Electricity Sector in Kerala: A Comparative Perspective
V. Santhakumar
Centre for Development Studies,
Prasanth Nagar,
Trivandrum 695011, Kerala
1.
Introduction and the Context
This is a short essay on the current status of, and the challenges faced by, Kerala's electricity
sector. However this essay does not address much the internal problems of the State
Electricity Board like its losses, number of employees, and the level of inefficiencies etc, and
these have been analysed by a number of studies in the past1. Instead the paper focuses on
issues such as quality of electricity supply and reform efforts as viewed by the society. The
evidence of the paper comes from a larger study on the social support/opposition to power
sector reforms conducted in 14 states of India, which address the following question: Why do
there is more opposition to electricity reforms in certain states than in others? Though the
insights of this study based on a primary survey of about 7000 households in 14 states are not
much relevant within the scope of this conference, it provides some insights as a 'by product',
on the performance of Kerala's electricity sector vis-à-vis (1) the expectations of its
consumers, and (2) the response of Kerala society towards electricity sector reforms. The
study also provides a comparative picture of the performance of electricity sector in different
states and this would give insights on where does Kerala stand in the company of other states.
These insights are shared in this short article.
As noted earlier, there have been a number of academic and consultant studies and
commission reports during the last decade, on the performance of Kerala's electricity sector.
A complete listing and reviewing of these studies is not attempted2. Most of these studies
have identified the inefficiencies in the performance of KSEB, the extent and causes of its
financial losses, and highlighted the need for some changes in the management of these
organisations. There have been disagreements on the kind of institutional changes or reforms
required, where in significant sections of the academic and political commentators have
opposed attempts of radical restructuring including privatisation3.
1
These include numerous committees including Government of Kerala (1997, 1998a, 1998b) and Kannan and
Pillai (2001) and Pillai and Kannan (2001). Rao et (1998) provide a comparative picture of performance of State
Electricity Boards including that of Kerala.
2
Apart from those mentioned in foot note 1, other studies include Santhakumar (2003a, 2003b) and EISP
(2000).
3
The left government in Kerala between 1996-2001, and the reform effort initiated during their time with the
support of Canadian International Development Agency, went ahead with the assumption that a `profit centre'
approach is to be followed for improving the effectiveness of KSEB. However neither that government nor its
successor has not made any serious attempt to institute functioning profit centres. The current UDF government
sought the assistance of Asian Development Bank, and their consultants suggested unbundling KSEB and
making these unbundled units into state-owned companies, and to think about privatisation as a strategy to
followed later on. The KSEB and the government did not accept these suggestions and hence could not avail the
offered assistance from ADB. Some academics including Pillai and Kannan (2001) and several left-oriented
political commentators have argued for keeping KSEB intact without unbundling or privatisation. They are
arguing for `internal reforms' without changing the public sector and bundled monopoly characters of the Board.
There are some broad limitations to these studies: (1) Current situation of KSEB is somewhat
different from the one viewed by the studies conducted two to three years ago. Of late, there
has been some improvement in the financial position of the SEB. Hence any discussion of the
future challenges needs to be grounded on the current situation, which is different from that
two to three years ago. (2) Most of these studies have looked at the inefficiencies of SEB and
the need for reforms in isolation from the expectations of the society. For example, while a
number of these studies have talked about the need for improving the quality of electricity
supply, few have asked whether consumers are willing to bear the additional cost of
improving the quality. This article addresses modestly some of these limitations. Moreover
this study is based on primary data, and there are not many studies on electricity sector based
on primary data4. This is important since the data on the actual tariff paid, and the quality of
service encountered, by the consumers are not easily available in secondary information.
The paper is organised in the following sections. The next section (2) provides some
indicators that show a 'relatively comfortable' position of KSEB to meet the current demand.
The factors that contributed to this situation have been discussed in section (3). The
expectation of the people of Kerala vis-à-vis the performance of its electricity sector is also
analysed in this section. This is followed by a discussion (in section 4) of the major
challenges faced by the sector in near future, and the final section lists down certain issues
that need to be addressed by the policy makers and the society.
2.
`Relatively comfortable position of KSEB'
We may consider the following as indicators of the relatively comfortable position of KSEB
today.
a. About 82% of the households in Kerala have access to electricity connection. In this
regard, the state is one among a few major states, which could extent electricity
connections to more than four-fifth of its households.
b. There are no declared power interruptions today. However still there are undeclared
and unexpected power interruptions. Our primary survey showed that only about 40
percent (as evident from Table 1) of the residential households have not experienced
any form of power interruptions (based on a question whether they experience power
cut during the last 24 hours). However when we compare this with the situation in
other states, one can see that the state of affairs in Kerala in this regard is better than
all other states except Tamilnadu.
4
Exceptions include the World Bank (2001) study on two states on electricity use in agriculture. Other primary
data based studies include EISP (2000, 2002) and Santhakumar (2004).
2
Table 1: Duration of power failure/ power cut encountered by connected consumers
during the last 24 hours (on the date of survey)
Duration of
power failure in
minutes
Kerala
Orissa
Tamil Nadu
West Bengal
Andhra Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Haryana
Madhya Pradesh
Rajasthan
Karnataka
No
power
cut
44.30
29.30
54.20
33.80
21.40
28.20
2.30
8.40
6.80
0.60
3.00
1-30
16.50
7.90
26.00
12.60
2.40
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.70
30-60
11.70
21.10
7.50
21.40
2.80
1.50
3.60
0.80
0.00
5.20
8.10
60-120 120-240 240+
9.60
10.60
6.84
35.40
5.80
0.60
10.70
1.60
0.00
16.60
14.90
0.60
0.00
0.00
73.30
0.00
0.30
70.00
0.00
10.60
83.50
18.80
26.40
45.50
0.00
0.20
92.80
43.00
39.70
11.50
19.60
5.00
59.50
Average
duration of
power failure
in minutes
73.15
94.34
21.82
58.44
281.18
645.31
1013.00
418.76
738.34
183.89
247.80
Source: Primary Survey conducted by the author in 2005.
c. Even though quality of electricity supply is not very good, people are not willing to
pay for better quality supply. (The state-wise willingness to pay more for higher
quality based on the primary survey is given in Table 2). This willingness is lowest in
Kerala (among the surveyed states), and it may be noted that willingness is higher
among the states with relatively poor quality. Hence the current level of supply in
Kerala seems to be in tune with (if not excess of) the economic demand (from the
households) within the state. Thus enhancing investments to improve the quality may
not generate adequate revenues from domestic consumers. This does not mean that
KSEB should not invest in reducing losses or in computerisation, etc., where the
returns would be much higher.
Table 2: State-wide opposition to privatisation and willingness
to pay more for better quality (Percentage of households)
States
Kerala
Tamil Nadu (TN)
Andhra Pradesh (AP)
Orissa
West Bengal (WB)
Uttar Pradesh (UP)
Madhya Pradesh (MP)
Bihar
Haryana
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Karnataka
All States
No to privatisation
51.9
44.4
71.2
52.6
30.9
18.1
11.3
29.8
2.6
17.7
28.3
33.9
WTP
8.7
12.5
15.5
20.3
26.6
38.5
75.7
81.5
43.3
33.7
62.1
74.9
40.4
Source: Same as Table 1
3
d. Majority of the domestic consumers get electricity at highly subsidised rates. This is
indicated by the distribution of the average cost of supply and the average tariff paid
by the sample households in descending order (of the average tariff) in each state,
given in Figure 1. As evident from Table A (in appendix) about 77% of the domestic
consumers get electricity at an average rate of less than 2 Rupees. In this regard, the
level of subsidy is one of the highest in Kerala. Thus residential consumers in Kerala
get electricity at cheapest rates in India (and the only exception can be the farmers in
some other states getting power free of charge). The situation is similar in Tamilnadu
and here the average cost of supply also is lower. However the situation in other states
is different as evident from that of Gujrat and Karnataka in figure 1.
Figure 1: Graphical patterns of distribution of tariff and cost of supply
(based on survey data)
Tamil Nadu
6
6
5.5
5.5
5
5
4.5
4.5
Unit Tariff/Cost (Rs)
Cost of supply / Unit Tariff Rate (Rs)
Kerala
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
1
0.5
0.5
0
0
Houses in the monthly electricity consumption order
Tariff Rate
Houses in the monthly electricity consumption order
Cost of supply
Unit Tariff in Rs
Gujarat
7
6.0
5.5
5.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
6.5
6
Tariff Rate/Cost of supply
Cost of supply/ Tariff rate
Karnataka
Cost of supply
5.5
5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Houses arranged in the monthly electricity consumption
Tariffrate
Houses arranged in the order of monthly electricity consumption
cost of supply
Tariff Rate
Cost of supply
Source: Same as Table 1
e. Though the industrial and commercial consumers in Kerala have to pay a higher tariff
than domestic consumers in the state, it is still cheaper than many other states (see
Table A in appendix). The industrial average rate in Kerala is significantly lower than
all other South Indian states. The commercial rate is also either comparable or
marginally lower than many other states.
f. The financial position of the KSEB has improved during the last few years. The
operational losses have come down from 1200 crores Rupees per annum five years
ago to around 200 crores today. It is not very difficult to wipe out the operating losses.
4
3.
The factors that have contributed to the relatively comfortable position
A. The previous left government had made significant investments (through borrowing) to
enhance domestic generation and also to strengthen T&D network. This has contributed
to the improvement of quality and availability of electricity. However these
investments based on borrowed money have led to a deterioration of the financial
position of the KSEB. Improvement of this financial position is the major achievement
during the regime of this UDF government.
B. There are a number of developments at the national level that facilitated the
improvement of the financial health of KSEB. Some of these are the following:
1. The reduction in the interest rates at the national level has enabled the Board to
reduce its debt burden.
2. The price reforms at the national grid, especially ABT (availability based tariff)
which provide incentives for withdrawing power from the grid when the demand is
lower has enabled a state like Kerala, which has some significant hydropower
capacity. So KSEB could wait for times when power is cheaper at the grid by using
domestic hydropower at other times.
3. Because of the threat of drastic reforms such as privatisation looming over,
employees did not object vehemently to the modest organisational changes
implemented in KSEB during the last four years. These changes include the
abolition of a number of staff positions without any retrenchment. There was also a
withdrawal of some benefits enjoyed by the employees.
4. The functioning of the regulatory commission, though have not made much
headway in tariff reforms and sorting out issues related to open access, have put
some pressure on the Board to reduce costs. The public discussions at the time of
tariff revisions, and the evaluation of tariff proposals by the regulatory commission
have enabled to bring out cost calculations of the Board into public scrutiny.
Even though the financial position has improved, and the Board is able to provide relatively
better quality of electricity supply, the situation can turn out to be difficult at any time. The
challenges that the sector faces in the short and medium term are the following.
4.
Challenges faced by Kerala's electricity sector in near future
a. Though the current situation is `comfortable', this can remain there only for a short
period. The increase in demand will increase the average cost of supply, because of the
declining share of hydropower and the need to buy costlier thermal power. This can put
further pressure on the financial position of the Board, or it will be forced to reduce the
quality/quantity by not buying adequate power from the national grid.
b. The subsidy distribution for domestic consumers is regressive with people consuming
more power get more subsidy per month (in spite of having an increasing block tariff).
This is evident from Table 3. This is due to the fact that everybody gets first 60 units or
so at very low charges, which makes the average rate per unit paid by the rich and poor
not as different as it would appear in increasing block tariffs. This coupled with the fact
5
that the richer sections consume more power create a situation in which they get more
subsidy per annum. This situation in which one gets more subsidy as consumption
increases would lead to an enhanced subsidy burden as per capita consumption goes up.
This increase in subsidy burden along with the increase in average cost of supply as
consumption increases (mentioned in previous paragraph), would accelerate the
worsening of the financial position of the Board, if proper remedial measures are not
implemented.
Table 3: Distribution (%) of electricity subsidy in Indian states among different MPCE
quintiles (by considering connected and unconnected households)
State
Year
1993-94
Andhra Pradesh
2001-02
1993-94
Bihar
2001-02
1993-94
Gujarat
2001-02
1993-94
Haryana
2001-02
1993-94
Karnataka
2001-02
1993-94
Kerala
2001-02
1993-94
Madhya Pradesh
2001-02
1993-94
Maharashtra
2001-02
1993-94
Orissa
2001-02
1993-94
Punjab
2001-02
1993-94
Rajasthan
2001-02
1993-94
Tamil Nadu
2001-02
1993-94
Uttar Pradesh
2001-02
1993-94
West Bengal
2001-02
1993-94
Assam
2001-02
Delhi
2001-02
1993-94
Himachal Pradesh
2001-02
1993-94
Jammu & Kashmir
2001-02
1-20
7.9
10.4
2.5
4.4
8.4
10
11.5
10.1
9.3
7
7.6
9.1
5.9
8.1
6.3
8.8
1.3
3.2
11.2
12.8
9.5
9
7.7
9.1
3.4
7.1
1.9
4.8
3.3
4.6
10.6
12.9
12.5
11.1
15.8
Quintiles from lowest MPCE to highest
20-40
40-60
60-80
80-100
13.5
18.4
25.4
34.8
15.6
19
24.2
30.8
3.2
9.6
25.9
58.8
10.7
18.3
26
40.6
13
17.9
25
35.8
17.9
21.4
25.8
24.8
16.7
20.7
24.1
27.1
15.9
21
21.9
31.1
14
20.7
28.5
27.5
12.5
18.6
28.7
33.1
12.6
18.4
25.1
36.1
15.2
17.2
23.7
34.7
10.9
16.9
23
43.3
16
20
25
30.9
14
20.5
24.8
34.3
15.5
19.6
21.3
34.8
6
13.5
28.3
50.9
13
18.5
31.5
33.8
14.1
18.4
22.7
33.6
19.4
20.1
24.7
22.9
14.3
20.3
21.3
34.6
14.9
22.2
25.5
28.4
12.5
17.8
25.9
36.2
13.6
19.6
24.3
33.5
8.7
14.5
22.4
51.1
12.3
17.5
24.1
39.2
7.3
14
25.5
51.2
11.4
18.5
24.1
41.2
6.4
19.3
20.9
50.2
11.1
20.2
28.4
35.5
14.9
16.4
20.2
37.7
15.7
18
21.6
31.9
16.5
22.1
21.6
27.4
15.7
17.4
24.3
31.4
19.4
21.6
21.1
22
Source: Compiled by the Author using NSS 50 th and 57th round data, and the cost of
supply provided by Govt of India (2002)
6
c. Though certain austerity measures have been implemented, no major organisational
reform has taken place in KSEB. Even those reforms that were agreed by the previous
left government (with a profit centre approach) could not be implemented so far. Lack
of any serious organisational reforms would make the Board vulnerable under any
future changes in leadership, governments and policies. Election-driven populism can
also bring back the Board into a crisis situation. There have been no explicit steps to
give functional autonomy to the Board. Enhancement of efficiency and managerial
effectiveness would require certain changes from top to bottom in the organisation.
Without these changes, KSEB will continue to remain vulnerable to financial crisis,
with a consequent impact on the quantity and quality of the electricity supply
available to the people.
d. However society is not willing to support drastic reforms such as privatisation. In our
survey only 15 percent (though it is slightly higher to 25% in the cities) of the
households have responded positively to privatisation in Kerala. Thus socio-political
situation is such that the KSEB may continue to be a bundled state-controlled
department-like entity. Under this condition, pressure on the Board to improve
efficiency and service delivery has to come through political route or `voice
option"(and not through competition or privatisation). With all its limitation of this
voice option we have to live with it in near future. What is evident from a study of
support towards privatisation in different states is that people are more willing to try
privatisation and competition route as the tariff that they pay becomes closer to the
perceived cost. This is indicated in Table 4. Thus one can hypothesise that once
significant sections of Kerala society start paying near-cost tariffs, they would be
more willing to support drastic reforms in the sector.
Table: 4: Linkage between aggregate reform response in states and certain features of
their electricity sector
Connec Househ
Average
tivity olds
duration
consum Househol of power
ing ds paying cut
Oppositi Willingne
more
tariff
(min.)
on to ss to pay
than more than per day Improvement
privatisa more for
150 Rs. 2.50/
during last
tion electricity
units
unit
three years
States
Bihar
Madhya
Pradesh
Karnataka
Uttar Pradesh
Rajasthan
Haryana
Tamil Nadu
West Bengal
Kerala
Andhra Pradesh
Orissa
Low
Low
High
High
Low
High
Low Medium
Low Medium
Low Medium
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
High
Low
20.3
Perception
Percentage
of change
of
in tariff
households
change in
with
relation to
Irrigation
quality Shop connection
17
74
17.2
NA
2.8
NA
1013
738
Worsened
Worsened
Fair
Unfair
2.6
1.4
0.7
22.9
85
43
47
94
83
49
80
84
1.2
28.2
0.0
28.0
34.9
51.6
38.6
13.5
31.0
96.3
56.3
100.0
93.8
1.4
68.5
6.0
33.9
8.1
247
645
183
418
21
38
73
281
94
Improved
Worsened
No change
No change
Improved
Improved
No change
Improved
Unfair
Unfair
Unfair
Fair
Fair
Fair
Fair
Unfair
Fair
3.0
7.9
17.9
3.5
6.2
15.9
9.7
7.4
36.4
18.4
0.9
6.3
13.0
18.0
0.3
9.7
16.8
0.5
Source: Compiled by the author based on the insights from the primary survey conducted in 2005.
7
e. The experience with the regulatory commission is somewhat mixed. They have been
successful to bring in tariff proposals to public scrutiny, and impose downward cost
corrections in final tariff orders. However, SERC has not been much effective in
restraining the blocking strategies of the Board in terms of having limited open
access, in ensuring that government compensate the losses, and also in reducing cross
subsidies. This is not so uncommon in other Indian states. However there is a larger
issue here. When the majority of domestic consumers get electricity at subsidised
rates, and this is paid through cross subsidies or government compensation, there is all
incentives for the government to meddle with the affairs of the regulatory
commission. Thus independent and effective functioning of SERC too depends on the
removal of subsidies for the non-poor sections of the society.
5.
Policy Suggestions
1. Though we need to be concerned about state-level generation capacity, too much
focus on state-level generation can be a problem in the current context. Of course, it is
OK if we can have more installed capacity of hydropower. But we have to be more
realistic in this regard. On the other hand, excessive capacity building within Kerala
through thermal generation may be costlier than buying power from the national grid.
This is especially so because of the current practice of availability-based pricing in the
national grid. Thus we have to tune our generation planning with national generation
investments. This is important since central government is planning massive
investments in energy sources such as nuclear power.
2. Limiting electricity subsidy only to poor and lower middle classes and to basic
consumption should be seriously pursued, if we want to ensure the viability of KSEB.
One can show that around Rupees 120 crores are given to upper 20 per cent of the
households in Kerala for their annual electricity consumption. Thus there is enough
scope for reducing the overall subsidy burden without burdening poor and lower
middle classes.
3. Since there has been some improvement in the financial position of the KSEB, it is
better to build on this improved position. Further policy and organisational changes in
KSEB should not lead to a worsening of its financial position.
4. Though electricity demand would increase as investments go up, there may not be a
rapid increase in demand in immediate future. This is especially so if we move
towards reasonable prices. This factor should be taken into account in generation
planning and in the signing of PPAs. Otherwise we may end up in a situation in which
EB has to pay for fixed costs without actually taking power. To some extent we have
seen that happening in the case of Kayamkulam power station.
5. Though we all agree that there should be more autonomy to the EB, and EB should
manage its affairs more effectively and efficiently, how to achieve these is a million
dollar question. Here we should understand that all past efforts to make these changes
were not successful. Though we need not carry out unbundling and privatisation,
making KSEB a state-owned company is an option worth exploring. We need to think
about some structural changes to give functional autonomy and also to have a
managerial culture in the organisation throughout. As we all know simply talking
about autonomy and proper management have not yielded much results. Fixing
responsibility and providing incentives/disincentives to individual employees/officers
are unavoidable.
8
6. Though the establishment of regulatory commission was not to the liking of many,
this should be effectively used by the society to instil efficiency measures on the
utility. This would require strengthening (rather than weakening of) regulatory
commission, and appointment of its members needs to be made without political
considerations. Similarly efforts should be made to use penalties on EB (as being
proposed by SERC) if it fails in terms of service delivery and for inordinate delays in
responding to line faults.
7. ANERT5's (Agency for Non-conventional Energy and Rural Technology) experience
of installing stand-alone solar-based electricity systems for tribal colonies located
inside forests need to be analysed, and if found successful this model can be used in
other localities where connection from the grid is costlier.
8. Many people have advocated the use of demand-management measures. However we
should understand that one major factor that discourages consumers from adopting
them is the price. That the price of electricity they pay is so cheap that they do not
find the adoption of demand side measures attractive. People are aware of these
possibilities. If government start providing these measures (say CFL) free or at
heavily subsidised rates, these will only add to the inefficiencies in the sector. Hence
the only way to encourage demand management is to have reasonable tariff for nonbasic consumption, especially for middle class and richer sections.
9. The currently prevailing tariff plans which provide very low rates for every one for
their first 60 or so units create a situation in which the difference between average
rates between the rich and poor not so different. This needs correction. The
connection load needs to be used to differentiate between poor and non-poor and
different tariff plans need to be worked out.
10. The current situation in Kerala is that the 'rent' from hydropower and the cross
subsidy from industry and commerce are used for providing the subsidy to residential
consumption. As I mentioned earlier those who consume more get more subsidy (in
spite of increasing block tariff) because of the small difference in average rates per
unit between rich and poor, and the consumption of more units by rich than poor. We
have to rethink whether this rent allocation policy is the right one. For example, what
about giving employment generating industry lower rates (not so low to create
incentives to locate power hungry industries) than those of neighbouring states, so as
to compensate for other disincentives that industrial firms face in Kerala?
References:
Energy Infrastructure Services Project (2000) Social and Gender Impact Assessment of
power Sector Reforms in Kerala, Trivandrum: Kerala State Electricity Board
Energy Infrastructure Services Project (2002), Electricity options for the poor, Madhya
Pradesh State Electricity Board, Jabalpur
Government of Kerala (1997), Report of the committee to study the development of
Electricity (Chairman E: Balanandan). February. Thiruvananthapuram
Government of Kerala (1998a), Report of the (K. P. Rao) Expert Committee to Review
the Tariff Structure of KSEB, May. Thiruvananthapuram
5
Agency for Non-conventional Energy and Rural Technology
9
Government of Kerala (1998b), Organisational Self-Assessment: Reports of the Working
Groups-Discussion Paper, KSEB and EISP. Thiruvananthapuram.
Kannan, K.P. and N.V. Pillai (2001) Plight of the Power Sector in India, Economic and
Political Weekly, January 13&20, 130-139; 234-246
Pillai, N.V. and K.P. Kannan (2001) Time and Cost Overruns of the Power Projects in
Kerala, Working Paper No. 320, Trivandrum: Centre for Development Studies.
Rao, M. Govinda, Shand, R. T., and Kalirajan. K. P (1998-99). 'State Electricity Boards: A
performance evaluation', The Indian Economic Journal, Vol. 46 (2), October-December.
Santhakumar, V. (2003a) The impact of distribution of costs and benefits of non-reform a case study of power sector reforms in Kerala between 1996 and 2000, Economic and
Political Weekly, 38, 2, 147-154.
Santhakumar, V. (2003b) Poverty and Social Impact Assessment of Power Sector
Reforms in Kerala, Kerala Power Development Project, Asian Development Bank
Santhakumar, V. (2003c) Poverty and Social Impact Assessment of Power Sector
Reforms in Assam, Assam Power Development Project, Asian Development Bank
World Bank (2001), India: Power Supply to Agriculture, Energy Sector Unit, South Asia
Regional Office, Report No. 22171-IN.
World Bank, (2002), India: Power Sector Reform and the Poor, Report No. 20517-IN,
South Asia Energy and Infrastructure
World Bank, (2004) Country Strategy Paper for India, Washington, D.C.
10
Appendix I
Table A: Percentage distribution of consumers based on tariff (per KwH) in each state
States
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Andhra Pradesh
Orissa
West Bengal
Uttar Pradesh
Madhya Pradesh
Bihar
Haryana
Rajasthan
Gujarat
Karnataka
Less
than Rs.
1.00
0.0
47.6
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
23.9
0.2
Rs.
1.001.50
7.2
35.4
0.2
17.1
0.3
6.3
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.5
0.0
Rs.
1.50 2.00
70.8
14.7
28.1
47.7
1.7
0.0
0.0
68.9
1.1
0.0
0.9
0.6
Rs.
2.00 2.50
16.3
0.9
38.5
27.1
32.8
47.3
0.0
31.1
4.9
0.0
2.3
2.6
Rs.
2.50 3.00
4.8
0.7
19.2
6.2
15.2
1.4
0.0
0.0
12.2
0.0
11.7
30.8
Rs.
3.00 3.50
0.6
0.0
4.7
0.6
39.4
32.9
0.0
0.0
54.1
0.6
39.8
20.9
Rs.
3.50 4.00
0.0
0.2
2.0
0.3
4.3
7.2
0.0
0.0
17.5
10.4
11.0
17.4
Rs.
4.00
+
0.4
0.5
7.3
0.6
6.3
4.5
0.0
0.0
10.0
89.0
9.8
27.4
Source: Same as Table 1
Table B: Average cost of supply and average tariff for industrial and commercial
consumers
SEB/Utility
Andhra Pradesh
Assam
Bihar
Delhi(DVB)
Gujarat
Haryana
Himachal Pradesh
Jammu& Kashmir
Karnataka
Kerala
Madhya Pradesh
Maharashtra
Meghalaya
Punjab
Rajasthan(Transco.)
Tamil Nadu
UP(Power corp.)
West Bengal
Av. commercial
tariff (Ps per unit)
426.00
485.68
276.60
420.00
501.00
451.14
270.00
160.00
572.12
436.40
430.64
456.39
192.13
374.81
432.00
430.77
466.72
271.31
Av. industrial
tariff (Ps/unit)
441.50
447.56
362.26
427.79
476.67
477.94
275.00
135.00
480.73
226.69
437.84
208.84
208.84
306.48
395.13
395.35
482.00
352.82
Av. cost of
supply (Ps/unit)
360.7
589.1
377.1
469.6
365.4
411.9
235.4
412.3
374.6
347.3
324.9
357.5
265.0
285.2
368.2
309.8
383.6
376.8
Source: Government of India (2002)
11