COT]RT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMET{Y COI.INTY
CTVILACTION
Be(y SiÞentein, Plaintiff
No. 1G19499
v.
Abington Mernorial Hospiúaf Defendant
ORDER
On January 17,20l3,the undersigned authored an order denying Defendant's motion for
reconsideration of our Jlurrre22,20l2,denial of the "Motion of Defendant, Abington Memorial
Hospital, to Strike Certificate of Merit and for Entry of Partial Judgment of Non Pros" pursuant
to pa.R.C.P . 1042.7. As our January 17 order explained, Defendant's motion for reconsideration
had alternatively sought certification under Pa.R.A.P. 13 1 1(b) that the June 22 order "involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and
that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
matter," 42Pa.C.S. $ 704(b), so as to allow Defendant to fîle in the Superior Court of
pennsylvania a petition for interlocutory appeal by permission. When we did not grant
Defendant,s alternative request for such certification within thirty days, it automatically became
,,deemed denied" by operation of law, see Pa.R.A.P. 131 1(b) ("Unless the
trial court or other
government unit acts on the application within 30 days after it is filed, the trial court or other
govemment unit shall no longer consider the application and it shall be deemed denied.");
Wisniski v. Brown & Brown Ins. Co.,852 A.zd 1206, and Defendant pursued at that point a
petition for review under Pa.R.A.P. ch. 15 in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania to test whether
our allowing the request for certification to be deemed denied was "so egregious as to
justif,
prerogative appellate correction of the exercise of discretion by the lower tribunal." Pa.R.A.P.
I 3 1 1 (b)
note. When the Superior Court of Pennsylvania denied Defendant's petition for review,
as we
Silverstein v. Abington Mem. Hosp.,No. 99 EDM 2012 (Pa, Super' Ct' Oct' 19,2012),
our order
explained in the January 13 order, we considered the matter concluded. Specifically,
or "expired" as
found that the alternative request for reconsideration had been "deemed denied"
well, citing Stephens v. Messíck,7gg A.2d793, 801 (Pa. Super. Ct.2002) ("4 motion for
reconsideration appeals to the court's discretion . . .
. Normally, motions for reconsideration
expire on their own . . . .").
of our
Undeterred, Defendant, on February 1,2013, filed a motion for reconsideration
1
¡
Abinglon
denial of the motion for reconsideration of our denial of the "Motion of Defendant,
,l
Non Pros"
Memorial Hospital, to Strike Certificate of Merit and for Entry of Partial Judgment of
pursuant to pa.R.C.P
. 1042.7,and sent us a copy of the second motion for reconsideration.
plaintiff filed an answer in opposition to the second motion for reconsideration, and obliged
us
in
by sending us a copy of that as well. In that answer, Plaintiff requested "monetary sanctions
to prepare
the amount of $2,500.00 to plaintiffls counsel for time and costs borne by Plaintiff
second motion for
and file multiple responses." Defendant filed a reply in further support of the
Plaintiff frled a
reconsideration, also opposing the sanctions requested in Plaintiffls answer; and
response to Defendant's reply to
Plaintiff
s answer to Defendant's second
motion for
reconsideration. We do not record having received copies of these latter two documents
(Defendant's
,.reply" and Plaintiff s "response") either from the parties or from the Court
Administrator.
We now, however, in the hope of putting the matter to rest, order as
follows:
1)
motion for
Defendant,s motion for reconsideration of our denial of Defendant's earlier
reconsideration is deníed.
'We pause to comment that the theory espoused in Defendant's
"reply"
we declined to
to plaintiff s answer in opposition to the second motion for reconsideration-that
entertain Defendant's first motion for reconsideration based on tlte en'oneous belief we had no
jurisdiction to do
so-is incorrect.
Rather, our citation to the Stephens opinion, and to the
"deemed denied" language of Pa.R.A.P. 131 1(b), was meant simply to illustrate our view that tlie
first motion for reconsideration had, in the language of Stephens, in our discretion been allowed
to "expire" by the time we were belatedly informed of the view that the motion was still open,
and that cerlainly after the alternative request for certification contained
within the motion was
"deemed denied" by not being acted upon, and the Superior Court denied Defendant's petition
for review of the "deemed denial," the alternative request for reconsideration also was no longer
extant. 2) The request for sanctions contained within Plaintiffls answer in opposition to
Defendant's second motion for reconsideration is denied. Once we had taken the position in
denying the first motion for reconsideration that it had "expired," and indeed that by then, in the
exercise of our discretion, were under no obligation to consider the motion further, there was no
need to continue to
file answers in opposition to further serial requests for reconsideration, and
therefore imposing sanctions for the time and cost of filing such answers is unwaranted. 3) This
Court, at least this jurist,
will
entertain no further requests for reconsideration of the subject
matter of these motions and orders, barring contrary direction from a higher authority, and we
encourage the parties not to
file any such further requests.
BY THE COURT:
Copies
cc:
of Order sent:
Hon. Rhonda Lee Daniele
Court Administrator
Carolyn B. DiGiovanni, Esquire
, Jr., Esquire
ecretary
myth, J.