Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point of View
Author(s): David O. Brink
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 83, No. 8 (Aug., 1986), pp. 417-438
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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME
LXXXIII, NO. 8, AUGUST
1986
4.-- 0 -4-
U
UTILITARIAN
MORALITY AND THE
POINT OF VIEW*
TTILITARIANISM
PERSONAL
has been the object of much criticism,
most of which is thought to undermine nonutilitarian forms
of consequentialism or teleology as well. The most common
objections to utilitarianism are moral objections.' It is alleged that
utilitarianism fails to accommodate the extent of our obligations to
* I would like to thank David Lyons, T. H. Irwin, Alan Sidelle, and Nicholas
Sturgeon for helpful commentson previous versions of this paper.
1 Of course, it is often argued that utilitarianism
is either theoreticallyor practicallyincoherent,because itpresupposes abilitiesto compare the consequences of an
infinitenumber of possible actions and to make interpersonal comparisons of
welfare. See, e.g., Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of
Economic Science (New York: Macmillan, 1935) and Alan Donagan, The Theoryof
Morality (Chicago: UniversityPress, 1977), pp. 201f. Cf. Jerome Schneewind,
Sidgwick and Victorian Moral Philosophy (New York: Oxford, 1977), pp. 141/2,
146. There is a theoreticalor metaphysicalproblem here just in case interpersonal
comparisonsof welfareare impossibleor incoherent.There is a practical or epistemological problemforutilitarianism
just in case, thoughinterpersonalcomparisons
of welfare are possible, we are unreliable measurers of value. Though I cannot
argue for these claims here, I thinkthat both metaphysicaland epistemological
objections can be dismissed.If therewere a metaphysicalobjection to interpersonal
comparisonsof welfare,it would have sweepingimplications.A metaphysicalobjection to interpersonalcomparisonsof welfarewould underwritemetaphysicalobjectionsboth to any moral theorythatincluded duties of beneficenceand to any theory
of rationalityrequiringdiachronic intrapersonal comparisons of welfare.We need
a better motivationfor denying the possibilityof interpersonal comparisons of
welfare than has been given before we scrap all plausible moral theories and
theories of rationality.The epistemological objection, on the other hand, is, in a
way,well motivated.For obvious reasons, we are not alwaysreliable calculators of
welfare.But this fact undermines utilitarianismonly if utilitarianismis a decision
procedure. However, as we shall see, utilitarianismis a standard or criterionof
rightnessand not a decision procedure and thus avoids the practical or epistemological problem about interpersonalcomparisons of welfare.
This defense of utilitarianismsummarizesargumentswhich can be found in my
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (manuscript),chapter 9.
0022-362X/86/8308/0417$02.20
?) 1986 The Journal of Philosophy,Inc.
417
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418
THE JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
and thedemands
others,2theexistenceof moraland politicalrights,3
justice.4 In a series of recent papers, Bernard Wilof distributive
liams5has added a new, ifrelated,moral objection to utilitarianism;
he argues that utilitarianismcannot account for the moral signifiStill more recently,in The Rejection of
cance of personal integrity.
has argued thatutilitarianism
Consequentialism,Samuel Scheffler6
cannot account forthe naturalindependence of the agent's point of
view and so should be replaced by a "hybridmoral theory" that
incorporateswhat he calls "agent-centeredprerogatives."On this
hybridmoral theory,agentsare permittedbut not required to maximize the good. The claim common to Williams, Scheffler, and
in parcharacteristicof utilitarianism,
others7is thatthe impartiality
ticular,and teleologicaltheories,in general,cannot account forthe
moral significanceof what I shall call thepersonal point of view.
It is thisclaim that I wish to examine. There are two reasons for
thisfocus. First,Williams,Scheffler,and othershave made thiscritiquite influential.Second, thiscriticismof utilicismof utilitarianism
tarianismis relatedto manyothermoralobjections to utilitarianism.
Though I cannot argue the claim here, it is reasonable to regard
manyof the moral objections to utilitarianismas stemmingfroma
common source: these objections assign great moral importanceto
the fact that people lead separate lives, possess differentcommit2
See, e.g., W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (New York: Oxford, 1930), pp.
22, 34/5, 38; Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1958),
pp. 203/4;John Rawls,A TheoryofJustice(Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard, 1971), pp.
572/3; Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard, 1978), pp. 2,
169.
3See, e.g., Rawls, pp. 209-211; Ronald Dworkin, "Taking Rights Seriously,"
reprintedin his Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1978) and
"Rights as Trumps" in J. Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights (New York: Oxford,
1984); Robert Nozick, Anarchy,State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974),
pp. 28/9; Alan Gewirth,Reason and Morality (Chicago: UniversityPress, 1978),
pp. 200, 296; Fried, pp. 81-105; David Lyons, "Utilityand Rights" reprintedin
Waldron.
4See, e.g., Rawls; Nozick, pp. 150-164; Gewirth,pp. 200, 296; Bernard Williams,
"A Critique of Utilitarianism"in J. J. C. Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For
and Against (New York: Cambridge, 1973), p. 137.
5 "Persons, Character, and Morality" and "Utilitarianismand Moral Self-indulgence," both reprintedin his Moral Luck (New York: Cambridge, 1981), and "A
Critique of Utilitarianism,"pp. 77-135, hereafter"A Critique."
6 New York: Oxford, 1982.
7Cf. Rawls, "Social Unityand PrimaryGoods," in A. Sen and B. Williams,eds.,
Utilitarianism and Beyond (New York: Cambridge, 1982), pp. 180/1; Fried, pp. 2,
34, 114; Loren Lomasky, "A Refutationof Utilitarianism,"Journal of Value Inquiry, XVII, 4 (1983): 259-279; Thomas Nagel, "Subjective and Objective," reprintedin his Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge, 1979), p. 205, and "The
Limits of Objectivity" in S. McMurrin, ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values I (Salt Lake City: Utah UP, 1980), pp. 108, 119/20, 127, 131, 135.
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UTILITARIANISM
AND THE
PERSONAL
POINT
OF VIEW
419
ments,and pursue differentprojects and plans.8If thisdiagnosisis
correct,examinationof the objection from the personal point of
view should cast some lightupon these other moral objections to
utilitarianism.
I shallargue thatthereis no successfulmoralobjection to utilitarianism fromthe personal point of view. There are various ways in
can accommodate the moral significanceof the
whichutilitarianism
personal point of view. It must be conceded, however,that these
imparstrategiesdo not eliminateall conflictbetweenutilitarianism's
tialityand the personal point of view.But thisresidual conflictdoes
for,in thisconflict,
not constitutea moralobjection to utilitarianism,
or
therationality
of
worries
about
view
represents
thepersonalpoint
supremacyof utilitariandemands. These worriesare properlyunderstoodas worriesabout ratherthanwithinmoralityand so do not
threatenand, indeed, support a utilitariananalysisof morality.
I. UTILITARIAN
AND TELEOLOGICAL
ETHICS
Utilitarianismis a kind of teleological moral theory.Teleological
moraltheories,unlikedeontologicaland othernonteleologicalmoral
theories,hold that rightnessor justifiedness consists in maximal
goodness; somethingis rightor justifiedjust in case it realizes the
most value possible in the circumstances.9It is sometimesclaimed
thatteleologicaltheoriesmustalso specifygoodness independently
of rightness,with the result that a moral theoryis nonteleological
just in case eitherit denies thatrightnessis maximalgoodness or its
Though I could,
specificationof goodness is in termsof rightness.10
for mypurposes, accept this account of teleological and nonteleological theories,we should, I think,question it. Teleological and
nonteleologicaltheoriescan be distinguishedalong traditionallines
ifa theoryis teleologicaljust in case itholds thatrightnessconsistsin
8 Cf. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 23/4, 27, 29, 187/8, 191; Nozick, pp.
31-34; Fried, pp. 33/4, 105, 114; Williams,"Persons, Character and Morality,"p.
3; and Scheffler,pp. 11/2.
9 Michael Slote, Common-sense Morality and Utilitarianism (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), chs. 3 and 5, suggeststhatwe construe consequentialist
or teleological moral theoriesas claimingonlythatcorrectmoral assessmentis some
functionof value realized. The claim that rightness is maximal goodness is, according to Slote, only a special case of teleologyor consequentialism. I thinkthat
Slote's broad construalof teleologymaymake it difficultto distinguishteleological
and deontological moral theories.Whetheror not thisis so, traditionalteleological
theories such as utilitarianismconform to my more narrow characterization of
teleology. I intend to adhere to this narrower,more traditionalconstrual. Those
sympatheticwithSlote's broader construal can treat mydefense of utilitarianand
teleological ethics as a defense of a special class of teleological theories.
'? Cf. WilliamFrankena,Ethics (Englewood Cliffs,NJ.: Prentice-Hall,1973), pp.
14-17 and Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, pp. 24/5, 30/1.
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420
THE JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
to
maximalgoodness. This weakerconstrualof teleologyis sufficient
distinguish between teleological and nonteleological theories,
thoughit allowsthe goodness of statesof affairsto be determinedby
or acceptability.As long as
considerationsof moral permissibility
or obligation, is
permissibility
rightness,i.e., all-things-considered
maximal goodness, rightnessand goodness will be distinctproperties,no matterhow goodness is conceived. We can fairlydemand of
teleologicaltheories,that theytreatrightnessand goodness as distinct properties,without requiring that they make rightnessand
goodness independent of each other. So I shall assume that what
distinguishesteleologicaland nonteleologicalmoral theoriesis that
the former,unlike the latter,hold rightnessto consist in maximal
goodness.
We can now make several importantpoints about teleological
moral theories,so construed. First,we can distinguishbetween teleological and consequentialistmoral theories; the latterare, on a
certainconstrual,just a special case of theformer.Consequentialism
is usuallyunderstood as the claim thatactions and other objects of
moral assessmentare rightor justifiedjust in case theircausal consequenceshave more intrinsicvalue thanalternativeactions,etc. This
is a special case of the teleologist'sclaim that actions and other
objects of moral assessmentare rightor justifiedjust in case they
realize more intrinsicvalue than alternativeactions, etc. Consequentialism,so construed,is only a special case of the teleological
claim,because, unlikethe teleologicalview,consequentialismtreats
the objects of moral assessmentas bearers only of extrinsicvalue.
The teleologist,on the other hand, allows that objects of moral
assessment,such as actions,mighthave intrinsicvalue and thattheir
intrinsicvalue counts towardthe rightnessor justifiednessof those
objects of assessment."
Second, this characterizationof teleologydoes not require that
teleologicaltheoriesprovidereductivetheoriesof goodness or value.
Teleological theoriesmaydefinerightnessin termsof goodness and
goodness in termsof moralpropertiessuch as fairnessor respectfor
persons. The resultingtheoryneed be neithercircularnor deontological. It would be circular,as we have seen, to identifyrightness
withgoodness and then to identifygoodness withrightness.But we
or oblipermissibility
can definerightness,i.e., all-things-considered
gation, in termsof goodness and goodness in termsof still other
" If, however,the consequences whose intrinsicvalue consequentialismseeks to
maximizeinclude conceptual as well as causal consequences, thenconsequentialism
can treatactions, motives,etc. as intrinsicallyvaluable. So construed, consequentialismand teleologywould be equivalent. Cf. Scheffler,pp. ln-2n.
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UTILITARIANISM
AND THE
PERSONAL
POINT
OF VIEW
421
moralpropertieswithoutcircularity
(contrastFrankena,14). Indeed,
as we have seen, since the teleologistdefinesrightnessas maximal
goodness, he can give an account of the good which relies on the
acceptabilityof certainstatesof affairswithoutidentifying
rightness
and goodness.
Third, this characterizationof teleologyallows for a pluralityof
objects of moral assessment.Utilitarianismand other teleological
theorieshave traditionallybeen concerned with the assessmentof
therightnessof actions.But actionsneed not be theteleologist'sonly
objects of moral assessment.'2The teleologistcan assess motives,
rules,and institutions
as wellas actions.These too the teleologistwill
assess by the value thattheyrealize.
Fourth, as we shall see at greater length below, teleological
theoriescan be construedas standards or criteriaof rightnessor as
decision procedures.A standard or criterionof rightnessexplains
what makes an action or motiverightor justified;a decision procedure provides a method of deliberation.Teleological theories do
provide criteriaof rightness,but need not provide decision procedures.'3 Justas an agent maybest secure his own happiness not by
alwaysseekinghis own happiness,but by pursuingcertainactivities
fortheirown sake,so too an agentmaymaximizetotalwelfarenot as
the result of deliberatingabout how to do so or by acting out of
benevolence,but byreasoningin nonutilitarian
waysor byactingon
nonutilitarian(nonbeneficent)motives.
Finally,different
teleologicaltheoriesresultfromdifferent
specificationsof thegood. Utilitariantheoriesare teleologicaltheorieswith
a welfaristtheoryof value. Utilitarianism
claimsthathuman welfare
or happinessis whatis of value.'4 As a teleologicaltheory,utilitarian12
Cf.JeremyBentham,An Introduction to thePrinciples ofMorals and Legislation (London: Athlone Press, 1970) ch. VII, sec. 13; J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979) ch. II, ? 17; Henry Sidgwick,The Methods of Ethics,
7thed. (Chicago: UniversityPress, 1907), p. 428; Robert MerrihewAdams, "Motive
Utilitarianism"thisJOURNAL, LXXIII, 14 (Aug. 12, 1976): 467-481; AmartyaSen,
"Utilitarianismand Welfarism,"ibid., LXXVI, 9 (September 1979): 463-489.
'3 Cf. Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), sermon XII,
sec. iv, ? 31;J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. II, ?? 16 and 19, Autobiography(New
York: Columbia, 1924), p. 100, A Systemof Logic (London: Longmans, 1970),
book VI, ch. xii, sec. 7; Sidgwick,pp. 405/6, 413, 431-433, 489/90; G. E. Moore,
Principia Ethica (New York: Cambridge, 1903), pp., 162-164; R. E. Bales, "Actutilitarianism:Account of Right-makingCharacteristicsor Decision-makingProcedure?" American Philosophical Quarterly, VIII, 3 (July1971): 257-265; Peter
Railton,"Alienation,Consequentialism,and the Demands of Morality,"Philosophy
and Public Affairs, XIII, 2 (Spring 1984): 140-146, 152/3; and Derek Parfit,
Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford, 1984), pp. 24-29.
14 Of course, a utilitariancan construe the good as sentientwelfareor happiness.
I will not discuss this form of utilitarianism;the sentient-welfareteleologist can
interpretmyargumentsand claims mutatis mutandis.
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422
THE JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
ism claims thatactions, motives,institutions,etc. are rightor justifiedjust in case theyrealize as muchhumanwelfareas anyalternative
action,motive,institution,
etc. available (i.e.,just in case theymaximize welfare).Of course, different
conceptionsof welfareare possible, and differentconceptions of utilitarianismresult from these
different
conceptionsof thegood. Traditionalversionsof utilitarianism offersubjectiveconceptionsof welfare.'5They construewelfare
as eitherpleasure or preferencesatisfaction.These theoriesof welfare are subjective,because theymake welfareconsistin or depend
importantly
upon psychologicalfactsabout what people happen to
want.Bycontrast,objectivetheoriesof welfaremaketheconstituents
of welfarelargelynonsubjective;on thisview,a valuable lifeconsists
in such thingsas having a certain kind of character,engaging in
certainkindsof activities,and exercisingcertaincapacities.'6 What
makes such thingsvaluable is largelyindependent of what people
happen to prefer.Of course, different
formsof objectiveutilitarianism resultfromdifferentobjective conceptions of welfare.
Althoughthe claim that utilitarianismcannot accommodate the
personal point of view is oftenurged against traditionalsubjective
versionsof utilitarianism,
it is supposed to be true in virtueof utilitarianism'steleologicalaspects.'7 For thisreason, the personal point
of viewis supposed to tellagainstnonsubjectiveversionsof utilitarianism and nonutilitarianteleological theories as well. Part of my
responseto thisobjection relieson the resourcesavailable to utilitarianism.Utilitarianism
can partiallyaccommodatethe demandsof the
personal point of viewif utilitarianism
is construedas a criterionof
rightness,ratherthan as a decision procedure, and if its theoryof
value is objective.There is no good reason to denytheseresourcesto
utilitarianism.
Since the objection fromthe personal point of viewis
supposed to undermineall teleological theories,however,it is im-
'5 If Fred Berger,Happiness, Justice, and Freedom (Los Angeles: CaliforniaUP,
1984) is correct,J. S. Mill is an importantexception to this general tendency.
Accordingto Berger,Mill defends a versionof objective utilitarianism,
whichI find
quite plausible.
16 Cf. T. M. Scanlon, "Preferenceand Urgency,"thisJOURNAL,
LXXII, 19 (Nov. 6,
1975): 655-669 and "Rights, Goals, and Fairness" reprintedin Waldron; Richard
Kraut,"Two Conceptions of Happiness," Philosophical Review, LXXXVIII, 2 (April
1979): 167-197. Kraut distinguishesbetween subjectiveand objective conceptions
of happiness. Though I thinkKraut is rightto find objective components in our
conception of happiness, it may be easier to see this distinctionas a distinction
between differentconceptions of welfare. For we mightthinkthat our criteriafor
application of the word 'happiness' are predominantlysubjective, even if we can
thinkof welfarein completelynonsubjective terms.
17 See Williams,"A Critique," pp. 79, 81; Nozick, pp. 28/9; Fried, pp. 2, 8, 104.
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UTILITARIANISM
AND THE
PERSONAL
POINT
OF VIEW
423
portantonly that these resources be available to some teleological
theories.
II. THE PERSONAL
POINT
OF VIEW
Williamsformulateshis versionof the claim thatutilitarianism
cannot accommodate the importanceof the personal point of viewas a
claim about personal integrity.He claims that it is a deep commitmentto certainpersonalprojectswhichgivesone's lifemeaningand,
hence, integrity.
Because utilitarianism
assesses the rightnessof, say,
actionsby the consequences of those actions foreveryone'swelfare,
Williamsclaims,utilitarianismrequires agents to assume an impersonal point of view.This impersonalpoint of viewrequiresagentsto
take an impartialattitudetowardtheirown welfare;an agent must
viewhis own projects as no more valuable than those of others.But
thisis inconsistentwiththe concern thatan agent,as an agent,must
have for his own projects and commitments.Utilitarianism,therefore,cannot accommodate the personal point of view.
The pointis thathe [an agent]is identified
withhisactionsas flowing
fromhisprojectsandattitudes
whichin somecaseshe takesseriously
at
thedeepestlevel,as whathislifeis about.. . . It is absurdtodemandof
sucha man,whenthesumscomein fromtheutility
network
whichthe
projectsofothershaveinpartdetermined,
thathe shouldjuststepaside
fromhisownprojectand decisionand acknowledge
thedecisionwhich
utilitarian
calculation
requires.It is to alienatehimin a realsensefrom
hisactionand thesourceof hisactionin hisownconvictions.
It is to
makehimintoa channelbetweenthe inputof everyone'sprojects,
including
his own,and an outputof optimific
decision;but thisis to
neglecttheextenttowhichhisactionsandhisdecisionshavetobe seen
as theactionsand decisionswhichflowfromtheprojectsand attitudes
withwhichhe is mostcloselyidentified.
It is thus,in themostliteral
sense,an attackon hisintegrity
("A Critique,"116/7).
Utilitarianismas a Criterionof Rightness.As Williamsand others
construethisobjection,it is an objection to utilitarianism's
requirementthatagents regard theirprojectsfroman impersonalpoint of
view.'8So construed,the integrity
objection is an objection to utilitarianismas a decision procedure: utilitarianreasoning requires
agents to discounttheirown projects in a waywhichdisregardsthe
personalpointof view.If utilitarianism
were a decisionprocedure,it
would require everyoneto value his projects and commitmentsimpersonallyand, hence, impartially.People would be required to act
on motivesof impartialbenevolenceand to sacrificefrequentlytheir
18
See Williams, "A Critique," pp. 113, 115/6, 123, 128, 135, and Scheffler,
p. 43.
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424
THE JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
own projects and commitments in order to maximize total welfare.
Utilitarian reasoning cannot recognize the special concern that an
agent has for his own projects and commitments and so cannot
recognize the moral importance of the personal point of view.
But utilitarianism does not require the assumption of the impersonal point of view in normal circumstances. It would require this
only if it were a decision procedure. Utilitarianism need provide only
a standard or criterion of rightness and not also a decision procedure. Although some utilitarians may have taken their theory to offer
a decision procedure,l9 utilitarianism need not be and typically has
not been construed in this way. Utilitarianism need only provide the
criterion or standard of rightness.
Joseph Butler, J. S. Mill, Henry Sidgwick, G. E. Moore, and others
have distinguished, in various terms, between moral theories as criteria or standards of rightness and as decision procedures (see fn 14).
Criteria of rightness supply the property or properties in virtue of
which objects of moral assessment, e.g., actions, are right or justified. A decision procedure states how agents should deliberate, reason, and make moral decisions. As such, a decision procedure also
has implications for the content of a moral agent's motives. Because
utilitarianism claims that everyone's happiness matters and that total
happiness be maximized, a utilitarian decision procedure would require, among other things, that agents be disinterestedly benevolent
at all times. But utilitarianism can be a criterion of rightness without
being a decision procedure. Sidgwick makes this point in the following way:
Finally,the doctrinethatUniversalHappiness is the ultimatestandard
mustnot be understoodto implythatUniversalBenevolence is the only
rightor alwaysthe best motiveof action. For, as we have observed,it is
not necessarythatthe end whichgivesthe criterionof rightnessshould
alwaysbe the end at whichwe consciouslyaim: and ifexperienceshows
that the general happiness will be more satisfactorily
obtained if men
it is
frequently
act fromothermotivesthanpure universalphilanthropy,
obvious that these other motivesare reasonably to be preferredon
Utilitarianprinciples(413).
Sidgwick's point is that because of facts such as our limited abilities
to benefit effectivelypeople whom we do not know and the special
importance of personal projects and relationships, utilitywill not be
maximized by universal benevolence. Rather, the standard of utili19Bentham, ch. ii, sec. 10, seems to be construingutilitarianismas a decision
procedure (Berger, pp. 73-77, disputes this). Interestingly,it is almost entirely
opponents of utilitarianismwho make this assumption.
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UTILITARIANISM
AND THE
PERSONAL
POINT
OF VIEW
425
tarianismwillbe bettersatisfiedif we have special concern for ourselves and those near at hand (432-434).
Call an agent who uses utilitarianism
as a decision procedure and
acts withthe intentionof maximizingwelfarea U-agent. There are
familiar utilitarian reasons for thinkingthat we should not be
U-agents. Interpersonal comparisons of welfare and estimatesof
total,long-runconsequences of alternativeactions and policies are
often difficultto make with accuracy. The causal mechanismsin
manyof these counterfactualsituationsare numerousand complex,
our timeis frequentlylimited,and our calculationsare oftensubject
to distortiondue to prejudice, self-interest,
and failureof imagination. For these and otherreasons, therewillbe manycases in which
our estimatesof what would maximize human welfare would be
highlyunreliable.U-agents,therefore,would frequentlyfailto maximize welfare.Of course, U-agentscan make use of rules of thumb.
But these are just summariesof formerprospectiveand retrospective estimates.Any U-agent must continuallyscrutinizethese rules
and departfromthemwheneverhe thinksa new situationsufficiently
differentfrom previous ones. And, of course, both the estimates
embodied in the rules of thumband those used in departingfrom
rules of thumb are subject to the same sort of errors as are the
estimatesthat the rules of thumbwere introducedto avoid.
These limitationson our abilityto make reliableestimatesof consequences and theirvalue present utilitarianreasons for believing
that agents should deliberate,not by attemptingto maximizewelfare,but byappealing to rulesthatare infactjustifiableas contributing to human welfare.These rules willnot be mere rules of thumb,
because they will not functionas aids in utilitariandeliberation.
Rather,moralrules,on thisview,should be appealed to and applied
more or less strictly
and uncritically
in mostcases. The complexityof
the moral rules that are justifiableon utilitariangrounds and the
strictnesswithwhichtheyshould be followeddepends upon just how
serious and general our inabilityto estimateconsequences and their
value is, and thismayvaryamong societiesand individuals.It maybe
thatour inabilitiesas U-agentsare so greatthatwe are neverjustified
in departingfroma relativelycoarse-grainedset of moralrules.20But
it is much more likelythatwe should set aside the moral rules and
deliberateas U-agentsin certainunusual circumstancesand in cases
of conflictsof moral rules.2'When the applicationof generallyoptiMoore, pp. 162-164, thoughtso.
Cf. Mill, Utilitarianism, ch. ii, ? 25 (Berger,pp. 66-73, 82-84); Sidgwick,pp.
401, 426, 429, 453, 461; R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking (New York: Oxford, 1981),
chs. 2 and 3.
20
21
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426
THE JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
mificrules would clearlyfail to maximizethe general welfare(e.g.
and when
and clearlyavoidable suffering)
would produce significant
moral rules, each of which has a utilitarianjustification,conflict,
agents should deliberate as U-agents.22
The utilitarian,then, can construe his theoryas a criterionof
rightnessratherthana decisionprocedure. Our cognitivelimitations
provide us withgood utilitarianreason for acting on valuable motivesand by appeal to valuable rules. By regularlyactingfromthese
motivesand withregard to these rules, we will maximizethe total
value realized by our actions.23
Indeed, as Sidgwickobserves,there is good reason to thinkthat
such a set of moral rules would specify,among other things,that
concernfortheirown projectsand
agentsshould adopt a differential
to knowwhat
them.
It is oftendifficult
close
to
of
others
thewelfare
would benefitothers,and, even when one does know,one is oftenin
a poor positionto produce some of thosebenefitswithoutgreatcost
to oneself.Moreover,thepossessionand pursuitof personalprojects
and the developmentof close personal relationshipsinvolvingmutual concern and commitmentare a source of great utility.Of
course, the utilitarianjustificationof the personal point of view
willrecognize obligations
should not be exaggerated.Utilitarianism
to assistotherswhen significantharm can be avoided or significant
benefitprovided withoutgreat cost to the agent. But even these
22
Of course, in some cases of conflictwe maybe poor U-agents,and theremaybe
generallyoptimificpriorityrules that should, therefore,be followed.
23
It maybe useful to emphasize that,insofaras it is a theoryof rightaction, this
utilitarianaccount of moral rules is an act-utilitariantheory.The rightnessof actions is determinedby theiractual contributionto human welfare.But agents need
not and should not deliberate as U-agents. Because of our unreliabilityas calculators of welfare,we would oftenbe betteroffacting from"nonutilitarian"motives
and rules. Part of our unreliabilityas U-agentsis our frequentinabilityto discriminate those cases in which the best action would involvedepartingfromestablished
rules. Our motivationaland cognitiveabilitiesare such that we could depart from
established rules and maximize welfare in this case only by being such as also to
depart fromestablishedrules in other cases in whichdoing so would not maximize
welfare.There are good utilitarianreasons, therefore,for acting fromsturdymotivesand established rules thatone knowswill sometimesfail to maximizewelfare.
By acting fromoptimificmotivesand in accord withoptimificrules, we will almost
certainlyperformsome actions that are wrong. But thisjust shows that the assessmentof particularactions is not the most importantdimension of assessmentfora
utilitarian.For by acting fromoptimificmotivesand in accord withoptimificrules,
we will mazimize the total value realized by our actions.
Even if agents should typicallyact fromsturdymotivesand in accord withestablished rules,theremaynonethelessbe good utilitarianreason forthemto deliberate
as U-agents in order to avert disaster,adjudicate conflictsamong moral rules, and
criticallyassess the value of theirmoral rules in a "cool hour" when theircalculations are less subject to distortion.
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UTILITARIANISM
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427
other-regarding
obligationscan be carriedout in waysthatare minimallydisruptiveof agents' personal projectsand commitments,
e.g.,
bymeans of public taxationschemesor mutual-aidorganizations.In
normalcircumstances,therefore,utilitarianism
can justifya limited
but nonethelessdifferential
concernforpersonalprojectsand so will
not require agentsto be foreversettingaside theirown projectsand
in the impersonalpursuitof welfaremaximization.24
A
commitments
utilitarianmaythusdefendhis theoryas a standardof rightnessand
claim to accommodate the moral importanceof the personal point
of view.
There are two worriesabout this defense of utilitarianism,
however, which need to be addressed. This defense depends upon the
distinctionbetween criteriaof rightnessand decision procedures.
The firstworryconcernsthelegitimacyof thisdistinction;the second
concerns the adequacy of the defense thisdistinctionaffords.
The Publicity Objection. Some would claim thatutilitarianismcannot be maintainedas a criterionor standardof rightnessratherthan
a decision procedure. In order for a moral theoryto provide a
standardof rightconduct, theywould claim,it must be a standard
whichcan be taughtand whichcan serve as a publicjustificationof
actions,policies,institutions,
etc.25 Utilitarianism,
therefore,cannot
distinguishbetweencriteriaof rightnessand decision procedures so
as to justifynonutilitarianmotivesand uncriticalacceptance of a
pluralityof moral rules. Williamsmakes thisobjection as follows.
There is no distinctiveplace for . . . utilitarianism
unless it is, within
fairlynarrowlimits,a doctrineabout how one should decide whatto do.
This is because its distinctivedoctrineis about whatacts are right,and,
especially,for utilitarians,the only distinctiveinterestor point of the
question what acts are right,relates to the situationof deciding to do
them("A Critique," 128).
Williamsalso referswith approval to John Rawls's insistencethat
utilitarianism
not violate a publicitycondition. Rawls writes
We should note, then,thatutilitarianism,
as I have definedit,is theview
that the principleof utilityis the correctprinciplefor society'spublic
Cf. Sidgwick,pp. 432-434; Scheffler,p. 15; and Railton.
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 133, 177-182, 582; Williams, "A Critique," pp. 123, 125, 128, 135; Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern
Moral Theories," thisJOURNAL, LXXIII, 14 (Aug. 12, 1976): 453-466; Donagan, pp.
198-200; and Lomasky, pp. 275, 279. Cf. Brian Medlin, "Ethical Egoism and
UltimateMoral Principles," reprintedin D. Gauthier,ed., Morality and Rational
Self-interest(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
24
25
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428
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of
Whatwewanttoknowiswhichconception
conception
ofjustice..
equilibrium
in reflective
judgments
ourconsidered
justicecharacterizes
Unlessone maintains
andbestservesas thepublicmoralbasisofsociety.
one is not a
thatthisconceptionis givenby the principleof utility,
utilitarian(A TheoryofJustice, 32).
Rawls's objection to the distinction between criteria of rightness and
decision procedures rests upon his acceptance of the publicity constraint. This constraint can be construed as a conceptual constraint
upon what can count as a moral theory or, alternatively, as a substantive and revisable moral belief.
Construed as a formal or conceptual claim which would undermine the distinction between criteria of rightness and decision procedures, the publicity constraint simply begs the question against
teleological moral theories. Whether the true moral theory should be
recognized, taught, or recommended as a decision procedure are
themselves practical questions the answers to which, the teleologist
claims, depend upon the intrinsic and extrinsic value that this sort of
publicity produces. Nor is this separation of truth and acceptance
value peculiar to ethics (cf. Railton, 154/5). Not only do we distinguish the truth and acceptance value of nonmoral claims, but we
recognize, as reasonable, claims that certain facts should be suppressed. We may not always thinksuppression is justified, but we find
such claims intelligible and take them seriously. It is conceivable that
truth and acceptance value are not separate in the case of moral
truth, but this needs to be argued.26
The publicity constraint, therefore, must be construed as a substantive moral claim. Here, I think, a utilitarian should claim that
there is no reason to think that utilitarianism will violate the publicityconstraint and that, in those counterfactual situations in which it
would, this constitutes no objection to utilitarianism.
In the actual world utilitarianism satisfies the publicity constraint.
Publicity would be violated only if utilitarianism could not be recognized as the standard of rightness and utilitarian reasoning was
always inappropriate. But a utilitarian commitment to moral rules
26 Of course, it would be difficult
to separate moral truthand acceptance value if
moral realismwere rejected. If moral claims could be not true but onlyacceptable,
as some noncognitivistsclaim, or if the truthof moral claims consisted in their
claim, then moral truthand acceptance value
acceptability,as some constructivists
could not be distinguishedso as to justifythe claim that utilitarianismcan be a
standard of rightnesswithoutbeing a decision procedure. But, of course, it takes a
separate argumentto show thatmoral realismis false. For defense of moral realism,
see my "Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and
Queerness," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, LXII, 2 (June 1984): 111-125,
and Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.
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UTILITARIANISM
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429
thatare more thanrules of thumband to the moralvalue of motives
other than benevolence is compatiblewiththe recognitionthat the
moraljustificationfor these rules and motivesconsistsin theircontributionto human welfare.Moreover,utilitarianassessmentis appropriatein some circumstances.Circumstancesin which the relevantcalculationscan be made accuratelycan limitthe applicationof
moral rules and call for utilitariandeliberation; conflictsamong
moral rules,each of whichhas a utilitarianjustification,can call for
utilitariandeliberation; and some agents in some circumstances
should take the time and effortto assess the consequences of past
and continued adherence to a particularset of moral rules. This
is psychologically
possibleand does not
attitudetowardutilitarianism
offendagainst the publicitycondition.
Of course,theremustbe possiblecircumstances,even ifwe cannot
representthem,in whichit would be best thatmostpeople not even
recognize utilitarianismas providingthe standard or criterionof
rightconduct. Under these circumstances,utilitarianismwould indeed be an "esoteric morality"(Sidgwick,489/90). But this is a
possibilityfor any moral theory.For any moral theory,there are
possible circumstances in which its recognition and application
would satisfythe theoryworse than recognitionand application of
The proper response of anyone,who, as
some alternativetheory.27
theorist,believesthe theoryin question to be true,is to thinkthatin
thosecircumstancesthe true theoryshould be suppressedand some
false theoryrecognized. Publicityis a plausible but revisable subA moraltheorythatviolatedpublicityin
stantivemoralcommitment.
the actual worldwould be less plausible forthatreason. But the fact
thatthereare merelypossible circumstancesin whicha moral theory
would require violationof publicityis not a factpeculiar to utilitarior to any
anismand is not itself,I think,an objection to utilitarianism
moral
other
theory.
So, a defense of utilitarianismthat relies on the distinctionbetweencriteriaof rightnessand decision proceduresis legitimateand
is not undermined by considerationsof publicity.The utilitarian
27
Aren't there circumstancesin whicha Kantian would thinkpublicityshould be
violated? Imagine people who have hopelessly false beliefs about what a rational
being as such would will. In such circumstances,agents mightbetter satisfythe
Categorical Imperativeif theydo not alwaysdeliberate about how to satisfyit. They
mightbetterapproximate how rational beings as such would act by acting directly
on a particularset of moral rules. In such circumstances,mightnot a Kantian want
to suppress the Categorical Imperativeand advocate some particularset of moral
rules which a rational being as such would will? Indeed, we mightwonder whether
these circumstancesare merelypossible.
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430
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claimsthatthevalue of publicitydepends upon the effectsof publicityon human welfare.There are possible circumstancesin whicha
utilitarianwould and should violate the publicitycondition.In normal circumstances,however,there is no reason for a utilitarianto
violate publicity.28
The Value of Autonomy.Even if the distinctionbetweencriteriaof
rightnessand decision procedures is legitimate,one may wonder
whetherthe defense that it affordsutilitarianismis adequate. The
objection fromthe personal point of view can be construed as an
criterionof rightness.Even ifutilitarianobjection to utilitarianism's
ismdoes not require agentsto adopt a purelyimpersonalattitude,it
stillassigns moral value impersonally.Is thisfeatureof utilitarianism consistentwiththe recognitionof the moral importanceof the
personal point of view?
I am not convinced that this sort of impersonalityis morallyobjectionable. Is it objectionable for a standard of rightnessto be
impersonal?Do I care whethervalue is assigned to projects impersonally,ifI am not requiredto viewmyown projectsimpersonally?If
fromthe personal point of
not, then the objection to utilitarianism
is a standardof
viewhas now been answered:because utilitarianism
rightnessand not a decision procedure, it need not and in factwill
not require agents to adopt an impersonalattitude.But let us see
of a
what can be said to someone who thinksthat the impartiality
utilitarianstandardof rightnessundervaluesthe moral significance
of agents' projects and commitments.
If the possession and pursuit of personal projects and commitare
mentsthatare supposed to be constitutiveof personal integrity
so important,then a utilitarian'saccount of human welfareshould
is
can claimthatself-determination
recognizethisfact.Utilitarianism
a dominantcomponentin an agent's welfareand that,therefore,a
certain amount of personal autonomyis a necessarycondition for
realizingthiskindof value. Because possession,pursuit,and realization of personal projects and commitmentsare dominant componentsin an agent's good, freedomto formulateand pursue personal
projects will trump other less important intrinsicand extrinsic
goods. On such a theory,one person's reasonable and important
projects will not be held hostage to others' whimsor preferences.
28 Cf. Sidgwick,pp. 489/90; Scheffler,
pp. 45-52; Railton,pp. 154/5; and Parfit,
pp. 24-51, especially40-43. Railton and Schefflerappear to assume thatutilitarianism does violate the publicityconstraintand argue that thisis not so bad. I agree
thatviolationof publicityis not so bad when it is necessary,but I do not agree thatit
is actuallynecessary.
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UTILITARIANISM
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431
This response presupposes an objective theoryof welfare;it would
depart from traditionalsubjective versions of utilitarianism.But
there is no reason to rule out objective theoriesof welfareor the
utilitariantheoriesthatincorporatethem.In thisway,objectiveutilitarianismmightclaimthatit accommodatesthe moralimportanceof
the personal point of view.29
Is the Impartial Value of AutonomyEnough? This response may
well not satisfythose who thinkthat the impersonalassignmentof
value undervalues the moral significanceof agents' projects. For
their objection presumablyis not that utilitarianismundervalues
projectsbut thatit undervaluestheagent's projects. Their worryis
about theimpersonalpointof view,and thisworryis not assuaged by
takingaccount of the personal point of view, as it were, fromthe
can treatautonomy
impersonalpoint of view. Even if utilitarianism
as a dominantgood, it mustbe impartialbetween the autonomyof
differentpeople.
Williamspresentsan example whichillustratesthisissue. His example is this.Jimis a foreignexplorerwho comes upon a smallSouth
Americanvillagein whichan armycaptainis about to execute twenty
innocentvillagersfor"purelypolitical" reasons. As an honored visitor,Jim is offeredthe privilegeof shootingone of the twentyvillagers. If he does, the other nineteenvillagerswill be released unharmed (of thisthereis no doubt!). If he does not, the captain will
shoot all twentyas planned. No otheroptionsare reasonablyopen to
Jim(Williams'sstipulation).Not implausibly,Williamsclaimsthatin
these circumstancesit is clear that Jim would maximize welfare,
including,we mightadd, personal projects, by killingthe one villager, and so utilitarianismrequires him to do so ("A Critique,"
98/9; Williamsis not explicitabout this,but, presumably,the commitmentthatutilitarianism
requiresJimto abandon here is a moral
commitmentnot to killinnocentpeople). Jim'scase illustrateswhat,
utilitarianism
allows
on thisview,is the problemwithutilitarianism:
the impersonalvalue of an agent's projects to exhaust theirmoral
significance(Scheffler,9, 61).
Should We Incorporatethe Personal Point of View into Morality?
One mightaccept this criticismof utilitarianismand demand that
moralityaccommodate the personal point of view. One mightthen
in favorof a moraltheorythatincorporateswhat
rejectutilitarianism
Schefflercalls "agent-centeredprerogatives"(chs. 2 and 3). On such
29 This objective utilitariandefense mightbe compared withNozick's "utilitarianism of rights"; see Nozick, pp. 28-30.
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a theory,the moral significanceof agents' projects is not exhausted
by their impersonalvalue; an agent's projects have moral significance out of proportionto theirimpersonalvalue. Agent-centered
prerogativespermitbut do not require agentsto maximizethe good
and so would produce whatSchefflercalls a "hybrid"moral theory.
Rightness,on thishybridview,is defineddisjunctively:
an action,say,
is rightjust in case it either maximizesthe good or preservesthe
agent's projects and commitmentsin the appropriate way.30This
hybridtheoryis superior to utilitarianism,
according to Scheffler,
because itreflects"the naturalindependence" of an agent's concern
for his own projects and commitments.3' A hybridmoral theory
containingagent-centeredprerogatives,therefore,mightseem the
best wayto recognize the importanceof the personal point of view.
But the utilitarianneed not accept thiscriticismand so need not
move to a hybridmoraltheory.Impersonalmoraltheoriescan assign
moralvalue to the commitments
of agentslikeJim,but theyrefuseto
assign Jim's commitmentsany special value because theyare his.
Jim'scommitmentsare important,but theyare no more important
thanthose of the nineteenvillagerswhomhe could save. In thisway,
theimpersonalpointof viewis impartial.It is impartiality
of thiskind
whichwe expect a moral theoryto reflect.Nor is thiskindof impartiality peculiar to utilitarianism or even to teleological moral
theories. Many nonteleological theories recognize duties to forgo
one's own good in order to preventgreat harm to or provide great
benefitforothers.It is, of course, a substantivemoralclaimthatit is
thiskindof impartiality
whichis characteristicof the moral point of
view,but it is a plausible claim whichcannot be rejected lightly.If
thisclaimis correct,thenit is no indictmentof utilitarianism
thatit is
impersonal.
This defense of utilitarianismdoes not force us to deny the importanceof the personal point of view.The personalpoint of viewis
important,and we can recognize thiswithoutmakingmoralitycaptureitsimportance.The worriesthatthe importanceof the personal
pointof viewraisescan be viewednot as moralworriesbut as worries
30 Scheffler,pp. 17f. discusses more specificformulationsof the second disjunct.
In particular,the scope of agent-centeredprerogativesdoes not include just any
personal projects or commitments;morallyobnoxious projects and commitments
receive littleor no protection fromagent-centeredprerogatives.
31Scheffler, pp. 56, 79, 116. Schefflerseems ambivalentabout whatconclusion to
draw. At times,he explicitlyrefusesto conclude thathis hybridtheoryis superior to
sophisticatedformsof utilitarianismof the sortdiscussed in pp. 423-427 and 430/1
above (see Scheffler,pp. 65 and 77). But he does claim that the objection to
utilitarianismbased upon the personal point of view is well founded (pp. 6, 13, 56,
90, 116). If this objection to utilitarianismis well founded, then a hybridtheory
which avoids this objection is presumablysuperior to utilitarianism,other things
being equal.
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UTILITARIANISM
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433
about morality.Our sympathiesforJimneed not be moral sympathies. Cases like Jim's can be dilemmatic,if they are dilemmatic,
because theyraise serious questionsabout thejustificationof morality.We can imaginethatifJimis a decent fellow-having the right
sortof motives-he maybe haunted by doing as utilitarianmorality
requiresand killingan innocentvillager.He mayexperience doubts
and serious personal anguish.We maycome to wonderwhetherJim
has reason or enough reason to do as moralityrequires in these
circumstances.These are worriesabout thejustificationor supremacy of moral demands, not about the correctnessof a utilitarian
account of morality.
Two preliminarypoints should be made about thisinterpretation
of the importanceof the personal point of view.First,thisinterpretationof the conflictbetween utilitarianismand the personal point
of view makes the externalistassumption that it is a substantive
questionwhethermoralconsiderationsprovidean agentwithreason
or sufficient
reason foraction, the answerto whichdepends upon a
substantivetheoryof reasons for action or rationalityand, in all
probability,a substantivetheoryof human welfare.An internalist
of moraldemandsmightdenythis,claimingthat
about therationality
"the concept of morality"makesthisconflictinconceivableor unintelligible.It is simplypart of the concept of a moral consideration
that moral considerationsnecessarilyprovide reason or conclusive
reason for action.32The dispute between internalismand externalism raises large issues, whichcannot be settledhere. But there are
familiarreasons to doubt thisinternalistassumption,whichshould at
least force an opponent of utilitarianismto provide a defense of
internalism.As many internaliststhemselvesrecognize, common
moral experience and philosophical reflectioncan lead one to ask
whetherthere are good or sufficientreasons to do as moralityrequires. Call this the amoralist's challenge. Internalismclaims that
we can rule out thischallenge as incoherentby appeal to "the concept of morality."But the amoralist'schallenge to the rationalityof
moral demands not onlyseems intelligiblebut deserves to be taken
seriously.Externalismdoes not claimthattheamoralist'schallengeis
unanswerable;itclaimsonlythatthischallengeis intelligibleand that
it can be addressed onlyin conjunctionwitha substantivetheoryof
reasons foraction. The factthatour abilityto representthe worries
32 Cf. H. A. Prichard, "Does Moral PhilosophyRest on a Mistake?" reprintedin
his Moral Obligation (New York: Oxford, 1949); W. D. Falk, " 'Ought' and Motivation" reprintedin W. Sellars and H. Hospers, eds., Readings in Ethical Theory
1952), pp. 494/5, 499-501; and R. M. Hare,
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford, 1952), pp. 20, 31, 169, 197 and
Moral Thinking, pp. 21, 23/4, 83-86.
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whichthe personal point of view raises as worabout utilitarianism
ries about the rationalityor supremacyof moral demands depends
upon these externalistclaims, therefore,does not seem to be a
weaknessin thiswayof representingthe importanceof the personal
point of view.33
Second, on this interpretation,the worries about utilitarianism
whichthe personalpointof viewraisescan be representedas worries
about either the rationalityor the supremacyof moral demands. I
assume thatif somethingis in one's interestthen one has reason to
bringthatthingabout. Rationalegoismclaimsthatone has reason to
do x if and only if x is in one's own interest.The personal point of
viewcan be seen as representingtheinterestsof theagent.If rational
whichthe peregoism is true,then the worriesabout utilitarianism
sonal point of view raises can be representedas worriesabout the
rationalityof morality.Do agents have reason to do as utilitarian
moralityrequires?This question is answeredby a substantivetheory
of human welfarewhich explains to what extent the demands of
utilitarianmorality,in particularits demands to benefitothers,promote or are constitutiveof the moral agent's well-being.For example, an objective conception of human welfare which recognizes
importantsocial or other-regardingcomponents in an individual's
good can provide the basis of a strongjustificationof utilitarian
moralityeven on rational-egoistassumptions.(Indeed, if there are
componentsto an agent's good, there
both self-and other-regarding
be
a
reason to do as utilitarianismrerational-egoist
may always
quires,even ifthereis not alwaysconclusiverational-egoistreason to
do so.) I willsay somethingbelow about a rational-egoistaccount of
the rationalityof utilitarianism's
implicationsin exceptionalcircumstances,such as Jim's.
Alternatively,
if rationalegoism is false and agentshave reason to
do as utilitarianmoralityrequires independentlyof its contribution
to theirown well-being,we can representthe worriesabout utilitarianism which the personal point of view raises as worriesabout the
supremacyof moraldemands. Even ifrationalegoismis false,agents
presumablystillhave prudentialreasons for action, and these prudential reasons can conflictwith the reasons for action which,on
such a theoryof rationality,other-regardingfeatures of morality
themselvesprovide.One maythenwonderwhetheragentshave sufficientor conclusivereason to do as utilitarianmoralityrequires.
I shallnot attemptto decide here betweenthesealternativerepre33 For a fuller defense of externalism,see William Frankena, "Obligation and
Motivationin Recent Moral Philosophy" reprintedin his Perspectiveson Morality,
K. Goodpaster, ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: UniversityPress, 1976) and my Moral
Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, chapter 3.
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435
sentations of the conflict between utilitarian morality and the personal point of view. Rather, I want to stress what is common to them;
both represent the worries that the personal point of view raises as
worries about the justifiability of moral demands rather than as
moral worries.
This interpretation of the true conflict between utilitarianism and
the personal point of view is confirmed by Williams's claims in "Persons, Character and Morality":
A man who has such a groundprojectwillbe requiredby Utilitarianism
to giveup whatit requiresin a givencasejust ifitconflictswithwhathe is
whenall of thecausally
requiredto do as an impersonalutility-maximizer
relevantconsiderationsare in. That is quite an absurd requirement.But
the Kantian,who can do ratherbetter than that,still cannot do well
enough. For impartialmorality,ifthe conflictreallydoes arise,mustbe
requiredto win;and thatcannot necessarilybe a reasonable demand on
theagent.There can come a pointat whichit is quite unreasonablefora
man to giveup, in thename of the impartialgood orderingof theworld
of moralagents,somethingwhichis a conditionof his havinginterestin
being around in the world at all (14).
The fact that Williams here takes Kantian views of morality to be
equally guilty of making unreasonable demands upon agents supports the claim that the real worry latent in the conflict between
utilitarianism and the personal point of view is not the worry within
morality about which moral theory is correct but the worry about
morality concerning the rationality or supremacy of moral demands.34 We can recognize the importance of the personal point of
view without granting it moral importance.
Indeed, not only can we recognize the importance of the personal
point of view without granting it moral importance; we should not
concede it moral importance. Not only is Scheffler's preference for a
hybrid moral theory incorporating agent-centered prerogatives unnecessary; hybrid moral theories actually misrepresent the connection between morality and the personal point of view. There are two
reasons for this.
First, the impartialityamong various people's goods which is characteristic of utilitarianism and other teleological theories represents
important considered beliefs about the nature and demands of mo3 Though we arrivedat our viewsseparately,I would like to record myagreement
on thispoint withSarah Conly's suggestivereviewof Scheffler'sbook in the Philosophical Review, XCIII, 3 (uly 1984): 489-492. Interestingly,this theme is not
emphasized in her discussion of Williams;see Conly, "Utilitarianismand Integrity"
The Monist, LXVI, 2 (April 1983): 298-311. Though Railton's title suggests this
interpretationof Williams'sargument,Railton does not develop thisinterpretation
fully.But see Railton, pp. 163n-164n.
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436
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ralitybetterthan a hybridmoral theorythat incorporatesthe personal point of view into morality.An importantmoral belief is that
the moral perspectiveis an impartialperspective;moral demands
frequentlyrequireus to put aside purelypersonal projectsand commitmentsin order to preventharm to or do good for others. One
argumentforthe impartialcharacterof moralityparallelsScheffler's
own argumentagainst agent-centeredrestrictions.Schefflerdistinguishes between his own agent-centeredprerogativeswhichpermit
but do not require an agent to maximizethe good and agent-centeredrestrictionsthatdo not even permitthe agent to maximizethe
good. Agent-centeredrestrictionsare based upon the claim thatit is
sometimeswrongto maximizethe good. Schefflerdefendswhat he
thesis:althoughthe naturalindependence of the
calls theasymmetry
personal point of viewprovidesa principledrationaleforagent-centered prerogatives,there is no principledrationale for agent-centeredrestrictions
(ch. 4, esp. 82-100). In particular,Schefflerargues
that a moral theoryincorporatingagent-centeredrestrictionsdoes
not represent a rational response to the demands utilitarianism
places upon agents.For example,againstNozick's construalof rights
as side constraints(Nozick, 28-30), Schefflerclaims,ifa violationof
a rightis a bad thing,then it is rational to want to minimizethe
violationof rights-even if we must violate one person's rightsin
order to do this. Similarly,ifJim's projects and commitmentsare
valuable, then so are those of the nineteenvillagerswhose lives he
could save, and it is rational to minimizethe violation of people's
projects and commitmentsas utilitarianisminstructsJim to. But,
againstScheffler,if these violationsof people's basic projects are of
disvalue, their minimizationis arguablyobligatoryand not merely
permissible.Moreover,thisjudgment seems to be confirmedbyconsidered moral beliefs. Regrettableas this kind of situationis, one
oughtto violateone person's right,say,to libertyin order to prevent
a greaternumber of equally serious violationsof liberty(or some
equally weightyright).Also, disagreeable as thisis,Jimought to kill
the one innocentvillagerin order to save nineteen other innocent
lives. Moralityappears impartialamong people's good in the way
utilitarianism
and other teleological theoriesclaim.
Second, ifwe were to accept the demand thatmoralityaccommodate the personal point of view, as Schefflerdoes, we would find
ourselvesunable to ask a question that,we have seen, is surelyintelligible and legitimate.We would be unable to ask whetherthe demands of moralityare reallyrationalor justifiable.If moralitywere
forced to incorporatethe personal point of view,we could not get
whatare at least apparentconflictsbetweenthe demands of morality
and the interestsof agents.Common sense and philosophicalreflec-
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UTILITARIANISM AND THE PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW
437
tion upon the demands thatmoralitycan make lead one to question
whetherthere are alwaysgood and sufficientreasons to be moral.
Philosophical deliberationabout the demands of morality,the nature of an agent's good, and the nature of rationalitymayvindicate
the rationalityor supremacyof moral demands. But, even if we are
able to answerthe question, Whybe moral?,we need to be able to
formulatethe question. If we are to be able to formulatethe question about the rationalityor supremacyof morality,we mustbe able
to representwhat are at least apparent conflictsbetween the demandsof moralityand theinterestsof agents.Hybridmoraltheories
could representapparent conflictswithinmorality,but not the conflictsbetween moralityand the agent's interestwithwhich we are
Since we are familiarwiththese apparent conflicts,it is a
familiar.35
virtueof moraltheoriesthatare impartialin thewayin whichutilitarianismis that theyallow, indeed, lead one to expect such conflicts,
and a defectof hybridmoraltheoriesthattheycannotrepresentsuch
conflicts.
or supremacyof morality
If it is reallya worryabout therationality
whichthe personal point of view raises, then the personal point of
view presentsno objection to utilitarianaccounts of morality.Indeed, as Williams'slater writingstestify,the worryabout morality
which the personal point of view raises is not a worrypeculiar to
or even to teleologicalmoral theories.
utilitarianism
of moralityraiseslarge issues whichare indepenThe justifiability
dent of the meritsof utilitarianism.Nevertheless,the defense of
utilitarianism
givenabove does suggestcertainclaims.An objective
version of utilitarianismthat recognizes autonomyas a dominant
good can explainwhythepursuitand realizationof personalprojects
is a standardor
is so important.Because thisversionof utilitarianism
criterionof rightnessand not a decision procedure,it can and will
justify agents in adopting a differentialconcern for their own
projects and the welfareof those close to them. Even on rationalegoistassumptions,therefore,agentswillnormallyhave reason to do
as utilitarianism
requires.
Of course, not all circumstancesare normal.Jim'scase illustrates
3 It mightseem thathybridtheoriescould representthe conflictbetween moralbecause agent-centeredprerogativesdo not incorporate the
ityand self-interest,
personal point of view completely into morality.Scheffler,pp. 17f. claims that
agent-centeredprerogativeswould not protectmorallyobnoxious personal projects
and commitments(e.g. those of Caligula or Hitler). So hybridtheoriesleave room
for conflictbetween moralityand these personal projects and commitments.But I
doubt that any plausible theoryof agent good would recognize these conflictsas
conflictsbetween moralityand self-interest.In any case, the apparent conflicts
between moralityand self-interest
withwhichwe are familiarare not limitedto such
cases.
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438
THE JOURNAL
OF PHILOSOPHY
can sometimesdemand of agentsa greatdeal. It is
how utilitarianism
true thatifJimis a decent fellow-having the rightsort of motives
he maysufferifhe complieswiththe demand of utilitarianmoralwould suffer
just as
itythathe killan innocentvillager.But surelyJim
much if not more, assumingagain that he is a decent fellow,if he
refusesto complywiththedemandsof utilitarianmorality.Here too,
he mayexperience doubts and anguish. Indeed, thistimehe would
be haunted not by the death of one innocent villagerbut by the
nineteen innocent lives he could have saved. It seems to be the
situation, notutilitarian morality,thatis hard on Jim.The factthat
Jim may be poorly offno matterwhat he does is one reason the
situationis dilemmatic.
Fortunately,these kinds of dilemma are rare. In normal circumstances,utilitarianism'saccount of moralityis compatible with the
concern forone's own projects
of a differential
moral permissibility
and the welfareof those close to one. In some circumstances,an
impartialweightingof everyone'sgood will require agents to sacriin orderto prevent
ficeimportantpersonalprojectsor commitments
greatharmto, or produce greatbenefitfor,others.This is the sortof
demand we expect a moral theoryto make. And where the sacrifice
demanded of the agent is great,he maytypicallytake consolationin
the knowledgethathis sufferingwould be no less were he to resist
the demands of morality.
III.
CONCLUSION
Considerationof the objection fromthe personal point of view reThe utilitariancan offera parveals the resources of utilitarianism.
betweencriteriaof rightnessand decitial rebuttalbydistinguishing
sion proceduresand claimingthat,because his theoryis a criterionof
rightnessand not a decision procedure,he can justifyagents' differentialconcernfortheirown welfareand thewelfareof thoseclose to
theoryof value allows further
in utilitarianism's
them.The flexibility
rebuttal of this objection; objective versions of utilitarianismcan
or autonomy as a dominant good which
treat self-determination
trumpseven large magnitudesof lessergoods such as pleasure. After
are exhausted,though,thereremains
the resourcesof utilitarianism
a worry,generatedby the personal point of view,about utilitarianBut thisworryis correctlyviewed,not as a moral
ism's impartiality.
as a moral theory,but as a
worryabout the meritsof utilitarianism
worryabout moralityconcerning the rationalityor supremacyof
impartialmoral demands. Whether or not this worrycan be answered, the fact that it arises supports rather than underminesa
utilitarianaccount of morality.
DAVID
Case WesternReserve University
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0. BRINK