Page
No.
2-1
2-3
2-5
Date
Author
8-Apr-1994 De Lapresle
13-Apr-1994 Schindler
April 1994
UNPROFOR
2-13
22-Apr-1994 Schindler
2-16
22-Apr-1994 North
Atlantic
Council
2-17
23-Apr-1994 National
Security
Council
9-May-1994 BoutrosGhali
2-21
2-22
2-25
2-28
2-30
27-Jul-1994 DCI
Interagency
Balkan
Task Force
6-Mar-1995 Baxter
7-Mar-1995 Baxter
5-Apr-1995 Baxter
2-33
18-Apr-1995 Janvier
2-35
13-May-1995 Owen
2-38
21-May-1995 Baxter
2-40
24-May-1995 Janvier
Session 2
Testing the "Safe Areas"
Document List
Title
Source
Notes
Definition of Safe Areas
ICFY/Owen
[Available ONLY in hard
copy at conference]***
ICFY/Owen
[Available ONLY in hard
copy at conference]***
UN
Bibliographic
Information
System
excerpt from original
document (portions of
pages 2-3 of 4)
UN
Bibliographic
Information
System
CIA 2013
Online Release
excerpt from original
document (portions of
pages 5-7 of 8)
Principals Committee
Meeting on Bosnia, 10
April 1994
Gorazde: Chronology of
Events 10-16 April
Principals Committee
Meeting on Bosnia 18
April 1994
Decision on the
protection of safe areas
taken at the meeting of
the North Atlantic
Council on 22 April 1994
Minutes of PC Meeting on
Bosnia
Report of the SecretaryGeneral Pursuant to
Resolution 844 (1993)
State Paper: New
Exclusion Zones and
Strict Enforcement
CIA 2013
Online Release
CIA 2013
Online Release
CIA 2013
Online Release
Meeting Gen Smith and
ICTY
Gen Mladic 5 March 1995
Meeting Gen Smith and
Gen Mladic 7 March 1995
Meeting Gen Smith / Dr
Karadizic 5 April 1995
Air Resupply to the
Eastern Enclaves and
Sarajevo
[Letter from Owen to
British Foreign and
Commonwealth Office]
Meeting Lt Gen Smith
and Dr Karadzic 21 May
1995
Extract from the Speech
Given by General Janvier
to Troop Contributing
Nations
ICTY
ICTY
ICTY
ICFY/Owen
ICTY
French
Parliamentary
Report
excerpt from original
document (two cover
sheets not included)
excerpt from original
document (attachment
not included)
[Available ONLY in hard
copy at conference]***
Excerpt from original
document (pages 1-2 of 4)
Excerpt from original
document (pages 1-2 of 4)
*Box around text denotes portion of document highlighted for conference discussion.
2-42
26-May-1995
2-45
27-May-1995 Menzies
2-49
Perina
29-May-1995 Smith /
Mladic
2-50
29-May-1995 Lake
2-53
29-May-1995 Smith
2-57
30-May-1995 BoutrosGhali
2-58
2-Jun-1995 Janvier
2-60
4-Jun-1995 Karremans
2-63
4-Jun-1995 Janvier /
Mladic
2-64
5-Jun-1995 Smith
2-65
2-71
2-72
2-74
9-Jun-1995 Akashi /
Janvier /
Smith
26-Jun-1995 Smith
27-Jun-1995 Janvier
Nov 1994 June 1995
Galbraith
May 26 Meeting with
Milosevic: Air Strikes,
Bosnian Recognition,
Zotov Visit
"I've Broken the
Machine"
Telephone Conversation
between Smith / Mladic
of 28 May 1995
US State
Department
Online
Reading Room
CIA 2013
Online Release
ICTY
Policy for Bosnia -- Use
of U.S. Ground Forces to
Support NATO
Assistance for
Redeployment of
UNPROFOR Within
Bosnia
Commander HQ
UNPROFOR Directive
2/95 - Post Airstrike
Guidance
Report of the SecretaryGeneral Purusant to
Resolution 982 (1995)
and 987 (1995)
[Letter from Gen Janvier
to Gen Smith on B-H
Strategy]
Deteriorating Situation
in Srebrenica
CIA 2013
Online Release
Meeting between
General Janvier and
General Mladic: June 4,
1995
[Letter from Gen Smith
to Gen Rasim Delic,
Commander BH Army]
[Discussion between
Akashi / Janvier / Smith
9 June 1995]
[Letter from Gen Smith
to Gen Mladic]
[Letter from Gen Janvier
to Gen Smith on May 29
Directive]
[Extracts from Diary of
US Ambassador to
Croatia Peter Galbraith
November 1994 - June
1995]
Excerpt from original
document (pages 1-3 of 7)
Cable from Akashi to
Annan, excerpt from notes
on telephone
conversation (portions of
pages 2-4 of 4, cover page
not included)
Kees Nicolai
Papers
UN
Bibliographic
Information
System
Kees Nicolai
Papers
ICTY
French
Parliamentary
Report
ICTY
excerpt from original
document (portions of
pages 17-18 of 24)
cable published in
"Srebrenica, Who Cares?"
by Thom Karremans
English translation excerpt of original
document
French
Parliamentary
Report
ICTY
Kees Nicolai
Papers
National
Defense
University
extracts from original
document
*Box around text denotes portion of document highlighted for conference discussion.
***THIS DOCUMENT***
Available ONLY in hard copy at conference
C05915996
2-3
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-
ER 94-1724
pproved for Release CIA Historical
ollections Division AR 70-14 1OCT201
13 April 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
10 April 1994
1.
The DCI and DDCI attended a PC called on short
notice following the first NATO air-strikes against Bosnian
Serb ground targets around Gorazde. President Clinton
attended part of the meeting before leaving to deliver a
press statement on the attack. National Security Advisor
Lake chaired and other attendees included Deputy National
Security Advisor Berger, Secretary Christopher, Secretary
Perry, UN Ambassador Albright, JCS Chairman Shalikashvili,
and Leon Fuerth. The meeting, which lasted almost two and
one-half hours, also dealt briefly with the situation in
Rwanda, following word that the last Americans had been
evacuated successfully from that country.
2. The meeting began with a briefing by General Shali
on the chain of events leading to the attacks by two US F16s. Participants were satisfied with the speed with which
permission was granted for the attack and UNPROFOR Bosnia
Commander Rose's subsequent statement that airpower "would
be turned on again" if Serb attacks continued; the delay in
actual execution of the attack was due to poor weather,
which made it difficult to pinpoint the targets. The DDCI
distributed a map of the Gorazde area and briefed
participants on Serb military gains during the recent
offensive and the balance of forces in the area. The DCI
interjected at a later point that,
the
UN believes the Muslins initiated the recent fighting in the
Gorazde area.
3. There was a lengthy--ultimately inconclusive-discussion of what to do next to prevent a further
deterioration of the Gorazde situation. Participants were
divided on whether to seek a Sarajevo-type exclusion zone
around the city, or a more limitedi-demand for a Serb
withdrawal from recent gains combined with a threat to
attack any forces- Jii-on Gorazde.
Participants decided
to await the results of planned discussions the next day
between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs (they did not take
2-4
C05915996
-S~ERET-
SUBJECT:
Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,
10 April 1994
place) before taking the issue up again. Peter Tarnoff
relayed information from Ambassador Redman in Sarajevo that
the UN intended to insist in those talks that the Serbs stop
shelling Gorazde and withdraw from recent gains. |
4. A few other substantive notes of interest emerged
from the discussion:
--
Tarnoff relayed other information from Redman that
UNPROFOR Commander DeLapresle was less inclined
than Rose to approve additional air-strikes against
Serb forces. Indeed, DeLapresle seemed to be
staking out a position that could lead the Serbs to
conclude that they can get away with anything as
long as UN personnel are not targeted.
--
Rose, who earlier had hoped to deploy some French
forces to Gorazde, now was leaning toward
deployment of a "less threatening" force comprised
of Ukrainians, Egyptians, and Jordanians. The
French were cooling toward participation in risky
military operations, in part because of Prime
Minister Balladur's declining political position at
home.
--
Redman talked to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Churkin in Belgrade, who had not been aware of the
attack. Churkin reacted in a tense manner, claimed
that the Serb offensive was due in part to Muslim
provocations, and suggested that there should also
be some Bosnian withdrawals if the Serbs are
ordered to retreat from their recent gains.
5. Lake did not indicate when the next meeting on
Bosnia would be held and there was no new tasking for the
Agency.
A. Norman Schindler
Chief, Balkan Task Force
2
***THIS DOCUMENT***
Available ONLY in hard copy at conference
2-13
C06011324
pproved for Release CIA Historical
ollections Division AR 70-14 1OCT201
-SEe
-
EXC
Iz
22 April 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR .THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
18 April 1994
1. The meeting, chaired by National Security Advisor
Lake, was called to assess five options for expanded UN/NATO
military activity in Bosnia aimed at avoiding further Serb
gains against Gorazde and other safe areas. In addition to
the DCI, other attendees included Secretary Christopher,
Secretary Perry, UN Ambassador Albright, JCS Chairman
Shalikashvili, Deputy National Security Advisor Berger, and
L7IF
th. Vice President Gore sat in for a few minutes.
2. The DCI briefed participants on the continued
fighting around Gorazde, the defiant -Serb reaction to the
recent NATO air-strikes, Muslim disgust with the UN, and the
deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gorazde. He
distributed copies of the latest Gorazde areas of control
map and a paper detailing Bosnian Serb air defense assets in
the Gorazde area. The DCI also addressed an inquiry on
whether the Intelligence Community had evidence that the
Muslims had provoked the Serb advance into the Gorazde
enclave.
Participants expressed concern that the situation
aroundSrajevo could rapidly deteriorate.
3. Several issues were raised at the outset of the
meeting. Some participants sought clarification of the US
position on sanctions against Serbia, making it clear that
they thought the time was not right to even hint at any
weakening of the sanctions regime. There was also concern
that the US was overly reliant on the UN and Lt.. General
Rose for information about the situation in Bosnia.
Finally, some participants expressed concern about recent
CIA and DIA analyses which they thought had said that the
Serbs wouldanot
pocket.
ke a significant advance into the Gorazde
4. The subsequent discussion of military options was
inconclusive, but agreement emerged on several issues and
principles:
--
The US needed to take some action in response to
the Serb advance on Gorazde, which was viewed as a
direct threat to the credibility of NATO and the
UN.
EXEC
REG
{A-//--
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SUBJECT:
Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
18 April 1994
--
Current European and Russian outrage over Serb
behavior has created an opening to win support for
tougher international action.
--
The US has approached the limits of what it can
credibly propose in terms of military action
without committing US ground troops.
--
UNPROFOR is having trouble raising new troops, so
any new proposals should not require additional
forces.
--
Whatever action was decided on, NATO should not
make any threats that it is not prepared to carry
out.
--
The setback in Gorazde was a tactical defeat for
the US/NATO; the wron reaction could turn it into
a strategic defeat.
5.
Lake recommended further action in two areas:
--
The NSC was to prepare a more detailed assessment
of two military options for presentation to the
President the next day: 1) Establishment of
exclusion zones around safe areas in which any
heavy weapons found would be subject to airstrikes.
2) Option #1 with some provisions to respond to any
attacks on safe areas by heavy weapons or infantry
with airstrikes.
--
Leon Fuerth was to seek interagency agreement on a
package of measures to strengthen sanctions against
Serbia.
6. The two-plus hour meeting resulted in several
taskings for the Agency:
--
Lake requested an assessment of recent violations
of the Sarajevo cease-fire and exclusion zone, as
well as prospects for a more serious confrontation
in that area.
(Delivered 18 April)
2
2-15
C06011324
SUBJECT:
--
Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia
18 April 1994
Lake requested Agency assistance in preparing an
unclassified summary of how living conditions in
some areas of Bosnia and Croatia had been improved
(Delivered 18 April)
by recent UN/NATO actions.
--
The DCI requested an analysis of CIA's reporting on
Serb objectives around Gorazde for presentat "" n^
(Delivered 19 April)
Vice President Gore.
A. Norman Schindler
Chief, Balkan Task Force
~S~ERET-
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CO 60 310.2 3
pproved for Release CIA Historical Collections
Division AR 70-14 10CT2013
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
20.690
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
Meeting of the Principal Committee
DATE:
April 23, 1994
LOCATION:
Oval Office
TIME:
1:30 - 2:30pm
SUBJECT:
Minutes of PC Meeting on Bosnia
-(-3)
PARTICIPANTS:
The President
The Vice President
The Vice President's Office
Leon Fuerth
State
Secretary Warren Christopher
DOD
Secretary William Perry
Walter Slocombe
USUN
Ambassador Albright
CIA
ADM William Studeman
JCS
GEN John Shalikashvili
DIA
ADM Michael W. Kraemer
White House
Thomas McLarty
Anthony Lake
David Gergen
George Stephanopoulos
NSC
Jenonne Walker
Minutes
Admiral Kraemer of DIA described continuing
Bosnian Serb attacks
on Gorazde despite NATO's ceasefire ultimatum.
Mr.
Stephanopoulos noted CNN reports of preliminary
indications of a
Bosnian Serb pullback, which Mr. Lake said UNPROFOR
General Rose
believes to be the case.
The President asked why, if the Bosnian
Serbs intended to comply, they had not already
done so and Mr.
Lake described evidence of serious command and
control problems
they are experiencing.
General Shalikashvili reviewed NATO actions to date:
(1)
CINCSOUTH Admiral Smith at 0630 EDT April 23
had asked UNPROFOR
agreement to NATO air strikes in response
to clear violations of
the ceasefire ultimatum but was told by UNPROFOR
Deputy Commander
McGinnis that both Akashi and de Lapresle were
away and the
Deputy Commander did not have authority to
agree; (2) at 0830
Admiral Smith faxed a written request to UNPROFOR
and received no
answer; (3) SACEUR General Joulwan sent Admiral
Smith to Zagreb
for a face to face meeting with UNPROFOR officials
at which
General de Lepresle said that the threat of
NATO air strikes was
Declassify on:
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2.
working and Akashi should be given time to
get the Bosnian Serbs
both to cease shelling Gorazde and to withdraw
forces as demanded
by NATO. Admiral Smith was now meeting with
Akashi to determine
the latter's intentions and especially to
press for a clear
understanding of the conditions for NATO air
strikes.
Ambassador Albright reviewed NATO Secretary
General Woerner's
efforts to persuade Akashi to agree to air
strikes and Akashi's
plea to Woerner that the Bosnian Serbs should
be given more time.
She also noted the UN's view that an UNPROFOR
presence in Gorazde
would permit verification of what is happening
and that Akashi
had told Kofi Annan that the presence of
UNPROFOR should not
impede air strikes.
Mr. Lake added that Karadzic is claiming
that NATO's conditions will be met when UNPROFOR
is in Gorazde.
He further noted the French refusal to join
an UNPROFOR
detachment for Gorazde.
The President asked if Akashi in effect
had authorized Gorazde to
be shelled today. Mr. Lake said our view
was that there should
have been NATO air strikes today and that
should be made public.
Mr. Lake said there was no important operational
decision to be
taken as to what will happen in the next few
hours. The
important thing is what we say to UNSYG Boutros
Ghali about what
should happen after midnight Sunday GMT.
His recommendation,
accepted by the Group, was to distinguish
at that time between
continued shelling and compliance with NATO's
demand for force
withdrawals.
If shelling continues, there should be
NATO
airstrikes.
But if the ceasefire is holding and there is
evidence that the Bosnian Serbs are withdrawing
as demanded by
NATO, then we would be in a poor position to
push for air
strikes.
This is so both because the best outcome on
the ground
would be one similar to Sarajevo--compliance
without airstrikes,
even if the deadline slips somewhat--and because
since there is
evidence that Mladic and local Bosnian Serb
commanders are
calling for a ceasefire and pullback, if NATO conducts
airstrikes
and if Bosnian Serbs then take UNPROFOR lives,
there would be
serious
problems with London, Paris, and other UNPROFOR
governments.
In response to a question from Secretary Christopher,
General
Shalikashvili said that night operations are possible.
In
response to a question from the President, the
General replied
that there would be a little less danger to NATO
pilots from some
air defense guns but the risk from heat seeking
missiles would be
about the same as during daytime operations.
Mr. Gergen, who joined the meeting late, noted
that he had come
from CNN where the public disagreement between
NATO and the UN
was '"going down very badly".
But, he continued, there was no
pressure to do anything now. People seemed to understand
that we
should wait until tomorrow morning in Bosnia and,
if by then the
firing had subsided and a pullback was underway, there
would not
be strong media pressure for airstrikes.
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The President then concluded that we need some
time to see what
happens on the ground, but also a credible explanation
for the
the UN-NATO conflict.
That explanation should be as honest as
possible without unduly complicating the ability
of the two
organizations to work together.
Mr. Lake suggested making clear that CINCSOUTH,
the USG, and NATO.
Secretary General Woerner all- believed that the Bosnian
Serbs
were in violation of NATO's ultimatum and that there
should be
airstrikes; NATO's commander and the -UN met during
the course of
the day; but because they saw evidence that the
threat of NATO
airstrikes was having the desired effect, UN officials
recommended delaying airstrikes.
Mr. Berger suggested we make
any such statement prospective, emphasizing that
NATO's threat
still obtains, with which the President agreed.
Secretary Christopher concurred with the decision,
but said
someone should telephone UNSYG Boutros-Ghali to point
out how he
has damaged the UN. UN officials had been claiming
that
procedures for authorizing airstrikes had been streamlined,
but
had really screwed-up.
The President speculated that Rose, de Lapresle and
Akashi wanted
to avoid airstrikes if at all possible in order to
minimize the
risk to UN personnel in Bosnia. The question, he continued,
is
how to avoid the absence of strikes today looking
like a major
defeat for NATO'and the US.
Mr. Lake said that the next four hours do not matter
very much;
the next 12 hours matters a lot and in the next 12 days
most of
all.
The Vice President asked if the NATO-UN decision-making
procedures have changed. Mr. Lake replied that the "ice
breaker"
issue has not been resolved. Our position is that it
has been
broken, but it may not matter because UNPROFOR seems
to be
consulting Akashi. General Shalikashvili said that
the NAC's
April 22 decision did not change procedures and
UNPROFOR still
can keep NATO from conducting air strikes or limit
the scope of
airstrikes if they do occur.
The Vice President termed that
untenable".
Secretary Perry said we need to prepare now so if firing
resumes
in Gorazde tomorrow we can go in big. Mr. Lake agreed,
asking
Ambassador Albright to ensure that Boutros Ghali makes
clear to
all in the UN chain of command that if Gorazde is shelled
on
Sunday "we whack them".
The President asked how best to convey
that message:
Boutros-Ghali to Akashi? Ambassador Albright said
that Boutros-Ghali believed he already had done so.
The President said that it may not be the worst thing
in the
world not to have conducted airstrikes today, since three
of the
nations with people on the ground are NATO members, if we
can get
agreement now to go all out tomorrow if necessary. We
must not
spend six .hours tomorrow repeating today's_.exercise.
Secretary
Christopher said he
&.,
.a- Boutios-Ghali
General
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LINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
2-20
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4
Shalikashvili will ask Admiral Smith to verify
that Boutros-Ghali
has passed the message to Akashi.
The President said the group should reconvene
at 5:00 today, just
before the NATO deadline expires. We dodged
a bullet today, he
noted, but we cannot permit the same thing to
happen tomorrow.
Secretary Christopher suggested we say there
was some confusion
today; Secretary Perry that the policy is
working because we are
getting compliance.
The Vice President and Mr. Lake suggested it
had not worked well for those who died from
continued Serb
shelling today. Mr. Lake said we should just
lay out the facts
without characterizing them, including by saying
there had been
confusion.
Mr. Gergen said we would need to background
the press today,'
especially on the UN veto of NATO airstrikes.
The President said
the UN had not vetoed; it honestly believed
the policy was being
complied with and wanted a delay when NATO
wanted immediate
action, but did not veto the basic decision.
Dumping on someone
on background, the President continued, hurts
us tomorrow; it
only makes us look weak.
So we should stick to facts:
we were
ready to go this morning, the UN thought NATO's
ultimatum was
working and made a decision not to undermine
the policy but to
delay it.
If we get into a pissing match with the UN
it will
make us look weak.
We believed there was a violation and the UN
did not disagree.
The Vice President asked what criteria would
trigger NATO
strikes.
Mr. Lake said (1) clear violation of the ceasefire
must
be responded to and that means any shelling by
heavy weapons
rather than small arms fire; (2) absence of clear
sign that the
Bosnian Serbs are doing all they can to comply
with the
withdrawal demand and UNPROFOR troops are permitted
into Gorazde
area to see it.
General Shalikashvili said that if NATO strikes,
its targets must
not be limited to offending guns but should include
groups of
targets.
Mr. Lake agreed, saying the targeting should be
pursuant to NATO's decision. General Shalikashvili
said we have
identified 110 Bosnian Serb heavy weapons around
Gorazde, and
within a day or so would like to hit all of them.
The President asked what he should say to the press
when walking
back to Blair House.
The Vice President recommended that he
avoid comment. Mr. Lake said he would background
the press.
The President closed the meeting by asking the
group to reconvene
at 5:00.
_____INTON
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CO 5916162
pproved for Release CIA Historical Collections
Division AR 70-14 10CT2013
DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
27 July 1994
State Paper:
--
New Exclusion Zones and Strict Enforcement
The creation of new exclusion zones and their strict
enforcement may result in some form of UNPROFOR's
redeployment. It could involve movement within
Bosnia,
withdrawal from safe areas, or complete withdrawal
from
Bosnia which would limit UNPROFOR's ability to
protect
humanitarian relief convoys.
--
As British and French forces withdraw, the remaining
forces are likely to be from Muslim countries which
may
appear-to be staying to assist the Bosnian Government.
--
It is essential to attain UNPROFOR--including UN/SYG--
approval of the use of:NATO air power in enforcement
of
the zones.
--
In order to benefit fully from strict enforcement
of the
zones, any decision should give the Serbs time
to change
their minds and sign on to the Contact Group proposals
and warn the Serbs that attacks against UN/aid
will elicit an appropriate military response. personnel
OWRIPe
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July 20, 1994
RELEASED IN FULL
NEW EXCLUS TON ZONES AND STRICT ENFORCEMENT
The Contact Group agreed that if the Bosnian Serbs reject
the proposed territorial settlement, NATO could impose
Gorazde-type exclusion zones around the other.safe areas -Srebrenica,. Zepa, Bihac and-Tuzla.
In addition, NATO could
strictly enforce the exclusion zones (which would require that
new instructions be given to UNPROFOR, to ensure that the UN
"key" is turned- when NATO-decides to strike)..
Declaring new.zones would require a NAC decision demanding
that the Bosnian Serbs withdraw all their military personnel. and
weapons from- around the other safe areas and prohibiting heavy
weapon and ground-force attacks.
If the Bosnian Serbs fail to
comply, their military forces in proximity to the safe areas,
including support facilities, would be subject to NATO air
strikes.
The -optio of putting heavy-weapona under UN control
would require too many additional UNPROFOR troops and should notbe repeated in these new exclusion zones, especially in light of
. UNPROFOR's vulnerability.
.
.
Timina: The NAC could declare new exclusion zones and NATO
could implement strict enforcement at once or in phases.
.Assuming that. -- as the British and French want -- new exclusion
zones: are created first, followed by strict enforcement, we
should press to have the time period during which the new
exclusion zones are created- made as short as possible; Bihac and
Tuzla are the most -difficult cases, given the array of forces in
these areas. The "strict enforcement" decision should be taken
shortly thereafter to.maintain credibility. Enforcement may be
phased in as well,.beginning with Gorazde and Sarajevo.
Risks to UTNPROPO~I
The creation of new zones, and
especially their strict 'enforcement, will be perceived by the
Serbs as a UN/NATO intervention on the. side of the Bosnian
Government.... As risk to-its fortes increases, UNPROFOR will:
o
redeploy from exposed positions (such as heavy weapons
sites)
o
.withdraw from the safe areas; or
o
withdraw completely from Bosnia.
NATO's Military Committee sees these steps as virtually
undifferentiated, simply stages in a withdrawal process.
UNPROFOR should be prepared to redeploy.on short.notice on the
date that Contact -Gr.oup Foreign Ministers. give the Bosnian Serbs
their final u.ltimatum.on accepting the map. Isolated UNPROFOR
units should be redeployed before that date. However, even if
UNPROFOR redeploys units from exposed positions,' it would remain
a lightly armed peacekeeping:force not- equipped for combat.
British may insist that UNPROFOR b.e withdrawn from the safe The
areas. These withdrawals would limit UNPROFOR's ability to
carry out its mandate in key-areas, including psotection og
humanitarian r.elie.f convoys, monitoring th. safe areas and
mohitoring of the heavy weapons collection sites. around Sarajevo.
REVIEW AUTHORITY:
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If we move on to strict enforcement after creating the new
zones, the UK and France must take the lead to get UNPROFOR out
of harms' way. In *response to limited NATO bombing around
Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs closed all convoy routes and stopped
all ground and air delivery of humanitarian aid, took some
UNPROFOR personnel hostage, confiscated UNPROFOR equipment and
fired on NATO aircraft. We must .be prepared for a similar -- or
harsher -- reaction should NATO again use air power. The
British especially have made clear that UNPROFOR should be
withdrawn completely if NATO plans to strictly enforce the zones.
One way to address this would be to establish a time period
of up to several weeks between the end of the extension period
and the beginning of strict enforcement, during which time those
UNPROFOR forces that wished to depart could do so.
The
remaining UNPROFOR forces could use the time to further
consolidate around Sarajevo, and.possibly in the interior cores
of the other safe, areas-.(the Turks have indicated a willingness
to do this). -We should be aware that most of the remaining
forces are likely to be from Muslim.countries --
Turkey,
Malaysia -- and would be seen as staying to assist the Bosnian
Government.. -In addition, without the logistical network set up
by the UK and France,. they would have difficulty maintaining
their forces in Bosnia. A British- and French withdrawal will
result in the 'de facto end of UNPROFOR.
-
Movin to Strit Enforeement: We need assurances before
deciding on strict enforcement that the UN/SYG is on board,. and
that UNPROFOR will approve the use -of NATO air power. UNPROFOR
should agree in. advance that NA.TO, can carry out strikes for a
fixed period of time against Bosnian Serb forces and their
support facilities. Our decision on strict enforcement should
be:
o
transparent, and give the Serbs-time to'-chanie their minds
and sign on to the Contact Group proposals=
o
.o
preceded by a warbing to the Serbs by the Contact Group that
attacks against UN/aid personnel: or hostage taking will
elicit an appropriate military response;
accompanied by UNPROFOR redeployment.
Other Bosnian Serb Reactions: Reacting either to new
exclusion zones or strict enforcement,.the.Bosnian Serbs may
step up military activity in areas not covered by the exclusion
zones, such as Maglaj or Brcko. In order for 'NATO to respond
directly, we would need a new Security Council resolution
authorizing further NATO action (such as creating a new
exclusion zone in the area of the offensive). The Serbs may
also take hostages from among the many civilian UN and NOO
humanitarian aid workers spread throughout Bosnia.
If NATO
plans to implement strict enforcement, and UNPROPOR is
withdrawing, it would be prudent for these aid workers to
withdraw as well -(at least .from areas where the Serbs' can take
thetm hostage)..
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. FTWJU:
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PTQ3118
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Date: 10/22/2013 A
RELEASED IN PART
Bl, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
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BELGRA 02572 01 OF 02 261738Z
INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00
/000W
C9E5B6 261739Z /38
O 261737Z MAY 95
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5978
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 002572
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
EXDIS
DECAPTIONED
E.O. 12356: DECL: 5/26/15
TAGS: PREL, SR
SUBJECT: MAY 26 MEETING WITH MILOSEVIC: AIR STRIKES,
BOSNIAN RECOGNITION, ZOTOV VISIT
REF: FRASURE/PERINA TELCON 5/25
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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: MARTIN MCLEAN
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 25 MAY 2020
DATE/CASE ID: 25 JUN 2010 200703885
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2007-03885 Doc No. C17799091 Date: 10/22/2013
fa)C17799091 Date: 10/22/2013
kl-N
caaggIF
2. SUMMARY: I MET FOR ABOUT AN HOwn risin
nf
MID-DAY MAY 26. ON MY URGING THAT HE INTERVENE WITH
MLADIC TO GAIN BOSNIAN SERB RESTRAINT AND COMPLIANCE
WITH UN DEMANDS, MILOSEVIC SAID HE WAS WORKING WITH
AKASHI AND IN INDIRECT CONTACT WITH MLADIC TO TRY TO
REVERSE THE ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT. HE SAID,
HOWEVER, THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE NOW "BLIND WITH
EMOTION AND ANGER" AND THAT THE UN HAD TO SHOW RESTRAINT
AS WELL TO STOP THE "VICIOUS CIRCLE." ON THE BOSNIAN
RECOGNITION PACKAGE, HE SHOWED NO SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY
ON THE SANCTIONS MECHANISM, REPEATING ONLY THAT HE WAS
PREPARED TO WAIT UNTIL THE U.S. GAINED GREATER TRUST
THAT HE WOULD ABIDE BY HIS COMMITMENTS. HE SAID HE
WOULD STRIKE A FINAL DEAL "ONLY WITH THE U.S.," HOWEVER,
AND THAT HIS TALKS WITH ZOTOV HAD BEEN PRO-FORMA AND
"EMPTY." HE SAID HE WOULD NOT BE MEETING THIS WEEKEND
WITH TUDJMAN BECAUSE MECIAR HAD VIOLATED THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE ARRANGEMENTS. END SUMMARY.
UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case tj
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3. NATO AIR STRIKES
I MET WITH MILOSEVIC ABOUT TWO HOURS AFTER THE MAY 26
MORNING AIR STRIKE AND BEGAN BY STRESSING THAT THE
SITUATION IN BOSNIA NOW THREATENED FULLY TO GET OUT OF
CONTROL. THE SHELLING BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS OF THE SAFE
AREAS THE PREVIOUS EVENING WAS TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIABLE AND
AMOUNTED TO A SLAUGHTER OF CIVILIANS. THE UN AND THE
WEST COULD NOT TOLERATE SUCH ACTIONS ANY MORE, AND IF
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THEY CONTINUED THERE WOULD BE A VASTLY ESCALATED
CONFLICT WITH UNPREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES. I URGED
MILOSEVIC TO USE ALL OF HIS INFLUENCE WITH MLADIC TO
GAIN RESTRAINT AND COMPLIANCE WITH UN DEMANDS AND TO
CAUTION HIM AGAINST FOLLOWING THE SUICIDAL COURSE OF THE
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN PALE.
4. MILOSEVIC SAID HE AGREED THE SITUATION WAS VERY BAD
AND HE HAD BEEN WORKING WITH AKASHI AND MLADIC TO TRY TO
CALM THINGS. HE SAID HE HAD JUST GOTTEN OFF THE PHONE
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2007-03885 Doc No. C17799091 Date: 10/22/2013
WITH AKASHI WHO HAD AGREED TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT
URGING RESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES. HE HAD THEN DISPATCHED A
MESSAGE TO MLADIC URGING HIM TO DO THREE THINGS:
-
UNCLASSIFIED
PUBLICALLY ACCEPT AKASHI'S CALL FOR RESTRAINT;
-- RETURN THE FOUR HEAVY WEAPONS THAT THE UN
DEMANDED; AND,
-- AGREE TO A MEETING WITH GENERAL SMITH AND BIH
COMMANDER DELIC TO DISCUSS AND CALM THE
SITUATION.
5. MILOSEVIC SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO REACH
MLADIC DIRECTLY, BUT THAT THE ABOVE MESSAGE HAD
BEEN RELIABLY RELAYED TO HIM. HE SAID HE "HOPED"
MLADIC WOULD HEED IT, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT BE
SURE. THE AIRSTRIKES HAD PREDICTABLY MADE THE
BOSNIAN SERBS IRRATIONAL AND "BLIND WITH EMOTION
AND ANGER." THIS "VICIOUS CIRCLE" HAD TO BE
BROKEN, AND IT WAS THUS IMPORTANT ALSO FOR THE UN
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AND NATO TO CURTAIL THE AIR STRIKES. HE HAD URGED
AKASHI TO DO THIS SO THAT TEMPERS COULD COOL.
6. I TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT WE WERE RECEIVING REPORTS
OF HOSTAGE-TAKING AND BOSNIAN SERB BLOCKADES OF THE
WEAPON COLLECTION SITES. I URGED MILOSEVIC TO
RESTRAIN MLADIC FROM SUCH TACTICS AS A FIRST STEP
IN COOLING EMOTIONS. MILOSEVIC SAID HE WOULD WORK
WITH AKASHI AND CONTINUE TO DO HIS BEST. HE
CONCLUDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE PALE
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SHOULD NOT SURPRISE US--THEY
WERE ALL "CRAZY" AND COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO REACT
IN ANY OTHER WAY.
7. BOSNIAN RECOGNITION PACKAGE
TURNING TO THE BOSNIAN RECOGNITION PACKAGE, I SAID
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UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of State Case No. F-2007-03885 Doc No. C17799091 Date: 10/22/2013