acted as Ordnance
Engineers working under the Gunnery
Officer. It was decided that this policy should
continue, but that ordnance engineering,
together with air engineering, should become
sub specialisations of the 'E' branch.
The formation of the TAS Branch was a
relatively simple matter but the Electrical
Branch posed greater problems. The
Committee took the view that ideally the
people best qualified to maintain and repair a
weapon or piece of equipment or control its
maintenance or repair were those who used it.
Only where this placed too heavy a burden on
the user in addition to his primary functions
should these duties be assigned to others - a
clear statement of the desirability of the
'userlmaintainer' principle which was then
current in the Royal Navy. The Engineer in
Chief strongly criticised Admiral Phillips's
proposals on the grounds that they 'involved a
rigid and early specialisation which in his
view would be a disadvantage to the Service'.
His own view was that the technical officers
required by the Royal Navy should be
members of a single large technical branch
whose officers should be trained firstly as
officers and secondly as technicians. They
should be given a basic engineering training,
whose principles were common to all
branches of engineering, and specialise later.
As they rose in rank they would broaden their
outlook by experience of other technical work
and the highest technical posts would be filled
FORMATION OF THE ELECTRICAL AND TAS BRANCHES
by officers who had shown the greatest ability
both as administrators and technicians,
regardless of their specialisation in junior
ranks. All the technical work of a ship would
be controlled by a single technical officer with
specialised officers under him for marine
engineering, electrics, ordnance etc. as
required. The Engineer in Chief was ahead of
his time, and was also, possibly unfairly,
suspected of 'empire building'. The
Committee decided that his proposals would
produce 'jacks of all trades and masters of
none' and his ideas were not accepted. It also
rejected the USN's Line Officer concept,
where officers were required to be capable in
both executive and technical duties, on the
grounds that it led to an all-round lower
standard of efficiency in its officers - 'any
imitation ofthe US system in the RN would be
disastrou.s '.
A Committee chaired by Rear Admiral
G. B. Middleton was formed to work on the
detailed implementation of those changes
proposed in the Phillips Report which had
been approved by the Board of Admiralty.
Implementation of the changes
The formation of the TorpeddAnti Submarine
(T/AS) Branch
The formation of the TIAS Branch was
announced in AFO 1012145, which read:
'The present division ($ the respon.sibility
for underwater wafare between the Torpedo
and A/S brancke.~ has resulted in a
consideruble overlapping with a consequent
uneconon~ical distribution of personnel and
material and a prejudicial effect on scientific
rind technical progress. Their Lordships have
therefore decided that these two branches
shall be amalgamated into a new General
ServicefTechrzical branch to be known as the
Torpedo A/S Branch, re.sl)onsihle ,for all
aspects of under water wu$are. They have
decided also to institute within the new
General Service Branch a non-executive
Torpedo Mechanical Brunch charged with the
maintenance of the material for under-water
warfare! Implementation of this policy is
dependent on the Torpedo Branch being
relieved of their electrical duties by the new
Electrical Branch.
369
Their Lordships do not, in general, propose
to require officers urrd ratings with long
experience in Torpedo or A/S to become
proficient in the new T/AS role, for which
junior personnel and new entries will be
required to qualib as soon as appropriate
.syllabuse.s oftraining are worked out'.
The implementation of this change was
relatively simple, Officers of the General List
becoming Lieutenant Commanders and
Lieutenants (TIAS), and Warrant Officers
becoming Gunners (TIAS). Ratings of the new
TIAS branch continued in their original duties,
less electricity for the Torpedomen, but
specialised in either Underwater Control or
Underwater Weapons up to CPO level.
Amalgamation of the branches was
subsequently extended to the Rating
'Instructor' level, Torpedo Gunner's Mates
and Submarine Detectors First Class,
normally CPOs or POs, becoming TAS
Instructors. It is of passing interest that the old
and well established titles of Gunner's Mate
and Torpedo Gunner's Mate were replaced by
Gunnery Instructor and TAS Instructor in
1946 because these highly experienced and
capable senior rates found themselves
seriously handicapped when seeking civilian
employment. The word 'mate' had a very
different connotation in industry, as
epitomised by that standing butt of music hall
comedians, the plumber's
mate, the
apotheosis of slackness and incompetence. A
Staff Division and Materiel Department,
respectively the Torpedo Anti Submarine and
Mine Warfare Division and the Underwater
Weapons Department, were established at the
Admiralty. Responsibility for diving was
transferred from the Gunnery Branch and the
new branch assumed responsibility for bomb
and mine disposal and demolition.
The,fornzation of the Electrical Branch
The formation of the Electrical Branch
posed far greater difficulties. Admiral Phillips
envisaged a large new branch, headed by a
Vice Admiral (L), covering all electrical, radio
and radar matters in the Service. The branch
was to be non-Executive and officers would
wear green distinguishing cloth with their gold
lace. Full implementation would involve the L
370
FORMATION OF THE ELECTRICAL AND TAS BRANCHES
Branch taking over the duties of the civilian
Electrical Engineering Department, which
would be headed and largely manned by naval
officers, and part of the work of other
departments such as the Director of Naval
Ordnance. This 'takeover bid'
was,
predictably and understandably, not viewed
with any great enthusiasm by the Departments
concerned. The members of the Electrical
Engineering Department
in particular
regarded with some concern the proposed
'navalisation' of their department and the
possible demise of their careers as established
civil servants. The Treasury, equally
predictably, raised grave objections to the
costs of implementing the new Branch,
resulting in some tricky Whitehall in-fighting
between senior civil servants.
One major problem was the lack of Naval
Officers, both permanent and HO, with the
professional qualifications to fill the higher
posts, particularly those in the Department of
Electrical Engineering. It was accepted that
the electrical duties currently carried out by
naval officers could immediately be assumed
by the new Electrical Branch. However.
taking over the work of the Department of
Electrical Engineering could only be a gradual
process, dependent largely upon the
recruitment of officers as Cadets (L), their
thorough training in electrical engineering to
degree level, and their promotion to the higher
ranks as they gained experience. It was
thought that a minimum period of 15, later
extended to 25, years would elapse before
Naval electrical engineers would be available
to assume all the functions of the EED.
Degrees were to be obtained at civilian
universities, initially Cambridge, to enable
Naval electrical engineers to meet their
civilian counterparts with whom they would
be in close contact in future years when
working on the design and production aspects
of equipment for the Fleet. Immediate
measures were taken to initiate a Cadet Entry
and as a first step volunteers were called for
from serving junior officers, both RN and
RNVR, with the academic ability to reach
Honours degree standard. Additionally it was
planned to recruit graduate officers direct
from universities on similar lines to a scheme
already operating for marine engineer officers.
It may be of passing interest to note that at the
time, and for some years afterwards, the
concept of a graduate Naval Officer was
viewed with an odd mixture of mild contempt
and dismay. To the traditionalists, of whom
there were many, a degree was an unnecessary
qualification for a sailor and 'boffins' were
viewed with some suspicion. Fortunately,
wiser counsels prevailed.
It would be several years before the first
Cadet Entry Electrical Officers would be
available to serve at sea in even the most
junior posts, and most of the expertise in the
new equipment introduced during the War lay
in the hands of HO RNVR officers who
would, in the normal course of events, be
demobilised at the end of hostilities. It was
imperative that their knowledge and
experience should not be lost to the Service,
because in the short term there was no one to
replace them, and very early action was
necessary to offer them attractive terms to
remain in the Royal Navy. So great was the
need to ensure that they were not demobilised
before being given the opportunity to transfer
that volunteers were called for before the full
details and conditions of transfer, such as
seniority, pay and pensions, had been
established by the Middleton Committee. In
the longer term there were no RN, and very
few RNVR, officers with the professional
qualifications and experience to fill the higher
posts in the EED but the electrical duties
currently performed by naval officers could
immediately be assumed by the new Electrical
Branch.
The formation of the Electrical Branch was
announced in AFO 5 17/45, in which 'Their
Lordships hope that many officers and ratings
on temporary service in the Navy who are
carrying out electrical duties will be attracted
to join this new branch of the Navy ,for
permanent service. Selected personnel in
existing branches ofthe Royal Navy will also
be afforded opportunities to transfer jf they so
desire'. The effective date was 1 January
1946, and 'the existing Electrical Branch is
tran.sferred to the new branch from this date'.
It was planned to start the branch by
transferring officers with experience of
FORMATION OF THE ELECTRICAL AND TAS BRANCHES
electrics from all available sources. These
included officers and warrant officers from the
Torpedo and Signal branches, both RN and
RNVR, RNVR Electrical Officers of various
categories, RNVR Radar, Air Signals. Radio,
and Air Electrical Officers, Warrant
Electricians and Electrical Artificers and Civil
Electrical Engineers in the Electrical
Engineering Department. The net was cast
wide and officers on the retired and
emergency lists were included in the trawl. All
would have to be volunteers. Many,
particularly the RNVR officers who were
highly specialised in such matters as radar,
minesweeping and degaussing, would need
considerable cross-training to qualify them in
all aspects of the duties of the new electrical
branch, particularly as radio and general
electrics had up till then been treated
completely separately. As a sideline on the
problems involved, some radio engineers
maintained that, whilst they themselves could
easily assimilate general electrics, the
converse was not the case, and that the
ethereal arcana of radio would be beyond the
capabilities of general electricians. This view
was firmly rejected! The new branch was to be
headed by a Captain (L) working under the
Second Sea Lord, as the bulk of his initial
duties concerned personnel matters; he later
became Director of the Naval Electrical
Department (DNLD).
Ratings were to be drawn variously from
Electrical Artificers, Air Artificers (L),
Seaman
Torpedomen,
Wiremen,
Air
Mechanics (L) and Radio Mechanics, and in
some cases were compulsorily transferred,
although Seamen Torpedomen were given the
option of remaining in the Seaman Branch.
The rating structure of the new branch was
basically divided into specialists in general
electrics and radio. Admiral Phillips had
expressed the robust opinion that there was
'nothing special about aircrufi' and that they
could perfectly adequately be maintained by
General Service personnel, but the Fleet Air
Arm, unsurprisi~gly,flapped its wings in
horror at such heresy. A further subdivision of
the branch into general service and air
personnel was therefore made. The initial
rating branch structure comprised four
37 1
separate streams, Electricians and Electricians
(Air), and Radio Electricians and Radio
Electricians (Air), with rates following the
normal structure of other branches from CPO
(Chief ElectricianIRadio Electrician), to PO
(ElectricianIRadio Electrician), Leading Rate
(Leading Electrician'sRadio Electrician's
Mate) and Able and Ordinary Rates
(Electrician'sIRadio Electrician's Mates 1st
and 2nd Class). Since ratings continued to be
employed largely in their original duties there
was considerably less need for cross training
than was the case for officers.
Conversion courses for officers began
almost immediately; the first thirteen officers
completed their cross training in May 1946
and went to sea as heads of newly formed
electrical departments in battleships, aircraft
carriers and cruisers shortly afterwards. They
relieved the Torpedo, but not initially the
Engineer, Officers of their electrical
responsibilities, and went to sea in carriers and
cruisers in the ranks of Lieutenant
Commander and Lieutenant, the ranks held by
their Torpedo specialist predecessors. The
other non-Executive heads of department in
ships of this size, the Engineer and Supply
Officers, were normally Commanders. Only
the Battleship Howe was given a Commander
(L). They took up their appointments before
the details of their ultimate responsibilities
had been defined, and before the arrangements
for the transfer of TAS (ex Torpedo Branch)
ratings had been made, leading to some initial
problems over such matters as divisional
responsibilities etc., although these were
settled on a common-sense and pragmatic
basis. Another early problem was [hat
although the Torpedo Officer was relieved of
his electrical responsibilities he was still
required to remain in certain classes of ship for
executive and operational duties, leading in
some cases to an increase in officer
complements. However, these teething
problems, which arose principally from the
desire to establish the Electrical Branch as
rapidly as possible, were quickly resolved.
Mechanical maintenance of Weapons
Systems
The hurried introduction of the new Electrical
372
FORMATION OF THE ELECTRICAL AND TAS BRANCHES
and TAS Branches left a number of loose
ends, particularly in the maintenance of the
mechanical aspects of above and under water
weapons systems. There were clear cut
divisions of responsibility between the
mechanical and electrical aspects and also
between gunnery and underwater weapons.
Specialist mechanical skills in gunnery
systems lay in the hands of ordnance
Artificers and Warrant Officersh working to
the Gunnery, and not the Engineer, Officer,
assisted by semi-skilled seaman ratings. Some
General List Engineer Officers received
training in ordnance subjects and also worked
for the Gunnery Officer with the title of
Gunnery Engineer (GIE) Officer. The
maintenance of underwater weapons, which
was mechanically considerably less complex,
was handled by Electrical Artificers
specialising in TAS equipment assisted by
Seamen Torpedomen. Mechanical expertise,
when needed, was provided by the
Engineering Department, the Ordnance
Branch dealing exclusively with gunnery
systems. At the policy, design and
development level in the Admiralty
responsibility was divided between a number
of departments such as the Director of Naval
Ordnance, the Signal Department whose
duties included radar although it was not the
user, the Torpedo and Mining Department,
and the Anti-Submarine Department. The
Engineering Branch, the Navy's mechanical
engineering experts, and the civilian Electrical
Engineering Department provided expertise
on the mechanical and electrical aspects.
Admiral Phillips had proposed a separate
Ordnance Branch to be responsible for all
mechanical matters connected with guns and
their mountings, directors and control
equipment, and for shells, propellants and
high explosives. Similarly, to deal with the
mechanical side of underwater weapons he
had recommended the formation of a Torpedo
Mechanic Branch. Neither of these
recommendations was accepted by the Board,
partly because both branches, particularly the
latter, would be small and would not offer
viable or interesting careers or promotion
prospects for officers. A considerable step
forward was taken in 1948 when Ordnance
Artificers, previously employed only in the
Gunnery Department, and Electrical Artificers
specialising in TAS weapons, were
amalgamated into a new style Ordnance
Artificer dealing with the maintenance of both
above and underwater weapons. Warrant
Electrical Officers (ex Electrical Artificers
with TAS experience) could also transfer7.
However, the supervision of Weapons
Engineering matters at General List level had
still to be tackled, and there was a strong
element in the Executive Branch which
viewed any surrender of the Gunnery and TAS
Officers'
material
responsibilities
to
technicians with grave concern. Although
Adrniral Phillips had reported in favour of
relieving Executive Officers of some of their
material responsibilities the Board did not
agree.
A Committee was set up in 1948 to
'consider and report on the introduction of a
category of Weapon Engineer Officer into the
Royal Navy'. The Board of Admiralty had
'agreed that the ultimate solution qf the
problem o f maintenance of Ordnance and TAS
material was likely to be found in the
institution of a Weapons Maintenance Branch
responsible for maintenance work on all
weapons. It would, however, not be advisable
to contemplate the institution of such a Brunch
of officers for two to four years, and further
detailed examination of the proposal . . .
shol~ldbe deferred until the Board considered
what action should be taken on a proposal for
a comprehensive review oj'the whole basis of
education qf naval officer.s.'Weanwhile, the
Gunnery and TAS Officers were to continue
to be responsible for the maintenance of their
weapons. The Committee was therefore
somewhat constrained in what it could
achieve, and concentrated on widening the
responsibilities of the existing Gunnery
Engineer Officers to include TAS materiel
(other than its electrical aspects). The Chief
Gunnery Engineer Officer was also a Deputy
Director of Naval Ordnance, and a number of
other Engineer Officers specialised in
underwater weapons, including Torpedo
Engineer Officers employed solely in Torpedo
Depots. The latter were extremely narrow
specialists.
FORMATION O F THE ELECTRICAL A N D T A S BRANCHES
The Committee reported in April 1949" It
recommended the introduction of an
organisation which was to be a subspecialisation of the Engineering Branch, and
which would cover all aspects of mechanical
engineering in surface and underwater
weapons systems. The duties of the Gunnery
Engineer Officers would be extended to
include TAS materiel, and the officers of the
Ordnance Branch, all of whom were Warrant
or ex Warrant Officers, and Electrical Officers
employed on TAS duties, were to transfer to
the new sub-specialisation, replacing their
respective dark blue and green distinguishing
cloth with the purple of the Engineers. The old
Ordnance Branch was to be abolished. The
proposed title of Weapons Engineer was
rejected by the Committee because its use
might cause complications if a separate branch
of Weapons Engineers were to be established
in the longer term, as in fact happened, and
Ordnance Engineer was the preferred solution.
A certain degree of cross training would be
necessary, although no attempt was to be
made to train former Warrant Ordnance
Officers or Electrical Officers in Marine
Engineering, in which all General List
Officers were qualified. General List Officers
were to place the letters OIE after the E of
their specialisation, eg a Lieutenant (E) (GIE)
would become a Lieutenant (E) (OIE), and
373
Warrant Ordnance Officers would become
Warrant
Ordnance
Engineers.
Naval
administration of Ordnance Engineers was to
be vested in the Director of Naval Ordnance,
through the Chief Gunnery Engineer Officer,
retitled the Chief Ordnance Engineer Officer.
Close links were to be maintained with the
Director of Underwater Weapons, the Director
of Armament Supply and the Engineer-inChief.
The
Board
approved
these
recommendations, which were promulgated in
AFO 2174150.
References
'The words 'Wireless Telegraphy' have up to now, and
in the interest of historical accuracy, been used to
describe what is now known as radio. The word 'radio'
will be used from now on.
!Report by Rear Admiral H. C. Phillips CB to the
Secretary of the Admiralty dated 15 March 1944.
'CW 66121144 of 22 Nov 1944.
'Despite this statement, the Torpedo Mechanical
Branch was never in fact implemented. The reasons for
this change of policy are covered later in this article.
'AFO 7526145.
"At this time the Ordnance Branch was a separate
organisation, and was not part of the Engineering
Department. Its officers, who were all Warrant or ex
Warrant Officers, wore dark blue distinguishing cloth.
'AFO 3688148.
"oard Minute No. 4224 of 27 May 1948 .
"Admiralty (CW 6666149) of 30 April 1949.
Incident Off The Belgian Coast
Commarzder Michael Barne RN (later, Captain, DSO) was the Commanding Officer of M.27,
one of the smaller class of monitors built hurriedly at the start ($World War I, from September
1915 to February 1918. In this period, M.27 was one of the many disparate ships in the Dover
Patrol, and Barne's tasks, despite M . 2 7 ' ~ slow speed, extended ,far beyond simple
bombardment: for instance, towing disabled M.L.s, r-escuing ditched aircraft, sinking drifting
mines and acting as an aiming mark for the large monitors. Much time was spent at sea at night,
threading through the channels and sandbanks off the Belgian coast, without, o f course, the
advantages of radar. Thefollowing extract from his diary is given with permission of his granddaughter.
Commander Michael Barne was Mentioned in Dispatchexfor this action. 'Did well in leading
the attack'.
2
6 May 1917 Dunkerque A red letter day in
the history of M.27'.
At 3 a.m. we weighed and returned to the
Roads. At 8 a.m. we weighed again and went
out to No.2 buoy with M.24 and with the 30
knotter (T.B.D.) Leven' as an escort. Our duty
was, as on the previous day, to mark for the
General WoIfe's experimental firing. W e had
got Bolitho of the General Wolfe on board
again, and the new surgeon Hoffmeister as
well as Struthers; the latter was to go by that
day's mail destroyer. We did the marking, and
got good results, and were just registering the
final round when our lookout man aloft
reported a vessel to the northwards. There,
sure enough, was a destroyer about five miles
away showing faintly through the haze. As we
looked, appeared three more, following her in
line ahead. There was little doubt that they
were Huns. MB' made a wireless, reporting
them, and we told M.24 and the Leven to close
us, and, having formed line ahead and being in
all respects ready for action, we went for them
as fast as we could. W e challenged them, but
getting no reply we opened fire on them with
our 6-inch, telling the other two to do the
same. The enemy, in line ahead, were standing
across to the eastward toward the outer Ratel
shoal, and we steered North East, to close
them as much as we could. No sooner had we
opened fire than 'swish' came a salvo from
them over our heads. We being the lead ship,
the fire of all four of them was concentrated on
us, and in a very short time the water about us
was boiling with shells, which were screaming
over and around us. On getting to within some
7,000 yards of them, we altered course more
or less parallel with them, steering across the
southern part of the outer Ratel shoal.
Presently Bell [the Navigating Officer], who
kept his head splendidly, reminded me that we
were nearing our minefield, so we turned right
round, 16 points to starboard, and as soon as
the six inch could bear on that side, started in
again. The shells were bursting all round us,
and we picked up some large splinters on the
bridge. Some of them drenched us with water,
which came down on the bridge like a water
spout, and a shell banged through our
searchlight, but, if it burst, did not do so until
it had passed through and overboard.' We
never discovered the hole through it till we got
into harbour. Our 6-inch gun, after firing a
dozen rounds, refused to run out, due, we
afterwards found, to a spigot which fitted too
tightly. Luckily, very luckily for us, as this
happened, the Huns turned northeastwards
and made off at high speed.'
Then came the claiming of hits. Rickord of
M.24, immediately after the action, claimed to
have sunk the third one in the line with a direct
hit from his 7.5-inch gun. This MB could not
entertain, as he had seen all four of the enemy
disappear. Our 6-inch gun layer. Petty Officer
Thompson, said that he had got four hits on
the fore part of the second destroyer, with
which we had been engaged all the time,
saying he saw through his telescopic sight a
red flame and cloud of black smoke as a result
of three of his shots. The gunlayer of the 12
pounder said he got two shots on the fore
bridge of the second destroyer. The Leven
claimed four hits on the last of the line and to
have put her out of action. As a matter of fact,
our rangetaker said he observed three hits on
the fore part of our friend. By a merciful
INCIDENT OFF T H E BELGIUM COAST
stroke of providence none of our three vessels
were damaged, with the exception of the shell
through our searchlight. If one of us had been
put out of action, it must have been all up with
the others, as these four great big destroyers
could have made mincemeat of all of us, if
they had had the courage to close us. A faulty
cartridge in our new 3-inch gun jammed
before we could fire a single round. Having
two out of our three guns out of action MB
settled that it would never do to let M.24 and
Leven go on alone, and if the enemy had not
cleared out after a hot twenty minutes we
should have had to fall back. If the Huns had
only known it, they had a soft thing on, and we
were the more thankful that they had packed
up before we did.
Presently, from the southwest, appeared the
General Wolfe, with her guns cocked up,
followed later by the T.B.D. Racehorse. We
formed astern of the Wove and after
manoeuvring about with her for a bit in case
Fritz should come back for some more, we
returned to harbour [Ouest Dunkerque]. On
getting into harbour we found that the Vice
Admiral of Dover Patrol had come over in the
Vikingh, and also Rear-Admiral Grant. The
V.A., (Sir Reginald Bacon) came on board to
hear about it and MB showed him the
searchlight. MB had to write a short account
for the newspapers, and later a long one for the
Admiralty. He and Rickord went for a short
walk in the afternoon. On getting back, MB
received an invitation to dine with the
Commodore, which he was unable to accept,
as we were for the Potje' again that night.
During the afternoon we took the faulty spigot
out of the 6-inch gun and filed it a bit, and at
9.30 p.m. on getting out of harbour again, we
fired two rounds to seaward to try the
mechanism. It was nearly dark and the French
people must have had a shake. We quite
expected them to fire at us from the Front de
Mer. We anchored in the Potje near the Wove
at 10.45 p.m.
To return a moment to the subject of our
fight, while commenting on the wonderful
shooting made by the Germans, it should be
remarked that they fired a torpedo which
passed within between 50 and 100 yards of
M.24, a truly marvellous shot from a range of
375
four miles! Though nobody on board us saw it,
M.24 who was following us said that it passed
between our two ships. Two of our men,
Almond (MB's marine servant) and a stoker
were struck by bits of shell but neither was
hurt. We had got drenched with water, and
splinters of shell came aboard, of which four
were picked up on the bridge. The enemy
seem to have been firing at the bridge, one
shell having, as recorded, passed through the
searchlight just abaft the bridge, and another
having removed the cap of the rangetaker just
before the bridge. Shells bursting close to the
stern had caused an after peak compartment to
leak and flood with water. There was a fair
amount of shrapnel flying about, a good many
bullets finding their way onboard the Leven.
Three German aeroplanes circling overhead
had put the Huns onto us. One of these almost
got us with a bomb. We had neither the means
nor the time to deal with her.
A. B. ERSKINE
COMMANDER,
RN
References
'At this stage in the War, the Royal Navy had two
classes of monitors (low-freeboard, shallow-draft ships
with one or two large guns, designed for coastal
bombardment). The larger class, of which General
Wove was one, mounted two 15-inch guns. The smaller
class were simply named M. followed by a number.
M.27 was built on the Tees In 1915, and Commander
Michael Barne was in command of her from 6 Sep 19 15
to 1 Feb 1918 in the 6th Flotilla of the Dover Patrol.
Several monitors of both classes were in the Dover
Patrol and frequently involved in bombarding the
German positions on the Belgian coast. M.27, 600 tons
displacement with a length of 177ft, was originally
equipped with one 9.2-inch gun, but Admiral Sir
Reginald Bacon, the Vice-Admiral Dover Patrol, for
various technical reasons had it removed and sent
ashore to France; a 6-inch gun was mounted in its place.
(M.24had a 7.5-inch). M.27 also had a 3-inch gun and
a 12-pounder, for self-defence. There was a crew of 69.
Maximum speed was only 11 knots.
'The Leven, and Racehorse, were $mall Torpedo Boat
Destroyers, the first so-called 'Thirty-knotters', 380
tons, equipped with two torpedo tubes and one 12pounder gun.
'In all his personal logs written after 1915, Barne wrote,
for some reason, in the third person, referring to himself
as 'MB'.
lMichael Barne's family still have part of the
searchlight, with a hole in it.
'The German destroyers were probably G class,
mounting two 4.1 -inch guns and one 3.4-inch gun, with
376
INCIDENT OFF THE BELGIAN COAST
six 20-inch torpedoes, and capable of 34 knots. Only a
month earlier, Michael B a r n e ' ~friend Teddy Evans,
commanding HMS Broke, a bigger British destroyer
mounting six 4-inch guns, in company with HMS Swift,
had had an engagement with four G class German
destroyers in the same waters, which resulted in two of
the German destroyers being sunk, though the Broke
suffered much damage and many casualties. Evans
became a national hero, becoming known as 'Evans of
the Broke' to the British public and being awarded the
DSO. He had been second in command of Scott's
second Antarctic Expedition.
WMS Viking was much larger than the TBDs, being
one of the first Tribal Class Destroyers, 1,090 tons, with
two 4-inch gun\ and two torpedo tubes, and a reputed
speed of 33 knots in calm weather. She was often used
by the Vice Admiral Dover Patrol as his tlagship. She
was the only ship in the Royal Navy with six funnels.
'I have been unable to identify 'Potje' which seems to
he a placename of some kind. It may have been a
sailor's nickname. or acronym, for the Port Est of
Dunkirk, which has two quite separate ports, Ouest and
Est.
HMS Goliath's Full Power Trial in 1908
The following is an extract from the diary of
the late Rear Admiral R. C. Boddie CVO,
DSO, who at the time was an Engineer Sub
Lieutenant aged 20.
VERY warship had to carry out a full
power steam trial every quarter, and it was
considered an achievement to get through this
trial without mishap. The trial consisted of
four hours at the maximum authorised power,
followed by eight hours at threelfifths power,
and I regret to have to record that the Goliath
was never able to achieve this during the 15
months I spent in the ship. HMS Goliath, one
of the 'Canopus' class, was a small battleship
built to pass through the Suez Canal with a
displacement of 13,000 tons and 15,000 IHP.
Our first attempt at a full power trial was
made on passage from Platea in Greece, to
Malta. I had the morning watch and by 0600
we were steaming at our highest speed, about
18 knots. It was a thrilling sight to see
reciprocating engines pounding round at
maximum revolutions with stokers swabbing
and syringing piston rods, feeling fast moving
bearings, refilling lubrication boxes with
unlimited quantities of olive oil, (this oil was
permitted at high speeds), and playing hoses
on warm bearings. Oil and water were flying
about in the engine room and everyone was
fully occupied and excited. Officers were
always in watch-and-watch during a full
power trial. In the stokeholds the tempo was
even higher. The roar of the forced draught
fans dominated the clatter of fire irons and the
crashing noise from the feed pumps, the
E
furnaces devouring the coal as fast as the
stokers could fling it on. After half an hour of
this pandemonium, with everything going
well, the Chief and Senior Engineers decided
to adjourn for breakfast, leaving me in sole
charge of the whole racket. Shortly after they
had gone it was reported to me that the bottom
of the ship in the starboard screw alley was
pulsating up and down as the propeller shaft
revolved. I dashed into the screw alley, a long
tunnel housing the shaft in which a man could
not stand upright, and saw an extraordinary
sight. The shaft was obviously bent, and as it
revolved it raised and lowered the plummer
block bearing, which was smoking, and with it
the bottom plating of the ship.
The first things to do were to bale oil on the
overheated bearing to prevent it firing, and to
send for the Chief Engineer. Meanwhile I had
thought it desirable to abort the full power trial
by reducing the speed of the starboard engine
from full to dead slow, and to telephone the
bridge to inform the Captain of this desperate
deed which was how it appeared to me at the
time. The Chief was soon down, quickly
followed by the Captain. It was decided to
stop the engine at once, and it was then
possible to see the cause of the trouble. A
fracture had occurred in the shaft near the
plummer block about 3 feet long, arranged
spirally along the shaft and gaping open about
'14 of an inch. My action in the matter was
approved and it was generally agreed that had
the injured shaft broken at full power it might
have knocked the bottom of the ship out and
HMS GOLIATH'S FULL POWER TRIAL IN 1908
the engine would have raced smashing itself to
pieces with much damage and loss of life. The
crankshaft of the starboard engine was then
chocked to prevent turning, and the ship
steamed the 400 miles back to Malta on the
remaining engine, at slow speed.
There was talk of a Court of Inquiry on the
accident, but nothing came of it. A month later
the Commander-in-Chief Sir Archibald
Berkeley-Milne, known as Sir Archie Bark
and neither popular nor brilliant, came on
board the Goliath and on the quarter deck
addressed the Captain, the Chief, and myself,
and said he had been directed by Their
Lordships to read an Admiralty letter which
mentioned us by name, and expressed Their
Lordships' appreciation and thanks for the
prompt action we had taken to avert a more
serious accident which might have had fatal
results.
Another unsuccessful attempt to carry out a
full power trial was made in the autumn. After
steaming at high speed for about two hours, a
condenser developed a serious leak, admitting
sea water to the boilers. Condenseritis was the
scourge of the fleet in those days and was
virtually eliminated when modern tube
packings came into service in the 1920s.There
was no way of rectifying this defect at sea, and
to return to Malta for repairs, and abandon the
trial, was to the Chief unthinkable. He was
well aware of the risk; but .took it and we
pushed on at full speed for some hours hoping
377
for the best. But it was not to be, for gradually
the boilers gave up one at a time as the tubes
clogged up with salt and the fires were
quenched to prevent the risk of a burnout or an
explosion. After a few hours of this misery the
trial had to be abandoned, and we crawled
back to Malta, with our boilers in a woeful
state. The experiment had been a mistake and
it took us many months to chip out the salty
scale from the tubes.
The Goliath like all her sister ships, was
provided with 18 Belleville boilers, which
were fitted in most of the ships built for the
British Navy, towards the turn of the century.
Its chief merit was the small quantity of water
it carried, but as this could be boiled away in
the matter of one minute, the maintenance of
the correct water level in the boilers was an
anxiety. To help meet this difficulty about 20
fusible plugs were fitted to each boiler which
often blew out for no apparent reason, with a
report like a rifle shot followed by a loud
hissing of steam. When a plug blew out a new
one had to be hammered into the plughole in a
furore of steam and noise against a steam
pressure of 320 lbs., per square inch; the
highest at that time in the Navy. Better boilers
than these soon afterwards appeared in the
Royal Navy, although this make of boiler
remained in service in HM Royal Yacht
Victoria and Albert until she was scrapped
after the 1939145 war.
(Contributed by Cornmatzder-R. G. Boddie)
The Suppression Of Piracy in The Gulf Background history
The Honourable East India Company and the
Bornbuy Marine
HE East India Company was founded in
1599. Its first expedition, comprising four
ships, sailed in 1601, and returned in 1603
having made a profit of some 95% on capital
invested. Sad to relate, the profits accrued
more from privateering activity than honest
trading, but the leathery 17th Century
conscience was not squeamish in these
matters. Further maritime expeditions
followed. After some problems the first
factories on shore were established shortly
afterwards, against strong opposition from the
Portuguese, at that time the dominant
European power in the region. The Portuguese
were evicted from their base on Hormuz by a
combined BritishIPersian force in 1622 and
from their last base in the area in Muscat in
1650. From this time on the British East India
Company slowly but steadily gained
ascendancy in the region, acquiring enormous
wealth and commercial and political influence
east of Suez.
A small force of ships was raised by the
Company to protect trade, initially from the
activities of the Portuguese, and this force
later became the Bombay Marine, the
maritime arm of the Honourable East India
Company. It pre-dated the Company's army
by some years. There was no state owned
British Navy as we know it today until the
Cromwellian era, the Navy Royal up to that
time having been the personal property of the
monarch. At the restoration of Charles I1 the
Commonwealth Navy became the Royal
Navy, but remained in the ownership of the
state. Ships of the RN subsequently served in
the East Indies but were principally employed
during major wars, usually against the French,
and HM Ships rdrely ventured into the Gulf
until the 19th Century. Most of the general
policing
work,
protection
of trade,
suppression of piracy and hydrographic
surveying was carried out by the Bombay
Marine. The ships of the Bombay Marine,
generically styled 'cruisers' regardless of their
T
size, comprised mostly the smaller classes of
warships, sloops and brigs, and lacked the
firepower for major operations, when larger
Royal Naval ships were provided to assist. In
joint operations the senior officer present of
the Royal Navy always took command,
regardless of his experience, or occasionally
inexperience, in the region, and there was
inevitably some friction between the two
services, the officers of the Royal Navy
always taking precedence. Despite these
problems, the two forces worked well
together when required. Although overall
policy was in the hands of the British
Government the enormous wealth and
influence of the East India Company gave it
considerable political power, and the two
organisations did not always see eye to eye. In
particular, the demands of the Company for
protection of its convoys were frequently at
odds with the strategic needs of naval policy
in the region.
Piracy
Piracy was widespread throughout the
entire area of the Company's influence, and
was not confined to the Gulf. Pirates operated
(and in some areas still operate) from the
Indian, Burmese, Malayan. East Indies,
African and China Coasts. and almost all
European merchant ships were armed. Slave
trading was also well established but was not a
problem until traffic of slaves by sea was
declared illegal by Great Britain in 1806,
when suppression of the trade provided further
tasks for the Royal Navy and Bombay Marine.
Slavery in British possessions was not
abolished until 1833.
In the Gulf the principal stronghold of
piracy was the area between the Musandam
Peninsula and the base of the Qatar Peninsula,
an area known to seamen as the Pirate Coast.
There were two principal tribes in the region,
the Joasmi to the east and the Bani Yas to the
west. Both were under the influence of the
Wahabis, who actively encouraged piracy and
exacted a tribute on all captured goods. The
Joasmi, who were the more ferocious and
THE SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY IN THE GULF - 1797 TO 1820
persistent pirates of the two, had also
established themselves on Qeshm Island and
on the Persian Coast west of Bandar Abbas.
Their principal base was Ras a1 Khaymah, and
they were therefore in an excellent position to
threaten all shipping entering and leaving the
Gulf. Their fleets were large, mainly locally
built vessels known to Europeans, but not
Arabs, as dhows. The largest were of some
300 tons and carried 40 to 50 guns and several
hundred men, and some captured European
ships were also pressed into service. The local
craft, designed for the region, were of shallow
draught allowing them to take shelter in the
shoal waters close to shore, and lateen rigged
enabling them to point closer to the wind than
most of the square rigged European vessels.
The latter, built to sail the high seas of the
world in all weather conditions, were mostly
deep draught and broad beamed to provide
stability and to allow them to carry the
maximum weight of broadsides or cargo.
They were clumsy in comparison to the local
vessels but their firepower gave them a major
advantage over the pirate craft which,
although usually heavily outnumbering the
warships, were normally defeated in close
encounters. The favourite tactic of the pirates
was to close the target ship swiftly and board
her over the stern but a well handled warship
could generally prevent this happening. The
native crews of ships unlucky enough to be
boarded could expect little mercy, and were
usually put to the sword. It should, perhaps, be
mentioned that piracy was viewed in a very
different light by the Arabs and the British. To
the British it was quite simply a criminal act;
to the Arabs it was a long established and
legitimate industry. Moreover, the murder of
many of the native crews of captured ships
was carried out because of internal religious
differences within the Islamic faith. Christians
were rarely killed.
Navigation, geography and climate
In the current era of radar, satellite and
radio navigation, accurate charts and well
equipped major ports it is difficult to recall
how very different matters were 200, or even
60, years ago. Navigation was far from easy.
Visibility is often poor because of haze,
379
reducing to metres in sandstorms, and in the
early 19th Century there were no charts. The
NW Shamal, which can blow strongly,
particularly in winter, made the Pirate Coast a
dead lee shore. The coastal waters are girt by
coral and extremely shallow, precluding ships
of
even relatively
shallow draught
approaching too closely. Major warships were
forced to remain well offshore. There are a
number of well concealed creeks and channels
leading to lagoons which provided excellent
sanctuary for the shallow draught pirate craft.
These inaccessible harbours were protected by
forts and round towers.
The climate is inhospitable for Europeans,
being extremely hot in Summer, and there
were numerous local diseases. The death rate
was high.
Trade and communication
The importance of the Gulf was twofold,
firstly in that it provided the shortest route for
communication between India and the United
Kingdom, and secondly trade. The passage
round the Cape of Good Hope, the only
suitable route for the carriage of freight in
bulk, took months, and the shorter route, used
for mail and despatches, was through the
Mediterranean, thence by land to the Red Sea
and by ship to Bombay. This became
impracticable during the French occupation of
Egypt from 1798 to 1801 and the alternative
was overland to Baghdad or Basra and from
there by sea to Bombay. This route became of
the utmost importance, a regular monthly
service was operated and the Company
maintained an agent in Basra to supervise the
safe transit of mail.
Trade was considerable, much of it carried
between Bombay and the Gulf in Muscat
ships. Trade to Bombay included pearls, salt,
saffron, raw silk, dates, opiates and specie,
whilst from Bombay came the East India
Company's manufactured goods, spices and
raw materials, principally iron, lead, tin and,
and most importantly, timber for shipbuilding,
there being no source in the Arabian Peninsula.
Politics and operations - 1797 to 1820
Policy and strategic background'
The East India Company was faced with the
380
THE SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY IN THE GULF - 1797 TO 1820
problems of protecting its profitable trading
links with the Gulf from the activities of
pirates whilst at the same seeking to do
nothing to antagonise the Gulf Arabs,
particularly the fanatical and warlike Wahabis
who had established effective control of most
of the Arabian coast. In fact the Wahabis
suffered a series of military defeats in the early
years of the 18th Century and their influence
declined, making the eventual suppression of
piracy rather easier than it would otherwise
have been. A further complication was the
activities of French privateers, which were
based on Ile de France (Mauritius) and
regularly cruised the Gulf and adjacent waters.
The French had a Naval Fleet in the region,
also based on Ile de France; its containment
and defeat provided the principal tasks for
both the Royal Navy's East Indies Fleet and
the Bombay Marine and there were few ships
available for the relatively minor matter of
piracy in the Gulf. Ile de France was captured
in 1810 after some stiff fighting which eased
the pressure on the Fleet.
Initially the East India Company handled
the problem of piracy in the Gulf with an
ostrich-like refusal to admit that there was a
problem. Ships of the Bombay Marine
operated under extremely restrictive rules of
engagement and were permitted to open fire
only if a shot had been fired at them. In view
of the pirates' normal and preferred tactic of
closing and boarding their targets without first
opening fire this posed the Bombay Marine
with serious problems. Officers who fired first
to prevent their being boarded were frequently
severely reprimanded for engaging innocent
traders by officials on shore who had little
idea of the realities of the situation. There
were a number of occasions when captured
pirate crews, brought to Bombay to stand trial,
were released on such flimsy pretexts as that
they had already been in confinement whilst
on passage. Not surprisingly, the Joasmi
regarded so feeble a policy of attempted
neutrality and appeasement as a sign of
weakness rather than clemency and responded
with treachery and insult.
Muscat was the principal trading and
shipowning power in the Gulf and suffered
badly from the piratical activities of the
Joasmi. The ruler therefore normally
supported British interests although also
having good relations with the French. In 1798
the Company's Agent at Bushire (a Persian)
persuaded the Sultan of Muscat to sign a
convention whereby he affirmed his
friendship for Great Britain and promised to
deny the French or Dutch any footing in his
territory and to succour the English if they
came to blows with the French in Muscat. This
was honoured more in the breach than the
observance, but was strengthened by a further
treaty of friendship in 1800. The Sultan of
Muscat subsequently provided the British
with advice and military support during their
dealings with the Joasmi.
The Company appeared to take little
interest in the fate of the ships of the Bombay
Marine but the capture of merchant ships by
the Joasmi, and consequent loss of profit,
stirred it to action on a number of occasions.
The Company was, of course, first and
foremost a commercial enterprise in business
to generate profit. It therefore initiated several
expeditions against the Joasmi culminating in
the campaign of 1819 and the Treaty of 1820,
which virtually ended piracy as a full time
occupation for the inhabitants of the region.
These events are covered below.
Operations - 1797 to 1820
The first recorded account of ships of the
Joasmi coming into conflict with the ships of
the Bombay Marine was in 1797 when the
Bassein, carrying despatches, was seized off
Rams but subsequently released. In the same
year there was a treacherous attempt to seize
the Cruiser Viper in Bushire Roads. An attack
by a numerically superior force was beaten off
and the Viper escaped, teaching the Joasmi a
salutary, but regrettably only short lived,
lesson.
In 1804 the Company's brig FLy was
captured in the Gulf by the French Privateer
La Fortune. The crew were taken to Bushire,
where they bought a dhow and sailed for
Bombay but were captured by a fleet of
Joasmi pirates off the Great Tunb and taken to
Ras a1 Khaymah. Released after revealing the
whereabouts of the treasure which had been
jettisoned by the Fly before capture, the few
THE SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY IN THE GULF - 1797 TO 1820
survivors finally reached Bombay with the
Fly's despatches intact after enduring major
hardship. La Fortune was subsequently
captured by HMS Coizcorde.
Two English merchant brigs, the Shannon
and Trimmer, were captured by the Joasmi in
1805. The native members o f the crews were
put to the sword, but the Europeans were
spared. Both ships were taken into service by
the Joasmi and, manned by Arab crews, they
subsequently carried out many successful acts
o f piracy. Encouraged by this success and
under the impression from the Company's
policy o f appeasement that British ships
would not respond to attack, the Joasmi next
attacked the Company's Cruisers Fury,
Teignmouth and Mornington on different
occasions. However, in attacking warships
with well trained crews they took on more
than they could handle and were repulsed with
heavy losses. The Captain o f the F u p was
severely reprimanded on return to Bombay for
having opened fire, and there was an
understandable feeling o f frustration among
the officersand.men o f the Bombay Marine at
the restrictions under which they were forced
to operate. The evidence suggests that the
Joasmi had some difficulty in distinguishing
men o f war from merchant vessels, and, o f
course, both mounted guns at that period.
The attacks on the two brigs made the
Company at last realise that something must
be done and in 1806 a maritime exuedition
was mounted against the pirates. The Joasmi
tleet at Qeshm was blockaded and a Treaty
was concluded at Bandar Abbas by which the
Joasmis agreed to give up the Trimmer and
Shannon, to respect the flag and property o f
the East India Company and its subjects and to
assist and protect any English ships touching
on their coasts. Fortuitously, as a result o f
Turkey declaring war on Russia, then our ally,
a powerful force was sent to the Gulf to
threaten the Ottoman Empire's interests in the
area in 1807. HMS Fox and eight o f the
Company's cruisers remained in the Gulf for a
year, and their presence led to a brief cessation
o f Joasmi piracy. The squadron returned to
Bombay in the Spring o f 1808 and in April the
Joasmi, taking advantage o f its departure,
reverted to their old trade, proceeding as far
38 1
afield as the coast to the north o f Bombay. The
Company's schooner Lively was attacked by
four pirate craft but drove them o f f .They were
subsequently seized and sent to Bombay, but
the crews were released on the grounds that
they had already been in detention for a
considerable period. This act o f clemency,
designed to be unprovocative, had the
opposite effect o f persuading the pirates that
the Company was feeble and ineffective, so
encouraging them to continue in their
misdeeds. The cruiser Fury, carrying
despatches, was attacked by several craft; she
beat them o f f but her Commanding Officer
was reprimanded for molesting the 'innocent
and inoffensiveArabs o f those seas'. Later the
ship Minerva was captured, the crew
murdered and the ship fitted out with guns and
taken into service at Ras al Khaymah. In
October the Cruiser Sylph was boarded and
captured with great loss o f life as a result o f
her Commanding Officer being forbidden to
fire the first shot. The Sylph was recaptured
shortly afterwards by HMS Nereide,
fortuitously in the area on a diplomatic
mission. Her Commanding Officer, who had
witnessed the capture, expressed his complete
astonishment that such a thing could be
allowed to happen. A further attempt by a
large pirate force on the Company's brig
Na~~tilus
was driven o f f ,the officers deciding
to open fire in view o f the hostile demeanour
o f the Arab vessels.
The eyes o f the Bombay Government were
slowly being opened by these incidents to the
true situation, particularly when the Ruler o f
Ras al Khaymah insolently demanded tribute
from the Bombay Government for the safe
passage o f merchantmen. The Treaty o f 1806
was clearly being totally ignored by the
Joasmi, whose fleet was assessed as 63 large
vessels and 813 o f smaller size, manned by
19,000 men.
In 1809 a further expedition to the Pirate
Coast was mounted to suppress the Joasmi.
The Company issued instructions that the
expedition was to act with discretion towards
the Wahabis, although it was well known that
the Joasmi were acting under Wahabi
instructions. The naval contingent comprised
HM Ships Chiffonne, 36, and Caroline 36, the
382
THE SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY IN THE GULF - 1797 TO 1820
Company's ship Mornington 24, and nine
smaller Company vessels including a bomb
ketch, which was old and foundered on
passage with a valuable cargo of ordnance.
The army force comprised British infantry,
Bombay Artillery and about 1,000 sepoys.
The first target was Ras al Khaymah, which
was defended with great tenacity. The larger
ships could not approach the shore because of
shallow water but the smaller vessels were
able to carry out bombardments. Troops were
landed under covering fire from the warships,
and the town was eventually carried after very
stiff resistance. Some 50 vessels, of which 30
were large war dhows, were burnt. However, a
large force of Arabs was approaching the town
from the interior and the troops re-embarked.
This early withdrawal had the unfortunate
effect of persuading the Joasmi that we were
not really in earnest and the re-embarkation
was carried out under heavy fire. The
lukewarm and temporising instructions of the
Bombay Government were at least partly
responsible. The next target was Linjah, a
Joasmi occupied port on the Persian coast near
the island of Qeshm. Linjah was occupied
without resistance and burnt to the ground and
another 20 dhows were destroyed. Further
minor blockading operations were conducted
before the final target, Luft, a Joasmi port on
the Island of Qeshm, was attacked. Luft
resisted strongly but later capitulated and a
further eleven dhows were burnt. Operations
then continued in the Gulf of Oman in the
vicinity of Khawr Fakkan. A desperate
resistance was put up by the Wahabi garrison
but the fort finally fell after heavy loss of Arab
life.
The Joasmi were a fierce and independent
people and the cessation of piracy after the
expedition did not last long. Two Company
Cruisers were in the Gulf in 181 1 but on their
departure the Joasmi recommenced their
depredations, principally on native vessels.
Although a large number of dhows had been
destroyed in the 1809 expedition it was, in
fact, only about one half the total Joasmi fleet,
the rest of which had been concealed in the
numerous creeks and inlets of the coast.
British activity at this period was confined
principally to political and diplomatic
overtures and in 1814 British vessels were
again captured by the Joasmis. This success
led to the general resumption of piracy against
all nations. A native manned Company vessel
was captured in 1816 but the Company
Cruiser Aurora fought a brisk action in
protection of a treasure dhow and succeeded
in beating off a force of some 15 pirate craft,
many of which were sunk. However,
depredations
against
merchant
ships
continued and the Cruisers of the Bombay
Marine were still placed under the most
restrictive rules of engagement.
By 1816 merchantmen could sail in safety
only under escort, and HM Ships and
Company Cruisers were deployed on this task.
The Bombay Government was at last
recognising the full extent of the problem and
a small squadron comprising one Royal Naval
sloop and twb Company Cruisers was
despatched to the Gulf in September of that
year. Its aim was to reproach the Joasmi for
their breach of faith of the 1806 Treaty and to
demand the return of four captured British
merchantmen. The Joasmi response was a flat
denial that they had taken the British vessels
and an insolent reply on their rights to plunder
whom they chose with the exception of
Christian vessels. After further unsuccessful
negotiations with the Joasmi at Ras al
Khaymah, the squadron, now increased to four
ships, attempted a bombardment which failed
because the shoal water prevented ships
getting within effective range. The squadron
then separated, two of the ships remaining to
attempt further negotiations and to afford
protection to the trade whilst one returned to
Bombay with despatches. The Joasmi,
meanwhile, increased their depredations.
Company cruisers and the occasional ship of
the Royal Navy continued to conduct
operations against the Joasmi, but they were
few in number and heavily outnumbered by
the pirate craft which could frequently escape
because of their better sailing qualities. There
were, however, some successes, and when
within range the European ships proved more
than a match for the pirate craft.
In 1819 the Bombay Government finally
decided to take decisive measures to stamp out
piracy and mounted a further expedition. It
THE SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY IN THE GULF
comprised some 3,600 soldiers, sepoys and
British troops in about equal numbers, HM
Ships Liverpool 50, Eden 26, and Curlew 18
and six vessels of the Bombay Marine. A
further three of the Company's ships were
engaged cruising in the Gulf. The troops were
landed at Ras al Khaymah under covering fire
from the smaller warships and captured it after
a short siege in December. The ruler
surrendered with nearly 1,000 followers and
the town was subsequently razed. Rams was
next investigated, but found abandoned, but a
fort some two miles away surrendered after a
short siege. The force then continued to
conduct operations against all the Joasmi
ports, including Sharjah and Ajman,
destroying their forts and burning their boats,
-
1797 TO 1820
383
but little resistance was offered. On 8 January
1820 a general treaty of peace was established
at Ras a1 Khaymah between the British
Government and nearly all the maritime tribes
of Arabs in the Persian Gulf. The purpose and
scope of this treaty were the entire suppression
of piracy and the slave trade. Arab signatories
of the Treaty included the rulers of Ras al
Khaymah, Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Sharjah and
Bahrain and the Pirate Coast became the
Trucial Coast. Ties were strengthened in 1869
by an exclusive agreement between the
Trucial Shaikhs and Great Britain by which
the Shaikhs undertook neither to enter into
agreements with, nor to make concessions to
any other government.
MEWSTONE
Paws For Thought
I
T was not intended to be a holiday for me
and, strictly speaking, nor for the family
either. But when my appointer in his
Whitehall office one gloomy January day
announced, 'We've pencilled you in for Hong
Kong with your family for three years', that's
exactly what it seemed. I could hardly believe
my good fortune. Accompanied postings were
rare unless you happened to be on the
'diplomatic circuit' so we had resigned
ourselves to never savouring the delights of
shore service abroad or relating 'most of the
time it's just like being on holiday' stories
favoured by those more fortunate.
Bubbling with the good news, I telephoned
my wife. When it finally sank in that I was not
joking, her excitement scaled the heights. 'At
last we'll be able to have some real time
abroad in the sun with the children' she
enthused. Like many other naval families,
holidays were always between appointments
and frequently spent with ever-so-quicklybored relations. But Hong Kong was different.
Yes, a job for me, but for the family a holiday
with a difference. 'The children will be over
the moon', I added. 'I sincerely hope so,' my
wife replied, 'let's tell the three of them
together at the weekend'.
We assembled in the 'are you sitting
comfortably' mode. It was immediately
apparent that something important was about
to be announced. 'Well', I said beaming all
round, 'I've got some really good news. I've
been appointed to Hong Kong and we're all
going to live there as a family! Isn't that
great?' My daughter, then aged 4, smiled
happily. The thought of living somewhere else
sounded fun even if Hong Kong was not yet
on her map. My sons aged 10 and l I, from
whom I was expecting whoops of excitement
and imitation kung-fu kicks, sat glum and
unsmiling. 'What's up with you then?' I said
'This is the chance of a lifetime. Think of
jetting out for holidays, sailing, swimming,
beaches, barbecues, trips into China.' I
babbled on, but the message was falling on
deaf ears. At last, after an eerie silence, the
eldest gulped, 'But will we be able to take the
pets?' The pets then were three gerbils and a
mouse. I laughed. 'Of course not, you clowns.
Anyway it's months away yet so they'll
probably be dead by then, or you can give
them to the school or one of your friends.' I
looked at my second son. Tears had begun to
form in his eyes and he ran from the room. My
daughter sensing that the words Hong Kong
384
PAWS FOR THOUGHT
were suddenly synonymous with the
abandonment of her little friends, cried
without restraint. 'If we can't take the pets
then we shan't go!' said my eldest. Stern
faced, he left our good news meeting. Things
were not going at all as planned.
Over the next weeks, we cajoled, we offered
bribes, but there was no changing our
children's minds. No pets - no go. Our
daughter however would have to be taken,
kicking and screaming. Our sons would remain
at boarding school and spend their holidays
with relations and the pets. Otherwise there
was only one alternative - take the animals as
well. As soon as this was promised, the gloom
lifted. Excited planning started in earnest. My
ultimate capitulation so that we could all have
that holiday with a difference was the last
throw of a desperate man. But not as desperate
as taking three gerbils and a mouse to Hong
Kong was to prove! Having promised, there
was no turning back.
The airline was helpful. To them, carrying a
cargo of livestock around the world was an
everyday event. Yes, my animals were very
small and whilst they were more used to
transporting rare species, those required for
breeding or some special animal going to a
collector, a few more like mine would be 'a
drop in the ocean'. With hasty apology for this
inappropriate metaphor, they would send the
necessary documentation. By return came
twenty pages. The international regulations
for the transport of animals and birds by air is
voluminous and all in small print. Gerbils and
mice are not excluded. I absorbed the details.
The exact dimensions of the box. The precise
thickness of the wood. Each box to be lined
with the exact sized wire mesh. Each animal to
have its own precise square metreage of space.
Each aperture for air to be correctly sited and
of the exact size. There was no room for error.
Diagrams accompanied the dimensions like
any good DIY kit. The message was clear.
Unless their containers conformed to the
international regulations, our pets were not
going anywhere. We decided they would have
to share accommodation and at a cost of £80
for two bespoke boxes, they would be
definitely travelling first class.
Animals, like humans going abroad, also
require vaccination against disease. The
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries sent
leaflets giving details. I approached our local
veterinary surgeon who confirmed the
requirements. 'But it will set you back £8 per
jab so if I were you I would just tell your
children that, sadly, the wee things passed
away under anaesthetic' he said. Heedless of
his advice, the inoculations went ahead and I
paid up.
The Min of Ag and Fish in Hong Kong also
had to be informed, demanding the reasons for
importing live animals, their age, medical
history and availability for inspection whilst in
the Colony. The paperwork for each tiny
animal piled up. My purpose in going to Hong
Kong, the worry of trying to let our house, sell
the car, and change childrens' schools were all
forgotten in making arrangements for three
gerbils and a mouse.
Check-in at Gatwick's International Cargo
Terminal was six hours before our own
departure. A large hangar away from the
turmoil of the South Terminal was our pets'
own executive check-in suite. Or so I thought.
A white coated handler examined the
documents, peered into the livestock-labelled
boxes, and juggled our expensive mesh with
his finger. 'These air holes don't look big
enough, but I'll get the vet to check'. I waited
nervously, fretting with worry that something
might be wrong. It was. The vet announced
brusquely that the apertures were insufficient
for two animals in each box and must be
enlarged before travel. This is similar to
finding you've checked in with excess
baggage and have no credit cards, cheque or
cash with which to pay. In this case I had no
tools with which to make the holes larger.
insufficient mesh to cover the enlarged hole
and our own tlight to catch. With me sincerely
wishing, not for the first or last time, that I had
never embarked on this whole zoo trip, the vet
finally agreed to try and enlarge the holes
himself, although he could not guarantee the
security of the animals. I was now past caring
and if a drop in the ocean did occur, I would
tell the children it was the fortunes of war.
The powerful reverse thrust of the 747's
engines as we landed at Hong Kong brought
the unmistakable odour of the Kai-Tak nullah
PAWS FOR THOUGHT
into the cabin and me back to reality. Hong
Kong bureaucracy, a glutinous mixture of
Chinese inscrutability and British pomposity
honed for nearly a century, is awesome and
immigration procedures rigorous. Our arrival
in the early evening of a high humidity day
after seventeen hours in the air coupled with
that ever present Hong Kong noise made me
fear the worst for our pets. At last we
extricated ourselves from the formalities and I
set off to find the equivalent of Baggage
Reclaim (Small Animals).
After several enquiries and much armwaving I was allowed into an airport authority
land rover and with lights flashing plunged
into the deafening and twinkling maelstrom
which is Kai-Tak International at night. The
cargo terminal made Gatwick's hangar look
like a shed at the bottom of the garden. If it
doesn't come by sea to Hong Kong, then it
certainly comes by air. The mountains of
boxes, the whirl of fork lift trucks, lines of
uniformed customs officers and police, plus
droves of sweating coolies did not augur well.
Clutching my Hong Kong Ag & Fish forms I
explained to an impatient immigration officer
that I had come to collect two boxes
containing three gerbils and a mouse. 'Wha
gebbil?' he grunted. 'Wha mouse?' I looked
around. It was clear from the piled containers
that every day fresh food arrives in Hong
385
Kong from all over the world. Knowing the
Chinese appetite for live animal delicacies, it
seemed from my interrogation that I was
suspected of trying to illegally import some
form of furry hors d'oeuvre. I explained they
were pets. 'Wha pet?' he insisted. 'For my
children' I replied. He looked confused. At
that moment a customs officer arrived with
my two expensive cages still intact despite
Gatwick's crude joinery. In the glare of arc
lights I peered inside and sharp movements
and bright eyes assured me all was well. 'Wha
gebbil?' the immigration officer repeated. 'A
form of rat' I replied. 'A lat? Why you bling
lat Hong Kong? I want look see', he said.
Tools were produced and my carefully
constructed boxes prized open. The largest
gerbil sensing freedom leapt into the air. The
Chinese official, visibly shaken, leapt
backwards. 'OK! OK! You go, you go, take
lat!' The lid to the box was quickly secured,
my forms stamped and unceremoniously I was
pushed into the Far Eastern night.
Next day I sent a postcard to my sons'
school in England where they awaited their
flight to Hong Kong. 'Arrived safely. Having
a lovely time. Wish you were here. Signed
Herbie, Phillipa, Thumper and Hans (mouse).'
Our holiday with a difference had begun.
Correspondence
COMMANDING THE FLEET IN THE
PJHQ ERA
Sir,-I was intrigued to read the article
'Commanding the Fleet in the PJHQ Era' (NR,
July '96). I am uncertain who the authors,
CANTABS, are, but they appear to be senior
members of the Naval Staff. I would hazard a
guess from internal evidence that neither has
served on the staff of CINCFLEET at
Northwood recently or they would be more
familiar with the rationale for the Fleet
Command as it has developed in the post Cold
War era.
CANTABS propose that the present 'Type
Commanders' and the Captains D/F be
replaced by 2* 'Functional Commanders', and
l * Type Commanders. Let us consider the
Captains D/F first. CANTABS refer to the fact
that there has been a debate about whether
Captains D/F should be ashore or afloat. From
this, while acknowledging the utility and
flexibility of the Captains D/F concept, they
jump to the conclusion that the Captains D/F
should be restructured. As recently as 1992,
Essenhigh (remember him), after exhaustive
study, recommended they should be afloat.
Has the advent of the PJHQ altered this
conclusion? I think not.
What about the present Type Commanders?
They came into existence as part of the Fleet
Command structure in the period 1990-92.
FOSM already existed. FONA was born in
1990 from the old FONAC (together with
some of the functions of FOF3). FOSF was
created in 1992 as the successor to the old
FOFs (FOF1, FOF2 and FOF3), incorporating
many of the staff and functions (particularly
engineering) of the old style Fleet staff. There
was seen to be a confusion of 4* and 2"
functions at Northwood at the time which was
clarified by the creation of a 2* Type
Commander for the Surface Flotilla.
FLEETMAN I and 2, between them, not only
created FOSF and the 4*/2* structure which
aligns with the then new NMS concepts of
Top and Higher Level Budget Holders (TLB
and HLB), but slimmed down the Fleet Staff
as well.
The Type Commanders were expected to
(and did) bring together all the expertise -
operational,
warfare, engineering and
personnel for their type of platform - surface
ships, submarines and aircraft. You could call
them 'Platform Commanders' as CANTABS
suggest (Note 3), but most people understand
the term 'Type Commanders'. The fact is
(what CANTABs might call a 'given') that
experience since 1990 has shown that the
present 2* Type Commander concept has been
very successful and should only be disturbed
for overriding reasons. Having seen the
concept at work both at the Fleet end and the
Type Commander end within the past five
years, I have personal experience. Can
CANTABS claim as much?
I compare the elegance of the present
structure of Fleet 4*, 2* Type Commanders
and Captains DIF, SM and TAS with the
fragmented
structure
of
Functional
Commanders and I* Type Commanders
proposed at figure 1 of the article. CANTABS
say that moving from Type Command to
Functional Command at the 2* level 'could'
engender a more joint approach to melding
naval disciplines. Perhaps it could. Perhaps
not. Verdict - unproven. As for tribalism, the
authors admit the argument could fall either
way.
The PJHQ is an excellent concept, which is
already showing its worth. The basic premise
that CINCFLEET should adapt to it cannot be
faulted. The role of the Fleet HQ and the
twofold generic roles of 'supporting
commander' and 'commander of those units
not engaged in PJHQ operations' must be
right.
As for the consequences for the Fleet staff
that CANTABS draw, on some dubious
assumptions (what CANTABS call 'givens'
when 'assumptions' would be better), I find
them unconvincing. What do others think?
FELIXIN UNDIS
CORPORATE MADNESS
Sir,-I was absolutely delighted to learn that
Sherwood (NR, July '96) was both so
'intrigued' and 'fascinated' by the 2SLlCNH
Corporate Plan that he read it in its entirety
despite the welter of other paperwork on his
cabin desk, the need to overcome management
CORRESPO
speak (which it seems to me he did with
tremendous aplomb) and the fact that it was an
'expensive' glossy (but more of that later)!
The originators must be proud that it, the first
of its kind in the personnel field, received this
kind of attention and so successfully reached
such a target.
However, I fear that there may be others
with less resilience than Sherwood who,
having read his view and not realising that his
use of references from the Corporate Plan was
highly selective, may now be irrevocably put
off finding for themselves the other crucial
messages contained in the document. Most
importantly, it lays out the strategies for
providing our people with the best possible
support whilst delivering the Navy's aim
against a background of ever reducing funding.
I do not, however, miss Sherwood's point.
But, as 2SLlCNH himself puts it in the
foreword of the Corporate Plan: 'Business
practice methods cannot on their own underpin
the management of naval personnel who need
to be fit to fight and win. Nevertheless, there
are some commercial skills we need to apply if
we are to achieve the most cost-effective way
of conducting our work such that we do not
imperil either the size of the Front Line or our
renowned high standards.'
As to the perceived high cost of production,
I am pleased to be able to assure Sherwood of
two things: first, that printing and distribution
costs were extremely modest, and a fraction of
the cost of the collective senior management
effort which went into the thought processes
behind the Navy's first Personnel Corporate
Strategy; and, second, that the benefits which
have already accrued from the simple expos6
of this strategy have already repaid the
investment handsomely.
Finally, readers of the NR must be in no
doubt that the Navy's willingness and
expertise in coming to terms with new
management techniques and initiatives
(including its language), in a responsible way,
has enabled us to emerge from recent LTCs
with credit and, among other things, with a
greater ability to safeguard the erosion of
frontline funding about which Sherwood
voices such concern.
BING
OPEN REPORTING AND PROMOTION
Sir,-I think Mike Ambler (NR, July '96) is
being a little too obtuse in accusing me of not
having faith in our promotion system simply
because 1 had earlier pointed out that open
reporting may not lead to more honest reports.
There are inherent dangers in any system of
reporting. With our current 'closed' system,
there is always the possibility that a reporting
officer may write a rather more adverse report
than he declares to the officer concerned. It
doesn't happen often, since the norm these
days is for the report to be read out verbatim
by the reporting officer, but it certainly does
happen from time to time. If we go to an
'open' system, there could be the opposite
danger, of a weak reporting officer writing a
rather more complimentary report than is
deserved because he knows it will be seen in
full by the officer under report. 1 very much
hope it won't happen often, and it may well be
that overall the advantages of open reporting
will outweigh the disadvantages, but the
danger is there.
Having seen our promotion system
operating at close quarters for a total of four
years now, I am convinced that it is as fair as
can humanly be devised, with lots of checks
and balances built in. I also know that the vast
majority of reporting officers (not all of
whom, of course, have been through our
selective promotion system) take their S206
responsibilities
extremely
seriously.
However, that does not mean that they are all
paragons of virtue all of the time. I do not see
why Mike Ambler should find that amazing personally 1 would find it amazing if it were
any other way!
FORTY YEARS ON
Sir,-The statement in your interesting article
on the 'UK nuclear propulsion programme'
(NR, July '96), namely, 'The United States
built their first SSBN by inserting a missile
compartment into an SSN', highlights a
historical meeting and memorable decision.
Following theiuccess of the first two SSNs
(Nautilus and Seawol!, the Naval Staff
388
CORRESPONDENCE
considered that a sea-borne (submarine
launched)
deterrent
missile
probably
constituted the most efficient system to
counter the Soviet threat. A 'Special Projects'
staff was established in Main Navy Building
on Constitution Avenue shortly there-after
with Rear Admiral 'Red' Raybourn in charge.
Lockheeds, California were selected as the
lead company to develop the missile and
launch capability.
The programme under-way, with little
publicity, was rocked when in 1957 the USSR
put into orbit their first 'Sputnik' - beating the
US by a short head. Alarm bells rang
throughout
Washington
as
President
Eisenhower called an immediate meeting, at
the White House, with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. CNO - Admiral Arleigh Burke - when
presenting the Navy's position, informed the
President that the Navy were developing a
submarine launched deterrent system and that
Rear Admiral Raybourn, a naval airman, was
in charge of the programme. Called to the
meeting, Raybourn was asked for a brief
statement on current progress and particularly
an estimated completion/operational date.
Replying, Raybourn emphasised that, subject
to satisfactory trials, the best estimate for an
operational date was late 1963 to early '64.
The President responded, 'Admiral, you
apparently don't appreciate, I will be
allocating your programme
unlimited
financial resources'. To which Raybourn
replied, 'I beg your pardon Sir. I will
immediately re-assess our schedules'. Being
dismissed, the President informed him he
wanted an answer at 1700, today.
On return to his office Raybourn convened
a meeting - a working lunch - with his senior
staff and informed them of the President's
directive. During the early exchanges the
technical officer responsible for submarine
hull construction commented, 'Admiral, there
is no way we can bring the programme
forward by any appreciable time. Construction
of the Submarine Hull currently governs the
lead time and, as of now, no keel has been laid
down, neither has the Yard been selected.'
Following further discussion the suggestion
was made that Scorpion - an SSN well
advanced on the ways at New London - could
perhaps be cut in half, the two sections drawn
apart and a Polaris launch tube section
together with its associated control system
inserted. In total an additional 141 feet of
pressure hull. The hybrid was born.
Having, at a stroke, drastically reduced the
lead time for hull construction attention was
turned to that of the missile. Initially, the Al
missile of relatively short range was not
intended to be deployed operationally but to
be the final test vehicle. The meeting decided
to bring this missile forward and for it to be
phased out within one year of operational
service by the A2 missile with over twice the
range.
Raybourn reported to the President that
evening and received permission to proceed
accordingly. In consequence, USS George
Washington - the first of five hybrids - with
Captain Jim Osbourne in command - fired the
first submarine launched ballistic missile from
dived at Cape Canaveral on 20 July 1960. The
operational date had been dramatically
brought forward by over three years - literally
halving the necessary development time given
to the President at the morning meeting.
The first fully designed SSBN - with its
greatly increased diving depth - was the USS
Ethan Allen, lead submarine of the 608 class.
The Al Polaris missile, with limited
capability, remained in service for the first
year until the improved A2 (1,500 nautical
mile range) began to enter service in 1962.
Meanwhile, a longer range, 2,500 nautical
mile version, the A3, was in development
stages behind it. By 1967 the last of the 41
authorised Polaris submarines joined the fleet,
some carrying the A2 missile, others the A3.
The British programme received the A3
missile from the outset.
Early in 1968 Lockheed received initial
funding for a drastically improved missile, the
Poseidon, with a greatly increased payload
and twice the accuracy of the A3 missile.
Poseidon was first flight tested from a land
pad in August 1968, test fired from a surface
ship in late 1969 and from a submerged
submarine in 1970. The initial outline
drawings and configuration for 'Trident',
another major leap forward, were forwarded
to the Admiralty from Washington by me in
CORRESPONDENCE
early 197 1. Subject to adequate funding the
progress possible, on even the most advanced
projects, is quite remarkable provided the
right team is given its head.
BOBGARSON
CAPTAIN,
RN
RETIRED OFFICERS IN
WORLD WAR I1
Sir,-No! J. M. Crossman's letter (NR, July
'96) does not quite complete the circle with Lt
Cdr Beach's (April '96). There is a gap. FT 22
came into Trinidad in 1943 on passage from
Norfolk Virginia to the Mediterranean. My
brother and I (aged 12 and 14 respectively)
were taken on board by the SNO Trinidad,
Captain Sir Harold Campbell RN, 'the wicked
mate' of the Scott Antarctic Expedition and
another famous retired officer - a boyhood
friend of my father. We rate, also, a mention
(about a line and a half!) in Lt Cdr Dixon's
Adventure is Never Done!
As boys we knew every insignia and ribbon
there was, so were wide eyed at the sentry on
the brow wearing a DSO, and the Boatswain
the DSO and MC. If I remember rightly, the
CPO cook wore Royal Flying Corps wings
above his MC. As, subsequently, 1 was to spend
33 years in another highland regiment, I was
fascinated to learn that he was a former Argyll.
However, being introduced to the lean
ferocious old man with his chestful of medals,
flag officer's buttons and two stripes RNVR,
remains etched on my memory to this day. For
our thank you letters, we were told that his
correct
designation
was
'Admiral
(ActingILieutenant) the Honourable Sir
Herbert Meade-Featherstonehaugh GCVO
CB DSO, Captain, FT 22'. Confusing to two
teenagers, and compounded by doubt as to
whether 'RNVR' should be added! It took us
several 'bishes', and a request for a bigger
one, to get the envelope right.
Also alongside in Trinidad was a spanking
new USN light cruiser, the USS St Louis (I
think). Asked what he thought of her, the
Admiral commented tersely 'Looks as if she's
never been out in the rain'. He may have 'worn
his wavy rings without embarrassment or
outward sign of anything abnormal', but we
gathered that, when fitting out in Norfolk Va.,
389
he forgot sometimes that he was wearing them,
to the surprise and discomfiture of US naval
officers wearing rather more brass than he.
However, my brother and I did not quite
know what to make of discipline in FT 22
when a number of those mentioned in J.M.
Crossman's letter came up to our house.
Baths, hot baths, were the greatest luxury that
could be offered. We were a little taken aback
by the voice of the cook from our bathroom
saying 'Come on, out of the bloody bath;
you'll go down the plug'ole if you wash any
more', and the Admiral complying without
demur. In retrospect, the cook was a
highlander. That could be an explanation.
J. J. H. SIMPSON
Sir,-As there has been some correspondence
recently concerning Admiral Sir Herbert
Meade Fetherstonhaugh, known throughout
his time in the Service as Jimmy Meade, may
I add some details of his career which may be
of interest to your readers.
He passed out from the Britunnia in 1892
and joined the newly commissioned Canada
which sailed as flagship of the N. America and
West Indies Squadron. The Canada was a full
rigged ship with additional steam power,
brought into use by the order 'Up funnelDown screw'. The commission ended
December 1895, and after Courses he joined
the Iphegenia, a 111 Class cruiser armed with
6" and 4.7s. She sailed to join the China fleet
in January 1897 returning to Portsmouth in
May 1900. After service ashore and in the
Royal Yacht he commissioned the Goshawk,
in 1912, as Commander 5th Div: 1st Flotilla at
Portsmouth. The Goshawk had two 4" guns
and two 21" tubes: 29 knots from 14,800 hp.
He joined Commodore Tyrwhitt's Destroyer
force at Harwich at the start of the Great War
and on 28 August in the Heligoland Bight
action he sank the German destroyer V187
and was awarded the DSO. He needed a new
ship after that action and was appointed to the
Meteor as Commander of M Division of the
Harwich force. They were in action at the
Dogger Bank in January 1915, torpedoing the
Bliicher for which he was mentioned in
Despatches. Another new ship was needed
and he was appointed Captain D 5th Flotilla in
the Royalist and saw action at Jutland. He then
commissioned two new C Class cruisers, the
Caradoc and then the Ceres serving under
Admiral Sinclair. The squadron had an
unfortunate encounter in fog with Fair Isle, but
Meade took avoiding action in time.
In 1922 he took the Prince o f Wales on his
world tour in the Renown, and was
subsequently Captain o f the RN College
Dartmouth, when he had the unhappy
responsibility for the sinking o f his first ship,
the Britannia. He was appointed RA(D)
Mediterranean, in 1926 to '28 flying his Flag
in the Coventry. The Command consisted o f
four flotillas each with a Captain in the Leader
and two divisions o f four V & W Class
Destroyers: that makes Coventry + 36
Destroyers. Comparisons are indeed odious!
In 1930 he accompanied the Duke o f York,
later George V I , on the Garter Mission to
Japan. His final command was Vice Admiral
Royal Yachts, The Victoria &Albert and the
24 metre Britannia, having conveniently
inherited Uppark in 1931, when he added
Fetherstonhaugh to his name.
On the outbreak o f WWII he applied to the
Admiralty and was employed as Commodore
RNR o f Convoys, managing to be at sea by
27110139 with OG4 bound for Port Said. He
took part in 1 1 further convoys without
incident until SL24 from Freetown to
Liverpool arriving in April 1940. He decided
that invasion was imminent and resigned to
join the Home Guard, retaining his Naval
Capbadge to the indignation o f the soldiery.
He was appointed Brigadier with Selsey Bill
as his command. When operation Sealion
collapsed he joined the Small Vessels Pool as
AlLt. RNVR and the story o f his voyage with
FT22 has already been told. A worthy
successor to the great sea Captains in our long
and glorious naval history. He was Mentioned
in Despatches in 1944 aged 69 and died in
1964 in his 90th year.
J.C.
MINES IN MIND, AND OTHER
MATTERS
Sir,-In his thought-provoking paper on the
modern mine menace Lieutenant Commander
Brooke, by crediting the Germans with
inventing the first magnetic mine, does the
Royal Navy an injustice.
Magnetic mines were invented first by the
Royal Navy, in the First World War, and were
also laid first by the Royal Navy - o f f the then
German U-Boat bases Ostend and Zeebrugge
-in 1918.
But the Royal Navy had developed no
magnetic sweep. Nor did it between the two
World Wars, despite the Final Report on Mine
Clearance in Home Waters, o f 15 September,
1919, that: 'The necessity for consistent
experiments to determine some satisfactory
method o f destroying magnetic and acoustic
mines cannot be too strongly emphasised'.
However, in March, 1939, work on a
magnetic sweep was begun, but none was
ready for acceptance trials when war broke out
six months later; moreover, the proposed
purchase and conversion o f a small merchant
ship as a 'magnetic mine Destructor Ship' had
been expunged from the 1939 Naval Estimates
as 'unwarranted expenditure'.
As for acoustic mines, no sweep had been,
nor was being developed when war came.
Acoustic mines were first laid by German
aircraft in August, 1940; it was December,
1940, before a sweep was in service at sea.
The shortage in numbers o f AIS convoy
escorts in 1939 was one result o f the
politically
motivated
London
Naval
Conference o f 1930. But the need for oceanic
escorts in the Second World War was not
caused by the Fall o f France in May, 1940.
German U-Boats sank merchantships o f f the
East Coast o f the United States in 1918. . .!
The root cause was the failure o f the Naval
Staff then, and successively thereafter to
appreciate the significance o f this historical
operational fact o f submarine warfare.
I was the Sub. in Achilles in 1933-34 when
she carried out the first - highly hazardous improvised attempts to re-fuel a British
warship from a tanker in mid-ocean,
somewhere in the North Atlantic. The
evidence is that it was not re-attempted for
another 10 years - in June, 1942, when
refuelling o f escorts from tankers in convoys
was first started. It was also one o f the key
factors that was to lead to the defeat o f the
U-Boats within a year - 23 May, 1943.
CORRESPONDENCE
Analogous situations will arise in the not so
distant future, when the present generation of
Dartmouth educated Royal Navy officers are
experienced sea-going officers. Doubtless
they will have developed even further their
'ability to think and speak on their feet' but,
without 'a sound knowledge of naval history'
on which to base their thinking, to what end?
While 'logic and rhetoric make men able to
contend', wrote the worldly wise Sir Francis
Bacon, nearly four centuries ago 'Of Studies':
'Histories make men wise'.
This is profoundly true, for it is knowledge
of past events that gives men and women, such
as naval Officers, necessarily concerned with
sea affairs of State, the ability 'to apply
experience and knowledge judiciously'
(Concise Oxford Dictionary); this, I have
always understood from my youth upwards, is
what England expects of all its Naval Officers,
so that they may be truly a safeguard to the
Realm, 'and a security for such as pass on the
seas upon their lawful occasions'.
D. W. WATERS
LIEUT.CDR,RN
HOW WE WON THE WAR
Sir,-On my last visit to the dentist, I read a
back number of Country Life which had a
letter from an infantry Major, describing how
he got away from Dunkirk in a cross-Channel
passenger ferry steamer.
Stuka divebombers were screaming
overhead, and sticks of bombs were exploding
right across Dunkirk harbour as the Major got
on board, so he was very surprised to see an
elderly steward still manning the bar in the
main saloon.
The steward was dispensing tea, at
twopence a cup. But as concessions to the
exigencies of the situation, he was wearing a
lifejacket, and he was also accepting payment
in foreign, i.e. French, money.
The Major bought his tea, and was trying to
drink it without spilling it, despite a very
adjacent near-miss which literally bounced the
deck under his feet, when he was struck by a
sudden thought. 'I wonder,' he said to the
steward, 'would you happen to have any
whisky?'
The steward gave him an old-fashioned
3 91
look. 'I beg your pardon, sir,' he said, after yet
another near-miss which shook the entire ship,
'but the bar is never open in harbour'.
At that moment, the Major wrote, I knew
we were going to win the war.
The Major went on to say that he slept the
sleep of the dead during the passage across the
Channel. When he awoke, all was quiet. The
ship was alongside in Dover harbour. The bar,
needless to say, was shut.
Some time ago, I did a magazine interview
with Sir John Boynton, for many years Clerk
and Chief Executive to Cheshire County
Council. He served in the army during the
Second World War, and won the MC. Shortly
before D-Day, the officers of Sir John's unit
were ordered to collect all their private
belongings, sleeping bags etc, and load them
into a lorry, which then drove away.
You can pick them up again when you get
across to France, they were told. A likely tale,
said Sir John. We can say goodbye to that lot,
we said. But on D+5, or thereabouts, there in a
barn near Bayeux was all their gear, neatly
laid out in rows.
At that moment, Sir John told me, I knew
we were going to win the war.
I wonder if any NR members have similar
naval anecdotes of the moment when they too
knew we were going to win the war?
JOHNWINTON
THE SUBMARINE AND THE
OPERATIONAL LEVEL
Sir,-Rear
Admiral
James
Perowne's
exposition of the 'virtual presence' of
submarines (The submarine and the
operational level (NR, Apl. '96)), omitted to
mention the downside to this ability to
deceive!
An unwelcome HMS Surprise has been
known to appear in unexpected places when
the 'real' boat was due to be welcomed home
by the long-suffering supporters club. I am
sure Admiral Perowne, like me, can think of a
few examples.
CLAYDEN
CAROLINE
OFFICIAL
SUPPORTER
Book Reviews - I
UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS
January to June 1996
Death of a Sailor's Sailor
The Danish Ambassador, addressing a large
gathering of NATO officers in Norfolk Va in
1981, said he had always liked serving in the
United States, ever since he was a Third
Secretary, '. . .because Americans wanted you
to succeed'. He contrasted this situation with
depressing tours behind the Iron Curtain,
where his hosts could not wait for him to fall
flat on his face! It was a nicely turned phrase,
which immediately struck a chord within your
reviewer.
Undoubtedly, a most pleasant aspect of
being CBNS in Washington, was the openness
and friendly courtesy with which one was
always received by senior US Navy officers,
even when they were extremely busy. And the
very helpful attitude, of their serving officers,
was exceeded only by the kindness we
received from several highly distinguished
retired US naval officers. The most legendary
of them was Admiral Arleigh A. Burke.
Arleigh slipped for his last voyage in the
early hours of New Year's Day 1996, aged 94.
He had been a member of the United States
Naval Institute for 68 years, and was a notable
past President. Moreover, all his life, he had
encouraged young officers to join it, and then
to contribute to the Proceedings, which he
once described as the best technical forum in
the world. As our Editor pointed in the last
Review of the USNIP, it is indeed a most
thought-provoking journal, and one could
built a strong case to support Admiral Burke's
assertion.
But, despite his many contributions towards
strengthening the intellectual underpinning of
the US Navy; and the massive collection of
important papers which he has left for
historians td mull over; Arleigh Burke will not
be remembered by the American public as a
man of letters. For them, he will always
remain '31-knot' Burke, Victor of the Battle
of Cape St George, fought off the SW Pacific
island of Buka, on 24/25 November 1943;
when five 'Fletcher' class Destroyers of
DesRon 23, under his command, engaged five
Japanese Destroyers, and sank three of them,
in a memorable night action - mostly
conducted at 33 knots.
Arleigh's post war career was by no means
all plain sailing, as he seriously fell foul of
Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews, in
the wake of what later became known as 'The
Revolt of the Admirals'. This was a successful
scotching of a bad and untimely plan to
impose Unification on the US forces at the end
of the 1940s. Matthews held Burke to blame
for providing the rebelling Admirals with
much of their ammunition, and sought to have
his name removed from the list of selectees for
Flag Rank. The furore which then resulted
persuaded President Harry Truman to
intervene, to get it reinstated.
Perhaps there is some truth.in that old
saying, that incurring Their Lordships'
displeasure, whilst in the zone. does at least
ensure that everyone has heard your name.
Because four years later, when Arleigh was
contemplating leaving the USN for Industry, a
new NAVSEC suddenly offered him the post
of CNO (Chief of Naval Operations), a jump
direct from two to four stars, over the heads of
more than 80 possible rivals.
So Arleigh never served as a Vice Admiral.
But he gave the US Navy a wonderful six
years' leadership as CNO, having been twice
reconfirmed in the job by President
Eisenhower. These important years, (which
included the initiation of the SSBN and
Polaris programmes), and the rest of Arleigh's
long career, are very well described in the
February 1996 issue, in an article headed
'Death of a Sailor's Sailor'.' The author, Dr
Rosenberg, is producing a biography of
Arleigh Burke, and has chosen an apt title.
Arleigh, always a very modest man, left clear
instructions that his tombstone was simply to
record that he had been a Sailor. He did not
want some spin-doctor working on his
epitaph.
Reading the January to June 1996 issues of
USNIP, and contemplating the many
problems which confront the new CNO problems which sadly seem to have
overwhelmed Admiral Boorda - one cannot
help feeling that Arleigh Burke's life contains
BOOK REVIEWS-I
a few useful sailing directions for those trying
to set a course today. It is a sad thought that he
will no longer be around to impart wise
counsel in person, which so often, yet so
unobtrusively, he did in the past. Even John
Lehman, that supremely self confident man, in
his very readable autobiography, Command of
the Seas,' acknowledges a big debt to Arleigh,
for much help received before and throughout
his time as NAVSEC.
The Arsenal Ship
A year ago, in this column, it was pointed out
that the most pressing operational requirement
of the US Navy was for existing ships and
weapon systems to be adapted - and maybe
new ones invented - so that operations could
be carried out in the littoral, without having to
accept a high risk of suffering casualties,
inflicted by relatively unsophisticated enemies
firing from short range.
With their characteristic energy, the USN
are well down the road to getting concept
studies set up to solve the ship problem. And,
since November 1995, these have been
foreshadowed by technological ways and
means studies, commissioned by CNO, and
being carried out by ARPA, the DOD's
Advanced Research Projects Agency. The
ARPA team has some impressive talent in it,
including Vice Admiral Joe Metcalfe, a
former Deputy CNO for Surface Warfare, and
General Al Gray, a former Commandant of the
US Marine Corps - as well as a full house of
number crushers.
If present thinking comes to fruition, these
studies will result in the appearance of what is
currently termed 'The Arsenal Ship'. It will be
the most truly innovative class of warship
since the first Polaris-carrying nuclear
powered SSBN sailed on deterrent patrol 36
years ago, largely thanks to the vision and
dauntless determination of Arleigh Burke. It is
a concept of which he would thoroughly
approve: mainly because it is simple and
makes excellent sense; but also because
Arleigh recognised, as did that great building
Admiral Lord Fisher, that to stay top nation,
you have to be the first to embrace change, not
resist it.
In an interesting article on the Arsenal Ship,
393
in the January 1996 issue, entitled 'More Bang
for the Buck'? the author Norman Polmar, who
very recently was co-opted onto the ARPA
team, has suggested that it will probably carry
about 500 - or maybe as many as 750 vertical launch missiles. They would be of
four varieties. Offensively, Tomahawk would
be held for launch against infrastructure
targets distant up to 2,500 kms. And a US
Army tactical missile, capable of reaching out
to about 220 kms, would be available for
direct support of any land operations.
Defensively,
existing
surface-to-airmissiles would be held, and also any new antiballistic-missiles resulting from current
developments. All the missiles, of both sorts,
would be launched, on demand from other
ships and forces, including those ashore, and
then controlled by them, using an
arrangement, already proven, known as 'the
cooperative engagement capability.'
Probably, there would never be more than
three or four Arsenal Ships in commission at
any one time. But this would still be enough to
allow one to be kept pre-deployed in each of
the possible world hot spots - so ensuring that
the most bulky of the ammunition to be
supplied, namely the missiles, was already
available, in quantity, in theatre, and, above
all, in time -when trouble arose.
Those against, are sure to argue that an
Arsenal Ship concept puts too many eggs into
too few baskets. Hence, it recreates the risk,
which existed when offensive power lay only
in the Big Deck Carriers - before Tomahawk
was widely fitted throughout the Fleet.
However, it is not an exact parallel, since,
unlike a Large Deck Carrier, an Arsenal Ship
will not be easy to find, nor to mark. True, she
will certainly be a big ship, of about 45,000
tons. But she will also be given a very small
radar cross section; and made semisubmersible; the two best ways of providing
any ship with stealth. It is a very neat idea.
Anti Ballistic Missile
Those wishing to keep up to date with US
thinking on weapons for use in the littoral,
should read ' A Better Naval ABM System', in
the April 1996 issue.4 The author brings
together two useful disciplines. He is a Naval
394
BOOK RE
reserve Intelligence Officer; and he is
employed as a Civilian Engineer within the
US Army Missile Command.
It is a good article, but not exactly a light
read, because there are some mind-bendingly
difficult choices to be made, and most are
explored in depth! For example, Missile or
Projectile? If missile, adapt or invent one? If
adapt, which to choose? - preferably not the
Army Theatre High Altitude system, which
uses nasty liquid fuel. If using projectile, what
sort of fuse, warhead and rate of fire will do
the trick? And can any system handle the
Theatre Ballistic Missile throwing out
Penetration Aids, a future development which
must be anticipated?
One message comes over loud and clear. A
two tier system will be needed. And if both
upper, exoatmospheric, and lower, below 20
kms altitude, endoatmospheric engagements
involve firing two missiles - normal ABM
practice to cover a malfunction -the total cost
of any engagement is going to be
astronomically high. A figure of $1,200,000 is
quoted, just to get off two missiles in the lower
tier. Much more is needed for the upper tier,
when one takes into account the cost of
adapting a Standard SM-2 Block IV(A)
missile, to send it exoatmospheric.
It was this thought which led the author to
explore the seemingly cheaper option of
adapting a Mk 45 5" naval gun to tackle the
lower tier engagement. He also explores the
capability of the Battleship 16" gun to provide
the upper tier, albeit with a low rate of fire per
barrel !
Clearly the big gun idea does not fit well
with that of the Arsenal Ship providing area
defence. And anyone who has ever tried to hit
anything airborne moving at high speed with a
gun must be a bit sceptical of even the lower
tier 5" gun solution. But it will obviously have
to be evaluated, with so much money at stake.
And conceivably, it could be useful for point
defence.
As a Gunnery specialist, who was much
involved with experimental work, Arleigh
might have been intrigued by either gun
option. But he would never have allowed his
judgment to be swayed by tribal loyalties.
Indeed, he once said that it would be better if
officers reaching Flag Rank wore no insignia
indicating their background - because from
then on they had to think 'generally' about
what would best strengthen the whole Navy.
Coping with the Knobology
When the first of the DDG 51 s, USS Arleigh
Burke, commissioned on Independence Day
1991, Arleigh was there, of course, as the
principal guest, standing up straight as a
ramrod. In an article in the May 1996
USNIP5, entitled 'Vision for the Future', the
present SECNAV relates how Arleigh
addressed the ship's company. He gave them a
very clear message, the main burden of which
was: 'This ship was built to fight . . . and you
had better know how.'
Arleigh certainly knew, none better, the
value of good training. In the months before
Cape St George, his own ship won Fleet
distinctions in Gunnery, Engineering and
Communications. In the close range part of the
gunnery competition, they scored an almost
unheard of 36 hits out of 36 goes. Bearing in
mind that many of those Pacific War night
actions around the Solomons were fought at
very close range, it must have been a great
reassurance to know that one's people were
not going to waste a single shot.
But perhaps Arleigh was thinking of more
recent times. Having good ships and good
weapons is certainly not enough when
operating in the littoral. The competence,
understanding of the systems, state of
alertness and, frankly, common dog of those
in the CIC (alias Operations room) may be far
more decisive factors. The USS Stark and
Vincennes incidents in the Arabian Gulf
would certainly not have escaped Arleigh's
notice.
When the Stark debacle was written up in
the USNIP some years ago, by a very
articulate USN Chief Petty Officer, he was
clearly of the opinion that their ship had not
been put into a sufficiently high state of
alertness, bearing in mind that they were in a
war zone. She paid a heavy price for it.
The CO of Vincennes was much better
prepared. But many ordinary difficulties are
greatly accentuated when operating in the
littoral. Both military and civilian aircraft
BOOK REVIEWS-I
often use the same airfield, so the GOP
(General Operation Plot) is not much help.
Both may use the same airborne radars, so
ESM cannot distinguish hostile from
harmless. No one carries IFF. And worst of
all, there is very little time to classify any
airborne contact, before the Firelwithhold fire
decision has to be made. Thus one may be
forced to make a judgment, based solely on
the behaviour pattern of the incoming plane as did Captain Will Rogers USN.
The shooting down of the Iranian Airbus is
analysed in an interesting article, 'The
Vincennes - and Automation', which appears
in the June 1996 USNIP." The author, Norman
Friedman, drawing on a report first published
by the US Naval Postgraduate School in
1995,' gives a succinct account of how the
disaster unfolded. Then, he uses the incident
as an introduction to a wider discussion of the
problems which will be encountered when
trying to adapt the naval Cooperative
Engagement Capability to embrace forces
operating in the much more complex land
battlefield environment. There is a lot of good
stuff here, for those doing operational concept
work on the Arsenal Ship.
There are, also, very useful immediate
lessons for anyone operating any ship in the
littoral, which, no doubt, the US Navy have
already taken aboard. Perhaps the most
important, but certainly not new, is that a CO
must himself be a good hands-on user of CIC
equipment, who controls affairs directly, by
use of graphic displays. And does not try to
conduct a complex battle purely by verbal
exchange of information.
The incident started with Vincennes
allocating Track No. 4474 to the Airbus. The
NTDS (Naval Tactical Data System) then
automatically changed it to No. 413 1, because
Vincennes' consort had already given the
Airbus this track number. No one in
Vincennes' CIC seems to have noticed the
change. Meanwhile, another USN group, 180
nm to the east - on a separate net - allocated
the identical number 4474 to an A-6E
Intruder.
Normally, it would not have mattered. But,
on the day, unfortunately, anomalous
propagation conditions existed, causing the
395
two nets to merge - another thing which went
unnoticed, or perhaps just unreported. Thus,
when CO Vincennes, asking the wrong
question, said: 'What is 4474 doing?' he got a
true, but for him misleading, answer: 'It is
diving.' The results were catastrophic.
Captain Rogers was right to be worried
about airborne contacts closing on steady
bearings from the dangerous northerly
quadrant. But had he simply trapped the
relevant radar blip on his graphics, with a box
cursor, his own Aegis system, with its
excellent height finding capability, could have
put up in front of him the information that the
contact - never mind its number - was slowly
but steadily ascending, not a threatening
profile.
Some years ago, an RN Captain took
command of a DLG in mid commission, and
found himself flailing a bit on his first big day
in the Ops Room. His XO, a bright young
commander, seeing the danger, immediately
said: 'Don't worry Sir. Keep at it. It's just a
question of getting to grips with the
Knobology!' How right he was. And how
important it is, to stop worrying about making
a fool of yourself, and to master the CIC
mechanics - however well or badly designed.
Perhaps that is what Arleigh meant.
Arleigh and the Brits
In his later years, when Arleigh went to a
cocktail party, he always sat down and let
people come to him - if his hosts had the wit
to provide any chairs. He also liked to do some
good on these occasions. Sitting, at a party
given by VCNO in 1981, he spotted Admiral
Bob Long USN, who was CINCPAC, but
happened to be in Washington, before briefing
NATO Bigwigs in Brussels. Arleigh turned,
and said to your reviewer:
'Have you ever been to Hawaii?' to
which the reply was
'No.'
'Would you like to go?'
'Very much so.'
By this time, Admiral Long, a VVIP and, so
to speak, apostolic successor to Douglas
MacArthur, was passing Arleigh's chair.
Arleigh arrested his further progress, by
grabbing the seat of his pants, and said:
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BOOK REVIEWS-I
'This guy here wants to come and see you.'
To anyone in the room, such a remark coming
from Arleigh would have been as good as an
order. And Bob Long immediately said:
'Great. Can you come next month?' and that
was how it was fixed.
The point of the story is not that Arleigh
was very kind to the Brits - though he always
was. The point is that you cannot begin to
understand the US Navy, until you have
visited them in mid Pacific. Arleigh wanted to
ensure that this Brit's education included
understanding the immense responsibilities
which the USN has in that huge area. It was,
also, the very best way he could ensure that
the new CBNS would be a success during his
time in Washington. But then, as the Danish
Ambassador said, they do want you to
succeed.
JOHNB. HERVEY
REARADMIRAL
References
"Death of a Sailor's Sailor', by Dr David Alan
Rosenberg, USNIP February 1996.
'Command of the Seas, by John F. Lehman Jr (Charles
Scribner's Sons, Macmillan Publishing Co, New York
1988).
"More Bang for the Buck', by Norman Polmar, USNIP
January 1996.
"A Better Naval ABM System', by Lieutenant
Commander Rick Denny, US Naval Reserve, USNIP
April 1996.
"Vision for the Future', by the Honourable John H.
Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, USNIP May 1996.
6'The Vincennes - and Automation', by Norman
Friedman, USNIP June 1996.
"The Vincennes Incident - Another Player on the
C.
of Systems
Management, US Naval Postgraduate School, and
Captain
Ann Dotterway US Air Force,
Published in Defense Analysis (Brasseys) Vol. XI,
No.1 1995.
BRITISH SECURITY 2010
Proceedings of a Conference held at
Church House, Westminster
November 1995
ed. G. A. S. C. WILSON
As is often the case, the papers presented at
this conference have been printed together
with summaries of ensuing discussions, but
not published. These 300 pages of weighty
thought contain much of interest to readers of
the NR, but are not generally available to
them. Rather than tempt the reader to wade
through the lot, therefore, this review will
attempt to summarise very briefly some of the
salient points and conclusions as they may
pertain to the future of our Service over the
next 15 years or so.
The conference was attended by an
impressive list of serving senior officers,
MOD civil servants, defence academics, from
the UK and abroad, and the Secretary of State
himself. The latter made a few salient points
of great interest. Intelligence will be of
increasing importance in the future, as a less
predictable world is faced by smaller defence
forces. Welfare budgets are likely to go on
increasing, further squeezing defence budgets.
And, more encouragingly, '. . . the projection
of power may rely more than ever before on
surface ships and submarines and on sea or air
launched stand-off weapons'!
So on to the general themes that emerged.
The international environment within which
British security policy operates will see a
diverse and numerous collection of significant
players, not just nation states but also
multinational companies, special interest
groups and terrorists. Environmental and
demographic issues are likely to be of rising
importance, and an increasing proportion of
conflicts will be within rather than between
states. Peacekeeping operations will continue
to be a major focus, though the UN is probably
not going to take on any more of an active role
than it has at Dresent.
F~~ the UK, this changing international
environment will see a distinction between
'wars of necessity' and 'wars of choice', to
use Professor Lawrence Freedman's terms.
The former, generally Defence Role One and
Two-related, are likely to be outnumbered by
the latter as Defence Role Three contributing to the maintenance of
international peace and stability - becomes
more central to British Defence Policy, and is
no longer just the traditional 'add-on' with
whatever is left over from the first two.
Readiness,
Regeneration,
Jointery,
civilianisation, the future of NATO and even
professional military 'Ethos' will all be
significant issues.
BOOK REVIEWS-I
Few people foresee the demise of NATO,
but it will go on evolving to fit the changed
international environment, a process given
added impetus by its likely expansion
eastwards. The American commitment to
Europe will endure, but Europeans will want,
and need, to do more for themselves. How far
the EU will take on a security identity remains
to be seen, but it is British policy that this
should not be at the expense of NATO
cohesion. The trick will be to make a
European defence pillar contribute to, not
detract from, the effectiveness of NATO. The
alliance is likely to come under enough strain
anyway.
Russia remains the greatest, if not the most
likely, potential threat. The extent to which
Britain and the West can influence that
country's future direction appears very
limited. Whatever the course of events, the
Russian military faces horrendous problems
and can never recover all its Cold War
capabilities.
Inevitably much of the future for Britain's
security and its forces comes down to
economics. The situation is neatly
summarised by the proportion of GDP
devoted to defence - down from 5.2% in
1985-5 to just 2.8% in 1997-8. The former
was clearly sustainable, though at a price. It
seems to this reviewer at least that the latter
figure is a matter of political choice, not
necessity or inevitability, especially as every
penny saved seems to go straight into a
burgeoning social security budget, which can
hardly be called an investment in any sense.
The escalation of equipment costs, ahead of
general inflation, exacerbates the problem.
The future prospects of the UK defence
industries, in both domestic and export
markets are also uncertain though despite all
the expressions of gloom defence exports at
around £5 billion per annum, if sustained, are
a significant economic asset.
The economic pressures to civilianise
defence can also reduce tlexibility, which
ironically is supposed to be the watchword of
our post-Cold War Armed Forces. Moreover,
as civilian management and budgeting
practices become everyday parts of our lives,
so we touch significantly on Ethos - a subject
397
much featured in the NR of late - and a
question mark arises as to the future
professionalism of the Forces, and the
'devaluation of the military as a profession'.
Disturbing thoughts, but encouraging to see
them aired at the highest levels.
2010 may seem some way off, but the point
was well made that many key aspects of our
force structure in that year have already been
determined. However hard it is to predict what
the world will be like, and what our forces will
be doing in it, the shape of those forces is
fairly clear. The future shape of the carrier
force, for instance, may yet to be decided, but
we know exactly what the amphibious forces
are going to be. The submarine,
frigateldestroyer and MCM fleets are all
predictable. These are what are called 'sunk
decisions'. Incidently, what do you think the
latest acronym for the carrier replacement is?
CV(F) - Carrier Vehicle (Future). Sounds
more like a follow-on to the Renault Espace.
In discussions about future force structures,
there was a sense of the RAF being a little on
the defensive. It was also nice to see the Head
of the US Air Force Historical Branch point
out that Air Power and Air Forces are not
synonymous terms.
What then, are the dominant trends? A less
predictable world, a significant role in it for
Britain, similar but evolving international
security structures, continuing economic
pressures on the defence budget, some
worrying personnel issues at the heart of our
very professionalism. Surprisingly, perhaps,
not much on Command & Control, Jointery or
future procurement decisions. And nothing
about the possible consequences of a change
of government, surely a potentially significant
input to our future security posture.
J. R. STOCKER
LIEUT.CDR,RNR
THE MARINE ENGINEERS' REVIEW
The very recent announcement, on 18 July, of
the ordering, at last, of the two LPD
replacements has produced a 'Late Extra' for
this review. There appears to have been no
mention of it in the national press and it was
completely overshadowed by the 'political
row' between the Treasury and the MOD over
398
BOOK REIVIEWS-I
the three air projects, the Nimrod update and
the Brimstone and Storm Shadow missile
systems. Some detail of the LPDs is given
below.
Ships
RN
The two LPDs have been ordered on a 'No
acceptable cost - No contract' basis at a total
cost of £450m from GECJVSEL Barrow
which now has an effective monopoly for
ships of this size, since Vosper Thornycroft
(VTJ and GECJYarrows do not have
sufficiently large building slips and Swan
Hunter is no longer a shipbuilder.
The ships, to be called HMS Albion and
HMS Bulwark, will displace 13,000 tons, have
a speed of 18kts and carry a crew of 325. They
will carry 650 troops, four large landing craft
in the stern dock, capable of landing main
battle tanks, four smaller landings craft in
davits and two helicopters, Merlins or Sea
Kings. No other details are available so far.
They will be based at Devonport and are not
expected to enter service before 2000 or 2001,
by which time HMS Fearless and HMS
Intrepid will be at least 30 years old.
Meanwhile HMS Fearless commanded and
controlled the 3rd Commando Brigade in the
UWUS rapid deployment exercise in North
Carolina in May.
It is reported that two RoRo ferries are to be
acquired for the Rapid Deployment Force.
There are no other details and it is not clear
whether they are to be a stop-gap until the
LPDs come in service. Damaged stability will
obviously be a concern.
GECNarrow has won the order for the last
three of the 16 Type 23 frigates, to be named
Kent, St Albans and Portland. Despite some
redundancies this will guarantee the yard work
load until the early years of the 21st century.
Conversely, VT will have a redundancy of 450
though the yard has found some work in other
areas.
HMS Trafalgar has completed a major
refuelling refit at Devonport including a total
upgrade of sonar and weapon systems and
controls, and associated alterations to the fin
and forward compartments. Integration of
control systems took six months before final
trials. Similar refits are in hand or planned for
HMS Turbulent and HMS Tireless at
Devonport and for HMS Sovereign, HMS
Superb and HMS Sceptre at Rosyth.
Earlier talk of a replacement for HMY
Britannia led to proposals for a 370ft steel
hulled three masted sail training ship, capable
of carrying 180 trainees and also maintaining
the role of a royal yacht and business
showpiece. Despite proposed private funding
and political support from Lord Callaghan and
Sir Edward Heath the scheme was blocked by
Mr Michael Heseltine as 'inappropriate' for
representing Britain in the 21st century.
The prototype Mk V LVCP (NR, Oct. '95,
p.405) has now been delivered to the Royal
Marines for trials.
Two small SWATH passenger transfer craft
are on order from FBM Cowes to carry 95
passengers out to and beyond Plymouth
Breakwater. They will be 78ft long, 36'12 ft
beam and 7'12 ft draught, diesel driven, with a
top speed of 15'12Kts.
RAN
The RAN has acquired a Submarine Rescue
Service (SERS) comprising a remote operated
vehicle, a manned transfer compartment for
72 survivors, recompression chambers and
related equipment. Trials have taken place
using a simulated submarine lying at 60' to the
vertical at a depth of 1,800ft. Further trials
will follow using HMAS Otama. SERS will
be held at Adelaide by the Australian
Submarine Corporation, packed in standard
containers, for deployment with its operators
anywhere around Australia by air, road or rail
within 96 hours of the SubSunk alarm. It can
be operated from, for example, offshore
support vessels.
RCN
The first 12 Maritime Coastal Defence
Vessels (MCDV), HMCS Kingston, has been
handed over. The use of remote controlled
vehicles for mine detection and destruction
has enabled the RCN to provide a more
economical multi-purpose vessel to be built,
compared with the earlier plan to build a class
of MCMV. Dimensions etc were given in NR,
Oct. '95, p.406.
BOOK REVIEWS-I
The minehunting system includes the
MCDV, a remote controlled semi-submersible
vehicle and a route survey sonar carried in a
towfish. The vehicle is linked to the MCDV
by radio and there are two shore mine-warfare
data centres, one on each coast, in overall
control.
The Canadian Coastguard is acquiring two
GKN~Westland hovercraft from UK for
service in a variety of roles on the St Lawrence
River and Seaway. They will be delivered in
spring 1998.
USN
The fifth amphibious assault carrier, USS
Bataan, was accepted in May 1996. The sixth,
USS Bonhomme Richard, and the seventh and
last, are both building. These are large ships,
844ft long and 106ft beam, displacement
40,500 tons, speed 20kts and a range of 9,000
miles. They carry 2,000 marines and aircraft
include a squadron of Harrier I1 V/STOL, VHIN attack helicopters, 28 CH-46 cargo
helicopters and three 54kt Landing Craft Air
Cushion (LCAC).
USS Inchon, formerly an 'Iwo Jima' class
amphibious assault helicopter carrier built in
1970, has been redelivered as a mine
countermeasures command, control and
support ship (MSC), (NR, Apr. '96, p.166).
She is 602ft long and displaces 18,340 tons.
The original plan was to adapt a commercial
'float onlfloat off' heavy lift vessel capable of
transporting a squadron of 'Avenger' or
'Osprey' class MCMV worldwide but suitable
for waterborne MCM activities only. USS
lnchon has a wider role being able to support
four MCMV (ocean going) or MHC (coastal)
vessels, carry a helicopter MCM squadron of
eight, a three helicopter search and
rescuelmine spotter detachment, with a total
air group of 450, and an explosive ordnance
disposal detachment of 75. Ship's company is
650.
The last 'Los Angeles' class SSN to be built
at Newport News, USS Greenville, was
completed earlier in the year. The future
nuclear programme (SSN and SSBN) is much
reduced and increasingly concentrated at
Electric Boat Division at Groton, Connecticut.
There have been some late changes in the
399
proposals, originally due in June, for the LPD
17 programme (NR, Apr. '96 p.174). The
original scheme was for Westinghouse/Sulzer
diesel propulsion, but gas turbines are now
being considered, either direct or integral
electric drive (NR, Apr. '96, p.176 etc). The
latter, in particular, offers gains in cargo space
and reductions in manning, life cycle cost,
purchase cost and exhaust emissions.
France
The carrier Clemenceau will be withdrawn
in 1997 with possible sale to Chile. Her sister
ship Foch is being refitted and upgraded to
carry Rafale-M aircraft due to enter service in
2000. Three destroyers, Suffren, Duquesne
and the experimental machinery vessel Aconit
are also being withdrawn several years earlier
than planned.
The navy is also dispensing with all SSK
including four Agostas and the last two
Daphnes. France continues to build SSK for
Pakistan, with an advanced Air Independent
Propulsion (AIP) system.
The second 'La Foudre' class LPD (NR, Oct
'94, p.437), laid down in 1994, will be named
Siroco - a third will follow. The two existing
'Ouragan' class LPD's, built in the 1960s, will
remain until 2003 when all three 'La Foudres'
will be in service. Fearless and Intrepid are
not alone!
Netherlands
The LPD HMNethNS Rotterdam will enter
service in 1998. She will be diesel or electric
driven, 20kts, with a complement of 127 and
carrying 600 troops. She can carry up to 30
Leopard I1 main battle tanks and other
transport and the dock can accommodate 6 Mk
3 LCVP, or 4 UK Mk 4 LCV or 4 US LCM(8)
landing craft. There is a hangar for 6 NH 90 or
4 EH 101 helicopters.
Norway
The RNorN has ordered 16 missile
deployment versions of the Royal Swedish
Coastal Artillery CB90 combat boats (NR,
Oct. '95, p.407). They can carry various
combinations of 2 1 troops, 3x12.7mm
machine guns, 4 mines or 6 depth charges, an
RBS-17 (Hellfire) SSM or an 81mm mortar.
400
BOOK REVIEWS-I
The order will provide four 4 boat squadrons,
each squadron comprising three missile boats
and one command boat, the latter with
additional electronic equipment and power
supplies in lieu of troops. Delivery is from
1996 to 1998.
Sweden
The coastal artillery is also obtaining a
further 39 boats, smaller in size and grp rather
than aluminium construction. They are mainly
intended for casevac duties.
Qatar
The QENS Huwar, the second of a class of
four fast strike craft, was handed over at VT
Portchester in June. The third, QENS A1
Udeid, is fitting out and the fourth will
complete in 1997. Length is 187ft beam 30ft
and draught 7'/2ft, displacement 420 tons. The
hull is steel and the superstructure is
aluminium. Propulsion is by diesels giving a
speed of over 30kts. Weapons include an Oto
~ e l a r 76mm
a
Super Rapid dp gun, two quad
Exocet SSM launchers, a Sadral 6 x Mistral
SAM point defence system, a Signaal
Goalkeeper CIWS and two 12.7mm machine
guns. A decoy system and a wide range of
sensors are fitted. The complement is 30.
Oman
The A1 Najar, the last of three Vigilante
class offshore patrol boats being built by
CMN, France was launched in March (NR,
Oct '95, p.407).
Having announced the intention to acquire
four to eight new frigates the UAE has now
obtained two RNethN Kortanaer frigates,
HMNethNS Piet Heyn and HMNethNS
Abraham Chrijnssen, originally completed in
1981 and 1983. They are receiving major
refits in Holland and Signaal is setting up a
CIWS maintenance and training facility in
UAE. Newport News is still interested in
further contracts and has set up a shipbuilding
and repair facility in Abu Dhabi.
Malaysia
The RMN has confirmed that it intends to
acquire three operational and one training
SSK although there are no orders yet. RMN
Officers have received submarine experience
in Europe and the USA in recent years.
Thailand
The 11,500 ton offshore Patrol Helicopter
Carrier Chakri Naruebet (NR, Apr. '93, p. 179)
has now been delivered in 1997 with much
equipment, except that required for safe
operation, fitted 'for but not with' at about two
thirds the full projected cost. As earlier
described, she will ultimately have a V/STOL
with ski jump and helicopter capability.
Dimensions are 600ft long, 90ft beam and 20ft
draught.
Ship and equipment design
Defence industiy
There is much discussion of restructuring of
the defence industries in Europe. GEC and
BAe are taking a lead in UK with a view to
greater coordination and an ability to compete
with US industry.
StealtWArmament Ship
This is an entirely new US concept now
being considered by US shipbuilders with a
demonstrator ship proposed for funding in
1998. Basically it is a large floating weapons
platform, capable of carrying about 500
conventionally armed vertically launched
cruise-type missiles, but without sophisticated
defence or targeting systems, and a
complement of about 50. Missile targetting
and programming would come from external
sources.
An unofficial proposal supported by an
artist's impression (Sunday Telegraph 26 May
1996) suggests a semi-submersible vessel
825ft long, 106ft beam and displacing 42,500
tons on the surface. It would semi-submerge in
a combat zone by 17ft to hold the missile deck
about 5ft above sea level. The impression
suggests a hull of flat, angular construction to
deflect radar, with minimum superstructure
apart from a small bridge, retractable radio
aerials and the cooled engine exhausts.
Propulsion would be by gas turbines with
water jets. She would carry a remote piloted
aircraft for routine air and sea surveillance.
BOOK REVIEWS-I
An alternative proposal is the conversion of
'SpruanceITicoderoga' class destroyers, with
the removal of much of their superstructure.
INEC 96
The third conference in this series
(International Naval Engineering Conference)
entitled 'Warship design, what is so
different?' was held at the RNethN College,
Den Helder, in April and was attended by
speakers and representatives from a large
number of countries. Topics included
submarine design, the all-electric warship, the
difference in operating envelopes between fast
ferries and frigates, emission control and
signatures, and many related topics. There
were many comments on the fetish for
minimum hull weights, concluding that 'to
skimp the hull, the only part of a warship to
last its life, does not appear to be good
thinking'. Those who have been involved in
getting a quart into a pint pot when installing
A&A1s without sufficient growth margins can
only echo 'Hear Hear'.
There was an interesting comment on the
comparison between the tripartite frigate
project (Netherlands, Germany and Spain)
where the outfit is standard but the platforms
differ (despite NR, Oct.. '95, p.407) and project
Horizon (CNGF) where standardisation is
total. The former is reported to be progressing
well, with orders for two RNethN air defence
frigates of this type, while the latter (NR, Apr.
'96, p.173) is said to be in difficulties.
Generators
Although warships are exempt from Marpol
regulations MOD(N) is conducting trials on a
method of NOx reduction for Paxman diesel
generators installed in Type 23 frigates,
without increasing noise and infra-red
emission levels. The equipment developed,
Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR) using
urea injection, replaces the existing uptake
silencer. Shore tests show a reduction of up to
90% in exhaust pollutants and further trials
are planned to produce a viable system for
retrofit or new building installation.
Miscellaneous
Water mist/Hi-Fog and a waterffoam
40 1
combination are replacing halon fire
extinguishing in ships and a UK company is
supplying fire suppressants for the USN
LPD17 project.
A Dutch shipping company is now legally
using electronic ARCS charts, supplied by the
UK Hydrographic Office, in the North Sea and
Mediterranean. Two independent ChartMaster
display systems are required and paper charts
must be available for back-up.
DRA and the Met Office have developed a
new computer-based operational forecasting
model for predicting storm currents and sea
surface elevations for the NW Europe Shelf
area.
The IMO is considering the implications of
the increasing level of regulations affecting
ship's waste disposal. The need for shredding,
burning, compacting, food waste pulping and
sewage disposal can all affect warships,
particularly during port visits.
A new ultra compact cooling plant, using
non-ozone depleting refrigerant, has been
developed by DML and York International for
'Trafalgar' class SSN.
A UK firm, Norwest Diving has developed
a method of repairing or replacing propellor
blades underwater, thus saving docking. A
watertight structure is erected over the
propellor, the water is pumped out and the
work carried out dry, but by divers. The
company operates world-wide.
PC Maritime in UK has developed, in
conjunction with the RAN, a 'Safe passage'
computer package for Rule of the Road
training. Another training package is 'Stability
for Ship Operations' widely used by maritime
academies and shipping companies.
A consortium, Ocean Safety, has a contract
for servicing and maintaining over 900
liferafts a year for the RFA.
GEC has a contract to extend the life of the
Stingray torpedo by 15 years.
Shipbuilding, ship repair and naval bases
There is now an agreement for Devonport
Management (DML) to take over ownership
of Devonport Royal Dockyard later this year.
Further detail is awaited.
Apart from the above SSN refit contracts,
Rabcock Rosyth has a reasonable programme
402
BOOK REVIEWS-I
of refits for HMS Cardiff and HMS Guernsey
and a series of nuclear submarine
decommissionings.
300 jobs are to go at the FMRO,
Portsmouth. Its future is under consideration.
The naval dockyard at Brest is facing a
severe rundown with the loss of 3,000 jobs in
the yard and its supporting subcontractors.
Press reports suggest that there may be
considerable unrest as up to 40,000 jobs in the
area depend on the yard directly or indirectly,
in an area remote from other industries.
US building shipyards are coming to terms
with the reduction (relative!) in the USN
building programme and are attempting to
enter the commercial market. Newport News,
sophisticated but expensive and one of the
worst affected, has become an independent
company and is concentrating on contracts for
the Middle East, overhauls for surface
warships and has obtained a number of orders
for building commercial tankers. It clearly
hopes for orders for the LPD 17 programme.
The collapse of Bremer Vulkan in Germany
shows that European countries have problems
although Germany is third in the world
shipbuilding league (UK does not feature at all
in the top 17). BV has not been involved in
warship building for some years but will
probably withdraw from the Malaysian Navy
OPV programme (NR, Apr. '96, p.175).
Other maritime matters
The British Chamber of Shipping is concerned
that taxation policy, employment cost and
'flagging out' are driving British MN officers
away from British ships. Similarly, British
shipping companies are unable to recruit more
than about 430 of the 1,200 replacement
officer cadets required annually to make up
losses. There is a consequent increase in the
employment of foreign nationals, following a
change in the law. All this must have an effect
on the recruitment of experienced RNR
officers.
RNEC Manadon - a sad footnote
A note in the MER described the sale, on 8
February 1996, of a vast range of tools and
equipment from the RNEC workshops to
industrialists and scrap merchants. A number
of retired Engineer Officers tried to buy a few
small items as mementoes but were
unsuccessful against the big bidders - who
wants 73 clock gauges? The writer of the note,
who first visited Manadon in September 1939
when it was only a big house and a park,
commented that 'it is dead - lifeless -just a
graveyard awaiting to be sold off'. A11 in one
lifetime!
R.B.B.
LOOK EAST
In that great and hilarious collection of
philosophy archy and mehitabel, achy the
cockroach asks
please
throw a late edition on the floor
i want to keep up with china'
China-watching has been an American
preoccupation at least since the early 1930s
when that was written, and we on this side of
the pond would do well to remember that even
at the height of the Cold War, that
preoccupation never went away; John Hervey
makes the point elsewhere in this body of
reviews.
But it has seldom been so acute in the
American strategic outlook as it is now, if one
is to judge by the amount of material coming
across the Atlantic, and that is having an effect
on the western strategic community as a
whole. Thus, of the papers to which this
review essay will briefly refer, some or some
parts have been written by British, Australian,
Canadian, Japanese, Indian and Indonesian
authorities; yet it is fair to infer that had it not
been for the American factor and American
interest in the region (now apparently called
'the Asia-Pacific'), they would have been
quite different in kind and emphasis.
A typical example, and a good place to
start, is the Report2 of a workshop held in
Tokyo in July 1994 under the co-sponsorship
of the Institute for International Policy Studies
(Tokyo) and the Center for Naval Analyses
(Alexandria, Va.). I picked this up without
high hopes, expecting careful exposition of
current positions, some more or less pious
expressions of aspiration and that's that.
Butin fact the paper was quite frank in its
coverage of the security problems of the
BOOK REVIEWS-I
region, and the impact of economic rivalries
across the Pacific divide. Japanese doubts
about the future of US engagement; nuclear
matters including of course Korea, but even
touching the 'unthinkable' possibility that
Japan might go nuclear; relations with rim
states further to the south; and of course the
loom of China, all received pointed attention.
The main conclusion, that the situation
requires 'a renewed
(and credible)
commitment on the part of the United States to
remain fully engaged in Asia and a
willingness on the part of Japan to
increasingly share in the risks and
responsibilities', will be echoed elsewhere.
That echo is perhaps strongest in an
Adelphi Paper of December 1995' which is
subtitled 'Building a multipolar balance-ofpower system in Asia'. It is written by a
Professor at an American university and a
Reader in the University of Queensland. Its
conclusions (did the sub-title, one wonders,
precede or follow them'?) 'do not constitute a
grand strategy' but a number of steps economic and diplomatic as well as military to establish a system governed by the
'cautionary dynamics of power balancing' and
'conventions of diplomatic consultation and
expectations of mutual economic benefit'.
This, the paper rightly argues, will place
unaccustomed demands on US diplomacy and
strategic subtlety.
Indeed, one could go further and say it runs
clean counter to the way the Pentagon has
approached most security problems in the
past: to find an enemy and deploy firepower
either to deter or, if necessary, zap him. Yet it
is hard to escape the conclusion that it is the
subtle approach that is more appropriate to the
Asia-Pacific region.
That view is strengthened by another
Adelphi Papef, this time by the Professor of
International Relations at the London School
of Economics, based upon his research in
Singapore. The ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) is of recent origin, giving a security
dimension to ASEAN which, throughout its
30 years' existence, had been criticised in the
West for not having such an instrument.
The criticism showed some ignorance of the
way Asia-Pacific interstate politics work.
403
Their 'distinctive approach', as Professor
Leifer shows, is cautious, incremental, often
economics-based,
avoiding
entrenched
positions and formal commitments. ARF
exhibits similar characteristics.
Yet it is of considerable significance. The
Forum included not only the (then six) states
of ASEAN but Australia, Canada, China, the
European Union, Japan, Laos, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, the
United States and Vietnam. Later, Cambodia,
India and Myanmar were added.
That broad membership could of course
mean that discussion was confined to
platitudes and nothing of substance emerged.
To some extent that has been the experience;
the approaches to Confidence Building
measures, surely a legitimate ground for
discussion in such a forum, have been cautious
in the extreme, compared with the HelsinkiStockholm process. This is made clear in a
most informative articlei in Survival, written
by a Senior Lecturer in the Department of
Peace Studies in the University of Bradford.
Openness, indeed, might have been even
less well served had it not been for the
participation in the ARF of states that already
had experience of Confidence Building
Measures in practice. It was Australia that
produced the initial inputs which led to a
'concept paper' proposing a three-stage
process:
mechanisms
for Confidence
Building, Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict
Resolution. But in even the first of these
stages, progress has been very slow and
cautious. It is all of a piece with the ASEAN
style: formal instruments and commitments
are avoided and reliance placed on the
emergence of accommodations through
discussion, often personal and highly discreet.
There is detectable progress, for example in
compliance with the UN Arms Register and in
the issue of open Statements of Defence
Policy, but it is piecemeal.
Accepting that this is the Eastern way and
there is nothing to be done about it, it does
seem to this reviewer that there are inherent
dangers. The first, general point is that
disputes which suddenly become acute are
likely to overtake the slow processes of
confidence building and cohesion in a
404
BOOK REVIEWS-I
catastrophic way. The second, particular point
is summed up in one word: China.
For running throughout all the studies under
review, and many more besides, is the loom of
this gigantic state, nearly one-fifth of the
world's population, perceptibly growing in
military power whatever nuances (and there
are many) may be put upon assessments of it.
Your reviewer has often come across
representatives of countries east of Suez who
claim that China can be handled, managed,
contained, co-operated with, by them and
without western interference; but underlying
the apparent confidence, it always seemed,
was a certain awed unease. It is like dealing
with an elephant: it plants its foot in a certain
place and then looks at you and asks what you
are going to do about it. One of the places
recently has been Mischief Reef in the
Spratlys: well-named.
So one returns to the question of American
commitment, which must in spite of rhetoric
be the desire of most states in the area; it will
remain, simply because the stakes are too high
for it not to, and in my judgment will remain in
what the US regards as sufficient strength to
contain unacceptable Chinese expansion.
And how about Europe? There is no doubt
about the extent of European economic
'2
interest in the area. Is trade going to protect
itself as it has never done in the past; or-is it to
be protected by US influence for which
undoubtedly there will be some price to pay,
sometime, somewhere; or is there to be a
substantial European security input in-theatre?
If so, how much of it should be British? It may
just be worth remembering that the two most
successful bits of crisis management in this
region since 1945 - the Malayan Emergency
and the Malaysia-Indonesia Confrontation were handled by the UK: and that the whole
area is essentially maritime in character. It
needs revisiting: on paper and in practice.
RICHARD
HILL
References
'don marquis, freddy the rat perishes, urchy and
mehitabel (faber and faber, 1946 edition) p.34.
2Workshop Report, The Japan-US Alliance and
Security Regimes in East Asia (Institute for
International Policy Studies and Center for Naval
Analyses, Tokyo and Alexandria Va, 1995).
'Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, A US Strategy
for the Asia-Paclfific (Adelphi Paper No. 299,
IISS/Oxford University Press, 1995).
'Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum (Adelphi
Paper No. 302, IISS/Oxford University Press, 1996).
'Malcolm Chalmers, 'Openness and Security Policy in
South-east Asia', 38 Survival No. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp.
82-98.
Book Reviews - I1
GRAVE OF A DOZEN SCHEMES:
BRITISH NAVAL PLANNING AND THE
WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1943-1945
by H. P. WILLMOTT
(Airlife Publishing)
During the Second World War, the grand
strategy of Alliance planning was a complex
and difficult field in comparison to its
execution. This was probably unavoidable
with marked differences between nations,
services, political and military leaders and
even individuals in several or all of these
categories. Some disputes are relatively well
known: Atlantic versus Pacific; bombers
versus ASW aircraft; the date of the European
landings and lines of advance in the Pacific.
Less well known is the British problem of
deciding what to do in the east once the
European land operation was sufficiently
advanced for victory to be realisable if not
assured. It is this eastern process with which
Dr Willmott's book is concerned.
The fundamental problem faced by the
British was having too many things to do and
not enough forces to do them with. There was
also a double logistics penalty to be paid.
Firstly any possible theatres that might be
considered as eastern were a long way from
the home base; secondly, even the distances
within and between the areas were almost as
large. Further, there was a paucity of bases
that were either suitable, well-placed or not
already in full use by the Americans. Thus any
oriental strategy that might be pursued would
need even more looking ahead than was
normal in the already difficult field of
planning. Willmott makes the excellent point
that around the end of 1944 was the very last
time that any decisions at grand strategic level
could be made that would bear on the war
before its end in August 1945, although this
chronology could not of course be known at
the time. This timelag problem brought its
own difficulties and tensions with it.
But these were not the only problems.
Perhaps the greatest one was where the limited
forces available should be used. Burma was at
once attractive, a distinct obligation and
fearsomely difficult. Some military leaders
hankered after bypassing it and going straight
to the Malay peninsula, whilst others favoured
placing all resources into the Pacific in
support of one of the two main American axes
of advance, or even starting an exclusive
British effort (although this last was grossly
over-ambitious). Personalities played a
considerable role in deliberations, especially
in the almost-guerrilla warfare conducted
sometimes between Churchill and the Chiefs
of Staff. The eastern theatres, too, had
commanders of stature and it is difficult to
imagine that the wishes and aspirations of
such as Mountbatten and MacArthur were
ever likely to be identical. Overriding all these
considerations was the growing strategic
dominance of the USA and this factor was
always likely to be the final arbiter for plans
conceived in London.
Willmott takes us through the dense maze
of CULVERIN, BUCCANEER, ZIPPER and
many others, revealing most, if not all, of the
Byzantine turns of the plot. Sometimes he
seems to have absorbed the atmosphere only
too well as an only slightly inattentive reader
would have to retrace his steps - possibly
more than once - to extract all of the meaning
intended. Indeed a case might be made for
some graphical timelines to demonstrate what
plans were under consideration, or even
worked through, at what times. On the other
hand, there is his wonderful appendix on
operation Zipper revealing authoritatively
how Mountbatten starved the British Pacific
Fleet of ships which would have been better
used in -and sorely needed for - its fleet train.
Another appendix details the eastern order of
battle.
Ned Willmott has made it very clear that
much of practical strategy-making - at least in
20th-century democracies - is as much to do
with what did not happen as what did. His
subject has been looked at before but not in
much detail since the Grand Strategy series of
the World War I1 Official Histories.
Willmott's style may lack the sophisticated
elegance of a Howard or Ehrman but his
analysis is on the whole much sharper and this
may contribute to reviving the debate on
eastern strategy that may have been kicked
into life by the recent anniversary of the
406
BOOK RE
'Forgotten Fleet'. It would be wrong to Rabaul. Leaving the squadrons at Scjlofields,
describe Grave of a Thousand Schemes as the Naval Air Station outside Sydney, Glory
light reading for an autumn evening, but it then repatriated several thousand prisoners of
nevertheless deserves to be read by anyone war and civilian internees from the Far East,
considering themselves a serious student of taking them to Vancouver for onward passage
across Canada to New York to sail in Queen
naval history.
W. J. R. GARDNER Mary to the UK.
Her third commission, from December
LIEUT.CDR,R N
1950 to July 1953, included three operational
tours in Korea - totalling fifteen months HMS GLORY
The History of a Light Fleet Aircraft Carrier
relieved by periods for rest and recreation
1942-1961
(little rest and much recreation!) in Australia
and the Mediterranean. This long commission
by PETERB ARRETT
takes up half the narrative of the book and
(Parapress Ltd-f 16.95)
Peter Barrett was a young 19 year old Aircraft gives brief details of every ten-day patrol off
Handler in Glory during her first Korean tour the west coast of Korea.
Her last eight years, until she is towed away
in 1951, a member of the dedicated team on
the cold, wet and windswept flight deck, a for breaking up, are covered in the short
team which played such an important part in chapter aptly titled 'Bowing Out'.
Fifty-seven Appendices, ranging from lists
the successful, and efficient, operations
against the North Koreans and Chinese. It was of aircrew and the Rolls of Honour, Daily
the effect of this draft on an impressionable orders, flying programmes and signals, poems
young man which later led him to his lengthy and extracts from the ship's newspaper, take
research into Glory's full story, a search which up one third of the book, and there are a
took him to squadron diaries, ship's logs, further 32 pages of photographs.
Overall this is an interesting book
reports of proceedings and contact with
members of the HMS Glory Association.
chronicling the daily doings of a ship's
In his Foreword, Admiral Godfrey Place company during a time of many and great
says 'Glory's active life . . . was a period of changes in the Royal Navy, before the
considerable significance . . . years of unsettled times of redundancies, cut-backs and
"Twilight of Empire". The light fleet carrier Options: recommended.
JOHNR. P. LANSDOWN
was a cost effective compromise between
mobility and the exercise of power, and
WARPATHS
economical operating and running costs. . .'
Travels of a Military Historian in
The 'Colossus' class carriers were intended
North America
to operate fighters to defend the battle fleet;
by JOHNKEEGAN
they were designed and built very quickly
(from 1942-45); Glory (the first of the class),
(Hodder and Stoughton - £25)
built by Harland and Wolff at Belfast, was Amphibiosity is in vogue. One great new
commissioned in February 1945, with 837 amphibious ship is fitting out and two more
Squadron of Barracudas and 1831 Squadron have been ordered. At last the importance of
of Corsairs, to join the British Pacific Fleet being able to move soldiers and marines by
where she arrived too late to accompany the sea seems to have been grasped by the
fleet carriers in their strikes against the procurement decision makers. But I suspect
mainland of Japan prior to the Japanese for most of us knowledge of amphibious
warfare is fairly elementary. We tend to think
surrender.
Having missed the fighting, Glory arrived in terms of successes in the Falkland Islands
in Sydney on 16 August 1945 - VJ+1 - and and on D-Day; and failure at Gallipoli. It may
was sent to New Britain to receive the come as a surprise, therefore, to hear how
surrender of the Japanese forces in New often amphibious warfare played a part in the
Guinea, New Ireland, Bougainville and wars in North America.
ROOK REVIEWS - 11
In W u r l ~ a t h . ~Keegan
,
shows how the
geography of the continent has influenced the
course of its military history. Surprisingly, it is
not the vast spaces of the interior but the sea,
its inlets, the rivers and the Great Lakes which
have been the more significant determinants.
And almost invariably Navies have had their
part to play. For example, at the crucial
moment of the Revolutionary War (or War of
Independence as we still call it) in September
1781 it was the inability of the British Fleet
under Graves and Hood to break through the
French cordon at the mouth of Chesapeake
Bay which left General Cornwallis isolated at
Yorktown and led to his ignominious
surrender. 'Britain had conceded command of
the sea at the decisive point to the enemy, an
almost unprecedented and rarely to be
repeated lapse of strategic grip by the Royal
Navy'.
Keegan's masterly grasp of his subject has
evolved from dozens of visits to the continent
over nearly 40 years - touring. researching
and lecturing. Add to that his insight as an
experienced military historian and the mix is
compelling. He sets the scene with a lengthy
chapter (a little too lengthy for my taste - I
longed to get down to serious business)
describing one Englishman's view of America
and the Americans. The four major wars on
North American soil are then given a chapter
each. The climax of the Civil War might well
have come in 1862. only a year after it started,
when the Union General McClellan decided to
move his army by boat from Washington
down through Chesapeake Bay to a point on
the Yorktown peninsula less than 100 miles
from the Confederate capital at Richmond.
Disaster threatened when the South's secret
weapon, the frigate Merrinzack, hastily rebuilt
as an ironclad with a penthouse mounting ten
guns, sailed to intercept and on her first day of
action sank two Union men o' war. This
presented a serious threat to McClellan's
gathering fleet of transports, but by what
Keegan
calls
the
most
remarkable
technological coincidence in the history of
warfare, the North had put to sea their own
ironclad, Monitor, only a week before. On the
day after Merrimack's first action, Monitor
found her and fought her to a standstill, thus
407
securing McClellan's command of the
Chesapeake for the duration of his land
campaign.
In the space of three weeks, McClellan
moved 121,000 men, 14,500 horses, 1,200
wagons, 44 artillery batteries and all of their
stores by sea to his forward base near
Yorktown - a remarkable feat without an LPD
or LSL in sight. It could have been a strategic
masterstroke leading to an early end to the
war. That it was not was partly due to
Stonewall Jackson's brilliant diversionary
campaign in the Shenandoah valley, but
mainly because of McClellan's prevaricating
and procrastinating character. Six months
after they had landed, his defeated Army reembarked for their humiliating return voyage
to Washington.
Perhaps the most decisive intervention of
Naval forces had come just over a century
earlier at Quebec where the war between
Britain and France for control of the whole
continent was approaching its climax. In
August 1759, Wolfe was running out of time
before the onset of winter in his attempt to
oust the French forces under Montcalm from
their fortress in the city. Exhausted and ill, the
32 year old Wolfe found inspiration from the
remarkable Vice Admiral Sir Charles
Saunders who commanded his naval force.
The sequence of events which led to Saunders
and Wolfe outwitting the French, making an
amphibious landing on a hostile shore, scaling
the cliffs to the Plains of Abraham and
ultimately driving Montcalm out of Quebec is
one of the greatest examples of cooperation
between an Army and a Navy in history, and it
is beautifully described here.
The fourth campaign described is that
against the American Plains Indians. Not
much naval involvement here of course, but
Keegan presents a fascinating insight into the
reasons behind that tragic conflict, and a
rivetting account of the events leading up to
the Battle of the Little Bighorn and Custer's
last stand. Here as throughout the book it is
Keegan's understanding of landscape and
geography which illuminates his writing and
sets the battles in their context. An American I
met recently described him as the world's
leading military historian; nothing in this book
408
BOOK REVIEWS - 11
contradicts this view. I could have done with her Japanese ally with all sorts of raw
more maps, but other than that it is difficult to materials including mercury; together with
criticise the book and it would anyway seem weaponry, radar, radio equipment, drawings,
churlish to try. It is a great read which, in and optical instruments. At the time of the
passing, helps our understanding of how to use surrender, one U-Boat which made its way to
the sea, lakes and rivers to prosecute war, not America, had on board some Japanese senior
in the narrow sense in which we are inclined to officers and scientists (who subsequently
parcel our amphibious forces, but in the committed suicide), and was carrying radio
broader strategic context of general war. active Uranium 235, an essential ingredient
Highly recommended.
for the manufacture of the atomic bomb.
T. J. H. LAURENCE Interestingly the amount was 78 tonnes short
RN
CAPTAIN,
of that loaded at Kiel; concerning which the
US has apparently refused to comment.
STALIN'S SILVER
Years later, salvage was also carried out on
by JOHNBEASANT
the wreck of the John Berry. With the aid of a
(Bloomsbury plc - £16.99)
'grab', operated by remote control, the salvage
On the night of 22 August 1944, the German team managed to bring to the surface about
submarine U-859 sank the American Liberty 1'12 million coins, which although minted in
ship USS John Berry, in the Arabian Sea, off America, had been embossed with the legend,
Oman. The holds were reputed to carry 3 'Made in Mecca'. A key figure at the time the
million silver Saudi riyals and over $300 shipment was made was the American
million in Silver bullion. The 7,200 ton ship minister in Jeddah who had been specially
broke in two, and sank to a depth of 8,500 feet, appointed, on the American assumption of its
over 1'12 miles down. There the ship lay for dominant role in Saudi Arabia - principally
over 45 years, this great depth ruling out any through Aramco. One theory was that he
prospect of salvage until the development of negotiated the biggest bribe in history, in
the kind of technology which resulted in the exchange for 'not causing trouble for the
recovery of some artefacts from the Titanic.
Zionists in Palestine'.
On 23 September 1944, the U-Boat, a type
The book provides some interesting
IXD 1, had been away from her base at Kiel, for comments on the effects of 'power politics'
5 months 2 weeks and 5 days; one of the longest and oil, in the Middle East as a result of 'lease
and most dangerous voyages of any German lend' - for which this cargo of silver
submarine. She herself was carrying an apparently played a big part. When the silver
important cargo of mercury. During this time, bullion finally surfaces it may yet yield some
she had sunk 30,000 tons of Allied shipping, more surprises, and the book asks whether
and when she surfaced for the last time she was perhaps gold and diamonds were also
within 3 to 4 hours of making the Japanese involved. It opens up the controversy on the
Base Poula, 20 miles north-west of Penang.
nature of the so-called 'special relationship';
Meanwhile the British submarine HMS Roosevelt spent the last two years of the war
Trenchant, Commander (later Vice-Admiral cultivating Stalin, seemingly at the expense of
Sir Arthur Hezlet KBE CB DSO* DSC) on Churchill. This goes back to the Teheran
patrol in the area, being in possession of her conference in 1943 when Britain vetoed a
ETA, intercepted and torpedoed her. He only Resolution proposed by the US, for the 'early
managed to rescue 1 1 , before being put down liberation of the entire colonial world'. The
by a Japanese plane. In 1973 one of the book quotes a supposed edict issued by the
survivors, one Oberleutnant Klatt, was asked Roosevelt administration that, 'The U K gold
to return to the scene to assist with an and silver balances should not be permitted to
expedition to recover the mercury which had be less than about 600 million dollars, and not
become an ecological concern. 30 tons were to be above one billion.' It asserts that 'this
recovered. Towards the end of the war, in seemed to be a contrivance designed to keep
great secrecy, Germany had been supplying Britain in a state of financial subservience to
BOOK REVIEWS
America, and be cornpliant to American
demands.'
The book makes a number o f assertions
about the whole 'lease lend' package, which i f
true, put a big question mark over the morality
attached to support by America during the
war. In July 1940 when we stood alone, a
senior Treasury officer went to Washington,
where he met Roosevelt and his financial
Secretary. He warned o f Britain's impending
financial crisis, and told them that i f Britain
was to stand alone prosecuting the war against
Nazi Germany, it would require credit from
the US - but it would seem that Washington
was not prepared to help, until it had evidence
that Britain's finances were exhausted, or near
exhaustion. This entailed meeting the
American demand that Britain sell o f f all her
assets, securities, and property holdings in the
US and South America. The heavy price
required supports the thesis by Professor John
Charmley, in the Sunduy Telegraph on 19
March 1995, who wrote 'First the Empire, and
then the Sterling area were dismantled - this
was called "Lease-Lend".'
The author had seen service both as press
and private secretary to the Presidents and
Prime Ministers o f a number o f islands,
including the Maldives, and currently lives in
the Sultanate o f Oman. He escaped from
Makulla in the Yemen, in 1994, and made a
hazardous escape with a group o f Bedouin
across 800 km o f desert and the mountains o f
the Hadrhamaut. He has also written a couple
o f other books - The Santo Rebellion - an
Imperial Reckoning, and Orphnns of Empire.
The book contains an enormous diversity o f
information at a number o f levels, ranging
from the high politics o f the President o f the
US, with the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, and
Britain; and as a detectiveladventure yarn,
about treasure and salvage, all against a
background o f the real wartime experiences o f
British, American, Japanese, and German
forces. The various strands are woven into a
compelling yarn, but the author leaves us
hanging with a number o f unanswered
questions. A good read, which gives food for
thought.
A. D. ROAKE
LIEUT.CDR,RN
- I1
409
STEALTHILY BY NIGHT:
The COPPists: Clandestine beach
reconnaissance and operations in World
War I1
By IAN TRENOWDEN
(Crecy Books - £1 8.99)
As the Second World War began to swing in
the Allies' favour, and plans were laid for
counter-offensives,it was realised that landings
would have to be made across enemy-held
beaches, about which virtually nothing was
known. As one Droggy wag put it: 'All our
charts are designed to keep ships off beaches'.
Early in 1941, Lieut Cdr (later Captain)
Nigel Clogstoun-Willmott, the inspiration
behind the Combined Operations Pilotage
Parties, or COPPists, and the main protagonist
o f this book, carried out a beach survey for a
planned assault on Rhodes. The assault was
cancelled, but the idea was born.
The COPPists were trained to carry out
covert surveys by submarine and canoe to
chart offshore shoals and sandbanks, gauge
the strength and direction o f tides and
currents, measure the depths o f water and
ascertain the gradients, textures, obstacles,
defences and exits o f enemy-held beaches.
Then they acted as navigation markers for the
assault landing forces.
They began as 'Party Inhuman' for the
Torch landings in North Africa in November
1942. when manv senior officers were still
sceptical about the need for such surveys.
They were not allowed to land on the actual
beaches but had to survey them through the
periscopes o f submarines. However, after
Torch the Inhumans expanded dramatically
and were officially named COPPs, with
Willmott as their CO and a training base at
Hayling Island Yacht Club.
The COPPists canied out surveys o f Sicily,
Salerno, Anzio, the South o f France, Normandy
and the Rhine, and then went out to the Far East
to survey the beaches o f Burma and Malaya.
Ian Trenowden has done a good job o f
research on COPPs personalities, their
training, their successes and their casualties
(several COPPists were lost in action,
drowned, or executed by the Japanese).
There is a foreword by Major General
L. Scott Bowden CBE DSO MC (himself a
410
BOOK REVIEWS - I1
COPPist; the COPPs also recruited from the
Army), a good selection of photographs, some
informative appendices, and a useful
bibliography.
JOHNWINTON
Bresluu in August 1914 from the pursuing
Mediterranean Fleet and their arrival in
Constantinople has been told many times. It
exerts a fascination because, without these
powerful reinforcements, Turkey might have
remained neutral in the First World War.
'CARE OF WORLD WAR I1 CONVOY
Russian trade through the Dardanelles might
CASUALTIES IN THE KOLA AREA OF have continued and the fate of the Russian
NORTH RUSSIA. ROYAL NAVAL
Empire and of the whole of the Middle East
AUXILIARY HOSPITAL, VAENGA'
might have been different.
by Surgeon Commodore G. H. G. MCMILLAN
Geoffrey Miller not only knows how to
(Journal of the Royal Nuvul Medicul Service
make the familiar story exciting, he also
- Winter '95 and Spring '96).
reminds his readers of aspects of the escape
This is an unusual look at a neglected story of which other accounts sometimes overlook.
the privations suffered by Royal and Merchant There were some Greek officials who wanted
Navy casualties in North Russia, and by the Turkey in the war on the German side so that
RN medical team who cared for them. The two it could be defeated and the spoils divided.
articles are inspired by a paper written by the Prominent amongst these, so Miller believes,
late Temporary Lieutenant Commander James was Eleutherios Venizelos, the Greek Prime
M. McEwan RNVR. He was the thirty year old Minister who connived in the coaling of the
doctor of the cruise liner SS Monlrose at the German ships. There was also the ambiguous
outbreak of war when he was commissioned. position of Admiral Mark Kerr, confidant of
Surgeon Commodore McMillan, who is editor the Greek King and head of the Greek Navy.
of the RN Medical Service Journal, has Miller's account suggests that Kerr delayed
graphically filled out McEwan's modest sending reports to London of the German
account of the establishment of a hospital at ships' intention to go to Turkey because the
Vaenga in the autumn of 1942 - and, by information was based on a telegram from the
considerable research, connected various Kaiser which was read to him by the Greek
actions at sea with the casualties that resulted.
King. The source and the confidential nature
Our Russian allies' strenuous opposition to of the information, together with Kerr's
provision of RN facilities matched the delicate position as a British naval officer and
primitive state of their hospital services. Nor head of a foreign navy, all created genuine
are there too many obvious bouquets for our dilemmas for the admiral. When Kerr did
own Naval Staff.
eventually warn London about the Germans'
Your reviewer remembers with affection destination he did so via the Russian
and gratitude the many young Reserve government in order to cover his tracks but the
doctors, who contributed so much to the handling of this information in St Petersburg
benefit and morale, as well as health and and London further delayed British actions.
humour, of the ships he served in, and with,
Kerr was open to criticism for his decisions
during WWII. He hopes that someone will or lack of them although much of the blame
develop this theme and tell more of their fell on Admiral Troubridge who decided that
stories, which may have been taken for the four heavy cruisers under his command in
the Adriatic were not powerful enough to
granted in times of peace.
RODERICK
MACDONALD intercept Goehen and Bresluu. Troubridge's
problem was his inability to communicate his
SUPERIOR FORCE: THE
judgements clearly to his superiors. This had
CONSPIRACY BEHIND THE ESCAPE
come out during the Russo-Japanese War
OF GOEBEN AND BRESLAU
when he was supposed, as naval attach6 in
by GEOFFREY
MILLER
Japan, to accompany the Japanese fleet into
(University of Hull Press-£1 2.95)
action against the Russians. However, when
The story of the 'escape' of Goehen and the government sent Pakenham out to assist
BOOK REVIEWS - I1
41 1
him, Troubridge chose to see Pakenham as his Conway Maritime, the publishers may be
replacement, left Japan without orders and trusted to demand extremely high production
refused to return even when his levels, and overall they do not fail - except
misjudgements were pointed out to him. In perhaps with proofreading, which provides us
August 1914 his inability to communicate his inter alia with 'detatched', 'their's', Admiral
estimate of his weakness and the conclusions Sir SidneyISydney Smith (take your pick),
he drew from it either to Admiral Milne in Admiral de GravinaIGraviiia, and much more
Malta or to the First Sea Lord in London had astonishingly, the Straights of Dover (and of
Gibraltar). Trivial they may be, but such
more serious repercussions.
Miller's account suffers from a misleading typographical errors irritate readers and
sub-title. There was not one but many demean both publisher and author.
More annoying is the decision to place
conspiracies which contributed to the escape
of the German ships and, like most notes neither at the foot of the page nor at the
conspiracies, the majority proved abortive or end of the book, but at the end of each chapter
had unintended consequences. In any case - a practice which makes for anything but
misjudgements, mistakes and misfortunes easy reference. Likewise, in a book such as
played quite as important a part as deliberate this, I fail to see the value of a two-page
conspiracies. The way Miller divides up the glossary of commonplace naval terms. Surely
book into sections on British warships in the any likely reader will already know the
Mediterranean before 1914, on ~rdubridge, meaning of binnacle, jib, leeward, rear
Kerr, Venizelos and others is also confusing. admiral? In the text I confess there was one
But, despite these reservations, Superior naval word I did not know - vangs - but on
Force is a valuable and readable contribution this the glossary was silent, and for
clarification I had to turn to the late Peter
to naval and diplomatic history.
Kemp's eternally valuable Oxford Companion
PHILIPTOWLE
QUEENS'COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGEto Ships and the Sea.
This leads me to the central weakness of the
book: any likely reader will already be
NELSON'S FAVOURITE:
familiar with quite a large proportion - at least
HMS Agamemnon at War 1781-1809
45% - of its contents.
by ANTHONY
DEANE
Agamemnon was by Nelson's admission his
(Chatham Publishing - £25)
favourite ship in the Royal Navy, widely
FEMALE TARS: Women Aboard Ship in
admired for her excellent sailing qualities. He
the Age of Sail
commanded her for 3'12 years (January 1793by SUZANNE
J. STARK
July 1796) and she was present at Copenhagen
(Constable and Co. - £16.95)
These two volumes are a salutary reminder in 1801. The jacket claim that she fought there
that you can't judge a book by its cover, or any is much exaggerated: as the text makes plain,
other aspect of its production. One has a dull she ran aground before battle commenced, and
and unprepossessing cover over pages of thereafter had little effect on the action beyond
rather low-grade paper; the other has one of forcing every subsequent ship 'to anchor at a
the most gorgeous covers I have seen this year less effective distance than Nelson had
and uses fine paper; yet the value of their intended.' Nevertheless, there she was; and
contents is in virtually inverse proportion. she was at Trafalgar, where she acquitted
This is a pity, because both deal with herself a great deal better. But this means that
out of 290 pages of text, 130 are devoted to an
interesting subjects.
The gorgeous cover ('an original painting interpretation which, for the potential
by Geoff Hunt depicting HMS Agamemnon audience, must be common knowledge.
It need not have been so, and the fact that it
and squadron') belongs to Nelson's Favourite,
its author's first full-length work and an is so is a great disappointment, for one comes
inaugural publication from the new imprint, away with the sense of a missed brilliant
Chatham. As former core members of opportunity. One hoped for a narrative history
412
BOOK REVIEWS - I1
of the ship, written (as it were) from her point
of view throughout. Instead, we have in every
chapter a quite unnecessarily lengthy and
often unclear element of contextualisation;
and for almost half the book, a recitation of
Nelson's life, in which poor Agamemnon allegedly the book's subject - features only
peripherally, with scarcely more detail than
has already been given in any of at least half a
dozen Nelson biographies.
As it disappointingly stands, the book's
value rests almost entirely in the chapters
before and after Nelson's connection, direct or
indirect, with Agamemnon. These sections and
the appendices are interesting, informative
and well done, covering her design,
construction, early years and eventual
unhappy fate, running aground (a la
Copenhagen) and becoming a total loss in the
mouth of the River Plate. The British-born
author lives close to the site, a fact which has
contributed much to his interest in the vessel
but less than one would have hoped to his
presentation of her history.
With Female Tars, the only criticism apart
from the inferior production is the rather
feeble title. otherwise, in just four chapters
totalling no more than about 55,000 words of
text, this little book (also a first for its author)
is in many ways exemplary, providing a
serious, thoughtful and unpolemical study of a
subject as often ignored by historians as it was
by the Admiralty. A lesser writer could easily
have made this into a shrill and indignant
work, but Stark has the wisdom to know that
sober facts can speak for themselves. Her
writing is always clear and frequently
memorable: in her first chapter, 'Prostitutes
and Seamen's Wives on Board in Port',
having noted that over 1,000 prostitutes (some
as young as nine) were always available in
Portsmouth and Plymouth, she adds, 'it is
unlikely that so many . . . have ever been
gathered together in one enclosed space at any
time in history as were regularly assembled on
the lower decks of vessels of the Royal Navy
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.'
There is often mischievous dry humour too:
for example, in 'Women of the Lower Deck at
Sea', Admiral Jervis admonishes against the
'alarming evil' of women 'who will have
water to wash'. With fresh water at sea being a
scarce and valuable resource, Jervis foresaw
that unless they stopped forthwith, the
blockade of Cadiz would fail, with
incalculable consequences - or in Stark's
words, 'the future of England rested on
whether or not the women could be prevented
from using drinking water to wash'.
Her third chapter, 'Women in Disguise in
Naval Crews', asks and persuasively answers
the question of why, when so many men were
forced unwillingly to sea, some women chose
to go as men. In a sentence: though life at sea
was harsh, it could be better for them than the
options on land. For the great majority of
women, conditions ashore were far from the
winsome ringlets of costume drama. The
fourth and final chapter, 'The Story of Mary
Lacy, Alias William Chandler', tells of
perhaps the most remarkable of all these
women. Unlike the hulking Hannah Snell,
who served as a marine for three years, or the
physically powerful 'William Brown', a black
woman who served as a sailor for at least 12
years and became captain of the foretop, Mary
Lacy was quite slight. Nevertheless, she
served successfully for 11 years, became a
qualified shipwright, and only left the Navy
because of ill health, with her real sex still
undiscovered. In her own name, she then
petitioned the Admiralty for a pension - and
got £20 a year, not bad in the money of the
day. Moreover, it was granted just two months
after her application. Perhaps her unusual
history caught their Lordships' attention;
certainly she was a very remarkable woman,
and Female Tars is a real and welcome
addition to naval historical knowledge.
STEPHEN
HOWARTH
GUERRES MARITIMES (1688-1713)
(Service historique de la Marine)
This collection, half in the French and half in
the English language, is the record of the
Fourth
Anglo-French
Naval
History
Conference held at Portsmouth in April 1992.
It consists of 18 papers covering the Wars of
the League of Augsburg and of the Spanish
Succession, and much of the surrounding
maritime scene as well - for, as we are
BOOKS REVIEWS - I1
reminded in several of the papers, trade
patterns were changing all the time and there
were other wars going on.
It was a very complicated piece of history,
made no less so by the intensity of internal
political activity in the chief protagonists. All
these factors are addressed by the authors of
the papers, often in considerable detail and
with much insight. Just why did Louis XIV
lose interest in his navy as a strategic
instrument after Tourville's good performance
against the odds at Barfleur? Why, on the
contrary, did the British stick to their maritime
guns? How critical was the Dutch connection,
and how did it change over the period?
Perhaps these questions will never be fully
answered, but progress towards an answer
surely is helped by this book.
The usual health warning must be issued
nonetheless. It is not a book for the tyro.
Newcomers to the subject should consult
some standard accounts before tackling this
more advanced, sometimes revisionist,
sometimes deliberately provocative, work.
Those who persevere will find a mine, if also
sometimes a minefield, of fascinating
information and ideas.
RICHARD
HILL
DIESEL TROUBLESHOOTER
by DONSEDDON
(Fernhurst - £1 1.95)
OUTBOARD TROUBLESHOOTER
by PETERWHITE
(Fernhurst - £1 1.95)
However wedded to primary means of
propulsion the small boat person may be, the
time comes increasingly often when he or she
wants to call on engine power. Crowded
marinas and congested waterways aren't
compatible with manoeuvring under sail or in
tow, the way we used to do it long ago - often
clumsily, I recall, in my own case. And, it
seems to me, it is no longer fashionable to
have an engine that doesn't work.
These two books should help owners to
avoid any such embarrassment. They are
comprehensive, understandable and profusely
illustrated. There are step-by-step procedures
for routine preventive work, and equally clear
413
suggestions for dealing with common
symptoms. Warnings of dangerous procedures
are highlighted.
Fernhurst have consistently produced, over
the last decade and more, books that are of real
practical value to the small boat owner and
operator. These are good representatives of
the range. I understand the firm is offering a
£10 voucher, applicable on orders of £30 or
more, to members of The Naval Review;
anyone interested should contact Annie
Buckley, for a brochure and details at:
Fernhurst Books, Duke's Path, High Street,
Arundel, West Sussex BN18 9AJ, giving some
proof of membership; a cutting of this review
would do.
RICHARD
HILL
BOOKS RECEIVED
The following books have been received and
are gratefully acknowledged. Space and
subject do not allow a full review; it is hoped
that the following brief notices, which a r e
made without any value judgment or
recommendation, will be helpful in bringing
the books to the attention of members with
specialised interests.
Defending Captain Lord: A Titanic Myth
Part Two, by Leslie Harrison (Images
Publishing, 190 pp., £15.95): Further
information from Harrison's 30-year crusade
to clear the name of the Captain of the
Californian.
Nelson's Blood, by Captain James Pack
OBE RN (Alan Sutton with the Royal Naval
Museum, Portsmouth, 196 pp. paperback,
£8.99): reprint of highly successful and
popular book on naval rum, first published in
1982.
Few Survived, by Edwyn Gray (Leo
Cooper, 274 pp., £ 14.95): new edition of book
on submarine disasters (first published in 1986
and reviewed in NR Oct. '86, p. 408), updated
to include Komsomolets and others.
Incidents in the life of a Wartime Seafarer
by Herbert D.Holden (Stockwell, 77 pp.
paperback, £3.99): Plain account of the
eventful war of a radio officer with Blue Star,
Bibby and Harrison Line ships.
New Members
The following have enrolled as new members since 1 March, 1996:
BAILEY,
J. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-LIEUTENANT
BALSTON,
D. C. W.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
BATTY,M. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
B u s c ~J., M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ADMIRAL,
CHILEAN
NAVY(RETD)
USNR
CALLO,J. F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . REARADMIRAL,
CANT,S. H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CAPTAIN,
RFA
COOKE,D. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
Cox, R. J.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUTENANT
CUTT,J. J. D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COMMANDER
EDWARDS,
A. G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUTENANT
(former prize member)
EVANS,
P. J. H.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CONSTRUCTOR,
RCNC
FRANKLIN,
G. D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUTENANT
HOBAN,
M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR,RANR
HOLLIS,R. L. G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUTENANT,
RNR
HOPE,M. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-LIEUTENANT
JONES,G. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
LAMBOURN,
P. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
LAURIE,
J. R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
LEAMAN,
R. D.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COMMANDER
MCCANN,
T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MIDSHIPMAN,
RNR
NOTLEY,
L. P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR(former prize member)
R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CAPTAIN,
ARMYEMERGENCY
RESER
PACKER,
PRIDEAUX,
A. G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
RFA
SELBY,P. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . FIRSTOFFICER,
STANLEY,
A. G.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
STICKLAND,
P. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CAPTAIN
S. P.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-LIEUTENANT
STRANGE,
TALL,D. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CAPTAIN
TERRY,
J. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
B. R.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR,RNR
THOMAS,
TINDAL,
N. H. C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
TROUP,Sir A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VICEADMIRAL
WATERS,
Miss N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
WATTS,W. H.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CAPTAIN,
RN
WILKINSON,
C. D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-LIEUTENANT,
RNR
WILKINSON,
R. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COMMANDER
K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COMMANDER
WINSTANLEY,
WITHINSHAW,
R. C.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
Prize membership for a period of two years has been awarded to:
DENNIS,
P. E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-LIEUTENANT
HAYMAN,
M. R.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-LIEUTENANT,
RNR
HULME,
T. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUTENANT
J. M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUTENANT
MILLER,
NORMAN,
P. D. N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUTENANT
O'REILLY,S. A.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . COMMANDER
PRESSDEE,
S. J.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-LIEUTENANT
SPOFFORTH-JONES,
M. A.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SUB-LIEUTENANT
WINKLE,
S. J.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LIEUT.CDR
Obituary
We regret to report the deaths of the following members in the period 1 March 1996 to
I September 1996:
Date joined
1984
1964
1946
1989
1953
1974
1995
1995
1977
1948
1964
1976
Member
ELLISON,
D. B.
GIBSON,
W. J. COMMANDER,
OBE, RD*,RNR
HODGES,
G. A,, LIEUT.CDR,GM, VRD, RNR
JONES,C. D., LIEUT.CDR
KITCHIN,
G. A. DE G., CAPTAIN,
CBE
LEGGATT,D. S., CAPTAIN
LOVELL-SMITH,
A,, LIEUT.CDR
MILNER,
F., CAPTAIN
RYLAND,
R. A,, LIEUT.CDR,RNR
STUART,
S. A,, CAPTAIN,
CBE
THORBURN,
W. D., CAPTAIN,
CBE, VRD, RNR, DL
TIERNEY,
R. H., STO(N)