SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Index Index .............................................................................................................................................................. 1 Inherency- Not Meeting Deadline .................................................................................................................. 4 Inherency- Current Deadline Bad .................................................................................................................. 7 Inherency- Mission Accomplished ................................................................................................................. 9 Inherency- Troops Still Deployed ................................................................................................................. 11 Inherency- No Reduction in Troops ............................................................................................................. 13 Inherency- Still Too Many Troops ................................................................................................................ 15 Inherency- Won’t Pull Out ............................................................................................................................ 17 Solvency-Iraq Withdrawal Modeled ............................................................................................................. 19 Solvency- History Proves Withdrawal Best .................................................................................................. 21 Solvency-Timetable Good ........................................................................................................................... 23 Solvency- PULL OUT NOW......................................................................................................................... 25 Solvency- Must Call For Immediate Withdrawal .......................................................................................... 26 Solvency- Demand Key ............................................................................................................................... 28 Solvency- Clear Definition of “Pulling Out” ................................................................................................... 30 Solvency-Iraq Ready ................................................................................................................................... 32 Solvency-Relations ...................................................................................................................................... 33 Solvency-Withdrawal Good ......................................................................................................................... 35 Harms- Imperialism...................................................................................................................................... 36 Harms-Security/Leadership ......................................................................................................................... 38 Harms- Domestic Politics............................................................................................................................. 40 Russia- Doesn’t support war ........................................................................................................................ 41 Russia- High Muslim Population .................................................................................................................. 44 Russia- Radical Russian Muslims................................................................................................................ 46 Russia- US-Russia War Bad ....................................................................................................................... 48 Russia- Relations Low ................................................................................................................................. 50 Russia- Withdrawal Key............................................................................................................................... 52 Russia- Relations Key to Region ................................................................................................................. 54 Russia- A2 Relations Good ......................................................................................................................... 56 Russia- Islam Makes New Russia ............................................................................................................... 59 Terrorism-Increasing Now ........................................................................................................................... 61 Terrorism-US Presence Increase ................................................................................................................ 63 Terrorism-Bad .............................................................................................................................................. 66 Heg- Cred .................................................................................................................................................... 68 Heg- Cred .................................................................................................................................................... 69 Heg- Overstretch ......................................................................................................................................... 71 Heg- Overstretch ......................................................................................................................................... 72 Hegemony- Budget Overstretched .............................................................................................................. 74 Stability-Unstable Now................................................................................................................................. 75 Stability-US Presence Makes it Worse ........................................................................................................ 77 Stability-Spills Over...................................................................................................................................... 80 Oil-Iraq = Major Source ............................................................................................................................... 83 Oil-US Depends On ..................................................................................................................................... 84 Oil- Production/Prices on the Brink .............................................................................................................. 85 Oil- US Presence increases Prices .............................................................................................................. 87 Patriarchy Advantage .................................................................................................................................. 90 1 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Structural Violence Advantage .................................................................................................................... 91 Structural Violence Advantage .................................................................................................................... 92 Abduction/Trafficking ................................................................................................................................... 93 Abduction/Trafficking-US Occupation Increases ......................................................................................... 94 A2 Extend Deadline CP ............................................................................................................................... 95 A2 Extend Deadline CP ............................................................................................................................... 96 Plan Popular ................................................................................................................................................ 98 A2 Iraqi Forces Can’t Take Over ............................................................................................................... 100 A2 Logistically Impossible.......................................................................................................................... 102 A2 Withdrawal causes Terrorism ............................................................................................................... 103 Neg – A2: Civilian Causalities .................................................................................................................... 104 Neg – Violence Increasing ......................................................................................................................... 105 Neg – Withdrawal Bad ............................................................................................................................... 106 Neg – Withdrawal Bad ............................................................................................................................... 107 Neg – Fast Withdrawal Bad ....................................................................................................................... 108 Neg – Fast Withdrawal Bad ....................................................................................................................... 109 Neg – Fast Withdrawal Bad ....................................................................................................................... 110 Neg – Perception of Weakness ................................................................................................................. 111 Neg – Perception of Weakness ................................................................................................................. 112 Neg – Terrorism ......................................................................................................................................... 113 Neg – Civil War.......................................................................................................................................... 115 Neg – Troops Good ................................................................................................................................... 118 Neg – Troops Good ................................................................................................................................... 119 Neg- Inherency- Will Meet Deadline .......................................................................................................... 120 Neg-Iraq Can’t Defend Itself ...................................................................................................................... 122 Neg- Destroys Reconstruction ................................................................................................................... 124 Neg- Logistically Impossible ...................................................................................................................... 126 Neg- US-Russia Relations Good ............................................................................................................... 128 Neg- Russian Radicals Overblown ............................................................................................................ 130 Neg-Stability .............................................................................................................................................. 131 Neg- Relations ........................................................................................................................................... 134 Neg- Heg ................................................................................................................................................... 135 Extend The Deadline CP ........................................................................................................................... 136 2 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 3 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Inherency- Not Meeting Deadline US won’t meet the deadline in Iraq because troops still needed to maintain peace VOA News 2010 (“US Commander Says Northern Iraq May Need UN Peacekeepers”) http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/USCommander-Says-Northern-Iraq-May-Need-UN-Peacekeepers-97862034.html, July 6, 2010, SB In March, the commander of U.S. forces in northern Iraq said it might be necessary to keep some U.S. forces in the region beyond an August 31 deadline. Major General Tony Cucolo said the troops might be needed to help maintain peace between Iraqi national and Kurdish regional forces. U.S. President Barack Obama has ordered the withdrawal of all combat forces from Iraq by September, with 50,000 troops to remain. Under a security agreement, all U.S. troops must pull out by the end of 2011. Deadline won’t be met due to lack of new government in Iraq Feaver 2010 [Peter Feaver (a professor at Duke University who served in the Bush White House,“What's dictating the Iraq withdrawal timeline?”) http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/28/whats_dictating_the_iraq_withdrawal_timeline?obref=obnetwork, April 28, 2010, SB] The original timeline was supposedly dictated by the Iraqi election clock: whatever newly elected Iraqi government took power would need the reassurance of a sizable U.S. combat troop presence for some period of time (months, not weeks) to ensure a smooth transition. On the original political calendar, an August deadline for completing the withdrawal seemed ambitious but doable. The Iraqis are now well off the original political calendar, however, and it now seems likely that by the time of the August deadline there will be no new government seated, or at best one only seated for a few weeks. Pace of withdrawal has been delayed and the US may miss the deadline AP 10, The Associate Press, US ‘reconsidering’ pace of Iraq withdrawal, 5/11/2010, http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0511/reconsidering-pace-iraq-withdrawal/ American commanders, worried about increased violence in the wake of Iraq's inconclusive elections, are now reconsidering the pace of a major troop pullout this summer, U.S. officials said Tuesday. The withdrawal of the first major wave of troops is expected to be delayed by about a month, the officials said. Waiting much longer could endanger President Barack Obama's goal of reducing the force level from 92,000 to 50,000 troops by Aug. 31. 4 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ Obama will delay withdrawal deadline Jakes 2010 [Lara Jakes, “ US reconsiders pace of troop withdrawal this summer in Iraq,” Associated Press, 5/12/10 http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2010/05/12/us_reviewing_pace_of_iraq_troop_pullout/] American commanders, worried about increased violence in the wake of Iraq’s inconclusive elections, are reconsidering the pace of a major troop pullout this summer, US officials said yesterday. The withdrawal of the first major wave of troops is expected to be delayed by about a month, the officials said. Waiting much longer could endanger President Obama’s goal of reducing the force level from 92,000 to 50,000 troops by Aug. 31. More than two months after parliamentary elections, the Iraqis have still not formed a new government, and militants aiming to exploit the void have carried out attacks like Monday’s bombings and shootings that killed at least 119 people — the country’s bloodiest day of 2010. The threat has prompted military officials to look at keeping as many troops on the ground for as long as possible without missing the Aug. 31 deadline. A security agreement between the two nations requires American troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. In Baghdad and Washington, US officials say they remain committed to the deadline, which Obama has said he would extend only if Iraq’s security deteriorates. Getting out of Iraq quickly and responsibly was among Obama’s top campaign promises in 2008. Extending the deadline could be politically risky back home — but so could anarchy and a bloodbath following a hasty retreat. Two senior administration officials said the White House is closely watching to see if the Aug. 31 date needs to be pushed back — if only to ensure that enough security forces are in place to prevent or respond to militant attacks. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the administration’s internal discussions. Already, the violence, fueled by Iraq’s political instability, will probably postpone the start of what the top US commander in Iraq, Army General Ray Odierno, has called the withdrawal “waterfall’’ — sending home large numbers of troops in a very swift period. In a January interview, Odierno said he hoped to start withdrawing as many as 12,500 troops a month on average, starting in May, to meet the August deadline. He has long said he would not start the withdrawal until two months after Iraq’s March 7 elections to ensure stability. But three US officials in Baghdad and a senior Pentagon official said that the “waterfall’’ is now expected to begin next m onth at the earliest. All cited ongoing concerns about whether the political impasse would lead to violence, and spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the process more candidly. “From a military perspective, the best way for us to maintain security is to hold as many forces on the ground until we need to redeploy them,’’ said one of the senior officials in Baghdad. The official said it would be wise for Odierno to wait as long as he can, given the unsettled political conditions in Iraq. At the Pentagon, “there’s been a renewed focus on Iraq lately,’’ said the senior military official there. He said all options were being considered, including later delays, adding that “we need to get out in an appropriate way . . . not completely tied to a timeline.’’ Major General Stephen Lanza, the top US military spokesman in Iraq, said yesterday troops are on track to draw down by the president’s Aug. 31 deadline but would not say whether the pace was being slowed. Although “there is still work to be done here,’’ Lanza said that overall, violence across Iraq is lower than it has been in years. “Shortly before the election, there were 96,000 US troops in the country. About 4,000 troops were sent home last month — including military dentists, postal workers, truck drivers, and other support personnel. As of last week, there were about 92,000 US troops in Iraq, meaning an average of 10,500 a month would have to be pulled out . Current deadline will not be followed because of the U.S. embassy Scahill 09 Jeremy Scahill is author of The New York Times-bestseller, “Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army.” Reporting from Iraq and Yugoslavia. Scahill is currently a Puffin Writing Fellow at The Nation Institute.“Obama's Iraq: All Troops Out By 2011? Not So Fast.” 2/28/09 Despite Obama's declarations Friday and the celebrations they have sparked on the liberal blogosphere , the Pentagon certainly seems to believe its forces may well be in Iraq after 2011. NBC's Pentagon correspondent Jim Miklaszeswki reported on Friday that "military commanders, despite this Status of Forces Agreement with the Iraqi government that all U.S. forces would be out by the end of 2011, are already making plans for a significant number of American troops to remain in Iraq beyond that 2011 deadline, assuming that Status of Forces Agreement agreement would be renegotiated. And one senior military commander told us that he expects large numbers of American troops to be in Iraq for the next 15 to 20 years." Then there's the monstrous U.S. embassy unveiled last month in Baghdad, the largest of any nation anywhere in the history of the planet and itself resembling a military base. Maintaining this fortified city will require a sizable armed U.S. presence in Baghdad and will regularly place U.S. diplomats in armed convoys that put Iraqi civilian lives in jeopardy. Finally, the Status of Forces Agreement, which supposedly lays out a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, contains a gaping loophole that leaves open the possibility of a continuation of the occupation and a sustained presence of U.S. forces well beyond 2011, "upon request by the government of Iraq." Article 27 of the SOFA allows the U.S. to undertake military action, "or any other measure," inside Iraq's borders "In the event of any external or internal threat or aggression against Iraq." Could this mean an election where the wrong candidate or party wins? What is the definition of a threat? 5 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Military Operations in Iraq will continue after the December 2011 deadline Tim Arango Writer for the New York Times for End of Combat, July 2, 2010 A.H. 10 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html?_r=1, War in Iraq Defies U.S. Timetable The August deadline might be seen back home as a milestone in the fulfillment of President Obama’s promise to end the war in Iraq, but here it is more complex. American soldiers still find and kill enemy fighters, on their own and in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and will continue to do so after the official end of combat operations. More Americans are certain to die, if significantly fewer than in the height of fighting here. The withdrawal, which will reduce the number of American troops to 50,000 from 112,000 earlier this year and close to 165,000 at the height of the surge is a feat of logistics that has been called the biggest movement of matériel since World War II. It is also an exercise in semantics What soldiers today would call combat operations hunting insurgents, joint raids between Iraqi security forces and United States Special Forces to kill or arrest militants will be called “stability operations.” Post-reduction, the United States military says the focus will be on advising and training Iraqi soldiers, providing security for civilian reconstruction teams and joint counterterrorism missions “In practical terms, nothing will change,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Lanza, the top American military spokesman in Iraq. “We are already doing stability operations.” Americans ceased major combat in Iraq long ago, and that has been reflected in the number of casualties. So far this year, 14 soldiers have been killed by hostile fire, and 27 more from accidents, suicides and other noncombat causes, according to icasualties.org. As fighting involving Americans tapered off, thousands of items of Iraq war matériel were packed and shipped to Afghanistan. The complex and flexible mission of cutting down forces while simultaneously keeping up the fight with a festering insurgency could prove a model for Afghanistan, where withdrawal is scheduled to begin next year. Next summer, the Americans will begin to leave Afghanistan, too, and they probably won’t be able to halt fighting completely as they do so. Beyond August the next Iraq deadline is the end of 2011, when all American troops are supposed to be gone. But few believe that America’s military involvement in Iraq will end then. The conventional wisdom among military officers, diplomats and Iraqi officials is that after a new government is formed, talks will begin about a longer-term American troop presence. “I like to say that in Iraq, the only thing Americans know for certain, is that we know nothing for certain,” said Brett H. McGurk, a former National Security Council official in Iraq and current fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. “The exception is what’s coming once there’s a new government: they We should take that request seriously. ” will ask to amend the Security Agreement and extend the 2011 date. Al-Qaeda will keep the US in Iraq passed the deadline Deborah Haynes the Baghdad Correspondent for The Times and has covered the country’s events since 2004 09, General Ray Odierno: we may miss Iraq deadline to halt al-Qaeda terror, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article6069734.ece, April 9, 2009 A.H. The activities of al-Qaeda in two of Iraq’s most troubled cities could keep US combat troops engaged beyond the June 30 deadline for their withdrawal, the top US commander in the country has warned. US troop numbers in Mosul and Baqubah, in the north of the country, could rise rather than fall over the next year if necessary, General Ray Odierno told The Times in his first interview with a British newspaper since taking over from General David Petraeus in September. He said that a joint assessment would be conducted with the Iraqi authorities in the coming weeks before a decision is made. Combat troops are due to leave all Iraqi cities by the end of June. Any delay would be a potential setback for President Obama, who has pledged to withdraw all combat forces from Iraq by August 2010 as he switches his focus to Afghanistan. 6 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Inherency- Current Deadline Bad Obama’s current deadline plan opens up for an increase in Iraqi violence that could hurt troops remaining in Iraq. China Daily 09, author is a researcher with the China Council for National Security Policy Studies, THE GOOD AND BAD OF US PULLOUT, 7/1/2009, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9728149514&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo= 1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9728149517&cisb=22_T9728149516&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=1 But the withdrawal process raises some questions. What has the Iraq war helped the US achieve? What has the US' six-year military presence brought to Iraq? The war that former US president George W. Bush launched in 2003 ousted Saddam Hussein and saw him hanged for his "crimes". But it has not ended anti-US insurgency and, more importantly, failed to bring peace to Iraq, as the Bush administration had promised. With the US' main strategic goals unresolved, the incumbent US administration will find it hard to explain the Iraq war to Americans. The withdrawal of US troops from urban areas could embolden anti-US forces in Iraq to intensify their attacks against American soldiers that will continue to patrol rural areas. And history shows they will not let such a chance slip by. So how will US troops respond if attacks against them increase after their colleagues pull out from urban areas? Since any overreaction can affect their withdrawal process, they have to consider all countermeasures. According to the plan reached with the Iraqi administration, the US will first withdraw its combat troops, while a certain number of its security forces will remain in Iraq. But that could make the remaining US troops vulnerable. 7 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 8 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Inherency- Mission Accomplished It’s time to leave. Shane 10, Leo Shane III, Stars And Stripes, Biden: Mission accomplished in Iraq, 7/6/2010, http://www.stripes.com/blogs/stripes-central/stripes-central1.8040/biden-mission-accomplished-in-iraq-1.110077 Most of the news focus on Vice President Joe Biden's trip to Iraq this weekend focused on his efforts to broker a deal between political factions whose infighting has stalled the seating of a new government there. But Biden also had a message for U.S. troops still in the country: mission accomplished. "I said last August of this year that we will have achieved two goals," he told troops at a naturalization ceremony on Sunday. "We will have helped Iraq’s leaders set the conditions for a sovereign, stable and self-reliant nation for future generations of Iraqis within a year, and we will have ended our combat mission here after more than seven years. And I’m proud to report that because of you, and tens of thousands of our sons and daughters, including our son, we’ve made good on that promise." Iraq army is mission capable – no need for U.S. troops Hanna 2010(Michael Wahid, Fellow and Program Officer at The Century Foundation, “Stay the Course of Withdrawal” April 4, 2010) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66188/michael-wahid-hanna/stay-the-course-of-withdrawal Over the past year, the United States has drawn down more than 40,000 troops while turning over control of Iraqi population centers to the ISF. In September 2009, the Department of Defense reported that the Iraqi army had 189 combat battalions, most of which qualified as being “in the lead” for the purposes of conducting operations. Relatively few of those battalions have achieved Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 1, meaning that they are logistics-capable units with the ability to function wholly independently. The vast majority of “in the lead” battalions have achieved ORA Level 2; they can plan, execute, and sustain counterinsurgency operations -- but only with U.S. assistance. Taking an overly pessimistic view of the current political environment and appraising the ISF’s progress stringently, some U.S. commentators have recently been urging the Obama administration to reconsider its timeline, suggesting that its implementation would destabilize Iraq at its moment of greatest vulnerability. But this allegedly realist view of Iraq’s current predicament is decidedly unrealistic about the country it purports to describe. Indeed, for Washington to seek to abrogate its withdrawal commitments -- and thereby suggest that an extended occupation is back on the agenda -- would not enhance security but would undercut the Iraqi government and risk spurring renewed violence. There is simply no political space for such an eventuality. Moreover, these commentators misunderstand the role of U.S. troops in Iraq, which focuses on training, advising, and assisting the ISF -- tasks that, given the ISF’s increasing independence, can be carried out by the residual U.S. troops envisioned. U.S. won’t withdrawal out of habit, we could go now. Engelhardt 2010 ( 4-25-2010 Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The End of Victory Culture, a history of the Cold War and beyond, as well as of a novel, The Last Days of Publishing. His latest book, The American Way of War (Haymarket Books) Over the decades, Washington has gotten used to staying. The U.S. has long been big on arriving, but not much for departure. After all, 65 years later, striking numbers of American forces are still garrisoning the two major defeated nations of World War II, Germany and Japan. We still have about three dozen military bases on the modest-sized Japanese island of Okinawa, and are at this very moment fighting tooth and nail, diplomatically speaking, not to be forced to abandon one of them. The Korean War was suspended in an armistice 57 years ago and, again, striking numbers of American troops still garrison South Korea. And then there’s another factor to consider: habit. 9 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 10 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Inherency- Troops Still Deployed Troops are still being deployed to Iraq. Bryan County News 10, Bryan County News Staff Report, More 4th BCT troops deploy Soldiers heading into a year in Iraq, 7/7/2010, http://www.bryancountynews.net/news/article/6861/ More than 3,000 soldiers from the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team are deploying to Iraq this month. Hundreds of Vanguard soldiers told family and friends goodbye before loading their duffel bags and equipment into Army trucks on Monday. The 4th brigade will be replacing the 1st Brigade 82nd Airborne out of Fort Bragg, N.C. Obama plans to redeploy all troops to Afghanistan in order to protect imperial interests Everest 2008 (Larry Everest, Revolution correspondent, “Obama’s Foreign Policy: Steering U.S. Imperialism Through Dangerous Waters”, http://www.rwor.org/a/137/iraq_obama-en.html, July 27, 2008) SB Obama argues that continuing the occupation in its current form will further damage U.S. imperial interests and has called for withdrawing U.S. combat troops from Iraq within 16 months. “Ending the war is essential to meeting our broader strategic goals, starting in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the Taliban is resurgent and Al Qaeda has a safe haven. Iraq is not the central front in the war on terrorism, and it never has been.” He then cites Admiral Mike Mullen, Bush’s own Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who argues, “we won’t have sufficient resources to finish the job in Afghanistan until we reduce our commitment to Iraq.” But Obama is not calling for leaving Iraq or allowing the Iraqi people to determine their own destiny. His plan includes leaving a “residual” force of perhaps 50,000 U.S. troops in Iraq to continue the effort to create a stable pro-U.S. state, which is seen as key to strengthening the U.S. grip on the region and transforming it in the interests of U.S. imperialism. And he makes clear that anything he does would be conditioned by the situation on the ground and U.S. interests: “...My plan would not be a precipitous withdrawal...we would inevitably need to make tactical adjustments. As I have often said, I would consult with commanders on the ground and the Iraqi government to ensure that our troops were redeployed safely, and our interests protected.” 11 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 12 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Inherency- No Reduction in Troops There will be no decrease in troops in Iraq after the deadline. US Fed News 10, U.S. ON TRACK TO END COMBAT MISSION IN IRAQ, OFFICIALS SAY, 7/6/2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9728151656&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo= 1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9728151662&cisb=22_T9728151661&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=282801&docNo=2 The United States is moving from a primarily military mission to a civilian, diplomatic and economic mission as the military presence in Iraq ramps down, he said. As of today, about 82,000 U.S. service members are serving in Iraq, down from 165,000 at the height of the surge in 2008. The number will drop to 50,000 by the end of the summer in accordance with the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, and the troops will remain in an "advise-and-assist" role. The agreement also calls for all U.S. troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011. But this change won't come overnight, the official stressed. "We're not flipping a light switch on Aug. 31," he said. "The combat mission will be ending; the presence of combat troops will not. We'll still have a significant number of troops there with combat capability." Much of the transition from a combat mission to an advise-and-assist mission already has taken place, the official noted. Iraqis have been in the lead since U.S. servicemembers pulled out of Iraqi cities last year, he said. There will be no actual reduction in troops, they are only being redefined Arango 10, Tim Arango, New York Times, War in Iraq Defies U.S. Timetable for End of Combat, 7/2/2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html The August deadline might be seen back home as a milestone in the fulfillment of President Obama’s promise to end the war in Iraq, but here it is more complex. American soldiers still find and kill enemy fighters, on their own and in partnership with Iraqi security forces, and will continue to do so after the official end of combat operations. More Americans are certain to die, if significantly fewer than in the height of fighting here. The withdrawal, which will reduce the number of American troops to 50,000 — from 112,000 earlier this year and close to 165,000 at the height of the surge — is a feat of logistics that has been called the biggest movement of matériel since World War II. It is also an exercise in semantics. What soldiers today would call combat operations — hunting insurgents, joint raids between Iraqi security forces and United States Special Forces to kill or arrest militants — will be called “stability operations.” Post-reduction, the United States military says the focus will be on advising and training Iraqi soldiers, providing security for civilian reconstruction teams and joint counterterrorism missions. “In practical terms, nothing will change,” said Maj. Gen. Stephen R. Lanza, the top American military spokesman in Iraq. 13 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 14 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Inherency- Still Too Many Troops Generals are waiting till the last minute to pull out creating a logistical nightmare AP 10, The Associate Press, US ‘reconsidering’ pace of Iraq withdrawal, 5/11/2010, http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0511/reconsidering-pace-iraq-withdrawal/ Shortly before the election, there were 96,000 U.S. troops in the country. About 4,000 troops were sent home in April — including military dentists, postal workers, truck drivers and other support personnel. As of last week, there were about 92,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, meaning an average of 10,500 a month would have to be pulled out. Odierno can wait only so long to start the "waterfall." Keeping tens of thousands of soldiers in Iraq until the last minute will create a logistical nightmare with a limited number of planes, trucks and ships available to get troops and equipment out. 15 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 16 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Inherency- Won’t Pull Out The US will not pull out of Iraq by the deadline, if ever. Jones 09, Shane Jones, In Defense of Marxism, Obama's Foreign Policy Speech: Imperialism as Usual, 3/18/2009, http://www.marxist.com/us-obamaforeign-policy-imperialism.htm It has been said that the first casualty in war is truth. The Obama administration is proving no exception to this common adage. The war, according to Obama and the military command, is not really set to end - not now, not 18 months from now, nor by the end of 2011. Obama was clear on this point, and in many other cases, during the campaign, the post election, and these first few months of presidency, he and many of the war hawks in his cabinet have said that they "would listen to commanders on the ground" and that the withdrawal will be based on "the need to maintain stability" and so on. It was only on very unstable legs that the Iraqi government was able to get the U.S. to agree on the withdrawal date in December 2011. However, from the point of view of Pentagon, this agreement, as well, is, of course, subject to change. So what Obama is really saying is: 'I will set a hard date for withdrawal, but that hard date is conditional.' Obama, who was roundly criticized by the more hawkish wing of the ruling class for being "inexperienced," is quick to lean on the "advice" from the generals "on the ground" (who are actually safe in the Green Zone or some other remote site!). This way, he is able to play the commanders as the experts now, and later on, as the deadline nears, he can then place the blame on them, e.g. 'I was only following orders!' If Bush, in all his ineptness, could pull it off, why can't the Obama administration, armed with a team of well-oiled, machine politicians? 17 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 18 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency-Iraq Withdrawal Modeled Withdrawal in Iraq is modeled in Afghanistan Arango 10, Tim Arango, New York Times, War in Iraq Defies U.S. Timetable for End of Combat, 7/2/2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/world/middleeast/03iraq.html “We are already doing stability operations.” Americans ceased major combat in Iraq long ago, and that has been reflected in the number of casualties. So far this year, 14 soldiers have been killed by hostile fire, and 27 more from accidents, suicides and other noncombat causes, according to icasualties.org. As fighting involving Americans tapered off, thousands of items of Iraq war matériel were packed and shipped to Afghanistan. The complex and flexible mission of cutting down forces while simultaneously keeping up the fight with a festering insurgency could prove a model for Afghanistan, where withdrawal is scheduled to begin next year. 19 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 20 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency- History Proves Withdrawal Best History Proves Withdrawal is the best option Ramberg 09, Bennet Ramberg, foreign policy writer and consultant based in Los Angeles, California, served in the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in 1989-90,Foreign Affairs Review, Published by the Council on Foreign Relations, The Precedents for Withdrawal, March/April 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64651/bennett-ramberg/the-precedents-for-withdrawal But as Washington ponders how long to stay in Iraq, it would do well to examine the strategic impact of the United States' withdrawal from other conflict-riven countries: Vietnam and Cambodia in the 1970s, Lebanon in the 1980s, and Somalia in the 1990s. Even though Washington's commitment to these situations differed in its degree, disengagement eventually proved to be the right policy for the United States. Abandonment damaged Washington's credibility at first, but it was the best way to protect U.S. interests in the long run. The dominoes did not fall after the United States left Southeast Asia; Moscow did not fill the power vacuum in Lebanon; Washington has been largely unaffected by the failed state of Somalia. In each case, after the United States exited, its adversaries became preoccupied with consolidating power and embroiled themselves in conflicts with neighboring countries. A regional stability of sorts emerged, leaving Washington's vital interests intact. For the people of Vietnam, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Somalia, U.S. withdrawal may have been a mixed blessing. But from the United States' perspective, the costs of withdrawal were less than those of staying and lower than what had been feared. 21 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 22 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency-Timetable Good US needs to stick to the Withdrawal Timetable Dallas News 09 (Dallas News, March 15, 2009, “Slow and Steady in Iraq New violence doesn't justify revised schedule”, Lexis) Withdrawal plan for Iraq are finding ample ammunition in the recent spate of bomb attacks there. Since March 5, more than 70 Iraqis have died in explosions around Baghdad. Unquestionably, the attacks serve as a reminder that Iraq remains a very unstable country. They also should remind Iraqis that their own government has mandated a complete U.S. withdrawal by the end of 2011, so there's no time to waste getting ready for the day when Iraqis will be solely responsible for their own security. The 136,000 U.S. troops currently in Iraq did not prevent the recent attacks, nor will an American presence regardless of size - be effective in preventing future attacks. "Nobody can stop a suicide operation because the suicide bomber explodes himself among crowds of civilians before he reaches a security checkpoint," Iraqi Maj. Gen. Abdul Karim Khalaf told reporters. "No security apparatus in the world can protect all the civilians in the streets, and the terrorists consider these civilians in the streets or in their houses as targets." Americans can be certain that violence will flare up in Iraq from time to time, but that's not a justification for altering the withdrawal schedule or rethinking the good reasons behind it. What is essential, though, is for the Iraqi government to take advantage of the American presence to step up equipment purchases, training and joint patrols so that the security transition will be seamless when the final U.S. forces depart. This newspaper has long opposed popular calls for a quick withdrawal from Iraq, instead favoring a gradual timetable that allowed for tens of thousands of troops to remain for training and ongoing counter-terrorism operations. President Obama, who once favored a get-out-quickly approach, has taken stock of the situation and selected a more prudent timetable. He plans to leave up to 50,000 support troops in Iraq until the end of 2011 exit date. This is the right plan for today's Iraq. A slow and steady withdrawal is the best way to guarantee the smoothest-possible handover 23 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 24 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency- PULL OUT NOW The imperialist Iraq war causes untold horror, and should be ended immedietly. Jones 09, Shane Jones, In Defense of Marxism, Obama's Foreign Policy Speech: Imperialism as Usual, 3/18/2009, http://www.marxist.com/us-obamaforeign-policy-imperialism.htm The empty treasuries of state and local governments have not been drained by social programs or "greedy unions," but by the knock-on effect of billions of dollar that have been spent destroying the living conditions of the masses in the Middle-East! This war, like all imperialist wars, is not romantic, just, or for freedom and peace. It is nothing but the sad decay of global capitalism, dragging millions into untold and pointless horror. If Obama and Bush are to be believed, the Iraq War is, quite simply, the greatest case of altruism in human history. This, of course, is not the case, but they want us to simply stand by, unemployed with no pensions, health care, or education, content with a false sense of charity. Well, such "charity" should be dropped, not in three years - but immediately! Must withdrawal now – continued presence exacerbates conflict and destroys any hope of US achievement. BBC 2008 [Iran paper Criticizes US policy in Afghanistan, Iraq, BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, October 21, 2008 Tuesday] Washington officials have admitted their failures in Iraq and have attributed them to the unforeseen nature of the problems they faced in the fight against terrorism in Iraq. America's Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has announced that the difficulties Washington has faced in Iraq has been unpredictable and beyond imagination. General David Petraus, the commander in chief of the American occupying forces in Iraq, like a defeated and failed leader, has portrayed a gloomy picture for America's future where there is no hope. America's ambassador to Baghdad, Iran paper criticises US policy in Afghanistan, IraqAt the same time Ryan Crocker, has spoken about a long and difficult path which portrays images of an unending war. The dim record of the occupiers in Iraq is seriously shameful; nonetheless Rice has arrogantly referred to it as a "proud achievement". The devastated Iraq is a country in which all economical, industrial and urban In this country 1.2m were killed 3m were injured and crippled, 4m were displaced, 5m were orphaned and a huge spectrum of people live in poverty, misery and difficulty. This is the real achievement of a war which was meant to transform Iraq into "a democratic paradise in the Middle East". Bush junior had infrastructures have been deliberately destroyed. promised that after the American invasion of Iraq other nations in the Middle East would look at Iraq and hope that their country would be invaded so they could enjoy the benefits of being "a democratic paradise in the Middle East". What we are now witnessing in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the Middle East is feature of a superpower which is defeated and crippled. The enormous cost of direct intervention in Iraq has inflicted [cost of] 700bn dollars on the occupiers of the region. Financial sources in America have spoken about the necessity of perhaps injecting 3bn dollars into the ailing American economy in order to help save the economy from this crisis. Other pundits however believe that even injecting this enormous amount of investment will not help and will in fact add to the extent of The aim and objective of American's occupation of Iraq was to prepare the grounds for the formation of a "Great Middle East" where Israel would be the first economic, political and military power in the region. All Washington's objectives however remained unfulfilled and what they received was the total opposite of what they had wished for. Today the Zionist leaders have publicly admitted the "destruction of great Israel's dream" and even believe in immediate withdrawal from the the current problem. Palestinian territories and Israel's return to the safe boarders! The former unjust heads of the Zionist regime have today admitted that Israel's dream has gone with the wind and they have insisted that as it stands the only way for guaranteeing continuation of the Zionist regime at all cost, is for Israel to acknowledge the existence of the Palestinian government and agree to withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank and other dangerous territories 25 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency- Must Call For Immediate Withdrawal We must call for immediate withdrawal in order to end the imperialist war waged in Iraq that only props up the class structure and oppress the poor. Jones 09, Shane Jones, In Defense of Marxism, Obama's Foreign Policy Speech: Imperialism as Usual, 3/18/2009, http://www.marxist.com/us-obamaforeign-policy-imperialism.htm We must oppose the occupation and call for nothing less than an immediate withdrawal! It is entirely cynical, racist , and condescending of the U.S. ruling class to claim that the war and occupation have been positive and that immediate withdrawal would create a 'worse situation.' The ethnic conflict has been aggravated by the U.S., which claimed that the country would inevitably slide into civil war at the same time that polls showed Iraqis themselves, by a strong majority, 61 percent, did not believe there was a civil war. The corporate media continues to focus on cross-ethnic violence, despite there being widespread inter-ethnic A war is not fought in a vacuum. The class relations in Iraq are magnified intensely under the occupation. It is one crushing weight on top of all of the others faced by the working people on a daily basis. violence of the same magnitude. On top of that, the most recent polls show that, along with 80 percent of Iraqis wanting the occupation to end, there is growing support for attacks on the "coalition forces." Why do Aside from the violent horror of the war itself, the U.S. installed puppet government continues the use of anti-union laws, e.g. "Law 52," which forbids public workers from forming unions, inherited wholesale from the Saddam period. It has also been reported that the U.S. military has raided trade union offices and left them in ruin. The Iraqi government has frozen union bank accounts across the country. The only concern of Washington is to preserve American hegemony in the region, allowing the capitalist class of the U.S. to maintain their dominant economic position. It is hypocrisy when Obama says, "To the Iraqi people, let me be clear about they feel this way? America's intentions. The United States pursues no claim on your territory or your resources. We respect your sovereignty and the tremendous sacrifices you have made for your country." While there are many possibilities for further internal conflict in Iraq, the situation can only be worsened by the continued presence of the U.S. and other militaries. The working class, youth, and poor of Iraq have had enough. While solidarity calls for us to demand that the occupying force leave at once! We have confidence that the Iraqi working class will play a leading role in transforming Iraqi society, just as we believe the same of the working class of every country on Earth. There is no other force in society to trust in, and in turn, that means that we can place no trust in Obama or the Democratic Party. heavily hit by the devastation of the occupation, they have been resilient, particularly layers like the oil workers. Class Troops’ presence in Iraq is ineffective. Immediate withdraw is key. Carpenter 2007 [Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Escaping the Trap: Why the US Must Leave Iraq, January 11, 2007, http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-tgc01112007.html] Optimism about the U.S. mission in Iraq has faded dramatically in the past few months. The bipartisan Iraq Study group conceded that the situation in Iraq was "grave and deteriorating." The Pentagon’s report to Congress in November 2006 paints a similarly dismal picture, with attacks on U.S. troops, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians at record levels. Yet proponents of the war refuse to admit what is becoming increasingly obvious: Washington’s Iraq occupation and democratization mission is failing, and there is little realistic prospect that its fortunes will improve. Something much more dramatic than a modest course correction is needed. It is essential to ask the administration and its hawkish backers at what point they will admit that the costs of this venture have become unbearable. How much longer are they willing to have our troops stay in Iraq? Five years? Ten years? Twenty years? How many more tax dollars are they willing to pour into Iraq? Another $300 billion? $600 billion? $1 trillion? And most crucial of all, how many more American lives are they willing to sacrifice? Two thousand? Five thousand? Ten thousand? Proponents of the mission avoid addressing such unpleasant questions. Instead, they act as though victory in Iraq can be achieved merely through the exercise of will power. The sooner we withdraw, the less damage our reputation will sustain Carpenter 07 Ted Galen, Vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. http://www.cato.org/people/ted-galen-carpenter, Escaping the Trap: Why the United States Must Leave Iraq, February 14, 2007 A.H. Even worse, Iraq has become both a training ground and a recruiting poster for Islamic extremists U.S. occupation of Iraq has become yet another grievance throughout the Muslim world and has exacerbated our already worrisome problem with radical Islamic terrorism. It is time to admit that the Iraq mission has failed and cut our losses. The notion that Iraq would become a stable, united, secular democracy and be the model for a new Middle East was always an illusion. We should not ask more Americans to die for that illusion. Withdrawal will not be without cost. Radical Islamic factions will portray a withdrawal as a victory over the American superpower. We can minimize that damage by refocusing our efforts on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but there is no way to eliminate the damage. Even superpowers have to pay a price for wrongheaded ventures. Whatever price we will pay for withdrawing from Iraq, however, must be measured against the probable cost in blood and treasure if we stay. That cost is already excessive. We are losing soldiers at the rate of more than 800 per year, and the financial meter is running at some $8 billion per month. With President Bush's announcement of a "surge" of 21,500 additional troops, the pace of both will increase. Worst of all, there is no reasonable prospect of success even if we pay the additional cost in blood and treasure. We need an exit strategy that is measured in months, not years. 26 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 27 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency- Demand Key Our demand of removal is key to solvency. Bennis 09, Phyllis Bennis, fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Contested Terrain: Obama's Iraq Withdrawal Plan and the Peace Movement, 3/9/2009, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/03/09-8 It's the story of FDR who, at the height of popular mobilization by trade unionists, communists, community activists and a host of others, finally told his demanding supporters, "okay, I get it. I know what we have to do. Now get out there in the streets and make me do it!" Our job is to constantly hold President Obama and his administration accountable to what appear to be promises: withdraw all the troops, respect Iraqi sovereignty, give up Iraqi oil...even as we ratchet up our push for a faster, fuller troop withdrawal, closure of bases, and more. At the same time our movement must take on other challenges as well. We need to oppose Obama's call for expanding the military. If he were really worried about the stress on military, the best solution is to bring them home - not ship them from Iraq to another illegal and unwinnable war two borders away. And at this moment of economic devastation across the U.S. and around the world, the issue of the financial costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan/Pakistan must be addressed directly; those hundreds of billions represent perhaps the largest single pot of money to pay for the health care/environment/energy priorities of the new administration. If things continue as they are, Stiglitz's Three Trillion Dollar War in Iraq will turn into a $4 trillion dollar set of wars, as Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to swallow more troops, more bombs, more lives. We need to demand replacement of the war budget with a people's budget that cuts the military budget by eliminating the Pentagon's network of foreign bases that cost billions and destroy lives and environments around the world, getting rid of all our nuclear weapons, and eliminating all the giant weapons systems that have been obsolete for years. 28 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 29 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency- Clear Definition of “Pulling Out” Obama’s plan for pull out is insufficient, other things must be done. Bennis 09, Phyllis Bennis, fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Contested Terrain: Obama's Iraq Withdrawal Plan and the Peace Movement, 3/9/2009, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/03/09-8 After eight years of reckless slaughter proudly justified in the name of a "global war on terror," it was stunning to hear the president of the United States announce what he called "a new strategy to end the war in Iraq." That moment was something we should celebrate. It was ours. The statement was a recognition of the powerful antiwar consensus in this country, a consensus that helped define the powerful constituency so key to Obama's election. Obama may not acknowledge, even to himself, that it was the organized antiwar movement that helped create and build and strengthen that consensus - but still his speech reflected the new political reality that requires him to speak to the demands of that antiwar community. Ending the War: A Definition From the vantage point of the peace movement, the speech was and remains insufficient, and shot through with wiggle room and loopholes. We know that President Obama's definition of "ending the war" is not ours. Our definition has not changed: Withdraw all the troops and bring them home (don't redeploy them to another illegal and unwinnable war in Afghanistan). Pull out all the U.S.-paid foreign mercenaries and contractors and cancel the remaining contracts. Close all U.S. military bases and turn them over to Iraq. Give up all efforts to control Iraq's oil. 30 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 31 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency-Iraq Ready Iraq is stable enough to remove troops Wilson 10 White House correspondent for the Washington Post, previously, he was the paper's Foreign Editor after serving as a correspondent in Latin America and the Middle East, most recently as Jerusalem Bureau Chief and was awarded an Overseas Press Club citation and an Interamerican Press Association award for his work in Latin America “Biden: U.S. Troops Will Leave Iraq on Deadline” Scott Wilson 5/27/10 President Obama called Iraq his predecessor's war of choice. Now it is his war to exit -- and quickly. "It's going to be painful; there's going to be ups and downs," Biden said in a 40-minute interview in his West Wing office this month. "But I do think the end result is going to be that we're going to be able to keep our commitment." White House officials say Iraqis are increasingly relying on politics, rather than violence, to deal with disputes, diminishing the need for U.S. forces. But the situation on the ground demonstrates that Iraq remains fractured. Senior administration officials counter that Iraq's fledgling democracy, now defended by improved domestic security forces, is sturdy enough to solve the country's problems with far fewer U.S. troops on hand. 32 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency-Relations Withdrawal is key to long term US-Iraqi Relations. Laipson 10, Ellen Laipson, President and CEO of the Stimson Center, Transition for Two: US-Iraq Relations, 6/1/2010, http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/06/01/transition-for-two-us-iraqi-engagement/ Secondly, the Iraqis seem to be undervaluing how far they’ve come, and should embrace the degree of sovereignty they’ve achieved. Sure, they still don’t trust each other across historic and ethnic or sectarian divides, but they should be proud of the progress made. They are now in control of the cities, and US forces are largely contained on one consolidated base in Baghdad. The occasional acts of violence by alQaeda or others do not erode entirely the fact that Iraq has a reconfigured security sector that is doing its job. To stop the clock on the US withdrawal would deepen a psychological dependency on the US as big brother that would not suit US-Iraq relations for the long term. 33 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 34 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Solvency-Withdrawal Good Withdrawal from Iraq won’t lead to Nuclear War Engelhardt 2010 ( 4-25-2010Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The End of Victory Culture, a history of the Cold War and beyond, as well as of a novel, The Last Days of Publishing. His latest book, The American Way of War (Haymarket Books) And here’s the truth of the matter: the world won’t end, not in Iraq, not in Afghanistan, not in the United States, if we end our wars and withdraw. The sky won’t fall, even if the US gets out reasonably quickly, even if subsequently blood is spilled and things don’t go well in either country. U.S. troops have just made the situation worse. Engelhardt 2010 ( 4-25-2010Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com. He is the author of The End of Victory Culture, a history of the Cold War and beyond, as well as of a novel, The Last Days of Publishing. His latest book, The American Way of War (Haymarket Books) Of course, before our troops entered Baghdad in 2003 and the American occupation of that country began, there was no al-Qaeda in Iraq. But that’s a distant past not worth bringing up. And forget as well the fact that our invasions and wars have proven thunderously destructive, bringing chaos, misery, and death in their wake, and turning, for instance, the health care system of Iraq, once considered an advanced country in the Arab world, into a disaster zone (that -- it goes without saying -- only we Americans are now equipped to properly fix). Similarly, while regularly knocking off Afghan civilians at checkpoints on their roads and in their homes, at their celebrations and at work, we ignore the fact that our invasion and occupation opened the way for the transformation of Afghanistan into the first all-drug-crop agricultural nation and so the planet's premier narco-nation. It’s not just that the country now has an almost total monopoly on growing opium poppies (hence heroin), but according to the latest U.N. report, it’s now cornering the hashish market as well. That’s diversification for you.. 35 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Harms- Imperialism The imperialist Iraq war has had untold human cost, devastating or killing millions, increasing prostitution and rape cases, orphaning millions of children, and spreading disease. It should be ended immediately. Jones 09, Shane Jones, In Defense of Marxism, Obama's Foreign Policy Speech: Imperialism as Usual, 3/18/2009, http://www.marxist.com/us-obama- foreign-policy-imperialism.htm "Thanks in great measure to your service and sacrifice and your family's sacrifices, the situation in Iraq has improved," Obama said in his speech Friday. The war on Iraq is largely seen to be a military and political failure - not a success. It should not continue at all, let alone three more years. The human cost of the war is staggering. All of the world's religions cannot describe hell as well as imperialism can produce it! This is the reality of capitalism as it rots alive. The U.S. deaths in Iraq stand somewhere near 4,251, with more than 31,000 wounded. There is no singular source for the death toll in Iraq, however many independent estimates range from 99,000 to well over a million deaths related to the invasion and occupation. However, the horror and cruelty of the imperialist war makes death seem a blessing next to the toll that it rains upon the living. Out of the nearly 20 million Iraqis, more than 4.7 million are refugees, i.e. more than 16.3 percent of the population! Some 2.7 million of these refugees are "internally displaced." Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis are fleeing each month to Syria and Jordan, compounding the contradictions within those nations. It has been reported that ghetto conditions for female Iraqi refugees leaves little less than prostitution open as a means to live by. Rape cases are widely reported, but are believed only to be only the tip of the iceberg, as most go unreported. 4.5 million children have been orphaned in Iraq, with 500,000 living on the streets. 800 orphans are reportedly being held in U.S. prison facilities! The overall health of the country has also sharply declined from relatively high standards, which once included free "western style" medical treatment. Typhoid, cholera, malaria, and tuberculosis outbreaks have occurred alongside the destruction of hospitals, 12 percent of which happened during the invasion. Cancer rates associated with the extensive use of radioactive materials in U.S. weapons (depleted uranium) have increased. This horrible list could go on - and these are just statistics. The human experience of this madness will be felt for generation to come! 36 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 37 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Harms-Security/Leadership Iraq war diminishes US security and leadership Everest 2008 (Larry Everest, Revolution correspondent, “Obama’s Foreign Policy: Steering U.S. Imperialism Through Dangerous Waters”, http://www.rwor.org/a/137/iraq_obama-en.html, July 27, 2008) SB Obama’s criticisms of Bush’s strategy are not unique—they are shared by many in the ruling class. These strategists of empire feel the invasion of Iraq and the neocon strategy of rapid, forcible regional transformation of the Middle East has not gone according to plan and has hurt U.S. interests in the region and globally in important ways. They think the Bush administration has focused too narrowly on Iraq and the Middle East to the detriment of other global concerns, giving other powers openings and more maneuvering room. And they argue that the Bush team has relied too heavily on U.S. military power and not enough on other elements of imperial might—economic leverage, political posturing, and diplomatic efforts. “This [Iraq] war distracts us from every threat that we face and so many opportunities we could seize,” Obama declared. “This war diminishes our security, our standing in the world, our military, our economy, and the resources that we need to confront the challenges of the 21st century. By any measure, our single-minded and open-ended focus on Iraq is not a sound strategy for keeping America safe.” 38 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 39 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Harms- Domestic Politics Iraq has many extreme domestic religious and political issues currently Krastev 2007 (Master's Degree in Political Science New York University Nikola June 13 Iraq: Religious Leaders Build Cross-Sectarian Dialogue http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077117.html) Al-Qaeda has a distorted ideology and vision and will pose a further threat to Iraq, to the region, and to the world," alThey have no respect and no boundary whether it comes to religion, or sect, or race. Their terrorism goes beyond all this." "I think Mullah said. "People here in the United States, New York, Madrid, and London have already witnessed the lethal efficiency of such an organization. Many conference participants shared al-Mullah's concerns. Among them were Ammar Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, a Shi'ite theologian and secretary-general of the AlHakim Foundation, and Sheikh Majid al-Hafid, who is a Sunni scholar from Al-Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq and the imam of a historic mosque. Despite their sectarian differences, al-Mullah says all of them are worried by the threat of growing religious extremism in Iraq. "Obviously, there's more than one problem, but the most profound is the religious extremism," he said. "This is a new problem and if I have to look into the number of casualties as a result of it, compared to the number of casualties related to the operations of the multinational forces in Iraq, I would say that 95 percent of the victims are dying from actions of religious extremism and only 5 percent are casualties related to the security operations of the multinational forces." Troops do not help in dealing with Iraq’s problems, Iraqis key to solving domestic politics. Abbas 2010 (Palestinian Canadian businessman Yasser January 22, U.S. cannot solve Iraq’s problems, senior Kurdish official says http://www.investorsiraq.com/showthread.php?139208-U.S.-cannot-solve-Iraq%E2%80%99s-problems-senior-Kurdish-official-says) Iraq’s problems must be solved in Baghdad and not in Washington, Mahmoud Othman, a veteran Kurdish politician said. Othman said if Iraqis were incapable of making the necessary compromises among themselves not other power can force them to so. Othman made the remarks as U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden is trying hard to solve thorny issues regarding general elections . More than 500 Iraqi candidates have been barred from participating on allegations of links with the former regime. The exclusion of so many candidates and their groups, most of them Muslim Sunnis, is certain to fuel tensions. “Iraq’s domestic problems should be addressed inside Iraq and not in Washington,” Othman, who currently heads the powerful Kurdish bloc in the Iraqi parliament, said. Asked on whether the U.S. or a third party could help bridge the gap between the central government and the Kurds, Othman said: “The federal government and the Kurdish regional government must solve their problems by themselves. If they fail, neither the U.S. nor any other party could do it for them. “The U.S. and Arab states can only be an auxiliary factor,” he said. Reduction of US troops is key to solving Iraq’s domestic politics. Shanglin 2006 (Luan Xinhua Online News Source Editor 09-14 Withdrawal of occupation troops key to Iraqi problems: Khamenei http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-09/14/content_5088315.htm) Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said on Wednesday that withdrawal of by Iraqi people, foreign occupation troops would solve problems faced the Fars news agency reported. Khamenei made the remarks in a meeting with visiting Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his supreme leader expressed his regret over pains and hardships suffered by the Iraqi people, and said that former Iraqi regime's behaviors and presence of occupation troops were the two major causes of sufferings in Iraq. Foreign troops should be withdrawn, Khamenei said, adding "once this happens, a major part of Iraq's problems will be solved." Meanwhile, Khamenei hailed the formation of "an independent and stable government" in Iraq, for which he pledged his accompanying delegation.The country's support."The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that extending practical support to the Iraqi nation and government is its responsibility," said the leader. 40 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- Doesn’t support war Russia did not support the invasion. Iraq is key conflict in relations Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 Russia's opposition to the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and recent revelations about Moscow's military and intelligence collaboration with Baghdad raise serious questions about the nature and long-term prospects of a U.S.-Russian postSeptember 11 "partnership," which, the Iraq contretemps notwithstanding, both nations continue to insist they regard as central to their foreign and security policies. To address such questions in post-Soviet Russia, which is no longer an ideological dictatorship, it is not sufficient to analyze just the views and choices of the top Kremlin executives and their reference groups among the "elites." Important though they are, a realistic assessment of the U.S.-Russian relationship, present and future, must also take into account the domestic context of Russian foreign policy, is shaped by public opinion, powerful constituencies outside the Kremlin, the imperatives of the political is little doubt about where Russian public opinion stood on the U.S.-led effort to disarm and destroy the Ba'athist regime--or how closely the Kremlin hewed to it in the run-up to and at the onset of the war. From the first hint of which to a far greater extent than ever before calendar, and the Russian economy. There possible military action against Saddam Hussein to the fall of his statue amidst a jubilant, shoe-banging crowd, Russians have been skeptical of the threat posed by Iraq, insistent that their government work for a peaceful resolution to the crisis, passionately opposed to any use of force, and suspicious of America's motives in the region. In a January 2003 national poll, 52 percent of Russians felt "indignant" about a possible U.S.-British "military operation against Iraq," while only 3 percent approved of the idea.[1] Asked which side would enjoy their sympathy in the event of war, 50 percent said neither, while 10 percent would root for America and 32 percent for Iraq.[2] While about one-fifth thought the United States was preparing for war in order to "destroy terrorist bases" or prevent Iraq from manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, twice as many ascribed America's bellicosity to a desire to "show the world 'who's boss,'" and over a third (34-37 percent) considered U.S. "economic interests"--including control over Iraqi oil--as the underlying casus belli. [3] In the months leading to war, positive attitudes toward America fell from 69 percent in October 2002 to 48 percent in March 2003, while negative ones rose from 24 percent to 40 percent.[4] With coalition forces massing in the Persian Gulf in early March, far more Russians considered By the end of March, as coalition forces raced across only 14 percent of Russians believed that America played "a mostly positive role in today's world;"[6] 91 percent disapproved of the war, while in another poll, 82 percent expressed indignation over it.[7] President Bush commanded an all-time the United States a greater threat to world peace (71 percent) than they did Iraq (45 percent).[5] the Euphrates plain, unfavorable "high" of 76 percent in Russia.[8] At the same time, Saddam Hussein's favorability ratings--at 22 percent--barely budged with the outbreak of war, up a mere seven points from February 2002.[9] Similarly, in early March the majority of respondents (51 percent) felt that Iraq was neither a hostile nor a friendly country to Russia.[10] Thus, most Russians' anger appears to have stemmed not from sympathy with the target of American power but from its very exercise. Russian people support governments’ position of opposition Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 The outbreak of war did little to jolt the broad desire for neutrality. Asked in early April if Russia should risk "damaging its relationship with the United States over war with Iraq," a clear majority (60 percent) said no. In fact, only 16 percent advocated this course of action; the remaining 24 percent "weren't sure."[13] With the official policy reflecting the majority's attitude faithfully, at the end of February 2003, almost seven in ten Russians (66 percent) supported their country's position, and a solid plurality (45 percent) felt their country was gaining respect in the world because of its stance.[14] 41 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ The war has caused anti-American beliefs on both Iraq and Afghanistan wars are on the rise among Muslims in Russia and they are rallying Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 Already by October 15, 2001, protests against the U.S. strikes took place in Kazan during the annual "day of mourning" rally, which commemorates the fall of the city to the Russian forces under Ivan the Terrible in 1552. Two weeks later, a cochairman of the Council of Muftis, Nafigulla Ashir, condemned the attack on Afghanistan's Taliban rulers as a "criminal war" and avowed that it would be "justified" for any Russian Muslim to take up arms in defense of the Taliban.[21] In April 2002, as the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia marked Memorial Day in Israel with rallies that condemned suicide bombings and commemorated their Israeli victims in nearly 100 Russian cities, Abdul-Vakhed Niyazov, a deputy for the Duma's largest party, the pro-government United Russia (UR), led a protest outside the Israeli Embassy in Moscow. A much larger antiIsrael demonstration was held in Khasavyurt, Dagestan's second largest city, with participants carrying posters that read "Hands off Palestine" and "Sharon is Terrorist No.1."[22] "We are absolutely dissatisfied with Russia's attitude toward the Palestinian problem," the imam of one of the mosques in Dagestan's capital, Makhachkala, told reporters. "There are more than 25 million [sic] Muslims in Russia, and if Russia is not taking into account the position of its citizens, this may lead to serious problems." Russia was proud of its objection to the war and enjoyed the chance to demonstrate its’ power. Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 a sizeable segment of the Russian elite undoubtedly welcomed a chance to demonstrate that former superpowers can "stand up to" and thwart the world's "hyperpower," if only momentarily and largely on a symbolic level. Short-lived though it is likely to be, this revival of "multipolarity" and the opportunity to strut in the brief but bright limelight of world attention must have been gratifying even to those in the political class who see partnership with the Finally, like their German and French counterparts, United States as the only viable strategic option for Russia. 42 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 43 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- High Muslim Population The population of Muslims is Russia is growing and they will become a more influential power over the government Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 Within the general electorate, Russian Muslims are a constituency to which the Kremlin likely paid special attention in developing its Iraq policy. Concentrated mostly in seven autonomous republics* and numbering 15 to 20 million, they are 10 to 14 percent of the population-the largest Muslim minority in Europe.** (By comparison, there are 4 to 5 million Muslims, or 7 to 8 percent of the total population, in France; 2.9 million, or 4 percent, in Germany; and 1.7 million, or 3 percent, in the United Kingdom. The 6 million Muslims in America are 2 percent of the United States' population.) Some Muslim activists claim that because of a birthrate much higher than the national average, Russian Muslims will constitute one-third of the country's population by 2025.[15] In May 2002 the Russian Muslims' top administrative body, the Council of Muftis, drafted a manual for officers of the Russian armed forces, in which every tenth serviceman is of Muslim extraction. The handbook contained "a list of regulations from the Koran" and "descriptions of the particulars of everyday Muslim life."[16] Like other religious minorities in Russia, most notably the Jews, the Muslim community has undergone an astonishing religious and cultural renaissance in the past decade. In 1991 there were eighteen mosques in Tatarstan, the home of Russia's most numerous Muslim people; today there are more than 1,000. The Russian Islamic University opened in Kazan, the Tatar capital, in 1998. Last September, the Kazan Mohammediya madrassa, a religious school, had about 1,000 students. 44 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 45 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- Radical Russian Muslims Russian muslims are exposed to radicalism and are taking up arms Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 While the overwhelming majority of Russian Muslims follow the more liberal Sufi branch of Islam, freedom of travel has exposed tens of thousands of haj pilgrims to the more militant and austere Wahhabite sect practiced in Saudi Arabia. Russia's largest mosque is being built in the center of Kazan with money from the Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank. In December 2001 one of Russia's top Muslim leaders admitted to having met Osama bin Laden's brother several times in the Muslim-majority autonomous republic of Bashkortostan.[17] Hundreds of Russian Muslim clerics, community leaders, and young students of Islam have trained in Saudi Arabia and returned as proselytizing Wahhabite imams, while Arab teachers of Islam freely travel throughout Russia. In November 2001, following reports that some graduates of the Yodyz madrassa in the city of Naberzhnye Chelny had gone to Chechnya to fight the Russian troops, the Tatarstan government expelled the Arab teachers of the madrassa and revoked the school's license. This past March, the chief mufti for the Sverdlovsk region, Khazrat Sibgatulla Khadzha, told reporters that the "struggle against Islamic extremism in the central Urals area is not sufficiently active."[ 18] According to the mufti, "Arab emissaries" distributed Wahhabite literature that contained "calls for an armed struggle against the nonbelievers." The cleric also claimed that the Wahhabites had opened two youth camps in the region and organized similar camps in Siberia and the Far East.[19] With the Soviet legacy of enforced atheism and secularism crumbling rapidly in Tatarstan, the number of women insisting on wearing head scarves in public grew large enough to alarm the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, which in the spring of 2002 issued a decree requiring that no scarves be worn in photographs for official documents, such as domestic passports and driver's licenses. Insisting that the Koran prohibited a Muslim woman from "removing the veil before an unknown man," fifteen Tatar women, represented by the Muslim Women's Union, sued the authorities for denying religious freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. Turned down by a Kazan district court and then in the Supreme Court of Tatarstan, the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, which upheld the lower courts' decision in March 2003. Russia faces Islamic Radicalism. Dannreuther, head of the department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster 2010 (Islamic radicalization in Russia: an assessment, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15747_86_1dannreuther.pdf) To what extent does the Russian Federation face the threat of Islamic radicalization? The threat is undeniably a serious one, and has been a source of some of the most critical challenges to the integrity and stability of Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Chechnya, Moscow has confronted a secessionist struggle which has become increasingly Islamized and integrated into the global trans national jihadist movement. The conflict has also spread beyond the North Caucasus. Moscow and a number of other cities and regions in Russia have suffered a series of deadly Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks, such as the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan siege in 2004. Some analysts consider there is a real threat that Islamic radicalization is inexorably advancing, driven in particular by Putin’s repressive and centralizing policies, and that it could ultimately overwhelm the Russian state. Gordon Hahn argues that ‘Russia is experiencing the beginning of an Islamist jihad’ and that the radicalization of the North Caucasus is inexorably spreading to the Volga–Urals region and into the main cities of Russia, such as Moscow and St Petersburg.1 Some Russian analysts have similarly raised the alarm of an overwhelming ‘Islamic threat’, the incipient ‘Islamization of Russia’, and the threat of an alliance between liberals and Muslims which could lead to an ‘orange–green revolution’.2 Close to the surface of such assessments is a demographic element—the fact that the ethnic Russian population is in severe demographic decline while the Russian Muslim population is growing rapidly. Among western commentators, Paul Goble has raised the prospect of a Muslim majority in Russia by 2050. 46 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 47 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- US-Russia War Bad Without plan, nuclear holocaust ensues Nick Bostrom, PhD, faculty of Oxford University, in and Related Hazards) The US 02 (http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html, Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Russia still have huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But would an all-out nuclear war really exterminate humankind? Note that: (i) For there to be an existential risk it suffices that we can’t be sure that it wouldn’t. (ii) The climatic effects of a large nuclear war are not well known (there is the possibility of a nuclear winter). (iii) Future arms races between other nations cannot be ruled out and these could lead to even greater arsenals than those present at the height of the Cold War. The world’s supply of plutonium has been increasing steadily to about two thousand tons, some ten times as much as remains tied up in warheads ([9], p. 26). (iv) Even if some humans survive the short-term effects of a nuclear war, it could lead to the collapse of civilization. A human race living under stone-age conditions may or may not be more resilient to extinction than other animal species. 48 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 49 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- Relations Low US-Russian Relations are low. Council for Foreign Services 2006 (Task Force Report, Russia’s Wrong Direction, http://www.cfr.org/publication/by_type/task_force_report.html#) Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, “U.S.-Russia relations are clearly headed in the wrong direction,” finds an Independent Task Force on U.S. policy toward Russia sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. “Contention is crowding out consensus. The very idea of a ‘strategic partnership’ no longer seems realistic,” it concludes. The bipartisan Task Force was chaired by former Senator John Edwards and former Congressman and Housing and Urban Development Secretary Jack Kemp and directed by Council Senior Fellow Stephen Sestanovich. The Task Force notes significant recent economic progress in Russia. “Between 2000 and 2004 the number of Russians living below the government’s poverty line dropped from forty-two million to twenty-six million. The national unemployment rate—over 10 percent in 2000—is now about 7 percent ... [and] a middle class appears to be emerging.” Russia Task Force trip At the same time, when President Bush has made democracy a goal of American foreign policy, Russia’s political system is becoming steadily more authoritarian, the Task Force charges. “The political balance sheet of the past five years is extremely negative. The practices and institutions that have developed over this period have become far less open, pluralistic, subject to the rule of law, and vulnerable to the criticism and counterbalancing of a vigorous opposition or independent media.” 50 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 51 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- Withdrawal Key Leaving Iraq signifies willingness to negotiate with Russia Graham, CSIS, senior director of Kissinger Mclarty Associates 08 (US-Russia Relationships, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080717_graham_u.s.russia.pdf) The first, and essential, step is rebuilding the trust that has evaporated over the past few years. The starting point for that is a return to the first principle of diplomacy: the willingness to accommodate the interests of the other side to the extent that that does not jeopardize the achievement of one’s own strategic goals. This will require each side to do a better job of articulating its interests and priorities and of listening to the other side. It will require a focus on concrete, pragmatic tasks, and less cynicism in Russia and less ideological fervor in the United States. This will not happen without a well-defined set of channels for communications—a framework for discussion, negotiation, and execution of agreed actions. 52 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 53 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- Relations Key to Region Russian Relations are key to relations in the region Cato Institute in 03 (Cato handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-59.pdf) Unquestionably, good relations between leaders are to be preferred to bad relations. In addition, the support the Russian government has given to the United States since the terrorist attack in September 2001 has been extremely helpful and a marked change from the hostility that characterized relations during the Cold War. Yet Putin is not the first Russian leader to turn toward the West. It may be significant that Putin has a portrait of Peter the Great in his office. Peter also thought that Russia should learn from the West, but Peter was an autocrat whose reform effort, observes historian Bernard Pares, ‘‘grew out of the needs of his army.’’ Russia is no longer a superpower, but it still controls a vast landmass in the center of Eurasia. Although Russia no longer has a global reach, it still exercises considerable influence along its periphery. And it is along that periphery that we must look to understand Russian foreign policy. 54 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 55 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- A2 Relations Good They are tired of the “one way street” of the russo-american relations Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 The Kremlin's policy choices in the Iraq affair were also influenced by the mood of the political establishment, including deputies in the Duma and the senior bureaucracy in the foreign and defense ministries, which have grown increasingly unhappy with what they perceive as a "one-way street" in Russo-American relations. In this view, Russia has taken a number of major steps helpful to the United States since September 11, 2001: unprecedented overflight and basing rights and intelligence sharing; quiet acquiescence to the unilateral abrogation of the ABM treaty (despite the spoiling for a fight by the Democratic majority in the U.S. Senate and by America's European allies) and the expansion of NATO to former Soviet territory. Not only, the argument goes, did the United States fail to reciprocate in any way commensurate with the Russian proffers, but, in fact, it damaged Russian interests in a number of ways. Much in the list of particulars may be inaccurate, ascribing ill will and intent to oversights, bureaucratic inertia, and policies in which Russia was far from a major consideration. Still, as the dean of American sociologists, W. I. Thomas, once noted: "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."[32] US refusal to lift the Jackson-Vanik Trade Law Amendment kills relations Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 Among the Russian grievances are: The Jackson-Vanik Trade Law Amendment. Passed by the U.S. Congress in 1974, the measure prohibits granting normal trade relations (formerly known as most favored nation) status to countries with non-market economies that restrict freedom of emigration. Even though more than 70 percent of the Russian economy is in a nonstate sector (last year the United States officially recognized Russia as a market economy) and both emigration and travel abroad are unrestricted, Russia has to receive an annual waiver to be exempted from the law. By contrast, China no longer does. The Bush administration repeatedly promised Moscow that it would have Congress repeal Jackson-Vanik. Last year it encountered stiff resistance in the Senate, controlled by the Democrats until the November midterm elections. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph R. Biden, opposed the repeal because of a Russian ban on U.S. poultry exports. (Russia was the single largest importer of American chicken parts, accounting for half of the total U.S. exports, much of them produced in Biden's home state of Delaware.) The White House retreated. Realtions bad because of Imposed Steel Tariffs that hamper Russian trade with the hurt their economy. Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 In March 2002 the Bush administration imposed tariffs ranging from 8 to 30 percent on imported steel for a three-year period. In addition to Russia, which provided 4 to 6 percent of the over 23 million tons of steel imported by the United States, the countries most adversely affected by the tariffs were Ukraine, Japan, China, South Korea, and Brazil. Russian steel imports to the United States accounted for 10 percent of the annual trade turnover between the two countries, and Russia stood to lose $400 to $500 million because of the imposition of the duties. In addition, the sharp decrease in trade was predicted to cause massive layoffs in the privatized Russian steel industry, which employed 750,000 people. At the time, Moscow called the imposition of the tariffs "illegal" and warned of their "negative" impact on the relations between the two countries.[33] 56 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ The US has been unwilling to help Russia forgive their soviet debt to the WTO and there quick willingness to forgive iraq’s Saddam-era debts which were mostly owed to Russia. Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Paris Club Debt. Russia hoped for U.S. assistance in expediting its entry into the WTO and in negotiating partial forgiveness or rescheduling of more than $100 billion of Soviet debt to sovereign lenders (the so-called Paris Club). As of now, Russia remains at least a year away from WTO membership, and the Paris Club has not rescheduled or forgiven any of its Soviet debt (most of it accumulated by the Gorbachev government between 1988 and 1991). The latter is likely a source of particular bitterness, as the Russians watched Eastern European, particularly Polish, communistera debts forgiven in the early 1990s and as the United States today helps postwar Iraq write off its Saddam-era debts, many of which are owed to Moscow. The disrespectful manner in which the US Embassy acts toward high class Russian citizens including cultural leader and civil rights advocates dampers relations. Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 The Consulate. The U.S. Embassy's Moscow consulate is known throughout Russia for the rudeness and incompetence of its staffers, who capriciously deny visas to (or subject to humiliatingly long interviews) not just would-be tourists from the middle and upper-middle class, but also leading Russian entrepreneurs, civic leaders, and cultural figures traveling to America by invitation. Russian Public doesn’t want to cooperate with the US Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 In the fall of 2001, after siding decisively with the United States, Vladimir Putin declared: Unlike the past, Russia today cooperates with the West not because it wants to be liked or wants to get something in exchange for its position. We are not panhandling and we are not asking anyone for anything. I conduct this policy only because I feel that it is completely in accordance with Russia's national interests.[36] At the time, Putin showed little deference to, or even patience with, the traditionally anti-American defense and foreign bureaucracies, whose list of grievances was likely to have been just as long then as it is now. Within a week of September 11, he overruled his defense and foreign ministers by granting U.S. troops unprecedented overflight rights and encouraging the former Soviet republics in Central Asia to allow the establishment of American bases there. According to a top Kremlin official, the Russian president understands, unlike many of his subordinates, that at least some of the U.S. policies Russia finds objectionable are not those of the Bush administration and, indeed, often are contrary to the wishes of the White House. Instead, they have been implemented by the lower echelons of the vast bureaucracy (especially in the State Department and the Pentagon), which the Kremlin perceives as "incorrigibly anti-Russian." In the same official's words, "even though the transmission has been disconnected, the motor is still running." Moreover, a Kremlin insider close to President Putin insisted in February that Moscow views the United States as its "most important strategic partner," and that "partnership, if possible, alliance and, even better, close friendship" with the United States remains the "strategic direction" of Russian foreign policy. The necessity to salvage this "strategic direction" may have been behind Putin's conspicuous silence during the final rounds of the Iraq debate in the United Nations in February and March of 2003. Unlike his French counterpart, Jacques Chirac, Putin did not publicly support his foreign minister in brandishing a veto over the putative U.S.-British UN Security Council resolution. Still, by the end of 2002, the United States had neither sticks nor carrots with which to influence Russia's behavior. From NATO expansion and ABM to the WTO and the Paris Club debt, the chips had either been cashed in or thrown out. Without Russian public opinion united behind him in sympathy and solidarity with the United States, as it was after 9/11, and with his pockets empty of anything that would impress the political class, Putin apparently decided not to challenge the elite consensus and, instead, joined it. 57 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 58 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Russia- Islam Makes New Russia Islamic radicalization will shape a new Russia ROLAND DANNREUTHER* International Affairs 86: 1 (2010) 109–126© 2010 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15747_86_1dannreuther.pdf To what extent does the Russian Federation face the threat of Islamic radicalization? The threat is undeniably a serious one, and has been a source of some of the most critical challenges to the integrity and stability of Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Chechnya, Moscow has confronted a secessionist struggle which has become increasingly Islamized and integrated into the global transnational jihadist movement. The conflict has also spread beyond the North Caucasus. Moscow and a number of other cities and regions in Russia have suffered a series of deadly Islamist-inspired terrorist attacks, such as the Moscow theatre hostage crisis in 2002 and the Beslan siege in 2004. Some analysts consider there is a real threat that Islamic radicalization is inexorably advancing, driven in particular by Putin’s repressive and centralizing policies, and that it could ultimately overwhelm the Russian state. Gordon Hahn argues that ‘Russia is experiencing the beginning of an Islamist jihad’ and that the radicalization of the North Caucasus is inexorably spreading to the Volga–Urals region and into the main cities of Russia, such as Moscow and St Petersburg.1 Some Russian analysts have similarly raised the alarm of an overwhelming ‘Islamic threat’, the incipient ‘Islamization of Russia’, and the threat of an alliance between liberals and Muslims which could lead to an ‘orange–green revolution’.2 Close to the surface of such assessments is a demographic element—the fact that the ethnic Russian population is in severe demographic decline while the Russian Muslim population is growing rapidly. Among western commentators, Paul Goble has raised the prospect of a Muslim majority in Russia by 2050.3 59 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 60 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Terrorism-Increasing Now Terrorism attacks on the rise now STEVEN LEE MYERS and MARC SANTORA December 8, 2009 writers for the New York Times Election Date Set in Iraq as Bombs Kill Scores http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/09/world/middleeast/09iraq.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Terrorist%20attacks%20in%20iraq&st=cse The bombings, a coordinated assault on capital, highlighted an ominous convergence of politics and violence, which American and Iraqi officials have long warned will mar the country’s election. The vote, originally scheduled for January, was delayed by ethnic and sectarian disputes resolved only two days ago. Five bombs, at least three detonated by suicide attackers, struck a courthouse, two colleges, a mosque and a bank. They created chaos across the city, locking down entire neighborhoods, overwhelming the police and rescue workers, and filling hospitals with the wounded. In one, a woman with her hair scorched and neck bloodied agonized as her child lay dying in a hallway. At least 121 people were killed and more than 400 were wounded, according to police and hospital officialsThe attacks were the worst in Iraq since twin suicide bombings destroyed three government agencies on Oct. 25, killing at least 155. They fit a pattern of spectacularly lethal attacks in the capital, followed by weeks of relative calm. In August, two suicide car bombs struck the country’s Finance and Foreign Ministries, killing at least 122. Those attacks became known as Bloody Sunday and Bloody Wednesday, respectively. Officials and average Iraqis promptly added the adjective to Tuesday, as well. Enviromental terrorism is becoming more common Ali Mohamed Al-Damkhi (Associate Professor of Environmental Sciences at the State of Kuwait's Public Authority for Applied Education and Training (PAAET). Rana Abdullah Al-Fares (Assistant Professor of Civil Engineering at the College of Engineering & Petroluem, Kuwait University). February 2010“Terrorist Threats to the Environment in Iraq and Beyond” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/glep.2010.10.1.1?journalCode=glep The environmental consequences of political conflict are a growing problem throughout the world. Not only nations, but a variety of terrorist and insurgent groups have shown a disturbing tendency to make use of intentional environmental destruction in the pursuit of their political agendas. Currently, scenarios of environmental terrorism in Iraq are particularly dire, due to the changing political situation in that country, the vulnerability of its petroleum infrastructure, and the precedent set by the catastrophe in Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War. The international community should remain aware of the real threat of sudden, intentional environmental destruction, and should take preventative steps, while preparing for the possibility of a major event. Steps can be taken to provide for security and emergency response, while the promotion of social justice and educational initiatives can help to decrease the likelihood of such an event. Further research should be conducted to identify the most effective strategies for reducing the threat of environmental terrorism in specific regions. More terrorists threaten US bases Leila Fadel (reported from Baghdad for McClatchy Newspapers and Knight Ridder) Tuesday, July 13, 2010 Washington Post Foreign Service ‘Amid threat, U.S. heightens security at its Iraq bases” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/13/AR2010071301768.html The U.S. military has beefed up security at some of its bases after a threat that an Iranian-backed militant group was planning to attack, the top U.S. military commander in Iraq said Tuesday. Men from Kataib Hezbollah, a Shiite group that U.S. BAGHDAD -- officials say is trained and funded by Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, crossed into Iran for training and returned to conduct attacks just as U.S. troop levels plummet over the summer, Gen. Ray Odierno said. By September, only 50,000 U.S. troops will remain in Iraq. "In the last couple weeks there's been an increased threat," Odierno said in a briefing to reporters. "We've increased our security on some of our bases. We've also increased activity with the Iraqi Security Forces. This is another attempt by Iran and others to influence the U.S. role here inside Iraq." 61 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 62 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Terrorism-US Presence Increase US presence is used as a terrorist recruiting tool Kenneth Pollack, of the Brookings Institution, September9 2008 an expert on national security and on the Persian Gulf. He served as Director of Gulf Affairs on the National Security Council under President Clinton Kenneth Pollack: If Iraq slips back into civil war…it will be far more dangerous than in Afghanistan http://blog.aapss.org/index.cfm?commentID=71 I think looking back on it right now you would have to say that the Iraq war has been a very significant negative in terms of the overarching war on terrorism. As you and I talked about at the beginning of this discussion, Iraq was not the central front on the war on terrorism, we made it a central front by our own mistakes. At best, what you can say today is perhaps we eliminated it as a central front, so we got back to zero, we are right back where we started. But unfortunately it is not even that much the case because the fact of the matter is that the Iraq war was a major distraction from our concentration on al Qaeda. And had we not gone to war in 2003, had we maintained our focus on al Qaeda, who knows. Perhaps al Qaeda would be less of a threat than it is today. Perhaps it would not be a threat at all. It is hard to know but certainly it is clear that the distraction of Iraq did not help the war on terrorism. I think over the longer term it is unclear what kind of an impact it will have. I would simply balance the clear negative that you have today by saying that I actually do think that some of the things that have come out of Iraq, especially in the last couple of years, suggest that there might, there might, be a longer, much longer-term positive benefit. Maybe over the next ten or fifteen years if what happened in Iraq in terms of al Qaeda basically introducing a philosophy that many people in the region now were able to see in practice and decide that they really did not like, that they did not want this kind of a ridiculously harsh version of sharia and this ideological approach to life, if they could look at that and say, we really do not want that, perhaps over time that will help weaken al Qaeda's appeal elsewhere in the Muslim Middle East. By the same token, if Iraq does emerge as a stable, pluralist Arab society, and that is still a big if, but the potential is now there, if that does happen over the next ten or fifteen a lot of Arabs who are angry and frustrated, and let us remember that is what al Qaeda preys on, al Qaeda is ultimately a revolutionary group, they are preying upon the widespread anger and unhappiness of so many Arabs and saying to them, "There is a different way, if we overthrow these Jahiliyyah, these unbeliever governments, like Hosni Mubarak's and the Saudi royal family, if we overthrow them we can build a new society for you." And there are a lot of people who are attracted to that simply because they hate their current situation so much they are willing to adopt any alternative to it. That is how most years that too could be a net positive. Because it will say to revolutionaries build their base. But if a new Iraq emerges that is stable, prosperous, pluralist, that will be a new model for people and people elsewhere in the region may be able to say, hey look, what we saw in Iraq was al Qaeda setting up shop and we really did not like what they had to offer and now we have this other model of what life could be like and that looks pretty good. And if that is the case, and I want to stress if, because it is very unclear that that will be the reality, but if it is the case that might over the long term work toward helping to solve the underlying problem of the war on terrorism. Hate for US fuels terrorism Dana Priest and Josh White February 17, 2005 Washington Post Staff Writers The Washington Post War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28876-2005Feb16.html Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to recruit new anti-U.S. jihadists," CIA Director Porter J. Goss told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence."These jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban terrorism," he said. "They represent a potential pool of contacts to build transnational terrorist cells, groups and networks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries." On a day when the top half-dozen U.S. national security and intelligence officials went to Capitol Hill to talk about the continued determination of terrorists to strike the United States, their statements underscored the unintended consequences of the war in Iraq. The Iraq conflict, while not a cause of extremism, has become a cause for extremists," Goss said in his first public testimony since taking over the CIA. Goss said Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian terrorist who has joined al Qaeda since the U.S. invasion, "hopes to establish a safe haven in Iraq" from which he could operate against Western nations and moderate Muslim governments. "Our policies in the Middle East fuel Islamic resentment," Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Senate panel. "Overwhelming U.S. has a negative policy toward the Arab world." majorities in Morocco, Jordan and Saudi Arabia believe the US presence provokes Terrorists-Withdrawing Troops key to Solve. Miron 10 (Jeffrey Miron, Christian Science Monitor Staff Writer, January 28, 2010, More airport security won't do much to stop terrorists. Leaving the Middle East would.; Ending US interference, including military support for Israel, could significantly reduce the rationale for terrorist acts.) But while not everyone in the US agrees that the drug trade, prostitution, and immigration are something that should be addressed, all Americans want to reduce the number of people or organizations that seek to commit terrorist acts against the US. So what can the US do to reduce this? The answer is expeditious withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Middle Eastern countries, along with cessation of economic and military aid to Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, and the rest of the region. Ending US interference in the Middle East is a necessary condition for reducing terrorism against the US because Islamic resentment results directly from this interference. The fact that virtually all terrorist attacks against the US since 9/11 have targeted US forces in the Middle East, rather than targets on US soil, suggests the crucial objective is getting the US to leave. Of course, terminating US intrusions in the Middle East will not eliminate antipathy to the US. Some Muslims, just like some non-Muslims, hate the US merely because it is rich and powerful. But ending US interference - which is not mild or occasional but pervasive and severe - would help achieve a significant reduction in the demand for terrorist acts against us. Numerous examples illustrate this view; terrorist attacks against Britain, for example, were concentrated historically against targets in the Middle East and India, but ceased when the British departed. US withdrawal from the Middle East must, of course, proceed slowly enough to safeguard US troops and equipment, and avoid putting locals in harm's way. And this withdrawal may initially increase violence and instability, as the remaining factions attempt to consolidate power. 63 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ US presence in Iraq fuels terrorism Posen 06, Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, Exit Strategy How to disengage from Iraq in 18 months, January/February 2006, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR31.1/posen.php Fourth, the American presence fuels all four social sources of insurgent support. Sunni Arabs almost surely see the United States as the agent of their fall from the top of the social order and the American presence as an obstacle to restoring their power and resources. U.S. military action, however precise by historical standards, nevertheless directly harms Iraqis and their extended families. Every killing or arrest produces more insurgents, and it is easy to see how when every victim may have two or three brothers and many more male first cousins. Finally, and obviously, the American presence stimulates both religious and nationalist opposition. It is easy to forget that, for a time, even some Shia violently opposed the American presence for these reasons. US presence exacerbates terrorism, terrorists want the US out and US presence makes security forces unmotivated. Posen 06, Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT, Exit Strategy How to disengage from Iraq in 18 months, January/February 2006, http://www.bostonreview.net/BR31.1/posen.php The American presence in Iraq—and official declarations that the U.S. military there will “hunt down” the terrorists— exacerbates these problems. First, Iraqi politicians will not apply sustained pressure to their security forces to improve themselves so long as they know that the Americans will remain to protect the state from the insurgents. Second, the Iraqi units themselves will not grow in capability and confidence so long as they are relying upon American command and control, firepower, and tactical acumen. The assertion that they would profit from more training, more professional leadership, more organization, and better equipment is true, though the American and Iraqi governments have already had two years to pour resources into these problems. But how do the insurgents do so well with no large training bases, no safe place to organize, no secure electronic command-andcontrol network, and only the weaponry they can obtain covertly? The answer is almost certainly motivation. The insurgents care more about ejecting the United States than Iraqi politicians and soldiers care about stopping the insurgents—in part because the Iraqis can rely on the United States to do it for them. 64 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 65 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Terrorism-Bad Terrorism risks the destruction of the environment Ali Mohamed Al-Damkhi and Rana Abdullah Al-Fares febuary 2010 Volume 10, Number 1, “Terrorist Threats to the Environment in Iraq and Beyond’ http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/v010/10.1.al-damkhi.html the continuing success of attacks on infrastructure in Iraq has proven that industrial facilities in that nation are vulnerable to organizations or individuals intent on creating ecological disasters. Nearly 500 separate attacks have been carried out on Iraqi industrial facilities since 2003, including attacks on major oil terminals in Baghdad, Basra, and Kirkuk.8 Insurgent groups have not yet made attempts to specifically target the environment during the course of these attacks or to create a widespread disaster like the 1991 catastrophe in Kuwait, but this is not beyond the bounds of possibility. Further, the changing situation in the region may increase both the willingness and capacity of certain groups to hold the environment hostage.9 Unfortunately, the tragedy in Kuwait left an Most disturbingly, indelible impression in the region. It showed the amount of destructive impact that can be had by targeting the environment, even and perhaps especially when the perpetrators are constrained to using hasty and improvised techniques. Potential scenarios for such an attack are grim. Iraq produces much more oil than Kuwait and a release from a central terminal in Iraq could be devastating. In addition, individual wells in Iraq are much larger and run at significantly higher pressures than did the Kuwaiti wells that were destroyed in 1991. Some individual wells in the northern region of Kirkuk are among the largest in the world and would burn with a ferocity unseen in Kuwait. A further threat is to be found in the proximity of Iraqi oil installations to the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. These vital waterways and their alluvial basin are extremely important to the ecology of the entire region; they also contain a large part of the fresh water [End Page 3] available for human consumption in the Middle East. A major release into these rivers would be an unprecedented catastrophe. 66 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 67 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Heg- Cred War in Iraq has put U.S. credibility on the brink Duss in 10 [Matthew, Research Associate at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, Huffington Post, “Report: Iraq War Undercut U.S. Credibility, Hobbled Democratic Reform”] 4/5/10, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/matthew-duss/report-iraq-war-undercut_b_525859.html So not only did the Bush administration's key (post-WMD) strategic claim about the war -- that replacing Saddam Hussein with a less turn out to be false, the war actually made things worse for democracy. By offering democratic reform as a component to the "war on terror," which many Muslims see as a war against Islam, the U.S. alienated and isolated at the outset scores of potential reformist allies. By then promoting Iraq as a potential showpiece for that agenda ("See all these explosions? This could be your country! Who's in?") we discredited democratic reform even more. despotic, more democratic government would start a democratic chain reaction in the region -- Pulling out now boosts U.S. Cred- empirically proven Takeyh 07 [Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Iran; “We've Lost. Here's How To Handle It.”] June 17 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13613/weve_lost_heres_how_to_handle_it.html A well-managed defeat would be more likely to boost U.S. credibility. Staying longer certainly won’t. As the historian Robert Dallek recently noted about Vietnam, “U.S. credibility was enhanced by ending a war that it could not win—a war that was costing the country vital resources that it could better use elsewhere.” Withdrawal would also staunch the hemorrhage of our global influence. U.S.-occupied Iraq is now a wellspring of images that seem to show U.S. weakness and cruelty. The insurgency alone produces more than 900 widely distributed communiques every month, which steadily erode our image in the Muslim world. Even King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, a conservative U.S. ally, has condemned the American occupation and said that he refuses to be President Bush‘s Arab Tony Blair. {Cred Impact} 68 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Heg- Cred U.S. credibility is decreasing, anti-Americanism is increasing, and the ability to refurbish U.S. image is failing Zaharna in 06 [R.S., Associate Professor Of Public Communication At American University, And Author Of Strategic U.S. Public Diplomacy In A Global Communication Era, Contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, “The U.S. Credibility Deficit”] 12/13/06, http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_us_credibility_deficit As Nancy Snow compellingly argues, more listening and civic diplomacy may be viable, preliminary steps to salvaging the U.S. international reputation from charges of arrogance and impatience. However, while more ears than mouth” may counter the U.S. image problem , U.S. public diplomacy has a much more serious problem. It has a credibility deficit of global proportions. To tackle that credibility deficit, U.S. public diplomacy needs a comprehensive, innovative, and strategic approach that entails developing more creative relationship-building strategies, matching policy decisions with Snow effectively underscores the severity and repercussions of anti-Americanism on the U.S. image. However nebulous the term, anti-Americanism has very real costs in terms of diminished U.S. prestige, restricted foreign policy options, lost revenues for American businesses, and, of course, decreased American security. International poll results give a disturbing glimpse of how pervasive and deep the sentiment has become. While anti-Americanism is not new, its growth despite an aggressive public diplomacy effort to refurbish the U.S. image is alarming. In this, I agree with Snow that U.S. public diplomacy needs “a fundamentally different approach.” Where I differ somewhat is on the depth and direction of that approach. America's inability to listen is tied to its preoccupation with designing and delivering messages. Since 9/11, U.S. public diplomacy has gone into overdrive to get the message out about U.S. values, policies, and positions. This information-centered approach presumes either a lack of information or an abundance of misinformation; hence the flurry of viable communication options, and coordinating traditional and public diplomacy initiatives. U.S. public diplomacy initiatives such as the Shared Values advertising campaign, Hi magazine, Al-Hurra television, and Radio Sawa. Yet, because of the U.S. What U.S. officials don't seem to register is that no amount of information pumped out by U.S. public diplomacy will be enough to improve the U.S. image. The problem, ultimately, is not lack of information but lack of credibility . People around the world superpower status, countries are continuously monitoring and gathering as much information as they can about U.S. activities and policies. questioned the Bush administration's actions before it entered Iraq back in February 2003. Last month, the U.S. public resoundingly expressed their misgivings Iraq has focused a spotlight on U.S. credibility. The more the United States flounders in Iraq, the more U.S. credibility erodes in the world. Without credibility, no amount of information holds persuasive weight, and U.S. soft power can't attract and influence others. about the Bush administration's handling of the war. 69 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 70 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Heg- Overstretch U.S. Military is detrimentally overstretched Defense Talk 2005(Defense Talk, August 23, 2005, http://www.defencetalk.com/is-the-us-military-overstretched-3595/) Voice of America News, WASHINGTON, D.C.: With more than 250,000 American troops deployed in nearly 130 countries, many analysts are questioning whether the United States military is stretched in ways that could undermine its future capabilities should new threats arise. In his annual report to Congress last May, General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, conceded that the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have strained the military to a point where it runs a higher risk of not being able to quickly and easily defeat potential enemies. U.S. military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan, and recruitment shortfalls in some branches of the armed forces, such as the Army and National Guard, have alarmed some observers who warn that the military is overburdened and overstretched. Charles Pena, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, says the current system used to repeatedly rotate and redeploy troops serving in Iraq over extended periods of time could negatively impact America Iraq is draining our forces Evans 2007(Michael Evans, November 5, 2007, Defence Editor, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article2806256.ece) The Armed Forces are “running on empty”, overstretched by the long-running operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to a report on the state of the military. “The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have seriously diminished the ability of the Armed Forces to meet future challenges,” the think-tank Demos said. With such pressures affecting the Forces, the current situation was “unsustainable – financially, organisationally, operationally and in terms of military-society relations”. Troops are suffering as a result of overstretching Lazare 2009(Sarah Lazare, December 26, 2009, http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2009/12/26/the-us-army-is-overstretched-and-exhausted-says-peacecampaigner-sarah-lazare.html) The call for over 30,000 more troops to be sent to Afghanistan is a travesty for the people of that country who have already suffered eight brutal years of occupation. It is also a harsh blow to the US soldiers facing imminent deployment. A Barack Obama, the US president, gears up for a further escalation that will bring the total number of troops in Afghanistan to over 100,000, he faces a military force that has been exhausted and overextended by fighting two wars . Many from within the ranks are openly declaring that they have had enough, allying with anti-war veterans and activists in calling for an end to the US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with some active duty soldiers publicly refusing to deploy. This growing movement of military refusers is a voice of sanity in a country slipping deeper into unending war. The architects of this war would be well-advised to listen to the concerns of the soldiers and veterans tasked with carrying out their war policies on the ground. Many of those being deployed have already faced multiple deployments to combat zones: the 101st Airborne "They are just going to start moving the soldiers who already served in Iraq to Afghanistan, just like they shifted me from one war to the next," said Eddie Falcon, a member of Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW), who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Soldiers are going to start coming back with PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), missing limbs, problems with alcohol, and depression." Many of these troops are still suffering the mental and physical fallout from previous deployments. Rates of PTSD and traumatic brain injury among troops Division, which will be deployed to Afghanistan in early 2010, faces its fifth combat tour since 2002. deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have been disproportionately high, with a third of returning troops reporting mental problems and 18.5 per cent of all returning service members battling either PTSD or depression, according to a study by the Rand Corporation. Marine suicides doubled between 2006 and 2007, and army suicides are at the highest rate since records were kept in 1980. 71 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Heg- Overstretch Obama agrees our military is suffering drastically Everest 2008 (Larry Everest, Revolution correspondent, “Obama’s Foreign Policy: Steering U.S. Imperialism Through Dangerous Waters” July 27, 2008) SB Obama has never criticized the invasion of Iraq because it was an illegal, immoral, and unjust war of conquest and empire. And the criticisms he raises come from the thoroughly chauvinist viewpoint of what’s best for America—i.e. the U.S. empire. “I warned that the invasion of a country posing no imminent threat the cost has outweighed the benefits for U.S. imperialism: ”Since then, more than 4,000 Americans have died and we have spent nearly $1 trillion. Our military is overstretched. Nearly every threat we face—from Afghanistan to Al Qaeda to Iran—has grown.... The strain on our military has grown, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated and we’ve spent nearly $200 billion more in Iraq than we had budgeted.” would fan the flames of extremism, and distract us from the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban,” Obama writes. And he argues that 72 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 73 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Hegemony- Budget Overstretched US military is overstretched, straining our budget Everest 2008 (Larry Everest, Revolution correspondent, “Obama’s Foreign Policy: Steering U.S. Imperialism Through Dangerous Waters”, http://www.rwor.org/a/137/iraq_obama-en.html, July 27, 2008) SB Obama has never criticized the invasion of Iraq because it was an illegal, immoral, and unjust war of conquest and empire. And the criticisms he raises come from the thoroughly chauvinist viewpoint of what’s best for America—i.e. the U.S. empire. “I warned that the invasion of a country posing no imminent threat would fan the flames of extremism, and distract us from the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban,” Obama writes. And he argues that the cost has outweighed the benefits for U.S. imperialism: ”Since then, more than 4,000 Americans have died and we have spent nearly $1 trillion. Our military is overstretched. Nearly every threat we face—from Afghanistan to Al Qaeda to Iran—has grown.... The strain on our military has grown, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated and we’ve spent nearly $200 billion more in Iraq than we had budgeted.” 74 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Stability-Unstable Now Iraq highly unstable now Pascual and Pollack 2007 (Carlos, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, Ken, expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf, “Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq”) September 2007, Brookings.edu Iraq presents a stark picture of a polarized and violent society beset by terrorism, widespread organized and unorganized crime, an insurgency, a failed state, and a civil war. A successful U.S. policy toward Iraq must come to grips with all of these problems if it is to have any chance of success. Unquestionably, this is a daunting challenge. Initially, Washington insisted that the problems of Iraq were merely a problem of terrorism, and later of terrorism and an insurgency. However, pulling Iraq out of its nose-dive will require the United States to confront the far more difficult problems of Iraq as a failed state and Iraq in civil war. Historically, building the political, economic, and bureaucratic institutions of The January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on a failed state require time, commitment, and a secure environment. Ending a civil war requires a negotiated settlement among the warring parties. Both will be necessary in Iraq for any changes in military tactics and augmented troop strength to create conditions for lasting progress. Even with U.S. help Iraq is still unstable Barzai 2010 (Baqi Barzai. July 12, 2010 Bahttp://www.kurdishaspect.com/ “farewell iraq”) 7 years of engagement in vain democratization efforts, apart from the scan, vague level of tranquility, in reality, the state of affairs in Iraq has not experienced any tangible shifts. The central government still remains powerless and lacks the capacity to impose laws on the tribally-administered Iraqi society. All government branches (judicial, executive, legislative) run quite autonomously from the authority of central government. Governmental corruption, fraud, embezzlement abound. The growing unemployment rate, inflation and poverty, especially among women are relapsing the country decades back After 75 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 76 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Stability-US Presence Makes it Worse Presence in Iraq hurts relations, decks credibility, and causes instability. Jarrar 2010 (Raed Jarrar, May 25, 2010, http://www.progressive.org/mpjarrar052510.html) President Obama should not bow to the Beltway voices urging him to keep U.S. troops longer in Iraq. At a speech at West Point on Saturday, May 22, Obama said: “We are poised to end our combat mission in Iraq this summer.” His statement, which the cadets greeted with applause, is a reaffirmation of his pledge to have all U.S. combat forces leave Iraq by Aug. 31. Any remaining armed forces are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with the binding bilateral Security Agreement, also referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement. But Washington pundits are still pushing Obama to delay or cancel the U.S. disengagement, calling on him to be “flexible” and take into consideration the recent spike of violence in Iraq. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed and injured during the last few months in what seems to be an organized campaign to challenge U.S. plans. While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as “flexibility,” but rather as a betrayal of promises. Iraqis believe that prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damaged, and they don’t think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iranian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation. Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them. By contrast, adhering to the current timebased plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve, but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi Iraq’s sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions. domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country. Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one. Troop reduction is key to US-Iraq relations and stability Hanna 2010 (Michael Wahid, Fellow and Program Officer at The Century Foundation, “Stay the Course of Withdrawal” April 4, 2010) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66188/michael-wahid-hanna/stay-the-course-of-withdrawal Policymakers and analysts too often measure U.S. influence in Iraq according to troop levels. In fact, the United States has become better able to develop a productive relationship with Iraq by abiding by the terms of the security agreement in good faith -which means reducing troop levels and withdrawing from Iraqi population centers , as the U.S. military did last June. Because of these actions, the U.S. presence was a relatively minor issue in last month’s elections, whereas in the recent past it was the central issue that drove Iraqi politics and fueled a broad-based insurgency. U.S.-Iraqi cooperation is only sustainable if Iraqis do not fear long-term U.S. plans. The United States will be able to play a stabilizing diplomatic role in Iraq’s ongoing political transition only if Washington and Baghdad continue along the path of normalizing bilateral relations. In this sense, it is the very act of withdrawal that will allow the United States to become a strategic partner for the emerging Iraqi state. 77 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ Troops are ineffective, immediate withdrawal solves conflict and regional stability Pascual and Pollack 2007 (Carlos, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, Ken, expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf, “Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq”) September 2007, Brookings.edu no “course of action in Iraq at this point will stop the sectarian warfare, the growing violence, or the ongoing slide toward chaos.”16 If you accept this assumption, it logically follows that it would therefore be better to withdraw American troops from Iraq over a rapid, but phased schedule. "The fundamental goal is to reduce American casualties in a civil war where external forces are believed to be incapable of stopping the fighting. A secondary objective might be to limit some forms of spillover from the war to the region, particularly the spread of terrorism, through a reduced regional troop presence. "The core element of the withdrawal option is to redeploy all American troops (say 150,000 for illustrative purposes) over 18 months. Iraqis would be given this timeframe in order to coordinate with American troops, focus their training, and phase in security functions carried out by American forces. A phased redeployment would leave “an Army brigade in Kuwait, and a Marine Expeditionary Force and a carrier battle group in the Persian Gulf. "This force would have sufficient military power to prevent Iraq from becoming a haven for al-Qaeda or being invaded by its neighbors.”17 A strong regional diplomatic initiative, focused on a political solution for Iraq and addressing the wider issues in the Middle East, would Withdrawal. "The case for withdrawal is based on the assumption that be launched in parallel with the announced redeployment. Special envoys such as former Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Madelaine Albright would be named to head the initiative. "There are good reasons to consider withdrawing U.S. troops. Civil and sectarian war may have deteriorated so badly that external troops cannot stop the fighting or redress the core problems underlying the conflict. "The announcement of a timecertain withdrawal might shock warring Iraqis into negotiation to avoid even more bloodshed after American troops leave. Iraq’s neighbors might also be forced to come to terms with a failed state and civil war on their borders that will threaten their interests even more once the U.S. Withdraws. Regional actors may then have an interest in stopping their support for sectarian factions and begin to pressure them to enter a political negotiation. The sooner we get out the better. Hanna 2010 (Michael Wahid, Fellow and Program Officer at The Century Foundation, “Stay the Course of Withdrawal” April 4, 2010) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66188/michael-wahid-hanna/stay-the-course-of-withdrawal Having held parliamentary elections on March 7 and endured a protracted period of vote counting, Iraqis are now focused on the arduous process of government formation. As this Iraqi drama unfolds, U.S. military forces are preparing to redeploy according to the U.S.-Iraq security agreement of November 2008 and President Barack Obama’s announced timetable for withdrawal. The impending drawdown -- from 96,000 troops today to about 50,000 on September 1, 2010, and zero on January 1, 2012 -- will require the United States to defer increasingly to Iraqis as they dictate their own future. This, in turn, requires that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue their development. The increased proficiency of the ISF is a main reason why, though Iraqis will continue to endure grievous violence in coming years, there is no longer a broad-based insurgency that poses a strategic threat to the political process or the government. But the ISF’s progress is relatively new: although President George W. Bush said in 2005 that “as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down,” the ISF has only recently achieved a substantial level of operational independence. 78 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ The longer the U.S. stays in Iraq the less politically stable it will be Young in 06 [Kevin Young, Senior History and Latin American Studies Major at Wesleyan University, Incite Magazine, “The Left's Uneasiness Over Immediate Withdrawal from Iraq,”] 2006; http://www.incitemagazine.org/iraq/YoungIraqWithdrawal210207.php This is not to say that one should only support "ideal" democratic resistance forces: the victory of even undemocratic forces against imperialism can still serve to open up pathways toward future democratic and radical struggles. However, there is a threshold of authoritarianism and historical momentum beyond which this is not the case: for example, the victory of resistance forces controlled by fascists, Pol Pot, Taliban-like fundamentalists, Stalinists, or unreconstructed Baathists intercepts the normal liberatory dynamic of national movements against imperialism.* In Iraq, then, the character of the different elements of the resistance matters. Those who say that Western peace activists should support anyone and everyone in the Iraqi resistance, no matter how capable of and committed to imposing hyperauthoritarian rule they may be ("Anybody But the U.S.") are giving misadvice. This is not a question of the peace movement seeking respectability by pandering to the prejudices of the American people. People in the U.S. are quite rightly horrified by repression and authoritarianism. If we peace activists ever hope to disentangle that horror from the support for imperialism with which it has become entwined, we need to make clear our own deep commitment to democracy and freedom. Those of us who advocate immediate withdrawal of the United States and its dwindling number of allies from Iraq make a mistake, however, if we try to assure people that withdrawal will necessarily produce a positive outcome. It may be that the grotesque polarization fostered by the U.S. war and occupation has already succeeded in legitimizing and strengthening reactionary elements in the resistance to the point where they will be able to impose their retrograde agenda on the Iraqi people. But one thing is for sure: the longer the U.S. stays in Iraq the less likely a democratic, secular outcome for Iraq becomes. The only hope for democrats in Iraq is a speedy end to the brutal occupation of the country. And the only hope for democrats internationally is to break out of the terrible symbiotic relationship between the U.S. empire and the reactionary forces that feed off of its brutality, by opposing both of them. 79 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Stability-Spills Over Iraq instability strengthen Iran prolif and causes regional instability Pascual and Pollack 2007 (Carlos, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, Ken, expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf, “Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq”) September 2007, Brookings.edu Instability in Iraq and the region strengthen Iran’s hand. Iran has realized its ambition in Iraq of a Shiiteled government and has exercised its influence through its support for Shiite political factions and militias and its religious ties. Indirectly, Iran is strengthened in its regional and international ambitions through U.S. humiliation. A weaker U.S. also gives Iran space to support its regional clients, Hezbollah and Hamas. Hezbollah’s ability to stand up to Israel in the July- August conflict in 2006 has further emboldened Iran to extend its regional influence. All of these factors complicate efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear program. Iran knows that it has leverage and influence in the region, that the U.S. is in trouble, and that it can make things worse for American troops in Iraq. Iraq instability causes civil war, regional instability and Middle East war Pascual and Pollack 2007 (Carlos, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, Ken, expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf, “Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq”) September 2007, Brookings.edu Internally within Iraq, militias will further entrench themselves as ruling bodies, eviscerating the state and making Iraq more susceptible to terrorist and extremist ideologies. As refugees flow into the region, both insurgents and terrorists will move across borders to resupply, recruit new members, and destabilize neighboring states. Jordan and Saudi Arabia will be particularly vulnerable to extremists agitating local communities and encouraging internal terrorist acts. Some Sunni neighbors will be tempted to fight back by supporting Sunni insurgents in Iraq against Shiite militias. Afghanistan is still enduring the impact of a comparable strategy when the United States armed the mujaheddin and de facto aided the rise of the Taliban in the 1980s. As instability grows within Iraq, the Kurds may declare an independent Kurdish state that would seek to take in Kurds from Turkey and Iran. Turkey has already been on the brink of intervening in Kurdistan to end what it considers a safe haven for PKK terrorist activity . Iran could also be drawn into a Kurdish conflict to prevent their own restless Kurdish population from following the example of their brethren across the border. NATO could face the choice of being drawn into another war in support of Turkey, or further alienating a Turkey that feels abandoned in coping with a severe terrorist threat that challenges its sovereignty. Humanitarian tragedies have massive security implications. Iraq instability causes oil shocks, civil war, and Middle East arms race. Pascual and Pollack 2007 (Carlos, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, Ken, expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf, “Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq”) September 2007, Brookings.edu Global Consequences. Finally, there are at least two major transnational considerations – terrorism and oil – though one should not lose sight of the risk of nuclear proliferation. Terrorists operate in political voids or weak or failing states. Such was the case with Al Qaeda’s emergence from Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan. "There is no doubt that a regional vacuum of governance in the Gulf and Middle East will become a base for transnational terrorism. An obvious target for terrorism will be oil producing states and transit networks. Instability alone will spike oil prices even without a disruption in production or shipping. In extreme (but, unfortunately, not so rare) cases of “spill over” from major civil wars, civil strife in one state can cause civil strife in another. "The Iranian revolution and Iraq’s civil war both demonstrated that such internal strife can affect oil production, dramatically so in the Iranian case. "Thus the potential for civil war in Iraq to spark similar conflicts in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran could be the worst-case scenario of all. "e loss of oil production from Iraq would be an irritant to the global economy; the loss of Saudi production would be a catastrophe. One need only follow this logic chain to understand the impacts of even lesser disruptions. Not only would energy importers feel the direct impact, but oil producers such as Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, and (in a different but still complex category) Russia would be emboldened to use energy and the wealth they derive from it as a domestic and foreign policy weapon. "This brings us back to the risk of a strengthened and wealthy Iran that cannot find accommodation with the P5+1 and proceeds with its nuclear program.8 "The question then emerges whether Saudi Arabia, Egypt and perhaps others will follow suit, fueling a race for nuclear weapons in a region prone to terror. Bad as the situation stands in 2007, the Middle East and Gulf can get worse and likely will as civil war in Iraq spills into the region. "e United States has a stake in stabilizing Iraq or containing the civil war that goes far beyond the issues inherent in Iraq. "at puts a premium on learning from both failed policies in Iraq and experience elsewhere. 80 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ Violence is rising with Iraq’s instability. Press association 2010 ( UPKA July 4, 2010. Press association. http://www.google.com/hostednews/ukpress/article/ A female suicide bomber killed four people and injured 23 in an attack on a government building in Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's the attacker detonated explosives strapped on her body in the reception room of the provincial government headquarters. The targeting of government offices is a hallmark of al-Qaida in Iraq which may be looking to use Biden's visit and the US Fourth of July holiday as a reminder of Iraq's continuing instability. Whether Iraq's ongoing political instability would lead to violence has been a concern since the March election , when the Shiite prime minister's State of western Anbar province. Councilman Aeefan Sadoun said Law coalition narrowly lost out to Allawi's Sunni-backed Iraqiya alliance, 89 seats to 91. 81 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 82 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Oil-Iraq = Major Source Iraq is a major source of the world’s oil Nordhaus et al 02—(William D, Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale University, Carl Kaysen, Economics Professor at MIT, Steve E Miller, Director of the International Security Program, Martin B Malin, Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center, and John D Steinbruner, Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, “War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, Alternatives”, American Academy for Arts and Sciences Committee on International Security Studies, http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edu/AAAS_War_Iraq_2.pdf) The Economic Background in Iraq It is widely recognized that the United States is an economic and military superpower. The military status of Iraq has been carefully reviewed,4 and I will concentrate on the current economic situation, beginning with Iraq’s major economic asset, oil. Oil experts believe that Iraq has immense oil resources. The most recent review by the U.S. Energy Information Agency stated in early 2002: Iraq contains 112 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the second largest in the world (behind Saudi Arabia) along with roughly 220 billion barrels of probable and possible resources. Iraq’s true resource potential may be far greater than this, however, as the country is relatively unexplored due to years of war and sanctions. Deep oil-bearing formations located mainly in the vast Western Desert region, for instance, could yield large additional oil resources, but have not been explored.5 Iraq has about 10 percent of the world’s oil proven reserves and resources. Iraq’s oil resources could satisfy current U.S. oil imports for almost a century. Iraq’s oil production in 2000 and 2001 averaged around 2.5 million barrels per day (mbpd). About 1 mbpd of this came from the northern Kirkuk field located largely in Kurdish Iraq, and the balance was produced largely in the southern, Shiite-majority Rumaila region. Iraq has frequently attempted to use oil as a weapon against the West, but recently it has held out the “oil carrot” to potential allies. As of early 2002, contracts involving many billions of dollars for increasing capacity have reportedly been negotiated with China, France, and Russia.6 It is probably not coincidental that these three countries have permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council. All three countries are probably suspicious of American economic designs on postwar Iraq, particularly given the powerful influence in Republican circles of construction and oil exploration companies like Bechtel and Halliburton. What is the current state of Iraq’s economy? The regime of Saddam Hussein has been as disastrous for the Iraqi economy as for other aspects of Iraqi society. The state of Iraq’s statistical system, like much of its economy, is in a sad state. None of the major international organizations has provided reliable data on Iraq’s economy for the last decade, but a rough estimate of economic conditions can be obtained on the basis of informal estimates. In recent decades, Iraq has been heavily dependent upon oil production. During those periods when oil production was not constrained by war or sanctions, Iraq’s oil production peaked at around 3 million barrels per day, or about 1 billion barrels per year. This constituted about half of Iraq’s GDP during the late 1970s. GDP per capita peaked in 1979 at around $9000 in 2002 prices. 83 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Oil-US Depends On A motivation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq was the securing of oil resources. The U.S. depends heavily on oil resources. Everest 04—(Larry, Worker for the Revolutionary Worker Magazine and author of “Iraq: War Against the People” Common courage press, “OIL, POWER & EMPIRE: IRAQ AND THE U.S. GLOBAL AGENDA”, “CHAPTER ONE – “GO MASSIVE. SWEEP IT ALL UP.”, http://www.worldcantwait.net/materials/OPECHAPTER%20ONE.pdf) Global capitalism is fueled and lubricated by oil. Of the world’s raw materials, none is more vital to economies and armies, none confers greater profit and strategic power. As we will show, it is the lifeblood of modern empire, a crucial prop of U.S. global power and wealth on many levels. Petroleum is an essential economic input whose price impacts production costs, profits, and competitive advantage. It is an instrument of rivalry: controlling oil means exercising leverage over those who depend on it and over the world economy as a whole. And it is impossible to project military power globally without abundant supplies of oil. This is not simply, or even mainly, a question of the U.S.’s growing dependence on imported oil. Even if everyone rode public transportation and the U.S. didn’t import a drop of oil, it would still seek to control the global flow of petroleum, if only to prevent others from doing so. The heart of the world petroleum industry lies in the Persian Gulf, which contains 65 percent of the world’s known oil reserves, 34 percent of the world’s natural gas reserves, and now accounts for nearly 30 percent of the world output of each.106 As the world’s thirst for petroleum has grown, so has the Gulf’s strategic importance. Since the end of World War II, dominating the Middle East and controlling these vast oil supplies have been crucial to U.S. foreign policy under 11 different presidents. In pursuit of these objectives, the U.S. acted covertly and overtly, employing the carrot of aid and the stick of military assault—installing and overthrowing governments, exerting economic, political and military pressure, waging wars, even threatening the use of nuclear weapons. The pillars of U.S. control have included the Shah’s regime in Iran, the state of Israel, and the subservience of repressive Arab rulers. Yet maintaining control of this volatile region of deep poverty, rapid social change, broad popular resistance, and growing anti-U.S. anger has been fraught with difficulties. During the tumultuous decades following World War II, U.S. dominance was repeatedly challenged and often thwarted by the rise of Arab nationalism, the explosion of Palestinian resistance to Israeli colonialism, the 1979 overthrow of the hated Shah of Iran and the subsequent rise of Islamist movements, and by its competition with other global powers—especially its Cold War rivalry with the nuclear-armed Soviet empire.Iran and Iraq, now labeled part of an “axis of evil,” have posed particular challenges to U.S. control. These two Persian Gulf states have adequate water supplies, enormous oil reserves, and relatively large populations. Both have experienced revolutions that put in power forces who sought to tap into nationalist sentiments in the area and turn their country’s assets into greater regional power and influence. This course threatened to impede U.S. hegemony and turned Iraq and Iran intofrequent targets of American intrigues and interventions. 84 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Oil- Production/Prices on the Brink Iraq oil production is stable because of oil contracts, but increasing instability from troops could cause investors to shy away from the oil market United Press International 10—(No author specified, “Iraq ready for oil production growth”, July 1, http://www.upi.com/Science_News/ResourceWars/2010/07/01/Iraq-ready-for-oil-production-growth/UPI-14351277995864/) Iraq is on pace to rival Saudi Arabia in terms of oil production as international explorers shy away from offshore developments, energy analysts say.Offshore oil exploration is a hot-button issue in the wake of the April sinking of the Deepwater Horizon oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. Iraq's vast oil fields, however, are on shore and already discovered. Iraq aims to increase domestic oil production from 2.5 million barrels per day to more than 9 million bpd in 2020 with the help of contracts signed in the past year.Leo Drollas, chief economist at London's Center for Global Energy Studies, told British newspaper The Independent that Iraq is set to become the world leader in oil production."Saudi Arabia will only meet its revenue needs if Iraq wholly fails to meet its production plans," he said.International investors shied away from the first round of auctions for oil-field development contracts in June 2009 because of high prices and instability. More than 20 companies rushed to sign deals in December, however. Much of Iraq is underexplored. A nationalization strategy coupled with war and economic sanctions has left much of the company's oil reserves idled for 30 years. Terrorism and Instability caused by anti-American backlash have targeted Iraq’s oil production sector. Iraq insurgents see oil as a reason to mistrust the U.S.Continued instability would halt oil production. Billon 5- (Philip Le, Associate Professor at the University of British Columbia with the Department of Geography, “Corruption, Reconstruction and Oil governence in Iraq”, Taylor and Francis Group, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3993715.pdf) Although it is too early to assess the long-term impact of the initial phases of the transition, the US-dominated Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in charge of the occupation of Iraq has failed in many respects to set propitious conditions for such a transition.6 Misguided US policies have been violently confronted by the realities of local and regional power networks and powerful discourses of resistance. Reconstruction has been slow, costs have spiralled above initial estimates, and early priorities were wrongly placed on large infrastructure projects awarded to a handful of US companies. In turn, the absence of tangible economic benefits and improvements in living conditions for most Iraqis has fuelled resentment, and contributed to both political and economic violence. Iraq's own repatriated funds and oil revenues, rather than US or international funds, have financed most of the initial reconstruction efforts, leaving the new Iraqi authorities in a tight fiscal position . As a key asset for the country, the oil sector has proved a vulnerable economic target for insurgents opposing the US, with massive disruptions in the flow of oil and the rehabilitation of infrastructures. Oil also remains a widespread reason for distrust of the US and its ultimate motives. As a result, Iraq faces the prospect of continued reliance on limited oil revenues and donor handouts, rather than a windfall peace dividend, which in any case many feared would have mostly benefited foreign investors if the CPA'S liberal economic policies had been implemented.7 85 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ Iraq’s oil business is still high, but it is still picking up the pieces from the war and UN embargos—Increased instability could once again spike the prices. AFP July 13, 2010— (No Author specified, “Iraq oil revenues 95% of state income: minister”, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5h9R_atH6eZRX5LwdIdK1elEeG4Yw) BAGHDAD — Revenues from oil sales account for 95 percent of Iraq's income, Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani said on Tuesday, underlining the war-battered nation's reliance on crude to rebuild its economy. Shahristani said Iraq raised 171 billion dollars from sales between 2006-2009, which accounted for all but five percent of the government's income during those years. "Oil accounted for 95 percent of government revenue," he told reporters in Baghdad, following estimates of about 85 percent. Shahristani said 30 billion dollars was raised from oil in 2006, 40 billion dollars in 2007, 60 billion dollars in 2008, and 41 billion dollars in 2009. The decline in revenues in 2009 was likely attributed to a fall in global crude prices in the second half of the year. Iraq produces about 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude, of which it exports 1.85 million, according to Shahristani. Last year, Iraq held two auctions of its oil fields for development, the first time foreign energy firms have had the opportunity to plant a foot firmly in the country since its energy sector was nationalised in 1972. Some 10 deals were agreed at the auctions, and one more signed since will, if fully realised, ramp up Iraq's oil output five-fold to 12 million bpd, putting it on a par with the world's top producer Saudi Arabia. At 115 billion barrels, Iraq has the world's third-largest proven oil reserves, behind only Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, there has been little exploration or development of fields in the past three decades because of wars and a UN embargo imposed on Iraq in 1990 following now executed dictator Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Iraq is getting some foreign oil investors, but U.S. investors are holding off for fear of instability—the investments are key to increasing oil output and reducing prices Fadel and Londoño 10—(Leila Chief of the Washington post Bagdad bureau and Foreign Correspondent for the Washington Post, and Ernesto, Washington Post Baghdad Bureau Correspondent, “Risk-tolerant China investing heavily in Iraq as U.S. companies hold back”, Washington Post July 2, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/07/01/AR2010070103406.html?hpid=moreheadlines) AL-AHDAB OIL FIELD, IRAQ -- China didn't take part in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq or the bloody military battles that followed. It hasn't invested in reconstruction projects or efforts by the West to fortify the struggling democracy in the heart of the Middle East. But as the U.S. military draws down and Iraq opens up to foreign investment, China and a handful of other countries that weren't part of the "coalition of the willing" are poised to cash in. These countries are expanding their foothold beyond Iraq's oil reserves -- the world's third largest -- to areas such as construction, government services and even tourism, while American companies show little interest in investing here. "The U.S. really doesn't know what to do in Iraq," said Fawzi Hariri, Iraq's industry minister. "I have been personally, as the minister of industry, trying to woo U.S. companies into Iraq. There is nothing yet. Nothing tangible." Chinese companies have walked away with stakes in three of the 11 contracts the Iraqi Oil Ministry has signed in its bid to increase crude output by about 450 percent over the next seven years. They also renegotiated a $3 billion In the past two years, deal that dates to when Saddam Hussein was in power. Only two American firms won stakes in oil deals, an underwhelming showing that industry analysts and U.S. officials say reflects deep concerns about doing business in a country besieged by insecurity, corruption and political turmoil. "They made a mistake and overestimated the risk," said Ruba Husari, an oil analyst in Baghdad who runs the Iraq Oil Forum, a trade Web site. "I think they did not realize on the spot that it was the biggest window of opportunity, and they missed out." In an effort to meet the rising energy demands of its fast-growing economy, China has invested aggressively in oil-rich nations. Chinese companies have made notable inroads in the Middle East and Africa, in part because of a higher tolerance for risk and a savvy diplomatic corps that has laid the groundwork for advantageous deals. Iraqi officials say they are heartened by their expanding ties with China but are still pursuing investment from other nations. "They have gained a number of plum contracts for energy," Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said of the Chinese. "Wherever there is an oil well in the world, you'll see a Chinese flag next to it." Working 'as partners' At al-Ahdab oil field in Wasit province, roughly 100 miles south of Baghdad, about 200 Chinese laborers have begun work under a contract renegotiated in 2008 by a Chinese state-owned consortium, Al Waha Oil Co and U.S. officials are hard pressed to point to any significant U.S. investment in Iraq. Outside of the two oil service contracts that American companies were awarded and U.S. government contracts, the United States "consistently ranks in the bottom" among investors, according to a 2009 study by Dunia Frontier Consultants, which tracks private investment in Iraq. The United Arab Emirates is Iraq's top private investor, with Except for a $3 billion General Electric contract to provide power-generating equipment and a Boeing deal, Iraqi plans to invest $70 billion across the country, followed by South Korea, a 2010 study by the same firm said. Turkey and Iran also are major trade partners with Iraq. "We're coming off a financial crisis," a senior U.S. diplomat said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of embassy rules. "You have to look at your bottom line. It's not the best time to be suddenly in the market as a new place to invest." Worth the risk? U.S. companies will probably continue to shy away, particularly after the State Department's latest Iraq investment climate assessment, issued in March. "Potential investors should prepare themselves for significant security costs; cumbersome and confusing procedures for business visas or new business registrations; long payment delays on some Iraqi government contracts; and sometimes unreliable, non-transparent dispute resolution mechanisms," the assessment said. "Allegations of corruption are still endemic, and the legacy of central planning and inefficient stateowned enterprises continue to inhibit economic development." 86 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Oil- US Presence increases Prices Instability and terrorism in Iraq targets the oil producers and spikes prices. If the instability “spills-over” to other petroleum-producing countries it would be an economic disaster. This can also lead to Iran using their oil as leverage and giving them enough money to fuel their nuclear weapons Pascual and Pollack 07—(Carlos, Vice president and director of Foreign Policy studies at Brookings Institute, Ken, Director for Persian Gulf affairs at the National Security Council and Senior Fellow at the foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute, “Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq”,The Brookings Institute, September) Global Consequences. Finally, there are at least two major transnational considerations – terrorism and oil – though one should not lose sight of the risk of nuclear proliferation. Terrorists operate in political voids or weak or failing states. Such was the case with Al Qaeda’s emergence from Somalia, Sudan and Afghanistan. "there is no doubt that a regional vacuum of governance in the Gulf and Middle East will become a base for transnational terrorism. An obvious target for terrorism will be oil producing states and transit networks. Instability alone will spike oil prices even without a disruption in production or shipping. In extreme (but, unfortunately, not so rare) cases of “spill over” from major civil wars, civil strife in one state can cause civil strife in another. "The Iranian revolution and Iraq’s civil war both demonstrated that such internal strife can affect oil production, dramatically so in the Iranian case. "Thus the potential for civil war in Iraq to spark similar conflicts in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran could be the worst-case scenario of all. "The loss of oil production from Iraq would be an irritant to the global economy; the loss of Saudi production would be a catastrophe. One need only follow this logic chain to understand the impacts of even lesser disruptions. Not only would energy importers feel the direct impact, but oil producers such as Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, and (in a different but still complex category) Russia would be emboldened to use energy and the wealth they derive from it as a domestic and foreign policy weapon. "This brings us back to the risk of a strengthened and wealthy Iran that cannot find accommodation with the P5+1 and proceeds with its nuclear program.8 "The question then emerges whether Saudi Arabia, Egypt and perhaps others will follow suit, fueling a race for nuclear weapons in a region prone to terror. Bad as the situation stands in 2007, the Middle East and Gulf can get worse and likely will as civil war in Iraq spills into the region. "The United States has a stake in stabilizing Iraq or containing the civil war that goes far beyond the issues inherent in Iraq. "that puts a premium on learning from both failed policies in Iraq and experience elsewhere. 87 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ The war is a main cause of the foreign oil prices going up, Instability and the loss of the investment in the Middle East spiked the oil prices. Since the United States was spending more money on foreign oil and less at home, it stagnated the economy Stiglitz 08—(Joseph, Professor of Economics at Columbia University, “The Three Million Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict”, Los Angeles World Affairs Council, September 17, http://www.lawac.org/speech/2008-09/stiglitz,joseph2008.pdf) Finally, there are the macro-costs. What we argue in the book is that the economic woes the country is facing today are related to the war in Iraq, that in some ways in this election these two issues are one issue. But let me try to explain very quickly the relationship between our macroeconomic problems and the war. There are actually two major connections: The first is perhaps the easiest to see and that is if we contrast the economic downturn that we had in 2001 and the current economic downturn, in 2001 when the economy slowed down we had a two percent GDP surplus, we had a lot of money to use to combat the downturn to stimulate the economy. In 2007- 2008, and this is going to go on in 2009-2010, if the economy slows down we have, partly because of the war, a very large deficit. Our national debt has increased from $5.7 trillion to over $9 trillion and our deficit this year and next year will be at all-time record levels. So, with those high levels of deficits, even Bush’s former advisor, now chairman of the Fed, Bernanke, pointed out the big difference between 2001 and today is that we have much less room to maneuver. As we come to think about how to stimulate the economy we worry a lot more about resources and what it will do to our deficit, what it will do our future liabilities. So that’s one way in which the war has reduced our scope for action. There is actually a more direct connection though but it’s a chain reasoning. The war is responsible for at least part, and I think a substantial part, of the increase in the price of oil that has occurred since 2003. In 2003 the price of oil before the war was $23-$25 a barrel. Futures markets understood that there was going to be an increase in the demand from China, from the emerging markets and even from the United States and Europe but they predicted that there would be an increase in supply and that increase was going to come mostly from the Middle East which is a low cost provider. And so futures markets predicted that the price of oil was going to remain at $25 a barrel for the next ten years. But what upset that equation was the war. It was no longer attractive to invest in the Middle East in a low cost provider. Things were made worse by turmoil in other oil regions, so I don’t want to pretend that it was the only factor; it was one of the factors. Again, in our estimates to be conservative we only attribute $5 to $10 of the $75 increase in the price of oil to the war but I think most people think that we were vastly underestimating the role that is much larger than that. Now what is the connection between the oil and the problems that we have? Again, there are several factors but one of them is that with the higher price of oil we had to spend much more money abroad to pay for the oil. We weren’t conserving, we were importing huge amounts of oil and the prices were going up and we had to spend more. In the past when oil prices shot up and people had to spend so much more on imported oil it weakened the economy because they were spending less at home and more abroad. In fact, when the prices went up in the ‘70s almost every region in the world went into a downturn. There was one region in the world that avoided the downturn, and I’ll come back to that because it seems that we followed their example. When we were looking at the data many things seemed strange. Here we were spending so much money abroad but the economy seemed to be going on pretty well unchanged. Some people suggested that we had repealed the laws of economics and whenever anybody says that you ought to be suspicious. It was actually pretty clear what was going on. The Fed, recognizing that the economy was weak, weaker than it otherwise would have been, did what it was suppose to do—although not quite the way it should have done—it tried to stimulate the economy and keep it going by letting out more liquidity, low interest rates and lax regulations. In a sense it worked. It fed the housing bubble, the housing bubble fed the consumption boom, and we were consuming so much that we could spend a lot of money in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other oil exporting countries and still have a lot of money to spend at home. America’s savings rate plummeted to the lowest level since the Great Depression—in some quarters negative and recently about .6 percent. But, of course, we time. were living on borrowed money and borrowed 88 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 89 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Patriarchy Advantage Women are less secure and free following the US-led invasion By Abdu Rahman and Dahr Jamail – BAGHDAD 2010 3-15 BADAMS Women miss Hussein! Under Saddam Hussein, women in government got a year's maternity leave; that is now cut to six months. Under the Personal Status Law in force since Jul. 14, 1958, when Iraqis overthrew the British-installed monarchy, Iraqi women had most of the rights that Western women do. Now they have Article 2 of the Constitution: "Islam is the official religion of the state and is a basic source of legislation." Sub-head A says "No law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of Islam." Under this Article the interpretation of women's rights is left to religious leaders – and many of them are under Iranian influence. "The US occupation has decided to let go of women's rights," Yanar Mohammed who campaigns for women's rights in Iraq says. American and American-trained Soldiers beat and rape the women of Iraq in detainment centers MHRI – 2005 Baghdad. BADAMS The Monitoring Network for Human Rights (MHRI), which consists of more than 20 Iraqi organizations for Human Rights, made this report about the crimes and continuous violations of human rights in Iraq. The rape of Iraqi women prisoners in the prisons of Abu Ghoreib and Buka is the most marked violation of women's rights. Many of these women committed suicide after being released because they could not live with the shame and disgrace they and their families were subjected to, and to find relief from the great psychological agony tormenting them. Many Forces locked up men and women together in the same cell, all of them naked, and women while being harassed and raped was heard. One Iraqi woman, after being released from Abu Ghoreib, reported that her cell inmate was brought back into the cell and remained unconscious for two days. After regaining consciousness, she told that she had been raped by U.S. soldiers more than 17 times. Her psychological state and her health situation gravely deteriorated in the following days, nearly causing her death. A similar case was reported by a prisoner, who had witnessed how a young girl was raped in front of her father, who was tied up to the bars in cell 42 in Abu Ghoreib, so as to get the man to confess. Another prisoner confirmed, that Iraqi women were shouting to their male inmates to kill them, to free them from the torture they were subjected to. He recognized among these women an acquaintance, a 35 year old woman, a mother of 3 children. After she was released, she was killed by her brother to wash away the dishonor of the family. Iraqi prisoners asserted that Iraqi that the screaming of This is only the tip of the iceberg, the damage is ten times as worse and will continue to happen as long as troops remain MHRI – 2005 Baghdad. BADAMS The Monitoring Network for Human Rights (MHRI), which consists of more than 20 Iraqi organizations for Human Rights, made this report about the crimes and continuous violations of human rights in Iraq. Abu Ghoreib and Buka prisons, which have become public, do not represent more than 10% of the actual crimes that had happened and which are still happening there. Though, the greatest crime of all is – as U.S. American documents and evidence show - that these violations are being committed based on orders of the highest ranking officers, one head of them General Sanchez, and with the knowledge of the U.S. Minister of Defense. The scandals of • Cases of deliberate killings of women, such as the case of an Iraqi woman (wife of Jum'a Al-Dalemi) in "AlMahmoudiyah" area, who was murdered on the 24th of January 2005, when Soldiers of the Iraqi Security Force were about to kill her two sons for no obvious reason. The woman threw herself on her sons, so as to protect them, and was therefore killed by the soldiers, who afterwards also killed her two sons. 90 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Structural Violence Advantage Women bear a double burden over a male in Iraq By Abdu Rahman and Dahr Jamail – BAGHDAD 2010 3-15 BADAMS "The status of women here is linked to the general situation," Maha Sabria, professor of political science at Al-Nahrain University in Baghdad tells IPS. "The violation of women's rights was part of the violation of the rights of all Iraqis." But, she said, "women bear a double burden under occupation because {they} have lost a lot of freedom because of it. "More men are now under the weight of detention, so now women bear the entire burden of the family and are obliged to provide full the same time women do not have freedom of movement because of the deteriorated security conditions and because of abductions of women and children by criminal gangs." support to the families and children. At The women not abducted after their husband is detained have to find their family, and avoid being abducted which prevents them education and their lives. MHRI – 2005 Baghdad. BADAMS The Monitoring Network for Human Rights (MHRI), which consists of more than 20 Iraqi organizations for Human Rights, made this report about the crimes and continuous violations of human rights in Iraq. Women family members of prisoners, searching and looking for their relatives (sons, fathers, brothers, husbands) are subjected to sexual harassments. It is reported that these women are being searched in a manner, which is not conform to the values and traditions of the Iraqi people. Further, these women are spending a lot of time looking for their relatives in various prisons, which forces them to stay away from their work places, education, homes and children. Most of [them] now stay at home unless [they] absolutely must go out for food," Fadhil said. "Because [they] know so many women who have been kidnapped, it is only a matter of time for [them] if [they] continue traveling around the city." Lack of work and education causes poverty in Iraq Francis Matthew, Editor at Large. Gulfnews.com July,1 2010 BADAMS Poverty, illiteracy and endemic disease are all major factors preventing millions of people from achieving their full potential. Living in the Gulf, these problems might seem far away, but a shocking report from the United Nations on the lack of progress over the Millennium Development Goals has spelt out how the Arab world has failed to tackle many of these issues. It is disturbing that the amount of extreme poverty has grown so sharply in this region, where economic development is apparently steadily improving. It may be that the large populations of Turkey and Iraq have their own problems, but even in the GCC poverty is an issue. 91 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Structural Violence Advantage Poverty from the occupation causes structural violence in Iraq because it causes unjust systems Iraqi social systems. Heartland Alliance 2010 BADAMS http://www.heartlandalliance.org/international/wherewework/project-pages/iraq-gender-based-violence.html Hunger and poverty are two prime examples of what is described as "structural violence," that is, physical and psychological harm that results from exploitive and unjust social, political and economic systems . It is something that most of us know is going on, some of us have experienced, but in its starker forms, it is sufficiently distant from most North American lives that it is often hard to get a good perspective on it. I've come across an approach that seems to help provide that perspective, and I'd like to describe it. Iraqi women and girls face extraordinarily high levels of cultural and institutional violence and discrimination. Women who are perceived to have dishonored their families – for allegedly or actually committing adultery, refusing an arranged marriage, or asking for a divorce, among other reasons – may be threatened with honor killing. Iraq's legal system institutionalizes gender-based violence and discrimination through criminal laws that condone male violence while punishing women who transgress cultural norms, and through laws that are either discriminatory or are harmful to women in their implementation. Throughout Iraq, there are no programs to deliver legal services with a gender-focused approach, and women in the family court system do not have access to lawyers who will advocate for them by presenting facts and legal theories that account for their experiences as victims of gender-based violence. Female detainees suffer abuse in Iraqi detention centers, including rape, violence and verbal abuse, as well as unmet basic needs such as medical care, clothing and sometimes food. Criminal arrest and detention places victims at risk of further abuse or being killed by their families upon release for dishonoring the family, and detention centers sometimes end up serving as protective shelters to prevent families from killing women and girls at risk of honor killing. While in detention, conditions are not monitored, just as there is no regular trial observation and monitoring of implementation of discriminatory laws and legal procedures toward women in either the criminal justice or family court system. On a broader level, ethnic and sectarian conflict marginalizes women and further limits their capacity to function in public roles, as economic actors, decision makers and professionals. Although women often function as mediators in social networks, their participation in formal peace-building efforts is usually minimized or nonexistent. 92 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Abduction/Trafficking Thousands of Women are abducted, and many don’t even get reported By Dahr Jamail and Ali al-Fadhily BAGHDAD, Dec. 11, 2006 (IPS) BADAMS But numbers are not always reliable here. Thousands of cases of abduction of women are never reported for fear of public disgrace. According to a study published by the Washington-based Brookings Institute Dec. 4, between 30 to 40 Iraqis were being kidnapped every day as of March {2006}. "The numbers on this table may be lower than the actual number of kidnappings as the Iraqi Police suggest wide underreporting," the study noted. US Presence causes a sharp rise in the number of abductions By Abdu Rahman and Dahr Jamail – BAGHDAD 2010 3-15 BADAMS Sabria tells IPS that the abduction of women "did not exist prior to the occupation. We find that women lost their right to learn and their right to a free and normal life, so Iraqi women are struggling with oppression and denial of all their rights, more than ever before." Women, she says, are also now under pressure to marry young in family hope that a husband will bring security. The Organisation for Women's Freedom in Iraq has estimated from anecdotal evidence that over 2,000 Iraqi women have gone missing in the period from the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 until spring 2006. The Abductees go through brutal treatment By Dahr Jamail and Ali al-Fadhily BAGHDAD, Dec. 11, 2006 (IPS) BADAMS Women face increased risk of abduction by militias and criminal gangs as lawlessness takes over the country. Thousands of other women have not been so lucky. Many have been executed, assaulted, or released only after their families paid considerable ransom money. Few women like to talk about what they have to go through. "{she} was taken by Americans for three days recently," Um Ahmed told IPS in Baghdad. "They told {her} they would rape {her} if {she} didn't tell them where {her} husband was, but {she} really didn't know." She said that she was turned over to the Iraqi National Guard "who were even worse than the Americans." Note: {The Iraqi National Guard is trained by Americans} Lack of respect for women's rights has increased the threat of women getting abducted simply as they step out of their homes. 93 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Abduction/Trafficking-US Occupation Increases Iraq Will Become Center Of Kidnapping, Prostitution, And Human Trafficking In Middle East During Occupation Sott.net Sat, 24 Apr 2010 22:08 BADAMS Adel, Shaymaa, "7 million Iraqis exist below poverty line," Azzaman, 4/6/10 AK News, "Iraqi Health: Gangs of thieves abducting children and False Doctor Arrested," 2/2/10 Bakri, Nada, "In Iraq, battling an internal bane," Washington Post, 10/22/09 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, And Labor, "2009 Human Rights Report: Iraq," U.S. State Department, 3/11/10 Debat, Alexis, "Vivisecting the Jihad: Part Two," National Interest, October 2004 Department of Defense, "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, December 2009" 2/15/10 Gunter, Frank, "Liberate Iraq's Economy," New York Times, 11/16/09 Miller, Deborah, "Iraqis face new threat: brutal violence," Cleveland Plain Dealer, 9/21/09 Paley, Amit, "Iraqis Joining Insurgency Less for Cause Than Cash," Washington Post, 11/20/07 Samuels, Lennox, "Al Qaeda Nostra," Newsweek, 5/21/08 Schmitt, Eric and Shanker, Thom, "Estimates by U.S. See More Rebels With More Funds," New York Times, 10/22/04 Criminals, Militias, And Insurgents: Organized Crime In Iraq, Strategic Studies Institute, June 2009 Many criminals joined the insurgency and militias, and now that both of those are in the decline, many militiamen and insurgents are joining their outlaw brethren to make a living. The State Department noted a number of growing problems in the country ranging from kidnappings to trafficking in human beings and organs. Kidnappings were and are a major threat to the Iraqi public. Abductions began early on in the insurgency, and that soon spread to militias, as a means to finance their activities. The practice actually increased as the insurgents began losing their foreign support with the decline of the sectarian war in 2007. The security forces have also been accused of abducting people. Today, most kidnappings are done for ransom. Kids are the most common targets, and there are sections of Baghdad for example, that have pictures of missing children posted on the streets. Most of these cases are not reported to the authorities, partly out of fear of what might happen to those taken, and also because the public doesn't always trust the local police. Iraq is also becoming a center of trafficking in slaves, prostitutes, human organs, babies, and illegal workers within the region. There are reports of women and children being sold off to Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Iran. There are also stories of orphanages selling kids, and gangs selling boys within and without Iraq for sex. In February 2010 for instance, the Health Ministry arrested two rings in hospitals in Baghdad and Kirkuk that were organized by nurses to kidnap and sell babies abroad. The State Department also recorded cases of human organs being trafficked. Illegal workers are brought into Iraq as well from Georgia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines, Uganda, and Sri Lanka. 94 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ A2 Extend Deadline CP Extending US occupation bad. Jarrar & Leaver 2010 (Raed Jarrar and Eric Leaver, Raed Jarrar is a senior fellow on the Middle East at Peace Action. Erik Leaver is a research fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. "Sliding Backwards on Iraq?" Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2, 2010 http://www.fpif.org/articles/sliding_backwards_on_iraq) Adding more years to the U.S. occupation, as Ricks suggested, or delaying the withdrawal of combat forces, as Odierno has will cost the United States hundreds of billions more dollars and result in the deaths of countless more U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians. Most importantly, it won't bring Iraq any closer to being a stable and prosperous country. suggested, Failure to meet the deadline would tank U.S. legitimacy and the suggestion of an extension has already caused an outcry in Iraq Jarrar and Leaver 2010 (Raed Jarrar and Eric Leaver, Raed Jarrar is a senior fellow on the Middle East at Peace Action. Erik Leaver is a research fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. "Sliding Backwards on Iraq?" Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2, 2010 http://www.fpif.org/articles/sliding_backwards_on_iraq) Flying in the face of these consistent messages of assurance by the White House and Congress, Odierno's statement has harmed the president's credibility in Iraq and caused the first major storm of criticism inside the country since Obama's election in 2008.The Iraqi media has been overwhelmed with political statements, analysis, and press releases condemning the possible prolongation of the U.S. occupation . In one statement, MP Omar Al-Jubouri, a Sunni from the National Iraqi Coalition, rejected the attempts to change the withdrawal plans, telling the Nina News Agency that while he "acknowledges the troubled administrative and security situation," he still "holds the U.S. forces responsible" for the deterioration. In another statement, covered by Al-Sabaah newspaper, MP Jamal Jaafar, a Shiite from the United Iraqi Alliance, argued that prolonging the U.S. presence "will cause more tension" among Iraqis. Jaafar also stated that the United States must "get an approval from the Iraqi government" if it was planning to leave even "one single soldier in Iraq beyond the withdrawal deadline included in the bilateral security agreement." MP Abdul-Karim As-Sameraie, chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, criticized the attempt to change the withdrawal plans and asked again for a public referendum on the bilateral security agreement. Such a measure could result in the cancellation of the agreement, potentially leading to an earlier U.S. withdrawal or having troops operate in Iraq without international legal safeguards. An Obama flip-flop on the timetable for withdrawing U.S. troops would have serious consequences in the United States and IraqB. The U.S. global image will be tarnished, Obama's credibility will be called into question, and the administration will likely lose what little global political capital it gained in the last year. 95 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ A2 Extend Deadline CP Continuation of military presence in Iraq is fiscally draining Schoen 06 msnbc.msn.com/ 25 years in business and financial news, senior producer for MSNBC, a 2005 finalist for the Gerald Loeb Awards for Distinguished Business and Financial Journalism. “How much is the war costing us?” John W. Schoen10/22/2006 With no end in sight to turmoil in Iraq and Congress borrowing hundreds of billions to pay for the war, Dave in North Dakota wants to know: Just what is all this costing us? Meanwhile, all that spending has Gary in Pennsylvania worried about whether Uncle Sam can afford it — without going bankrupt. So you’ve got several comprehensive studies to choose from. One of the most up-to date comes from the National Priorities Project, and Amherst-Mass.-based group that tracks the impact of federal spending on local communities. Using a “top-down” calculation based on U.S. budget appropriations, the group estimates the total money spent or allocated comes to about $255 million per day, or a little less than $1.8 billion a week. That figure includes both military and non-military spending on things like reconstruction. Delaying Withdrawal would have severe consequences. Jarrar and Leaver 10 (Raed Jarrar and Eric Leaver, Raed Jarrar is a senior fellow on the Middle East at Peace Action. Erik Leaver is a research fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. "Sliding Backwards on Iraq?" Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2, 2010 http://www.fpif.org/articles/sliding_backwards_on_iraq) But reneging on withdrawal would have the gravest consequences in Iraq. The Bush administration adopted a conditions-based withdrawal plan. The mantra was "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down." But such plans for "condition-based" withdrawal create the very deteriorating conditions that lead to an extension of the military occupation. Unfortunately, there is considerable support both inside and outside Iraq for the continuation of U.S. occupation. Some groups, such as the Iraqi ruling parties or the military industrial complex in the United States, believe occupation is in their self-interest. Others, such as al-Qaeda, hope to cripple the United States by keeping it engaged in a conflict that takes an enormous toll on human lives, money, and global reputation. And Iran and other regional players fear the reemergence of a strong, independent, and united Iraq. Obama's current plan is based on two sets of time-based deadlines that avoid the pitfalls of a conditions-based withdrawal. Obama's both plan to withdraw combat forces by August 31, 2010 and Bush's bilateral agreement for the withdrawal of all troops and contractors by December 31, 2011 put the responsibility for military, economic, and political security squarely where it should be: on Iraqis. Adding more years to the U.S. occupation, as Ricks suggested, or delaying the withdrawal of combat forces, as Odierno has suggested, will cost the United States hundreds of billions more dollars and result in the deaths of countless more U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians. Most importantly, it won't bring Iraq any closer to being a stable and prosperous country. On the eve of Iraq's March 7 elections, the president needs to reaffirm the U.S.-Iraqi withdrawal agreement and issue a clear warning to military officers who seek to take the war into their own hands. Extending the deadline would cause instability and violence Hanna 2010(Michael Wahid, Fellow and Program Officer at The Century Foundation, “Stay the Course of Withdrawal” April 4, 2010) http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66188/michael-wahid-hanna/stay-the-course-of-withdrawal Taking an overly pessimistic view of the current political environment and appraising the ISF’s progress stringently, some U.S. commentators have recently been urging the Obama administration to reconsider its timeline, suggesting that its implementation would destabilize Iraq at its moment of greatest vulnerability. But this allegedly realist view of Iraq’s current predicament is decidedly unrealistic about the country it purports to describe. Indeed, for Washington to seek to abrogate its withdrawal commitments -- and thereby suggest that an extended occupation is back on the agenda -- would not enhance security but would undercut the Iraqi government and risk spurring renewed violence. There is simply no political space for such an eventuality . Moreover, these commentators misunderstand the role of U.S. troops in Iraq, which focuses on training, advising, and assisting the ISF -- tasks that, given the ISF’s increasing independence, can be carried out by the residual U.S. troops envisioned. 96 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 97 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Plan Popular Troop Reduction is supported Swanson 2010 (7/3 David The Peace Movement's Progress Swanson holds a master's degree in philosophy from the University of Virginia. He has worked as a newspaper reporter and as a communications director, with jobs including press secretary for Dennis Kucinich's 2004 presidential campaign, media coordinator for the International Labor Communications Association, and three years as communications coordinator for ACORN, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now.http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-Peace-Movement-s-Progr-by-David-Swanson-100703-419.html) So, why do I say we've made progress? Well, I said we've made progress from where we were in late 2008, at which point the downward trends I've just We'd just elected a president promising a larger military and an escalation in Afghanistan. Since then, the U.S. public has turned dramatically from supporting to opposing the war in Afghanistan and the President's handling of it. The planned escalation in Kandahar has failed to get off the ground. Every official governmental and nongovernmental study has deemed the effort in Afghanistan hopeless, pointless, catastrophic, or criminal . High ranking whistleblowers have spoken out. The Pentagon has resorted to wild claims of mineral wealth, as it flails about for new ways to justify the war. And the blame game, surrounding the eventual withdrawal, has begun; the general in charge has been dismissed. In addition, the withdrawal dates that people associate with Iraq and Afghanistan (out of Iraq by the end of 2011, beginning to get out of Afghanistan by July 2011) are closer, meaning that outrage at their violation is closer. mentioned could be foreseen. The plan is popular with both key democrats and republicans. Bennis 09, Phyllis Bennis, fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Contested Terrain: Obama's Iraq Withdrawal Plan and the Peace Movement, 3/9/2009, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2009/03/09-8 Leading Democrats, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Senate Leader Harry Reid, criticized Obama's plan for leaving 50,000 or more U.S. troops in Iraq after the withdrawal of "combat brigades." Their critique was powerful, public, and their first substantive break with the president - breaking to his left. Although they will likely back down, indeed they have already gone silent on this issue, their initial response opens the possibility for their greater engagement with more progressive members of Congress whom they had consistently dissed throughout the Bush years, and perhaps ultimately with the peace movement directly. The "speak with one voice" posture of the Democratic Party may be eroding with a Democrat in the White House. Perhaps not so surprisingly, it was key Republicans - including Senator John McCain - who voiced immediate support for Obama's withdrawal plan. Clearly they understand the huge loopholes inherent in the "withdrawal" strategy. They recognize the limited character of Obama's pledges. But what they have officially endorsed, on the record, is a strategy that includes the language of "remove all U.S. troops from Iraq," "our combat mission will end," etc. They will never be our allies - but they are stuck with those words. Certainly they can and surely will - reverse themselves if partial withdrawal moves threaten to turn into a real end of U.S. occupation. But they will pay a high political price when they do - and risk being dubbed flip-floppers on the Iraq War. 98 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 99 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ A2 Iraqi Forces Can’t Take Over Iraqi security forces are capable of taking over for US troops after withdrawal. BBC 10, BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, US military spokesman discusses Iraq after troop withdrawal, 7/7/2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9728151656&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo= 1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9728151662&cisb=22_T9728151661&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=10962&docNo=3 Abi-Asi begins by asking about US "arrangements to complete the withdrawal of combating troops in less than two months." Asked whether the US arrangements mean that the US forces "believe the Iraqi forces have become ready to fill the gap" the US troop withdrawal could cause, Gen Lanza agrees by saying that "the capability of the Iraqi forces has allowed us to continue to decrease our troops," adding that these forces are "professional and their combating capability, their use of intelligence information to secure this country have improved significantly." Abi-Asi raises the following question: "Since you are comfortable about the status of the Iraqi forces, why did General Ray Odierno suggest a possible deployment of international forces in areas of tension between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq?" Gen Lanza, for his part, clarifies Gen Odierno's remarks, saying Gen Odierno answered by noting that he did not know what will happen if the ArabKurdish tension continues even after US troops leave, while denying that Gen Odierno made any proposal to deploy any forces inIraq after the US troop withdrawal. The anchor asks whether the US forces are "assured that the Iraqi soldiers and officers are professional and do not have any bias, given previous accusations that these soldiers and officers showed bias towards certain sects and political parties." Gen Lanza denies seeing any bias by the Iraqi forces, something which he says was evidenced by "the support these forces received from about 80 per cent of the Iraqi people." 100 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 101 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ A2 Logistically Impossible Logistics will be a challenge but easier than staying. Dobbins 09, James F. Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation; Former assistant secretary of state and special envoy to Afghanistan, Withdrawal from Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?, 7/16/2009, http://www.mepc.org/forums_chcs/57.asp In fact, in some ways, leaving Iraq is easier than staying logistically. If you think about it - the American practice is to rotate our troops every year. So if you have 130,000 troops and you are not withdrawing, it means you have 260,000 men moving; you have 130,000 men leaving and 130,000 men arriving over the course of the year. If you are leaving you will have only half that number of transits because you're taking out 130,000; you're not putting any in. So there are of course complications associated with some of the heavier equipment that stays and is used by one unit after another. So I'm not suggesting there is no logistical challenge to withdrawing, and there are the challenges associated with closing bases and that sort of thing. But basically under the withdrawal plans as the administration has articulated them, this doesn't seem to be a particularly difficult risk. 102 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ A2 Withdrawal causes Terrorism No chance for terrorist safe haven post-withdrawal Carpenter 07 (Ted, vice president for foreign policy and defense studies at Cato, “Escaping the Trap: The Case for Withdrawal from Iraq”) http://www.cato.org/pubs/policy_report/v29n4/cpr29n4-4.html I will be the first to concede that withdrawing from Iraq is not going to be without cost. Opponents of withdrawal constantly bring that up. They that, if we leave Iraq, al- Qaeda is going to gain a safe haven, and it will be just like Afghanistan before 9/11. That is actually the least likely danger. Al- Qaeda, according to the Iraq Study Group, has a grand total of about 1,300 fighters in Iraq today, compared to the thousands it had in Afghanistan before 9/11. In addition, in Afghanistan the al-Qaeda units had the protection of an entrenched friendly government. In Iraq they will have nothing of the sort. The government is dominated by Kurds and Shiites who are almost unanimous in their hatred of al-Qaeda. A poll conducted by the University of Maryland in September 2006 found that better than 99 percent of Shiite and Kurdish respondents had a negative view of al-Qaeda. But what was surprising about that poll and other indications is that al-Qaeda does not have a good reputation even among Sunnis, its supposed allies in the advance a variety of horrors, ranging in plausibility from the extremely unlikely to the rather likely, that are going to occur. One allegation is country. That same poll found that 94 percent of Sunnis had a negative view of al-Qaeda. Where is al-Qaeda going to gain protection when the organization is so widely hated in Iraq? At best, al-Qaeda would have a harried existence in a few isolated areas of Iraq, where it might find a handful of allies among Sunnis who are still willing to support the organization after its indiscriminate violence against Muslim civilians. Iraqi Forces can combat terrorism Butler 09 Katherine Butler, The Independent (London), August 21, 2009 Petraeus, the US general who masterminded the "surge" in Iraq, yesterday ruled out a review of the US decision to withdraw troops from Iraqi cities despite an upsurge of violence which claimed the lives of nearly 100 people in a single day this week. A string of suicide attacks in Baghdad on Wednesday - the worst day of bloodshed since February 2008 - and another bombing in the city yesterday, have caused dismay among Iraqis, and shaken confidence in the ability of the country's own security forces to keep the peace and contain the threat from extremists. The attacks have also reopened questions about Barack Obama's troop withdrawal timetable. But the head of US Central Command said Iraq was no longer facing "an insurgency". Instead he termed the current spasm of violence "a terrorist threat" - and one that the Iraqi army and police were equipped to contend with. David General Petraeus conceded that while al-Qa'ida and its Sunni extremist affiliates in Iraq had been considerably weakened, they retained a "capability", bolstered by a small but steady supply of foreign fighters and money channelled through Syria. Iraqi authorities have said Wednesday's attacks were "archetypal" of the style favoured by al-Qa'ida and said they had detained two alleged members of the organisation in the west of the capital. "There is no question that there are elements that are trying to reignite the cycle of sectarian violence of 2006 which necessitated the surge," said General Petraeus. Shia extremists were also still active, he added, and they were being trained and supported by Iran. While there had been a splintering of Shia militant organisations, their continuing presence remained worrying, the US general said. However, he insisted that the Iraqi security forces were "more than capable" of performing their security tasks. According to the withdrawal timetable, US troops were pulled back to bases at the end of June and combat forces are to be fully out of Iraq by this time next year. Concerns have been growing about northern Iraq where territorial and oil tensions between Kurds and Arabs have raised fears of a new civil war. And Anbar, the province once held up by the Bush administration as a model of reconciliation, has also seen a recent spate of attacks. 103 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – A2: Civilian Causalities The actual amount of civilian deaths in Iraq is much lower than many poles say Spagat and Dougherty ’10 (Professor Michael Spagat [Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London], Josh Dougherty [Iraq Body Count], New study exposes fundamental flaws in poll estimate of one million Iraqis killed since 2003, 5 May 2010, http://www.iraqbodycount.org/analysis/beyond/exaggerated-orb/) In September of 2007 a British polling company named ORB released an alarming estimate of “more than 1,000,000 Iraqis murdered” in the Iraq war (updated version here). ORB's poll-based estimate has been cited approvingly in much of the blogosphere, a number of mainstream media outlets and academic publications, and in official statements from the Bloomberg School of Public Health of Johns Hopkins University in support of their own work in this area. “Conflict Deaths in Iraq: A Methodological Critique of the ORB Survey Estimate” by Michael Spagat and Josh Dougherty, just published in Survey Research Methods, describes in detail how the ORB poll is riddled with critical inconsistencies and methodological shortcomings. This first and only peer-reviewed analysis of the ORB estimate concludes that it is too flawed, exaggerated and ill-founded to contribute to discussion of the human costs of the Iraq war. Survey Research Methods also publishes a reply from Johnny Heald of ORB and our response to Heald’s piece. An internal validity check of ORB data across three separate polls reveals internal contradictions indicative of compromised data collection practices which greatly exaggerate the resulting estimate (section 4 of the paper). In particular, four governorates in central Iraq account for more than 80% of ORB’s estimated one million deaths. Yet in these governorates a higher percentage of respondents report deaths of household members than report deaths of extended family members in another ORB poll conducted only six months earlier. This pattern can not be seen as credible since extended family networks are far larger than households. The percentage reporting deaths in the entire southern region of Iraq, on the other hand, does show the expected sharp drop between the two polls (from 35 to 7 percent) when ORB switches from its extended-family question to its household question. This more reasonable pattern casts strong doubt on precisely the data (in the four key central governorates) which provided the vast bulk (more than 80%) of deaths in the “million” figure. 104 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Violence Increasing Violence increasing REBECCA SANTANA (Columbia University - Graduate School of Journalism journalism 1996 — 1997 University of California, Berkeley 1990 — 1995)(AP writer – 6 days ago) July 8, 2010 http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hwK_CSpBxsNuVUEaDuOwmSSCiqGwD9GQU9JO0 BAGHDAD — At least 15 people were killed Thursday by bombs targeting the hundreds of thousands of pilgrims who defied violence to take part in the final day of a Shiite religious holiday, officials said. The deaths came one day after nearly 60 people were killed in attacks in and around the Iraqi capital, most of them by a suicide bomber who targeted pilgrims heading to a mosque in northern Baghdad to mark the anniversary of the death of a revered Shiite figure. While violence in Iraq has plummeted since the height of the insurgency a few years ago, the attacks targeting devout Shiites who walk from across Iraq to take part in the holy occasion underscore the tentative nature of the security gains and the persistent attempts by insurgents to once again foment sectarian divisions. The attacks come as Iraq is struggling to seat a government a little over four months after the March 7 election failed to bring about a clear winner to lead the country. As opposing political blocs jockey to form a ruling coalition, the ongoing political uncertainty has raised questions about whether insurgents will try to destabilize the country just as American troops are reducing their numbers to 50,000 by the end of August. Iraqi Attacks Increasing BBC News 9 July 2010 Last updated at 07:55 ET http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10570993 In its latest report released on Thursday, the UN said 4,068 civilians were killed and 15,935 injured in violence in 2009, second half of 2009 saw a large increase in the number of injured civilians when compared to the first half," it said. Iraqi forces took over control of security in Iraq's towns and cities from the US military one year ago. according to information provided by Iraq's Ministry of Human Rights. "This represents an overall decrease in comparison to 2008. However, the 105 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Withdrawal Bad Withdrawal bad – laundry list Ryan Mauro (is a geopolitical analyst. He began working for Tactical Defense Concepts (www.tdconcepts.com), a maritime-associated security company in 2002. In 2003, Mr. Mauro joined the Northeast Intelligence Network (www.homelandsecurityus.com), which specializes in tracking and assessing terrorist threats. He has appeared on over 20 radio shows and had articles published in over a dozen publications. His book "Death to America: The Unreported Battle of Iraq" is scheduled to be published in the coming months. In addition to writing for the Global Politician, he publishes his own web site called World Threats.) - 5/7/2007 http://www.globalpolitician.com/22760-foreign-iraq Moral Consequences Withdrawal would mean watching by as millions of Iraqis were slaughtered by terrorists, insurgents, militias, and neighboring states as each struggles to take the spoils. We would also have to watch as hundreds of thousands of children die from treatable diseases, as any humanitarian effort would fail due to the violence. Advocates of withdrawal also must be willing to sacrifice the potential for freedom-loving people in the region. Democratic success in Iraq threatens nearby tyrannies and empowers those fighting them. Women who aren’t allowed to drive and are persecuted for showing skin, young girls who are stoned for being raped, homosexuals who are hung for their relationships, student activists who are tortured in jail for criticizing their leader must be looked in the face and be told, “The Americans didn’t feel your plight was a high enough priority. We wish you success in the future, but this superpower won’t be around to help you.” Military Consequences Senator John McCain, a former POW in Vietnam, said it best this week when he stated that “the only thing worse than a stressed military, is a broken and defeated military.” Withdrawal would mean the complete collapse of morale in the military and a reluctance to support a responsible military budget. Failing to support and fund our military leaves our troops without the armor they need and our political leaders without the option of force in dealing with foreign enemies. Advocates of a withdrawal think it will end the war, but it will not. The disastrous security situation in Iraq will lead to a terrorist sanctuary that the United States will then have to confront. Our uniformed men and women who came home the first time will have to enter again under much harsher and costlier conditions. Consequences in Iraq Withdrawal would lead to a collapse of the elected Iraqi government, who all would then have to flee outside the region or be executed by terrorists. All the work done to bring about elections and representation for all the people of Iraq would vanish. In southern Iraq, the “Islamization” process would move full throttle, stripping away individual rights, particularly that of women. As Islamic extremist rule increases, and Iran grows more powerful, a radical Shiite state will be created that will oppress not only its own citizens, but seek to oppress others. Sectarian violence will spiral out of control, killing millions of Iraqis, both Sunni and Shia. Even more will be forced to flee their homes as radical militias seek to create homogenous regions. Shiite terrorist groups like Hezbollah will likely find safe haven and support. Sunni territory will become home to an assortment of terrorist organizations that will use it as a base to fund and plan attacks on the United States and nearby moderate Muslim nations. Al-Qaeda, who will certainly not hesitate to attack us again, will have access to safe harbor, recruits, and oil revenue. The Kurds of northern Iraq will likely declare independence, but will probably see a tremendous amount of violence and despair. Turkey will invade northern Iraq to stop the emergence of a Kurdish state, leading to yet another war. Iran will almost certainly join in. Consequences in the Middle East The voices of those who want freedom and justice will be silenced. While the movement for democratic change will continue, its prospects for victory will diminish and come at a much higher cost. The Middle Eastern countries, faced with the threat of Iranian interference, will probably increase the oppression of its dissidents in order to stifle any attempt at foreign subversion. Iran, the #1 sponsor of terrorism and home to several Al-Qaeda leaders, will grow in power and become the leader of the region. It will become easier for Iran’s government, who denies the holocaust has ever happened and has repeatedly cited the destruction of Israel and the United States as its goal, to obtain nuclear weapons. The West will find its options to deter isolate and affect Iran’s behavior very limited. In response to the growth of Iran’s power, countries in the region like Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the states in the Gulf will obtain nuclear weapons. Iran’s leadership has expressed willingness to share its nuclear technology with other rogue states like Syria and Venezuela. Saudi Arabia will increase its support to Sunni jihadists and Wahhabists (which spawned Osama Bin Laden) in order to counter Iran’s influence. There may very well be a bloody civil war inside Saudi Arabia, causing oil prices to hit a new spike and possibly bringing the American economy into a deep recession. The growth in power of terrorist elements will lead to a complete breakdown in the Middle East Peace Process, and renewed fighting between Israeli and militant Palestinian groups. Israel will have to take an even more hawkish stance towards Iran, quite possibly leading to a nuclear showdown. One of the problems the United States has had among Iraqis is that they don’t believe we will stay to protect them, so they sit on the sidelines and won’t stand up to the terrorists . A premature withdrawal would forever eliminate any goodwill and trust between America and the people of the Middle East, instead replaced by bitterness and hatred as its people watch their family members die due to American selfishness. Any hope of having a foreign ally would diminish, as no one would trust the United States to stand by them in tough times. Consequences in Africa The subsequent nuclear arms race may force Libya to re-start its nuclear program, having no longer to fear U.S. action but having to fear its nuclear-armed neighbors. Insurgency in North Africa would expand, as Iran would likely increase support to organizations like the GIA in Algeria, furthering the civil war there. The United States would not have the willpower to stop the genocide in Sudan. The Sudanese government, an ally of Iran (and previously of Saddam Hussein), may find hope in America’s withdrawal and increase, or at least stay focused on, their brutal activities in Darfur. Consequences in the War on Terror Terrorists worldwide will be emboldened. The American withdrawal from Somalia helped motivate Osama Bin Laden into thinking that he could attack us in the 1990s. An American withdrawal from the much greater and more important conflict in Iraq would surely inspire a new generation of terrorists. Additionally, terrorists could go to Iraq to find training, money, weapons and safe harbor. These recruits would then go on to attack targets throughout the world, including Western Europe and the United States. Rogue states, finding themselves strengthened, would be convinced that terrorists and insurgents are the way to defeat and deter America. An immediate withdrawal would cause these nations to increase their sponsorship of terrorist organizations. Consequences in Latin America Venezuela’s missile and inevitable nuclear cooperation with Iran would continue. The weakness of the United States would encourage the rise of an anti-American bloc in South America, led by Cuba and Venezuela that would ally itself with Iran, China and Russia. Consequences in Asia American forces would be less able to block the shipment of drugs, banned goods, and WMD technology from North Korea to the Middle East. This increased revenue would help shore up North Korea’s oppressive regime, and allow them to arm our enemies. 106 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Withdrawal Bad Withdrawal causes regional chaos Victor Davis Hanson (is the Martin and Illie Anderson Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is a classicist and an expert on the history of war. A regular contributor to National Review Online and many other national and international publications, he has written or edited sixteen books, including the New York Times bestseller Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power. His most recent book is A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War. He was awarded a National Humanities Medal by President Bush in 2007.) appeared in the Washington Post on September 4, 2005. http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/6174 If we flee precipitously, moderates in the Middle East could never again believe in American assurances of support for reform and would have to retreat into the shadows—or find themselves at the mercy of fascist killers. Jihadists would swell their ranks as they hyped their defeat of the American infidels. Our forward strategy of hitting terrorists hard abroad would be discredited and replaced by a return to the pre-9/11 tactics of a few cruise missiles and writs. And loyal allies in Eastern Europe, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan, along with new friends in India and the former Soviet republics, would find themselves leaderless in the global struggle against Islamic radicalism. 107 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Fast Withdrawal Bad Pullout is not an effective security measure Graham, WASHINGTON, July 4, 2010, is a member of the Senate's Armed Services Committee, Republican Senator of South Carolina, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/04/ftn/main6645802.shtml, Graham: Obama Withdrawal Date Hurts Afghan War. Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, speaking from Afghanistan, said this morning that President Barack Obama must clarify his July 2011 withdrawal deadline because it is hurting the war. "If the people in Afghanistan thinks we're going to begin to leave in July 2011," Graham said on on CBS' "Face the Nation," "we have no chance of winning a counterinsurgency. "If you send a signal to your enemies you're going to leave at a certain date, they'll wait until that date and wait you out." Graham, who is a member of the Senate's Armed Services Committee, said he supports transitioning control to the Afghans. But he said Mr. Obama's deadline strategy has not worked. "We're not here as an occupier," Graham said. "But this confusion has hurt. It's emboldened our enemies. We need to get it right and get it clarified." Graham said the purpose of securing Afghanistan is to make America more secure. "We can't leave this country in chaos," he the Taliban ever come said. "We'll never be safe. This is not just some place on the map; this is the place where 9/11 was planned and executed. "If back and take over all or part of this country, we'll never know peace," he said. In addition, Graham said those who'd helped the U.S. would be killed, and jihadists in other areas would be emboldened because "no one will help us in the future." The senator, who is known for being one of the most willing Republicans to work with Democrats, said he wants to hear the White House say that there will be an evaluation in a year's time. "If you can transition, we will do so in certain areas. But everything will be conditioned," Graham told moderator and CBS Political Analyst John Dickerson. "The vice president reassured me that it would be condition-safe. I take him at his word. "General [David] Petraeus needs this monkey off his back. It's not fair to him and our troops and our civilian counterparts to be operating in Afghanistan with the belief that come July 2011, we're going to begin to withdraw no matter what. "That can't be the way we lead this. That would be counterproductive." 108 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Fast Withdrawal Bad Obama's deadline for withdrawal is detrimental to regional stability Thiessen Tuesday, June 29, 2010 (Thiessen is an author, columnist and political commentator, who served as a speechwriter for United States President George W. Bush (2004–2009) and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2001–2004). He is the author of the 2010 New York Times bestselling book, Courting Disaster. Thiessen's articles have appeared in the Los Angeles Times, National Review, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The Weekly Standard, USA Today and other publications. He has also appeared on Fox News, CNN, NPR.) http://www.aei.org/article/102244 What is it with President Obama and artificial deadlines? First he set a deadline for shutting down Guantanamo by January 2010 -yet the detention center remains open and the New York Times reports that the White House has given up on closing it before Obama's term ends. Instead of learning from that experience, Obama set another misguided deadline -- this time to begin an American withdrawal from Afghanistan by July 2011. Whether the president realizes it or not, he is going to have to abandon that deadline as well -- and the sooner he does so the better. The Guantanamo deadline only cost him some momentary embarrassment; the Afghanistan deadline could cost us a war. At his confirmation hearing tomorrow, Gen. David Petraeus will be pressed to answer a difficult question: Can his counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan succeed when the U.S. has already announced a date for withdrawal? There is growing concern among congressional Republicans that the answer is no. Until last week, a revolt had been brewing among senators who backed Obama on the surge but have concluded that the deadline could bring down the entire war effort. Petraeus's nomination has for the moment quelled this insurgency on Capitol Hill, but concern remains that Petraeus may not be able to quell the insurgency in Afghanistan if the president does not untie his hands. As Missouri Sen. Kit Bond put it, if the withdrawal date stands, Obama is "setting [Petraeus] up for failure." The deadline is more than a tactical error; it is a strategic miscalculation that undermines almost every element of our efforts in Afghanistan. A withdrawal date undermines the very premise of a counterinsurgency strategy -- that by protecting the population, you can earn their trust and get them to help you root out the terrorists and insurgents. As columnist Charles Krauthammer has explained, Afghans will not risk joining us in the fight if they think America will soon be leaving them to the mercy of the Taliban. The damage goes even deeper than that. The stated purpose of the deadline is to put pressure on Afghan President Hamid Karzai to eliminate corruption and increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan government. Instead, it has had the opposite effect -- creating a perverse incentive for Karzai to make overtures to the Taliban, and cut deals to stay in power, so that he can cover his bets when the Americans leave. The deadline is also weakening our coalition. It is hard enough to get NATO countries to cough up troops, but when our NATO allies believe that America is packing its bags, they start packing as well. Canada has announced its mission will end in 2011. In February, the Dutch announced they will withdraw by this December. And last week, Poland declared that all its troops will be leave by 2012 because, as the head of Poland's National Security Bureau put it, Afghanistan is heading toward a "strategic catastrophe" and Poland needed to "seek a way out of this situation." Obama can hardly push back on NATO allies to stay if America is not committed to staying itself. The deadline also sends the wrong message to Pakistan. Elements of Pakistani intelligence have long maintained quiet ties with the Taliban and other jihadist groups, using these militants to destabilize Afghanistan and India. Obama is pressing Pakistan to cut these ties and help us dismantle these networks -- an effort that is critical to the success of both our mission in Afghanistan and our campaign against al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal regions. But if the Pakistanis perceive America is leaving, why would they accede to such pressure? The withdrawal date also emboldens the Taliban. As Arizona Sen. John McCain puts it, "We warfare and expect your strategy to be able to prevail." cannot tell the enemy when you are leaving in Obama's defenders point to the fact that Petraeus set a timeline for withdrawal in Iraq. But that timeline was set nine months after the surge began, when Iraq had clearly turned a corner. We have not yet turned a corner in Afghanistan. Moreover, at the height of the surge, President George W. Bush vetoed a bill that would have created a deadline for withdrawal -- sending a clear signal of America's determination to prevail. Today, Obama appears to be hedging for defeat. At the G-20 summit, Obama complained that there has been "a lot of obsession" with the withdrawal date. He tried to put some nuance on the deadline, declaring that beginning to withdraw troops in a years' time doesn't mean we will "close the door and shut off the lights." This nuance is lost in the voyage across the Hindu Kush. Obama cannot afford to repeat in Afghanistan what he did in Guantanamo -- let the deadline linger for months after the administration knew it could not be met. The "obsession" will not end until he repudiates the withdrawal date, clearly and unequivocally. But lifting the deadline alone is not enough; the president needs to start projecting resolve. When his health care bill was in trouble, Obama barnstormed the country like his presidency depended on it -- explaining the stakes, the consequences of failure, and why he would not accept defeat. He needs to start doing that for Afghanistan -- explaining the stakes, the consequences of failure, and why he will not accept defeat. If Afghanistan truly is a "war of necessity," then the security of our country depends on it. His presidency depends on it as well. 109 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Fast Withdrawal Bad Now is Not the Time to Withdraw Troops Ranj Alaaldin (is a Middle East political and security risk analyst based at the London School of Economics and Political Science.) Saturday 1 May 2010 14.00 BST http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/01/iraq-elections-allawi-maliki/print Iraq continues to be embroiled in its messy post-election coalition-building process. It has become so messy that the US may well be rethinking its withdrawal plans, and particularly its withdrawal of all combat troops at the end of August. In the past few weeks, amid a number of terror attacks, two key developments have taken place: an order by an electoral panel to have all the votes cast in Baghdad manually recounted; and a ruling that paves the way for banning some elected candidates because of their sympathies for the outlawed Ba'ath party. Reports suggest at least two of these candidates won seats in the 325-member Iraqi parliament; both belong to the winning bloc of the Iraqi National Movement (INM), led by Ayad Allawi who won 91 seats, ahead of Nouri al-Maliki and his State of Law coalition's 89 seats. The banning of other INM elected members is also possible within the next couple of weeks. Together, the recount and the ban, may give Maliki little more than three or four additional seats, making him the overall electoral winner. But many will question what difference it will make, since Iraq's supreme court has already ruled that it is the largest post-election parliamentary alliance, rather than the largest vote winner, that can form the next government. Any changes in Maliki's favour strengthen his hand in his push to retain the premiership and have his State of Law coalition lead the next government. State of Law (and indeed, Maliki) will redeem the prestige lost when INM was declared the largest single bloc after the elections. In such a position, Maliki could also be more willing to negotiate with INM since he would rather Allawi and INM played second-fiddle to him (as runners-up) than the other way around. Maliki has also reportedly encountered internal problems within his Islamic Dawa party, with some factions in the group opposing another tenure for him. Any changes in his favour would constitute a political boost and help to silence his critics. The decisions on the recount and the bans may be perceived on the Iraqi street as yet another set of attempts to sideline the Sunni voice in post-2003 Iraqi politics. But it is too easy to assume that they mark the beginning of the return to Iraq's violent past. Although there is cause for concern, as argued this week by Simon Tisdall, the recount itself was expected since both Allawi and Maliki complained of irregularities in the voting process and count. Also, he decision to ban the candidates was made on election day itself, meaning all the political entities had ample warning of what was to come; significant in this context is that the ban will not dramatically alter the allocation of seats. The extent to which both rulings will adversely impact on Iraq's political process and, indeed, US withdrawal plans will, of course, depend on Allawi and the INM's own reactions to them – whether, that is, their reactions will go beyond rhetoric. Allawi's coalition, it should be noted, contains fierce ultra-nationalists all too capable of igniting damaging and destructive violence, but there is a feeling that Iraq's political actors, some of them former insurgency members, have matured and given up their futile and costly ways of violence. INM would certainly be concerned about the possibility of the recount justifying State of Law's calls for a manual recount in other provinces, particularly if it provides for any significant changes. As a result of all this, a government is unlikely to be formed until August or perhaps even September, creating a vacuum that terrorists are all too happy to try to fill, and leaving the US with sufficient justification to alter its withdrawal plans. Iraqis Will be Overwhelmed Kim Gamel, (a veteran correspondent and editor for The Associated Press, has been appointed to the new position of news editor in Baghdad.) Associated Press Monday, June 29, 2009 If the Iraqis can hold down violence, it will show the country is finally on the road to stability. If they fail, Iraq faces new bloodshed, straining a nation still divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. American commanders insist publicly that they're confident Iraqi forces are up to the task after years of training. Privately, many U.S. officers worry the Iraqis will be overwhelmed if violence surges, having relied for years on the U.S. for everything from firepower to bottled water. Fears that Iraqi forces can't cope have been rising since a spike in bombings and shootings this month that killed more than 250 people. U.S. and Iraqi officials have warned they expect more violence as insurgents try to stage a show of force in the days surrounding the withdrawal. Timing Critical With Troop Withdrawal Discussants: Ted Galen Carpenter and James Phillips Updated: February 29, 2008 http://www.cfr.org/publication/15586/when_should_the_us_withdraw_from_iraq.html The choice offered by presidential candidates is either abandoning Iraq (and dooming its people to a protracted civil war that inevitably will provide fertile ground for al-Qaeda and other hostile forces to exploit) or patiently assisting the Iraqi government to overcome formidable challenges, reaching out to Sunni Arabs, and consolidating the security gains of the surge by anchoring them in a sustainable political accommodation. The United States eventually should withdraw all troops not needed for training, logistical support, and counter-terrorist operations, but it should do so at a deliberate pace calibrated according to the situation in Iraq. 110 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Perception of Weakness A quick and hasty withdrawal from Iraq will harm the reputation of the US military Tunç ’08 (Hakan Tunç teaches Political Science at Carleton University, Canada. Currently, he is involved in various research projects about U.S. foreign policy toward terrorism, the Iraq war, and Afghanistan. Orbis 2008 Volume 52 Issue 4 pages 657-669 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_ udi=B6W5V-4T9JWKM- &_user=7030691&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F2008& _rdoc=1& _fmt =high& _orig=search&_ sort=d&_ docanchor=&view=c&_ se archStrId=1399203015&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000070945&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=7030691&md5=6a016642b4ef37dd8263c750bd5dc05a) -AM Last year, the editors of The Economist magazine asserted that “the most important question that now confronts American foreign- policymakers: beyond the question of whether it was right to invade Iraq, what are the likely consequences of getting out now?”1 So far, attention has focused on the strategic and security consequences of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, including the possibilities of a decline of American influence in the Middle East, a wider regional war, and an For those who oppose a rapid U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, including members of the Bush administration, however, among the most feared consequences is damage to America's reputation. According to this argument, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility. The forces of radical Islam would tout a U.S. pullout as a victory, declaring that the United States did not have the resolve to endure the battle. A U.S. withdrawal would thus encourage jihadists to foment unrest against other governments they oppose and against other U.S. interventions, such as in Afghanistan. President Bush has repeatedly noted that “Extremists of all strains would be emboldened by the knowledge that they forced America to retreat.”3 A number of observers have driven the same point home.4 This article argues that the proponents of the reputational argument make a strong case against a premature and hasty withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. The argument is forceful in the sense that it can invoke pronouncements by the radical Islamists themselves, which unmistakably call into question the United States's resoluteness. These pronouncements point to America's past withdrawals increased terrorist threat as Al Qaeda fills the vacuum left by the Americans.2 from theaters of war and declare Iraq to be the central front, raising the reputational stake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq considerably. The potency of the reputational argument regarding Iraq is also clear when compared to the formulations of similar arguments about U.S. reputation in the past, especially the Vietnam War. In contrast to the current struggle in Iraq, advocates of the reputational argument (“credibility”) as The importance of the reputational argument regarding U.S. policy towards Iraq should not be underestimated. Any discussion of a U.S. withdrawal which focuses solely on the strategic, humanitarian, and/or financial consequences of a continued U.S. presence in Iraq would be incomplete. What does “U.S. withdrawal” mean in the context of the Iraq War? I would argue that the term means abandoning America's major combat role in Iraq and such a quick departure of U.S. troops from Iraq that the United States will not have achieved its core military objectives of pacification and stability in the country. applied to Vietnam were unable to employ their adversaries’ rhetoric to substantiate their claim that a U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam would change the latter's perception about America's resolve . 111 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Perception of Weakness Reputation is a necessary to avoid future conflicts Tunç ’08 (Hakan Tunç teaches Political Science at Carleton University, Canada. Currently, he is involved in various research projects about U.S. foreign policy toward terrorism, the Iraq war, and Afghanistan. Orbis 2008 Volume 52 Issue 4 pages 657-669 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_ udi=B6W5V-4T9JWKM- &_user=7030691&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F2008& _rdoc=1& _fmt =high& _orig=search&_ sort=d&_ docanchor=&view=c&_ se archStrId=1399203015&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000070945&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=7030691&md5=6a016642b4ef37dd8263c750bd5dc05a) -AM Reputation can be defined as a judgment about an actor's past behavior and character that is used to predict future behavior. In international politics, a major component of building or maintaining a country's reputation involves resolve. Policy makers may believe that a lack of resolve in one military confrontation will be seen as an indication of general weakness. According to Shiping Tang, this concern frequently amounts to “a cult of reputation” among foreign policy makers, which he defines as “a belief system holding as its central premise a conviction (or fear) that backing down in a crisis will lead one's adversaries or allies to underestimate one's resolve in the next crisis.” Of particular importance to the cult of reputation is concern about the consequences of withdrawal from a theater of war. The major dictate of the cult of reputation is that a country should stand firm and refuse to withdraw from a theater of war. The underlying belief is that a withdrawal would inflict a severe blow to a country's reputation and thus “embolden” the adversaries by boosting commitment and recruitment to their cause. Since the end of World War II, a cult of reputation has evolved among certain American policy makers who maintain that being a global power means being able to convey the image of strength and resolve. According to this perspective, a reputation for firmness and resoluteness deters adversaries and reassures allies about U.S. commitments. Conversely, being perceived as weak and irresolute encourages adversaries to be more aggressive and results in allies being less supportive. This logic has had two general consequences for America's use of force abroad: First, exhibiting resolve has been deemed necessary even in small and distant countries. This is because the mere perception of power generates tangible power, thereby reducing the need to use actual physical force against every adversary. In the 1950s and 1960s, this logic translated into military interventions in several places, notably in Korea and Vietnam, countries whose strategic value to the United States appeared questionable to some. Second, reputational concerns made it difficult for the United States to withdraw from a theater of war. The Vietnam War is the most prominent case, although the logic was also evident during the Korean conflict in the early 1950s. As is well-documented by historians, both the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon administrations took reputation seriously and argued that leaving Vietnam without an “honorable” exit would seriously hurt U.S. credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike. For both Johnson and Nixon, an “honorable” exit meant creating an autonomous South Vietnam (much like independent, anti-communist South Korea after the Korean war) that was recognized by all parties involved in the conflict, particularly by the North Vietnamese government. Such an outcome would vindicate U.S. sacrifices. 112 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Terrorism A withdrawal from Iraq would be seen as a victory and would be used as a recruitment tool for terrorist organizations Tunç ’08 (Hakan Tunç teaches Political Science at Carleton University, Canada. Currently, he is involved in various research projects about U.S. foreign policy toward terrorism, the Iraq war, and Afghanistan. Orbis 2008 Volume 52 Issue 4 pages 657-669 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_ udi=B6W5V-4T9JWKM- &_user=7030691&_coverDate=12%2F31%2F2008& _rdoc=1& _fmt =high& _orig=search&_ sort=d&_ docanchor=&view=c&_ se archStrId=1399203015&_rerunOrigin=google&_acct=C000070945&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=7030691&md5=6a016642b4ef37dd8263c750bd5dc05a) -AM Unlike the Vietnam War, the reputational argument over Iraq identifies not only adversaries but also allies as intended audiences for U.S. reputational concerns. According to Frederick Kagan, a prominent advocate of the reputational argument, a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would “cement our reputation as untrustworthy [among allies]. We will lose this generation not only in Iraq, but throughout the Middle East.”20 For Brent Scowcroft, the former National Security Advisor of President George H.W. Bush, a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would create “the perception, worldwide,… that the American colossus had stumbled, was losing its resolve and could no longer be considered a reliable ally or friend — or the guarantor of peace and stability in this critical region [the Middle East].”21 Like the allegations about ally behavior during the Vietnam War, these arguments fail to provide supporting evidence. So far, no government allied with the United States in the Middle East or elsewhere has given any indication that it would indeed lose its confidence in Washington if the United States were to withdraw from Iraq. While the reputational argument is weak concerning allied perceptions about a U.S. exit from Iraq, it is much stronger when applied to the adversary's perceptions. Hence, adherents of reputational argument put much stronger emphasis on the latter. This is for a reason. In contrast to the Vietnam War, the proponents of the reputational argument can capitalize on the adversary's rhetoric to advance As is well known, Osama bin Laden and his deputy Ayman Zawahiri have repeatedly questioned American military resolve and have depicted America as a “paper tiger” and a “weak horse” that cannot endure a protracted military conflict. Al Qaeda's leadership, as well as most militants of radical Islam, believe that America lacks resolve due to its decadence, materialism, and life-loving character, all of which weaken the fighting spirit of American troops and enhance the casualty aversion of American society. America's military technology cannot defeat Muslim fighters who are motivated by religious faith and willing (not to mention, eager) to die in battle. The U.S. withdrawals from Beirut in 1983, Somalia in 1993 and Yemen following the bombing of USS Cole in 2001 are held up as evidence of America's lack of military resolve. In each of these cases, after sustaining only a few casualties, the United States withdrew from the theater of war.22 The perception that the United States lacks resolve is not restricted to bin Laden and Zawahiri, but is a common theme among jihadists.23 What is unprecedented about their thesis. these proclamations is that for the first time in history, a main foe of the United States has made a judgment about America's character and drawn conclusions about American resolve based on dispositional attributes. No other enemy of the United States has so blatantly, persistently, and publicly emphasized U.S. irresoluteness in fighting wars. During the Cold War, even though many American policymakers made assumptions about their country's reputation and credibility, the Soviet Union never seriously questioned U.S. resolve in dispositional terms. As one historian observed, “In retrospect, it is apparent that American concern for resolve, in theory and practice, bordered on the neurotic.”24 It is not surprising, then, that depicting the United States as weak and irresolute has become crucial evidence for those opposing Iraq if the United States abandons Iraq, “the terrorists would be emboldened, and use their victory to gain new recruits.”25 Vice President Cheney asserted that “absolutely the worst possible thing we could do at this point would be to validate and encourage the terrorists by doing exactly what they want us to do, which is to leave [Iraq].”26 According to a former aide in the Bush White House, the claim that America is a “‘weak horse’ that runs when bloodied ‘will be right’ if the United States does not bring a decent outcome in Iraq.”27 A widely-read conservative observer notes that “To drive the United States out of Iraq would be a huge victory for the terrorists, attracting withdrawal on reputational grounds. The argument's proponents repeatedly point out that a quick withdrawal from Iraq would confirm bin Laden's claim about U.S. irresolution. For President Bush, both recruits and support from around the world.”28 The forcefulness of the reputational argument also depends on how important a particular battlefield or theater of war is in the eyes of America's adversaries. If adversaries believe a particular battlefield constitutes the major front in a larger conflict, then the reputational argument is strengthened. Conversely, if a military conflict is understood to be peripheral to a larger strategic conflict, then the reputation stakes are relatively low. In this regard, the contrast between the Vietnam War and Iraq is again striking. Neither the United States, the Soviet Union nor China saw Vietnam, or Indochina for that matter, as the central front in the Cold War. For all three powers, Vietnam was considered peripheral to the larger conflict whose main front was in Europe. Neither the Soviet nor Chinese leadership suggested that Vietnam was pivotal in the Cold War. In fact, Moscow and Beijing from the late 1960s onward did not perceive any great advantage to themselves as a result of a humiliating U.S. defeat in Vietnam. Moreover, Washington wished to see a quick end to the conflict through a negotiated settlement.29 Even though Nixon and Kissinger believed that an honorable exit from Vietnam was important, they “shared the conviction that Vietnam was an irritant that needed to be removed by any means necessary.”30At present, proponents of the reputational argument, in particular, Bush administration officials, argue that Iraq is the central front for the United States in the larger conflict with radical Islamists. This greatly raises the stakes for U.S. reputation.31 Given the centrality of Iraq, advocates of the reputational argument contend an American withdrawal would embolden jihadists to an extent even greater than previous U.S. departures, such as Beirut and Somalia. Jihadists will certainly liken an American withdrawal from Iraq under fire to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988. Consequently, their determination to defeat the United States will harden. Once again, the jihadists’ rhetoric and actions provide sufficient evidence for the reputational argument proponents to claim that “Al Qaeda does not think Iraq is a distraction from their war against us. Al Qaeda believes Iraq is the central front – and it is.”32 Indeed, both bin Laden and Zawahiri regard Iraq Osama bin Laden noted in 2006: “the war [in Iraq] is for you or for us to win. If we win it, it means your defeat and disgrace forever as the wind blows in this direction with God's help.”33 In another statement, now as being the front line of the Islamic militant battle against the West. For instance, bin Laden announced: “The whole world is watching this war and the two adversaries. It's either victory and glory, or misery and humiliation.”34 In his letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in late 2005, bin Laden's deputy Zawahiri also emphasized that Iraq had become “the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era.”35 The fact that Iraq had attracted thousands of jihadists from other Muslim countries attests to the importance of Iraq as the central front in the global war on terror.36 113 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ US withdrawal from Iraq will increase terrorism, cause Iraq civil war and spill over to its neighbors China Daily 09, author is a researcher with the China Council for National Security Policy Studies, THE GOOD AND BAD OF US PULLOUT, 7/1/2009, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9728149514&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo= 1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9728149517&cisb=22_T9728149516&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=1 But the US troop withdrawal could leave Iraq with some problems and uncertainties, too. For example, Iraqi security forces have to maintain security and social order. Iraq has a 750,000 security personnel, but not the combat capability of US troops. And if the much better trained US troops couldn't wipe out insurgency in Iraq, can the Iraqi forces do so? Bombings and suicide attacks have increased since the beginning of this year, but only some of them have been targeted at US troops. Most of them have targeted the Iraqi government and people. This raises the fear that once the US troops withdraw the insurgents' war against the US could turn into a civil war, especially between Shi'ites and Sunnis. In the absence of US troops and a highly capable security force in Iraq, there is fear that the radical armed wings of the two religious factions could declare war against each other to get as much power and privileges as possible in the new dispensation. In fact, almost every domestic conflict in Iraq has the potential of snowballing into a deeper crisis, and spreading to neighboring countries. Iraq fought an 8-year-long war with Iran. Just a couple of years after the end of that war, Iraq invaded Kuwait, leading to the Gulf War in 1991. Even after the war, Iraq has had many disputes with Iran, especially over Islam. The US military presence ensured that the two countries did not clash over sectarian beliefs. But if the Shi'ite-Sunni conflict in Iraq is not controlled after the US withdraws its troops, it could escalate into a conflict with Iran. 114 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Civil War Iraq’s government is in a fragile state Pollack, April 2010, Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Irena L. Sargsyan is a research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. 2010 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly. http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr_PollackSargsyan.pdf is a noted former CIA intelligence analyst and expert on Middle East politics and military affairs. He has served on the National Security Council staff and has written several articles and books on international relations. Pollack obtained a BA from Yale University, in 1988, and went on to earn a PhD from MIT in 1996. He has served in a variety of roles in government. From 1988 until 1995, he was analyst on Iraqi and Iranian military issues for the Central Intelligence Agency. He spent a year as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs with the United States National Security Council. In 1999, he rejoined the NSC as the Director for Persian Gulf Affairs. He also served two stints as a professor with the National Defense University. Indeed, candidate Obama correctly argued that when the United States prematurely turned away from Afghanistan to focus on Iraq in 2002—2003, the result was the near collapse of the new Afghan government and the resumption of widespread civil strife. Even if it is to focus on Afghanistan, if the United States turns away from Iraq prematurely, it would have dire consequences for Iraq, whose fragile government will be more likely to fail, and for the United States, because success in Iraq is vital to U.S. interests. ISF threatens Iraq stability if we withdraw too soon Pollack, April 2010, Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Irena L. Sargsyan is a research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. 2010 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly. http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr_PollackSargsyan.pdf is a noted former CIA intelligence analyst and expert on Middle East politics and military affairs. He has served on the National Security Council staff and has written several articles and books on international relations. Pollack obtained a BA from Yale University, in 1988, and went on to earn a PhD from MIT in 1996. He has served in a variety of roles in government. From 1988 until 1995, he was analyst on Iraqi and Iranian military issues for the Central Intelligence Agency. He spent a year as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs with the United States National Security Council. In 1999, he rejoined the NSC as the Director for Persian Gulf Affairs. He also served two stints as a professor with the National Defense University. One of the least acknowledged problems with the ongoing transition of the U.S. mission in Iraq is the potential for problems to arise between the Iraqi military and the civilian government. The increase in the size, capabilities, and political reliability of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were important elements in the turnaround in Iraq in 2007—2008. Today, the ISF are so large (roughly 650,000 in early 2010) and relatively capable that many Iraqis and Americans believe that the U.S. military presence has become superfluous. In Baghdad and Washington, there is a growing consensus that the Iraqis can handle their internal security and the residual insurgency threat by themselves, and as a result, the United States can pull out its troops quickly. This notion is dangerously mistaken. There are many things that could still tear Iraq apart, and the future of the Iraqi security forces themselves are among those at the top of the list. Today, the ISF sees itself as a strong, modern, progressive institution, fully capable of fulfilling its national mission. More critically, most Iraqi generals see few, if any, other institutions in Iraq that can make the same claim. They view Iraqi politicians as venal and incompetent, squandering all of the gains won at such a high price by their soldiers. In and of itself, this has been the textbook recipe for a military coup throughout modern history, especially in the Middle East. The only way to prevent the risk of civil war is leaving troops. Pollack, April 2010, Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Irena L. Sargsyan is a research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. 2010 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly. http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr_PollackSargsyan.pdf is a noted former CIA intelligence analyst and expert on Middle East politics and military affairs. He has served on the National Security Council staff and has written several articles and books on international relations. Pollack obtained a BA from Yale University, in 1988, and went on to earn a PhD from MIT in 1996. He has served in a variety of roles in government. From 1988 until 1995, he was analyst on Iraqi and Iranian military issues for the Central Intelligence Agency. He spent a year as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs with the United States National Security Council. In 1999, he rejoined the NSC as the Director for Persian Gulf Affairs. He also served two stints as a professor with the National Defense University. Today, the surest guarantee that the Iraqi military will not move against the civilian leadership, and that the civilian leadership will be limited in its ability to emasculate the military either of which could trigger a new civil war is the presence of almost 100,000 U.S. troops. When that presence is removed in December 2011, that guarantee will depart with them. Since history in similar circumstances elsewhere warns of the risk of catastrophically bad civil-military relations, unless large numbers of the departing great power’s combat troops remain behind for years or decades, the United States may be committing de´ja`vu all over again in Iraq. 115 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ History shows us the avoidable threat Pollack, April 2010, Kenneth M. Pollack is the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Irena L. Sargsyan is a research analyst at the Saban Center and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. 2010 Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly. http://www.twq.com/10april/docs/10apr_PollackSargsyan.pdf is a noted former CIA intelligence analyst and expert on Middle East politics and military affairs. He has served on the National Security Council staff and has written several articles and books on international relations. Pollack obtained a BA from Yale University, in 1988, and went on to earn a PhD from MIT in 1996. He has served in a variety of roles in government. From 1988 until 1995, he was analyst on Iraqi and Iranian military issues for the Central Intelligence Agency. He spent a year as Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs with the United States National Security Council. In 1999, he rejoined the NSC as the Director for Persian Gulf Affairs. He also served two stints as a professor with the National Defense University. The emergence and reemergence of the armed forces as potent political players in Latin America, driven by insurgencies in the wake of World War II, illustrates these problems. In the early 1960s, when the Tupamaro terrorist insurgency was born in Uruguay, the Uruguayan military was considered a model of professional disinterest, especially by the standards of twentieth century Latin America. Although pay was low, morale was still high because soldiers received other benefits such as better medical care, housing, pensions, and loans for private homes since the military routinely participated in projects designed to improve infrastructure and otherwise assist the Uruguayan people. As a result, the Uruguayan military was a purely volunteer force, able to obtain all of the recruits it needed through enlistment, which further buoyed their sense of mission and professionalism. Moreover, the Uruguayan military had only ever had a hand in one ‘‘coup d’état,’’ and in that case, its crime was following the orders of the democratically-elected but dictatorially inclined then-President Gabriel Terra. In the early 1960s, Uruguay could boast the lowest rate of domestic violence in Latin America, which is no small feat. By the late 1960s, however, the political leadership in Montevideo had become increasingly panicky over the growth of popular discontent, symbolized by the burgeoning Movement for National Liberation, which came to be known as the Tupamaro movement. Beginning in 1968, the government resorted to ever more drastic repression to try to snuff out the insurgents and crush their allies among trade unions and other civil society groups. In 1971, the government transferred responsibility for the COIN campaign from the national police to the armed forces. The army responded by ratcheting up levels of domestic repression to previously unheard of heights to the point where Uruguay had the greatest number of political prisoners per capita in the world. Simultaneously, the government suspended its citizens’ individual liberties to facilitate the military’s counterterrorism and COIN measures. US withdrawal from Iraq would lead to an Iraqi civil war Dobbins 09, James F. Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation; Former assistant secretary of state and special envoy to Afghanistan, Withdrawal from Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?, 7/16/2009, http://www.mepc.org/forums_chcs/57.asp The second risk is the risk associated with al-Qaida and other non-Iraqi terrorist groups that might seek to complicate the withdrawal, embarrass the United States in the course of the withdrawal, and of course plunge Iraq back into civil war. This risk too seems manageable as long as the major Iraqi groups themselves don't for one reason or another go back into conflict. The terrorist groups, al-Qaida in Iraq, seem to have been largely marginalized; they are much less active and the Iraqi security forces are probably capable of dealing with them as long as they don't find support within the Sunni community. So the major threats are threats that in the context of the American withdrawal, the major Iraqi groups themselves will for one reason or another resume the civil war, which largely, not entirely ended in 2007. And the major groups concerned are the Sunnis and in particular those associated with the Sons of Iraq, the former insurgents who were put on the U.S. payroll and whom we are now trying to transfer to the Iraqi government payroll; the Kurds; and then among the Shia there are several major groupings. There is what used to be called SCIRI, which is part of the largest of the political parties, the one - one of the ones with its own militia, the Badr Corps, and the one that historically was most closely associated with Iran. Their militia has largely been incorporated into the Iraqi security forces, and they have lost some prominence politically. The second of the major groups is the Da'wa Party headed by the current prime minister, which has gained somewhat largely due to his record and embrace of nationalism as opposed to more sectarian themes. There is the force associated with Muqtada al-Sadr, the Jaish al-Mahdi or JAM, which has been largely quiescent, and thus less prominent and is not likely to make a strong comeback. And finally there are the special groups which were originally part of al-Sadr's Jaish al-Mahdi, but which have achieved a certain degree of autonomy and were supported by and some people speculated directed by Iran, and which were among the most destructive of the forces back in 2006, 2007. They were largely defeated and have drawn back and the Iranians are providing less support and encouragement for these groups. Among those, probably the greatest danger, actually, I mean there are dangers that the government dominated by the Shia will not adequately integrate the Sunni minority politically and also to some degree militarily, that is, accept the Sons of Iraq and put them into a certain proportion of military security positions and ensure the others have some form of livelihood. There is the danger that the Shia groups could potentially begin fighting among themselves. But probably the greatest danger is the danger inherent in the Arab/ Kurdish disputes over disputed territories along the border between the Kurdish region and the Arab majority provinces, Kirkuk and other disputed areas are still flashpoints. And so if you are looking at where civil war in Iraq might resume in a civil way, and seriously that could be the most dangerous and the most difficult to manage. 116 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ An Iraq civil war would spill over to the region Dobbins 09, James F. Dobbins, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation; Former assistant secretary of state and special envoy to Afghanistan, Withdrawal from Iraq: What are the Regional Implications?, 7/16/2009, http://www.mepc.org/forums_chcs/57.asp In terms of external actors, all of Iraq's neighbors are going to interfere in one way or another. They would be foolish not to after all, they are the ones who are going to get the refugees, the commercial disruption and the terrorism, endemic disease, the criminality that flows from having a failed state on their doorsteps. So they are going to interfere. Now, left to their own devices, this kind of interference often has exactly the opposite effect of what the neighboring states would ideally like because they tend to interfere by each of them backing their own favorite champion as the factions within the country maneuver for power and influence, and thus they feed potential conflicts. So successful management of external actors requires that to the degree they interfere, you try to get them to interfere in ways that are convergent and helpful rather than divergent and unhelpful. As I said, all of them are going to interfere in one way or the other. Saudi Arabia is going to provide some support to Sunni groups and as long as the Sunni groups are being adequately integrated into the polity in Iraq, this essentially probably means support for political activities which - while it might not meet American standards is probably inevitable and not all that unhelpful. Syria has been a traditional pathway for the entry of suicide bombers and aspirant (sic) terrorists; that traffic has reduced significantly. Not clear whether that is because Syria is cracking down or because there is a reduction either in the supply of such people or in the demand of such people in Iraq, but that has dropped off significantly. Turkey is the only one of the neighbors that is likely - not likely, but it is the only one of the neighbors in which a conventional military intervention is feasible, is even conceivable. None of the other neighbors are going to interfere conventionally, and to the extent they interfere, they will interfere surreptitiously, politically, economically, covertly. In Turkey's case, they have repeatedly intervened with conventional military forces and they could do so again provoked either by Kurdish terrorism , by a Kurdish Arab dispute over Kirkuk, or by Kurdish abuses of Turkish or Turkmen minorities in those disputed areas. So an intervention by Turkey is a serious possibility, not a likelihood, but a serious possibility. Iran is the country that probably has the greatest capacity to destabilize Iraq as the U.S. withdraws to embarrass the U.S. withdrawal and to deny America what should be its objective, which is to leave behind an Iraq that is at peace with itself and its neighbors. Whether Iran does so or not will probably depend more on the state of U.S.-Iranian relations than on the state of U.S.-Iraqi relations. That is to say, Iran's interest in Iraq per se is not very inconsistent with the American interest. It doesn't want the country to break apart, but it wants the country to be governed by the majority, who happen to be Shia, and so it doesn't have an inherent interest in destabilizing Iraq. But it might see an interest, a derivative of the state of its relationship with the United States. And so that is a significant risk factor. 117 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Troops Good Presence of U.S. troops in Iraq crucial to a real and lasting peace Barbara F. Walter, (Barbara F. Walter is professor of political science at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at UC San Diego. | She is the author of "Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars" and the forthcoming "Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent.") http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/04/opinion/oe-walter4/2 August 04, 2009 Over the last 15 years, scholars have collected and analyzed data on the 125 or so civil wars that have taken place around the world since 1940. Two findings suggest that the outlook for Iraq is significantly more pessimistic than policymakers in the U.S. or Iraq would hope. That's partly because violence tends to exacerbate the political, economic and social problems that caused war to break out in the first place. But it is also because the first civil war often ends with no clear victor and no enforceable peace settlement. As soon as the combatants have rested and resupplied, strong incentives exist to try to recapture the state. The second finding is what I call the settlement dilemma. Combatants who end their civil war in a compromise settlement -- such as the agreement to share power in Iraq -almost always return to war unless a third party is there to help them enforce the terms. That's because agreements leave combatants, especially weaker combatants, vulnerable to exploitation once they disarm, demobilize and prepare for peace. In the absence of third-party enforcement, the weaker side is better off trying to fight for full control of the state now, rather than accepting an agreement that would leave it open to abuse in the future. Iraq today faces both of these problems. No one group has been able to win a decisive military victory, even though violence is down from the high of 2006. Shiite groups continue to compete for power and influence, conflict continues among the Kurds and various factions over valuable oil fields in the north, and Al Qaeda remains ready to realign with the Sunnis should the opportunity arise. American soldiers have kept a lid on internecine fighting. But the recent increase in violence in some of Iraq's cities reveals that different groups began jockeying for position as U.S. troops left the cities in the hands of Iraqi security forces in June and in anticipation of complete U.S. withdrawal. Dangerous Omens for Iraq Without U.S. Andrew Lee Butters / Baquba Tuesday, Mar. 02, 2010 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1968853,00.html Inside the fortified government headquarters, Diyala Governor Abdul-Nasser al-Mahdwe is relatively optimistic that the elections — the fourth poll since the U.S invasion brought democracy to Iraq — will go smoothly. "The country is getting better at elections," he tells TIME. "In the first, the fraud was about 40%. In the second, let's say 20%. Now it's not going to be that much at all." But the governor worries that as the U.S. begins to withdraw its soldiers from Iraq later in the year, Iraqis could revert to settling their political disputes in the streets. "The problem is the police," he says. "The police are all local, so the local parties can manipulate them." For now, though, al-Mahdwe, who belongs to a Sunni party that opposes Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shi'ite-led governing coalition, is more worried about an élite counterterrorism unit run by Maliki's office, which he accuses of arresting scores of opposition politicians and government critics in Diyala. Two months ago, they took the deputy governor, Mohammad Hussein al-Joubouri, and nothing has been heard since about his case. "Of course it's totally political," says one of the governor's aides. "If he is really a terrorist, why didn't they arrest him before he was elected? Thus, democracy Iraqi-style — a little fraud, sectarianism, extralegal government intimidation and the underlying fear of violence. Iraq has by now had more practice at choosing its own leaders in relatively open elections than perhaps any other Middle Eastern country besides Israel and Lebanon. But while the Bush Administration had hoped this would create a democratic ripple effect throughout the region, the results of Iraq's elections have been less than edifying. The politicians who came to power after the country's first parliamentary elections four years ago have been unable to resolve such core issues as sharing oil revenue, balancing power between the regions and the central government, and national reconciliation. Still, the U.S. is betting heavily that through the democratic process, Iraq's contending factions will achieve a consensus that will prevent a relapse into civil war. Under the Status of Forces Agreement concluded between the Bush Administration and the Iraqi government, all U.S. combat forces will be withdrawn from Iraq by the end of July, and the remaining support troops and training personnel will leave by the end of 2011. The Obama White House, which needs extra soldiers for its expansion of the war in Afghanistan, is committed to that timetable and optimistic about the country that they will leave behind. But on the streets of Baquba, it seems that the goal of a stable, independent and somewhat democratic Iraq has yet to be achieved . The U.S. and its local allies have certainly made massive security gains in Diyala. The al-Qaeda-inspired insurgent groups that once rampaged through the province have been reduced to a handful of criminal cells that attempt the occasional assassination, according to Sheik Hussam al-Mojjma, head of the local Awakening Council — the Sunni citizens brigade largely responsible for defeating al-Qaeda. "When we started fighting al-Qaeda [in 2007] it was just us and the Americans," he says. "Not the army, not the police." But he isn't happy about the way he and his men were treated by the Shi'ite-dominated government once they began to disband. Only 4,000 of the Awakening Council's 23,000 men were given jobs in the police and security forces, according to al-Mojjma. "It's all sectarian," says the sheik, whose headquarters are a concrete hut with no furniture on the eastern edge of Baquba. "The government doesn't trust us because we are Sunni. [But] if they push us any more, we are going to explode." He is particularly worried about what will happen once the U.S. pulls out of Iraq. "Iran will take us," he says. "Everyone in the region will try to occupy Iraq." But what makes the sheik even angrier is the possibility that a future government in Baghdad might turn over disputed areas of northern Diyala to the Kurdistan Regional Government, a body governing a semi-independent Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq. "If that happens, we won't even wait five seconds," he says. "We'll go to war at once." 118 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg – Troops Good Troops Need to Stay in Iraq for Strategy to Work Erik Swabb (a former U.S. Marine infantry officer and veteran of the war in Iraq who appeared July 12, 2007, on the Diane Rehm Show as a member of the pro-war Republican front group Vets for Freedom.[1] In 2004-2005, former 1st Lt. Swabb served in Iraq as "a member of the Marine Corps' 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion's Apache Company, which is based out of Camp Lejeune in North Carolina."[2] Swabb is a member of the class of '09 at Harvard Law School.[3] He is a staff member of the Harvard Journal on Legislation.[4].) March 20, 2007 http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/03/20/the_us_needs_to_stay_in_iraq/?page=full The biggest danger now is that the public and Congress are so pessimistic that US forces will be withdrawn before the strategy has time to produce results. Ultimately, this view reflects a lack of understanding about how this strategy, unlike previous failed plans, is a real change in the right direction. Such skepticism is understandable considering the difficult last four years. But it risks cutting short the best hope yet for putting Iraq on the right course. Iraqi Forces Not Good Enough Sebastian Meyer, Contributor Christian Science Monitor / July 9, 2010 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0709/Iraq-withdrawal-A-US-unitprepares-Mosul-police-for-self-rule "Right now, the [Iraqi] security forces are not good enough to take on the insurgents," explains Vic Morrow, ex-Special Forces and now an adviser to the transition team. "Some of them are up to it, but what'll fail it is corruption. And the price of failure is astronomical. "Many believe a dysfunctional security force in Iraq would allow insurgents, as well as neighbors such as Iran and Syria, to fill the power vacuum as the US withdraws. This could lead to a return of sectarian fighting. 119 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg- Inherency- Will Meet Deadline The Military will meet it’s deadline for pulling out Needham 10, Vicki Needham, The Hill, U.S. 'on track' to meet Iraq troop reduction deadline of Aug. 31, 5/30/2010, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefingroom/news/100653-us-on-track-to-meet-iraq-troops-reduction-deadline The U.S. military "is on track and will stay on track" to meet its Aug. 31 deadline to get down to 50,000 troops in Iraq, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen said on on CNN's "State of the Union" Sunday. "Right now the trends are moving in the right direction," he said. Mullen said he was "somewhat optimistic" in Iraq's ability to "stand up the government." Sen. Jim Webb (D-Va.) questioned whether the deadline could be met. Despite an uptick in violence in the country during the past year, it hasn't resulted in a sectarian response, he said. "Over the next couple of years we'll have the ability to get to a point where we are home twice as long as we are deployed," Mullen said. "So right now, as far as troop numbers are concerned, I'm comfortable." The US will pull out of Iraq by the deadline no matter what- Biden proves. Wilson 10, Scott Wilson, Staff writer for The Washington Post, Biden: U.S. Troops Will Leave Iraq on Deadline, 5/27/2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/05/27/politics/washingtonpost/main6523510.shtml The challenge for Obama, whose opposition to the Iraq invasion helped propel him to the presidency, is sticking to his timeline for a U.S. military withdrawal despite a jump in violence and continued wrangling among Iraqi politicians over who will lead the country. The sensitive departure is being managed by Vice President Biden, who says the U.S. military will reduce troop levels to 50,000 this summer, even if no new Iraqi government takes shape. "It's going to be painful; there's going to be ups and downs," Biden said in a 40-minute interview in his West Wing office this month. "But I do think the end result is going to be that we're going to be able to keep our commitment." Withdrawal from Iraq is happening now with full support. Jarrar & Leaver 2010 (Raed Jarrar and Eric Leaver, Raed Jarrar is a senior fellow on the Middle East at Peace Action. Erik Leaver is a research fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies. "Sliding Backwards on Iraq?" Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 2, 2010 http://www.fpif.org/articles/sliding_backwards_on_iraq) Obama has consistently said he would comply with the August 31 deadline to remove combat forces from Iraq. He repeated this dozens of times on the campaign trail, stated it clearly at Camp Lejeune last year, and also repeated this policy in his Cairo speech. Vice President Biden affirmed this policy numerous times, saying in February, "You're going to see 90,000 American troops come marching home by the end of the summer." And just last week, the White House reaffirmed its intention to call an end to operation Iraqi Freedom by August 31. Congress confirmed the president's policy by including clear language recognizing and supporting the deadlines for the withdrawal of combat forces in both the FY10 defense appropriations and defense authorization bills. Last month 28 members of Congress, including the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, sent a letter to Obama commending him on his plan to withdraw combat forces by August 31, regardless of the situation on the ground. We will meet the current deadline of withdrawing troops from Iraq Dobbins et al 2009 [ U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ: WHAT ARE THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS? James F Dobbins, Ellen Laipson, Helena Cobban, Lawrence J Korb. Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg.5-6 ] A lot of people ask whether we can get out of Iraq in this particular period of time. Yes, we can. One of the things the U.S. military does exceptionally well is logistics. Remember that in the campaign, Obama said one to two brigades a month. If you look at when he came into office and count the combat brigades and the rest of the forces, you've got the equivalent of about 52 brigades. If you have over 36 months, you will be able to do it. As Jim Dobbins mentioned, you're not replacing as many people as you are taking out. That doesn't mean you take out every port-a-potty when you leave or anything like that, but you can take out your vital equipment. It is also very good for the U.S. military and for the country that we had to leave the cities at the end of June. What I worried most about was Maliki's trying to use U.S. forces to deal with his own challenges rather than with people who are trying to destabilize the country. We've already seen indications of his using the Iraqi security forces to go after his political opponents. The last thing you want U.S. forces to do is to be caught in that type of conflict rather than dealing with the real threats to the country. Now that we're out of the cities, I think the likelihood of that happening is much lower 120 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ Obama already plans to remove troops from Iraq Montopoli 10 cbsnews.com, political reporter for CBSNews.com since Sept. 2007. Previously he was editor of Public Eye, the CBS News blog that goes inside CBS News and the rest of the press. Before coming to CBS News, he covered press coverage of the 2004 campaign for Columbia Journalism Review. Montopoli has contributed to The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, Slate, Salon, Legal Affairs and The Washington Monthly. “Obama Running Up Against Iraq Pullout Deadline.” Brian Monotopoli 5/14/10 Last February, President Obama told troops at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, that he planned to remove combat brigades from Iraq by the end of this summer. "Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end," he said. The president said up to 50,000 troops would remain in a non-combat capacity after the deadline. All troops, he added, would be out of the country by the end of 2011. The U.S. military has roughly 94,000 in Iraq now; to meet the president's deadline, it must thus cut that number nearly in half by the end of August. "We do want to pull all their unit equipment out with them," said Army Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton (Ret.). "That's not trivial. But major stuff like vehicles that are a bit of a challenge -- it wouldn't surprise me if we would keep some or move those out a little more slowly." They may be cutting it close in terms of a cut-off point where meeting the deadline becomes unfeasible from a technical perspective, but I haven't seen anything to make me think that they would be missing the deadline," military affairs researcher Peter Juul said. 121 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg-Iraq Can’t Defend Itself Can’t leave, Iraq can’t defend themselves Al Asarki 10, Mayada Al Asarki, Staff Reporter for Gulf News, US doubts defence capability of Iraqis, 7/13/2010, http://gulfnews.com/news/region/iraq/usdoubts-defence-capability-of-iraqis-1.653557 Dubai: Iraqi forces will not have everything they need to defend their country against external threats by December 2011 when a complete US withdrawal takes place, a top US officer said. In an exclusive interview with Gulf News, Lieutenant General Michael Barbero, Deputy Commanding General of US forces in Iraq, said the withdrawal of US troops stationed in Iraq was not linked to the formation of the country's government General Barbero said that a small contingency will remain in Iraq and will work in the embassy under the control of the ambassador. He also said that there is a resistance and resentment starting at the Iraqi level, against Iranian influence and pressure in Iraq. "I see this in my discussions with Iraqi security leaders" he added. General Barbero also said: "My estimate is that Al Qaida in Iraq is not capable of threatening the Iraqi government". "However, they are capable of sporadic violent attacks against innocent Iraqis, but those are becoming further spaced apart and less effective." 122 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 123 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg- Destroys Reconstruction US troop withdrawal would devastate reconstruction projects. Williams 10, Timothy Williams, The International Herald Tribune, U.S. abandons or cuts back Iraqi projects; Others being finished hastily as troop removal creates a security risk, 7/5/2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9728151656&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo= 1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9728151662&cisb=22_T9728151661&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8357&docNo=18 After two devastating battles between U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents in 2004, this city needed almost everything - new roads, clean water, electricity, health care. The U.S. reconstruction authorities decided, however, that the first big rebuilding project to win hearts and minds would be a citywide sewage treatment system. Now, after more than six years of work, $104 million spent, and without having connected a single house, U.S. reconstruction officials have decided to leave the troubled system only partly finished, infuriating many city residents. The plant is just one of many projects that the United States has decided to scale back on - or in some cases abandon - as U.S. troops who provide security for reconstruction sites prepare to leave in large numbers. Even some of the projects that will be completed are being finished with such haste, Iraqi officials say, that engineering standards have deteriorated precipitously, putting workers in danger and leaving some of the work at risk of collapse. U.S. officials give many reasons for their decisions to scale back or drop some projects before more troops leave, including that they have discovered in some cases that the facilities diverged from Iraq's most pressing needs, or that the initial work - overseen by U.S. contractors and performed by Iraqi workers - was so flawed that problems would take too long to fix. 124 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 125 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg- Logistically Impossible The plan is logistically impossible Dreazen 08, Yochi J. Dreazen, The Wall Street Journal, Pentagon Wary of Fast Iraq Withdrawal, 11/18/2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122696942306335651.html Many senior military officials agree with Mr. Obama's call to withdraw tens of thousands of troops from Iraq next year. They believe that the large U.S. military presence in Iraq is causing significant manpower strains on the armed forces and preventing needed reinforcements from being sent to Afghanistan, where conditions have worsened in recent months. Still, there is a fair amount of skepticism within the Pentagon about Mr. Obama's call to have all U.S. forces out of Iraq by 2010. In recent interviews, two high-ranking officers stated flatly that it would be logistically impossible to dismantle dozens of large U.S. bases there and withdraw the 150,000 troops now in Iraq so quickly. 126 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 127 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg- US-Russia Relations Good Relations with russia are good now after spy trade off and are on grounds to talk. By H. JOSEF HEBERT (AP) 7/12/10 “Attorney general: Russian spies posed threat to US” http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iT08DZI2lTjDg3QGM2o4rnz1kewD9GT770G1 Copyright © 2010 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. WASHINGTON — While they passed along no U.S. secrets, the 10 Russian sleeper agents involved in the spy swap posed a potential threat to the U.S. and received "hundreds of thousands of dollars" from Russia, Attorney General Eric Holder said."Russia considered these people as very important to their intelligence-gathering activities," he told CBS' "Face the Nation" in an interview broadcast Sunday. He defended the decision to allow the 10 to return to Russia in exchange for the release of four Russian prisoners accused of spying for the West because the swap presented "an opportunity to get back ... four people in whom we have a great deal of interest." White House press secretary Robert Gibbs, sidestepping the question of whether Russia's espionage poses a threat to the U.S., said the swap came amid improved relations between the two countries. "The economic discussions that President (Dmitry) Medvedev and President Obama had just recently and the progress that we've made in reducing nuclear weapons — and hopefully we'll get a treaty through Senate this summer that will further reduce nuclear weapons — means our security is stronger and safer and our relationship is stronger," Gibbs said on NBC's "Meet the Press." 128 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 129 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg- Russian Radicals Overblown Radicals condemed in russia not conventional view of mulism russians. Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 Tadzhuddin's outburst provoked swift denunciations from most quarters, including the Russian Orthodox Church, the speaker of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the president of Russia's Jewish congress, and Muslim muftis from across the Russian Federation.[28] In Islamic leaders came together to annul the call for jihad and, more importantly, snatch power from the "rogue" cleric: "Tadzhuddin has seceded from Islam and presented himself as a false prophet. His statement conflicts with the major postulates of sharia law." A near-unanimous resolution was subsequently passed in support of President Putin and his policy concerning "stabilization around Iraq and worldwide."[29] a meeting chaired by Sheikh Ravil Gaynutdin on April 14 in Moscow, Russia's Public opinoin is to always the foreign policy exspecially in russia. Politics are not going to change President is making no effort. Aron ,may 03 http://aei.org/outlook/17061 How U.S.-Russian relations will be affected by the war in Iraq AEI OUTLOOK SERIES Russia, America, Iraq By Leon Aron | AEI Online (May 2003) American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research | 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W. | Washington, D.C. 20036 Although Russia's Iraq policy appears to have mirrored the country's mood (and certainly that of its Muslims), it cannot be explained by public opinion alone. After all, public opinion is not always automatically translated into policy even in mature liberal democracies, much less in nations, such as Russia, that have only recently broken with a long authoritarian tradition. Deference to the leader, especially in matters of foreign policy and national security, is an integral part of that tradition and, with his country in its fourth year of economic growth, Vladimir Putin remains a very popular president. Why, then, has he not attempted to use his popularity to mold and change the country's attitude or, failing that, hazarded his vast political capital on taking an unpopular decision and leading Russia in a pro-U.S. direction, changing public opinion as British prime minister Tony Blair and his Spanish counterpart, JosŽ Maria Aznar, have done? Figures are blown out of preportion the same thing happened durning the collapse of the ussr. There is no contradiction betweens being a muslim and being a loyal solviet. ROLAND DANNREUTHER* International Affairs 86: 1 (2010) 109–126© 2010 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Affairs http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/15747_86_1dannreuther.pdf There are interesting parallels between these projections of an Islamic threat in post-Soviet Russia and similar projections made during the Soviet period. In the final two decades of the Soviet Union, a number of western Sovietologists argued that Islam represented a powerful counter-ideology to communism which constituted, with the increased demographic weight of Muslims in the Soviet Union, a serious threat to the Soviet regime.4 The fact that these predictions fell short of the mark, and that the most serious challenge to the Soviet state came from European nationalist movements, suggests that a similar caution should be exercised in projecting a generalized Islamic threat to the post-Soviet Russian state. As some scholars of Soviet Central Asia understood, there was no necessary contradiction between being a Muslim and being a loyal Soviet citizen, and most Soviet Muslims had no ambition to challenge, let alone overthrow, the Soviet state.5 In post-Soviet Russia, it is similarly important to take care not to treat the Russian Muslim community as a monolithic bloc which is in existential opposition to the Russian state and within which Islam is understood primarily as a counterideology to Russian national identity and statehood. 130 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg-Stability Withdrawing troops before the current deadline leads to instability not only in Iraq but neighboring countries escalating conflict Dobbins et al 2009 [ U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ: WHAT ARE THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS? James F Dobbins, Ellen Laipson, Helena Cobban, Lawrence J Korb. Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg.5-6 ] http://marshallarmyrotc.org/documents/JamesFDobbinsetalUSWithdrawalfromIraq--WhatAretheRegionalImplicationsMiddleEastPolicyFal_001.pdf On the broad principles, let us bear in mind a couple of things. One is that the withdrawal will happen over a period of time. It is a little like the frog in the water: you get adjusted to a slight change in temperature over time; it does not happen overnight. We just passed a very important milestone, the withdrawal from the major cities - at least most of them. It is something that is happening incrementally, and there is time; it is happening in stages. It is transparent, and the neighbors are being briefed on it. This is not a surprise or something that will be happening very abruptly for them. The first instinct on the part of the neighbors is to have some concern that, once again, instability in Iraq could spill over to them. So, if they make the judgment that Iraqi forces are not up to the task of maintaining law and order and keeping Iraqi troublemakers inside Iraq's borders, they will view this development more negatively than positively . But I do think that both at the popular level and among some of the governments of the region, there is some positive reaction to the end of American occupation of a major Arab country. This is a positive political development in terms of Arab pride and Arab experience. They even have some expectation that they will get a little more attention from Washington and that there will be a redistribution of time, energy and resources to other problems in the region. So, certainly, some of the states in the region think that the end of this period of the exceptional ism of American engagement in Iraq could be a net positive for our ability to attend to other issues of concern. We should, however, recall that the larger historical context is that most of Iraq's immediate neighbors - with the exception of Iran - did not feel that the U.S. decision to go in and topple Saddam was good for them. They are still dealing with a largely negative perception that this decision - whatever motivated the United States and whatever our priorities were - was not done in full consideration of what would really enhance stability in the region or be in the national interest of each of them. Stability and how long troops are stationed in Iraq is irrelevant. Iraq’s stability only depends on their individual actions. Dobbins et al 2009 [ U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAQ: WHAT ARE THE REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS? James F Dobbins, Ellen Laipson, Helena Cobban, Lawrence J Korb. Middle East Policy. Washington: Fall 2009. Vol. 16, Iss. 3; pg.5-6 ] http://marshallarmyrotc.org/documents/JamesFDobbinsetalUSWithdrawalfromIraq--WhatAretheRegionalImplicationsMiddleEastPolicyFal_001.pdf Our departure is also important because it gives the Iraqis the incentive to undertake the political reconciliation that is necessary to create stability. It doesn't matter how long you stay, because if the Iraqis do not undertake this political reconciliation, they are going to have problems, at least internally. It is going to be up to them to do it, and now they can't have any more excuses or incentives. The clock is ticking. They know we are leaving, and to the extent that they don't deal with their internal problems and political reconciliation, they can't count on us to deal with the situation. Can the Iraqis maintain internal security? General Odierno thinks so, and it seems to me 600,000 people in the Iraqi security forces should be more than enough to maintain internal security. Having looked at that over the years, my view is that it is never really going to be a question of capabilities; it's motivation. Do they want to? I think they won't want to unless you have the political reconciliation that's necessary to create a unified Iraq. 131 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Political instability and bloodshed prove that U.S. troops are still vital in Iraq Chulov 10 The Guardian's Iraq correspondent. He has reported from the Middle East since 2005. Martin Chulov “Iraq violence set to delay US troop withdrawal” 5/12/10 The White House is likely to delay the withdrawal of the first large phase of combat troops from Iraq for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country. American officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a government, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Late tonight seven people were killed and 22 wounded when a car bomb planted outside a cafe exploded in Baghdad's Sadr City, a Shia area, police and a source at the Iraqi interior ministry said. The latest bomb highlights how sectarian tensions are rising, as al-Qaida fighters in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremists have mounted bombing campaigns and assassinations around the country. The violence is seen as an attempt to intimidate all sides of the political spectrum and press home the message to the departing US forces that militancy remains a formidable foe. Iraqi leaders remain adamant that combat troops should leave by the deadline. But they face the problem of not having enough troops to secure the country if the rejuvenated insurgency succeeds in sparking another lethal round of sectarian conflict. "The presence of foreign forces sent shock waves through Iraqis," said Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister. "And at the beginning it was a terrifying message that they didn't dare challenge. But then they got emboldened through terrorism and acts of resistance. And as the Americans are leaving, we are seeing more of it." Earlier this week, Allawi warned that the departing US troops had an obligation enshrined in the security agreement and at the United Nations security council to safeguard Iraq's democratic process. He warned of catastrophic consequences if the occupation ended with Iraq still politically unstable. Pulling out now will cause regional instability Pascual and Pollack 2007 (Carlos, vice president and director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, Ken, expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf, “Salvaging the Possible: Policy Options in Iraq”) September 2007, Brookings.edu January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, reflecting the concurrence of the 16 heads of the U.S. intelligence agencies, concludes that Iraq’s growing polarization, the weakness of the state, and the “ready recourse to violence are driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism” that is likely to get worse unless the U.S. and Iraqi governments are able to find some way to reverse this trend.1 Shiias mistrust U.S. efforts at reconciliation. Sunnis “believe the central government is illegitimate and incompetent. Kurds are systematically increasing control over Kirkuk, a center of oil wealth, which will provoke another source of conflict with the Sunnis. Iraqi Security Forces “will be hard pressed in the next 12-18 months to execute significantly increased security responsibilities.” In other words, militias and their leaders dominate Iraqi politics and the streets. "There is no dispute that U.S. forces have been a target for violence in Iraq, but the insertion of U.S. forces arguably has deterred a wider and more brutal sectarian war. As of mid 2007, somewhere in the range of 2,000 to 3,500 Iraqis have died every month for over six months – more so from Sunni-Shiia violence than from al Qaeda attacks. If U.S. forces withdraw, we should expect violence in Iraq and its regional consequences to soar. Genocidal civil war will intensify after U.S. forces leave Takeyh in 07 [Ray, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Iran; “We've Lost. Here's How To Handle It.”] June 17 2007, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13613/weve_lost_heres_how_to_handle_it.html The risk of a longer, bloodier Iraqi civil war is considerably higher. Sunni-Shiite-Kurdish killing and score-settling will probably intensify after U.S. forces leave. So fears of genocidal violence shouldn’t be dismissed , especially if the United States goes ahead with its current plans to arm Iraq’s largely Shiite army. But at this point, the three essential ingredients for genocide— heavy weapons, organization and broad communal consent—don’t exist. The present rough military balance between Sunnis and Shiites, both of whom have built formidable militias, reduces the likelihood of nationwide genocide; so does the fact that Sunnis have a haven available in western Iraq. 132 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ Withdrawal result in massive increase of terrorism and regional instability Pollack 2008 (Ken, expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf, “Iraq's Long-Term Impact on Jihadist Terrorism”) http://ann.sagepub.com/content/618/1/55. This article argues that the problems facing Iraq could have tremendous consequences for the broader “war on terror,” particularly if they return to or exceed Salafi militants, followers of an extreme interpretation of Islam who want to use violence to unite Muslims under religious rule, have been fighting in Iraq and may use the country as a base for operations and attacks elsewhere in the region. In addition, refugees from Iraq might spread terrorism, radicalize neighboring populations, and contribute to strife and instability throughout the region. While a U.S. troop withdrawal may inspire fewer young men to take up terrorism against the United States, it would also increase militants' operational freedom in Iraq itself, allowing terrorist groups to recruit, train, and plan with relative impunity . As a result, if levels seen at the height of the violence in 2006. the United States withdraws from Iraq without leaving behind a stable Iraqi government, it should still maintain a regional military presence and help bolster other regimes in the Middle East from the threat of terrorism from Iraq. 133 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg- Relations U.S. - Iraqi relations high Dreazen 2009 (POLITICS JULY 29, 2009, Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A7, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124876767249586221.html) BAGHDAD -- Defense Secretary Robert Gates said the American military withdrawal from Iraqi cities went fairly smoothly, clearing the way for Baghdad to reshape its relationship with the U.S. and begin assuming primary security responsibility for the entire country. Mr. Gates's unannounced trip on Tuesday to Iraq came at a pivotal moment for Washington and Baghdad, as the two countries try to take advantage of a decline in Iraq's violence to focus attention on trade, weapons sales and nonmilitary aspects of their complex relationship. On Wednesday, Mr. Gates is slated to visit Iraq's semiautonomous Kurdish region, where, he said, the U.S. is prepared to help resolve a growing political dispute between Arabs and Kurds over land and oil. It was Mr. Gates's first visit to Iraq since U.S. forces left the country's cities in late June, a milestone both nations describe as the first step toward a complete American military withdrawal by the end of 2011. In the first days after the pullout from Iraq's cities , several U.S. commanders complained that the Iraqis were imposing too many restrictions on U.S. forces , barring them from certain roads and demanding sensitive information about future U.S. ground convoys. Fueling tensions, an Iraqi officer tried to detain U.S. soldiers this month after they killed three Iraqi civilians while chasing militants near the restive city of Abu Ghraib. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, on a visit to Washington last week, said the Iraqi officer had been "out of Bomb attacks in Baghdad kill at least 10 people and at least four people are dead after clashes break out at camp Ashraf. Mr. Gates acknowledged some early miscues, but said U.S. and Iraqi officials had hammered out their differences and were cooperating closely on security matters. "The agreement has changed the chemistry of the relationship," Mr. Gates told reporters. "Nobody's the boss or the occupier or however you want to put it, but there's a real sense of empowerment by the Iraqis." Gen. Ray Odierno, the top American commander in Iraq, attributed the turnaround to a previously undisclosed videoconference involving line." more than 500 Iraqi and American officers. Gen. Odierno said the July 9 session allowed the two sides to better clarify the terms of the security agreement, reducing disputes over its implementation. Mr. Maliki recently said that some U.S. forces might be allowed to remain in Iraq after 2011, but Gen. Odierno said he was still operating under the assumption that a full U.S. withdrawal would occur within the next 30 months. U.S. military officials are working with the Iraqis on the next stages of the drawdown. U.S. commanders say roughly 80,000 of the 130,000 U.S. troops currently in Iraq will leave the country by August 2010. At the same time, U.S. officials want to build a long-term relationship with Iraq that more closely resembles America's ties to other Arab allies. 134 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Neg- Heg American hegemony has come to a conclusive end Mason in 09 [David Stewart Mason, Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Leicester, Co-Director of the University of Leicester, Rowman & Littlefield, “The end of the American Century, Volume 2008” Published in 2009] The Iraq War and global terrorism have hurt the United States in many ways and have diminished its power, influence, and authority in the world. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the decline of the Unites States was already in progress well before the Iraq War, but this war has accelerated the process and brought a conclusive end to the American Century. Washington’s cavalier disregard of international law, the United Nations, and U.S. allies in the run-up to the war contributed to the country’s already diminished standing in the eyes of the rest of the world. The mistreatment of prisoners of war in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo, including the use of torture (apparently sanctioned by the U.S. government), horrified people around the world. The infringement of fundamental rights in pursuit of national security, including the bedrock principle of habeas corpus, eroded America’s status as a beacon of democracy and freedom. The utter failure of the United States to achieve its goals in Afghanistan and Iraq has shattered the illusion of American power, even its military prowess. And these botched military and diplomatic efforts have contributed to the growth of anti-Americanism, terrorism, regional instability, and Islamic fundamentalism, all of which will continue to gnaw at American power and influence in the years ahead. 135 SCFI 2009 File Name Lab Name ___ of ___ Extend The Deadline CP Counterplan Text: The United States federal government should retain 30,000 combat troops in Iraq until 2013. New political struggles require continued U.S. presence- Withdrawal now causes instability and eliminates Iraqi democracy Ricks 2010 (Thomas E., a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who covered the war in Iraq for The Washington, “Extending Our Stay in Iraq”) February 23rd 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2 IRAQ’S March 7 national election, and the formation of a new government that will follow, carry huge implications for both Iraqis and American policy. It appears now that the results are unlikely to resolve key political struggles that could return the country to sectarianism and violence. If so, President Obama may find himself later this year considering whether once again to break his campaign promises about ending the war, and to offer to keep tens of thousands of troops in Iraq for several more years. Surprisingly, that probably is the best course for him, and for Iraqi leaders, to pursue . Whether or not the elections bring the long-awaited political breakthrough that genuinely ends the fighting there, 2010 is likely to be a turning-point year in the war, akin to the summer of 2003 (when the United States realized that it faced an insurgency) and 2006 (when that insurgency morphed into a small but vicious civil war and American policy came to a dead end). For good or ill, this is likely the year we will begin to see the broad outlines of post-occupation Iraq. The early signs are not good, with the latest being the decision over the weekend of the leading Sunni party, the National Dialogue Front, to withdraw from the elections. The political situation is far less certain, and I think less stable, than most Americans believe. A retired Marine colonel I know, Gary Anderson, just returned from Iraq and predicts a civil war or military coup by September. Another friend, the journalist Nir Rosen, avers that Iraq is on a long-term peaceful course. Both men know Iraq well, having spent years working there. I have not seen such a wide discrepancy in expert views since late 2005. The period surrounding the surge of 2007 has been misremembered. It was not about simply sending 30,000 more troops to Iraq; it was about using force differently, moving the troops off big bases to work with Iraqi units and live among the people. Perhaps even more significantly, the surge signaled a change in American attitudes, with more humility about what could be done, more willingness to listen to Iraqis, and with quietly but sharply reduced ambitions. The Bush administration’s grandiose original vision of transforming Iraq into a beacon of democracy that would alter the Middle East and drain the swamps of terrorism was scuttled and replaced by the more realistic goal of getting American forces out and leaving behind a country that was somewhat stable and, with luck, perhaps democratic and respectful of human rights. As part of the shift, the American commander, Gen. David Petraeus, also effectively put the Sunni insurgency on the American payroll. Looking back now, I think the surge was the right thing to do. In rejecting the view of the majority of his military advisers and embracing the course proposed by a handful of dissidents, President Bush found his finest moment. That said, the larger goal of the surge was to facilitate a political breakthrough, which has not happened. All the existential questions that plagued Iraq before the surge remain unanswered . How will oil revenue be shared among the country’s major groups? What is to be the fundamental relationship between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds? Will Iraq have a strong central government or Unfortunately, all of these questions have led to violence in the past, and could again just as the Obama administration’s timeline calls for troops to leave areas that are far from quiet. The plan this year is to pull out about 10,000 troops a month for five months, beginning in late be a loose confederation? And what will be the role of Iran (for my money, the biggest winner in the Iraq war thus far)? spring. That will halve the American military presence, with the remainder (other than a “residual force” of unspecified size) scheduled to be withdrawn in 2011. The withdrawal plan was written on the assumption that the elections would be held late in 2009 or early in 2010. Under the plan, troop numbers would be kept level to ensure stability in a vulnerable period, especially if the Sunnis were to feel that the electoral process was unfair, or if they were not given a role in the new government commensurate with their success at the polls. But given the changed timetable, just as Iraqi political leaders are struggling to form a new government, American military leaders will be distracted by the myriad tasks of supervising major troop movements. On top of that, the deeper the troop withdrawals go, the more potentially destabilizing they will be — because the first withdrawals will be made in areas that are considered more secure, or where Iraqi forces are deemed more reliable or evenhanded. By June, American troops may be leaving areas that are far from quiet, and where new tensions may be brewing as a result of the elections. Once again, the United States would be rushing toward failure in Iraq, as it did so often under the Bush administration, trying to pass responsibility to Iraqi officials and institutions before they are ready for the task. By late summer, the Obama administration could find itself in the uncomfortable position of reconsidering its vows to get out of combat in Iraq by August and to remove all troops by the end of next year. This will be politically difficult for the president, but he has shown admirable flexibility in his handling of Iraq. My impression is that the American people now wish they had never heard of Iraq, but understand just what a mess it is and are willing to give the president a surprising amount of leeway. Extending the American military presence will be even more politically controversial in Iraq, and for that reason, it would be best to let Iraqi leaders make the first public move to re-open the status of forces agreement of 2008, which calls for American troops to be out of the country by the end of next year. But I think leaders in both countries may come to recognize that the best way to deter a return to civil war is to find a way to keep 30,000 to 50,000 United States service members in Iraq for many years to come. 136 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ Withdrawal now leads to civil and regional war, oil shocks, and collapses the global economy Ricks 2010 (Thomas E., a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security who covered the war in Iraq for The Washington, “Extending Our Stay in Iraq”) February 23rd 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/24/opinion/24ricks.html?_r=1&pagewanted=2 These troops’ missions would be far narrower than during the surge era; their primary goal would be to train and advise Iraqi security forces and to carry out counterterrorism missions. (It is actually hard to get below 30,000 and still have an effective force; many troops are needed for logistics, maintenance, medical, intelligence, communications and headquarters jobs, and additional infantry units are then needed to protect the people performing those tasks.) Such a relatively small, tailored force would not be big enough to wage a war, but it might be enough to deter a new one from breaking out. An Iraqi civil war would likely be a three- or four-sided affair, with the Shiites breaking into pro- and antiIranian factions. It could also easily metastasize into a regional war. Neighboring powers like Turkey and Iran are already involved in Iraqi affairs, and the Sunni Arab states would be unlikely to stand by and watch a Shiitedominated regime in Baghdad slaughter the Sunni minority. A regional war in the middle of the world’s oil patch could shake the global economy to its foundations and make the current recession look mild. In addition, a continued American military presence could help Iraq move forward politically. No one there particularly likes having the Americans around, but many groups seem to trust the Americans as honest brokers. And there would be a moral, humanitarian and political benefit: Having American soldiers accompany Iraqi units may improve the behavior of Iraqi forces, discouraging relapses to Saddam Hussein-era abuses, or the use of force for private ends and feuds. Advisers not only instruct Iraqi commanders, they also monitor them. As a longtime critic of the American invasion of Iraq, I am not happy about advocating a continued military presence there. Yet, to echo the counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen, just because you invade a country stupidly doesn’t mean you should leave it stupidly. The best argument against keeping troops in Iraq is the one some American military officers make, which is that a civil war is inevitable, and that by staying all we are doing is postponing it. That may be so, but don’t think it is worth gambling to find out 137 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ Withdrawal causes regional instability and destroys U.S. credibility Khairallah 2010 (Khairallah, former foreign editor of Annahar in Lebanon , “Obama risks sacrificing Iraq in the name of punctuality”)July 6th 2010 http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100707/OPINION/707069944/1080 Will the Americans, now led by the US President Barack Obama, leave Iraq better off than when they invaded? Or will they be the perpetrators of an even greater disaster than the one that has already befallen the region, thanks to the adventurism of George W Bush? The continuing wave of violence in Iraq, and the country’s inability to form a new government four months after elections, exposes serious threats to the unity of the country, both now and for the foreseeable future. There is more than just the division of Iraq at stake. The danger faced by those who remain in Iraq, as the US military continues to withdraw over the course of this year, is that they would not be able to prevent the outbreak of civil war on their own. It might not be just one civil war, but many, as the divisions among Iraqis run deep. There is no common denominator that unites them. There are divisions even among members of the same denomination, ethnicity and geographical area. Sect and ethnicity There are severe internal clashes between Shiites, rivalries among Sunnis and jockeying among Kurds. The attack that targeted the Central Bank in Baghdad last month reflects the systemic failure to rebuild institutions and security services. are no longer the only fault lines. Dozens of gunmen attacked the security guards protecting the bank in a battle that lasted several hours. There was a confusing tangle of forces, despite the heavy security presence, even though the bank is situated in a supposedly secure area of Baghdad. Where did these gunmen come from? How did they enter this “secure” area? Is it true that they were members of al Qa’eda – and who exactly is al Qa’eda in Iraq anyway? There are no answers to these questions, even though an extensive investigation was conducted. That investigation only exposed the extent to which security forces in the country have deteriorated since Saddam’s time. This does not pay any tribute to the former dictator. Saddam’s regime had to be overthrown because of the threat that it posed to the region and to the Iraqis themselves. But those who have taken the place of the former dictator, his family and the Baathist regime have not been able to establish a better system on the basis of democracy. Today’s leaders are refusing to hand over political power to the victor of the elections. They have failed to achieve a peaceful transfer of power, as is expected in countries with democratic traditions and a respect for the constitution. This failure to form a government was highlighted by Jeffrey Feltman, the US assistant secretary of state, when he visited Baghdad last month. His mission was to forge a political solution to the impasse, but the real fear now is that the US has concluded that withdrawal from Iraq is the overriding goal. Will Mr Obama commit the same errors as Mr Bush? Will his errors have even worse consequences? The Bush administration toppled the regime in Baghdad based on the dream of a democratic state, one that could be an example to others in the region. What he did not realise was that it is not possible to establish a democratic regime based on sectarian parties that have armed militias trained in Iran. Now, Mr Obama believes that it is possible to contain the situation. He believes that what is required, more than anything else, is to respect the schedule of the US withdrawal. In turn, that will allow the US to focus on Afghanistan. What should be fixed in the mind of every American official is that the presence of the US military is preventing a civil war in Iraq. With the exception of the Kurdish region, we cannot talk about a safe area in the country. If the Americans withdraw, thinking that it will be simple to leave the war in Iraq behind, they will face a situation no less dangerous than Afghanistan and Pakistan. A speedy withdrawal from Iraq, even in carefully timed phases, is nothing more than the road to disaster. This disaster would be on a larger scale even than that caused by the US occupation of the country in the first place. The Americans must take their time – and take responsibility for what they have done in Iraq. They must weigh the factors carefully, apart from the domestic political concerns of the Obama administration. This is not an invitation for the US military to stay indefinitely. Their occupation of Iraq is despised, in the way that all occupations are hated. But the Americans cannot be excused if they follow their campaign in Iraq which began in 2003 by pulling out haphazardly, under the pretext that Mr Obama must respect his promises to the American people. Iraq simply cannot tolerate a power vacuum. It would open the doors to those who wish to divide the country. The result would be another Somalia – or, at least, a Somalia with the second-largest oil reserves in the world. There is also Iraq’s geographical location to consider. The entire regional system would be threatened if Iraq were to fall. What will the Obama administration do to avoid the disaster? Or is a perceived respect for punctuality more important than the future of Iraq and the region? 138 SCFI 2009 Lab Name File Name ___ of ___ 139