Morten Ougaard
Copenhagen Business School.
mo.ikl@cbs.dk
A modified Poulantzasian Perspective on Geopolitics and Capitalism
Paper for the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm 9-11
September 2010
1. Introduction
This paper is written for a conference section on "The return of the state? Capitalism and
Geopolitics after the Crisis of Neoliberalism" and a panel herein on "Theorizing the dialectics
of Global Capitalism and Geopolitics". These labels situate the paper politically in the context
of the present global conjuncture ("after the crisis of neoliberalism"), and academically in
the context of a recent lively debate about capitalism and geopolitics which is set in the
broader context of historical materialist theories of capitalism, the state, imperialism, and
the international system. By way of an introduction I will offer a few comments on these
contexts.
The present international conjuncture (a concept that could call for a lengthy discussion in
its own right) is not only marked by the aftermath of the financial crisis and the lingering
recession, but also by the rise of the emerging economies, the process of adjusting formal
power relations in international institutions to new realities, noteworthy in the rise of the
G20 to potentially the most important global policy coordination forum, the American transition to the Obama administration with declared ambitions of ending wars, making peace in
the Middle East and revitalizing American multilateralism, and the increased political attention to climate change concomitant with a disappointing outcome from COP 15 in Copenhagen. We are in an international situation that appears to be quite different from just a few
years ago.
The lively theoretical debates I am referring have particularly been conducted in the pages of
the journals Cambridge Review of International Affairs and Historical Materialism and have
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been triggered among other things by the surge of scholarly debate on globalization, by
some key interventions in these debates, most noteworthy Hardt and Negri's Empire (2000)
and David Harvey's The New Imperialism (2003), and in the real world by the Bush administration's war against Saddam Hussein. The debates have engaged with several questions
that are central for historical materialist analyses of international relations and international
political economy.
One theme in these debates concern the question whether capitalism requires a system of
multiple states for its reproduction so that the inter-state system is inherent in the capitalist
mode of production (CPM), or the interstate system predated capitalism but has become
essential to its continuation, or the multiplicity of states although being a historical fact is
not in any way functionally related to the logic of capital. A related issue is whether geopolitics and interstate competition on one side and capitalist competition on the other represent
two separate logics or one, or perhaps two relatively autonomous logics that nevertheless
are parts of the same larger systemic package, and in that case, which of the two, if any, has
primacy (Teschke & Lacher 2007, Wood 2002, 2006, Callinicos 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Is a
more or less autonomous logic of geopolitical competition compatible at all with historical
materialism's research programme, or is it a problematic import of a "realist moment" from
structural neo-realism, a major intellectual rival (Pozo-Martin 2007)?
These questions imply another one, namely whether a global or transnational capitalist state
is emerging, as argued by Robinson (2002, 2004), is theoretically possible from the perspective of historical materialism but not today a reality in any meaningful sense, or simply impossible in capitalist society because CPM requires the interstate system.
Inherent in these problems are also questions about class and the relationship between
capitalists and the state. Are the contemporary bourgeoisies, as they were labelled in classical historical materialism, primarily constituted at the national level or have we seen the
emergence of a transnational or Atlantic ruling class (Pijl 1998, 2007)? Answers to this question have implications for how the above questions are addressed.
Another major theme has been the nature and trajectory of US hegemony. Is it in decline or
is it more pervasive than ever; was the second Gulf war and the toppling of Saddam Hussein
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a logical product of the systemic requirements of US capitalism or was it, in Sutcliffe's summary of Arrighi's analysis, a "colossal strategic miscalculation" by the Bush Administration
(Sutcliffe 2006: 76, Arrighi 2005)? Is the future prospect for a world led by the US "war
without end" (Wood 2003: 143 ff) or are other scenarios plausible?
This again leads on to several issues of meta-theory and methodology. One question is how
determinate a theory of geopolitics can be? Is the task to develop concise theory-driven
models of systemic explanation that in principle would allow for prediction, or are the actual
outcomes so un-determined and depending on multiple historical contingencies that theory,
when charged with explaining historical outcomes, only can be an open-ended list of potential explanatory factors to be employed in empirical analysis?
Furthermore, how does the issues under debate relate to the different levels of abstraction
in Marx's conceptual universe, what is the appropriate movement from the abstract to the
concrete when dealing with them, and how are they located in Marx's distinction between
‘formal abstractions’ and 'real abstractions'? What is the place of the theory of CPM in the
larger construct of historical materialism, and what would be the proper place of notions
about geopolitics? Callinicos, for instance, emphasizes that the movement form the abstract
to the concrete is not an exercise in deduction; at each lower level of abstraction new 'determinations' are added through intellectual processes that cannot be reduced to a process
of logical deduction, and this also pertains to geo-politics. He also maintains that "the international system is one dimension of the capitalist mode of production" (Callinicos 2009a:
103). Sam Ashman, while concurring with this (Ashman 2009: 42) also alluded to another
possibility by pointing to Poulantzas' distinction between 'modes of production' that strictly
speaking does not exist in reality, and the real existing "historically determined social formations" where relations of production are reproduced (Ashman 2009:41).
Ashman brings this up in the context of a debate on the relevance and potency of the notion
of "uneven and combined development" for the analysis of the issues at hand, and a debate
about the status of this notion in the larger theoretical edifice. This theme, which I will touch
upon again below, signals that an important part of the discussion relates to the understanding of how the capitalist relations of production have been reproduced at an ever larger
scale historically in a world composed of multiple territorial nation states.
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All of these questions are important and have implications for the theorization of capitalism
and geo-politics but none of them are quite simple, and it is not possible to engage thoroughly with all of them in this paper. On the other hand, however, they are interlinked so
that the answer to one question has implications for or depend on how others are approached. Therefore, and to give background on "where I am coming from", before I focus
on a few issues that I consider particularly important I will, as a preliminary, simply assert my
position on some of the questions, without trying to justify or substantiate them.
2. Preliminary remarks
The first asserted premise is the validity and relevance of the distinction between relatively
autonomous levels in society, the economic, the political, and the ideational. I find that if
you accept the distinction at all, the notion of relative autonomy is the only acceptable alternative to the two untenable positions of absolute autonomy, i.e. no interactions or interlinkages between the levels, and no autonomy at all, which would either negate the distinction as such or make it irrelevant because everything could be reduced to one of the levels.
The second premise is the distinction between two different types of theory in historical
materialism, theory of modes of production and in particular CPM, and theories of social
formations where modes of production exist in reality but never in pure form. In the words
of Althusser: "The Capital-Labour contradiction is never simple, but always specified by the
historically concrete forms and circumstances in which it is exercised" (Althusser 2005: 106)
and this always takes place in concrete society that is "a 'pre-given' complex structured
whole" (Althusser 2005: 193). To this I would add that such societal wholes or totalities are
always in a process of ongoing development and change.
Thirdly the question at hand – geopolitics and capitalism - is located in the realm of theories
of social formations and not the realm of theories of modes of production. Marx's theory of
capitalism has an implied political component that specifies certain non-economic societal
conditions that are required for the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. 1 But
1
This is, with some modifications, a shared ground between the German capital-logic state theory and Poulantzas.
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there is nothing in the theory to suggest that this has to be multiple nation states and not,
for instance, a centralized global state. Geo-politics have consequences for how CPM is reproduced and vice versa, but these mechanisms cannot be located in the theory of the pure
CPM, they must be located in the theory of social formations (Ougaard 1990, 2004, Lacher
2002: 148, several others).
This implies further that the present object for analysis is the global social totality, world
society or the global social formation which is the context and social space in which capitalist
relations of production are being reproduced.
The fifth point is more concrete and has to do with the understanding of the capitalist relations of production in contemporary world society. The central point is that both the relations of production and the forces of production have been profoundly internationalized
during the second half of the Twentieth century and this process is still ongoing. Poulantzas
called attention to this as early as 1974, long before the rise of the globalization discourse, in
a long article aptly entitled "the internationalization of capitalist relations and the nation
state" (Part I in Poulantzas 1978). One point made in this work is that the penetration of
Europe by American capital induces the European states to "take charge of the interests of
the dominant imperialist [i.e. American] capital within the 'national' social formation" (Poulantzas 1978: 73). The internationalization of capital further leads Poulantzas to discard the
concept of a 'national bourgeoisie' and instead, “provisionally, and for want of a better
word,[ …] use the term ‘internal bourgeoisie’ “ (Poulantzas 1978: 72). Since Poulantzas wrote
this almost forty years ago the international division of labour has deepened considerably
and the world economy has become ever more integrated, none the least as a result of the
rise of transnational corporations. These processes are well documented, for instance in
Dicken 2003, UNCTAD's annual World Investment Reports, and the growing literature on
global commodity or values chains and production networks (e.g. Gereffi et.al. 2005).
I find that some of the participants in the debate about geopolitics seriously underestimate
the extent to which the forces and relations of production have been internationalized and
globalized over the last half century. The notion of uneven and combined development, for
instance, while descriptively of course completely correct, does not capture this deep inter5
nationalization and the associated integration of the world economy. The reproduction of
the capitalist relations of production in world society is not only uneven and combined, it is
also inherently expansive, a tremendous force for economic integration as well as growth,
concentration and centralization on a world scale. Globally integrated production networks
and transnational value chains led by transnational corporations are, along with globalized
finance and the rise of emerging economies the most salient characteristics of the capitalist
mode of production in today's world.
The final preliminary point I want to make here is about the possibility or reality of something akin to a global or transnational state. An important clarification is that a global political superstructure does not have to take the form of a centralized bureaucratic state as we
know it from national societies. Lacher seems to imply this, when he argues that a global
state is necessary but impossible (Lacher 2006: 162), as if the only conceivable global political superstructure would be a centralized capitalist state writ large, capitalism following "the
ideal history of its conceptual self-realization" (ibid). What I argue and has substantiated at
some length elsewhere (Ougaard 2004) and also has been argued by other scholars, such as
Jan Aart Scholte (2005) is that what is happening is the development of, in Scholte's terms, a
poly-centred, multi-layered system of global governance that, I argue as does Robinson
(2004) albeit in a different fashion, in certain ways has state-like features. This view is not
about the end of the state or the end of conflict between states, it is about the transformation of the state and its integration into a larger framework (Cox 1987), where conflicts are
played out in institutionalized and largely peaceful forms. Lacher, incidentally, acknowledges
that there is some reality to this when he says that the notion "of an irresistible and irreversible process of economic globalization in an age in which capital has become allpowerful and reduces states to mere transmission belts or even local branches of a global
empire is incomplete and one-sided, though it undoubtedly captures an important aspect of
the current conjuncture" (Lacher 2006: 163).
The question for this paper, however, is not to examine how far this process has evolved,
whether the glass is half full, half empty, or almost empty. I posit it as a possibility and an
evolving reality that is fully compatible with historical materialism and on this basis I ask
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questions about how to analyze it if, when and to the extent it evolves, and to address the
question of geopolitics and capitalism on the basis of the recognition that this is one central
feature of contemporary world society, but not the only one.
The first step in this discussion is to consider the concept of geo-politics and locate it in the
larger theoretical framework.
3. What is geopolitics?
Traditionally geo-politics referred to “the links and causal relationships between political
power and geographical space” (Østerud 1988: 192). Geopolitics was the interaction between states in pursuit of control of territory by military means, whether actual or potential,
by conquest, deterrence, or intervention and for purposes of territorial expansion, defence
of own territory, access to raw materials, or control of transport lanes and trade routes or
points of strategic value derived from their topographical features and geographic location.
The notion also referred to the consequences of territorial control for relations of power and
influence between states, and strong concerns with military aspects of political power runs
through much of the discourse on geopolitics.
In some recent contributions, however, the focus on geographical space and military matters
seems to have been somewhat loosened and the notion broadened, as for instance when
Callinicos writes that "geopolitics denote all conflicts over security, territory, resources and
influence among states" (2007:537-8). By adding security and influence to territory and resources the notion tends to encompass all interstate conflicts. This is in line with Harvey’s
usage although he does not use the term geopolitics to denote "the territorial logic of
power" (Harvey 2005: 29). He writes of "the politics of state and empire", denoting "the political, diplomatic, and military strategies invoked and used by a state […] as it struggles to
assert its interests and achieve its goals in the world at large" (Harvey 2005: 26) but uses it
much in the same way as Callinicos uses geopolitics. In these broader usages, then, geopolitics denotes all elements and aspects of interstate rivalry, conflict and competition.
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I find merit in both of these usages. There can be analytical value in focussing specifically on
military aspects of power in their articulation with geography, and there can be value in addressing more broadly the whole spectrum of interstate interactions and power relations.
The term chosen to designate each of these aspects is largely a matter of taste. What matters in the present context, however, is that following Clausewitz’ classical dictum that war is
a continuation of politics by other means, geo-politics is either identical with foreign policy
or an important aspect therein. This raises the question of theorizing foreign policy in the
framework of historical materialist state theory.
The answer to this is straightforward in Poulantzasian state theory. Foreign policy must be
understood as state activities directed towards other states and societies, and in consequence this is theorized as the extra-societal or extra-territorial aspects of the state’s function. In other words: geopolitics, when seen from the perspective of a state, is to be theorized as a state function or a modality of a state function. But this is only a partial answer
because ‘geopolitics’ also refers to the systemic level, indicating that certain systemic features and dynamics emerge in the interplay between states pursuing geopolitical interests
whether narrowly or broadly conceived. State actions are constrained and conditioned by
systemic features, and these features emerge as a result of state actions. Examples of this
could be found in arguments on how the international ‘balance of power’ exerts a powerful
influence on states, as claimed in very strong versions by realist and neo-realist thinking.
As indicated above this is one of the contended issues in current debates whether there is
room for such a ’realist component’ in a historical materialist account of international politics. I argue that if the relative autonomy of the political is accepted, and if it is accepted that
the dialectic between structures and institutions on one hand and social practice on the
other involves all societal levels, then the notion of a specific international political or geopolitical dynamic is compatible with historical materialist theory. But at the same time it cannot
be emphasized enough that such a political dynamic always will be specified by the historical
and societal context in which it operates, and this is precisely what differentiates historical
materialism from a-historical and context devoid realism in this matter (Ougaard 1990, also
Ashman 2009, Lacher 2002, 2006).
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Geopolitics, in conclusion, refers to the dynamics resulting from the interplay between modalities of the extra-territorial function of multiple states. But this begs the next question,
namely what is the function of the state? Here I find Poulantzas' contribution essential, but
also in one respect problematic.
3. State functions in Poulantzas
In Political Power and Social Classes (1973) Poulantzas introduces the concepts of the general function of the state and the modalities of this function. He defines the state’s general
function as that of being the factor of cohesion for a society, or the "regulating factor of its
general equilibrium as a system" (Poulantzas 1973: 45).” The modalities are different for
different types of state. They may be ideological – or, as I prefer to call it, ideational -, concerning for instance education and socialization, and they may be economic and technical,
for instance the construction of irrigation systems in ancient ‘Asiatic modes of production’,
or the provision of material infrastructure or regulation of the business cycle in modern capitalist states. The political modality in the strict sense (ibid: 53) is the maintenance of social
order and class rule. These various economic, ideational, and political functions are all to be
understood as modalities of the general or overall function, which is the cohesion of society.
Poulantzas proceeds to argue that this general function is inherently political, and that all
modalities of this function are ‘over-determined’ by the political function. This point has
generally been accepted as one of the core elements in his early theory of the state, but
there are reasons to pause and take a closer look. (It should be noted that my reading on
this point in diverges from that of Bob Jessop's comprehensive 1985 discussion of Poulantzas' work).
The general function is discussed in close relation to the modalities of the state. All of these
modalities are modalities of the general function, which is the cohesion of a class divided
society. This overall function is also political, or rather, it ‘adopts a political character’ (ibid
54), exactly because “it maintains the unity of a formation” marked by ‘class domination’. In
this sense the strictly political function over-determines the other modalities. Note the separate steps in this logic: First the general role – being the factor of cohesion – is identified,
then the modalities – economic, ideational, and strictly political – are acknowledged and
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described as exactly modalities of the general function, i.e. the modalities are subordinate to
the general function. Then it is claimed that the political modality over-determines the rest,
and hence that the general function is inherently political. And in consequence, all modalities in the final analysis are aspects of class domination. There is a tension here: first a separation between a political modality and other modalities, then a claim that all modalities are
aspects of a political general function, but a function that is political in another way than the
strictly political function – expressed through the word ‘over-determination’. Everything
about the state’s functions is political and related to class domination, but still there is a difference between the strictly political function and for instance the technical and economic
functions. They are, apparently, political in different ways.
It is illuminating to follow Poulantzas’ reasoning even closer and look at the way in which he
engages with the Marxist tradition in arriving to this point. He points out that Marx, Engels,
Lenin and other classics have grappled with the relation between the state’s ‘technicoeconomic’ functions and its political role – or its “social function” versus “political supremacy”, as he quotes Engels as having put it (ibid 51). Even Lenin, who more than anybody else
argued that the state always is an instrument of class rule, acknowledged according to Poulantzas that the state also had ‘technico-economic functions’. This has led some theorists to
separate the two aspects, so that the relation of the state to society is independent of the
struggle between classes, a very old thesis that is “dear to social democrats” as Poulantzas
continues in a discernibly sarcastic tone. Clearly it is important for Poulantzas to counter the
view that some aspects of the state’s functions are apolitical and neutral. On the other hand
it is necessary to maintain the differences between the modalities, and in particular the difference between the ‘strictly political function’ and the economic and ideational functions.
His solution to this problem, then, is the claim that the ‘strictly political function’ ‘overdetermines’ the general function, which in turn determines the modalities – they are but
modalities of the general function – so that the general function ‘adopts a political character" (ibid 54).
I see a difficulty in this proposition: how can the ‘strictly political function’ at the same time
be determined by the general function of which it merely is a modality, and be the modality
that over-determines the general function? How can it be true that A determines B (a modality of A), while at the same time B over-determines A? There may be a satisfactory an10
swer to this, but Poulantzas never produced it, may be because the exact meaning of the
notion of ‘over-determination’ in my reading never was made clear.
Be that as it may, interestingly there are in Poulantzas’ discussion arguments that point to a
different solution. Remember that he wanted to counter the view that the ‘social function’
could be separated from the political one. In this regard he quotes with approval Friedrich
Engels’ comment on the Asiatic mode of production that ‘the exercise of a social function
was everywhere the basis of political supremacy; and further that political supremacy has
existed for any length of time only when it discharged its social function” (ibid 51). In other
words: the societal and political functions are interlinked, the one presupposes the other.
They are different, yet one cannot separate them. To reproduce society is to reproduce a
specific social order with specific relations of power; hence one cannot say that any part of
the function of cohesion is apolitical in the sense of neutral. One the other hand, one cannot
reproduce social order and relations of power without reproducing society, hence the societal function cannot be reduced to the political function of domination.
At this point Poulantzas draws a relevant analogy: “this role of the state correspond to the
twin roles of the capitalist: those of exploitation and of organization-cum-supervision of the
labour process” (ibid 53). Instead of complex notions of determination and overdetermination between ‘modalities’ that correspond to the ‘regions’ of the social formation,
there is here a more straightforward understanding of a duality in the functions of the state,
and this duality parallels the economic duality just mentioned. If capitalism only is exploitation, and if the state’s function is to reproduce the capitalist mode of production, then the
function is only to maintain dominance, it is only political. But if capitalism also is production
of use value, and the reproduction and development of the capacity to produce use value,
then the capitalist state’s general function as the factor of cohesion is both dominance and
societal persistence and development.
Thus there is an inherent duality in the overall function of the state: it is both a function of
societal persistence, and a function of maintaining historically specified relations of power.
The two sides presuppose each other; none of them can be reduced to or subsumed under
the other, both of them are required in the theoretical analysis of the state. If society is reproduced, so are the relations of power within society, while at the other hand relations of
power cannot be reproduced if society does not persist. We cannot sort out the activities
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and performance of any state in relation to on the one hand a neutral persistence function
that equally benefits all, and on the other hand the task of dominance, of securing a social
order that privileges dominant classes. Persistence is always shaped by relations of power,
dominance is impossible without persistence. This means that for analytical purposes we
have to analyse state practices under both aspects, we have to examine the function of persistence as well as the function of dominance.
Having established above that geopolitics is a modality of the external aspects of the state's
function, this means that geopolitics too must be theorized as relating to both sides of this
duality: to societal persistence and to the reproduction of relations of power. The question
now is where this leads when applied to geopolitics and capitalism at the systemic level,
generally in the current stage in the development of CPM in world society, and specifically in
the present conjuncture.
4. Then uneven and partial globalization of state functions
As indicated above one of the salient characteristics of contemporary world society is the
rise of global governance or what I elsewhere have labelled political globalization (Ougaard
2004). When theorizing this from the perspective of the duality of state functions, my suggestion is that political globalization understood as the rise of global governance and the
concomitant internationalisation of states is theorized as the uneven and partial globalization of aspects of statehood. I refer to aspects of statehood to indicate an element in Poulantzas' thinking not mentioned above, namely that for him the concept of the state covers
several aspects including the state apparatuses, i.e. state institutions, the state as a structured arena for political contestation, state power, and the functions of the state. My claim
is that all of these aspects are being internationalized and globalized although unevenly and
only partially. This includes the state's function in both of its aspects, power and persistence.
In other words, and significant in the present context, an incomplete globalized function of
persistence has emerged, having as its object the persistence of the global social formation,
but being only one side of a dual function that also serves to reproduce global relations of
power.
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This global state function is not materialized in a distinctly global political superstructure
separate from and above the territorial nation states. Rather it is, as indicated above, a polycentred and multi-layered system that encompasses the territorial states as they are transformed in the process of internationalization and integrated in international institutions and
governance networks. In addition to their roles in relation to domestic society nation states
participate in and contribute to the global function of persistence while at the same time
they engage in struggles over the reproduction or re-articulation of global relations of
power. A basic tenet of historical materialist state theory is that states' mode of functioning
is determined by the societal context; in a globalizing world this means that there is a fourfold societal determination of states: they are determined by their function in relation to
domestic relations of power, to the persistence of domestic society, by their participation in
a global function of persistence and their function in relation to global relations of power.
The global function of persistence has some similarities to the tasks ascribed by Robinson to
the transnational capitalist state but it is broader. For Robinson the transnational state is
directly related to institutional underpinnings of global capitalism; it covers in other words
mainly the economic modalities of the state's function (Robinson 2004). I argue that it also
includes broader concerns derived from societal persistence, such as environmental sustainability, public health, education, poverty and concerns with security and order.
Geopolitics, then, being a modality of a globalizing state function, is to be theorized both as
an element of a global function of persistence and as an important component in reproduction and contestation of global relations of power. Furthermore, the way single states engage in geopolitical games must be theorized as shaped by the fourfold societal determination of state practice.
To illustrate this, examples of persistence-related components in contemporary geopolitics
can be found in joint efforts towards nuclear disarmament, avoidance of regional wars, deterring aggression, peace-making in civil wars, the combat of terrorism and piracy and so on.
They represent military aspects of a global function of securing social order, but, to reiterate,
such they are also elements in global power relations. Under conditions of globalization
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geopolitics cannot be reduced to competition and rivalry between states but neither can
cooperation between states be analyzed without consideration of competition and rivalry.
5. Contemporary geopolitics and the function of persistence
The global persistence function relates to a world society where capitalism is the dominant
mode of production and where, within this, liberal transnational capitalism, organized in
particular by large transnational corporations, and rooted in the OECD countries in North
America, Europe, East Asia and the pacific, is dominant. Thus, although Pijl in my judgement
overstates the degree to which an ‘Atlantic ruling class’ has emerged (Pijl 1998, 2007) if the
concept of class is taken in its traditional strict sense, I concur with the conclusion that there
is a high degree of unity and shared interests in this liberal transnational bloc. There are
differences and conflicts between varieties of capitalism within it, but these are secondary
compared to common features and mutual dependencies. But in the global social formation
there are other versions of capitalism, more regulated or state organized such as in India and
South Africa, while in other countries CPM is articulated with remaining elements of precapitalist modes of production (e.g. Pakistan, Afghanistan, perhaps Indonesia, parts of India)
or with centrally planned economic structures (China, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea). In this
context one of the most important questions is whether capitalism has become the dominant mode of production in China. This I am not equipped to answer in any definitive way,
but my hunch is that there is no way back from market economy based on competing profitseeking enterprises (whether state or privately owned) and integration in the world economy.
The most salient geopolitical realities of the contemporary global social formation are first
the predominance of American military power and the existence of a US centred set of military alliances (NATO, the American security arrangements with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,
Australia). These alliances have, in spite of internal disagreement for instance over Iraq and
Afghanistan, proven remarkably durable, also after the end of the Cold War, which is not
unrelated to the internal economic and political cohesion of the liberal transnational bloc.
The second salient geopolitical feature is the existence of a group of powerful and to some
extent revisionist states outside of this bloc – China, Russia and India in particular. With
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these the dominant bloc has conflicts that are deeper than those internal to the bloc and a
stronger element of rivalry but there are also cooperative arrangements of various kinds,
including in the military sphere. A third salient geopolitical feature is the existence of states
with potential or real nuclear capability who more fundamentally reject the dominant international order, most noteworthy of course North Korea and Iran. And finally, the existence
of various local or regional ‘hotspots’ that have actual or potential consequences for the
larger geopolitical picture. Among these are the Israel-Palestine conflict, the complex entanglements of nationalism, radical Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and Western intervention in the Middle East, combined with the shakiness of the Pakistan state, and the East
Asian problems associated with North Korea and Chinese aspirations on Taiwan and the
South China Sea.
The content of the global persistence function in world society as presently configured, under current relations of power, is at the basic level about securing the reproduction of the
world order in a way that is compatible with the long term expanded reproduction of capitalism in its liberal and transnational form. This means, among other things, when focussing
on geopolitical aspect, the avoidance of major wars and pursuit of nuclear disarmament and
other forms of arms limitations, the management of tensions and conflicts with revisionist
states, but also involving them in cooperation on aspects of the global persistence function,
in particular in relation to rejectionist states and hotspots. The dominant bloc has the leading role in shaping the function of persistence, but other major states are involved in various
ways as well, they also participate in this function.
This does not mean, however, the end of competition and rivalry among states; the duality
of globalizing state functions must not be forgotten, and reproduction and contestation of
relations of power are also salient features of the global political superstructure. But the
cumulative weight of the arguments presented above – the deep internationalisation and
integration of the world economy, the dominance of liberal transnational capitalism, the rise
of global governance and political integration among states, experiences from world wars
and nuclear arms races, and more – lead me to the conclusion that the persistence aspect
now is dominant in relation to the power aspect. In other words, it is unlikely that geopolitical rivalry will lead to major wars among states – the above mentioned hotspots being the
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exception. A war between any of the countries in the dominant bloc (say France –Germany,
US-Japan, Europe –US) is, based on this analysis inconceivable. And a war between this bloc
or parts of it and any one of the major revisionist states is also highly unlikely. They are already partially integrated in an institutionalized global persistence function and few of their
aspirations are achievable with military means, and none through war with the dominant
bloc – China’s aspiration on Taiwan perhaps being a significant exception.
What it does mean however, is that while conflicts persist they can be and increasingly are
managed in institutional and peaceful forms. In the rise of the G20 and the ascension of the
“emerging economies” we seem to see precisely a peaceful and institutionalized adjustment
of the global political superstructure to changed relations of power. Lenin’s dictum that adjustment to changed relations of power due to uneven economic development only can take
place through war is being disproved by history once again.
This does not mean, however, that everything is well for the global persistence function.
Historically American hegemony has played a key role in organizing the dominant bloc and
creating the global institutions and policies through which the dual global state function is
exercised. Therefore, finally, some comments on American leadership in the current conjuncture.
6. Whither hegemony?
The 'crisis of neoliberalism' is, in my interpretation, the failure of a specific hegemonic project (a concept developed in Jessop 1990) that placed oil and finance interests in a hegemonic position in the US power bloc, to use Poulantzas concept for the dominant classes and
class fractions in a social formation (Poulantzas 1973: 296 ff), relied for popular support and
legitimacy on right wing populism and neo-conservative ideology, and pursued a unilateralist
foreign policy marked by over-reliance on military power and gross negligence of the persistence aspect of the US role in the global state function. Combined with neo-conservative
ideological blinders, this led, among other things, to the "colossal miscalculation" in Iraq. The
project was simply not viable.
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The Obama administration, having gained office in a hard fought electoral battle, is in my
interpretation trying to forge a new hegemonic project. This project is at the most basic level
about securing the international conditions – political, economic and ideational - for the persistence of US society and the conditions for the long term continued expanded reproduction of capitalist relations of production and the persistence of world society on these basic
conditions. But it diverges from its predecessor in several important respects. Domestically it
seeks to realign the balance of forces, to reorganize the power bloc in a way that brings productive capital in the lead and reduces the power of finance and oil interest, and builds political support and legitimacy on a greater accommodation of the interests of labour and
small businesses. Internationally it seeks to reorganize the global power bloc by adopting a
more cooperative and multilateralist posture towards other developed capitalist power, relying less on the use of military power, to some extent upgrading the standing of the emerging powers including China and accommodating their interests. At the same time the project
puts more emphasis on shared global concerns, i.e. strengthening the function of persistence, for instance with a more intense engagement in the Middle East peace process, but
also maintaining a policy of containing the military power of potential challengers, particularly China, and reigning in the so called 'rogue states' such as Iran and North Korea.
As to the prospects for success for establishing and consolidating this hegemonic project,
firstly it is worth recalling that from the breakdown of the first post-World War II hegemonic
project in the early 1970s, it took almost ten years of crisis and economic readjustment, political realignment, and ideational reorientation before the new neo-liberal project led by
Reagan and Thatcher had been consolidated. Secondly there are several beneficial conditions for the Obama project to succeed. One is the deep integration of the world economy
and the fact that also the emerging powers are dependent on this. Another is the fact that
American transnational corporations still constitute a powerful economic force globally. Also
important is the imperative of strengthening the global function of persistence particularly
concerning the environment along with the fact of a much more developed system of global
governance. Finally the status of the US as by far the world's strongest military power and
its extensive system of alliances, always present in the background, is also a contributing
condition.
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On the other hand, it seems clear after the failures of the Bush presidency that military
power is less relevant for many of the challenges a new hegemonic project is facing. The
domestic dynamics of climate politics in the US cannot be changed by military means, and
neither can military power compel countries like India and China to accept climate regulations against their interest. Nor can the US force China to appreciate its currency or the EU
to adopt more expansionary policies, and there are glaring difficulties in using armed forces
successfully in Iraq and Afghanistan. And there are other problems. Based on observing the
unfolding of the Obama project in its first eighteen months, it seems rather obvious that it is
meeting stiff and stubborn resistance and facing serious challenges, both internally and externally. It appears to be highly precarious on both fronts. On the other hand again, however, presently I see no viable contending global hegemonic project that could take over if
this one founders, neither in the US, nor elsewhere in the world. We are, in other words,
living in interesting and uncertain times.
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