The Arab Revolt
The Political Dimension
The Arab Revolt was an armed uprising in the second half of WW1 by the
Hashemite Arabs of the Hejaz area of the Arabian Peninsular, led by Sheik Hussein
bin Ali, Emir of Mecca and descendant of Mohammed the Prophet, and his four
sons, against the Ottoman Turks who had occupied the area for over 400 years.
Before and during the armed uprising, the political manifestations were beyond
complex – they were a maelstrom of deals, promises, doubts, lies, deceit and
agreements.
The Hashemites were given early moral encouragement by certain Arabs of the
Syrian area and finally military support by other tribal Arabs once the revolt started
and successes were seen. British political concerns see-sawed, being seen by some
as a lower priority than the France/Western Front theatre but vital by others.
British military support of weapons and advisers followed and, although little
known, Australia gave invaluable military and logistic support that arguably led to
final victory in Palestine and the Arabs.
The British officer Lt (later Lt-Col) T E Lawrence, who became known as
Lawrence of Arabia, aided the revolt, acting as liaison officer between the British
and the Arabs. Whilst the initial aim of the Arabs and Lawrence was for the unity
of all Arabs and the formation of an Arab Nation, tribal disputes plus British and
French post-war domination resulted in the establishment of Mandates in the
Middle East and fragmented Arab control in scattered regions, laying the
foundation for the Middle East as we see it today.
The Arab Armies, tribal Arabs, British and Dominion forces all combined to defeat
the Ottoman Turks. And whilst opinion is divided about the significance of the
military impact of the Arab forces and the value of the eastern campaign of the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force’s total contribution to World War 1, there is
absolutely no argument about the impact it has had on the formation of today’s
Middle East. Equally, there is no doubt that had the Revolt or the EEF campaign
failed, the world would be a very different place than it is today.
This paper looks at the political and global issues – a future paper will examine the
military campaign.
Mankind has occupied the Middle East for around 50,000 years. Arab culture in the
desert provides hospitality to a visitor for three days without question. But that same
culture allows five generations to effect retribution if a tribe or clan is dishonoured.
The desert is a harsh landlord and life is cheap to those who have little and seek
comfort from another. This is not Islamic culture, it is Arabic culture and their “law of
the land” and their “land” is the desert. There are few friends and no cohesion between
tribal peoples – only within the tribe and clans. It is important for peoples with
different cultures to recognize this to understand the actions of the various Arab
groups and those who came into contact with them.
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To Start A Revolt
At 53 years of age he was bearded and grey – he looked older … and tired. He sat alone by the
window in his room in Mecca. Sweat dripped down his forehead, down his face and neck onto
his chest as he sagged over the long barrelled rifle. A finger oscillated across the trigger. His
thoughts were troubled - King or conquered?
Was the sweat from the desert heat of mid-summer, or the realisation of what he was about to
unleash? If he could have known the future, he would have sweated even more.
With a deep breath and an effort to straighten his shoulders, Sheik Hussein bin Ali, Emir of
Mecca as appointed by the Ottoman Sultan just eight years earlier, fired that rifle on the 5th
June 1916 - an aging man with dreams of a unified Arab nation, himself as King of the Arabs,
and much hope in his heart.
That shot formally started the Arab Revolt; the uprising of the tribal Hejaz Arabs against the
residual might of the 600 year old Ottoman Empire.
His thoughts were troubled. Would the revolt gain widespread Arab support, or would the other
tribes wait in dis-unity and watch before involving, if at all? Would Britain, already heavily
defeated at Gallipoli and Mesopotamia and held to stalemate by the Germans in France, come
to his aid, and even if it did, would it be of any value? The day he fired that shot, Hussein could
not have known that Lord Kitchener, an early advocate of the eastern campaign and the Arab
position, had been killed that same day when the ship he sailed on was sunk by a German mine.
Background
The Ottoman Empire at its peak (towards the end of the 17th Century) rivalled in size and
influence the older dynasties of Rome, Greece, Egypt and Persia. From around 1300AD over
the next six centuries it had grown from its hub in central Turkey to project like spokes of a
wheel 360; it went north through the Balkans into southern Europe including Greece, stopped
only at the gates of Vienna; it went east surrounding the Black Sea into the southern areas of
Russia, down the Mesopotamian rivers into Persia (Iran and Iraq today) to the Persian Gulf;
south through the Arabian Peninsula to Yemen; then west through the top of Africa into Egypt,
Algeria, Libya and Tunisia. The Ottomans controlled the Black Sea, The Aegean Sea, the Red
Sea and much of the Mediterranean Sea – but the Suez Canal did not exist until the very end of
their reign.
In triumphant times, the Ottomans controlled the massive trade routes through the unique land
areas that join Asia Minor to Europe at the Bosporus (Istanbul today); from Egypt through the
Sinai into Palestine and then on to Mesopotamia and the Silk Routes to India and China. It was
an Empire of controlled wealth and military strength. It was a palette of race, religion, culture,
custom, skin colour, language, gastronomy, building, clothing and, love of the conqueror – for
not all Rulers are loved unquestioningly.
2
map showing the extent of the Ottoman reach in its heyday
Abdul-Hamid II had ascended to the Ottoman Sultan throne in 1876. His rule was punctuated
with corruption, wild rantings, autocratic rulings, death-squad control of opposition and
intolerance to contrary opinions. He was not loved.
But during his reign the Ottoman Parliament had included Turks, Arabs, natives - Muslims,
Christians and Jews. People of all religions could work, own business, vote and be part of the
military. In cities and villages, people of all types lived side by side, mostly happily. Although
the Sultan was corrupt and feared, the politics of his day had allowed Muslim, Jew and
Christian to participate in the government, commerce and the military.
During the 19th Century world politics had taken wild about-swings and new alliances replaced
old ones and former enemies became friends and friends became enemies, as only politicians
can achieve. Into the 20th century, the Ottoman Empire was an aging relic, at the twilight of its
once dynamic reign. It was at the frontier of its final stages of decline and the seeds of internal
revolt were formed by an enthusiastic group of what could be called ‘Turkish nationalists’, also
known as the Young Turks of the Committee of Union and Progress [CUP]. They were forcing
the Sultan to amend his corrupt and idiosyncratic ways that were leading the Empire to ruin.
Under the Young Turks however, it was the Turkish members of the CUP who rose to
prominence and positions of influence, while others were expelled or given much more minor
roles1.
The Sultan had his powers restricted by these Young Turks, who by 1909 finally deposed him
in favour of his kindly but docile and obedient brother, Sultan Mehmed V who became the
figurehead for the CUP.
As the temples of Greece and Rome had collapsed from earthquakes, so this Empire was
collapsing from the failure of leadership.
By the outbreak of WW1 it was known as “the sick man of Europe”. It had lost expensive wars,
was broke and its military disorganised and ill-equipped. The Balkans and Greece had gone
back to the inhabitants. The French, Italians and British had taken Africa. The Russians had reoccupied their Black Sea coast. Britain had formed an alliance with Russia two decades before
and Germany was the Empire’s new suitor, but hesitant to tell the Ottomans of its dream to
create its own Empire into Asia Minor and Africa at the expense of the Ottomans.
In the deserts the Arabs were stirring more revolt – the Hashemites were ready to revolt, the
Rashids were ‘on-side’ with the Ottomans but the Indrissi and Sauds were not supportiveof
either side.
3
The Empire was crumbling.
The Hejaz Railway
Despite his failings, Abdul-Hamid did have a bright spot. Except that it eventually became a
favourite target of the Arab Revolt.
He had ordered the building of the Hejaz Railway from Damascus to Mecca although it was
only ever completed to Medina (the second holiest site in Islam) – this being done between late
1900 and 19082. Part of the reasoning for the railway was to enhance the Sultan’s prestige
through his charitable donation of a more secure means for Muslims to complete their religious
pilgrimage.
The Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca3 became much easier, more affordable to the masses and less
dangerous with three or four days on a train from Damascus, the new alternative to 40 days
through a hostile desert with a paid-for Bedouin safari escort (itself subject to looting, murder
and bribery by other Bedouin); or an expensive voyage by ship through the Suez Canal and
subject to British favours.
However, the Bedouin tribes that previously had made a living during the Hajj were to loose
their livelihood from camels, food, guides, protection and looting, so shooting Ottoman tax
collectors and soldiers became the new reward. They also found reward in periodically
attacking the trains and passengers.
In addition, the Arabs recognised the Hejaz Railway as an effective funnel for extended
Turkish and German troop movement through the Hejaz, through the Arabian Peninsular into
the troubled but desired area of Yemen. This would impose even greater restrictions on Arab
life and welfare. Adding to their burden, new taxes were imposed to pay for the railway. This,
and military domination was too much to bear.
The desert Bedouin and their spiritual leader Sheik Hussein vehemently opposed this railway
and hit-and-run attacks became so common the Turks had to increase their defences. This
added to the need to revolt.
Look quickly at a map and recognise the area bounded by the Sinai Peninsular, the Arabian
Peninsular, Palestine and Anatolia (now Turkey) is the joining of Asia Minor and Europe; it
was the trade connection from Africa to Mesopotamia and further into China and Russia.
Armies and traders for thousands of years had negotiated this region in search of conquest,
riches and power. Add now the strategically vital Suez Canal that had only been there for a few
decades, and there is no more vital an area on God’s planet! And this was before the
recognition of the power of oil. It was, and probably still is, the real centre of the universe.
The Germans recognised this. The British however, seemed unconvinced and the whole area
leading up to and during WW1 was seen as a “side-show” by those with a ‘western’ focus and
only a few could clearly see an ‘eastern’ vitality. Strangely, the Germans gave only modest
support, believing the Ottomans were in no position to wage war at the outbreak of WW1. The
British however, despite early uncertainty, gave General Allenby considerable (if not total)
support such that the EF greatly outnumbered the Ottoman/German forces to win the day.
The Seeds of Revolt
For 15 years from 1893, Hussein and his family (including four sons Ali, Abdullah, Feisal and
Zeid) had been the reluctant guests of Abdul-Hamid II. While enduring this reluctant
‘guesthood’ to satisfy the Sultan’s belief that Hussein would cause instability in the Hejaz,
Hussein educated his sons in politics, languages, warfare and social graces in preparation for
their eventual return to the Hejaz.
4
In the short period after 1905 as the Sultan became more erratic, the Young Turks and the CUP
took over control of the Empire and became Turk-centric. They evaporated the power of Arabs
and other non-Turks. Those Anatolian and Syrian Arabs now with lesser status formed ‘secret
societies’ and advocated the consequential revolt within Turkey and the occupied areas. These
northern or Syrian Arabs were formulating even greater discontent towards ongoing Ottoman
rule and were pressuring Hussein through his son Feisal, to revolt in consult with the British; in
which case they would accept him as King of the Arabs. This later became the seed of the
Damascus Protocol.4
Add to this, other Arabs, including the Hashemites, Sauds, Rashids and Indrissi, were stirring
trouble toward the Ottomans in Arabia and especially the western area of the Peninsular in the
Hejaz, the home of Hussein and his now grownup sons.
Ironically, the Sultan now had to agree to the CUP and Young Turks demands to return
Hussein and his family to the Hejaz with the intent to restore peace on the Arabian Peninsular;
the very thing the Sultan initially thought Hussein’s presence in the Hejaz would undermine.
Home they went in December 1908 (just two months after the official opening of the Hejaz
Railway) with Hussein appointed as Emir of Mecca, to influence all the tribes of the Arabian
Peninsular and restore harmony towards the Ottomans.
Instead, he was influenced by the Arabs to combat the Ottomans and their Turkish domination.
The groundswell of an uprising by Arabs against the Ottoman occupiers was fertilised. They
sought a leader.
In the meantime, Germany was pressuring the Young Turks to accept its military advice,
advance the railway to Baghdad, extend their influence into Palestine and take on the Russians
more effectively. The Germans beat up the plight of Turkey since the British Government had
completed a peace and trade agreement with Russia, the arch-enemy of Turkey, only two
decades earlier. Germans proffered themselves as ‘saviours’. The Young Turks succumbed to
this Germanic ‘assistance’ that had been reinforced by the Kaiser’s visit in 1898.
What the Young Turks were not aware of was Germany’s strategic plan to replace Ottoman
influence once that Empire finally collapsed, as surely it would. Germany expected to create its
own empires in Asia Minor and Africa6 and control the Arabian Peninsular, the perceived
gateway to Africa and India. A railway system attached to their Baghdad railway would make a
huge contribution to this outcome.
Before the start of world hostilities in August 1914, Hussein struggled to see the future. He had
to contend with mixed loyalties towards his fellow Muslims and maintaining allegiance to the
Ottomans or, forge independence and his own destiny with the so-far indecisive British and
French [hopefully] at his side. Hussein had his son Abdullah sound-out Lord Kitchener, British
Agent in Egypt, to seek British support for an uprising against the Ottomans. Britain was not at
war so failed to encourage Abdullah. But hope is eternal and war was imminent. Britain
thought Hussein was a simple tribal chief and of little consequence. But the Damascus Protocol
changed that when they realised he had more widespread support. Sir Ronald Storrs continued
discussions with Abdullah and Hussein was encouraged. Was mutual support possible? Could
the British support an Arab Revolt and nationhood for the Arabs and in return the Arabs
support a British campaign to remove the Ottomans? Christians and Muslims together – how
would world Muslims respond to that; what a quandary for Hussein, Emir of the holiest sites in
Islam.
Revolt
Sheik Hussein bin Ali was a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed and the Emir of Mecca.
This made him the spiritual leader of Muslims in the whole of Arabia, whilst also the tribal
5
leader of the Hashemite Arabs of the Hejaz region - thus a highly respected person amongst
Arabs and Muslims everywhere.
The sound of his rifle shot signalled to all Arabs that their new Nation was at hand.
But, creating unity amongst Arabs, even to create an Arab Nation, was like herding cats. The
families and tribes of the Rashids of the Shammar, the Sauds of the Nejd, the Indrissi in the
south of the Peninsular and the Yahyas of Yemen, each in their tribal lands of the Arabian
Peninsular, were tolerant but not ardent supporters of Hussein (or each other); and then only
whilst it suited them – and that was not long in the bigger scheme of Arab politics. In the end
the Rashids sided with the Ottomans; the Sauds stayed home; the Indrissi and Yahas were too
far away to be interested. It was left to the Hashemites and the tribes of the Hejaz and the
Hauran of Syria.
Within two months of his shot the uprisen Arabs had captured Mecca to wild excitement that
only Arabs can find. Medina though was heavily fortified and unable to be captured, not
surrendering until Feb 1919. The garrison there was always contained and never able to
seriously threaten anyone. Then there were some successes and some failures, but over the
coming months leading into the next two years, and eventually with extensive British and
Australian contributions, the sound wave of that shot blew an ancient Middle East into
doomsday.
The reverberation continues to be felt right around the world today, 90 years later. It vacillates
most in the Middle East where still, Muslim, Jew and Christian, and now terrorists, continue an
age-old spiritual and combative conflict, just as they combined to do in 1916. And from there it
radiates in perpetual motion throughout an unsettled world.
An accelerant (but scarcely the sole cause) to the flames of this desert conflagration and
complexity of today’s Middle East, was the controversial and reputed deceit by the double or
triple-dealings of the British, French and initially the pre-revolution Russian Governments in
the planning phases of WW1 - in their dealings with the Arabs and with one another. These
dealings extended into the aftermath of war in (supposed) peace discussions that then included
the USA. Some argue that these dealings caused the failure of Arab unity and nationhood. But
that is to ignore that harnessing Arab unity is like capturing a winter fog with a butterfly net.
World War 1 Arrives
War between England and Germany was inevitable and August 1914 saw the commencement
of hostilities (with Turkey joining Germany in October) amidst high expectation of a quick
solution and triumph; strangely enough, by both sides!
To top this, Sultan Mehmed V, presumably at the instigation of the Young Turks, then decreed
to all Muslims “know that our state is at war with the Governments of Russia, England and
France and their allies, who are the mortal enemies of Islam. The Commander of the Faithful,
the Caliph of the Muslims, summons you to the Jihad.”6
Hussein was astounded that the Sultan could view Germans as non-Infidels and exempt the
Jihad. He collapsed into further disbelief that someone else should be telling the Sheik of
Mecca and Protector of the Holy Site to engage in a Jihad!
He became frenzied in early 1915 when it was discovered that the Sultan and Young Turks
were also planning to depose him and have him replaced as Sheik of Mecca. Then, in 1915 and
1916 the murder by hanging execution of 25 Arab nobles in Damascus and Beirut sent him
near manic and further incensed other Arab leaders; the fuse for revolt was ignited.
6
From July 1915, a year before the shot to start the Arab Revolt and the Lawrence/Storrs visit,
further serious discussions took place between Hussein and, amongst others but mainly, Sir
Henry McMahon who, having replaced Kitchener when he was recalled to London to become
Secretary of War, was then High Commissioner in Egypt. A series of correspondence became
known as the Hussein-McMahon Letters7 and gave an indication of British support for an
Arab Revolt with future reward and support for an Arab Nation, of sorts.
Time later revealed that these letters were sufficiently ambiguous and vague as to allow a
finally victorious British and French alliance, with the complicity of the victorious allies
including the United States of America, to deny the rule of lands and people and the formation
of Hussein’s dreamed Arab Nation.
While this was going on, India became an issue. British politicians here and their local military
and vice-regal staff, were opposed to British support for Hejaz Arabs for fear of inciting the
Jihad further and turning India’s huge Muslim population against Britain. They were also
concerned to protect the food bowl and known oil fields of Mesopotamia8, the Royal Navy
having converted to oil in 1908. Eventually, certain Indian Muslims agitated to promote the
Jihad amongst the Arabs and did so in a series of letters, to be known as the Silk Letters9.
Fortunately, this concern did not materialise.
Simultaneously, in parts of the British government and military command, there was vociferous
opposition to any campaign in the Hejaz, idealising the home-a-phobic war effort to be directed
to defence against Germany in the France and Western Front campaigns. These ‘westerners’ as
their policies became known, were influential and drove the early phase of WW1 and British
political and military strategy.
At around this time, the Ottomans began to turn the tables on the Russians who called for
military help from their new alliance partners, Britain and France. The Dardanelles debacle
resulted throughout 1915. The Royal Navy got thumped in February so the ground forces of
Britain and the Dominion countries of Australia, New Zealand and Canada, were sent in from
April; only to be decimated by an ill-conceived plan. Turkish political and military morale was
significantly boosted by their victory. The allies eventually escaped with a brilliant, undetected
withdrawal in December after the loss of tens of thousands of young men from both sides, with
positively nothing having been achieved. Winston Churchill was removed from his position as
Lord of the Admiralty.
For more intrigue, the ever hopeful French, Russian and British Governments were, early in the
war, giving consideration and defining new boundaries for the division of the Middle East for a
post-war ‘sharing of the spoils’. It is now arguable whether they did or did not tell Hussein
about their longer-term political and territorial aims and how these differed with his view of an
Arab Nation and his regal status of King of the Arabs. Out of this in 1916 came the Sykes-Picot
Agreement10.
7
map showing territorial division for post-war occupation
But there was another factor at work here too. Zionism. In the 19th and early 20th centuries,
there had been small but steady influxes of European Jews into Palestine - controlled by
Muslim Ottomans. The Ottoman rulers and also the local Arabs, some of who were Christian,
had accepted the Jews. Within the Empire, Jews and Christians could vote and were eligible,
almost compulsory, for military service in the Ottoman Army. But at the outbreak of WW1,
they were deprived of weapons and uniforms and put into labour battalions. Jews now became
a hated group and their numbers increased their push for a ‘homeland’ for their existence.
Zionism was largely sponsored and politically influenced from Britain. After the outbreak of
war, Chaim Weizman continued to lobby the British Government and politicians for acceptance
of Palestine as the Jewish “home”. The Balfour Declaration11 came to pass in November 1917,
considerably adding stress to the Arab Revolt and Muslim aspirations then, post-war land
divisions.
8
map showing areas allocated for the Jewish homeland and Arab/non-Jewish occupation, today's Jordan
The Side-Show
Not only was the whole concept of an Arab Revolt doubted, so was the engagement of a
campaign in the ‘eastern theatre’. The ‘westerners’ mentioned before felt the only priority was
the defence of ‘own soil’ and the security of Europe – all else was a distractive “side-show”.
There was however, a group of British politicians and military commanders who recognised the
political machinations as well as the military and strategic importance of the East. For example,
Lord Kitchener, before his premature death, recognised the vitalness of the Red Sea and Suez
Canal and its susceptibility to interference to shipping and supply from India and Australasia.
The treasures and oil of Mesopotamia were also recognised. Additionally, tying up Ottoman
troops in the east would protect the British flank and prevent them descending on France and
adding to the “homeland” burden and possibility of defeat against a superior force.
So there became a group of ‘easterners’ who saw strategic value in supporting the Arabs and a
campaign in the Middle East.
To improve their knowledge and influence, in 1916 the British gathered in Cairo what was to
be called the Arab Bureau12. A group of intelligence officers was formed to gather and
distribute information about the Arab world to assist the policy makers in London, Delhi and
Cairo. This is where Lawrence of Arabia, a 28-year-old archaeologist with no military
experience but a vivid imagination and an abundance of intellect and passion, has been
endeared as a gifted revolutionary. His success and influence should be celebrated for its
military and political achievements (although some of these are now widely and seriously
refuted in key places).
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The Arab Bureau had other active officers, and whilst no others seem to have gained the
reputation of Lawrence, many may well have contributed equally or perhaps more greatly, than
this fabled man; as indeed it can be shown that members of the British and ANZAC forces
made splendid contributions to the success of the Arab Revolt and the British campaign in
Palestine.
Hussein’s shot was fired some four months before the first arrival of Lawrence and Sir Ronald
Storrs. War had been exploding for two years and British attitudes were different to the times
of Abdullah’s enquiries. This investigative trip to the Hejaz was now to confirm Kitchener’s
earlier view that British support for this “revolt of the Arabs” could be pivotal to British efforts
in the East, the overall war and Britain’s eventual position in global control.
And, did the ‘westerners’ give thought to the economic significance, in addition to the military
advantages, that resulted from the strategic value of this area where three continents join and
the passage of trade routes? What thought to recovery of the Holy Land that had been lost some
730 years earlier when Saladin had captured Jerusalem? Was it recognised that he who controls
the Middle East controls Suez, the sea route of the Red Sea, the land trade routes, the British
Aden Protectorates, the Christian, Jewish and Islamic holy sites, water, oil and food? What
thought to home morale if a quick victory could be had, to compensate for the stalemate and
horrific death toll of the France theatre and the disasters at Gallipoli and Kut? Indeed, some
did.
The Egyptian Expeditionary Force and
The Arab Revolt
From the outbreak of war in 1914 there was little active British political or military support for
the Arabs – getting support for the eastern campaign at all seemed difficult enough. Although
the ‘politicing’ described above continued, the Arabs were on their own militarily.
In June 1917 General Allenby was appointed Commander-in Chief of the EEF that soon
included the Arab Armies of Feisal in the north (with Lawrence as his liaison officer with the
British) and Ali and Abdullah with their British officers in the south.
Within weeks of Allenby’s arrival an Arab tribal force with Lawrence, and a rebel chieftain
Auda abu Tai who was to become famous and significant in the Revolt, captured the Red Sea
port of Aqaba. This gave some credence to the previously doubting British, perhaps including
Allenby. From this successful exploit the Arabs gained weapons, ammunition, aircraft,
armoured cars, machine guns and mortars, light artillery, military advisers and importantly,
gold (mainly Australian)! From here on they had British support of mention and military
achievements multiplied. The Arab armies were now acknowledged.
The Royal Flying Corps and Australian Flying Corps flew countless missions in support of the
Arab Revolt then the EEF campaign.
The Southern Arab Army maintained pressure on Ottoman forces south of Mudowarra and
permanently kept the 15,000 strong garrison in Medina such that they could not influence the
Revolt or the EEF campaign.
The Northern Arab constantly harassed the railway and Ottoman forces north of Mudowarra.
These formal military groups provided right flank protection for the EEF and Allenby’s
campaign and were generally reliable.
In addition to those armies, there were intermittent actions by tribal Bedouin. These relied
totally on gold sovereigns (also mainly Australian) for encouragement, and the ability to loot
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and plunder the battlefield, even stripping the dead and wounded of uniforms, weapons,
jewellery, weapons, ammunition, personal equipment, animals and food. Although this was
common practice in the desert, the ‘humane’ troops of the EEF could never condone such
action and a hatred of the Bedouin quickly developed – as did a recognition of their
unreliability to engage in actions they had been tasked to do, if it was dangerous or not to their
liking.
Politically however, the solution was far more complex than simple military actions and
victories. The aim of Arab nationhood flamed amongst Arab leaders, if not the Bedouin who
care only for their tribe and home.
From early in 1918 the whole War and the Revolt dragged on. The France/Western Front
theatre was a stalemate of death and destruction. This eastern campaign stood still as the
infantry had been extricated from the EEF to go to France and was replaced by untrained,
inexperienced Indians who needed acclimatization and training.
Worse, dissent now grew within the Arab structure. Certain Syrian Arabs had become
disgruntled with a perception of British uncertainty about an Arab nation and, Hussein’s
obstinacy towards their wishes and hopes. A gathering in Egypt saw a group of seven notables
write to the British Government seeking a clear and comprehensive statement of Britain’s
policy towards the future of Arab territories, Hussein’s influence and in particular, the merits of
the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration and the Hussein-McMahon Letters. In
June 1918 the Americans (now in the war) , French and British had agreed to the British
Foreign Office’s issue of the Declaration to the Seven.13 This indicated a division of lands
dependent upon who had owned it, who liberated it or who occupied it at the cessation of
hostilities. For some reason, it gave the Arabs heart, as they seem to have failed to interpret its
vagaries also.14 It also drove Feisal and Lawrence towards Damascus, seen by them to be the
key to Arab nationalism.
At the same time, the British through Lord Wingate, gave confirmation to Hussein that the
terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement were merely a discussion between Britain, France and
Russia at the time (1917) “and do not constitute an actual agreement”. Wingate assured
Hussein “the sticking success of the Arab Revolt … had long ago created an altogether
different situation” (to that of 1916 when it was first written).
These assurances gave great heart to all Arabs and the Revolt continued with renewed vigour.
But, just as the red skies of a morning are deemed a ‘sailors warning’, so too the red skies of
Arabia set fires ablaze with revolt and warned an unsuspecting world of what was to come.
The First World War was politically and consequently militarily, a confused sea of competing
theatres and promises by the Entente partners and Arab tribal leaders. An unprecedented scale
of misgivings and enthusiastic but immature decisions by key policy-makers resulted.
Emphasis, perhaps understandably, was given to the nearer-home fields of France and Belgium.
There was little real knowledge of Arabia and little understanding of its strategic importance in
1915 and 1916 and how the future could unfold. An Arab Revolt was given perfunctory early
support.
Modern study and knowledge of the events following WW1 can lead us to identify the Arab
Revolt’s significant role in the whole make-up of the British led and successful Palestine
campaign. Had the campaign been given greater support earlier, it is arguable that this theatre
could have been won much sooner and allowed greater support to the Western Front and its
earlier success.
Nevertheless, some people argue that the military consequences of the Arab forces and
the overall Arab Revolt were insignificant. This however, is to not fully appreciate the
effect of the revolt.
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Effects sometimes result from what you don’t get as much as what you do get!
Sheik Hussein, the Emir of Mecca, leader of local Muslims and of great influence amongst
many Muslims of the Region, had the choice of joining the Christian British or, remaining
linked to his fellow Muslims, the Ottomans. Had he remained with the Ottomans,
something like this could have resulted;
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all Arab forces could have been against the British. This would have denied
to the British; armed support, intelligence, local food supplies, drinkable
water for men and animals, guides and local knowledge,
the Ottoman Sultan’s Jihad could have had a much greater effect as all Arabs
may have joined, rather than have it dwindle as it did,
the Muslims in the Indian/British Army may have deserted and taken up
the Jihad call,
Aqaba would not have been captured and that sea port denied as a supply
route,
The Hejaz Railway would have given unrestricted logistic support of troops
and materiel throughout the Arabian Peninsular and may have extended to
the west to harass Allenby more effectively,
General Allenby would have had an exposed right flank during the EEF’s
advance through Palestine,
the large Ottoman garrisons in Medina and Ma’an would have been
available for re-deployment against the British,
the Egyptians may have risen against the British, not only denying a stable
logistic base, but also creating a military/guerilla style conflict and
jeopardizing the Suez Canal plus, denying the EEF the extremely valuable
thousands of workers in the labor and transport Corps, without whom the
campaign would have failed (the railway line across Sinai and following
water pipeline would not have been built, nor the roads system, and the
camel supply line would not have been available),
the loss of the Suez Canal would have been ruinous to resupply routes from
India and Australasia for both Europe and the Middle East,
local tribes and villagers may have actively opposed and interdicted the
British in Egypt, Sinai, Palestine, Syria and the Arabian Peninsular.
These factors, had they occurred, would have brought defeat to the British in the Middle
East and availed the Germans in Europe of a vast Ottoman and Muslim force and that
could have aided the final defeat of England and France. That would have allowed the
Germans to achieve their other aims of Empires in Africa and India, further undermining
British and French influence and prestige. But, the consequences of the Arab Revolt were
very significant and directly contributed to an eventual Entente success.
So what of the old man? He declared himself Kind of the Arabs and Caliph but, hardly
surprisingly, failed to gain the support of all Arabs. In 1924 he and son Ali lost a battle with
Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, was exiled in Cyprus and so, today’s Saudi Arabia that includes the
Hejaz, came into being. Son Abdullah became King of Transjordan under British mandate.
Feisal declared himself King of Syria in 1922 until the French kicked him out in 1924 and the
British made him King of Iraq.
There was no Arab nation. Hussein’s dreams were shattered, his sons spread, his influence
gone. Hussein sweated for new reasons, with no rifle and no one to hear. But, he had set the
world on a new path.
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Notes:
1. Hanioglu, S., A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton University Press,
200
2. For a general description of the construction, operation and military effect on the
railway see James Nicholson’s The Hejaz Railway, Stacey International, 2005, and for a
detailed technical recount of the construction, financing and operation see William
Ochsenwald’s The Hijaz Railroad, University Press of Virginia, 1980
3. The Hajj is one of the five Pillars of Islam that all able Muslims must aspire to in their
lifetime – the other Pillars being; belief in Allah as the only God and Muhammad as His
Prophet, daily prayers, alms to the poor and fasting [Ramadan])
4. Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, Putnam, New York 1946, 158-9 and 164-5
5. Pratt, Edwin, The Rise of Rail Power in War and Conquest, originally King & Son,
Westminster, 1915, 331
6. Barr, J., Setting the Desert on Fire, Bloomsbury 2006, 3
7. To read these letters see Antonius, 413-27
8. Lawrence, T.E., Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Penguin Books 1935, 23
9. Barr, 42-3
10. For text of this Agreement see Antonius 428-30
11. Many references including text of the Agreement can be found by “googling” ‘Balfour
Declaration’
12. Westrate, B., The Arab Bureau, British Policy in the Middle East 1916-20,
Pennsylvania Press 1992, xiii
13. The English translation of the Declaration is in Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening,
Putnam 1938, 433
14. Kedourie, Elie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire,
113. Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, 270-3.
15. ibid, 112
 Neil Dearberg, 2010
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