Nazi Germany
Documents
SEMESTER ONE 2013-14
1.
1.1.
The Origins and Development of Nazism
Karl Lueger, speech reported in Der Österreichische Volksfreund, 2 October 18871
Whether Democrats or anti-Semites the matter really comes to one and the same thing. The Democrats in their
struggle against corruption come up against the Jews at every step, and the anti-Semites, if they want to carry out
their economic programme, have to overcome not only the bad Jews, but the bad Christians also. […]
All my party comrades share my opinion that it is the first duty of a Democrat to take the side of the poor
oppressed people and to take up the fight with all determination against the unjustified and even harmful
domination of a small fraction of the population. To be sure the Manchester Liberal papers have their habit of
describing a Democrat in somewhat different terms. They claim, for instance, that it would be the duty of such a
Democrat to come forward as an enemy of the Christian religion, to mock and ridicule its believers and priests. But
we know that the motive of such a manoeuvre is solely to mislead the people, which we may deduce from the
remarkable fact that were anybody to come forward against the Jewish religion and ridicule its doctrines and
believers he would be branded by the same organs as a reactionary obscurantist. However, this strange conception
can be seen even more clearly in an economic question.
1.2
Georg Schönerer, Austrian Reichsrat deputy, Unverfälschte deutsche Worte, 16 November 18982
Ever more clearly and plainly we may see that Slav insolence and Roman lust for power have closely allied
themselves in the old German Ostmark in order to annihilate Germandom in this Empire which has been built up
on German foundations.
Clerical spirit of intrigue is influencing the whole of public life in Austria more than ever before, with
dangerous effects on the free exercise of the German people’s national powers in a way which is justly causing
anxiety to every German.
In view of the steadily growing peril which is threatening us from Rome and Prague, in view of the
clerical agitation, asserting itself more insolently from day to day and disposing of the most powerful means, the
final target of which is the undermining of the mighty imperial structure created by Bismarck and which needs as
an implement to this end an Austria totally given over to Slavism, the genuine German patriot must consider the
timely application of an appropriately potent antidote. The struggle against the anti-German power of Rome can be
carried only under the general battle-cry: ‘Break with Rome!’ in the hope of the final victory of Germandom over
the un-German, quarrelsome, Roman Church. […]
Not Jesuit but Germanic spirit shall rule and command in German lands.
Krems, Nebelung 1898/2011 n.N
With unfeigned German Greeting
1.3
The Pan-German League: Heinrich Class, ‘If I were the Emperor’
A return to health in our national life, in all its branches --cultural, moral, political, and economic--and the
maintenance of that recovered health is only possible if Jewish influence is either completely expunged or screwed
back to a bearable, innocuous level.
Let us be clear in the discussion of these necessities that the innocent must suffer along with the guilty....
Today, the borders must be totally and unconditionally barred to any further Jewish immigration. This is
absolutely necessary, but no longer sufficient. Just as self-evident, foreign Jews who have not yet acquired
citizenship rights must be speedily and unconditionally expelled, to the last man. But this also is not enough....We
must demand that resident Jews be placed under an Aliens' Law....
A Jew, according to the above Aliens' Law, is anyone who belonged to a Jewish religious corporation as of 18
January 1871, as well as all the descendants of such persons who were Jews at that date, even when only one
parent was or is [a Jew by the above definition]. All public offices remain closed to Jews whether of a paid or
honorary nature, whether national, state, or municipal. They will not be allowed to serve in the army or navy. They
will hold neither the active nor the passive right to vote. The professions of lawyer and teacher are denied them,
also that of theatre director.
Newspapers which have Jewish collaborators must make this fact known. The others, which we generally call
‘German’ newspapers, may neither be owned by Jews nor have Jewish editors or reporters. Banks that are not
purely personal enterprises may not have Jewish directors. In future, rural property may not be owned by Jews or
be mortgaged to Jews.
1
2
Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria (London, 1988), p.330.
Pulzer, Rise, p.332
2
As compensation for the protection Jews enjoy as foreigners, they shall pay double the taxes of Germans....
And now we come to the saving of the German nation's soul....When it comes to the future of our nation, we must
put off weakness....
Resolutely militant policy against the Poles through application of expropriation and introduction of a prohibition
against parcellisation of land....Extension of military law to all regions endangered by Polish assault. Especially
for Upper Silesia we must demand that those elected by the Polish people can sit in parliament only as advisors;
they therefore should have no vote and are to be heard only on those matters of interest to their fellow nationals or
homeland. Should it turn out that these determinations are avoided by mergers with other parties, we should not
shrink from the further step of finally withdrawing the active and passive franchise from Poles. The definition of a
Pole should be established on the same basis as suggested for Jews, naturally with language as the determining
factor.
Under all conditions Polish newspapers and periodicals must include a German translation next to the Polish text.
German will be the only tolerated language for any assembly....
However, there must be created a Central Office in which everything concerning the Polish question is deliberated
upon. Only after an Ostmark ministry [has been created] in which the practical struggles of the Polish question are
worked out by experts, guaranteeing uniformity of direction, will, and execution of policy, can we expect a lasting
success. Should it come to the stage of Polish resistance with recourse to means thus far avoided, the state should
not shrink from the ultimate. However, we need not speak of this today and, hopefully, never will have to.
When we consider that in [Alsace-Lorraine] the number of French speakers has grown constantly since 1871, we
need to speak out in cold blood. We didn't take the Reichsland ‘for the sake of your beautiful eyes’; we took it out
of military necessity. The inhabitants were an extra; the territory was the main thing. We have already made our
choice once. Now we choose again. Every adult must declare publicly and without reservation for himself and his
family, to which meeting of the obligation also applies, that the French language will be used neither in the home
nor outside it and that no newspapers, periodicals, or books will be brought in from France. Whoever refuses this
obligation has opted against the German Empire and must swiftly leave the country. Breach of the obligation
meets with the same fate.
[…]
The constitution will be abolished. The territory will be placed under a minister for Alsace-Lorraine...and ruled
dictatorially....
If we are now to create order in our fatherland, we must also consider the Danes and also place before them a new,
deciding choice: Whoever fails to declare himself unconditionally for the Prussian state must cross the border [to
Denmark]. Danish language and administration must at a certain point in time vanish from schools, churches,
courts, and administration. Only until this time will Danish newspapers, with German translations included, be
tolerated.
To facilitate the settlement of Germans [in Schleswig], the right of expropriation of Danish landed property is to be
granted to the state, similar to the one applying to Poles. Further, the protective measures of the Law against
Revolution is to be universally applied against Danish intrigues....
Concerning the counter-measures [against alien non-citizens in the German Empire] we will have to distinguish
according to the race- relatedness as well as the value or lack of value of the foreigners before taking appropriate
action....
As a significant measure...the highly welcome return immigration of Germans from the lost colonial outposts of
the far-flung ancient Empire should be fostered through the most generous expenditures. The Welfare Association
for Return Immigration has rendered great service, gathering and developing information. From this core an
imperial central office will be established to distribute within the country the German colonists fetched back from
southern Russia, Galicia, Russian Poland, and North America.
Keeping this overall goal firmly in sight means therefore that all non-German aliens must be expelled from the
territory of the Empire as swiftly as possible and under all conditions; and then they must be kept out for the
duration....
Simultaneously, we must take steps for the preservation of our rural population--vitally important in respect to our
national health, our posterity, and the composition of the army. We will thus secure the eastern lands and the solid
anchoring of this [peasant] estate without which the state can not exist....
[…]
In the discussion of voting rights it has already been put forth that the political strivings of women cannot be
regarded as justifiable or useful. The strength of the woman is instinct. If she is conscious of her nation and proud
of its character, history, greatness, and exploits, the German woman, acting on instinct, will cause her children to
value their fatherland in feeling and attitude so that when they begin to think they can do naught but love it....
We must rethink the axiom: equal rights for all. It should be replaced by the principle: political rights are to be
regulated according to the service the individual renders to the totality and according to his behaviour toward it....
It is essential that everyone interested in public life learn to rethink matters, that we must pursue an active foreign
policy--in a word, an aggressive one. Either we find that things are going well, that we are prospering more each
day and have space enough for a long, long time to come; then we ought to let things run their course and limit
ourselves to a defensive posture, that is, defending ourselves should another dare to attack us.... Or we notice that
not only is the economic struggle for existence growing ever sharper within the country, but that the foreign
3
market is also becoming increasingly difficult. Then, in the near future, we shall find that the resulting necessities
arising from these conditions will not be met by present-day Germany together with all its colonies. That being so,
we will have to acquire territory....
Obviously, any expansion in Europe is to be brought about only through victorious wars.... If we have been
victorious and force cessions of territory, we will thereby get regions inhabited by Frenchmen or Russians, people
who are hostile toward us. We then have to ask whether such an increase in territory improves our situation....
Since we have broached the question of evacuation [of native populations] in passing, so to speak, it is perhaps not
out of order to speak of it publicly on occasion. By so doing, our enemies will recognise that such desperate
measures already have their advocates in Germany.... In other words, we ought not think of an aggressive war to
take foreign territory for purposes of evacuating [inhabitants]. But we ought to accustom ourselves to thinking of
such a measure as an allowable response to foreign attack. A predatory war contradicts our principles. But a
punishment for a ruthless attack justifies us, even to this severest measure, for there is such a thing as ‘iron
necessity.’ A defensive war in this sense may legitimately be conducted in an aggressive way on the German side,
for we must undertake to pre-empt the enemy....
Heinrich Class (Daniel Frymann), ‘Wenn ich der Kaiser wär’ [‘If I were the Emperor’], 1912
1.4
Proclamation of the German Fatherland Party
Large sections of the German people do not agree with the position of the present Reichstag majority on the most
important questions affecting the life of the Fatherland. They see in the attempt to create and prioritise conflicts
about constitutional questions, especially now when the fate of the Reich is at stake, a danger to the Fatherland,
and a boost to our enemies, even if it is unintended. They are of the opinion that the Reichstag elected before the
war is no longer actually representative of the will of the German people. […] The German Fatherland Party aims
to bring together all the patriotic forces regardless of party political allegiance. It is made up of patriotically
inclined individuals and organisations. It wishes to be a support and back-up for a strong Reich government which
does not give in either to internal or external pressures, but knows how to respond to events with German fortitude
and unshakeable faith in victory.
Proclamation of the Deutsche Vaterlandspartei, October 1917
1.5
The Nazi Party Programme
The programme is the political foundation of the NSDAP and accordingly the primary political law of the State. It
has been made brief and clear intentionally.
All legal precepts must be applied in the spirit of the party programme.
Since the taking over of control, the Führer has succeeded in the realisation of essential portions of the Party
programme from the fundamentals to the detail.
The Party Programme of the NSDAP was proclaimed on the 24 February 1920 by Adolf Hitler at the first large
Party gathering in Munich and since that day has remained unaltered. Within the national socialist philosophy is
summarised in 25 points:
1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination
of peoples.
2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in respect to the other nations; abrogation of the peace
treaties of Versailles and St. Germain.
3. We demand land and territory (colonies) for the sustenance of our people, and colonisation for our surplus
population.
4. Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can only be one who is of German blood,
without consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of the race.
5. Whoever has no citizenship is to be able to live in Germany only as a guest, and must be under the authority of
legislation for foreigners.
6. The right to determine matters concerning administration and law belongs only to the citizen. Therefore we
demand that every public office, of any sort whatsoever, whether in the Reich, the county or municipality, be filled
only by citizens. We combat the corrupting parliamentary economy, office-holding only according to party
inclinations without consideration of character or abilities.
7. We demand that the state be charged first with providing the opportunity for a livelihood and way of life for the
citizens. If it is impossible to sustain the total population of the State, then the members of foreign nations (noncitizens) are to be expelled from the Reich.
8. Any further immigration of non-citizens is to be prevented. We demand that all non-Germans, who have
immigrated to Germany since the 2 August 1914, be forced immediately to leave the Reich.
9. All citizens must have equal rights and obligations.
10. The first obligation of every citizen must be to work both spiritually and physically. The activity of individuals
is not to counteract the interests of the universality, but must have its result within the framework of the whole for
the benefit of all Consequently we demand:
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11. Abolition of unearned (work and labour) incomes. Breaking of rent-slavery.
12. In consideration of the monstrous sacrifice in property and blood that each war demands of the people personal
enrichment through a war must be designated as a crime against the people. Therefore we demand the total
confiscation of all war profits.
13. We demand the nationalisation of all (previous) associated industries (trusts).
14. We demand a division of profits of all heavy industries.
15. We demand an expansion on a large scale of old age welfare.
16. We demand the creation of a healthy middle class and its conservation, immediate communalisation of the
great warehouses and their being leased at low cost to small firms, the utmost consideration of all small firms in
contracts with the State, county or municipality.
17. We demand a land reform suitable to our needs, provision of a law for the free expropriation of land for the
purposes of public utility, abolition of taxes on land and prevention of all speculation in land.
18. We demand struggle without consideration against those whose activity is injurious to the general interest.
Common national criminals, usurers, Schieber and so forth are to be punished with death, without consideration of
confession or race.
19. We demand substitution of a German common law in place of the Roman Law serving a materialistic worldorder.
20. The state is to be responsible for a fundamental reconstruction of our whole national education programme, to
enable every capable and industrious German to obtain higher education and subsequently introduction into
leading positions. The plans of instruction of all educational institutions are to conform with the experiences of
practical life. Understanding of the concept of the State [Staatsbürgerkunde] must be striven for by the school as
early as the beginning of understanding. We demand the education at the expense of the State of outstanding
intellectually gifted children of poor parents without consideration of position or profession.
21. The State is to care for the elevating national health by protecting the mother and child, by outlawing childlabour, by the encouragement of physical fitness, by means of the legal establishment of a gymnastic and sport
obligation, by the utmost support of all organisations concerned with the physical instruction of the young.
22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and formation of a national army.
23. We demand legal opposition to known lies and their promulgation through the press. In order to enable the
provision of a German press, we demand, that: a. All writers and employees of the newspapers appearing in the
German language be members of the race: b. Non-German newspapers be required to have the express permission
of the State to be published. They may not be printed in the German language: c. Non-Germans are forbidden by
law any financial interest in German publications, or any influence on them, and as punishment for violations the
closing of such a publication as well as the immediate expulsion from the Reich of the non-German concerned.
Publications which are counter to the general good are to be forbidden. We demand legal prosecution of artistic
and literary forms which exert a destructive influence on our national life, and the closure of organisations
opposing the above made demands.
24. We demand freedom of religion for all religious denominations within the state so long as they do not
endanger its existence or oppose the moral senses of the Germanic race. The Party as such advocates the
standpoint of a positive Christianity without binding itself confessionally to any one denomination. It combats the
Jewish-materialistic spirit within and around us, and is convinced that a lasting recovery of our nation can only
succeed from within on the framework: common utility precedes individual utility.
25. For the execution of all of this we demand the formation of a strong central power in the Reich. Unlimited
authority of the central parliament over the whole Reich and its organisations in general. The forming of state and
profession chambers for the execution of the laws made by the Reich within the various states of the confederation.
The leaders of the Party promise, if necessary by sacrificing their own lives, to support by the execution of the
points set forth above without consideration.
NB: Adolf Hitler proclaimed the following explanation for this programme on the 13 April 1928:
Explanation
Regarding the false interpretations of Point 17 of the programme of the NSDAP on the part of our opponents, the
following definition is necessary:
Since the NSDAP stands on the platform of private ownership it happens that the passage ‘gratuitous
expropriation’ concerns only the creation of legal opportunities to expropriate if necessary, land which has been
illegally acquired or is not administered from the view-point of the national welfare. This is directed primarily
against the Jewish land-speculation companies.
Edited by: Dr. Robert Ley
Published by: Central Publishing House of the N.S.D.A.P. Franz Eher, successor Munich
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1708-PS (Military Tribunal at Nuremberg)
5
1.6
To the entire working Germany!
The total bankruptcy of the Revolt of 1918, the great betrayal of the people is revealed through the failure of the
whole of the policy of fulfilment and impoverishment. Resignation before the French bayonets, crawling before
stock exchange pirates of Wall Street, corruption, protection of fraud, lack of work, inadequate housing, a
frightening epidemic of suicide, emigration of the best elements of the people etc., these are all the consequences
of ‘Victory along the whole front’. Fighting purposefully and fearlessly against this
Shame of Versailles and of the Dawes Betrayal
is only the
National Socialist German Workers’ Party
It fights
Against the debasement of German life and the disintegration of the belief of all sections of the people,
for the re-awakening of the national feeling of honour, of military thinking and of the will to freedom.
Against the dominance of international finance capital and its Marxist-democratic servants,
for the nationalisation of the banks of issue and of the stock exchange, that is for protecting the whole of the honest
working people from private exploitation.
Against the profiteering of department stores,
for the protection of the national community of all workers of the brain and fist from external threat and internal
enslavement.
Against the lies of internal class solidarity and international reconciliation,
for the reversal of foreign policy with the help of the natural opponents of the French-Polish system.
Against the lying speeches of the readiness of the French, Poles and Czechs to be friendly ; against the swindle of
Locarno and of the lie about the League of Nations,
for a just revaluation of the robbed, high taxation of the banking aristocracy and the death penalty for those who
exploit the people.
Against the consequences of the inflation swindle, cheating on the stock exchange and the freedom of the
exploiter,
for building housing, the protection of the tenant and the provision of work for the Dawes army of
unemployed, for the annulment of the Dawes agreement, for cleaning up our literature and theatre, for the
furtherance of German art and artists.
Against Dawes payments and huge taxes in favour of ‘reparations’ and international black marketers,
for the independence and incorruptibility of German public life, for a law to protect the Fatherland and
the honour of the people.
Against the filth and trash which is poisoning our youth, and our whole culture, and against its Jewish and nonJewish purveyors,
for the arrest and punishment of those responsible for the November Revolts, for the inflation, for the Dawes
crime, and for the League of Nations betrayal
Against the organised lies of the international Jewish press and for their continuous betrayal of the people and of
the country,
for true nationalism and real socialism , which does not recognise bourgeois or proletarians but only Germans.
German worker, burgher, farmer!
Germans of all occupations and estates!
German men and women!
He who wishes to fight for Germany’s honour, for the freedom of German labour and for a real national state,
votes for that Movement which has already realised within its ranks the united front of all the working people,
the
National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Hitler-Movement)
Vote List 10 in Every Election
Völkischer Beobachter No 113, 15 May 19283
Detlef Mühlberger, Hitler’s Voice. The Völkischer Beobachter, 1920-1933. Vol 1 Organisation and Development of the Nazi
Party (Peter Lang, Bern 2004), pp. 277-8
3
6
1.7
Hitler’s speech to the Düsseldorf Industry Club, 27 January 1932
If today the National Socialist movement is regarded in many circles as being opposed to the business world, I
believe the reason for this lies in the fact that we formerly adopted a position in respect to the event which
determined the development of today’s situation differing from that of the other organisations which play a
significant role in public life. Today our views still differ in many points from those of our opponents. […]
One thing was clear to me: the world of the parties … had shattered Germany, and Germany was broken by this.
It is absurd to believe that the factors whose existence is inseparably bound up in history with Germany's
disintegration can now suddenly be factors in its recovery.
[…I] f there are many in Germany today who believe that we National Socialists are incapable of constructive
work—they are deceiving themselves! If we did not exist, Germany today would no longer have a bourgeoisie.
(Hear, hear!) The question, ‘Bolshevism or no Bolshevism’ would long have been decided! Take the weight of our
gigantic organisation — this greatest organisation by far in the new Germany — off the scales of national events
and you will see that, without us, Bolshevism would already tip the scales now — a fact best evidenced by the
attitude which Bolshevism has toward us. It is a great honour to me when Herr Trotsky calls upon German
Communism today to cooperate with
the Social Democrats at any price because National Socialism is to be regarded as the only real danger to
Bolshevism. And it is an even greater honour for me because in twelve years, starting with nothing at all and in
opposition to the overall public opinion at the time, in opposition to the press, in opposition to capital, in
opposition to the economy, in opposition to the administration, in opposition to the State: in short, in opposition to
everything, we built up our Movement, a Movement which can no longer be eliminated today, which exists, on
which one must have an opinion whether one wants to or not. (Cheers of approval) And I believe that this opinion
actually must be quite clear to anyone who still believes in a German future. You see before you an organisation
which does not only preach the theory of the realisations I characterised as being essential at the beginning of my
speech, but which puts them into practice; an organisation tilled with the utmost national sentiment, based on the
idea of the absolute authority of leadership in every field, on all levels — the only party which has, in itself, totally
overcome not only the international idea but the democratic idea as well; which, through its organisation,
acknowledges only responsibility, command and obedience and which thus for the first time integrates into the
political life of Germany a phenomenon of millions united in upholding the principle of achievement. An
organisation which fills its followers with an unrestrained aggressive spirit (Kampfsinn); for the first time, an
organisation which, when a political opponent declares: ‘We take your behaviour to be a provocation,’ is not
satisfied to suddenly withdraw, but brutally enforces its own will and hurls back at him: ‘We are fighting today!
We will fight tomorrow! And if you regard our meeting today as a provocation, then we'll hold another one next
week — and will continue until you have learned that it is not a provocation when the German Germany professes
its will! And if you say, ‘You may not go out on the streets’ — we will go out on the streets in spite of it! And if
you say, ‘Then we will beat you’ —no matter how many sacrifices you force us to make, this young Germany will
always march again, it will one day completely win back the German streets, the German individual. And when
people reproach us for our intolerance, we are proud of it — yes, we have even made the inexorable decision to
exterminate Marxism in Germany down to its very last root. We made this decision not because we are pugnacious
— I, for one, could imagine a life made up of nicer things than being chased through Germany, being persecuted
by countless decrees, standing constantly with one foot in prison, and having no right I can call my own in the
State. I could imagine a better fate than that of fighting a battle which, at least in the beginning, was regarded by
everyone as a mad chimera. And lastly, I believe that I also have the capability of taking on some sort of post in
the Social Democratic Party, and one thing is certain: had I placed my capabilities at its service today I would
presumably even be fit to govern. But for me it was a greater decision to choose a path along which nothing guided
me but my own faith and an indestructible confidence in the natural powers of our Volk — which are certainly still
present — and its significance, which will one day of necessity once more manifest itself, given the right
leadership.
Now a twelve-year struggle lies behind us.
[…]
Today we are at the turning-point in German destiny. If the present development continues, Germany will one
day of necessity result in Bolshevist chaos – however, if this development is brought to an end, our Volk must be
sent to a school of iron discipline and gradually cured from the preconceptions of both camps. A hard lesson, but
one which we cannot avoid!
If one believes that the concepts of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘proletarian’ can be conserved then one is either conserving
German impotence and thus our downfall or one is ushering in the victory of Bolshevism. If one is not willing to
abandon these concepts, then it is my conviction that a recovery of the German nation is no longer possible. The
chalk line which the Weltanschauungen have drawn for peoples throughout the history of the world has more than
once been the death line. Either the attempt to reshape a body politic hard as iron from this conglomerate of
parties, associations, organisations, world outlooks, arrogance of rank, and class madness is successful, or else
Germany will perish once and for all for lack of this inner consolidation. Even if another twenty emergency
decrees were sent to hail down on our Volk, they would be unable to alter the main course leading to our rum! If
one day the way which leads upwards is to be found again, then first of all the German Volk must be bent back
7
into shape. That is a process no one can escape! It does no good to say: ‘The proletarians are the only ones to
blame for that!’ No, believe me, our entire German Volk, every single class, has more than its share of the blame
for our collapse; some because they willed it and intentionally tried to bring it about; the others because they
looked on and were too weak to prevent it! In history, failure weighs just as heavily as the intention or the deed
itself. Today no one can escape the obligation to bring about the regeneration of the German Volkskörper by means
of his own personal contribution and integration.
When I speak to you today, then it is not with the aim of moving you to cast your ballots or inducing you to do
this or that for the party on my account. No, I am presenting an outlook to you here, and I am convinced that the
victory of this outlook constitutes the only possible starting point for a German recovery; at the same time it is also
the very last asset which the German Volk possesses. I have heard it often said by our opponents: ‘You, too, will
be unable to master today's crisis.’ Assuming, Gentlemen, that that were the case. Then what would that mean? It
would mean that we were approaching an appalling age and would have nothing with which to counter it but a
purely materialistic attitude on all sides. The crisis, however, would be experienced a thousand times more
strongly as a purely materialistic matter, without some ideal having been restored to the Volk. (Animated
applause)
People so often say to me: ‘You are only the drummer of national Germany!’ And what if I were only the
drummer?! Today it would be a greater statesmanlike deed to drum a new faith into this German Volk than to
slowly squander away the one they have now. (Cheers of approval)
[…]
Thus in contrast to our official Government, I regard the vehicle for German recovery not as being the primacy of
German foreign policy but rather as being the primacy of the restoration of a healthy, national and powerful
German body politic. It was in order to accomplish this task that I founded the National Socialist Movement
thirteen years ago and have led it for the past twelve years; and I hope that it will also accomplish this task in days
to come, that it will leave behind it the best reward for its struggle: a German body politic completely regenerated
from within, intolerant against anyone who sins against the nation and its interests, intolerant against anyone who
will not acknowledge its vital interests or opposes them, intolerant and relentless against anyone who endeavours
to destroy and subvert this Volkskörper – and otherwise open to friendship and peace with anyone who wants
friendship and peace! (Tumultuous, long drawn-out applause).4
4
Max Domarus, Hitler. Speeches and Proclamations 1932-1945. The Chronicle of a Dictatorship. Volume One. The Years 1932
to 1934, pp. 88-114
8
1.8
John Heartfield: The Meaning of the Hitler Greeting, photomontage 1932
Der Sinn des Hitlergrusses:
Kleiner Mann bittet um große
Gaben.
Motto: Millonen Stehen Hinter
Mir!
The Meaning of the Hitler
Salute: Little man asks for
great gifts.
Motto: Millions Stand Behind
Me!
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2
2.1
The Nazi ‘Seizure’ of Power
Party Membership
Source: Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 1, pp. 84-5
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2.2.1
Electoral Support
Reichstag Elections 1919 – 1933
19
20/22
24 I
Turnout.
83.02
79.18
77.42
24 II
78.76
28
75.60
30
81.95
32 I
84.06
32 II
80.58
33
88.74
Turnout
6.55 a
3.00 b
.
1.71
0.64
19.45
.
9.20
5.65
3.23
13.37
20.52
0.80
12.61
6.25
.
2.29
1.03
20.49
.
10.07
6.34
3.74
13.60
26.02
0.33
8.94
4.15
2.63
0.87
1.89
4.54
1.56
14.25
0.20
8.71
4.90
3.07
12.07
29.76
0.07
10.62
4.86
18.33
.
3.17
3.95
0.97
7.03
2.49
4.75
3.78
3.03
11.81
24.53
0.03
13.13
3.02
37.36
.
0.25
0.40
0.37
5.93
1.10
1.18
1.01
3.26
12.44
21.58
.
14.56
0.56
33.09
.
0.30 c
0.31
0.42
8.66
1.48
1.86
0.95
3.09
11.93
20.44
.
16.86
0.61
43.91
.
.
.
0.29
7.97
0.98
1.10
0.85
2.73
11.25
18.25
.
12.32
0,35
NSDAP
VNB
Landvolk
WP
DBP
DNVP
CSVd
DVP
DStP
BVP
Zentrum
SPD
USPD
KPD
Other
608
230
.
1
2
2
37
3
7
4
22
75
133
.
89
3
584
196
.
1
3
52
5
11
2
19
71
121
.
100
3
[647]
288
.
.
.
2
52
4
2
5
19
73
120
.
[81]
1
Seats
NSDAP
VNB
Landvolk
WP
DBP
DNVP
CSVd
DVP
DStP
BVP
Zentrum
SPD
USPD
KPD
Others
NSDAP
DVFP
Landvolk
WP
BBB
DNVP
CSVd
DVP
DDP
BVP
Zentrum
SPD
USPD
KPD
Other
.
.
.
.
0.91
10.27
.
4.43
18.56
19.67
37.86
7.62
.
0.68
.
.
.
.
0.78
15.07
.
13.90
8.28
4.39
13.64
21.92
17.63
2.09
2.30
Seats
423
459
472
493
491
577
.
.
32 a
14 b
NSDAP
12
107
.
.
.
DVFP
.
.
.
.
Landvolk
9
19
.
.
WP
7
12
23
23
BBB
4
4
3
5
8
6
DNVP
44
71
95
103
73
41
.
.
.
.
CSVd
14
DVP
19
65
45
51
45
30
DDP
75
39
28
32
25
20
BVP
91
20
16
19
17
19
Zentrum
64
65
69
61
68
SPD
165
103
100
131
153
143
USPD
22
83
.
KPD
4
62
45
54
77
Others
3
6
19
12
11
10
a DVFP und NSDAP
b NSFB
c davon 0,17 % Thüringer Landbund, 0,13 % Deutsches Landvolk
Abbreviations:
BBB
BVP
CSVd
DHP
DStP
HuG
NSFB
VSB
VSFB
WP
Bavarian Farmer’s League
Baviarian People’s Party
Christian-Social People’s Service
German Hanoverian Party
Germa State Party
Home and Landowners
Agrian League
National Socialist Freedom Movement
Völkisch Social Block
Völkisch Social Freedom Block
Buisness Party
Centre Party
Bayerischer Bauerverbund
Bayerische Volkspartei
Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst
Deutsch-Hannoversche Partei
Deutsche Staatspartei
Haus- und Grundbesitzer
Landbund
Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegung
Völkischsozialer Block
Völkisch-sozialer Freiheitsblock
Wirtschaftspartei
Zentrum
11
2.2.2
Growth of the Nazi vote by electoral District 1924-1933
Reichstag elections:
4 May
1924
14 Sept. 31 July 6 Nov.
1930
1932
1932
5 Mär.
1933
32
6.5
7 Dec. 20
May. 1924
1928
14
12
3.0
2.6
Number of seats:
National vote (%):
District vote (%)
1 East Prussia
2 Berlin
3 Potsdam II
4 Potsdam I
5 Frankfurt a.d. Oder
6 Pomerama
7 Breslau
8 Liegnitz
9 Oppeln
10 Magdeburg
11 Merseburg
12 Thunngia
13 Schleswig-Holstein
14 Weser-Ems
15 East Hanover
16 South-Hanover-Brunswick
17 Westphalia North
18 Westphalia South
19 Hesse-Nassau
20 Cologne-Aachen
21 Koblenz-Trier
22 Düsseldorf-East
23 Düsseldorf-West
24 Upper Bavaria-Swabia
25 Lower Bavaria
26 Franconia
27 Palatinate
28 Dresden-Bautzen
29 Leipzig
30 Chemnitz-Zwickau
31 Württemberg
32 Baden
33 Hesse-Darmstadt
34 Hamburg
35 Mecklenburg
107
18.3
230
37.3
196
33.1
288
43.9
8.6
3.6
6.5
5.8
5.0
7.3
4.0
1.5
2.6
4.9
8.7
9.9
7.4
7.4
8.6
7.6
3.5
1.5
5.6
1.5
1.3
3.9
2.6
17.0
10.2
20.7
5.7
4.5
7.9
7.7
4.1
4.8
2.9
6.0
20.8
6.2
1.6
2.9
2.8
3.2
4.2
1.4
1.5
1.5
3.0
4.3
5.4
2.7
4.8
4.4
3.4
1.3
1.1
2.5
0.6
—
1.6
0.9
4.8
3.0
7.5
1.9
1.5
1.8
4.2
2.1
1.9
1.3
2.3
11.9
22.5
12.8
16.7
18.8
22.7
24.3
24.2
20.9
9.5
19.5
20.5
19.3
27-0
20.5
20.6
24.3
12.2
13.9
20.8
14.5
14.9
17.0
16.8
16.3
12.0
20.5
22.8
16.1
14.0
23.8
9.4
19.2
18.5
19.2
20.1
47.1
24.6
33.0
38.2
48.1
48.0
43.5
48.0
29.2
43.8
42.6
43.4
51-0
38.4
49.5
46.1
25.7
27.2
43.6
20.2
28.8
31.6
27.0
27.1
20.4
39.9
43.7
39.3
36.1
47.0
30.3
36.5
43.1
33.7
44.8
39.7
22.5
29.1
34.1
42.6
43.1
40.4
42.1
26.8
39.0
34.5
37.1
45-7
31.9
42.9
40.6
22.3
24.8
41.2
17.4
26.1
27.0
24.2
24.6
18.5
36.4
42.6
34.0
31.0
43.4
26.2
34.1
40.2
27.2
37.0
56.5
31.3
38.2
44.4
55.2
56.3
50.2
54.0
43.2
47.3
46.4
47.2
53-2
41.4
54.3
48.7
34.9
33.8
49.4
30.1
38.4
37.4
35.2
40.9
39.2
45.7
46.5
43.6
40.0
50.0
42.C
45.4
47.4
38.9
48.0
0.8
1.4
1.8
1.6
1.0
1.5
1.0
1.2
1.0
1.7
2.7
3.7
4-0
5.2
2.6
4.4
1.0
1.6
3.6
1.1
2.1
1.8
1.2
6.2
3.5
8.1
5.6
1.8
1.9
4.3
1.9
2.9
1.9
2.6
2.0
From G. Pridham and J. Noakes (ed.) Documents on Nazism, Jonathan Cape, 1974, pp. 115-16.
12
2.2.3
Distribution of National Socialist Voters in July 1932 election
13
2.2.4 Distribution of Catholics and Protestants in Germany
Source: Meyers Kleines Konversationslexikon. Leipzig and Vienna, 1908, vol. 2, pp. 332-33; reproduced in
Helmut Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 2-3.
14
2.3.1
Contemporary Eye Witness Accounts
Count Harry Kessler, Diaries of a Cosmopolitan5
Saturday 25 June 1932
The country is coming apart. The repeal of the veto on uniforms has resulted in open Bavarian revolt against the
government. The Bavarian government refuses to obey. Bismarck’s achievement, the unity of the Reich, is being
jeopardised because a few thousand silly youngsters want to take delight in wearing uniforms. Were it not so
tragic, it would be grotesque.
Monday 27 June 1932
The struggle between the radical movements (Communists and Nazis) have much more affinity with the wars of
religion during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Germany, France and Britain than they have with the
political struggles belonging to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They are bitter armed disputes between
two ideologies which exclude compromise, whereas in the case of political struggles compromise is the objective.
This explains the bitterness and hatred.
[…]
Tuesday 12 July
While we spent Sunday driving through the lovely countryside, the unbridled, organised Nazi terror has again
claimed seventeen dead and nearly two hundred wounded as its victims. It is a continuous Bartholomew Day’s
massacre, day after day, Sunday after Sunday.
[…]
Monday 18 July 1932
Yesterday there were fifteen dead and numerous wounded all over the country, twelve of the fatalities occurring in
Altona alone. The Nazis, several thousand strong, and doubtless meaning to provoke an incident, marched in their
spick and span uniforms through the poorest quarters of Altona. The predictable result occurred. The unemployed
and the loafers, probably criminal elements too, attacked them. But the guilt rests upon those who provided the
provocation. There is great and general distress about this fresh Sunday bloodshed.
At one o’clock the government announced over the radio a general veto on demonstrations throughout
the country. But it took good care not to deal with the real cause of the bloodshed, the provocative Nazi uniform.
Wednesday 20 July 1932
At ten o’clock visited Abegg in the Ministry. He informed me that Papen has appointed himself Reich
Commissioner and has called in Bracht, the Lord Mayor of Essen, to act as Commissioner for Prussia. Severing
and Hirtsiefer were in conference with Papen and therefore Abegg did not as yet know what the attitude of the
Prussian government would be. He had no doubt, however, that Papen’s move is unconstitutional (making it a
coup d’état).
At lunch time the radio broadcast the Government declaration and the news that a military state of emergency has
been proclaimed in Berlin and Brandenburg, that executive power has been put in the hands of a General von
Runstedt, and that the Prussian Prime Minister Braun, Severing and Grzezinski have been dismissed by the new
Reich Commissioner Papen. Severing’s answer was that he did not accept his dismissal and would yield only to
force.
The guard at the entrance to the Defence Ministry has been doubled and is armed with rifles. Machineguns are said to have been mounted in the courtyard. The Prussian Ministry of State, at 63 Wilhelmstrasse, has
been occupied by the military since noon.
[…]
Friday 22 July 1932
At four o’clock this morning the Berlin Police Commandant was hauled out of bed by the Reichswehr and arrested
for the second time. Also the local chairman of the Reichsbanner in Charlottenburg.
At lunch-time the radio announced forthcoming personnel changes at Berlin police headquarters. They
are meant to ensure that those responsible for deciding cultural matters ‘take their stand on the basis of the
Christian way of life and culture’ and that those who deal with left-wing radical matters strictly dissociate
themselves from left-wing radical trends. In other words we are sailing full steam into a reactionary epoch on a
Metternich scale.
5
Harry Kessler, The Diaries of a Cosmopolitan (London, 2000)
15
Sunday 31 July 1932
Reichstag polling day, day of destiny! Sultry weather, cloudy in the morning, but it cleared somewhat towards
lunch-time. At eleven o’ clock cast my vote in the Kaiserin-Augusta-Strasse next to the Defence Ministry. During
the morning a telephone call from Helene Nostitz, rather anxious and depressed. In the afternoon drove to Altenhof
via Lanke, Finow, Bernau and so on. A good many flags had been put out in the northern part of the city and it
seemed as though the Socialists and Communists together had a slight preponderance over the swastikas. In the
villages very few flags, the proportion between left and Nazis about fifty-fifty, and an atmosphere of complete
calm.
In the evening at the Hilferdings. Listened to the election results until half past two. The sensation was
the uprush in the Communist vote, the expansion of the Centre, and the utter collapse of the government party.
Although forecast, the stagnation in the Nazi vote, which even went down in some constituencies, is still
surprising. The SPD has maintained its strength by a hair’s breadth and has distinctly fallen behind the KPD. The
radio, between issuing results, played disgracefully bad music, circus tent quality, which at its best attained the
level of a second-class spa concert.
Monday 1 August 1932
The right lacks a majority in the new Reichstag. As against its 230 Nazi seats, 37 nationalists, 7 People’s Party,
and 6 others, totalling 280 in all, there are 327 seats belonging to the Centre and left-wing parties. The
Communists, with their 89 seats as against 78 formerly, are again the third strongest party. The National Socialists,
most of whom expected a fifty to sixty per cent majority, are bitterly disappointed.
This morning the Nazis in Königsberg attacked the former East Prussian administrative governor
(People’s Party) in his home, using firearms, murdered two Communist workers in their homes, and attacked the
buildings where the SPD and the Hartung (government leaning) newspapers are published. In short they launched
an operation which demonstrates in miniature what they proposed to do all over the country, on a bigger and far
more thorough scale if they had won the election.
Last night the latent civil war claimed another fifteen dead and many wounded.
Friday, 5 August 1932
Assaults, bomb-throwings, and murders continue in East Prussia, Bavaria, and Holstein. It has now been officially
established that the cases of arson and bomb-throwing at Königsberg were committed by Nazis. The government
held a cabinet meeting on the subject yesterday, but confined itself to threatening vigorous action. It obviously
hesitates about getting on the wrong side of the Nazis.
[…]
Sunday, 14 August 1932
In the morning at Marseilles read news that Hindenburg, during yesterday afternoon’s interview with Hitler,
declined to make him Chancellor and that hereupon the negotiations between the Nazis and the government were
broken off. The crucial talk between Hindenburg and Hitler lasted only thirteen minutes. What now? Civil war or
the inglorious crumbling of the Nazi movement? The one thing certain is that we are heading for the darkest
reaction. It is difficult to say which of the two competing parties , the Nazis or the Schleicher clique, is the more
reactionary. The only hope is for those two lots of bigots to exterminate each other, now that they have fallen out.
[…]
Sunday 6 November 1932
Reichstag election. The fifth big election in eight months. During the morning went to the polling booth and voted
SPD. In the afternoon drove through various parts of the city. Everywhere the same picture of more or less sleepy
Sunday afternoon quiet to the accompaniment of damp, cold, overcast weather. Very sparse show of flags in the
western and central parts, but those to be seen were almost exclusively swastikas. In Neukölln and Moabit
(Wedding) the display was greater and here the preponderance lay with the ‘three arrows’ and hammer and sickle
banners.
The traffic strike continues, but it is noticeable only in a negative way in so far as there are hardly any
trams and no buses at all. What makes this strike so odd is that the Nazis and Communists support it while the
Social Democrat trades unions disapprove and dissociate themselves from it. At any rate it has improved the
Nazis’ electoral chances and impaired those of the SPD and Papen adherents (Nationalists).
[…]
Tuesday, 28 February 1933
Marinus van der Lubbe, a poor wretch of an alleged Dutch Communist, has been arrested as the incendiary
responsible for the Reichstag fire.' He promptly confessed that he was suborned by Communist deputies to perform
the deed and that he was also in touch with the SPD. This twenty-year-old youth is supposed to have stowed
inflammable material at thirty different spots in the Reichstag and to have kindled it without either his presence,
his activity, or his bestowal of this enormous quantity of material being observed by anyone. And finally he ran
straight into the arms of the police, having carefully taken off all his clothes except for his trousers and depositing
16
them in the Reichstag so as to ensure that no sort of mistake could fail to result in his identification. He is even
supposed to have waved with a torch from a window.
Göring has immediately declared the entire Communist Party guilty of the crime and the SPD as being at least
suspect. He has seized this heaven-sent uniquely favourable opportunity to have the whole Communist Reichstag
party membership as well as hundreds or even thousands of Communists all over Germany arrested and to prohibit
publication of the entire Communist Press for four weeks and of the Social Democratic Press for a fortnight. There
appear to be no limits set to the continuation of arrests, prohibitions house searches, and closure of Party offices.
The operation proceeds to the tune of blood-thirsty speeches by Göring which savour strongly of 'Stop thief!'
Everything suggests that this all too convenient transgression, with the concomitant arrests and so on, is the
outcome of a compromise between the two trains of ideas in the Nazi Party. The extremists relinquished the
projected ‘assault’ on Hitler and the subsequent massacre for the arson in the
Reichstag, less dangerous for Hitler and therefore more appealing to him,
followed by neutralisation of the KPD and SPD leadership through imprisonment. This solution was not only
acceptable to both wings of the
Party, but indeed a more advisable one in view of the fact that the previous plans had become generally known.
Not one person to whom I have spoken believes in 'Communist arson'. Incidentally, and apart from any political
purposes whatever, destruction of the hated Reichstag could not but make a warm appeal to the NSDAP crew.
In the afternoon, as I was about to leave for Weimar for a day, I had a call from a young man who urgently
requested to see me on behalf of Plivier. He brought a letter from him in which the latter asked me to hear what he
had to say. The young man, deathly pale, told me that at six o'clock this morning Storm Troopers arrived to fetch
Plivier from the apartment he shares with him. They mistook another young man lying in bed for their prey and
beat him up terribly. On discovering their error, they smashed the apartment amid yells that they will yet avenge
themselves on that swine Plivier, who is now hiding somewhere or other with not a penny in his pocket and unable
to get away. Later, when the young man who was talking to me returned to the apartment to see what could be
saved from the ruins, he watched how a close friend was knocked down in front of his door by Nazis and brutally
manhandled.
Left for Weimar by the evening train to negotiate about the mortgage. The old porter on Weimar station met me
with an utterly scared look on his face. Things are terrible in Weimar, he told me, with 'auxiliary police' (SA)
everywhere and nobody daring to speak a word.
Monday, 6 March 1933
Frankfurt am Main
The Nazis have won 288 seats and 43.9 per cent of the Reichstag vote (as against 196 and 33.1 per cent on 6
November and 230 and 37.3 per cent on 31 July). The Social Democrats, regardless of the scandalous pressure
exercised against them and the complete paralysis of their propaganda, have lost only a hundred thousand votes,
the KPD only a million. Thatis astounding and a wonderful tribute to the imperturbability of the ‘Marxist front’.
The Nazis and the Nationalists now have constitutionally complete freedom of action for the next four years,
though lacking a two-thirds majority to introduce constitutional changes.
Wednesday, 8 March 1933
Frankfurt-Paris
In the afternoon left for Paris via Saarbrücken, where the train stopped for an hour. I went into the town and in a
local paper read an article, reprinted from a Nazi Palatinate newspaper, on Nazi policy towards the workers. The
pith of it is that Germany is to become a real home for German workers, a land fit for heroes to live in. A new trap
for dunces is all that this can amount to, a revival of the patriarchal principle whereby the boss looks after his
employees, these being pampered to a greater or lesser degree but remaining like minors without any right of selfdetermination. In other words, not a vestige of ‘leftist’ policy, the essence of which lies in each man's right to selfdetermination and not stall-feeding. The struggle against 'Marxism', as far as Hitler is concerned, is simply the
struggle against the worker's right to self-determination and against personal liberty, a struggle against the freedom
of man. The state is to become a snug stable where all obedient domestic animals will feel happy and, as necessity
requires, allow themselves to be tamely led to slaughter. I cannot think of any idea which would seem to me more
degrading and revolting.
Saturday, 1 April 1933
Paris
The abominable Jewish boycott has begun. This criminal piece of lunacy has destroyed everything that during the
past fourteen years had been achieved to restore faith in, and respect for, Germany. It is difficult to say which
feeling is stronger, loathing or pity, for these brainless, malevolent creatures
[…]
Thursday, 6 April 1933
Paris
Quidde came to lunch. He is not a refugee and proposes to return to Germany. He gave me the details of Gerlach's
pretty adventurous escape from Berlin to Munich and then without a passport to Switzerland. He thinks that
probably an Army putsch is alone capable of freeing us from the Brownshirt plague, adding that it is indeed a
strange reversal of situation when he, as an old pacifist, is forced to pin his hopes on the military.
17
Saturday, 8 April 1933
Paris
Arrival of a small suitcase with papers and letters. Also a letter from Goertz, telling me that it is my manservant
Friedrich who has been stealing my things and betraying me to the Nazis. ‘Three days ago, at Friedrich's
instigation, three Nazis came and hauled your banner out of the attic and tore it to pieces in the courtyard.
Friedrich was not ashamed to express his special satisfaction at this occurrence. It was Friedrich (I have proof of
what I say) who supplied the Nazis with the wildest information about you. It was
he who betrayed the whereabouts of your safe and all those with whom you
have been in contact.’
Sometimes I seem to be going through an evil dream from which I shall suddenly awake. These last few days have
been grim. Yet life somehow continues. I work, I can concentrate on work, I talk to people, and I read.
But all the time I am aware of a muffled pain throbbing like a double-bass.
18
2.3.2
The Diaries of Victor Klemperer
10 March [1933], Friday evening
30 January: Hitler Chancellor. What, up to election Sunday on 5 march, I called terror, was a mild prelude. Now
the business of 1918 is being exactly repeated, only under a different sign, under the swastika. Again it’s
astounding how easily everything collapses. What has happened to Bavaria, what has happened to the
Reichsbanner etc. etc.? Eight days before the election the clumsy business of the Reichstag fire – I cannot imagine
that anyone really believes in Communist perpetrators instead of paid [swastika] work. Then the wild prohibitions
and acts of violence. And on top of that the never-ending propaganda in the street, on the radio etc. On Saturday,
the fourth, I heard a part of Hitler’s speech from Königsberg. The front of a hotel at the railway station,
illuminated, a torchlight procession in front of it, torch-bearers and swastika flag-bearers on the balconies and
loudspeakers. I understood only occasional words. But the tone! The unctuous bawling, truly bawling, of a priest.
–On the Sunday I voted for the Democrats, Eva for the Zentrum. In the evening around nine with the Blumenfelds
to the Dembers. As a joke, because I entertained hopes of Bavaria, I wore my Bavarian Service Cross. Then the
tremendous election victory of the National Socialists. Their vote doubled in Bavaria. The Horst Wessel song
between the announcements. – An indignant denial, no harm will come loyal Jews. Directly afterwards the Central
Association of Jewish Citizens in Thuringia is banned because it had criticised the government in ‘Talmudic
fashion’ and disparaged it. Since then day after day commissioners appointed, provincial governments trampled
underfoot, flags raised, buildings taken over, people shot, newspapers banned, etc., etc. Yesterday the dramaturg
Karl Wolff dismissed ‘by order of the Nazi Party’ – not even in the name of the government – today the whole
Saxon cabinet etc., etc. complete revolution and party dictatorship. And all opposing forces as if vanished form the
face of the earth. It is this utter collapse of a power only recently present, no, its complete disappearance (just as in
1918) which I find so staggering. Que sais-je? On Monday evening at Frau Schaps with the Gerstles. No one dares
say anything any more, everyone is afraid […] Gerstle was hobbling on crutches, he broke a leg skiing in the Alps.
His wife drove her car and took us part of the way home.
How long will I keep my post?
[…]
20 March, Monday evening about midnight
At the cinema after a long gap: Hindenburg in front of troops and SA men on Sunday 12, the day of the war dead.
When I saw him filmed about a year ago, the President, his hand on the wrist of his escort, walked somewhat
stiffly, but quite firmly and not at all slowly down the Reichstag steps, an old but vigorous man. Today: the tiny
laborious steps of a cripple. Now I understand it all: that is how Father walked after his stroke at Christmas 1911,
until he died on 12 February 1912. During that time he was no longer in his right mind. I am now completely
certain that Hindenburg is no more than a puppet, that his hand was already being guided on 30 January.
Every new government decree, announcement etc. is more shameful than the previous one. In Dresden
an Office to Combat Bolshevism. Reward for important information. Discretion assured. In Breslau Jewish
lawyers forbidden to appear in court. In Munich the clumsiest sham of an attempted assassination and linked to it
the threat of the ‘biggest pogrom’ if a shot should be fired. Etc. etc. And the newspapers snivel. The Dresdener
neueste Nachrichten pays the government compliments. Hitler ‘as statesman’ has always stood for a revision of the
peace treaty.
Goebbels as Minister of Advertising. […]
21 March
Day of the ‘Act of State’ in Potsdam. Pity that we don’t have a radio. – The most frightful pogrom threats in the
Freiheitskampf together with gruesome medieval reviling of the Jews – Jewish judges dismissed. Appointment of a
committee to ‘nationalise’ the University of Leipzig. […]
[…]
30 March, Thursday
Yesterday evening at the Blumenfelds with the Dembers. Mood as before a pogrom in the depths of the Middle
ages or in deepest Tsarist Russia. During the day the National Socialists’ boycott call had been announced. We are
hostages. The dominant feeling (especially as the Stahlhelm revolt in Brunswick has just been played out and
immediately hushed up) is that this reign of terror can hardly last long, but that its fall will bury us. Fantastic
Middle Ages: ‘We’ – threatened Jewry. In fact I feel shame more than fear, shame for Germany. I have truly
always felt a German. I have always imagined: the twentieth century and Mitteleuropa was different form the
fourteenth century and Romania. Mistake. – Dember describes the effects on business: Stock Exchange, setbacks
for Christian industry – and then ‘we’ would pay for all of it with our blood. Frau Dember related the case of the
ill-treatment of a Communist prisoner which had leaked out: torture with castor oil, beatings, fear – attempted
suicide. Frau Blumenfeld whispered to me, Dr alzburg’s second son, a medical student, has been arrested – letters
from him had been found in the home of a Communist. Our parting (after abundant good food) was like a leavetaking at the front.
19
Yesterday a wretched statement in the Dresdener Neueste Nachrichten – ‘on our own account’. They are
92,5 per cent founded on Aryan capital, Herr Wollf, owner of the remaining 7.5 per cent, has resigned as chief
editor, one Jewish editor has been given leave of absence (poor Fentl!), the other ten are Aryans. Terrible! – In a
toyshop a children’s ball with a swastika.
31 March, Friday evening
Ever more hopeless. The boycott begins tomorrow. Yellow placards, men on guard. Pressure to pay Christian
employees two months salary, to dismiss Jewish ones. No reply to the impressive letter of the Jews to the President
of the Reich and to the government. […] No one dares make a move. The Dresden student body made a
declaration today: united behind … and the honour of German students forbids them to come into contact with
Jews. They are not allowed to enter the Student House. How much Jewish money went to this student house only a
few years ago!
In Munich Jewish university teachers have already been prevented from setting foot in the university.
The proclamation and injunction of the boycott committee decrees ‘Religion is immaterial’, only race
matters. If, in the case of owners of a business, the husband is Jewish, the wife Christian or the other way round,
then the business counts as Jewish. 6
[…]
2.3.3
Goebbels’ Diaries
January 29th, 1933
The Führer is in the midst of everlasting Conferences. I make a final sally in an article: 'The Road clear at last’!
In the afternoon, whilst we are having coffee with the Führer, Goering suddenly comes and reports everything to
be A1. Tomorrow, the Führer is to be appointed Chancellor. One of our principal conditions is the dissolution
of the Reichstag, as the Führer is unable to go on working with it as at present constitut ed. The Nationalists
resist this with might and main. Their motives are more than obvious. This is surely Goering's happiest hour. And
he is right. He has diplomatically and cleverly prepared the ground for the Führer in nerve-racking negotiations
for months, or even years. His prudence, endurance, and above all, his firmness of character and loyalty to the
Führer were genuine, strong and admirable. His face •was turned to stone when, in the very thick of the fight, his
beloved wife was torn from his side by death. But he did not flinch a second. Seriously and firmly he went on his
way, a steadfast and devout shield-bearer to the Führer.
How often have he and I been together during the past years, and revived each other's courage! How often have
our spirits been raised and fortified by our love of the Führer and by the untiring work for the common cause!
Although our spheres of action were often wide apart we have each grown to respect and esteem the other's
personality and accomplishments as loyal comrades whom neither distress nor crisis could sever.
This upright soldier with the heart of a child has always remained true to himself; and now he confronts the Führer
and brings him the greatest piece of news of his life! We are quite unable to speak for some minutes; then we rise
and solemnly shake hands.
A wordless vow to our Führer! As it has been, so it shall remain! The world will witness in us and through us, a
splendid example of loyalty to the Führer, and an instance of the most beautiful companionship that can bind rnen
together.
So be it!
In a talk with the Führer it is settled that I am to remain free of office till the end of the election campaign, so as to
be able freely to carry on the election work. I have therefore a good opportunity to offer a last great proof of my
ardour in this cause.
We are at home and are just about to leave for the Ausstellungshallen [exhibition halls], to see the great (riding)
exhibition there, when news is brought to us of a last dangerous move planned by our adversaries. We must
keep our heads. One does not know if it is merely a threat, or something really serious, or just childishness. I
inform the Führer at once, also Goering, both of whom are waiting in the next room. Goering at once informs
Herr von Papen. Nothing is left undone to safeguard the following day.
We sit up till five o'clock in the morning, are ready for everything, and have considered the thing from all
angles. The Führer paces up and down the room. A few hours' sleep and the decisive hour will strike.
The great hour has struck!
January 30th, 1933
It seems like a dream. The Wilhelmstrasse is ours. The Führer is already working in the Chancellery. We stand in
the window upstairs, watching hundreds and thousands of people march past the aged President of the Reich and
the young Chancellor in the flaming torchlight, shouting their joy and gratitude.
6
The Diaries of Victor Klemperer 1933-1945. I Shall Bear Witness and To the Bitter End (London, 2000), pp. 6-10
20
At noon we are all at the Kaiserhof, waiting. The Führer is with the President of the Reich. The inward
excitement almost takes our breath away. In the street the crowd stands silently waiting between the Kaiserhof and
the Chancellery. What is happening there? We are torn between doubt, hope, joy and despair. We have been
deceived too often to be able whole-heartedly to believe in the great miracle.
Chief-of-Staff Roehm Stands at the window the whole time, watching the door of the Chancellery from which
the Führer must emerge. We shall be able to judge by his face if the interview was happy.
Torturing hours of waiting! At last a car draws up in front of the entrance. The crowd cheers. They seem to
feel that a great change is taking place or has already begun.
The Führer is coming.
A few moments later he is with us. He says nothing, and we all remain silent also. His eyes are füll of tears. It has
come! The Führer is appointed Chancellor. He has already been sworn in by the President of the Reich. The final
decision has been made. Germany is at a turning-point in her history.
All of us are dumb with emotion. Everyone clasps the Führer's hand; it would seem as if our old pact of loyalty
were renewed at this moment.
Wonderful, how simple the Führer is in his greatness, and how great in his simplicity.
Outside the Kaiserhof the masses are in a wild uproar. In the meantime Hitler's appointment has become public. The
thousands soon become tens of thousands. An endless stream of people floods the Wilhelmstrasse.
The day passes like a dream. Everything is like a fairy tale. Slowly the evening closes in over the Capital of
the Reich. At seven o'clock Berlin resembles a swarming bee-hive. And then the torchlight procession begins.
Endlessly, endlessly, from seven o'clock in the evening until one o'clock in the morning crowds march by
the Chancellery. Storm Troopers, Hitler youths, civilians, men, women, fathers with their children held up high
to see the Führer's window. Indescribable enthusiasm fills the streets. A few yards from the Chancellery, the
President of the Reich Stands at his window, a towering, dignified, heroic figure, invested with a touch of oldtime marvel. Now and then with his cane he beats time to the military marches. Hundreds and thousands and
hundreds of thousands march past our Windows in never-ending, uniform rhythm.
The rising of a nation!
Germany has awakened!
In a spontaneous explosion of joy the people espouse the German Revolution.
What goes on within our hearts is indescribable. One feels like crying and laughing at the same time.
The everlasting stream of cheering people flows on and on and on. The tree-tops at the Wilhelmplatz in front of
the Chancellery are swarming with boys who cheer the Führer in shrill ear-splitting chorus.
His people acclaim him!
For the first time the German people in demonstration is being broad-cast. We speak for the first time over all
German transmitters. I can say nothing, but that we are happy beyond words, and that we shall go on working.
When the celebrating crowds at last show some sign of coming to an end, long after midnight, ten thousand
people still stand in front of the Chancellery and sing the ‘Horst-Wessel-Song’ I deliver a short address to the
masses and close with three cheers for Hindenburg and the Führer. This miraculous night ends in a frenzy of
enthusiasm.
At length the square is empty. We close the windows and are sur-rounded by absolute silence. The Führer lays
his hands on my shoulders in silence.
Arrive home at three o'clock.
21
2.4
Government
There were few cabinet meetings after Hitler’s appointment. The following extracts, from the minutes of the earlier
ones are taken from the published Documents on German Foreign Policy (Series C, Volume 1). They are preceded
by an extract from the same source, which sets out the reasons for Hitler’s appointment for the benefit of German
diplomats who might have to explain the political situation in Germany to foreign governments.
2.4.1
Foreign Office Circular to Chiefs of Mission, 30 January 19337
After it became evident that, as a result of the opposition of almost all political parties, the political
pressure upon the Schleicher Cabinet had immeasurably increased, while on the other hand with the revival of the
so-called Harzburg Front a new basis was at hand, the President did not feel that he was in a position to entrust the
Chancellor von Schleicher with the powers to dissolve the Reichstag and accepted the subsequent resignation of
the whole Cabinet.
With respect to the forming today of the Hitler Cabinet I expect you, in view of the foreign comments so
far, to exert a calming influence. As guidance for your conversations I point out that
(. . . ) in its composition as available to date, the new Cabinet conforms to the earlier expressed wish of the
President to enlist, on the basis of the constitution, the co-operation of the largest German party; and furthermore
that the effective participation of the German National party and the Stahlhelm has been achieved. Still pending
negotiations about the Centre Party and the Bavarian People’s Party about participation or abstaining from
opposition might even result in a working majority in the Reichstag.
[. . .]
2.4.2
Minutes of Conference of Ministers, January 31 19338
Present:
Reich Chancellor
Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissar of Prussia
Foreign Minister
Reich Minister of Interior
Reich Minister of Finance
Reich Minister of Economics, Food and Agriculture
Reich Minister of Labour
Reich Minister of Justice9
Reichswehr Minister
Reich Minister without Portfolio and Reich Commissioner for Air
Reich Commissioner for Employment
State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery
State Secretary in the Reich President’s Office
Reich Press Chief
Recording Official
[. . .]
7
Source: DGFP, C 1, No 1, p.1
Source: DGFP, C 1, No. 3 pp. 5-7
9
No name is entered in the original.
8
22
Hitler
von Papen
Freiherr von Neurath
Dr. Frick
Count Schwerin von Krosigk
Dr Hugenberg
Seldte
von Blomberg
Göring
Dr. Gereke
Dr. Lammers
Dr. Meissner
Ministerialdirektor Funk
Ministerialrat Wienstein
(2) Political Situation
The Reich Chancellor reported about his conversation on the morning of January 31 with representatives
of the Centre Party, Prelate Dr. Kaas and Dr. Perlitius. The representatives had told him that they did not wish to
join the government at this time. They did not consider abstention from opposition to the cabinet by the Centre
Party impossible.
He, the Reich Chancellor, had immediately asked them whether they would consent to an extended
adjournment of the Reichstag, perhaps for a year. he had received the answer that the Centre Party could not at
once consent to the adjournment for a whole year, but at the most to an adjournment for two months at a time.
[. . .]
The Reich Chancellor further stated that he thought it possible in case of a new election to have 51 per cent of the
Reichstag backing the present government. He had talked on the morning of January 31 with a number of
Gauleiters of the NSDAP, who had also confirmed that. In his opinion further negotiations with the Centre Party
were useless, so that a new election would be unavoidable.
The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissioner for Prussia stated that it would be best to decide even
now that the coming election of the Reichstag was to be the last one, and a return to the parliamentary system was
to be avoided forever.
The Reich Chancellor declared that he wished to make the following binding promises:
(a) The outcome of the election of the Reichstag is to have no influence on the composition of the
present Government;
(b) the forthcoming election of the Reichstag is to be the last election. Any return to the parliamentary
system is to be absolutely avoided.
2.4.3
From Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, February 1 193310
(1) Political Situation
The Reich Chancellor stated that a united front extending from the trade unions to the Communist Party
appeared to be forming against the present Government. The Reich President had declared himself willing to
dissolve the Reichstag. He, the Reich Chancellor, was thinking of the slogan ‘Attack Against Marxism’ as the
election slogan of the government.
Reich Minister Göring pointed out that acts of terrorism on the part of the Communists were becoming
increasingly frequent. The police had partly fallen down on the job, especially in the west. Unfortunately, the
existing statutes were inadequate, especially for taking action against the press. It was therefore necessary to put
the so-called ‘drawer decree’(Schubkastenverordnung) into effect as soon as possible. He had some doubt whether
it would be possible to work with the present staff of the Prussian Ministry of the Interior.
The Reich Minister of the Interior stated that it would be best to hold the election of the Reichstag on
March 5. On February 2 he would submit the so-called ‘drawer decree’ to the Cabinet for its decision. It was
perhaps advisable for the election to change the election law on a few points. Perhaps the electoral quota of
required votes (Wahlkoeffizient) for one seat could be increased from 60,000 to 80,000 so that the number of
deputies would be reduced , or at any rate not increased, which might occur through the increase in the number of
persons qualified to vote.
The Chancellor objected to the increase of the electoral quota of required votes because the German
National Party might suffer by it.
[. . .]
The Reich Minister of Labour proposed to make the forming of new parties more difficult in such a way
that parties not represented in the last Reichstag were to be allowed to participate in the new election only if they
could enlist a minimum of 60,000 signatures in one constituency.
The Reich cabinet adopted this proposal.
2.4.4
Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, February 28, 193311
The Reich Chancellor stated that a ruthless reckoning with the Communist Party was now urgently
needed. The right psychological moment for that reckoning had arrived. It was useless to wait any longer.
The German Communist Party was resolved to resort to extremes. The struggle against it must not be made
dependent on legal conditions. Since the arson in the Reichstag building he no longer doubted that the government
would capture 51 per cent of the votes in the election.
He had to submit several proposals to the Reich Cabinet:
(1) The Government should express its thanks to the personnel of the Reichstag building and the personnel of the
police and fire brigade who participated in fighting the fire.
(2) The Reichstag building had to be restored immediately.
(3) The outrage against the Reichstag building must not change the date of the election and the convening of the
Reichstag.
10
11
Source: DGFP, C 1, No. 7 pp. 15-16.
Source: DGFP C 1, No 42, pp. 88-90.
23
(4) He proposed that the Town Palace in Potsdam should be the place for the meeting of the Reichstag.
(5) The issuance of a decree for the protection of society against the Communist danger was urgently needed. Also
needed was the special protection of all cultural monuments of the German people. .
He estimated the damage to the Reichstag building at 3 to 4 million Reichsmarks. The repairs would in
his opinion take two years.
Reich Minister Göring stated that it was impossible for a single arsonist to have started the conflagration.
the setting of the fire was carefully prepared for at least an hour in advance. The police had behaved in an
exemplary manner. According to a statement of the Dutch Communist arrested he had also been in touch with the
German Social Democratic party. To be sure, the man arrested had indeed asserted that he was the only one
involved in the outrage. But no credibility should be attached to this statement. He, Reich Minister Göring,
assumed that there were at least six or seven involved in the outrage.
The arsonist together with the Communist Reichstag Deputy, Torgler, was observed some time before
the fire by unexceptionable witnesses. Both had been walking about in the Reichstag building. The question arose
why the Communists had instigated this outrage. Her, Minister Göring, did not believe that the attempt had been
decided on because of the closing of Liebknecht House. he was more inclined to believe that the outrage upon the
Reichstag building had been decided on and carried out because of the seizure of voluminous secret material of the
Communist Party by the Prussian police. From the material seized it appeared that the Communists wanted to form
terror groups, intended to put fire to public buildings, wanted to put poison into public kitchens, sacrificing if
necessary even some of their own followers; and that they also wanted to kidnap as hostages the wives and
children of Ministers and other high-ranking personages.
The Communist Party headquarters was, in his opinion, being conducted by Münzenberg. the
Communists Remmele and Schneller, who could not be found by the police, had been arrested by SS men.
Unfortunately the loss of three SA men, who had been shot dead during the night, had to be deplored.
He, Reich Minister Göring, had taken the following measures:
He had ordered the temporary closing of all museums and palaces. Furthermore he had provided for a
better surveillance of the government quarter. Besides the Communist press he had also prohibited the Social
Democratic press in the whole territory of the Reich. He had ordered the closing of the premises of the German
Communist party and the arrest of all Communist deputies and party officials who could be reached. For the
regular police (Schutzpolizei) and the criminal police the highest state of readiness had been ordered. Today 2,000
SA and SS men would march through the city in support of the police.
The Reich Minister of the interior stated that he had originally intended, in view of the arson in the
Reichstag building, to change the decree of February 4 for the protection of the German people. But now he had
decided to work out, proceeding from a decree of July 20 of last year, the draft of a decree for the protection of the
people and the state.
The Reich Minister of the Interior thereupon read the draft of the decree for the protection of the people
and the state.
The Vice Chancellor and Reich Commissioner of Prussia voiced some objections against the text of
paragraph 2 of the draft, according to which the Reich Minister of the Interior may temporarily exercise the powers
of the supreme state authority in a state if the measures necessary for the restoration of public security and order
are not being taken. He declared that such a wording would arouse the resistance of the South German states in
particular. It would be better to come to an amicable arrangement with the states about the measures to be taken.
2.4.5
From Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, 2 March 193312
Reich Minister Göring stated with regard to the measures directed against the Communists that last night important
material on the Communist plans had been found. The time for setting off the operation had first been fixed for the
evening and the night of Election Day, but had then been postponed to the middle of March. A Pharus map of
Berlin had been found in duplicate, on which all important electrical control stations, subways, transformer
stations were indicated. One copy had been in the hands of headquarters; the other had been cut up and distributed
to the individual groups. The map was being photographed. In consequence the powerlines were being guarded
with special care.
From the material the close connection that existed with Moscow was also evident. The German
Communists had been given a time limit within which to do something. Otherwise they would be deprived of their
subsidies. The directive concerning the operation and the photograph of the map would be sent to the ministers
personally. He did not consider it feasible to publish it because it might provoke acts of sabotage.
[. . .]
The Reich Minister of the Interior considered it necessary, even before the election, to take measures in favour of
the people without means, particularly the unemployed, which would result in relieving their situation. He was
thinking primarily of the delivery of free coal on ration cards in the amount of some five Zentners13 for each
household. That would be an expenditure for the individual household of from eight to ten Reichsmarks. The coal
stocks would be reduced. After the elections it would be necessary to achieve substantial savings in relief for the
unemployed. Then the expenditures could be balanced again.
12
13
Source: DGFP, C 1, No. 44, pp. 93-97.
250 Kilos.
24
The Reich Chancellor considered such action desirable and effective. In the discussion that followed, it
appeared, however, that at least 20 to 30 million Reichsmarks would have to be spent for this.
The Reich Minister of Finance proposed that, instead of the delivery of coal, certain agricultural products
should be distributed at reduced prices or free, either to the unemployed in general or limited to certain distressed
areas. It would be a question primarily of butter and grain. They had to be consumed in additional quantities.
The State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture explained the statements by saying
that out of the butter subsidy 2,000 tons were available that could be given away free or against payment of
charges. But the quantity was too small for a general distribution. Certain distressed areas came into consideration,
such as Berlin, Upper Silesia, Thuringia, Ruhr and Rhineland, the Free State of Saxony, Königsberg, which
together would comprise a quarter of the German population. Relief with bread grains could also be considered,
particularly in the Bavarian Forest, the Thuringian Forest, in the Allgäu, in the Erzgebirge. The distribution would
best be by the authorities, not by other organisations. The quantities of butter owned by the Government would,
however, be too small even for the distressed areas. It would be possible, to be sure, to continue the butter subsidy
and thus make greater quantities available. For this purpose some four million would be needed, two million of
which would be available from savings. Altogether an operation of this kind would cost five to six million.
The Cabinet agreed to this proposal.
2.4.6
From Minutes of the Conference of Ministers, 7 March, 193314
The Reich Chancellor opened the meeting and stated that the newly-elected Reichstag had best convene in the
period from 3 to 8 April. The formal opening session was to take place in the Potsdam Garrison Church.
[. . . ]
There would now have to be a large-scale campaign of propaganda and information in order that no
political lethargy should set in. This operation of informing the people conducted from a central office to be newly
established. It should be borne in mind that the overwhelming electoral victory of the National Socialists was
achieved in part with the help of persons who would ordinarily not vote, and who, if not given adequate political
information, would soon return to the ranks of the non-voters. The assertion that many Communists had switched
to the National Socialists was not true. The situation was, on the contrary that former Social Democratic voters had
voted National Socialist and former Communist voters had voted Social Democratic. As far as the voters of the
Centre and the Bavarian People’s Party were concerned, they could not be won over by the national parties until
the Curia had dropped both parties.
A bold attack on the problem of the relation of the Reich to the Länder was necessary. . . The frequent
elections to approximately fifty different bodies in the German Reich were very awkward. It was necessary to
establish the present and future composition of the Reichstag as the ratio for the composition of all the Diets.
He regarded the events of 5 March as a revolution. In the end Marxism would no longer exist in
Germany.
What was necessary was an enabling law with a two-thirds majority. He, the Reich Chancellor, was
firmly convinced that the Reichstag would pass such a law. The deputies of the German Communist party would
not appear at the opening of the Reichstag because they were in gaol.
[. . . ]
The Minister of the Interior reported on the events in Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and Hessen. he stated
that measures by the Reich had to be taken, because otherwise the greatest danger to order and security would have
existed in these Länder. The present rulers in these Länder struck no responsive chord in the people; the discipline
of the police seemed endangered if the Reich did not intervene.
Also in Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and Saxony, new ordering of governmental conditions was
urgently recommended.
2.4.7
Chancellor Hitler to President Hindenburg, 5 April 193315
Dear Herr President: The counteraction of the German people against the swamping of certain professions by the
Jews is caused by two things:
First, the obvious injustice that exists on account of the outrageous slighting of the dominant German
people [Staatsvolk]. For today there is a whole series of learned professions , e.g. the professions of the lawyers
and doctors, in which in individual localities of the Reich - Berlin and other cities - the Jews occupy up to 80 per
cent and more of all positions. At the same time hundreds of thousands of German intellectuals, including
innumerable veterans of the war, are on the dole or have some sort of entirely subordinate position and become
entirely demoralised.
14
15
Source: DGFP, C 1, No. 54, pp.113-115.
Source: DGFP, C1, No. 141, pp. 253-255.
25
Second, the serious shock to the authority of the State caused by the fact that here an alien body that was
never entirely amalgamated with the German people, and whose ability is mainly in the business field, has pushed
into governmental positions and furnishes here the mustard seed for a corruption about the extent of which today
one still has no conception that would come close to being adequate. The cleanness of the old Prussian State
depended in no small degree on the fact that the Jews had only a very limited access to the civil service. The
officers’ corps kept himself almost entirely clear of it. The German people to an overwhelming majority also
recognise the these defects emotionally and suffer together from their consequences. The counteraction in the
present day form was set off only by the entirely unjustified attack made by the Jews through their international
atrocity and boycott agitation.
It is understandable that in such a muddled situation the counteraction involves serious consequences for
the individual. But unemployment is no harder for a Jewish intellectual than the unemployment that has affected
millions of our own people. And it has affected them as a result of general conditions for which they cannot be
blamed, but for which on the whole one must make alien factors responsible which, even before November 1918
and particularly since then, have pursued a systematic destruction of the Reich.
Herr Field Marshall, in a generous and humane way you are taking up the cause of those members of the
Jewish people who at one time were forced to perform war service as a result of general conscription. I have
complete understanding for this noble humane sentiment, Herr Field Marshall. May I nevertheless respectfully
point out that the members and supporters of my movement, who were Germans, were for years driven from all
government positions without regard for wife and child and without regard for the war service they had performed.
Even formerly the National Socialist Party had the highest percentage of war veterans in its parliamentary
grouping in the Reichstag. Everything was represented in it, beginning with generals and officers with Pour le
Mérite down to the simple private. And it’s exactly the same with members and supporters. Nevertheless the
members of the largest movement of millions of the German people, whose primary aim in the struggle was the reestablishment of a German Wehrmacht, were not allowed to work in government enterprises even as workers or
clerks. Those responsible for this cruelty were the same Jewish parties who are complaining today when their
supporters with a thousand times more justification are barred from access to government positions in which they
can be of little use but can do a limitless amount of damage. It was only through your intervention, Herr Field
Marshal, that this outlawing of the members of my movement was done away with in individual cases, and then
finally in general. Nevertheless, Her Field Marshall, I respect the noble motives of your sentiment, and I have
already discussed with Interior Minister Frick the preparation of a law that will remove the solution of these
questions from the arbitrariness of separate actions and regulate them in general by a law.
[. . .]
Herr Reich President, please be convinced that I shall try to take into account your noble sentiment to the
greatest possible extent. I understand your inner motivations and, moreover, I myself often suffer from the
harshness of a fate that forces one to make German decisions which for humane reasons one would wish a
thousand times to avoid.
The law under consideration will be drafted as soon as possible, and I am convinced that this question,
too, will then have found the best possible solution.16
In sincere and deep respect, yours etc.
ADOLF HITLER
16
Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, April 7 1933.
26
2.5
Gleichschaltung
2.5.1
The Nazification of Local Government in Hamburg: Nationalist senator Paul de Chapeaurouge to
Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, 9 March 1933
...On the morning of 3 March, the Social Democrat Senators resigned from the Senate because they did not
want to consent to the ban on the Echo contemplated by the Reich Government. The remaining bourgeois
Senators pronounced this ban, which was undoubtedly permissible by law, as their first official act.
After the resignation of the Social Democrat Senators, I, as the previous deputy police chief, had to take over the
police. I knew that I had taken on a very difficult office. But I had no idea that my administration would prove as
difficult as it at once became owing to the activities of the Reich Ministry of the Interior....
After the resignation of the Social Democrat Senators, the Senate's first duty was to continue to carry out its
functions in accordance with a strict observance of the Constitution and the laws until the new election, and to
try its best to achieve an early election [of the Senate]. This I was determined to do.
The Reich Government had the clear duty of supporting the Senate as the official organ of legal power. In my
opinion, the Reich Ministry of the Interior, which is mainly responsible for relations with the states, failed in its
task. To a large extent it bears the responsibility for the developments in Hamburg. The city was quite calm;
according to absolutely reliable information given to the police, no serious disturbance of public Order was to
be expected from the Left. The course of events has proved the correctness of this opinion held by the police
authorities.
Unrest occurred in Hamburg only because a few authorities, especially the Gau leadership of the NSDAP, sent
alarmist reports to Berlin and caused the Reich Minister of the Interior to ask the Senate officially to transfer the
command of the police to the former police lieutenant, Richter [an SA leader]. This suggestion was apparently
passed on from Berlin simultaneously to the NSDAP and the press. In Hamburg it was underlined by wild press
articles and by pressure on the members of the Senate in personal discussions in a most questionable way, and thus
the Situation was aggravated.
The course which the Senate should have followed was laid down in the Constitution. According to the
Constitution and the law. it was unable to meet the request which had been made. In my opinion, since the election
to the Senate was obviously to take place shortly, it was the Reich Minister's duty to urge the (lim leadership of the
NSDAP, which prided itself on its constant contact with the Ministry, to maintain law and order so that the
Constitution and the law would not be broken before the forthcoming election. But, so far as I could observe
events, there were no such attempts at persuasion. Despite the alarmist press articles. Hamburg remained
completely peaceful; only the police, among whom the NSDAP had begun an active Propaganda campaign
some time before, begari to waver...
...The Hamburg events were, in my opinion, determined by the NSDAP’s Intention, known to me since 3
March, of gaining control of the police before the election of the Senate. This aim could not be achieved owing to
the present legal position in Hamburg. Therefore, the NSDAP tried to reach their goal via the Reich. Owing
to the fact that the NSDAP did not want to wait over the police question, circumstances have developed in
Hamburg which are very regrettable from the point of view of police discipline and public order in the future.
The fact was noted that the final order of the Reich Minister of the Interior to the Senate to give the command of
the police to Police Lieutenant Richter apparently reached the Gau headquarters of the NSDAP before it
reached the Senate. Furthermore, the way in which Gauleiter Kaufman and Harry Hennigsen, [NSDAP]
member of the city council, conveyed the order of the Reich Ministry of the Interior to the Senate was in no way
appropriate to the importance and gravity of the moment.
It is my firm conviction that, if the Reich Ministry of the Interior had used its füll authority to persuade the NSDAP
to keep the peace, Hamburg would have been spared the events of 5 March, so constitutionally and politically
unsatisfactory. The situation now is that, contrary to the solemn promises of the Reich Government, an interference
in Hamburg's sovereignty has taken place which could have been avoided and is undesirable from the point of
view of the initial work on the Reich reform... .
I must add a few personal remarks: I regard the procedure of the Reich Ministry of the Interior towards Hamburg
as at the same time an injustice towards myself. The Reich Ministry knows who I am and where I stand politically
and as a soldier. I met State Secretary Pfundtner only a few weeks ago at a dinner of the local Nationalist
Club, of which I have been a member since its foundation, given in honour of the presence of His Royal
Highness the Duke of Coburg-Gotha. In former times there was a way by which a German officer, a German
graduate could take the law into his own hands. Today, unfortunately, I have to confine myself to asking you,
Vice-Chancellor, to inform the Reich Government of my letter in the hope that they will then adopt the correct
attitude towards me... .
2.5.2
Nazification of the Judicial System: Testimony at Nuremberg by Dr Hans Anschütz, judge and
public prosecutor in Baden in the 1930s.
Immediately after the seizure of power those who were undesirable for political or racial reasons were eliminated
or demoted from leading positions to unimportant ones; in particular they were eliminated from criminal courts.
For this purpose they used the Law concerning the Reconstruction of the Professional Civil Service of 7 April
1933, which did away with the principle that judges could not be removed or demoted and thereby destroyed the
guarantees of the independence of justice.
27
Subsequently, the sister of spying upon and supervising the political opinions of each citizen, which permeated the
entire public and private life in Germany, was, of course, also extend to judges. This spy system eventually
reached the point of open attacks and defamatory statements in the press; this was done particularly in the
newspapers der Stürmer and Das Schwarze Korps, which took delight in distorting reports of trials and in naming
those judges who had imposed sentences which the party considered intolerable. The political power of these
papers, or rather of those persons who are behind them, namely, Streicher and Himmler, was so great that not even
the Reich Minister of Justice succeeded in having them publish corrections of trial reports which were
demonstrably untrue.
Finally, the German civil service code 26 January 1937 (effective as of 1 July 1937) placed judges on the same
level with all other public officials. Article 71 of this code made it possible to retire any official who indicated that
he was no longer prepared to intercede at all times for the National Socialist state.
But while even the German civil service code made certain exceptions for judges (Article 171 prohibited the
retirement of judges solely because of the contents of decisions made by them), Hitler, in the Reichstag meeting of
26 April 1942 had the Reichstag, confer upon him the ‘right’ to dismiss judges even without regard to vested
rights, if he thought it necessary. This Reichstag speech of Hitler's really constituted a signal testimonial to the
German judge because it showed that Hitler had reasons to be discontent with the administration of justice in that it
had not been sufficiently subservient to the party. After the issuance of the German civil service code, strong
pressure was brought to bear upon all officials, including judges, to join the NSDAP or not to reject requests to
join; otherwise there existed the danger that they might be retired or dismissed. Once a party member, a judge was
under party discipline and party jurisdiction which permitted his entire life as official and as private person. In
addition to these measures concerning judges, the party resorted to measures which might be characterised as the
‘undermining of regular jurisdiction’ and the ‘establishment of special jurisdiction’.
Until the end of 1933, the Supreme Court [Reichsgericht] was the highest German tribunal with jurisdiction of the
cases of treason and high treason. For that reason, the Reichstag fire trial still came before the Supreme Court. As
is well known, it ended with the acquittal of most of the accused, whom the regime had hoped to see convicted as
members of the Communist Party. After this trial, the Supreme Court was deprived of its jurisdiction in matters of
treason and high treason. This was transferred by law of 28 April 1934 to the newly created People's Court
[Volksgerichtshof], which consisted of only two professional judges (even these, of course, were selected primarily
because of political considerations) and five higher party functionaries. Thus, this court offered a guarantee that
the law will be applied exclusively in accordance with the principles of the NSDAP.
Even prior to this, the law of 21 March 1933 had created Special Courts [Sondergerichte] for the trial of political
crimes. Their members were appointed at first by the governing Council [Präsidium] of the District Court in
whose district the Special Court was established, and later by the Appeal Court President
[Oberländesgerichtspräsident]. Actually, only party members were made judges of the Special Courts.
A further means of influencing judges was contained in the institution of ‘judges’ letters’. In these letters, which
were issued by the Reich Ministry of Justice and destined for internal destination only, law cases were commented
upon as illustrative of good or bad examples; while no names of judges were contained in them, they did name the
respective courts and thus exercised pressure on the judges.
Under the slogan of ‘Directed Justice’, finally, they used pressure upon judges by having the public prosecutor
[Obertsaatsanwalt] in important criminal cases which might also include non-political matters, inform the
presiding judge prior to prior to the trial of the punishment which would be sought and point out that this sentence
would be expected of him.
The strongest interference with the administration of justice, however, developed increasingly after 1933 ‘outside
of’ the administration of justice. The police, under the command of the Reichsführer SS, arrested persons who
were persona non grata for political reasons were other reasons without judicial procedure (and, indeed, without
any procedure at all) and detained them in prisons and concentration camps. In political cases, it was the rule rather
than the exception that accused persons who have been acquitted by the court were taken immediately after the
trial into ‘protective custody’ by the police and thus disappeared into concentration camps.
Finally, the party sabotaged the administration of justice by failing to execute sentences imposed upon ‘old
fighters’ [alte Kämpfer] or otherwise specially favoured party comrades and by nullifying the sentences through
the arbitrary exercise of the right to pardon.
The foregoing list of attempts to influence justice is of course by no means complete.17
Doc. 1964-PS, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression vol. 5, cited in Saxe and Kuntz, Inside Hitler’s
Germany, pp. 142-4 (edited).
17
28
2.6
National Revolution
2.6.1
Hitler’s distinction between means and ends as a witness of the trial of three Nazis, Leipzig, 1930
The National Socialist movement will try to achieve its aim with constitutional means in this state. The
constitution prescribes only the methods, not the aim. In this constitutional way we shall try to gain decisive
majorities in the legislative bodies so that the moment we succeed we can give the state the form that
corresponds to our ideas.
The chairman of the court summed up the Statement to the effect that the setting up of the Third Reich was
being worked for in a constitutional way... 18
2.6.2
Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of People and State, 28 February 1933
By the authority of Section 48, paragraph 2 of the German constitution the following is ordered as a defence
against communist acts of violence endangering the state:
§ 1. Sections 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the constitution of the German state are suspended until
further notice. There are therefore restrictions on personal liberty, the right of free expression of opinion, including
freedom of the press, association and assembly, violations of the privacy of communication by post, telegraph and
telephone, search warrants for houses, confiscation orders and restrictions on property rights are permissible
beyonfd the legal powers otherwise prescribed.
§ 2. If in any German state [Land] the measures necessary for the restoration of public security and order are not
taken, then the Reich government can provisionally assume supreme power in that state.
§ 3. The authorities of the federal states and local government are obliged to comply to the limits of their
responsibilities with the orders of the Reich government issued under the provisions of § 2.
§ 4[…]Whoever provokes, or appeals for, or incites inractions of the Orders given out by the supreme Reich
authorities or the authorities subject to them for the execution of this decree, or the Orders given by the Reich
Government according to § 2, is punishable — insofar as the deed is not covered by other decrees with more
severe punishments — with imprisonment of not less than one month, or with a fine from 150 up to 15,000
Reichsmarks.
Whoever endangers human life by violating § l, is to be punished by sentence to a penitentiary, under mitigating
circumstances with imprisonment of not less than six months and, when violation causes the death of a person,
with death, or, under mitigating circumstances with a penitentiary sentence of not less than two years. In addition
the sentence may include confiscation of property.
Whoever provokes or incites to an act contrary to public welfare is to be punished with a penitentiary sentence,
under mitigating circumstances, with imprisonment of not less than three months.
§ 5 The crimes which under the Criminal Code are punishable with a penitentiary life sentence are to be
punished with death: i.e., in Sections 81 (high treason), 229 (poisoning), 306 (arson), 311 (properties), 324
(general poisoning).
Insofar as a more severe punishment has not been previously provided for, the following are punishable with death
or with life imprisonment or with imprisonment not to exceed 15 years [...]
6. This regulation enters into force on the date of the announcement.
2.6.3
Execution of the ordinance for security of people and state (national security) in Prussia (circular)
As a defence against the criminal, communist activities and a means of ruthless suppression of this source of peril,
whose extremely dangerous scope has been revealed at the last minute, the Reich president decided on 28 Feb.
1933 to proclaim the decree for the protection of the people and the state. (Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, page 83.)
For the actual application of the measures authorised in this decree, I give the following directions:
1. Sect. 1 of the decree not only suspends temporarily articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the
constitution; it rather eliminates all other Reich and state limitations in this matter, as far as this is necessary or
practical in order to reach the aims of this decree. Within this framework police officials thus may go beyond the
restrictions laid down by the provisions of sections 14 and 41 of the Prussian police code, their orders still remain
police ordinances of police warrants and thus as far as form is concerned remain subject to the applicable
regulations. However, violations are punished according to sect. 4 of the decree which in this respect prevails,
according to p. 4 of the preceding decree. Conforming to the aim and purpose of the decree, the additional
permissible actions will be directed primarily against the communists, but also against all those working with the
communists or even indirectly supporting or promoting their criminal aims. To avoid any blunder, I remind you
that the decree for the protection of the people and state, dated 28 Feb. 1933, should be used against members or
institutions other than communist, anarchist or social democratic parties or organisations, when such measures
serve for the defence against such communist tendencies in their broadest meaning. In other cases the decree of 2
April 1933 shall be applied. Labour unions shall not be put on the same level with Social Democratic
organisations.
18
Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol 1, p. 90
29
2. The local police has principal jurisdiction for all those police measures, which are permissible after the legal
limitations mentioned under 1. have been removed. The jurisdiction has been changed by my decree of 3 Feb.
1933, (G.S. page 33) based on section 3 par. 5 of the Prussian police Code. Consequently all regulations dealing
with the suspension of a periodical or the restriction of property have to be issued from the state police offices.
Regulations concerning personal liberty, the right to assemble and congregate, or restrictions concerning the
secrecy of mails, communications, telegraph and cable may be ordered by the district police only, (Section 3, part
2, P.V.G.).19
2.6.4
The erection of the first concentration camp outside Munich, March 1933
On Wednesday the first concentration camp will be erected near Dacahu, with a capacity for 5,000 people. All the
Communists, and as far as is necessary, all the Reichsbanner and Social Democratic functionaries who endanger
the security of the state, will be brought here, because it is not possible in the long term to accommodate these
functionaries in court prisons, and places too great a burden on the state is too overburdened. It has become evident
that it is not appropriate to leave these people at liberty, as they continue to agitate and create disorder. We must
take this measure in the interests of the security of the state and without regard to pedantic objections. 20
2.6.5
Rudolf Diels, Head of Political Department IA of the Berlin Police Prasidium (subsequently the
Geheimes Staatpolizeiamt)
From all parts of the capital we in the IA received rumours, police information, complaints and victory reports of SA
operations. Unlike the Party, the SA was all prepared to seize power. It had no need of homogeneous leadership; the
Gruppenstab set the example but gave no orders. The SA Stürme, however, had firm plans for operations in the Communist
quarters of the city. In those March days every SA man was ‘on the heels of the enemy’, each knew what he had to do.
The Stürme cleaned up the districts. They knew not only where their enemies lived, they had also long ago discovered
their hideouts and meeting places. ... Not only the Communists but anybody who had ever expressed himself against
Hitler’s movement was in danger...
SA men broke up the contents of the home of Reich President Ebert’s son. They forced their way into the homes of
the owners of the publishing houses of Ullstein and Mosse. They took off any of the members of the Weltbühne and the
Tagebuch on whom they could lay hands.... SA leaders no longer went anywhere on foot. The gay Victors roared along
the Kurfürstendamm and the Linden in elegant automobiles. Manufacturers or shopkeepers had presented them with these
cars or put them at their disposal in order to assure themselves protection. The cars of Jews and democrats were simply
confiscated. ... In those March days the concentration camps around Berlin were set up. News was received of camps near
Oranienburg, Königswusterhausen and Bornim.... ‘Private prisons’ were set up in various parts of the city. The
‘bunkers’ in the Hedemann and Vossstrasse became hellish torture chambers. The SS Columbia prison, the worst of
these torture chambers, was established....
The uprising of the Berlin SA electrified the most distant parts of the country. Revolutionary conditions prevailed in
many big cities where the powers of the police had been transferred to local SA leaders.... In Lower Silesia SAGruppenführer Heins of Breslau established a reign of terror. In the northern Rhineland it was SS-Gruppenführer
Weitzel who as Police President of Düsseldorf together with SA-Führer Lobek displayed fanatical radicalism. The Ruhr
towns were dominated by Terboven’s SA. East Prussia, where Gauleiter Koch had allowed neither the SA nor the SS to
come to the fore, was ruled by the political leaders. The fight was directed against ‘reaction’. It was as though the country
was in a state of war in which the aristocracy as the imaginary enemy was subjected to duress. In Stettin the example of
SA-Gruppenführer von Heydebreck encouraged the Pomeranian SA to terrorise the country. From Rostock, Stargard and
Greifswald came reports of cases of maltreatment. Some victims had died under torture.21
2.6.6.
Bavarian Justice Minister Hans Frank to Bavarian Interior Minister, 21 April 1933
According to reports received from the Prosecutors General, prisons continue to be crowded as a result of being filled
with prisoners in protective custody. I am therefore compelled once more to draw your attention to troubles caused by
over-crowding. Keeping too many prisoners in insufficient space seriously affects their physical health and leads to major
imprisonment psychoses, particularly in the absence of any possibility of work. Moreover, with the existing staff it is impossible to supervise the prisoners effectively. In addition, the crowding caused by accommodating protective custody
prisoners has resulted in serious delays in carrying out sentences. As I said in my letter of n April 1933 No. IV 11302a,
in many instances prison sentences would not be served. For the same reason suspects who ought to have been
remanded in custody for the unhampered investigation of their case could not and cannot be remanded. Present
19
1933 Ministerial Gazette for the Internal Administration of Prussia, p.503, Trials of the Major War Criminals, 2371-PS
(Avalon Project)
20
Völkischer Beobachter 21 March 1933, in Wolfgang Michalka (ed.) Deutsche Geschichte 1933-1945. Dokumente zur Innenund Außenpolitik (Frankfurt, 1993), p.23.
21
Rudolf Diels, Lucifer ante portas (Stuttgart, 1950), p.50, cited in Krausnick and Broszat, Anatomy, p.p. 151-2
30
conditions therefore prevent the orderly administration of justice and endanger vital interests of State and people.
They are unbearable for the Law and cannot be tolerated any longer. I must therefore urge you to see that prisons
are immediately relieved of all persons in protective custody..
A copy of this letter has been sent to the Politische Polizeikommandeur of Bavaria.22
2.6.7
The End of the National Revolution: Hitler to Reichsstatthalter, 6 July 1933
The political parties have now been eliminated in full. [...] The achievement of external power must now be
followed by internal education. Care must be taken to avoid making purely formal decisions in a rush and
expecting this to bring a lasting solution. People are easily capable of bending an outer form into one bearing the
stamp of their own ideas.
A change, of course, can only be made when the persons required for such a change are present. More revolutions
have succeeded in the initial onslaught than successful revolutions brought to a standstill. The revolution is not a
permanent state of affairs, and it must not be allowed to develop into any such permanent state. The river of the
revolution which has been released must be channelled into the safe bed of evolution. The most important thing
in this connection is the education of the individual. Today’s conditions must be improved and the people
embodying them must be instilled with a National Socialist concept of the state. Thus a businessman may not be
dismissed if he is a good businessman but not yet a National Socialist, particularly if the National Socialist appointed in
his place does not understand anything about business. In business, ability alone must be the decisive factor.
It is the task of National Socialism to ensure the development of our nation. However, we should not be searching
to see if there is anything left to revolutionise; rather, it is our task to secure position after position, to hold our
positions and to make exemplary appointments to these positions in a gradual process. In doing so, we must focus our
actions on the space of many years and think in terms of relatively long periods of time. Theoretical Gleichschaltung
will not enable us to provide bread to workers. Moreover, history will not judge us according to whether we have
dismissed and jailed the largest possible number of businessmen, but rather according to whether we have been
able to provide work.
Today we have the absolute power to enforce our will everywhere. But we must also be able to replace those who
are dismissed with better people.
In the long term, security in terms of power politics will be all the greater, the more we are able to underpin it
economically. It is the task and the responsibility of the Reichsstatthalter to ensure that no arbitrary organisations or
party offices claim for themselves governmental authority, dismiss individuals or make appointments to offices, for
these are matters in which the Reich Government – and in respect to the economy, the Reich Minister of
Economics – alone is competent. The Party has now become the state. All power lies in the authority of the Reich. It
must not come to pass that the main emphasis in German life be transferred back to individual areas or, much less,
individual organisations. Authority is no longer anchored in any partial area of the Reich, but in the concept of the
German nation itself!
22
Cited in Krausnick and Broszat, Anatomy, pp. 149-50
31
3.
The Nazi State
3.1.1
The Enabling Law, 24 March 1933
The Reichstag has passed the following law, which is, with the approval of the Reichsrat, herewith promulgated, after it
has been established that it satisfies the requirements for legislation altering the Constitution.
Article 1. In addition to the procedure for the passage of legislation outlined in the Constitution, the Reich Cabinet is
also authorised to enact Laws. This applies equally to the laws referred to in Article 85, paragraph 2, and Article 87
of the Constitution.
Article 2. The national laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet may deviate from the Constitution provided they do not
affect the position of the Reichstag and the Reichsrat. The powers of the President remain unaffected.
Article 3. The national laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet shall be prepared by the Chancellor and published in the
official gazette. They come into effect, unless otherwise specified, upon the day following their publication. Articles
68-77 of the Constitution do not apply to the laws enacted by the Reich Cabinet.
Article 4. Treaties of the Reich with foreign states which concern matters of domestic legislation do not require
the consent of the bodies participating in legislation. The Reich Cabinet is empowered to issue the necessary
provisions for the implementing of these treaties.
Article 5. This law comes into effect on the day of its publication. It ceases to be valid on l April 1937: it also
ceases to be valid if the present Reich Cabinet is replaced by another.
3.1.2
Carl Schmitt on the ‘Enabling Law’. 1933
What then is the significance of the Reich law of 24 March 1933, which was passed with the required two thirds
majority on 24 March 1933, in the manner of a law amending the constitution in accordance with the conditions
set out in Article 76 of the Weimar Constitution. This so-called ‘Enabling Law’ was enacted by the Reichstag to
implement the will of the people as manifested in the Reichstag election of 5 March 1933. In reality, seen from the
point of view of legal theory, the law was a referendum, a plebiscite, through which the German people recognised
Adolf Hitler, the leader of the National Socialist movement, as political leader of the German people. The
communal [local] elections of 12 March reinforced the same popular will. So both the Reichstag and the Reichsrat
[state council] were acting here only as executive organs of the popular will. In terms of the conventional wisdom
of the hitherto so-called positivist legal minds it nevertheless seems possible to find the legal basis of the present
state in this law. The expression ‘Enabling Law’ reinforces the tendency to make this mistake. It is therefore
necessary to recognise the term ‘Enabling Law’ as a legally [juristisch] imprecise, in fact an incorrect designation,
and it would be advisable to avoid the term altogether, in so far as it appears neither in the title (Law for the
Alleviation of the Distress of People and State), nor in the text of the law itself and has only been attributed to the
law externally. In reality this ‘Enabling Law’ is a provisional constitutional law for the new Germany.
[…] The German revolution was legal, i.e. according to the earlier constitution it was formally correct. It was thus
out of discipline and a German sense of order. Moreover its legality signifies only a feature of the earlier Weimar
constitution, of a defeated system. It would be legally wrong, and an act of political sabotage to assume from this
kind of legality the continuing validity of an obsolete legal concept [Rechtsgedanken], institutions or norms, and
thereby continue to submit to the letter or the spirit of the Weimar constitution. The sound law [das gute Recht] of
the German revolution is not based on the readiness of several dozen Deputies to use their votes to bridge the gap
between a simple and a two-thirds majority, and the law of the present German state does not depend on the
conditions, stipulations, or mental reservations with which that group gave its consent. It would be equally
contrary, politically, politically, morally and legally, to grant the power of enablement from a position of
powerlessness, and in this way to steal back power for a system that has become powerless. Life cannot legitimate
itself through death, and power need not legitimate itself through powerlessness. […] 23
...
23
Wolfgang Michalka (ed.) Deutsche Geschichte 1933-1945
32
3.1.3
Franz von Papen on the Enabling Law
After the Chancellor's declaration, Dr Kaas (Zentrum), Ritter von Lex (Bavarian People’s Party), Maier
(Staatspartei) and Simpfendoerfer (Christian Socialists) undertook that their parties would support the Enabling
Law. After a speech by Reichstag President, Goering, the Enabling Law was passed in the Third Reading by 441 to
94; that is, with the necessary two-thirds majority. The Reichstag adjourned sine die...’ So runs the official report.
A whole library has been written about how the Enabling Law helped Hitler towards total dictatorship - most of it
written by those who voted for the Law in good faith and now seek some justification for doing so. There is no
doubt that Hitler's dictatorship and the self-dissolution of Parliament begins at this point. But those who voted for the
Law bear an equal responsibility with the ministers who presented it.
I have already mentioned Brüning's article in the Deutsche Rundschau of July 1947. In it he remarks that the
Communists should have surrendered their 81 seats to the Socialists, thereby giving them 201 seats and enabling
them to play a much more decisive role. This is a completely unrealistic Suggestion. If the Communists had exhorted
their followers to vote for the Socialists in the elections on March 5, the Social Democrats would only have
inherited the violent campaign of suppression to which the Communists were subjected. Brüning juggles with
figures to prove that Hitler's two-thirds majority could have been prevented, But the Reichstag had 647 seats, twothirds of which is 431. Hitler obtained 441 votes for the Law, which is nearer three-quarters. The Communists had
been banned from the Reichstag and some Socialist members arrested (although I managed to obtain the release
of Severing and others), but they still could not have prevented the majority.
Brüning maintained that Hitler was prepared to go on arresting opposition members until he obtained his majority.
There is no proof of this, and in any case, the combined opposition parties were always in a position to prevent his
getting the necessary vote. It was no doubt alarming to see the Reichstag Building full of Brownshirts, but then
Brüning is not a man who lacks physical courage. He would do much better to admit the opposition was not
browbeaten itno voting for the Law, but did so out of conviction. I cannot admit the idea that nothing would have
been gained by rejecting the Enabling Law because the Nazis would then have dissolved all opposition parties
under the decree of February 28. Brüning forgets that at the time Hitler would not have been able to carry through
any such measures. Up to the end of April, I had taken part, at the President's express request, in all his interviews
with Hitler. The President and the Conservative members of the Cabinet were always in a position to block such
radical measures. It is pure nonsense to suggest that the President could have been brought before the
Constitutional Court, had the Nazis made up their minds to overcome his Opposition by appointing Hitler in his
place. Such a step was neither planned nor possible, and cannot be used as an excuse for voting for the Enabling Law.
At the Nuremberg trial I gave a full account of my own efforts to ensure against dictatorial abuses of the Law. The
best weapon was always the President’s right of veto, and with my influence on him, I hoped to put this to good use.
However, the President soon expressed a wish to dissociate himself from the decisions of the Cabinet and Hitler’s
measures, and this affected my own influence. It is very convenient for critics to declare that it was obvious from the
start that Hitler had no intention of keeping his promises. But they destroy their own case, as the logical conclusion
would have been to vote against the Enabling Law, and anyone who failed to do so is hardly in a position to
proclaim himself a hero of the resistance.
It was this Law alone that provided the legal basis for Hitler's development as a dictator. Anyone who has been
accused, as I have, of underwriting the Nazi despotism, has a right to make this point. No one could possibly foresee
the actual course of events, and those now possessed of such hind-sight should ponder their own share of the
responsibility. The fact that all the parties, with the exception of the Social Democrats, voted for the Enabling
Law, had more effect on developments than the increased electoral support for the Nazis. If the Law had not been
passed, it would have been much more difficult to abolish constitutional guarantees and much easier to oppose
dictatorial methods.24
3.1.4
The office of the Führer
The office of Führer has developed out of the National Socialist Movement. In its origins it is not a state office.
This fact must never be forgotten if one wishes to understand the current political and legal position of the Führer.
The office of the Führer has grown out of the movement into the Reich, firstly through the Führer taking over the
authority of the Reich Chancellor and then through his taking over the position of head of state. Primary
importance must be accorded to the position of 'Führer of the movement’; it has absorbed the two highest
functions of the political leadership of the Reich and thereby created the new office of 'Führer of the Nation and of
the Reich’...
The position of Führer combines in itself all sovereign power of the Reich; all public power in the State as in
the movement is derived from the Führer power. If we wish to define political power in the völkisch Reich
correctly, we must not speak of ‘state power’ but of ‘Führer power’. For it is not the state as an impersonal entity
which is the source of political power but rather political power is given to the Führer as the executor of the
nation’s common will. Führer power is comprehensive and total; it unites within itself all means of creative
political activity; it embraces all spheres of national life; it includes all national comrades who are bound to the
Führer in loyalty and obedience. Führer power is not restricted by safeguards and controls, by autonomous
24
Franz von Papen, Memoirs (London,1952)
33
protected spheres, and by vested individual rights, but rather it is free and independent, exclusive and
unlimited. 25
3.2 State and Party
3.2.1 The Leadership Principle: Organisationsbuch der NSDAP 1936 (Robert Ley)
The Party was created by the Führer out of the realisation that if our people were to live and advance towards
an era of prosperity they had to be led according to an ideology suitable for our race. They must have as
supporters men above average, that means, men who surpass others in self-control, discipline, efficiency, and
greater judgment. The party will therefore always constitute a minority, the order of the National Socialist
ideology which comprises the leading elements of our people.
Therefore the party comprises only fighters, at all times prepared to assume and to give everything for the
furtherance of the National Socialist ideology. Men and women whose primary and most sacred duty is to serve
the people.
The NSDAP as the leading element of the German people control the entire public life, from an organisational
point of view, as well as from that of affiliates, the organisations of the state administration, and so forth.
In the long run it will be impossible to let leaders retain responsible offices if they have not been recognized
by the Party.
Furthermore, the party shall create the prerequisites for a systematic selection of potential ‘Führers’.
The reconstruction of the National Socialist organizational structure itself is demonstrated by the observation of
the following principles:
The Führerprinzip.
The Subordination and coordination within the structure of the entire organization. The regional unity. The
cxprcssion of the practical Community thought.
I. FÜHRER PRINCIPLE [FÜHRERPRINZIP]
The Führer Principle requires a pyramidal organization structure in its details as well as in its entirety.
The Führer is at the top.
He nominates the necessary leaders for the various spheres of work of the Reich’s direction, the Party apparatus
and the State administration.
Thus a clear picture of the tasks of the party is given.
The Party is the order of ‘Führers.’ It is furthermore responsible for the spiritual-ideological National Socialist
direction of the German people. The right to organize people for their own sake emanates from these reasons.
This also justifies the subordination to the party of the organisations concerned with the welfare of the people,
besides the inclusion of people in the affiliates of the party, the SA, SS, NSKK [Motor Corps], the Hitler Youth,
the NS Women's League, the NS German Student Union and the NS German ‘Dozentenbund’ [University
lecturers association].
This is where the National Socialist Führer structure becomes more strongly apparent.
Every single affiliate is cared for by an office of the NSDAP.
The leadership of the individual affiliates is appointed by the Party.
The Reich Organisation Leader [Reichsorganisationsleiter] of the NSDAP is simultaneously leader of the DAF
[German Labour Front]. The NSBO [Factory Cell Organization] is the organization bearer of the DAF.
The Leader of the Central Office for Public Welfare also handles within the ‘Personal union’ the National Socialist
People's Welfare Organization and the Winter Relief.
The same applies to:
The Reich Justice Office [Reichsrechtsamt] for the NS ‘Rechtswahrerbund’, The Central Office for Public
Health for the N S German Medical
Association,
The Central Office for Educators for the NS Teachers Association, The Central Office for Civil Servants for
the German Association of Civil Servants,
The Central Office for War Victims for the NS War Victim Relief, The Central Office for Technology for the N
S Association of German Technology.
The Central Office for Race and Resettlemcnt handles the National Association of Families with numerous
Childrcn [Reichsbund der Kinderreichen], the NS Women’s Organisation [Frauenschaft] and the Women's
Work Association.
The Reich Office for Agrarian Policy of the NSDAP remains furthermore in closest touch with the Reich Food Estate,
which is anchored in the state. Direct handling and personal contact of the leaders is also provided in this
manner.
All attached affiliates, as well as the offices of the Party, have their foundation, in the same manner as in the Reich
direction, in the sovereign territories, in the Gaue and furthermore in the districts [Kreise] and, if required, in the
local groups of the NSDAP. This applies also to cells and blocks in the case of the NS Women's League, the DAF,
25
E.R. Huber, Verfassungsrechtdes Grossdeutschen Reiches (Hamburg 1939) p. 142, in Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, vol. 2,
pp.198-9
34
and the NSV. The members of the attached affiliates will be included in local administrations, respectively district
sectors or district associations which correspond geographically to local groups of the Party. 26
3.2.2
Hitler to the Party Rank and File, 10 March 1933
Party Comrades! Men of the SA and the SS!
A tremendous upheaval has taken place in Germany! It is the fruit of the most difficult of struggles, the most
dogged persistence, and of the utmost discipline.
Unprincipled characters, mostly Communist spies, are attempting to compromise the Party with individual actions
which are not in any way related to the great task of the national uprising and can only damage and belittle the
accomplishments of our movement. In particular, there are attempts to bring about a conflict between the Party, or
Germany, and foreign countries by harassing foreigners in cars flying foreign flags. Men of the SA and SS! You must
apprehend such creatures yourselves immediately and call them to account for their actions; you must turn them over
to the police without delay, regardless of who they may be.
As of today, the National Government has the executive power over all of Germany in its hands. This means that the
national uprising will continue to be carried out methodically and under control from above. Only in instances when
these orders meet with resistance or when, as was the case in the past, surprise ambushes are made on individual
men or marching formations, should this resistance be immediately and thoroughly broken. Harassment of
individuals, the obstruction of cars, and disruptions to business are to be put to an absolute stop.
Comrades, you must make sure that the National Revolution of 1933 does not go down in history as a
counterpart to the revolution of the Rucksack-Spartakisten. And one more thing: never let yourselves be
distracted for one second from our watchword, which is the destruction of Marxism.
Berlin, March 10, 1933
Adolf Hitler27
3.2.3
Hitler to SA Men in Dortmund on the tasks of the future, 9 July 1933
Our foremost task consists of the following: we have power. No one can put up any resistance to us today. But now we
must educate the German individual for this State. An enormous piece of work will begin for the coming decades of
the German nation.
Our second task is: we see in Germany an enormous army of people who are without work and thus without a
reliable source of daily bread. The past state ruined the entire economy in fifteen years. Seven million people lost
their jobs. We have always declared that we are fighting not for some pale theories, but for the continued existence
of our nation.
Now we must master one of the greatest tasks ever assigned to statesmen. We must eliminate unemployment.
We are the largest organisation which has ever existed in Germany, but not only that: today we are the only
organisation. The fact that we have eliminated everything else has palced a tremendous burden of responsibility upon
us. We cannot load it on other people’s shoulders. This great responsibility forces us to lead this Movement in such
a way that we are able to hold our own before history at all times and later generations will look back on this time
with pride. But this Movement is also the German nation’s only hope and its only faith in the future.
Now that we have raised our flag throughout Germany as the flag of the state, we are obliged to ensure that nothing
happens which might dishonour this flag. The flagbearer is responsible for the honour of the flag. I bid you gather
together, my men of the SA and SS, and you of the Stahlhelm who have joined us, rally around this symbol of evolving
life and of the resurrection of our nation!
We must be the ones to fulfil the great tasks, for there is no one besides us who could clo it. Only despair would come
after us. Millions of unemployed have confidence in us. They perceive in us the only ones who can save them from
their need and misery. We will win the victory, for this victory is everything, it is Germany itself!28
3.2.4 Reich Minister of the Interior to the Land governments of 9 January 1934
Protective custody must not be used as a 'punishment', i.e. as substitute for a sentence passed by a court of law or by the
police, and its duration must not be fixed at the outset. In principle it is therefore not permissible to order a person to be
taken into protective custody instead of starting criminal proceedings against him. Recently there have been several cases
when lawyers were taken into protective custody. In so far as the lawyer merely represents his client's interests in
suitable form he may not be taken into protective custody even if the claim or application of his client is directed
against an organ of the State.29
26
Sax and Kuntz, Inside Hitler’s Germany, pp. 163-5
Domarus, Hitler, vol. 1, pp. 263-4
28
Domarus, Hitler, p.345
29
Krausnick and Broszat, Anatomy, p.157
27
35
3.2.5
Rudolf Diels to the Oberprasidenten and Regierungsprasidenten 16 January 1934
Whereas in the early days of the take-over it was possible to overlook this because the protection of the state against the
plots and machinations of its enemies required quick measures, unhampered by formal instructions, today the instructions
issued must be strictly observed. ... Anyone failing to do so will be called to account for misuse of authority and
restriction of liberty.30
3.2.6
Werner Willikens, State Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Agriculture, 21 February 1934
Everyone who has the opportunity to observe it knows that the Führer can hardly dictate from above everything
which he intends to realise sooner or later. On the contrary, up till now everyone with a post in the new Germany
has worked best when he has, so to speak, worked towards the Führer. Very often, and in many spheres it has been
the case – in previous years as well – that individuals have simply waited for orders and instructions.
Unfortunately, the same will be true in the future; but in fact it is the duty of everybody to try to work towards the
Führer along the line he would wish. Anyone who makes mistakes will notice it soon enough. But anyone who
really works towards the Führer along his lines and towards his goal will certainly both now and in the future one
day have the finest reward in the form of the sudden legal confirmation of his work. 31
3.2.7
Franz von Papen on his role in Hitler’s government
Whether my detractors like it or not, the fact remains that in the flood of excesses committed by the Nazi radicals, the
focal point of normality in the government was my Vice-Chancellery and its staff. The other ministers were happily
engaged in the technicalities of administration. But right up to the Roehm Putsch on June 30, 1934, my staff received
thousands of complaints, protests and warnings, which were sifted and, where necessary, brought to the attention of
the responsible ministers. In party circles we soon acquired the reputation of being a ‘nest of reactionaries’ and
our names were included in the lists of those ripe for liquidation. If a few of the Germans now engaged in
flooding the market with resistance legends had spent half their energy at the time in such real opposition, things
might have been different.
By the autumn the radical elements in the party had started their campaign against ‘outmoded’ theories of
individual freedom, of equality before the law, and the independence of the judiciary. In a speech at Bonn at the end
of May, I had already given a warning against this development. By December I considered it necessary to be more
explicit. The 150th anniversary of the founding of the Bremen Club gave me an opportunity to speak my mind to
two thousand people, including leading members of the party, in this ancient Hanseatic city. I dwelt on the things
that Hitler least wished to hear: the growing unrest in the nation at the attacks on the principles of law, and the
restrictions placed on the churches and the free development of individual personality. ‘The nation is becoming
divided into two camps,’ I declared. ‘Those who deny a personal existence to the individual, and those who see in
individual personality the fundamental basis of existence.’
In a violent attack on the Nazis' terror methods I stated, 'Non-members of the party are not second-class citizens
with inferior rights.' Every revolution was faced by the problem of harnessing its dynamics to orderly
administration. If it failed to do this, the basic values on which national life had been built up would be destroyed. I
compared the Party's anticlerical tendencies with the methods of the Bolsheviks. Their campaign against the judiciary
I described as a campaign against the very conception of law. My Statements were greeted with frenzied applause,
and it was clear that I had expressed the thoughts of a vast majority of my audience. The Party leaders present
drew their own conclusions. While they had turned up in full panoply to greet my arrival, not a single uniform was
seen at my departure form the station, and there was not a single Hitler salute. Senator Bernhard, who
accompanied me to the train, thanked me for my speech, saying that such criticism had become only too rare now
that the press had ceased to be an organ of true public opinion.32
30
Ibid.
Noakes and Pridham, Nazism II, p. 207
32
Papen, Memoirs, p.p. 305-6
31
36
3.2.8
Party interference in State Administration
The authority of the State is in danger through constant unjustified interference by political officials in the machinery of
normal administration.
Every NSBO functionary, NSBO local branch leader, NSBO district leader..., every political cell leader, political local
branch leader, political district leader is giving orders which interfere with the exercise of the authority of the ministries
at the lower levels, that is to say, the authority of the regional governments, the district offices, down to the smallest
police Station.
Everyone is arresting everyone else, avoiding the prescribed official channels, everyone is threatening everyone else
with protective custody, everyone is threatening everyone else with Dachau.
Businesses are being forced to dismiss any number of employees, and businesses are being compelled to take on
employees without checking on their qualifications...
Right down to the smallest police Station, the best and most reliable officials have become uncertain about the hierarchy
of authority; this clearly must have a devastating and destructive effect on the state.
I really cannot be counted among the pussyfooters, and for that very reason I must see that if the revolution is
to be turned into an ordered relationship between State and people, the State apparatus must be made completely
safe from all revolutionary interference from the street.
It must be left to the responsibility of the state ministries alone, both in the spheres of policy and of personnel,
to embody revolutionary ideas in a form which is suitable to thecommunity... .
Every little street cleaner today feels he is responsible for matters which he has never understood... .
No one can dispute that fact that, at the moment, two-thirds of the daily work in my area, and in all other areas I
know, has to be wasted on trifles arising from Party officials’ lack of discipline... .
The leadership principle is in grave danger from these conditions.... I do not mind if my giving this warning makes
me appear a grumbler. I can only state that these circumstances must inevitably lead to chaos. 33
3.2.9
The Night of the Long Knives: Statement of the Reich Press Office, 30 June 1933
For many months now, individual elements have attempted to drive wedges between the SA and the Party
and between the SA and the state and to create conflicts. More and more evidence arose in support of the
suspicion that these attempts were attributable to a limited clique with a definite purpose.
Chief of Staff Röhm, in whom the Führer had placed a rare trust, did not combat these manifestations but
unquestionably promoted them. His known unfortunate predisposition gradually became such an
insupportable burden that the Führer of the Movement and Supreme Commander of the SA was driven into an
extremely difficult moral dilemma.
Chief of Staff Rohm made contact with General Schleicher without the knowledge of the Führer. In doing so, he made
use of the services of an obscure character from Berlin of whom Adolf Hitler most strongly disapproves as well as those of
another SA leader. Due to the fact that these negotiations – likewise, of course, without the Führer’s knowledge –
ultimately involved a foreign power or, respectively, its representatives, an intervention was no longer avoidable,
both from the standpoint of the Party and from the standpoint of the State.
Strategically initiated incidents culminated in the fact that the Führer left Westphalia after he had toured labour
camps there, flying from Bonn to Munich at 2:00 a.m. this morning to order that the most seriously incriminated
leaders be removed from office and placed under arrest. The Führer proceeded to Wiessee in person with a small
escort in order to nip any attempt at resistance in the bud. The act of arresting the men was accompanied by such
morally pitiful scenes that every trace of sympathy was necessarily banned. A number of the SA leaders had taken
catamites (Lustknaben) with them. One of them was surprised in a most revolting (ekelhaft) situation and arrested.
The Führer issued the order to ruthlessly eradicate this plague spot. In the future he is no longer willing to tolerate
that millions of decent people are incriminated and compromised by isolated persons with pathological leanings.
The Führer issued the order to the Prussian Minister-President Göring to carry out a similar action in Berlin and
particularly crack down on the reactionary accomplices to this political conspiracy.
At 12:00 noon, the Führer made a speech to the higher-ranking SA leaders who had convened in Munich, in which he
stressed his unshakeable alliance with the SA, but at the same time announced his decision to show no mercy from now
on in exterminating and destroying (ausrotten und vernichten) undisciplined and disobedient characters and asocial
or diseased elements. He pointed out that Service in the SA was an honorary Service for which tens of thousands of
upright SA men had made the most difficult sacrifices. He expected from the leader of each SA division that he prove
himself worthy of these sacrifices and be a living example to his organization. He also pointed out that he had
defended Chief of Staff Rohm for years against the heaviest attacks but that the most recent development had forced
him to place all personal feeling second to the welfare of the Movement and to that of the state, and that above all
he would eradicate and nip in the bud any attempt to propagate a new upheaval by ludicrous circles of pretentious
characters.34
‘Eyewitness’ report: Press statement of 30 June
33
The perspective of an SA leader, quoted in Peter Diel-Thiele, Partei und Staat im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1969), p.95, and here
from Noakes and Pridham, Nazism I, pp. 169-70.
34
Domarus, Hitler, pp, 472-3
37
As soon as the events and news of the past few days had provided the Führer with certain knowledge of the
conspiracy which had been hatched against himself and the Movcmcnt, he made the decision to act and to resort to
drastic measures. While he had been in Essen and had toured the labour camps in the west German Gaue in order to
create the outer appearance of absolute calm so that the traitors might not be warned, the plan of carrying out a thorough
purge had been fixed to the last detail.
The Führer headed the action personally and did not hesitate for a second to stand up to the rebels and call them to
account for their actions.
Obergruppenführer Lutze was chosen Chief of Staff – in place of Röhm – and included in the action.
Despite the fact that the Führer had spent several days almost totally without sleep, he ordered at 2:00 a.m. in
Godesberg that his plane take off from the Hangelar airfield near Bonn and fly to Munich.
The Führer's bearing during this nocturnal journey into the unknown was one of incredible determination. When
Hitler and his escort landed at the Munich airfield at 4:00 a.m., he was given the message that the Munich SA had
been alerted during the night by its highest command. Using the vulgar and false slogan, ‘The Führer is against us;
the Reichswehr is against us; SA, out on the streets.’
In the meantime, acting on his own initiative, the Bavarian Minister of the Interior Wagner had relieved
Obergruppenführer Schneidhuber and Gruppenführer Schmidt of their command over the SA formations and sent
them home.
While the Führer was driving from the airfield to the Ministry of the Interior, the last remnants of the disgracefully
deceived and now departing SA formations could still be seen. Schneidhuber and Schmidt were placed under arrest
at the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior in the presence of the Führer. The Führer confronted them alone and ripped the
shoulder Straps off their SA uniforms himself. Accompanied by only a small escort, the Führer left immediately at 5:30
a.m. for Bad Wiessee, where Röhm was staying. Heines was also staying the night at the country house where
Röhm was lodging.
The Führer entered the house with his escort. Röhm was personally placed under arrest in his bedroom by the Führer.
Röhm wordlessly submitted to being taken into custody and offered no resistance.
In Heines' room directly opposite, a disgraceful picture presented itself to those who entered the room. Heines was
in the Company of a young man.
The repulsive scene which then followed when Heines and his companion were arrested defies description. It sheds
sudden light on the conditions surrounding the former Chief of Staff which have been able to be done away with
thanks to the determined, brave and intrepid action of the Führer.
The greater part of Röhm’s staff was arrested with him. Röhm's Staff Guard, which arrived in Wiessee for relief duty at
8:00 a.m. in trucks, instantly complied with the Führer's words without resistance and spontaneously broke out in a
triple chorus of ‘Heil.’
After the arrested men had been taken away, the Führer travelled back along the road from Wiessee to Munich in order
to arrest a number of further SA leaders underway who were heavily incriminated and had been journeying to the
scheduled SA leadership meeting.
The cars were stopped during the journey and their occupants, to t he extent that they were found guilty, were transported
to Munich by the Führer's escort. A number of other SA leaders involved in thee rebellion were removed from trains at
the Munich Central Station and arrested.
Having returned to Munich, the Führer went to see Reichsstatthalter Ritter von Epp for a short Conference before
proceeding to the Ministry of the Interior, from which locale the remaining steps were taken.
Then the Führer spoke to the assembled leadership of the SA in the Braunes Haus. What had been assumed now became
a certainty: only very few members of the SS leadership clique had backed these highly treasonous plans, while the bulk
of the SA leaders and all of the SA men stand by their Führer in loyalty as one man, as a unified bloc.
What the Führer has accomplished for the SA and for the Movement during these days can be gauged only by those who
stood at his side in this short period of tremendous nervous tension and incredible physical exertion. By his own
personal behaviour, the Führer has once again been a shining example of vigour and loyalty. The fruits of this purge
action will be reaped by the German nation as a whole.35
3.2.10
Order of the day to Chief of Staff Lutze, 30 June 1933
When I appoint you to the post of SA Chief of Staff today, I expect that you will concern yourself with a number of
tasks which I hereby assign to you:
l. I demand from SA leaders the same blind obedience and unqualified discipline which they demand from their
SA men.
2.1 demand that every SA leader – and every political leader – is conscious of the fact that his manners and his
behaviour are to be an example to his association and even for our entire following.
3.1 demand of SA leaders – and political leaders – that, should they make themselves guilty of any offence by their
actions in public, they are to be mercilessly removed from the Party and the SA.
4. I demand particularly of the SA leaders that they may be an example of modesty and not of extravagnce. I do
not wish my SA leaders to hold or take part in costly dinner parties. We were not invited to such events in the past
and we still have no business attending them. Millions of our Volksgenossen [national comrades] today still lack the bare
necessities of life, they are not envious of those whom Fortune has blessed, but it is unworthy of a National Socialist
35
Domarus, Hitler, pp. 473-4
38
to further increase the distance between misery and good fortune, which is great enough as it is. I specifically forbid
that Party or SA funds or, in fact, any public funds at all be appropriated for such banquets and similar events.
It is irresponsible to hold gourmet dinners (Schlemmereien) from funds comprised in part of the pennies of our
poorest fellow citizens.
The luxurious staff quarters in Berlin in which, as has been ascertained, amounts of up to 30,000 marks per month
were spent for banquets, etc. are to be dissolved immediately.
I therefore prohibit all Party offices from sponsoring such so-called banquets and dinner parties with any type of
public funds. And I forbid all Party and SA leaders from attending such functions. Excepted are those obligations which
the state requires be met, for which above all the Reich President and, following him, the Reich Foreign Minister are
responsible. I prohibit all SA leaders and all Party leaders in general from holding so-called diplomatic dinners. The
SA leader’s task is not to cultivate social prestige, but to do his duty.
5.1 do not want SA leaders to take business trips in expensive limousines or convertibles or to use official funds for
the acquisition of same. This also applies to the heads of the political organizations.
6. SA leaders and political leaders who become inebriated in public are unworthy of being leaders.
Our ban on carping criticism imposes an obligation to exhibit exemplary bearing. Mistakes can always be forgiven;
bad behaviour cannot. Hence SA leaders who behave unworthily before the eyes of the public, who rampage
about or even promote intemperance shall be immediately removed from the SA without further consideration. I am
holding the superior offices responsible for taking vigorous action. From the State authorities I expect that sentences will
be harsher in such cases than in the case of non-National Socialists. The National Socialist leaders and, in particular, the
SA leaders should be looked upon highly by the nation. Hence the demands placed upon them are also higher.
7.1 expect all SA leaders to help to maintain and fortify the SA as a neat and clean institution. I would particularly like
every mother to be able to send her son to the SA, the Party and the Hitler Youth without fear that he might become
morally depraved there.
Thus it is my desire that all SA leaders take meticulous care to ensure that transgressions pursuant to § 175 are
punished with the guilty party's immediate expulsion from the SA and the Party. I want to see men as SA leaders, not
ridiculous apes.
8. I demand of all SA leaders that, in return for my loyalty, they give me their own loyalty and support. I particularly
demand that they attempt to find their strengths within the sphere assigned them and not in spheres which belong to
others. I demand above all from every SA leader that he exhibit unreserved honesty, loyalty and obedience in his
behaviour toward the Wehrmacht or the Reich.
9.1 demand from SA leaders that they require only that degree of courage and sense of sacrifice from their
subordinates which they are ready to demonstrate themselves at all times.
Hence I demand that they prove themselves in their behaviour and in their handling of the Volksgut which I have
entrusted to them as genuine leaders, friends and comrades. I expect that, in their associations as well, they will place
virtue before number.
10. And I expect from you as Chief of Staff that the old, loyal party comrades, those who fought in the SA for long years,
will not be forgotten. I do not want inflation with a thousand unnecessary but costly staffs, and I want promotions to
be based not so much upon abstract knowledge as upon the inborn capability to be a leader, and a loyalty and
willingness to make sacrifices which have been tried and proven over the years. In my SA I have a tremendous stock of
the most loyal and obedient followers. They are the ones who have conquered Germany, not the clever latecomers of
the year 1933 and thereafter.
11.1 want the SA man to be trained mentally and physically to be the most proficient National Socialist. The unique
strength of this organisation lies solely in its being anchored in the Party in a common Weltanschauung.
12. I want obedience, loyalty and comradeship to prevail as guiding principles in this organization. And just as
every leader demands obedience from his men, I hereby demand from the SA leaders respect for the law and
obedience to my Orders.
Adolf Hitler36
36
Domarus, Hitler, pp.475-7
39
3.3
Administration
3.3.1
Law for the Restoration of a Professional Civil Service, 1933
The Reich Government has enacted the following Law, promulgated herewith:
§1
1) To restore a national professional civil service and to simplify administration, civil servants may be dismissed
from office in accordance with the following regulations, even where there would be no grounds for such action
under the prevailing Law.
2) For the purposes of this Law the following are to be considered civil servants: direct and indirect officials of the
Reich, direct and indirect officials of the Länder, officials of Local Councils, and of Federations of Local Councils,
officials of Public Corporations as well as of Institutions and Enterprises of equivalent status...The provisions will
apply also to officials of Social Insurance organisations having the status of civil servants....
§2
1) Civil servants who have entered the service since November 9, 1918, without possessing the required or
customary educational background or other qualifications are to be dismissed from the service. Their previous
salaries will continue to be paid for a period of three months following their dismissal.
2) They will have no claim to temporary pensions, full pensions or survivors’ benefits, nor to retain designation of
rank or titles, or to wear uniforms or emblems....
§3
1) Civil servants who are not of Aryan descent are to be retired (§ 8 ff.); if they are honorary officials, they are to
be dismissed from their official status.
2) Section 1 does not apply to civil servants in office from August 1, 1914, who fought at the Front for the German
Reich or its Allies in the World War, or whose fathers or sons fell in the World War. Other exceptions may be
permitted by the Reich Minister of the Interior in coordination with the Minister concerned or with the highest
authorities with respect to civil servants working abroad.
§4
1) Civil servants whose previous political activities afford no assurance that they will at all times give their fullest
support to the national State, can be dismissed from the service....
Reich Chancellor
Adolf Hitler
Reich Minister of Interior
Frick
Reich Minister of Finance
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
Reichsgesetzblatt, I, 1933, p. 175
3.3.2
Corruption in the Public Service: Sopade report, July/August 1934
BAVARIA: The President of the Police in Augsburg has had himself a large house built near Augsburg. When his
official accounts were checked, enormous deficits were discovered. The President of the Police was sacked and
taken to a concentration camp. The public was forbidden to spread the news of the incident, under threat of the
severest penalties.
SAXONY: The Nazi city councillor in Zittau, Vollbrecht, raised the question in the council chamber of whether it
might not be possible to make savings in the city bureaucracy, as 400 new civil servants and clerical workers had
been appointed since 30 January 1933. The next day he received a note from the district leadership in which it was
he suggested he immediately give up his seat, as criticism of this kind was not needed.
District hospital Annaberg (Erzgebirge): In the swamp of corruption surrounding the Annaberg district hospital a
sum of 80,000 Marks has gone missing so far.
Taucha, near Leipzig: The city has bought the district court building for a sum of 350,000 Marks and is converting
it into a town hall. The old town hall has been let out to the NSDAP for a rent of 2,500 Marks a year. In the new
town hall the mayor, Dr. Uhlmann, has had a seven-roomed flat built. The man is married, but has no children.
Nazi councillors are enraged at this. Four have given up their mandates. The mayor keeps his flat, however.
[…]
POMMERANIA: Mayor Münter of Ueckermünde, who is also District Leader of the NSDAP, has been removed
form his office, because he proved absolutely incompetent, and because there were repeated cases of
embezzlement came to light during his period of office.
At the beginning of June the Prussian Minister of the Interior published a general instruction [Runderlaß], which
contained indirect proof that up to that point local authority finances had been plundered by the NSDAP and the
SA on a large scale. It contained the following: ‘Furthermore, financial support for the office of the party , the SA
and the SS, or of other party organisations is not the job of the local authorities. And for that reason it has to stop.
That includes one-off or recurrent contributions to administrative costs or salaries, the free use of heating or
vehicle fuel, allocations of free travel tickets, free carriage of loads and similar.
Items already given out in contravention of these rules need not be returned. In future, however, the
distribution of items in contravention of these guidelines is prohibited even if it has been planned for in the budget.
The following effects of this instruction are reported form Berlin:
40
The order that public finances may no longer be used for party business is now having a big impact. The NSDAP
frequently lacks the necessary means even for the simplest organisational tasks. The Berlin organisation of the
Hitler Youth has already asked all youth groups to give notice on all youth centres in private accommodation
because the rent can no longer be paid.37
3.3.3
Excerpt from a Civil Service Entry Examination, 1936
It is correct and to the point to say that the civil servant is no longer a servant of the state, but a servant of the
community [Volksgemeinschaft]. However, the latter is represented by the Party... False is the formulation: the
civil servant is that totality of the servants of the people [die Gesamtheit der Diener des Volkes]. This is another
intrusion of superseded formal political thought. Maybe that used to be the case. But not today. There are many
servants of the people in the above sense who were in the Party and the armed forces. In this sense it might be truer
to say that the servants of the people are all those who have sworn loyalty to the Führer. 38
3.3.4
Reports on the impact of Nazism on the Civil Service
NORTH-WEST GERMANY: (Report form a small town, the seat of a Regierungsprasidium [larger district
council]) Self-confident republicanism was really scarcely perceptible even in the Weimar period, either in the
bureaucracy or in the executive. The ministerial and government secretaries ensured that the spirit of the old days
was maintained. What is their behaviour like in the Third Reich? The local authority is led by ‘March-Pg’ X.
Nothing much has changed around him. The names of a few department heads are different. […] As in the council,
some of the old guard still sit in the district court: ‘Do you think these louts impress me? But in the end I have
children.’. So ends the complaint of one of them, on his way to the hunt. Sometimes he loses control in the
courtroom when one of the idiots in uniform is putting on airs.
BERLIN: The impact of the Nazis on the civil service has been uneven. Local government bureaucracies in the
smallest and medium ranking towns and districts (up to 50,000 inhabitants) have been fully shaken out, as have
political administrations [politische Verwaltungen], district council offices, and finally school boards. There have
also been big personnel changes in the Reich statistical office. There it was enough to have been in the Central
Association of Clerical Employees to get the sack. On the other hand there have only been small changes in the
Reich financial administration and in the Prussian financial administration. In the hospital administrations our
people are being called back, because the National Socialists have proved so incompetent.
PALATINATE: In the bureaucracy of course everything is more or less dominated by the spirit of Nazism. In
many cases civil servants who were initially dismissed have had to be re-employed following decisions taken by
the Administrative Court, and in other cases they received pensions or compensation. […] One could say that the
Nazis have succeeded in taking control of the lower levels of administration, but even at the level of district
authorities this is doubtful.
On the whole one can say that in the Reich and Land bureaucracies the personnel changes following the change of
regime have been on a smaller scale than is generally supposed. The lack of appropriate staff and the general coordination of the civil servants have prevented the National Socialists from implementing a comprehensive
‘reorganisation’ of the administration according to their agenda. Things are rather different in the local government
bureaucracies. The offices and posts were much more accessible to the National Socialists, they were sought-after
sinecures for the local party bigwigs. After the seizure of power numerous jobs changed hands. But even here the
‘old fighters’ were not able to get very far. Lack of ability, corruption and an unrestrained lifestyle did for many of
them, or at least undermined all public respect for them. 39
37
Deutschland-Berichte 1934, pp. 322-325
Cited in Jane Caplan, ‘Recreating the Civil Service’, p.34
39
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, pp. 66-7
38
41
4.
The Nazi Economy
4.1
Social and Economic Structure of the Reich
4.1.1
Population by Economic Sector (%) 1882-1939
1895
1907
1925
1933
1939
Agric. and Forestry
33.6
27.1
23.0
21.0
18.2
Industry and Crafts
40.0
41.3
42.0
38.8
40.9
Trade and Commerce
11.2
14.7
16.7
16.9
15.8
Non-Domestic Services
5.7
5.9
6.8
7.8
10.1
Domestic Service
3.4
2.9
2.4
2.0
2.0
Total employed
93.9
91.9
90.9
86.5
87.0
Non-dependants
without occupation
6.1
8.1
9.1
13.5
13.0
________________________________________________________________________________
4.1.2.
Employed Population by Economic Sector (%) 1882-1939
1895
1907
1925
1933
1939
Agric. and Forestry
36.4
34.0
30.5
28.9
26.1
Industry and Crafts
38.8
39.7
42.1
40.4
42.1
Trade and Transport
17.5
8.4
10.7
13.7
16.2
18.4
Non-Domestic Services
6.9
6.8
6.8
8.4
10.4
Domestic Service
7.2
5.8
4.4
3.9
3.9
42
4.2
Economic Policy and Problems
4.2.1
Schacht’s New Plan, 1934
2.. . . In future, all German imports will be regulated and they will be controlled by Supervisory Offices. Within the
framework of a general allocation System the Supervisory Offices will issue foreign currency permits to importers
before trans-actions are concluded if, judging by the amount of foreign exchange received, it could be assumed that
the foreign currency would be available on the due date. These foreign currency permits ensure priority for
foreign exchange allotments. Thus, provided that the foreign exchange received comes up to our expectations,
foreign exporters will be given a substantial assurance that their Claims will be met on the date. Where
transactions are concluded without a prior foreign currency permit, however, the importer cannot count on being
considered for an allocation of foreign exchange in the near future.
3. It is assumed under the New Plan that, in view of the decline in German exports and the consequent decline in
foreign exchange receipts, the issue of foreign currency permits will be to a large degree restricted to vital
foodstuffs as well as to raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. Even here considerable restrictions will
have to be imposed. Outside the foreign exchange plan the System of barter transactions will be expanded. As
regards essential commodities, barter transactions will be sanctioned provided that they do not require foreign
exchange. In the case of non-essential commodities, an effort must be made to obtain foreign exchange through
barter transactions too, for example by exporting more goods from Germany than are imported.
4. Treaty arrangements will not be infringed. The import of goods in itself can continue in the same way as
hitherto, but the German importer who concludes transactions and imports goods without previously receiving a
foreign currency permit will be aware from the outset that he cannot count on an allocation of foreign exchange.
Consequently, in future the foreign exporter will also be able to satisfy himself as to whether the German buyer and
importer will be supplied with foreign exchange and whether, therefore, he himself can expect payment. Thus any
com-plaints about allotment of foreign exchange and non-payment will in future be deprived of justification.
Where exchange agreements or Clearing arrangements are in force, they will not be affected by the New Plan
for the time being, but they must, if necessary, be adjusted to the new Situation by negotiation in the sense that the
Clearing will remain limited to certain goods and quantities. Payments agreements containing the so-called
Swedish clause will be applicable only to such goods as are not subject to special management. As, however, all
German importers will be subject to management, the payments agreements will, although without any formal
in-fringement of the law, become unworkable in practice. What the effects will be of this undermining process
[Aushöhlung] in respect of the various countries concerned remains to be examined.... 40
4. 2.2
Economic Problems
The populism of the Nazi movement was reflected in the economic sphere with schemes supposedly intended to
increase popular consumption – to bring goods to the general public that had hitherto been the preserve of the
better off. Yet the Nazi economic recovery, based as it was on deficit spending and rapid rearmament brought with
it its own problems. Germany’s limited foreign exchange reserves were needed to import raw materials for
rearmament, and this meant restricting the outflow of hard currency, and it meant there was less foreign currency
to pay for imported food and consumer goods. Combined with a shift in emphasis from the production of consumer
goods to capital goods, this quickly produced shortages of certain kinds of food and consumer goods - just as the
return to full employment began t stimulate the consumer market. This raised very early the question of how much
discomfort the German public would suffer in support of the Nazi agenda: could they be persuaded that guns were
more desirable than butter?
4.2.3
Hitler at the Opening of International Automobile Exhibition in Berlin , 7 March 1934
The Government will be persistent and rigorous in continuing the program announced last year. It will give to the
entire automotive sector the strong impulse it needs to overcome the general preconceptions on the one hand and
the lethargy on the other. It will attempt to continue to directly and indirectly decrease taxes for the automobile
owner. In addition to extending the tremendous Autobahn road network, the Reich is determined to devote
practical attention to improving the existing major roads. The Reich Government will provide every possible
support to the development of the automobile industry. Above all, it will continue its endeavours to establish a close
and profitable link between this most recent means of transportation and the large existing transportation
Institution of the Reichsbahn. The problem of securing and producing fuel on a national basis will be solved!
[...]
Above all, it gives me the indestructible confidence that the commercial adroitness of our great plants, the
ingenuity of our technicians and the miraculous productivity of our German manual labourers and precision workers
will doubtless succeed in accomplishing the great tasks which still lie before us. And these tasks are not small.
40
Karl Ritter, Director of the Economic Section of the Foreign Office, to German Embassies. DGFP Series C Viol. III pp. 344ff.
Cited in Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, 2, pp. 272-3.
43
Gentlemen, if we really want to increase the number of automobile owners in Germany to a figure in the millions, this is
only possible if we adapt the price to the financial capabilities of the mass of millions of potential buyers in question.
The German Government desires that the German nation take an animated interest in motorised vehicles, and it
follows that the economy must design and build the right vehicle for the German Volk.
Only a few months ago, German industry succeeded, by fabricating a new Volksempfänger (people’s radio), in
introducing and selling an enormous number of radio sets on the market. I would cite the most significant task of the
German automotive industry as that of increasing production of the one car which will necessarily open up a class
of buyers numbering millions, for only if we are able to win over the broadest possible masses for this new means of
transportation will its economic and social advantages be indisputable. 41
4.2.4
Hoarding, May/June 1934
The degree to which insecurity has increased is illustrated by the continuing spread of panic buying. This hoarding
(Hamsterei) against which the official press and numerous public offices have warned in vain over the last few
weeks, is not only a consequence of the collapse of the currency, but is rooted in the general widespread fear of
shortages of raw materials, of a renewed inflation, and of another war. There are reports from all parts of the
country of the hoarding not only of fabric and shoes, but also of groceries, such as flour, for example. 42
4.2.5
On the Economic situation, January 1935
BADEN: The second feature of a change in the mood is that hoarding [Hamsterei] has almost completely
disappeared. In the towns, shopping has almost come to a standstill. From the Swiss border on the other hand it’s
been reported that the German population along the frontier is now completely orientated towards buying up Swiss
quality goods. This means that small business people are also already complaining, and demanding a tightening up
of the regulation of border traffic. Lack of money is generally given as an explanation for the end of hoarding in
the cities. People have spent their savings, and any other income is only enough for the most necessary items; there
is nothing left over for little extras.
BAVARIA: The hoarding panic has eased off somewhat, and in many cases has been dealt with. The pricereduction measures have had a positive effect on public morale. The reduction in the price of beer has been a
particularly pleasant surprise. But even that [good mood] has fizzled out again, because the masses have seen
through the ulterior motives behind the price reductions.
BERLIN: The consequence of the appointment of the price commissioner meant that hoarding came very quickly
to a stop. The Christmas trade in particular suffered form this. Department stores were not remotely as busy as in
previous years on the Sundays before Christmas. People want to wait, of course, until the prices have been
reduced.
NORTH-WEST GERMANY: The Christmas trade this year was generally very bad. Random checks in Dortmund,
Essen, Düsseldorf ad Cologne came up with the same results: We are selling virtually nothing at all.[…]
We received the following reports on the effects of the shortages of raw materials.
NORTH-WEST GERMANY: The shortage of raw materials is now already affecting the armaments industries as
well. For example, the quota system for brass has recently been organised in such a way that during the third and
fourth quarter the requirements they only receive about ten percent of the maximum demand.
A soap factory ahs reported that the most expensive soaps are no longer to be had, or at best only in very small
quantities. On the other hand the cheaper varieties of soap, with less fat content, are still delivered in the same
quantities. The price of soap has remained stable, but the quality has deteriorated significantly. The firm is
concerned that in a few weeks it will no longer have any material for the production of soap.
A textile factory in the Rhineland, which employed 500 people, has been closed down due to lack of cotton.
Among the employers there is also a great deal of irritation at the bureaucratic methods of the offices
responsible for the rationing of foreign currency reserves.43
Deutschland-Berichte, pp. 30-31
4.2.6
Colonel Georg Thomas, Defence Economy and Munitions Section, Wehrmacht Office, 20 June
1934
The Reich defence Ministry has for years been pointing out the necessity of preparing the economy for the event of
war. It has demanded stockpiling, revealed the dangers of the loss of foreign exchange and the collapse of exports for
41
Domarus, Hitler, I, p.410
Deutschland-Berichte, 1934, p. 104
43
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, pp. 30-31
42
44
the defence of the country and has especially requested the regulation of the peacetime economy in accordance with
the needs of war. Only the present Reich Government has decided to fulfil these demands, but unfortunately
economic developments threaten to nullify these efforts which have hardly begun.
The information from industry and the reports from the supervisory offices for raw materials show clearly that the
raw materials situation is becoming daily more acute. Not only does this endanger the Government's work
programme, but also the basis for an operational commitment of the Wehrmacht is becoming more and more
remote and everywhere the question is being asked: What is the point of a larger army if it lacks supplies, its
lifeblood? The raw materials Situation is taken far more seriously by the business Community than by the Reich
Economics Ministry, and since everybody is clear about the fact that we are in the middle of an economic war, it is
incomprehensible that decisions are not taken to overcome the danger which threatens. For months we have
noticed the drain of foreign exchange followed by the melting away of Stocks of raw materials, but so far there
has been no firm intervention to remove the danger, with a few exceptions which have proved insufficient.
What has happened to all the lessons we have learned from the Great War in the economic field? Because of
struggles between capitalist interest groups, the wishes of Party Offices, and the misguided interventions and
opinions of individuals, no decisions are taken....
The economic crisis, which is imminent because of the raw materials and foreign exchange Situation, is recognised
in all informed quarters; the will of the Führer to overcome it is irreversible. Why is the nation not urged to
undergo self-denial and restrictions in order to overcome this economic crisis? The measures of individual leaders
of the Labour Front run directly counter to these requirements. In this Situation employees should not be
lectured about the necessity for a higher Standard of living, which leads everywhere to the desire for wage increases.
The Labour Front imposes financial demands on employers, which small and medium-sized industry cannot endure
in the long run and which are not intelligible so long as the Labour Front spends large amounts on buying
luxurious houses and similar extravagances. Actions of this kind weaken the financial power of industry and
what must be particularly avoided, weaken confidence in the leadership.
These impressions of economic life today keep reappearing and can now no longer be wished away with hopeful
optimism. They are supported by the news about the harvest situation which may well give cause for further
disquiet about the economy. It must be clear that in overcoming the crisis we have to fight for time, that the
economy will not survive the coming struggle if this conflict between the various authorities and the present
indecisiveness of the economic leadership continues.
The whole Situation calls for a resolute and unified economic leadership which can direct the work of the Ministries
of Economics, Agriculture, Labour, and Finance, the Reichsbank and all Offices of the Labour Front by
dictatorial methods.44
44
Cited in Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 2, pp. 270-1
45
4.3
The Four-Year Plan
This memorandum was given to me personally by A.H. in 1944 with the following Statement:
The lack of understanding of the Reich Ministry for Economics and the Opposition of German business to all largescale plans induced him to compose this memorandum at Obersalzberg.
He decided at that time to carry out a Four-Year Plan and to put Göring in charge of it. On the occasion of
Göring's appointment as the official in Charge of the Four-Year Plan he gave him this memorandum. There are
only three copies, one of which he gave to me....
[signed] ALBERT SPEER
The political Situation
Politics are the conduct and the course of the historical struggle of nations for life. The aim of these struggles is
survival. Even ideological struggles have their ultimate cause and are most deeply motivated by nationally
determined purposes and aims of life. But religions and ideologies are always able to impart particular
bitterness to such struggles, and therefore also to give them great historical impressiveness. They leave their
imprint on centuries of history. Nations and States living within the sphere of such ideological or religious conflicts
cannot opt out of or dissociate themselves from these events. Christianity and the barbarian invasions determined
the course of history for centuries. Mohammedanism convulsed the Orient as well as the Western world for half
a millennium. The consequences of the Reformation have affected the whole of central Europe. Nor were
individual countries—either by skill or by deliberate non-participation—able to steer clear of events. Since the
outbreak of the French Revolution the world has been moving with ever-increasing speed towards a new conflict, the
most extreme solution of which is Bolshevism; and the essence and goal of Bolshevism is the elimination of those
strata of mankind which have hitherto provided the leadership and their replacement by world-wide Jewry.
No nation will be able to avoid or abstain from this historical conflict. Since Marxism, through its victory in Russia,
has established one of the greatest empires as a forward base for its future operations, this question has become a
menacing one. Against a democratic world which is ideologically split Stands a unified aggressive will, based on an
authoritarian ideology.
The military resources of this aggressive will are in the meantime rapidly increasing from year to year. One has only
to compare the Red Army as it actually exists today with the assumptions of military men of ten or fifteen years
ago to realize the menacing extent of this development. Only consider the results of a further development
over ten, fifteen or twenty years and think what conditions will be like then.
Germany
Germany will as always have to be regarded as the focus of the Western world against the attacks of Bolshevism. I
do not regard this as an agreeable mission but as a serious Handicap and burden for our national life,
regrettably resulting from our disadvantageous position in Europe. We cannot, however, escape this destiny. Our
political position results from the following:
At the moment there are only two countries in Europe which can be regarded as standing firm against Bolshevism
– Germany and Italy. The other nations are either corrupted by their democratic way of life, infected by Marxism
and therefore likely to collapse in the foreseeable future, or ruled by authoritarian Governments, whose sole
strength lies in their military resources; this means, however, that being obliged to protect their leadership against
their own peoples by the armed hand of the Executive, they are unable to use this armed hand for the protection of
their countries against external enemies. None of these countries would ever be capable of waging war against
Soviet Russia with any prospects of success. In fact, apart from Germany and Italy, only Japan can be considered as
a Power Standing firm in the face of the world peril.
It is not the aim of this memorandum to prophesy the moment when the untenable Situation in Europe will reach the
stage of an open crisis. I only want, in these lines, to express my conviction that this crisis cannot and will not fail
to occur, and that Germany has the duty of securing her existence by every means in the face of this catastrophe,
and to protect herself against it, and that this obligation has a number of implications involving the most
important tasks that our people have ever been set. For a victory of Bolshevism over Germany would lead not to a
Versailles Treaty but to the final destruction, indeed to the annihilation, of the German people.
The extent of such a catastrophe cannot be estimated. How, indeed, would the whole of densely populated
Western Europe (including Germany) after a collapse into Bolshevism, live through probably the most gruesome
catastrophe which has been visited on mankind since the downfall of the States of antiquity. In face of the necessity
of warding off this danger, all other considerations must recede into the background as completely irrelevant.
Germany's defensive capacity
Germany's defensive capacity is based upon several factors. I would give pride of place to the intrinsic value of
the German people per se. The German nation with an impeccable political leadership, a firm ideology, a
thorough military organization, certainly constitutes the most valuable factor of resistance in the world today.
Political leadership is ensured by the National Socialist Party; ideological solidarity has, since the victory of
National Socialism, been introduced to a degree that has never previously been attained. It must be constantly
deepened and strengthened on the basis of this concept. This is the aim of the National Socialist education of our
people.
The development of our military capacity is to be effected through the new Army. The extent of the military
development of our resources cannot be too large, nor its pace too swift. It is a major error to believe that there can be
any argument on these points or any comparison with other vital necessities. However well-balanced the general
pattern of a nation's life ought to be there must at particular times be certain disturbances of the balance at the
expense of other less vital tasks. If we do not succeed in bringing the German Army as rapidly as possible to the
rank of premier army in the world so far as its training, raising of units, armaments, and, above all, its spiritual
46
education also is concerned, then Germany will be lost! In this the basic principle applies that omissions during the
months of peace cannot be made good in centuries.
Hence all other desires without exception must come second to this task. For this task involves life and the
preservation of life, and all other desires—however understandable at other junctures—are unimportant or even
mortally dangerous and are therefore to be rejected. Posterity will ask us one day, not what were the means, the
reasons or the convictions by which we thought fit today to achieve the salvation of the nation, but whether in fact
we achieved it. And on that day it will be no excuse for our downfall for us to describe the means which were
infallible, but, alas, brought about our ruin.
Germany's economic Situation
Just as the political movement among our people knows only one goal, the preservation of our existence, that
is to say, the securing of all the spiritual and other prerequisites for the self-assertion of our nation, so neither has
the economy any other goal than this. The nation does not live for the economy, for economic leaders, or for
economic or financial theories; on the contrary, it is finance and the economy, economic leaders and theories, which
all owe unqualified service in this struggle for the self-assertion of our nation. Germany's economic Situation is,
however, in the briefest outline as follows:
1. We are overpopulated and cannot feed ourselves from our own resources.
2. When our nation has six or seven million unemployed, the food Situation improves because these people
lack purchasing power. It naturally makes a difference whether six million people have 40 marks a month to spend,
or 100 marks. It should not be overlooked that a third of all who earn their living is involved, that is to say that,
taken as a proportion of the total population, through the National Socialist economic policy about 28
million people have been afforded an increase in their standard of living of, an average, from at least 50 marks a
month to at most 100-120 marks. This means an increased and understandable run on the foodstuffs market.
3. But if this rise in employment fails to take place, the effect of under-nourishment will be that a higher
percentage of the population must gradually be deducted from the body of our nation, so far as its effective
contribution is concerned. Thus, despite the difficult food Situation, the most important task of our economic policy
is to see to it that all Germans are incorporated into the economic process, and so the prerequisites for
normal consumption are created.
4. In so far as this consumption concerns articles of general use, it can be satisfied to a large extent by an
increase in production. In so far as this consumption falls upon the foodstuffs market, it cannot be satisfied
from the domestic German economy. For, although the Output of numerous products can be increased without
difficulty, the yield of our agricultural production can undergo no further substantial increase. It is equally
impossible for us at present to manufacture artificially certain raw materials which we lack in Germany or to
find other substitutes for them.
5. There is, however, no point in endless repetition of the fact that we lack foodstuffs and raw materials; what
matters is the taking of those measures which can bring about a final solution for the future and a temporary
easing of conditions during the transition period.
6. The final solution lies in extending our living space, that is to say, extending the sources of raw materials and
foodstuffs of our people. It is the task of the political leadership one day to solve this problem.
7. The temporary easing of conditions can be achieved only within the framework of our present economy. In
this connexion, the following must be noted:
(a) Since the German people will be increasingly dependent on imports for their food and must similarly,
whatever happens, import a proportion at least of certain raw materials from abroad, every effort must be made
to facilitate these imports.
(b) An increase in our own exports is possible in theory but in practice hardly likely. Germany does not
export to a political or economic vacuum, but to areas where competition is very intense. Compared with the
general international economic depression, our exports have fallen, not only not more, but in fact less than those
of other nations and states. But since imports of food on the whole cannot be
substantially reduced and are more likely to increase, an adjustment must be found in some other way.
(c) It is, however, impossible to use foreign exchange allocated for the purchase of raw materials to import
foodstuffs without inflicting a heavy and perhaps even fatal blow on the rest. But above all it is absolutely
impossible to do this at the expense of national rearmament. l must at this point sharply reject the view that by
restricting national rearmament, that is to day, the manufacture of arms and ammunition, we could bring
about an 'enrichment' in raw materials which might then benefit Germany in the event of war. Such a view
is based on a complete misconception, to put it mildly, of the tasks and military requirements that lie before
us. For even a successful saving of raw materials by reducing, for instance, the production of munitions
would merely mean that we should stockpile these raw materials in time of peace so as to manufacture them only
in the event of war, that is to say, we should be depriving ourselves during the most critical months of munitions in
exchange for raw copper, lead, or possibly iron. But in that case it would none the less be better for the nation to
enter the war without a single kilogram of copper in stock but with full munition depots rather than with empty
munition depots but so-called 'enriched'
stock of raw material.
War makes possible the mobilization of even the last remaining supplies of metal. For it then becomes not an
economic problem, but solely a question of will. And the National Socialist leadership of the country will have not
only the will but also the resolution and the toughness necessary to solve these problems in the event of war. But it
is much more important to prepare for war in time of peace. Moreover, in this respect the following must be
stated:
47
There can be no building up of a reserve of raw materials for the event of war, just as there can be no building
up of foreign exchange reserves. The attempt is sometimes made today so to represent matters as if Germany
went to war in 1914 with well-prepared Stocks of raw material. That is a lie. No country can assemble in
advance the quantities of raw materials necessary for war lasting longer than, say, one year. But if any nation were
really in a position to assemble those quantities of raw material needed for a year, then its political, military and
economic leaders would deserve to be hanged. For they would in fact be setting aside the available copper and
iron in preparation for the conduct of a war instead of manufacturing Shells. But Germany went into the world
war without any reserves whatsoever. What
was available at that time in Germany in the way of apparent peacetime reserves was counterbalanced and rendered
valueless by the miserable war Stocks of ammunition. Moreover, the quantities of war materials that are needed for
a war are so large that there has NEVER in the history of the world been a real Stockpiling for a period of any length! and
as regards preparations in the form of piling up foreign exchange it is quite clear that:
1. War is capable of devaluing foreign exchange at any time, unless it is held in gold.
2. There is not the least guarantee that gold itself can be converted in time of war into raw materials. During the
world war Germany still possessed very large assets
in foreign exchange in a great many countries. It was not, however, possible for our cunning economic policymakers to bring to Germany, in exchange for them fuel rubber, copper or tin in any sufficient quantity. To
assert the contrary is ridiculous nonsense. For this reason, and in order to secure the food supplies of our
people, the following task presents itself as imperative:
It is not sufficient merely to establish from time to time raw material or foreign exchange balances, or to talk about
the preparation of a war economy in time of peace; on the contrary, it is essential to ensure all the food supplies
required in peacetime and, above all, those means for the conduct of a war which can be secured by human energy
and activity. I therefore draw up the following programme for a final Provision of our vital needs:
I.
Parallel with the military and political rearmament and mobilization of our nation must go its economic
rearmament and mobilization, and this must be effected in the same tempo, with the same determination, and
if need be with the same ruthlessness as well. In future the interests of individual gentlemen can no longer play any
part in these matters. There is only one interest, the interest of the nation; only one view, the bringing of
Germany to the point of political and economic
self-sufficiency.
II.
For this purpose, foreign exchange must be saved in all those areas where our needs can be satisfied by
German production, in order that it may be used for those requirements which can under no circumstances be
fulfilled except by import:
III. Accordingly, German fuel production must now be stepped up with the utmost speed and brought to
final completion within eighteen months. This task must be attacked and carried out with the same
determination as the waging of a war, since it is on the discharge of this task, not upon the laying in of
stocks of petroleum, that the conduct of the future war depends.
IV. The mass production of synthetic rubber must also be organized and achieved with the same urgency. From
now on there must be no talk of processes not being fully determined and other such excuses. It is not a matter of
discussing whether we are to wait any longer; otherwise time will be lost, and the hour of peril will take us all
by surprise. Above all, it is not the Job of the economic institutions of government to rack their brains
over methods of production. This has nothing whatever to do with the Ministry of Economics. Either we
possess today a private industry, in which case its Job is to rack its brains about methods of production; or we
believe that it is the Government's Job to determine methods of production, and in that case we have no further
need of private industry.
V.
The question of the cost of producing these raw materials is also quite irrelevant, since it is in any
case better for us to produce expensive tyres in Germany which we can use, than to seil theoretically cheap tyres,
but tyres for which the Minister of Economics cannot allocate any foreign exchange, and which therefore cannot
be produced for lack of raw materials and consequently cannot be used at all. If we really are obliged to build
up our domestic economy on autarkic lines, which we are—for lamenting and harping on our foreign exchange
plight will certainly not solve the problem—then the price of raw materials individually considered no longer
plays a decisive part.
It is further necessary to increase German iron production to the utmost limits. The objection that with German
ore, which has a 26 per cent ferrous content, we cannot produce pig iron as cheaply as with the 45 per cent
Swedish ores, etc., is irrelevant; we are not faced with the question of what would rather do, but what we can do.
The objection, moreover, that in that event all the German blast-furnaces would have to be converted is equally
irrelevant, and, what is more, this is no concern of the Ministry of Economics. The Job of the Ministry of
Economics is simply to set the national economic tasks; private industry has to fulfil them. But if private
industry thinks itself incapable of doing this, then the National Socialist State will know how to resolve the
problem on its own. In any case, for a thousand years Germany had no foreign iron ores. Even before the war,
more German iron ores were being processed than during the period of our worst decline. Nevertheless, if there is
still the possibility of our importing cheaper ores, well and good. But the future of the national economy and,
above all, of the conduct of war, must not depend on this.
Moreover, the distillation of potatoes into alcohol must be prohibited forthwith. Fuel must be obtained from the
ground, not from potatoes. Instead it is our duty to use any arable land that may become available either for
human or animal foodstuffs or for the cultivation of fibrous materials.
It is further necessary for us to make our supplies of industrial fats independent of imports as quickly as
possible. This can be done by using our coal. This problem has been solved by chemical means and the technique
48
is actually crying out to be put into practice. Either German industry will grasp the new economic tasks or else it
will show itself incapable of surviving any longer in this modern age in which a Soviet State is setting up a gigantic
plan. But in that case it will not be Germany that will go under, but at most a few industrialists. Moreover, the
extraction of other ores must be increased, regardless of cost, and, in particular, the production of light metals must
be increased to the utmost limits, in order to produce a substitute for certain other metals.
Finally, it is also necessary for the rearmament programme to make use even now whenever possible of those
materials which must and will replace high-grade metals in time of war. It is better to consider and resolve these
problems in time of peace than to wait for the next war and only then, in the midst of a multitude of tasks, to try to
undertake these economic researches and experiments with methods.
In short, I consider it necessary that now, with iron determination, a 100 per cent self-sufficiency should be
attained in every sphere where it is feasible, and that not only should the national requirements in these most
essential raw materials be made independent of other countries, but we should also thus save the foreign exchange
which in peacetime we need for our imports of foodstuffs. In this connexion, I want to emphasize that in these tasks I
see the only true economic mobilization and not in
the throttling of armament Industries in peacetime in order to save and stockpile raw materials for war.
But I further consider it necessary to make an immediate investigation of the outstanding debts in foreign
exchange owed to German business abroad. There is no doubt that the outstanding Claims of German
business abroad are quite enormous. Nor is there any doubt that behind this in some cases there lies concealed the
contemptible desire to possess, whatever happens, certain reserves abroad which are thus withheld from the grasp of
the domestic economy. I regard this as deliberate Sabotage of our national self-assertion, that is to say, of the
defence of the Reich, and I therefore consider it necessary for the Reichstag to pass the following two laws:
1. A law providing the death penalty for economic Sabotage, and
2. A law making the whole of Jewry liable for all damage inflicted by individual
specimens of this Community of criminals upon the German economy, and thus upon
the German people.
Only the fulfilment of these tasks, in the form of a Several Years Plan for rendering our national economy
independent of foreign countries, will make it possible for the first time to demand sacrifices from the German
people in the economic sphere and in that of foodstuffs. For then the nation will have a right to demand of their
leaders whom they blindly acknowledge, that they should not only talk about the problems in this field but tackle
them with unparalleled and determined energy, not only point them out but solve them.
Nearly four precious years have now gone by. There is no doubt that by now we could have been completely
independent of foreign countries in the spheres of fuel supplies, rubber supplies, and partly also iron ore supplies.
Just as we are now producing 700,000 or 800,000 tons of petroleum, we could be producing 3 million tons. Just as
we are today manufacturing a few thousand tons of rubber, we could already be producing 70,000 or 80,000 tons
per annum. Just as we have stepped up the production of iron ore from 2\ million tons to 7 million tons, we
could process 20 or 25 million tons of German iron ore and even 30 millions of necessary. There has been time
enough in four years to find out what we cannot do. Now we have to carry out what we can do.
I thus set the following tasks; I. The German armed forces must be operational within four years.
II. The German economy must be fit for war within four years.
49
4.5
The Impact of the War Economy
The Nazi regime orientated the economy towards re-armament from the outset, creating a ‘defence economy in
peace time’. This exacerbated the shortages and the bottlenecks, particularly in consumer goods, where the
synthetic goods that were introduced to replace natural products in short supply, - and which were an important
element in plans for ‘autarky’ - were often both expensive to produce and use, and a shabby alternative to the
real thing.
The ‘defence economy’ also rapidly generated shortages of agricultural and skilled labour. This meant that the
labour market itself became a ‘sellers’ market’ and had to be regulated to prevent wage inflation (the costs of
which would be passed on to the government as arms manufacturers outbid each other in order to attract the
workers they needed to complete lucrative government contracts).
4.5.1
Minutes of the Fifth Conference of the Reich Chamber of Labour
[Colonel Thomas] . . . Gentlemen! The total war of the future will make demands on the people of a kind which we
have not yet encountered. The spiritual and physical strains of the world war, which imposed really heavy burdens
on our German people, will be far exceeded in the in the war of the future. And a people strong in spirit and firm in
character physically sound and trained to be tough will take such impositions and strains in its stride. A people
only shows such qualities in an emergency, however, if it has been taught to do so in time of peace, and so your
training work is of particular importance to us soldiers in my opinion. The defence economy has five basic
requirements.
1) The maintenance of social peace
2) The maintenance of a healthy population which is able to defend itself
3) The stabilisation of present wages and prices
4) Co-operation in training skilled workers and other labour
5) Enlightenment and educational work in defence
[. . .]
I have put the maintenance of social peace at the top of our demands because this requirement is one of the basic
foundations of National Socialist thinking and because it is an unconditional pre-requisite for the implementation
of our great tasks in the case of an emergency. We are certainly world leaders in this matter already, since no other
country can claim to have achieved such a massive expansion of its economy in such difficult conditions without
disturbing the social peace.45
4.5.2
Raw Materials Shortages (November 1936)
During the last few months the regulation of raw materials allocation has been sharply tightened up. New
regulations have been applied to the wool trade from 1 October. The designations ‘pure wool’ and ‘wool mix’ may
no longer be used. Similarly, indications of the foreign origin of a product (e.g. English worsted) are also no longer
allowed. These prohibitions have been introduced in order to make it impossible to differentiate between the old
supplies of pure wool fabrics and the new products entirely made of cellulose substitute.
[…]
SOUTH-WEST GERMANY: The shortage of iron is increasingly noticeable. In various departments at Opel in
Rüsselheim they have been working three days a week for three weeks on account of the iron shortage. In
Frankfurt various firms have given notice of short time for the same reason.
RHINELAND-WESTPHALIA: Shortages not only of raw materials but also of semi-finished goods are becoming
increasingly noticeable […]
The Aachen textile industry has a particularly difficult fight on its hands. Pure cellulose-wool bags have to be dyed
twice. That wasn’t necessary before and naturally makes the production process considerably more expensive. It
also takes longer, and some kinds of materials had to be deleted altogether as the production process would have
made them prohibitively expensive to sell.46
45
46
Mason, Arbeiterklasse, pp. 179-180. Original: Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Potsdam, RWM., Vol. 10314, pp. 114-171.
Deutschland-Berichte, 1936, pp. 1420-29
50
4.5.3
Labour Shortages: Labour Minister to Dr Lammers, Head of Reich Chancellery, 28 August 1936
According to the Reich Office of Labour Allocation and Insurance there were still 1,170,000 unemployed in
Germany at the end of July 1936. We have returned to the conditions of 1928 and 1929. The level of
unemployment in the year 1936 is still half a million les than last year. The reduction since the winter this year is
even more than in 1935. […] Among those counted as unemployed is a not inconsiderable percentage who are
only of limited employability, and also many who are changing jobs and unemployed only in the short term. On
the other had there is still a certain proportion of long-term unemployed, who despite the favourable economic
trend cannot be accommodated, many older clerical workers in particular. […] The favourable trend presented
above has already brought about a discernible labour shortage in various branches of the economy, particularly in
the main occupations in the metal industries, in construction and in agriculture, and this has had many adverse
consequences. The punctual completion of a number of construction jobs and contracts, including some for the
armed forces and for export, has been put in question. On the other hand employers fighting over the scarce supply
of skilled workers has also had very unhappy consequences, including frequent, unregulated changes of
employment, unrest in factories, unplanned wage increases, and as a consequence price increases, for example in
the building materials trade; strike attempts by workers in the boom industries, and want to push through even
more wage rises, are sadly no longer the exception.47
4.5.4
From: Draft of a second law to regulate labour allocation, 6 October 1936
Rationale (not for publication)
I. The Shortage of Skilled Labour and its Consequences
As a consequence of the strong revival of the German economy discernible shortages of skilled workers have
emerged in the construction industry, building materials trade, and in the metal industries, in addition there are
difficulties in satisfying the demand for labour in agriculture. The number of missing workers needed in these
branches is naturally not to be determined, but according to reports received must be in the tens of thousands. And
the demand is set to rise. For the new factories in the aircraft industry alone a further 50,000 metal workers will
shortly be needed. The introduction of the two-year labour service will make the labour shortage even worse. […]
2. This shortage of labour has numerous undesirable consequences, both economic and social. Under pressure
from too short delivery times, particularly in the case of public contracts, and under pressure from the contract
penalties with which employers are threatened by clients, the employers see themselves forced to use all methods
possible to recruit the workers necessary to complete the contracts. 48
4.5.5
Preparations for War
Military preparations in Germany have reached such an extent that there have been bottle-necks in some parts of
the normal economy. Private and public building projects have had to be shelved because so many workers are
needed for work on fortifications that work was no longer possible. There have been great difficulties in some
places in bringing in the harvest, because too many workers have been taken off the land to dig trenches. Holidays
with Strength through Joy have had to be cancelled on the grounds that the Reichsbahn could not provide extra
trains.
The search for labour has reached grotesque proportions. Officers stand in dole queues picking out
people who in their opinion are fit for work. Skilled workers are even being taken away from munitions works on
the grounds that they have experience working on concrete buildings.
[. . .]
Reports have come in from all parts of the country about these military preparations.49
The material factors which increasingly determine the attitude of the middle class towards the regime are related
above all to the growth in state intervention in the economy. Private property has not been abolished, but its used is
increasingly regulated by the state. People earn well, but the freedom to dispose of one’s income is increasingly
circumscribed. The concerns which many businessmen have about the future as a consequence, have been
multiplied recently by the dismissal of Schacht.50
47
Mason, Arbeiterklasse, pp. 194-5
Mason, Arbeiterklasse, pp. 198-9
Deutschland-Berichte, 1938 p. 809
50
Deutschland-Berichte, 1939 p. 12.
48
49
51
4.5.6
War Economy Decree, 2 September 1939
The safeguarding of the frontiers of our fatherland necessitates big sacrifices from every German citizen. The
soldier is protecting our homeland with his weapons at the risk of his life. In view of the extent of this
commitment, it is the obvious duty of all citizens at home to put all their strength and resources at the
disposal of the nation and Reich and thereby to guarantee the continuation of an orderly economic life. This
means above all that all citizens must impose upon themselves the necessary restrictions on their Standard of
living. Therefore, the Ministerial Council for the Defence of the Reich decrees with the force of law:
SECTION I: BEHAVIOUR DETRIMENTAL TO THE WAR EFFORT
(i) Anyone who destroys, conceals, or hoards raw materials or products which are essential to the existence of
the population and thereby maliciously endangers the supply of these goods will be punished with penal
servitude or hard labour. In particularly serious cases the death penalty may be imposed. (ii) Those who hoard
bank notes without good reason will be punished with hard labour, in particularly serious cases with penal
servitude.
SECTION II: WAR TAXES
War surtax on income tax . . .
2. Those liable to tax
(i) The Reich will levy a war surtax on income tax.
(ii) Those liable to income tax at the Standard rate whose income does not
exceed RM 2,400 are exempt from the war surtax.
3. Amount of war surtax on income tax
(i) The war surtax on income tax is 50 per cent of the income tax for the tax collection period . . .
(ii) The war surtax on income tax may not amount to more than 15 per cent of income, income tax and war
surtax on income tax may not amount to more that
65 per cent of income . . .
[Special war taxes were also imposed on beer and tobacco.]
SECTION III: WAR WAGES
. . . 18. The Reich Trustees and Special Trustees of Labour, on instructions from the Reich Minister of Labour,
will adjust wages immediately to wartime conditions and will fix a compulsory maximum limit for wages,
salaries and conditions of work.
(i) If new plants or administrative offices are established or reorganized, or if workmen or employees carry out a
different form of employment than hitherto after this decree has come into effect, the same wage or salary levels
apply as for
similar plants or administrative offices as those which are Standard for the new occupation. If any doubts arise
as to which wage and salary scales should be used, the Reich Trustee or Special Trustee of Labour will make the
decisions. (ii) Bonuses for overtime work, and for Sunday, national holiday, and night shifts are no longer to
be paid.
(iii) Paragraphs 1-3 apply equally to remuneration and other work conditions in home labour.
19. Regulations and agreements on holidays are temporarily suspended. More
detailed instructions on their reinstitution will be given by the Reich Minister of
Labour.
20. The Reich Minister of Labour can make decisions on the announcement
and content of wage scales and regular hours of work which deviate from
existing regulations. For public administrative offices and plants the Reich
Minister of Labour makes these decisions in agreement with the Reich Ministers
concerned.
21. (i) Anyone who promises or grants wages or salaries or accepts a promise or
grant contrary to paragraphs 18-20 of this decree will be punished with a
disciplinary penalty in the form of an unlimited fine for each violation. The
same punishment will apply to those who demand or grant more favourable
working conditions than are permitted according to the regulations of this
decree. Appeals to the Reich Minister of Labour against disciplinary penalties
are permitted.
(ii) In serious cases the sentence will be hard labour or penal servitude. Prosecutions will be instituted at the
request of the Reich Trustee or Special Trustee of Labour. The charge can be withdrawn . . .
SECTION IV: WAR PRICES
Prices and charges for goods and Services of all kinds must be fixed in accordance with the principles of
the war economy.
23. (i) Prices and charges for goods and Services of all kinds are to be reduced in so far as savings in wage
costs for goods and Services occur as a result of
Section III of this decree.
(ii) Prices and charges for goods and Services of all kinds must in future be based on the wages and
salaries permitted according to Section III of this decree, these being treated as the maximum.
52
(iii) Social benefits for the retinue, which are not prescribed as compulsory in laws, decrees, or wage scales, must
be used to determine prices and changes only in so far as they are customary for that particular business and are
not contrary to the principles of economical business methods.
(iv) It is forbidden to demand or permit higher prices or charges than those laid down as permissible in
paragraphs 1-3 . . .51
4.6
SD Morale Reports on the Germany Economy at War
4.6.1
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 30) 18 December 1939
I. General
The collection for the Winter Relief which was carried out over the weekend was an extraordinary
success in all part of the Reich, as far as can be determined so far. In many places WHW badges had already sold
out on Saturday. In the collections of gifts for soldiers at the front that were out in some areas there were generous
gifts almost everywhere. Even groceries which can only be obtained on rations were given with relative
generosity. On the other hand there was only very little success with the collections of clothes for Baltic Germans
which were carried out in some places (according to reports from Stuttgart and Troppau) and for ethnic Germans
in Poland (according to reports from Franconia and Upper Silesia). [. . . ]
The slogan ‘We shall not capitulate’ used by the Party and the Labour Front in a propaganda and
educational drive has generally had negative responses on account of the title. It is not deemed appropriate to be
discussing the question of whether or not we will capitulate in this way in the very first months of the war.
Source: Meldungen, 3, p. 581.
4.6.2
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 45) 26 January 1940
I. General
The shortages of coal have not been without influence on general morale. Although many national comrades help
each other in the spirit of the National Socialist community by giving up and helping to transport coal, grave
disquiet is to be discerned in may quarters. There are, for example, in Berlin-Moabit widespread rumours that there
have been coal demonstrations in other parts of Berlin, at which the police have had resort to firearms. It can be
assumed from the way in which these rumours have been spread that they were started by oppositional groups with
the intention of inflaming public opinion. Thefts of coal from cellars and factory yards have increased
considerably. The coal situation has an all the more adverse effect since there scarcely any articles to be found in
the German press which contribute to calming the population.52
Source: Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 50) 7 February 1940
I. General
The general easing of the shortage of coal for domestic heating, combined with the good weather, has
distracted that section of the population which was particularly affected by the coal shortage from the worries that
it caused. But since many households only have enough coal to last a few days, and there are quite considerable
gaps in coal supplies in some places, the supply of coal is still the subject of everyday discussion among the
public. The action of the party and its affiliated organisations to alleviate particularly severe local shortages in coal
supply has almost everywhere helped to consolidate the confidence in local party offices among those affected.
On the other hand many reports make clear that the position of political leaders, SA men, Hitler Youth members
etc. who helped with the distribution of coal in emergency areas, often seemed difficult and thankless, as some
sections of the population occasionally transferred their unhappiness about the coal shortage to the men deployed
by the party etc. Thus in a small village in the district of Worms, for example, a local NSDAP leader
[Ortsgruppenleiter] was physically attacked as he distributing the available coal because he was able to give each
person only one hundredweight.53
51
Cited in Noakes, Nazism IV, pp. 189-90
Meldungen, 3, pp. 686-687.
53
Meldungen, 3, pp. 731-732; Zentner
52
53
4.7
War Economy
4.7.1
Göring to representatives of the Wehrmacht, 28 November 1939
Present: Göring, Reich Economics Minister Funk, the chiefs of the Weapons Procurement Offices of the three
branches of the Armee! Forces, Major-General Thomas, Major-General Dr Todt, Professor Speer, the Commander
of the Reserve Army [General Fromm], the responsible state secretaries.
Field Marshal Göring opened the meeting by saying that the Führer had complained to him that the transition to a
war economy was going much too slowly. The armaments projects were not properly organized. There were flaws in the
munitions finishing plants. Furthermore, the present organization revealed certain inadequacies in comparison with the
armaments planning during the First World War.
Field Marsha Göring urged all the agencies involved to engage in more extensive cooperation, otherwise he would be
compelled to appoint an independent munitions minister . . .
In addition, Field Marshal Göring said that industry had still not understood the Situation. They were still dreaming of
an immediate peace. As a result, they were not changing their approach. This undoubtedly represented a failure on the
part of the Reich Economics Ministry. The Reich Economics Ministry, in agreement with the economic warfare staff
[i.e. the Wehrmacht agencies] must now at last take a tough line. The only thing that would work was rigorously to close
down those plants which were not vital for the war effort or for civilian life. The larger armaments plants must then be
instructed as far as possible to sub-contract work to the smaller factories which have been closed down. This process
should also involve a decentralisation in the allocation of Wehrmacht contracts but this would have to be handled
unbureaucratically. This would also avoid the problem of workers having to wander round the country like gypsies.54
4.7.2
Todt’s Death and Speer’s Replacement as his Successor
Dr. Todt was one of the very few modest, unassertive Personalities in the government, a man you can rely on, and
who steered clear of all the intrigues. With his combination of sensitivity and matter-of-factness, such as is frequently
found in technicians, he fitted rather poorly into the governing class of the National Socialist state. He lived a quiet,
withdrawn life, having no personal contacts with party circles—and even very rarely appeared at Hitler's dinners
and. suppers, although he would have been welcome. This retiring attitude enhanced his prestige; whenever he did
appear he became the centre of interest. Hitler, too, paid him and his accomplishments a respect bordering on
reverence. Nevertheless, Todt had maintained his personal independence in his relations with Hitler, although he
was a loyal party member of the early years.
In January 1941, when I was having difficulties with Bormann and Giessler, Todt wrote me an unusually candid
letter which revealed his own resigned approach to the working methods of the National Socialist leadership.
‘Perhaps my own experiences and bitter disappointments with all the men with whom I should actually be cooperating might be of help to you enabling you to regard your experience as conditioned by ,the times, and
perhaps the point of view which I have gradually arrived at after much struggle might somewhat help you
psychologically. For I have concluded that in the course of events . . . every activity meets with opposition
everyone who acts has his rivals and unfortunately his opponents also. But not because people want to be
opponents, rather because the tasks and relationships force different people to take different points of view.
Perhaps being young, you have quickly discovered how to cut through all such bother, while I can only brood
over it.’
At the breakfast table in the Führer's headquarters there was lively discussion of who could possibly be
considered for Todt's successor. Everyone agreed that he was irreplaceable. For he had held the positions of three
ministers. Thus, he had been the supreme head of all road-building operations, in charge of all navigable
waterways and improvements on them, as well as of all power plants.
In addition| as Hitler's direct envoy, he was Minister of Armaments and Munitions. Within the framework of
Göring's Four-Year Plan he headed the construction industry and had also created the Todt Organization
which was building the West Wall and, the U-boat shelters along Atlantic, as well as the roads in the occupied
territories all the way from northern Norway to southern France. Now he was also responsible for road
building in Russia.
Thus in, the course of the past several years Todt had gathered the major technical tasks of the Reich into his
own hands. For the time being his operations were still nominally divided into various Offices, but in
essence he had set up the future technical ministry — all the more so since he was entrusted, within the party
organization, with the Head Office for Technology, whose scope included all technical societies and associations!
During these first few hours I had already realized that: an important portion of Todt’s widely ranging tasks
would surely fall to me. For as early as the spring of 1930, on one of his inspection tours of the West Wall,
Hitler had remarked that if anything should happen to Todt, I would be the man to carry out Ms construction
assignments. Later, in the summer of 1940, Hitler received me officially in the Chancellery Office to inform me that
Todt was over-burdened. He had therefore decided, he said, to put me in charge of all construction, including the
fortifications along the Atlantic. At the time I had been able to convince Hitler that it would be better if
construction and armaments remained in one band, since they were closely linked. Hitler had not referred to the
54
Noakes, Nazism, IV, p. 198
54
matter again, and I had not spoken to anyone about it. The arrangement would not only have offended Todt but
would surely have diminished his prestige.
I was therefore prepared for such assignment when I was summoned to Hitler as the first caller of the day at
the usual late hour, around one o'clock in the afternoon. Even the face of Chief Adjutant Schaub expressed the
importance of the occasion. In contrast to the night before, Hitler received me officially as Führer of the Reich.
Standing, earnest and formal, he received my condolences, replied very briefly, then said without more ado:
‘Herr Speer, I appoint you the successor to Minister Todt in all bis capacities.’
I was thunderstruck. He was already shaking hands with me and on the point of dismissing me. But I thought he
had expressed himself imprecisely and therefore replied that I would try my best to be an adequate
replacement for Dr. Todt in Ms construction assignments. ‘No, in all bis capacities, including that of Minister of
Armaments,’ Hitler corrected me. ‘But I don't know anything about .. .’ I protested.'
‘I have confidence in you. I know you will manage it," Hitler cut me off. "Besides, I have no one else. Get in touch
with the Ministry at once and take over!’
‘Then, mein Führer, you must put that as a command, for I cannot vouch for my ability to master this
assignment,’ Tersely, Hitler issued the command. I received it in silence. Without a personal word, such as had
been the usual thing between us, Hitler turned to other business. I took my leave. having experienced a first
sample of our new relationship. Hitherto, Hitler had displayed a kind of fellowship toward me as an architect. Now
a new phase was perceptibly beginning. From the first moment on he was establishing the aloofness of an official
relationship to a minister who was his subordinate.
As I turned to the door, Schaub entered. ‘The Reich Marshal is here and urgently wishes to speak to you mein
Führer. He has no appointment.’
Hitler looked sulky and displeased. ‘Send him in.’ He turned to me. ‘Stay here a moment longer.’
Göring bustled in and after a few words of condolence stated his mind: ‘Best if I take over Dr. Todt's,
assignments within the framework of the Four-Year Plan. This would avoid the frictions and difficulties we had in
the past as a result of overlapping responsibilities.’
Göring had presumably come in his special train from his hunting lodge in Rominten, about sixty miles from
Hitler's headquarters. Since the accident had taken place at half past nine he must have wasted no time at all.
Hitler ignored Göring's proposal. ‘I have already appointed Todt's successor. Reich Master Speer here has
assumed all of Dr. Todt's Offices as of this moment.’
The Statement was so unequivocal that it excluded all possible argument. Göring seemed stunned and alarmed. But
within a few seconds he recovered his composure. Coldly and ill-humoredly, he made no comment on Hitler's
announcement. Instead he said: ‘I hope you will understand, mein Führer, if I do not attend Dr. Todt's funeral.
You know what battles I had with Mm. It would hardly do for me to be present.’
I no longer remember precisely what Hitler replied, since all this washing of dirty linen was naturally somewhat of
a shock to me at this early moment in my new ministerial career. But I recall that Göring finally consented to come
to the funeral, so that his disagreements with Todt would not become public knowledge. Given the importance
assigned to such ceremonies by the System, it would have cause quite a stir if the second man in the State
was absent from a formal act of state in honour of a dead cabinet minister. There could be no doubt that
Göring had tried to win his point by a surprise assault. I even surmised that Hitler had expected such a manoeuvre,
and that this was the reason for the speed of my appointment
55
5.
Nazism and Society
5.1
The Working Class
5.1.1
Hitler’s May Day Speech, 1933
German Volksgenossen!
‘Der Mai ist gekommen’.. That is how a German folksong puts it. And for many centuries, the first day of May was not
only symbolic of spring’s arrival in the countryside; it was also a day of joy, of festive spirits and sentiments. There
carne a time when this day was enlisted for other purposes, and the day of new life and hopeful joy was transformed
into a day of quarrel and internal strife. A dogma which had seized hold of our nation attempted to transform the day
of awakening nature, of the visible approach of spring, into a day of hate, of fraternal strife, of discord, and of
suffering. Centuries passed by this German country, and this day seemed more and more destined to document the
division and disunity of our nation. But there finally came a time of reflection, too, after the deepest suffering had
seized our nation, a time of turning inward and for German people to come together again.
And today we can once more join in singing the old folk song: ‘Der Mai ist gekommen.’ Our Nation's awakening
has come to pass. The symbol of class conflict, of never-ending strife and discord, is now becoming once again
the symbol of the great unity and uprising of the nation. And thus, for all time to come, we have chosen this day
when nature awakens as the day of regaining our own power and strength and, at the same time, the productive
work which knows no limits, which is not bound to unions or factories or offices; work we wish to recognize and
promote wherever it is performed in a positive sense for the very existence and the life of our Nation.
The German Nation has a gruesome crisis behind it. But it is not as though this were due to lack of industry, no! Millions
in our Nation are working like before. Millions of peasants are walking behind their ploughs as in the past, millions
of workers are standing at the workbench, hammering to the sound of the ringing anvil. Millions in our Nation are
working, and millions more want to work, but they cannot! Tens of thousands voluntarily put an end to an
existence which, for them, holds only grief and misery. They have traded it for the next world, in which they hope
for something more and better. Appalling suffering and misfortune have descended upon us and brought, in their
wake, despondency and even despair. And we now ask ourselves, why?
It is a political crisis. The German nation has become disintegrated internally, its entire vitality is being used up in the
internal struggle. The ability to build on the power of one's own will has dwindled, people's faith in the power of
the individual has diminished. Millions are eyeing the rest of the world in the hope that it will bestow upon them
good fortune and well-being. The Nation is disintegrating, and its vitality, its power to assert its own life, is fading
with this disintegration. We see the consequences of this class conflict around and within us, and we want to learn
from this. For there is one thing we have recognized as the primary requirement for the recovery of our Nation: the
German Nation must once again come to know itself!
The millions of people divided into professions, separated into artificial classes which, infested by arrogance of
rank and class madness, are no longer able to understand each other – they must find their way back together!
A gigantic, tremendous task – we know it! But when madness has been upheld and preached as a political idea for
seventy years, when the destruction of the Volksgemeinschaft has been the political rule for seventy years, then it is
difficult to seek to change people's minds overnight. We must not allow this to let us become despondent and despair.
What one man has built, another can tear down; what human madness once created can be overcome by the power of
reason.
We know that this process of coming to know and understand each other cannot be a matter of weeks or months or
even of a mere few years. We do, however, have the unshakeable will to accomplish this great task before
German history, we have the resolution to lead German people back together, and if necessary, to force them back
together.
That is the meaning of May Day which shall be celebrated in Germany from now on and throughout the centuries so that all
those who are active in the great machinery of our productive national work may join together and extend their hands
to one another once a year in the realization that nothing can be accomplished unless everyone contributes his
share of work and efforts. And thus, as our motto for this day, we have chosen the sentence, ‘Honour the work, and
respect the worker!’
For millions, it is difficult to overcome all the hate and misunderstandings which have been artificially cultivated in
the past and find their way back together. There is one realization which allows us to tread this path more easily. Take
a person who is working, wherever it may be—he should and must not forget that his Volksgenosse, who is doing
his duty just like him, is indispensable; that the nation does not subsist on the work of a government, of a certain class
or in the products of its intelligence, but rather lives from the mutual and harmonious work of all! When millions
believe that the type of work itself is any indication of the worthiness of those who execute it, this is a bitter mistake.
There are many tens of thousands among us who want to make respect for the individual dependent upon the type of
work he does. No! Not what he does, but rather how he does it must be the decisive factor. The fact that millions
among us are industrious year in, year out, without ever being able to hope to gain riches, or even only to
achieve a life without cares—that should oblige everyone to support them all the more. For it is their idealism and
their devotion alone which make it possible for the whole to exist and live. It would be a sorry fate if today this idealism
in our nation were to fade and the value of an individual were to be judged solely by the external fortunes of life which
have fallen to his lot. The value of our nation would then no longer be great and its term of existence would not
be long.
It is useless to explain to the worker that he is important or to prove to the peasant the necessity of his existence;
useless to approach the intellectual, the mental worker, in Order to make him understand the importance of what
56
he does. It is necessary to teach each rank and class the significance of the other ranks and classes. And therefore
we want to go forth into the cities to proclaim to them the necessity and the essentiality of the German peasant and go
out into the country and to our thinkers and teach them the significance of the German working class. We want to
go to the worker and to the peasant to teach them that there can be no German life unless there is a German spirit;
that they all must unite to form a great community: spirit, mind and hand, worker, peasant, and burgher.
5.1.2
Robert Ley, Instructions for the ‘Gleichschaltung’ of the Free Trades Unions
On Tuesday, 2 May 1933, the coordination [Gleichschaltungsaktion] of the Free Trade Unions will begin....
The direction of the entire Operation lies in the hands of the Action Committee....
The essential part of the Operation is to be directed against the General German Trade Union Federation (ADGB)
and the General Independent Employees' Federation (AFA). Anything beyond that which concerns the Free
Trade Unions is left to the discretion of the Gauleiters.
The Gauleiters are responsible for the establishment of coordination in the individual areas. Those concerned
in the Operation should be members of the National Socialist Factory Cell Organization.
SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of trade-union properties and for taking into custody the
people concerned.
The Gauleiters must proceed on the basis of the closest understanding with the appropriate Gau factory cell
leaders.
The action in Berlin will be carried out by the Action Committee itself.
In the Reich the following will be occupied: the headquarters of the unions; the trade-union buildings and offices
of the Free Trade Unions; the party buildings of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in so far as trade
unions are lodged there; the branches and pay offices of the Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials, Ltd; the
district and local committees of the General German Trade Union Federation and of the General Independent
Employees' Federation.
The following are to be taken into protective custody: all trade-union chairmen; the district secretaries and the
branch managers of the Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials, Ltd.
The chairmen of local committees as well as the employees of unions are not be taken into protective custody
but are to be urged to continue their work.
Exceptions are to be made only with the permission of the Gauleiters.
The taking over of the independent trade unions must proceed in such a way that the workers and employees will
not be given the impression that this action is aimed at them, but, on the contrary, at a superannuated System
which does not conform with the interests of the German nation.
The provisional local leadership of the General German Trade Union and of the General Independent Employees'
Federation is to be taken over by a commissioner of the National Socialist Factory Cells Organization.
Negotiations with the authorities and other organizations are to be immediately put into the hands of the newly
installed commissioners.
All funds and accounts of the independent trade unions are to be blocked immediately and to remain so until
Thursday afternoon 1800 hours. In so far as incumbent cashiers are permitted to remain in office they will be
subject to the authority of a commissioner. All receipts for payments must be countersigned by the commissioner.
After lifting the blocking of the funds, the usual payments for the Support of individuals must be unconditionally
assured, to avoid creating a feeling of uneasiness among members of the trade unions.
Mass meetings are to be arranged as soon as possible, to be freely attended by all trade-union members. In these
meetings the significance of the action must be explained and it must be pointed out that the rights of the
workers and employees are being unconditionally guaranteed . . . .
It must be understood that this Operation is to proceed in a highly disciplined fashion. The Gauleiters are
responsible for this: they are to keep the direction of the Operation firmly in hand. 55
5.1.3
Reich Press Agency, 2 May 1933
National Socialism, which today has assumed leadership of the German working class, can no longer bear the
responsibility for leaving the men and women of the German working class, the members of the largest trade
organisation in the world, the German Trade Union Movement, in the hands of people who do not know a
fatherland that is called Germany. Because of that, the National Socialist Factory Cell Organisation (N.S.B.O.) has
taken over the leadership of the trade unions. The N.S.B.O. has eliminated the former leadership of the trade
unions of the General German Trade Unions Federation, and of the General Independent Employees'
Federation...56
55
56
Nuremberg Document 2283 PS, Cited in Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 2, pp. 330-1
Nuremberg Document 2224-PS
57
5.1.4
The Mood of the Workers, 1934
The working class is that part of the population, which - as was established in the previous report - is most reticent
in its criticism. On the strength of the most recent reports the working class can be divided into three categories in
terms of its attitude to the Hitler regime. The first group comprises those workers who have found work under
Hitler. A report from the Rhineland serves as an example. (There are other reports from Bavaria, Saxony and
western Germany.)
‘ . . . and even when they receive only a small sum more in wages than they previously had in social security
benefit, they nevertheless see finding a job as progress or improvement . . .’
The second group comprises those workers who had work before, and some of whom were organised [in trades
unions]. They were and are opponents of the regime, but are still very cautious. A report from Hamburg elaborates:
‘A large number of old organised industrial workers are still opposed to the regime. They only pretend to be
convinced by fascism in order not to lose their jobs, as was often the case before’.
[. . . ]
The third part comprises those workers whose socialist beliefs were so firm in 1933 that they have not abandoned
them today. Even the most recent reports agree that this core of the former organised workforce clings to its
socialist beliefs as much as ever. And not only clings to them, but as much as is possible expresses them. 57
5.1.5
From the Shop Floor (June 1936)
Anybody who criticises the fearful and sometimes over-cautious attitude of German workers under the Nazi
dictatorship must take into account the comprehensive and ruthless nature of the terror to which workers are
subjected at work. The supervision and covert surveillance of workers has become even more intense recently. The
regime is attempting to prevent reporting from the shop floor by any means possible. [. . ]
North Sea Coast: Aircraft factory X. There are many police spies among the workforce, mainly SS men. There
have been many arrests recently. All those arrested had been careless about what they said.
Bavaria: At the end of May a woman was dismissed from the wax candle factory X because she had not raised her
hand when the Horst Wessel song was sung at a factory rally. The Councillor of Trust insisted on the dismissal,
and also made sure that she was immediately expelled from the German Labour Front. The Factory Leader wanted
to reinstate her after a week. The chairman of the Council of Trust was against it. In the reference she was given
the reason for dismissal was that she had endangered the security of the factory. 58
5.1.6
Signs of Resistance
Bavaria: In the X glass factory there was a strike . . . The main reasons for this spontaneous downing of tools are
the low wage rates, which are often no higher than welfare payments. The wage struggle took a very animated
course. The workers came to the factory but could not be persuaded to start work.
Saxony: Internal tensions and arguments about wages have arisen during the last few weeks at the NSDAP
newspaper firm in Zwickau. Print workers have complained vehemently about their low wages, some of which are
only 30 to 35 Marks a week, and drawn attention to the high wages of the editors and party functionaries, who get
salaries of 700 to 800 Marks a month. Workers have demanded that there should be a narrowing of differentials
according to the spirit of ‘German socialism’; one should not just talk about ‘the worker’s honour’ and write about
it in the papers, but act accordingly. 59
5.2
The Middle Classes
5.2.1
Reports from the Trade and Commercial Sectors, 1935
One cannot say that National Socialism has done nothing for the commercial middle class. They have done various
things, but their measures have for the most part turned out to be double-edged. Alongside agriculture the
commercial middle class was the area in which the National Socialists attempted to give their ideology practical
form. If blood-and-soil Romanticism and autarky-insanity have raged in agricultural policy, then Mittlestand
policy has been the field in which to realise their corporate conception of the economy. On the surface there has
been the double-sided and irresolute action against department stores and consumer co-operatives. The National
Socialists themselves have placed much greater emphasis on their other middle-class policies [and their measures]
are intended to protect craftsmanship from the competition of pure ‘businessmen’. The duty to apply for
57
Deutschland-Berichte, 1934, pp. 106-107.
Deutschland-Berichte 1936 p. 711-14
59
Deutschland-Berichte 1936 p. 720.
58
58
permission to set up a new small retail business – originally envisaged as a provisional measure, then made a
permanent regulation in 1934 – was intended to prevent the retail trade becoming overpopulated. The
incorporation of commerce into compulsory guilds, and into a complete organisation of estates reaching up to and
including the Reich Minister of Craftsmanship, was intended to establish an independent occupational estate [for
artisans] alongside those for agriculture, industry, and trade. But all these measures driven by guild Romanticism –
and also by the mass-organisation requirements of the dictatorship – have revealed serious disadvantages, while
the potential advantages […] have proved largely illusory.
[…]
A reporter from Saxony has the following to say:
It is noticeable how many shops are for sale, and that small grocers have had simply to close their shops and for
the most part are drawing welfare benefits. Shop sales are proving fairly difficult, because the new regulations
insist that the new owner be a member of the trade. Even if a shopkeeper has only given up the trade temporarily,
he cannot simply start up a new one. He needs permission form the authorities to do that. For example, a craftsman
who could no longer carry on his trade as the result of an accident was forced to close his workshop, and bought a
small grocery shop instead. He neglected, however, to get the necessary official permission and was actually
forced to give the business up shortly afterwards.
…
We have taken the following from a report from Berlin:
Among the craftsmen a rigid guild system is in full swing. Today, for example, it is quite precisely set down which
odd jobs a Hausmeister can undertake, and which ones mean calling in a craftsman. In the same spirit the battle
against ‘black market’ labour has been pursued in individual cases with brutal hardness. And the new rules which,
for example, make it necessary to complete a three-year apprenticeship and a master’s exam before practising as a
tailor, are part of the same tendency. In the past a girl who, for example, had learned dressmaking, could establish
her independence by taking on customers, and thereby earn a modest living. That is now strictly forbidden, and
only those who have served an apprenticeship and passed the exam can open a tailor’s shop. That means of course
that the poorer classes, who do not have the means to support their children through a three-year apprenticeship ,
will be simply excluded form these occupations in the future. 60
Victor Klemperer’s Diary: New Year's Eve '38, Saturday
Yesterday I cursorily read through the diary for 1938. The resume of '37 maintained that the peak of wretchedness
and intolerableness had been reached. And yet compared to the present state of things the year still contains so much
that is good, so much (everything is relative!) freedom.
[…]
Certainly things were getting manifestly worse and worse in the course of the year. First the Austrian triumph.
Then from the end of May the absence of Frau Lehmann. (More serious for us personally than the carry-on about
Greater Germany.) Then in September the frustrated hope of a war that would deliver us. And then the decisive blow.
Since the Grünspan affair the inferno.
But I do not want to assert prematurely that we have already reached the last circle of hell, for uncertainty 1s not the
worst thing, because in uncertainty there is still hope. Also we still have pension and house. But the pensions are
already being tampered with (no special arrangements any more, i.e. the promised full salaries, which I never
received, are being cut), and I have already had to provide the Office for the Liquidation of Jewish Assets with all
particulars relating to the house. We must not let ourselves be deceived by the relative calm of recent weeks: in a
couple of months either we are finished here or ‘they’ are.
Recently I have really been doing everything humanly possible to get out of here: the list of my publications and
my SOS calls have gone everywhere: to Lima, to Jerusalem, to Sydney, to the Quakers via Miss Livingstone. I gave
the affidavit sent by Georg’s youngest to the US Consulate in Berlin, confirmed by telephone that the Mr Geist named
by Georg is still there and will be available after the New Year, and wrote a letter requesting a personal audience. But
that any of it will do any good at all, is more than doubtful.
Moral was here again on Thursday afternoon: feeling of friendship and Isolation and the same irresolution. He
thinks and hesitates as we do. Away and into absolute nothingness? Give up the pension one still has? But precisely:
still! And afterwards, if it is too late? But where can we go now? etc. etc. ad infinitum. Moral is a District Court Judge,
is 61 and looks, also behaves a little as if he were 71 - it is therefore even harder for him than for me. He thinks it
possible that war and collapse are near. A St Bartholomew's Eve - such a pogrom would surely be the beginning of
the end, there would, he argues, be only one night of blood, because then the army would restore order - he
therefore wants to escape the night of blood by lying low in Berlin in a neutral and Aryan pension. He has already
provided for that eventuality.
The News Review London of 8th December, which I have from Frau Meyer, claims that there was a military plot to kill
Hitler at the Berghof recently. Himmler had uncovered the plot, executions had been carried out. Truth? Rumour?
To go by this newspaper, we must be close to the end here. But here we read just such reports about Moscow. And
Stalin remains, and Hitler remains.
To the extent that I have worked at all since the catastrophe, it has been a haphazard courting of English. Now
grammar, now vocabulary, now the translation of a short text; since 15th December one and a half hours (with
dictation) two or three times a week with Mrs Meyer. Perhaps I have learned a tiny amount more, at least with
respect to reading and understanding the spoken language; but I continue to be quite unable to speak it and I am
increasingly alienated from the syntax, indeed regard it with helpless dismay. And in the long term I am unable to
60
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, p. 1334 (November)
59
bear this fumbling around, this complete lack of productive work. If January passes without bringing any certainty
about emigration, then I shall concentrate on my Vita, of which I recently wrote down the first tentative lines.
5.2.2
End-of-the-World Mood among the Middle Classes
[. . .]
[The] feeling of uncertainty has grown during the last few months, but it has increased above all among those
upper middle class groups which sympathised with National Socialism for a long time. These groups, who
welcomed Hitler because he liberated them from the growing influence of the labour movement, from the scrutiny
of free public opinion, from the constraints of a democratic parliamentary form of government, and an
independent bureaucracy, are gradually recognising that they have fallen out of the frying pan and into the fire.
They liked to persuade themselves in 1933 that Hitler had saved Germany from Bolshevism. Now they have
slowly come to realise that form the point of view of their own interests National Socialism is nothing other than a
particular variety of Bolshevism. No wonder that they are depressed by dark anxieties, even as they make large
amounts of money.
A good example of this mood in the German middle class is the following extract from a letter, which a
German industrialist wrote to a fiend abroad while he himself was travelling abroad.
‘. . . My letter will disappoint you perhaps, but I have very much changed my mind since the pogrom,
and count myself among those businessmen who are as afraid of National Socialism now as of Communism in
1932, the only difference being that communism was a phantom then, whereas National Socialism is a dreadful
reality now. There is a general conviction in business circles conviction that we ‘white Jews’ will be the next in
line after the Jews. The extent and timing of the plundering of ‘Aryan’ businessmen depends on the outcome of
internal struggles within the National Socialist Party. [. . .]
Yes indeed, we are approaching dreadful times, and you can imagine my mood as I sit here in the middle of this
mess. If I had only got 10,000 dollars over the border in time, 5,000 even, nothing would keep me or my family in
the Reich. I never understood before why in the eighties Great Uncle H. had all his sons brought up in America to
get them American citizenship, so that they would be free of Prussian military tyranny, but today even I, a Prussian
officer in the war, Knight of the High Order and so on and so forth, have the same thoughts when I look at my
grandchildren. ‘For Kaiser and Reich’ or ‘With God and King for the Fatherland’, that was still a great idea, but
slaughtered for gangsters and hangmen’s bully boys? That’s dammed hard for an old conservative.
Now don’t let my letter make you think that the Germans might have become more politically astute, or
are even on the way to it. No, it’s still the same old German people, behaving like a misunderstood old spinster. ‘If
the British had only acted in time!’ and ‘If the French had made concessions earlier!’ and ‘If the Americans had
joined the League of Nations!’ - All very well, but I’m still looking for Germans who will finally say of
themselves: ‘If only we hadn’t been such asses, and if only we - regardless of party - had learned more from the
British, the French and Americans, instead of only criticising, neither William nor Hitler would have been
possible.61
5.3
Youth
5.3.1
Baldur von Schirach, The Hitler Youth (Leipzig, 1934)
In place of a foreword.
My Führer! It is five years now since you gave me the mission to take over leadership of the National Socialist
youth. At that time you explained to my collaborators and to me the idea of this youth organisation. What you
preached to us at that time as aim and demand, my Führer , has taken on shape here before you. You asked at that
time from me and my collaborators that we should create a community of youth in which no other law should be
binding for the process of reconstruction but the law of achievement.
Here, among the leaders of the Hitler Youth (HJ) are the sons of the poorest who exercise command over hundreds
of thousands. What do the conceptions of poverty and richness mean in face of the reality of this community? In
future days only those will be called poor who did not belong in their youth to this community. And further, my
Führer, you demanded from my collaborators and from me that we should not only unite the youth in enthusiasm,
but also by discipline and order. We fought for years laboriously for this end, but today even this demand is
fulfilled and proudly we feel ourselves as a worthy part of your great National Socialist Movement.
But we were powerless regarding one of your demands. You told us then it would appear as a great success to you
if we succeeded to hold together in one organisation of the German one hundred thousand German youth. My
Führer, you forgot, that you had given this organisation your name.
You asked for one hundred thousand, and it was all who came. There is one thing which is stronger than you, my
Führer , that is the love of the young Germany for you.
There are many gay hours in the year of the youth. This one, however, is in every year our happiest. Because more
than other people, my Führer , we feel to be chained to your person by our name. Your name is the happiness of
the youth, your name, my Führer , is our immortality.
61
Deutschland-Berichte, 1939, p. 303-306.
60
5.3.2
Compulsory Youth Labour Service: Daily Routine 62
6 a.m.
6.05 - 6.20
6.20 - 6.40
6.40 - 6.55
7. a.m.
14.00
14.30 - 15.00
15.00 - 16.00
16.00-17.00
17.00-18.00
18.00-19.00
19.00
20.00 - 21.00
21.45
22.00
5.3.3
Rising (5 a.m. in summer).
Early exercises
Washing, bed-making, room-cleaning.
Breakfast.
Marching in line, flag parade, the day’s task and speech, march to the
place of work.
Six hours of agricultural labour, average of 45 minutes spent on the
marching route, half an hour for late breakfast.
Return from work.
Midday meal
Rest period in bed.
Sport or cleaning up.
Political instruction.
Issuing of tasks, instruction period, polishing and mending roll-call.
Supper.
Festivities (singing, oratory, games).
Locking up
Retiring
The League of German Girls
If I think of the national rally of B.D.M. leaders at Bamberg in the summer of 1938, then once again I can
only recall this feeling of happiness - to be allowed to belong to a Community which embraced the whole
youth of the nation, even that part of it which was forced to grow up outside the national frontiers. Many
leaders who were Volksdeutsche from abroad had left their homes in secret. What made us so happy at this was
not the numerical size of our Community, but the feeling that no one was excluded from it any more - neither
our Austrian comrades, nor even those who were German leaders in Transylvania or Banat. The feeling of being
young, of belonging together, of understanding and loving one another in all the variety of our characters,
which resulted from our different origins - and above all the feeling that we had a common task — how should it
not fill us with overwhelming joy?
In this joy there was still no harsh note of hate or arrogance. The war had not yet begun. We were still not
'orientated' towards the con-quest of our neighbours and amidst our own jubilation we did not hear the
muffled cries of fear and distress from those people who lived in our country and were persecuted as enemies of
the regime.
Now, when I sometimes talk about those days to people who were on the other side of the barricades before
1945,1 can always feel their resentment as soon as I mention, for example, the tremendous amount achieved in
the intensive and discriminating musical education of young people in those days. I can understand this
resistance very well. It would be much simpler if it could now be said that in the Hitler Youth they only
bellowed bloodthirsty horror songs and played military marches. But this was not the case and the position is
similar in other fields.
The fact that so many of us find it hard to square our accounts with the past is also directly related to the fact
that in those days every one of us invested a great deal of positive achievement and drew benefit from the
positive achievement of his fellows. These memories obstruct our view. One must tear aside the flowers, if I
may use a somewhat bold Image, in order to be able to recognize that the roots were poisonous. Millions of
men died from this poison, among them the German soldiers and the victims of the bombing raids. But my example was that of our musical education and activities. The general comments followed in anticipation of your
reaction. You may remember that I always got low marks in music. It was part of my family tradition to be
unmusical. When I left school I could hardly sing a scale. In the summer of 1938 I heard a performance of
Bach's Art of the Fugue in St. Thomas' church, Leipzig, to which I am indebted for the fact that music is
today my chief consolation in life. For then a door really opened before me. The concert took place during
the Reich music festival of the Hitler Youth. I was sent there - despite my protests — to report on it for our
papers. For days I went from one concert to another. The programme ranged from the Gregorian chant to
choral and instrumental music which had been composed within the Hitler Youth itsel f.
After my ears had been opened at that unforgettable concert at St. Thomas' church I made the surprising
discovery that not only could I listen, but I also had a critical appreciation of music. I knew almost no
technical terms, but what I said in my layman's language coincided with the judgement of discriminating
musicians.
You may well comment that if I had heard the Art of the Fugue outside this Hitler Youth performance my
ears would still have been opened.
62
A Krüger, Aufgabe und Sinn des Arbeitsdienstes (n.p. 1935) cited in Robert A. Brady, The Spirit and Structure of German
Fascism (London, 1937) pp. 168-169.
61
This is certainly true. Provided I had felt the same inward receptiveness at a 'neutral' concert. I did not go to
concerts voluntarily, because I thought I was too unmusical. But my point in giving this detailed description
is that if one sought it, one could also find within the Hitler Youth satisfaction for one's deepest cultural
needs. And sometimes, as in this case, one found it even where one was not look-ing for it. The fact that this
was so bound us with our whole being to the Hitler Youth. Even at the time when the war was destroying
almost all the beauty of our lives. 63
5.3.4
Criticism of the Hitler Youth, December 1938
The attitudes of young people are easy to influence than those of adults. This fact made it easier for the regime to
win over young people during the first years after the seizure of power [Umsturz]. It seems that the same situation
now makes it difficult for the regime to keep young people bound to it. The attitudes of young people are naturally
influenced by the general popular mood, and the reports on young people reflect the same dissatisfaction and
disillusionment as the general reports on popular opinion. In addition, however, young people have particular
cause for disappointment. They were made particularly grand promises, which could only be kept for a few. [. . .]
Berlin: [. . .] Even young Nazis are disappointed and unhappy. They realise more and more that what is happening
is not in accordance with the ideals for which they fought. They starve unless their mothers send bread to the work
camp, and have nothing to smoke unless their fathers send cigarettes. . . . They understand that the
Volksgemeinschaft for which they were so enthusiastic is only a slogan. There is still much talk of a second
revolution. And that often means thoughts of a revolution against the fascist regime.
Many in the Hitler Youth have long since ceased to get any fun out of all the marches and exercises.
They do not want to be with the same group all the time and march to order. They want to go walking where they
want, with whom they want, wearing what they want. The Hitler Youth training evenings are boring. They listen to
the speeches but only answer the leader’s questions when they cannot get out of it. . . Only the Bündische Jugend
still knows how to make a go of things.64
63
64
Maschmann, Account Rendered, pp.54-5
Deutschland-Berichte, 1938, pp. 1390-1391
62
6.
Coercion, Conformity, Opposition and Resistance
6.1
Popular Opinion
Sopade Reports 1934-1938
April /May 1934
In the first of its published reports smuggled out of Germany to the exiled leadership in Prague, the Sopade
discerned a general change of mood, but this observation was qualified by the disclaimer that the reports came
from people who could only report directly on very limited areas:
It is remarkable in any case that these days the perspective and experience of almost everybody in Germany is
restricted; an overview of the general situation can only seldom be achieved.
All the more remarkable, then, the unanimity with which a general change of mood is reported from almost all
parts of the country, and almost all occupational classes. . . ‘[Party] henchmen and denouncers are not as active as
they were. There can be no doubt that the mass basis of National Socialism is beginning to disappear’.
Another report makes the same point as follows:
‘Before, it was impossible to do anything in Germany, because every second man was a voluntary spy for the
Nazis. Today things are very different.’
A further report from the Rhineland claims:
‘From the similarity of the reports I would suggest that the euphoria has evaporated, It is no longer possible to pull
the wool over the eyes of the middling and lower classes. People are becoming more critical and many are already
oppositional. Certain people still believe in miracles, even today. But it is recognised that earlier levels of social
and economic well-being cannot be matched, let alone improved upon.’
Even more optimistic is a report from Baden, although the reporter himself emphasises that this is an
overwhelmingly rural area:
‘Criticism is already expressed quite openly, and in some cases entirely without apprehension. Discontentment is
increasing in the SA, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that we are witnessing the beginnings of a new
movement. The economic situation is confronted with complete helplessness.’
A report from southern Bavaria illustrates the ways in which this disaffection is expressed:
‘All reports agree that popular disaffection is on the increase. And the cause of the disaffection is quite simply
disappointment. Disaffection is expressed in various ways. Some of those who were once enthusiastic are now
indifferent. Interest in events has disappeared. Other former supporters express their disaffection through criticism
of the local inadequacies of the system, and against local officials and functionaries.’
‘The most open criticism’ according to a report from northern Bavaria ‘now comes everywhere from older people,
including pensioners. These older people no doubt feel that it is unlikely that they will be sent to concentration
camps so quickly.
Many people spoke in terms of what they would do should there be another election. A reporter from rural
Brandenburg wrote:
‘One often hears something along the following lines: ‘Yes, if it should come to another election, where we had to
decide yes or no, as on 12 November, then we would write: Yes to Adolf Hitler, No to the brown bigwigs!’
(This reporter estimates the number of votes for the National Socialists in a genuinely free election at 45%, another
observer from Berlin, who is noted for his political judgement, at 35%.)
A summary report from the Rhineland and Westphalia comes to the following cautious conclusion;
‘The present psychological state of almost all classes in Germany seems to be founded above all on our German
mentality. If we have become used to some burdens, and others have been lifted, or are no longer so evident, there
is immediately great hope. Of course, this mood is an important factor in the struggle against the system, but its
importance should not be overestimated.’65
The report on the ‘general mood’ of the German people was expanded in the second edition of the DeutschlandBerichte.
May/June 1934
The general change in the popular mood which was described in the previous report has continued and is
spreading. Not even the masterly control of the propaganda machine can achieve any lasting results. An observer
from eastern Saxony writes:
‘Festivals and parades still have the power to animate people. There was great enthusiasm during the Führer’s visit
to Dresden, and it encompassed even those groups who had become indifferent. It should be noted, however, that
the boost from festivals and marches has a very short-term effect, for a few days later the greyness of everyday life
was reflected in disaffection and insecurity.’
All the reports are agreed that criticism is sometimes astonishingly open.66
65
66
Source: Deutschland-Berichte, 1934, pp.9-14
Deutschland-Berichte, 1934, p.99
63
January 1935
Travellers’ reports are usually particularly good sources of information on the general mood in Germany.
. . . The following travellers’ reports refer to journeys to south-west Germany and Berlin:
First Report: When one returns to Germany after a long time and looks around with open eyes, one is quite
astonished at what has become of the old cultured Germany. This is a people walking around with fear and anxiety
stamped on their foreheads. Where two people are together, neither is sure whether there isn’t a spy either behind
them or in front of them. Nevertheless, people are slowly becoming more confident. People have stopped saying
‘Heil Hitler’ and started saying ‘Good day’ again. Even on trains people say ‘Good day’ and public officials
always say it. On the station where I had to wait for half an hour, I drank a cup of coffee in the second class
restaurant where the new big-wigs go. There I immediately got the right impression. There sat a Hitler big-wig
with three stars on his collar and a ceremonial dagger in his belt, drunk as a pig, and that at seven o’ clock in the
morning. Next to him was a woman, with whom he was making the most almighty row. After half an hour they
left with a drunken ‘Heil Hitler’. I asked the waiter if everybody who wore such a uniform was such a swine, to
which the waiter said: ‘Sadly, most of them are, and he is one of the worst’.
On the train there was little talk of politics, since everybody is afraid of being denounced. Nazis tell each
other about all the things that are being done, but have to admit that more was achieved in the past.
Second Report: I found the atmosphere in south-west Germany unbearable. I had the impression that here was a
whole people being systematically drilled in an unprecedented culture of hypocrisy. Perhaps the most repellent
thing is that a large number of people one speaks to, or hears from, are either oppositional or indifferent deep
down, but go along with it on the outside.67
February 1935
Reports over the last month on the general mood in Germany contain a new note in so far as a growing
indifference to the regime is reported. This apathy and weariness is an expression of the fact that in the last few
weeks a whole range of widely held illusions have had to be buried. It is by no means the result of the Saar
plebiscite that has brought about this change of mood. . . . Besides the Saar plebiscite the collapse of several other
illusions has had an effect on the popular mood. For is a start there is the economic illusion. At the beginning of
the winter it was widely believed in oppositional circles that as a consequence of economic difficulties the regime
would not survive the winter. The army and big business would leave Hitler in power until the spring and then get
rid of him. Then there is the illusion that another 30 June, more violent conflicts within the regime, were on the
agenda, and had only been postponed until after the Saar plebiscite. Now instead if these illusions about domestic
politics, there has been a recognition, even in broad oppositional circles, that although the dictatorship is changing,
precisely this change diminishes the possibility of getting rid of the regime, or of dramatic struggles between the
separate groups within it. Finally, the foreign policy illusions of increasingly broad circles have also proved
deceptive. There is a growing fear that Germany will get away with its rearmament plans, and that the Western
powers could prove even more accommodating. The broader oppositional circles are now entering a period of
disillusionment which the hard core of the opposition had already overcome during the course of 1934. 68
April 1935
BERLIN: Most people are still saying very little about the re-introduction of conscription. . . . It is remarkable that
in this case too the flurry of enthusiasm has very quickly dissipated, and has again given way to a general
disillusionment. Most people are expecting a war soon. There is no sign of jingoism; on the contrary the mood is
very depressed. Many people say: We could no longer tolerate suppression by foreign countries, something had to
happen, but Hitler has overdone it. In addition they believe that the leaders of the Third Reich only dare to speak
so boldly because Germany is already very strong. As ever, fantastic rumours are being spread and believed, of a
technical defence capability of unheard-of effectiveness. After the rumour made the rounds a few months ago that
in the neighbourhood of the big Märkisches 69 power station at Finkenheerd cars had suddenly stopped in the street
of their own accord, and could only be started up again after half an hour, there is now a report of the same thing
happening on the road from Ruheleben to Spandau (death rays!).
Many young men are joining the army voluntarily, because they think it will bring them advantages. As
before the term is for a year and a half.
In Socialist opposition circles one often comes across the view that the war ought to come sooner rather
than later, because it is hoped that it will bring with it the end of the Third Reich. No thought is given to what
might come after. The basic thinking is simple: it surely cannot get any worse. 70
July 1935
The observer of the situation in Germany who takes the trouble to look behind the events in the foreground at the
general trend, can now make three observations:
1. For a long time - we have mentioned it repeatedly in these reports - the dread of Bolshevism was the great
negative foundation of the regime. Fear of the chaos, which was inevitable because the fall of Hitler would be
followed by Communism coming to power, prompted the ‘middle classes’ (‘Der Bürger’) again and again, and
67
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, pp. 15-16
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, pp. 152-3
Märkisch (adj.) refers to the Mark Brandenburg (Brandenburg March)
70
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, p. 409
68
69
64
despite all the cursing and grumbling, to come to terms with the system nevertheless. The opinion is now gaining
ground that there are forces which are both capable of removing the system, and competent to do so. . . . Some - so
far the greater number - is inclined to believe that a military dictatorship will, and will have to be established, and
that the measures against the Stahlhelm are the regime’s response. A minority, however - and this seems to us an
important symptom - increasingly believe that ‘the workers must do it’. This view is based on the increasingly
pathbreaking realisation that it was quite different during the ‘fourteen years’71 from the picture generally painted
by Hitler and his followers.
2. The second observation that can be made today is that Hitler’s position is shaky. The popularity of the ‘Führer’
has been subject to fluctuation for some time. His image had been bolstered considerably by the Saar victory, and
the re-introduction of general conscription and turns of phrase such as ‘That’s not the what the Führer wants’ or
‘If only the Führer knew about it he would never put up with it’ were quite common. For some time, however,
reports predominate that people in all classes are beginning to doubt the Führer himself. Even members of the
NSDAP, including occasionally ‘alte Kämpfer’,72 sometimes join in this criticism of Hitler. But this criticism is in
many cases not yet a fundamental criticism of the leadership principle, but a hankering after another ‘Führer’, for
some Schacht, for others Blomberg.
3. The third observation - and for an accurate assessment of current events the most important - concerns the status
of the NSDAP, its popular image, and its internal constitution. Several months ago (April 1935, Part B) we pointed
out in these reports that the NSDAP is undergoing a process of undermining from within, because it has seconded
people to all kinds of public and semi-public institutions, and continues to do so; it is no longer anything more than
an interest group for pushy careerists. These observations have been confirmed again by a series of reports, which
observe that the Party no longer has any respect, and that it no longer has the image of a coherent organisation, still
less that of an intellectual powerhouse and determined political advance guard.
RHINELAND-WESTPHALIA: The whole west has become very unsettled in the last few weeks. It appears as if
broad sections of the middle classes are moving on from grumbling to a position against the system which has to
be taken more seriously.
The most prominent symptom of this is the abundance of rumours which are passed on by word of
mouth. There is talk of riots in Hamburg, for example. There are said to have been clashes between the Stahlhelm
and the SA, with hundreds of casualties. Similar things are said about Berlin. And we should not forget to mention
that there is again talk of an assassination attempt on Hitler.
In Düsseldorf there was a Stahlhelm demonstration a few weeks ago. Signs were carried with
oppositional slogans. There were also clashes with SA men. Stahlhelm men and German Nationalists are working
with illegal publications. In these there are abrupt slogans, such as: ‘The Stahlhelm fights in the Third Reich and
rules in the Fourth’. . . In an illegal Stahlhelm flysheet, of which we were unfortunately unable to obtain an
original copy, there were passages such as: ‘We are no longer prepared to be suppressed!’ and: ‘We are no longer
in the Third Reich but already in the Fourth’.73
The nervousness of the regime is remarkable; the following reports about it have reached us in the last few days:
RHINELAND-WESTPHALIA: The west is in a general state of ferment. And this time it has seized broader
sections of the population and goes deeper. The unrest is increased by certain events and facts. For example, the
SA was put on general alert (though many took no heed of the order); the Landjäger74openly carry rifles for the
first time for a long time. In addition there are rumours of all kinds, which naturally add to the unrest. There is talk
of a state of emergency being declared. Something exceptional is expected.
SOUTHWEST GERMANY First Report: In Mannheim those over 35 in possession of licences for cars
or motor cycles were called to the police station and asked if they would be ready to place themselves at the
disposal of the police as drivers if internal unrest were to become serious.
Second Report: The fear of Marxist activity is growing more and more in the NSDAP. It has gradually
become so great that it is expressed in a rather comic nervousness, and affects groups who are certainly not
Marxist. Thus in our area three weekend houses belonging to middle class societies were closed down. Anything
that does not profess to be Nazi, even if it’s the most harmless family club, has no rights. The regime lives in a
state of constant concern that, in some secret gathering or other, dark plans are being forged.75
March 1936
According to the reports we have received, the unilateral lifting of the demilitarised zone by the regime has by no
means aroused any enthusiasm. The first reaction of the broad mass of people was rather: an increase in the
existing fear of war, and concern about the reaction of the western powers.
RHINELAND, First Report: A travelling textiles representative, who gets around a lot, reports: [. . .] I frequently
talk to soldiers. With the occupation of the Rhineland many of them were of the opinion that things would now
really take off. . . I very much disagree that these soldiers have been seized by a clear enthusiasm for war. They
like to pretend, of course. But they are afraid of the real thing as much as any other rational human being. I said to
one soldier that wasn’t a case of his own dislike of war, he would get his orders, and then he would march. […]
71
The Weimar Republic.
Party veterans, literally ‘old fighters’.
73
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, pp. 757-759
74
Rural policemen
75
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, p. 761
72
65
The soldiers were already fed up. Drill was dreadful. The food was getting worse and worse and the discipline was
not nearly as good as many imagine. These young men were difficult to command, so many of them were full of
the National Socialist spirit, which recognised no respect for the older generation, or even for age.
There are many people who took part in the world war. These are a strong counterweight to the ones
who are a hundred per cent for war. I doubt very much whether it will be so easy this time to generate enthusiasm
among the people. The mood is the same in the military associations affiliated to the new Reich Warriors’ League.
Second Report: People are generally expecting a war, and soon. This is a view which has not come only with
recent events. In the west a German invasion of Holland is expected. Many believe they have made certain
observations which indicate that. There are said to be camouflaged troops on the Dutch border. [...]
Now, after the troops’ re-occupation of the de-militarised zone there is a great deal of unrest in the
Rhineland. People have been from Aachen over to Belgium to see whether it’s true that the Belgians are
mobilising. That is what is being said, and also that the Belgians have put up barbed wire barriers at the border, so
that nobody can get across, and other things. There is a great deal of excitement among the people. [. . .]
Third Report: The occupation of the Rhineland is generally approved of, and people are very supportive of the
army, but not of the Nazis. The Nazis’ so-called military associations keep more and more in the background.76
The Other Side: Growing Indifference.
All reports of growing disaffection and discontentment need to be put into perspective: they are misleading if they
are not complemented by any indication of the growing depoliticisation, the increasing indifference, the
astonishing political numbness of the majority of the majority of people. In all the reports we get of the general
situation in Germany, there is always the same complaint if that behind all the impotent cursing there is neither
clear perspective nor political will. If we do not print these reports it is because they repeat observations which
have already been reported here a hundred times. Instead there follows a report from northern Germany, in which
is a clear recognition of the present situation, but the hope is nevertheless expressed that one day the German
people will overcome this lethargy and retake control over their own destiny.
The general situation in Germany is characterised by widespread political indifference. The great majority of the
people is completely numbed, and simply does not want to know about politics any more. . . One should not be
misled by the general complaining. These days there are complaints everywhere, and about everything, but nobody
wants to turn their complaints into a criticism of the regime. These days you can hear people curse in public: in
trams, in restaurants etc. and as a rule there is generally nobody who is prepared to defend the government. But nor
does anybody consider the complaints as an attack on the regime, as a political stand against the dictatorship. The
people and the regime do not identify with each other. People consider themselves as passive objects of the present
form of government, and no longer think that they could one day become politically active.
The attitude of the western powers has contributed decisively to this general depoliticisation. During the
last few years even the most resolute opponents of Hitler have been given to saying how pointless it is to oppose
Hitler, if the democracies always make sure he has the advantage by failing to resist him. For this reason Hitler’s
opponents are still watching the West. They are waiting impatiently for a sign that the time of unresisting
concessions is past, and that the time for resolute resistance has come
[. . .]
If we have spoken of the political numbness and indifference of the masses in Germany, that certainly
does not mean that the masses are not receptive to anti-Nazi propaganda. The opposite is the case. Since National
Socialist propaganda has long since run into the sands there is a great potential for the positive reception of antiHitler propaganda. But the question is how one can make people aware of such propaganda. There is no
conception outside Germany of how far the German people has been cut off from the outside world, and how
effective Hitler’s propaganda has been in stopping people thinking.
The most devastating thinking is the widespread ignorance of many people about what is actually
happening in Germany. During the last few months I have had the opportunity to give people Conrad Heiden’s last
two books to read. When I have done so it has always been the case that people simply do not want to believe the
facts that Heiden reports in these books, quite apart from the opinions that Heiden expresses. They are completely
convinced that there are no longer any concentration camps; they simply do not want to believe that the Nazis act
against their opponents with relentless brutality. They do not want to believe it because the truth would be to too
dreadful for them to contemplate and because they prefer to close their eyes against it. The moral front against
National Socialism could be much broader if people really knew what the situation was in Germany. But this front
is only very small these days, even among the working class. It happens again and again that even when opponents
are arrested only a couple of families know anything about it, and the rest of the neighbourhood remains in total
ignorance.77
April 1939
Hitler’s Fiftieth Birthday
4 February 1921 was the fiftieth birthday of the first President of the German Republic, Friedrich Ebert. The day
passed almost unremarked in public. There was no official celebration. Even the President’s party newspaper,
Vorwärts restricted itself to a twenty-line notice in an obscure spot, which ended with a self-deprecating apology:
‘So we hope no-one will ascribe Byzantine motives to us, if we wish our comrade Fritz Ebert, who is
coincidentally also President of the Reich, our warmest congratulations.’
76
77
Deutschland-Berichte, 1936, p.300-304
Deutschland-Berichte, 1938 pp. 698-9.
66
[. . .]
The National Socialists in contrast believe with Carlyle and Treitschke that ‘men make history’. And by
men is meant personalities who through some particular characteristic stand out from the crowd, men who in
reality, or in the perception of those around them, have abilities well beyond those of ordinary people. This attitude
is reflected in the needs of a large part of the German people and was heavily exploited by the pre-war monarchyand-military political system.
[. . .]
SOUTH-WEST GERMANY: Hitler’s fiftieth birthday was celebrated so extravagantly , that one might actually
believe that Hitler’s popularity surpassed everything. If one really knows the people, however, one knows that
much of that, albeit not all, is pretence. For two weeks people have been bombarded with appeals to decorate their
houses, and businesses in particular have been called to set up ‘dignified’ displays in their windows. [. . .]
The government’s decision to make the day a public holiday to be paid by the employers has naturally pleased
many workers, less so industrialists, small businessmen and small master craftsmen. Even some workers have been
heard to say ‘another carrot, so that we forget the stick for a few days. They should pay us a decent wage all year
and we would happily give up holidays like this.’78
6.2. SD Reports 1938-44
Situation Report of the Central Security Office 1938. Volume 1.
General Overview
The oppositional activity of the various ideological groups during 1938 was influenced essentially by the
consequences of great foreign policy events: the incorporation of Austria and the Sudeten German areas - in terms
of domestic politics the measures taken by the party and the state against the Jews were the most influential
events.79
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (Nr. 14)
10 November 1939
The attention of the whole German people was yesterday focused on the assassination attempt on the
Führer. This event was discussed with deep shock among all sections of the people. In many schools the hymn
‘Now thank we all our God. . .’ was sung. Many factory leaders told their retinues about the attempt in factory
rallies. There was particular concern among the public during yesterday morning before the details of the effects of
the assassination attempt were made known. Rumours sprang up everywhere that, for example, the Führer was
badly injured and that several leading men in the Party and the state had been killed. As the details of the
assassination became known during the course of the day, all the problems arising from the situation were the
subject of general discussion. The English and the Jews, who were seen as the being behind the attempt, were
talked about with bitterness. In some places there were demonstrations against the Jews. 80
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 19) 22 November 1939
I. General Mood and Situation
The first news of the arrest of the would-be assassin of Munich was revealed to the public by radio in the
night of Tuesday to Wednesday. It only became generally known through Wednesday morning’s papers. The
impression it made on public opinion was huge. The assassination attempt in Munich had been very widely
discussed in recent days, not least as a result of the cinema newsreels, and numerous rumours had been in
circulation, some with absurd suspicions as to the culprits. The announcement of the results of the investigations
carried out so far has, so far as can be determined so far, had a positive effect on morale. The announcement that
the attempt was instigated by the British secret service, and the news that British secret service agents have been
arrested on the Dutch border has reinforced hostile attitudes to Great Britain, which had been expressed in recent
days in anticipation of an early attack on England.81
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 25) 6 December 1939
I. General Mood and Situation
The rumour that the second day of Christmas will not be a public holiday this year is spreading more and
more with the approach of Christmas. It is discussed in all part of the Reich and given rise to a certain amount of
grumbling among the people. It has to be assumed from reports coming from large factories in particular that
oppositional circles are making use of the rumour to create disaffection among the working class. Religious groups
are also using the gossip about the Christmas holidays for their own purposes. Business people are expecting an
official statement on the question of the second public holiday at Christmas because a number of business
arrangements depend upon it. There are also scattered rumours that the New Year will not be celebrated as a public
holiday either. An official announcement on all these questions is now generally expected by the population. 82
.
78
Deutschland-Berichte 1939 pp. 435-450.
Source: Meldungen, 2, p. 7
80
Source: Meldungen, 2, p.441.
81
Source: Meldungen, 3, pp. 482-483
82
Source: Meldungen, 3, p. 534
79
67
Report on Developments in Popular Opinion, 28 July 1944
The abortive attempt on the Führer and the putsch attempt of the officers’ clique have pushed
observations on the situation on the battle fronts into the background. After the first shock of the attempt had
subsided the conversation of national comrades was dominated by discussion of the reasons for this event and its
possible consequences. According to reports received so far there has been no deterioration in morale. The
population has breathed a sigh of relief that the attack on the Führer was unsuccessful.
[. . .]
National comrades cannot believe that the attack on the Führer was possible at all. They indulge in various
speculations about the men behind it, and make no bones about what they want to do with the culprits.
Source: Meldungen, 17, p. 6684.
6.3.
The Fifth Broadsheet of the "White Rose" (January 1943)83
A Call to All Germans!
The war is approaching its destined end. As in the year 1918, the German government is trying to focus attention
exclusively on the growing threat of submarine warfare, while in the East the armies are constantly in retreat and
invasion is imminent in the West. Mobilization in the United States has not yet reached its climax, but already it
exceeds anything that the world has ever seen. It has become a mathematical certainty that Hitler is leading the
German people into the abyss. Hitler cannot win the war; he can only prolong it. The guilt of Hitler and his
minions goes beyond all measure. Retribution comes closer and closer.
But what are the German people doing? They will not see and will not listen. Blindly they follow their seducers
into ruin. Victory at any price! is inscribed on their banner. “I will fight to the last man,” says Hitler – but in the
meantime the war has already been lost.
Germans! Do you and your children want to suffer the same fate that befell the Jews? Do you want to be judged by
the same standards as your traducers? Are we to be forever the nation which is hated and rejected by all mankind?
No. Dissociate yourselves from National Socialist gangsterism. Prove by your deeds that you think otherwise. A
new war of liberation is about to begin. The better part of the nation will fight on our side. Cast off the cloak of
indifference you have wrapped around you. Make the decision before it is too late! Do not believe the National
Socialist propaganda which has driven the fear of Bolshevism into your bones. Do not believe that Germany’s
welfare is linked to the victory of National Socialism for good or ill. A criminal regime cannot achieve a German
victory. Separate yourselves in time from everything connected with National Socialism. In the aftermath a terrible
but just judgment will be meted out to those who stayed in hiding, who were cowardly and hesitant.
What can we learn from the outcome of this war – this war that never was a national war?
The imperialist ideology of force, from whatever side it comes, must be shattered for all time. A one-sided
Prussian militarism must never again be allowed to assume power. Only in large-scale cooperation among the
nations of Europe can the ground be prepared for reconstruction. Centralized hegemony, such as the Prussian state
has tried to exercise in Germany and in Europe, must be cut down at its inception. The Germany of the future must
be a federal state. At this juncture only a sound federal system can imbue a weakened Europe with a new life. The
workers must be liberated from their condition of down-trodden slavery under National Socialism. The illusory
structure of autonomous national industry must disappear. Every nation and each man have a right to the goods of
the whole world!
Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the protection of individual citizens from the arbitrary will of criminal
regimes of violence – these will be the bases of the New Europe.
Support the resistance. Distribute the leaflets!
Source: Inge Scholl. “The Fifth Broadsheet of the White Rose” from TheWhite Rose: Munich 1942-1943. Wesleyan
University Press.
83
68
7.
Culture, Leisure and Propaganda
7.1.
Annual Report of Security Head Office 1938. Volume 2.
Cultural life.
The National Socialist Weltanschauung has made the concept of the nation, understood in the racial and biological
sense, the perspective through which cultural activity is evaluated.
1. From the point of view of this ideological orientation the following fundamental features characterised the year
1938:
The biological substance of German blood has been reinforced to an unprecedented extent through the annexation
of Austria and the Sudetenland, so that the basis of German cultural life has been extraordinarily broadened.
During a few months in the course of the year 1938 all fields of cultural activity had to catch up with development
of National Socialism in the Altreich. In practical terms that meant the closing down of all oppositional cultural
organisations and cultural institutions, whether liberal, Jewish, Masonic, Marxist or political-confessional.84 At the
same time the gaps created by the removal of opponents had to be filled by the appointment of appropriate staff.
The basic elements of this comprehensive and multi-faceted project have been implemented in Austria in the
Sudetenland, although the project was not completed in 1938.
2. The following represents the state of cultural life in the Altreich in 1938.
Despite the consolidation of cultural organisations there is no central cultural planning. The Reich education
ministry, the interior ministry, the Rosenberg Office [Dienststelle Rosenberg], the cultural organisations of the
Länder and provinces, the cultural office of the party, the Reich Chamber of Culture, along with individual
chambers, the ‘Strength Through Joy’ organisation, the University Lecturers’ Association, the Student
Association, the respective professional organisations, the military scientific and research institutions, the
corresponding institutions in business and industry etc. – are all concerned on an individual basis with the
promotion of National Socialist cultural policy and cultural projects, but it has not yet been possible to combine
these forces, effective as they are in their diverse ways, in order to create a coherent and consistent cultural policy
capable of forward planning.
No less wide-ranging is the contribution of cultural institutions where bearers and creators of culture are
involved in cultural achievements: universities, technical high schools, thousands of individual scholarly and
cultural institutions, cultural associations, theatres, schools, adult education institutions, archives, museums,
research centres and so on. Despite this broad contribution of innumerable personnel, it has still not been possible
to make of the achievements of individual institutions or people as foundation stones of a unified, purposive and
forward-looking strategy.
3. The ever wider dissemination of culture to broad sections of the people must be seen as a success in the field of
cultural policy. Through the organisations created (KdF-Kulturgemeinde, Deutsches Volksbildungswerk, the
cultural institutions it was possible more than ever before to bring broad sections of the German people to
countless musical performances, theatre productions, films, scientific presentations and other such events.
4. In the academic field the natural sciences have been almost totally deployed in the service of the Four-Year
Plan.85
The Churches
The following extract is taken from the general statement of charges against the Germans at Nuremberg.
And how the Party had been securing the Reich from Christian influence will be proved by such items as
this teletype from the Gestapo Berlin to the Gestapo Nuremburg [sic!] on 24th July, 1938. Let us hear their own
account of events in Rottenburg:‘The Party, on 23rd July, 1939, from 2100 on carried out the third demonstration against Bishop Sproll.
Participants, about 2,500-3,000, were brought in from outside by bus, etc. The Rottenburg populace again did not
participate in the demonstration. This town took rather a hostile attitude to the demonstrations. The action got
completely out of hand of the Party Member responsible for it. The demonstrators stormed the palace, beat in the
gates and doors. About 150 to 200 people forced their way into the palace, searched the rooms, threw files out of
the windows, and rummaged through the beds in the rooms of the palace. One bed was ignited. Before the fire got
to the other objects or equipment in the rooms and the palace, the flaming bed was thrown from the window and
the fire extinguished. The Bishop was with Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg, and the ladies and gentlemen of his
84
85
politisch-konfessionell, refers to political Catholicism.
Source: Meldungen 2, p. 80
69
menage in the chapel at prayer. About 25 to 30 people pressed into the chapel and molested those present. Bishop
Groeber was taken for Bishop Sproll. He was grabbed by the robe and dragged back and forth. Finally the
intruders realised that Bishop Groeber was not the one they were seeking. They could then be persuaded to leave
the building. After the evacuation of the palace by the demonstrators I had an interview with Archbishop Groeber,
who left Rottenburg in the night. Groeber wants to turn to the Führer and Reich Minister of the Interior Frick
anew. On the course of the action, the damage done, as well as the homage of the Rottenburg populace beginning
today for the Bishop, I shall immediately hand in a full report, after I begin suppressing counter mass meetings.’ . .
.86
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 38) 10 January 1940
II. Opponents
Although more than 55 Jehovah’s Witnesses have already been sentenced to death for refusing military
conscription since the beginning of the war, secret subversive activity has been discernible in recent days on the
part of small groups of Jehovah’s Witnesses in some parts of the Reich, above all in Sudeten Germany and the
Ostmark.87
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 66) 15 March 1940
I. General
The visit to the Pope by Reich Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop has caused great surprise among the
public. It has been the subject of remarkably frequent discussion, above all in Catholic areas, and has given rise to
rumours and conjecture about the content of the discussions in the Vatican, and particularly to the rumour that the
Pope will act as intermediary in peace negotiations. In Catholic circles the visit to the Pope, and the congratulatory
telegram which the Führer sent the pope on the anniversary of his coronation, are seen by some as a success for the
Vatican.88
7.2
Domestic Propaganda, December 1938
An important constituent of the regime’s domestic propaganda is its building work. Like all systems of rule based
on coercion the Hitler dictatorship also feels the need to immortalise itself in gigantic monuments. Since all
historical experience suggests that such systems of government have only a very short life span, dictators are keen
to erect such ‘witnesses to a glorious past’ during their lifetimes, which will be able to pass on glimpses of a lost
grandeur to later generations of solemn observers.
It is not only concern with posthumous glory that fuels the drive for more and more monumental
constructions however, but also a concern with self-legitimation before the living. They are meant to give ‘national
comrades’ a sense of the greatness and permanence of a regime which they are all too readily inclined to see
through the perspective of daily cares, taxes, donations and contributions, wages, working hours and the tempo of
work, shortages of raw materials and groceries, tight financial policies, party machinations and corruption. There is
much from which the regime has cause to divert attention.
Whether all this building will achieve the aim of immortalising the regime remains to be seen. It seems,
however, to have fulfilled its present propaganda purposes at best incompletely. Quite independently of each other
our reporters have commented very sceptically:
Berlin, First Report: The propaganda effect of Nazi monument construction is very dubious. Many people say it is
unproductive . . . The time has not yet come for such monumental constructions. We should have enough flats
first. This opinion, for example, is very widespread among the lower middle class.
[. . .]
But people are also against the style of the new buildings. ‘Massive resources are poured into them, and what do
you get? Boxes - which all look the same, like Prussian barracks’. There’s the new Reichskanzlei for example,
they made such a song and dance about it, and what is there now is beneath contempt. The building looks badly
proportioned. [. . .]
I have it on good authority that the construction plans for the new Reichskanzlei were changed twenty or
thirty times, and that changes were still being made during the construction. That was particularly true of the
interior. Entire halls had to be pulled down again. The whole thing has involved such an incredible waste. 89
The regime has worked particularly hard on building up Radio-Propaganda. The number of radio
listeners has risen from 4.3 million at the time of the seizure of power [Umsturz] to over 10 million. Loudspeakers
in cities, and portable loudspeaker equipment for smaller communities ensures that even stubborn non-listeners can
be reached by radio propaganda.
The effect of this propaganda is also dubious. Saturation dulls the senses, and - particularly since the
crisis in September - there is a lack of faith in its reliability.
Nordwestdeutschland: The degree to which it has become a habit simply to swallow the pills served by the regime
is revealed in the following oft-made observation: Some big-wig makes a speech during the day. It is broadcast on
86
IMT, 1, pp. 60-61. (848-PS).
Austria. The term was not an official designation. Source: Meldungen, 3, p.732.
Source: Meldungen, 4, p.891.
89
Source: Deutschland-Berichte, 1938 pp. 1321-1322.
87
88
70
the radio. Almost out of habit the loudspeaker is turned on. Housewives, who are neither noted Nazis nor even
particularly interested in politics let the speeches of leaders and functionaries wash over them. There is no control
over it. No one cares whether the radio is switched on or not. It’s all down to force of habit. [. . .]
Silesia: Many people often listen to foreign radio stations. You can hardly get Moscow. The jamming signals
sound like machine-gun fire. It’s better in the countryside because the jamming is done locally rather than from a
central transmitter. The Freedom sender has been heard occasionally, but only on the best sets. Strasbourg on the
other hand is easy to get. It is a mistake to think you cannot get any foreign station with a Volksempfänger
[People’s Receiver]. Anybody who understands it ca even get Moscow. These foreign stations play a big part in
the factories. People tell each other what they have heard. Even the Nazis join in. Nobody likes listening to the
German station. An old fighter commented as the racket started up in Nuremberg: ‘I’m sending the wireless back
this week. Party conference all the time. It makes you sick.’
Source: Deutschland-Berichte, 1938 pp. 1326-1328
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (Nr. 52)
12 February 1940
I. General
The latest announcements in the German press and on the radio about the success of the air force have not been
followed very closely by the public. According to many reports such announcements are increasingly taken for
granted; nevertheless, they contribute to the perfectly confident general mood.90
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (Nr. 53)
14 February 1940
Responses to Current Films
According to numerous reports from the Reich capital the film which has attracted most popular interest
is ‘Campaign in Poland’. The performances are largely sold out down to the last seat and large numbers of people
have to be turned away. In almost all cinemas there was spontaneous applause at particularly vivid scenes. Keen
cinema-goers who did not miss a single newsreel during the Polish campaign observe, without intending any
criticism of the film, that it is a clever compilation of newsreel material; those, however, who do not know all the
newsreels, say that this film is their most impressive cinema experience since the beginning of the war.
[. . .]
According to reports from all parts of the Reich, the film ‘Motherly Love’ is the subject of widespread
debate. The responses cannot be reduced to a common denominator. Alongside widespread approval there are
criticisms along the following themes: The family in the film is not a recognisably normal German family, but one
with children who are almost difficult to bring up. , whose fate has been constructed in this way for dramatic
reasons.
On the other hand mothers argue that such children have to be subjected to a somewhat stricter
upbringing. [. . .]91
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (Nr. 59)
28 February 1940
I. General
The reports on responses to the Führer’s speech in the Hofbräuhaus agree unanimously that the speech in so far as it was heard on the radio - was enthusiastically welcomed. It was observed everywhere that the
confidence in victory which the Führer’s words communicated had raised morale again, so that the start of summer
offensive is anticipated with tense excitement.
. . . It was observed by all national Socialists that the Führer’s words were reminiscent of the old speeches from
the ‘time of struggle’92 . . . The sudden announcement of the speech, shortly before it was made, meant of course
that only a small part of the German people was able to listen in. Although people were prepared to accept that
there were presumably important political reasons for this, it was generally expected that the speech would be
repeated on the radio on Sunday. There was general regret that there was no such repeat, and there is still an
expectation, and a strong wish, that the speech be repeated at a time when everybody can hear it, e.g. on Saturday
evening. There was also disappointment at the very brief reports in the Sunday morning papers, since there was a
general desire to read through the speech in one’s own time on Sunday. 93
III Cultural Matters
Responses to the Activity of the Gaufilmstellen [Regional film shows]
According to reports from the entire Reich during recent months, e.g. from Frankfurt/M, Königsberg,
Bayreuth, Potsdam, Stuttgart, Munich, Allenstein and Posen the rural population has shown great interest in the
Gaufilmstellen. The attendance at performances has generally been so great that they have been sold out and,
despite repeats, have been unable to meet demand. [. . .]
National
90
Source: Meldungen, 3, p. 747
Source: Meldungen, 3, p. 759
Kampfzeit, i.e. before the Nazis came to power.
93
Source: Meldungen, 3, p.818
91
92
71
National Socialist circles report that it is scarcely possible to imagine how important the content of the
programmeme is, because the propaganda effect on the rural population is much more enduring and more serious.
The following films, for example, had a positive reception: ‘Das unsterbliche Herz’, ‘Westwall’, ‘Edelweißkönig’,
‘Eine Division greift an’, ‘Frau Sixta’, ‘Drei Unteroffiziere’, ‘Vermessungsschiff Meteor’, ‘Mine in Sperrlücke
X.’, Klar Schiff zum Gefecht’, ‘Husaren zur See’, ‘11.000km durch Ost-Afrika’, ‘Im Namen des Volkes’, ‘Die
Pfingstorgel’, and ‘Pour le Mérite’.
Foremost among the performances most in demand are the weekly newsreels.94
Foreign Radio Broadcasts
BERLIN, First Report: People are listening more and more to foreign radio broadcasts, particularly the British. It’s
just that nobody talks about it any more. There is no need. But I can say with absolute certainty that very many
people listen to these stations. [. . .]
Second Report: The interest in foreign radio broadcasts is still much greater than that in the German newspapers
or radio. [. . .]
SOUTH GERMANY: Sometimes it is completely apolitical people who listen to foreign radio broadcasts, while
those whose political position is better known hardly dare to any more. It is difficult to establish with any accuracy
how much people listen to foreign radio broadcasts, since everybody is concerned not to say anything that might
give rise to suspicion that his remarks might be inspired by foreign broadcasts. There are no discussions about
foreign radio broadcasts. The mistrust is generally so deep that either only the husband or the wife listens alone, or
when they listen together, they make sure that the older children do not notice. It has also happened that older
children have protested at being sent to bed early, because they knew that their parents only wanted to listen to the
radio.95
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 140) 11 November 1940
II. Cultural Matters
Lack of knowledge of geography is impeding the understanding of political events among the rural population.96
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 201) 10 July 1941
Cultural Matters
Reception and Impact of Propaganda. Press and Radio during the Period from 8-10 July 1941
1. It is reported from all parts of the Reich that the realistic reporting of Bolshevik atrocities in word and
image, press and radio, have filled the population with deep revulsion (e.g. from Königsberg, Bremen, Chemnitz,
Cologne, Karlsruhe, Frankfurt am Main, Munich, Salzburg, Breslau, Potsdam, Vienna, Thorn, Düsseldorf, Posen,
Innsbruck, Allenstein, Weimar, Troppau, Liegnitz). This is particularly true of the murder of Ukrainians in
Lemberg. These impressions are reinforced by the fact that letters from the front reinforce the accounts in the press
and on the radio, and sometimes go further than the propaganda. There are occasional expressions of concern,
particularly among women, that their husbands and sons could become victims of the same Bolshevik sniper
warfare. The question is often raised of what fate our soldiers suffer when they are taken prisoner, and what we do
with the Bolsheviks (‘After all they are scarcely human’). The belief that the real masterminds are the Jews
prompts occasional demands for radical treatment of the Jews in the Reich.97
94
Source: Meldungen, 3, p.820.
Deutschland-Berichte, 1940, pp. 229-231.
Meldungen, 5, p. 1753.
97
Meldungen, 7, p. 2505
95
96
72
7.3
Propaganda Posters
Winterhilfswerk: “A people helps itself”, Poster, circa 1933.
73
“Back then as now – We remain Comrades”, Poster, from about 1933.
74
“KdF - Car”, Poster, 1938.
75
“Working Maid”, Photography by Liselotte Orgel-Köhne, circa 1941.
76
“The eternal Jew”, Exhibition Poster,1938. This was a travelling
exhibition, the film with the same title was only released in 1940.
77
“Degenerate Music: A reckoning… ”, Booklet accompanying another
exhibition,1938.
78
“Radio for every estate”, Advertisement 1934.
79
“You are not the yardstick, the Front is.”, Propaganda postcard
1943.
80
81
“In every company a factory women’s group ”, Poster 1933 -39.
82
8.
Gender, Reproduction and the Family
8.1.1
Women’s work
Employment of Women by Economic Sector 1925-3998
Agric. and Forestry
4,969.3
1925
1933
4,648.8
1939
4,880.6
Industry and Crafts
Trade and Transport
Non-Domestic Services
Domestic Service
2,987.4
1,514.2
650.1
1,357.1
2,758.8
1,920.8
901.1
1,249.6
3,310.3
2,083.9
1,093.6
1,331.8
Total
11, 478.0
11.478,0
12,700.2
Branches of the Economy employing a majority of women, 1933 99
Agriculture
Confectionery industry
Tobacco industry
Clothing manufacture
Catering
Churches and
religious institutions
Accommodation services
Nursing
Welfare services
Domestic service
Total
8,934,971
Women
4,569,868
57,321
212,321
1,477,161
762,782
34,329
143,167
788,443
419,694
165,072
67,505
401,448
104,512
1,269,582
92,027
52,408
250,010
69,895
1,249,636
1. Excluding forestry, fishing and gardening.
Female Workforce by Sector, 1939-44* (1,000s)100
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1944
Sept.
Agric./Forestry
6,049 5,689 5,369 5,537 5,665 5,694 5,756
Industry/Crafts
3,836 3,650 3,677 3,537 3,740 3,592 3,636
Finance/Transport/
Commerce
2,227 2,183 2,167 2,225 2,320 2,219 2,193
Domestic Service
1,560 1,511 1,473 1,410 1,362 1,371 1,287
Public Admin./Services
954 1,157 1,284 1,471 1,719 1,746 1,748
Total
14,626 14,386 14,167 14,437 14,806 14,808 14,897
* Figures for May, unless otherwise indicated.
98
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1939, (p.19) 1942 (p.34)
Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1936, p.20
100
Dörte Winkler, Frauenarbeut im Dritten Reich (Hamburg, 1977), p.201
99
83
8.1.2
Return to full Employment
Rhineland Palatinate
[…]
It has further been arranged that all women drawing welfare benefits must try within four weeks to find a job. It
has been emphasised that this measure is still implemented even when there are two or three children at home.
Practice is held to have shown that even women in this position are able to do a job. These women are sent for
hours into the woods where they have to clear paths for work for hours. If they refuse on account of the children
their welfare support is immediately withdrawn.101
8.1.3
Labour Service
The girls who volunteer for service are usually housed in groups of 35-50 in vacant houses in farming
districts. Each camp has a responsible and specially trained girl as leader. Besides the girl-leader there are often
trained women-teachers, who instruct the girls in a life of service and co-operative living. The work, as I already
told you, is limited to six hours a day, the rest of the time being given to political instruction, sports and physical
education. The discipline of the camp is a very rigid one, the girls are not allowed to leave the camp except on one
Sunday in the month, on the other Sundays they undertake joint excursions.102
8.1.4
A Girl’s Experience of Labour Service
The summer after the Abitur was the most carefree period of my youth. I was called up for Labour Service in East
Prussia from the beginning of April. While the train was still drawing out of the Silesian station in Berlin I began
happily to adjust my mind to the fact that this coming period of service to the National Community. Would give
me a chance to leave behind the theory of my newspaper articles and get down to practice. My ‘service’ began a
few minutes after the train had left the station, and I remember it with a grin. I had taken onto my lap a little girl of
about two, who was one of a large family, in order to relieve her mother. She remained with me all through the
night, for her mother did not show herself again. It was thanks to this child, who was dirty and neglected, that I
arrived for my Labour Service with lice. With my sensitive nose suffering agonies – my nursling soon had her
pants full – I found that the transfer from theory to practice put something of a strain on my ‘social beliefs’.
Next morning I discovered that I had been looking after the youngest offspring of a family of Polish seasonal
workers. Though I felt that had learnt my lesson for my overeagerness, I could not help seeing the funny side.
What did not occur to me was that the Polish mothering her need was just as entitled to my help as any German
would have been.
The camp was installed near the largest of the East Prussian lakes at D. on the Spirdingsee. It was
installed in a worn-out house which was far too cramped. All the equipment was as shabby as the rooms, down to
the patched straw mattresses, the threadbare clothing and the clumsy laceup boots. This poverty corresponded to
the style of our life there. The day began at six o’clock with early morning physical training. At half past seven we
went off to work on the farms, after half an hour of singing, during which most of us were in fact falling asleep
through exhaustion. At harvest time the farm work went on for up to fifteen hours a day; normally it was only
meant to last seven or eight hours. In the late afternoon there was sport, political instruction, dancing or singing.
The evenings were generally free.103
8.1.5
Preparations for War
The extent to which preparations for war are underway is best evident from the fact that already women are being
trained for work at the Post Office and on the railways. Nobody doubts that this is being done in order to release
men for military service.104
8.1.6
The Vocational Training of Girls
The National Socialist ideal of the woman as guardian of the community of the home was in any case an
economically dubious proposition. In 1925 there were 12 million women employed in full-time jobs, and they
were by no means restricted to the so-called women’s occupations, but constituted an essential part of the
workforce in commercial and office work, textiles, electrical goods, precision engineering, optics, and the iron
steel and metal manufacturing industries. Today the system no longer regards the question of women’s work as an
ideological one, but in practical terms, as an essential factor in the preparations for war. These days women and
101
Deutschland-Berichte April-May 1934, pp. 46-7
Source: Gertrud Scholtz-Klink, The Position of Women in the New Germany, Lecture, London, July 1935. Cited in Robert A.
Brady, The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism (London, 1937), p. 193.
103
Melitta Maschmann, Account Rendered (London, 1965), p.p. 31-2
104
Deutschland-Berichte April-May 1934, p. 91
102
84
girls are also required to achieve the highest performances at work. Naturally there is no lock of ideological
trimming. ‘It is a pressing necessity that girls too pursue a career, and take up a productive part in the work of the
nation … We want girls to take a place in keeping with their nature in the great might work of the nation.’ (Trude
Bürkner, national spokeswoman of the BdM). Even graduate occupations for women are being pushed again: ‘The
enormous expenditure of energy on the part of the German nation cannot afford to do without the contribution of
women, who can master grater tasks, but remain in inappropriate positions], writes Gerda Hymmen in the R.J.P. of
10 March 1938. She argues against the materialism of parents ‘who see work as a transitional phase on the way to
marriage; … the intellectually and psychologically debilitating effects of such career choices are sadly not taken
into account. At a time when the Four Year plan is demanding an the greatest acceleration of job performance, the
romantic ideal of the education of girls has been buried, and new methods of occupational training have been
implemented which were criticised in the past as liberal or Marxist errors.105
8.1.7
Difficulties in the Recruitment of Female Labour
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (Nr. 55)
19 February 1940
Appendix
There are reports from all parts of the Reich about the increasing difficulty of recruiting female labour. It
is no longer possible to recruit the female labour required in both agriculture and domestic service and in industry
voluntarily through advertising.[. . .]
The reports explain the difficulties in recruiting women in various ways. It is a question of working
hours, wages and the type of work . . . It is emphasised that it should always be remembered that the main task of
every woman is the fulfilment of her household and maternal duties, and that if in exceptional times, women have
to be brought into industrial work for reasons of state, a woman’s femininity must be taken into account as much
as possible. From women themselves the same demands would always be made: a restriction of the working day to
eight hours; no night shifts; and at least one day off every two weeks. If industry does not consider this free day
feasible, then it must also be said that conditions are such these days that women simply take their free day
anyway. It would therefore be the legalisation of an existing fact, and one which would also have propaganda
value.106
8.1.8
Holidays for Women whose Husbands are on Leave from the Armed Forces
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (Nr. 57)
23 February 1940
According to reports there has recently been an increase in the number of cases of women whose
husbands are on leave from the front taking time off work without permission during their stay. This situation is
tolerated in silence by the authorities responsible, but the usual measures should be taken in such cases
nevertheless. Furthermore, managers are willing in most cases to grant time off wherever possible if women ask
for it on these grounds. According to reports there have been orders given by Reich Trustees of Labour in some
economic districts that women are generally to be granted time off in such circumstances, if they present their
husband’s leave papers to the management. These regulations have been received very well by working women,
and general ruling for the whole Reich is expected.107
105
Deutschland-Berichte April-May 1938, p. 549.
Source: Meldungen, 3, pp. 783-784.
107
Source: Meldungen, 3, p.803
106
85
8.2
Marriage, motherhood and the family
8.2.1
Marriage, bigamy and infidelity
Marriage in its existing form is the Catholic Church’s satanic achievement; marriage laws are in themselves
immoral. The case histories of monogamy so often show up the woman as thinking: ‘Why should I take as much
trouble with my appearance as before I was married?’… But with bigamy, each wife would act as a stimulus to the
other so that both would try to be their husband’s dream woman… The fact that a man has to spend his whole
existence with one wife drives him … to deceive her’.108
8.2.2
Eligibility for the Mother’s Cross
. . . 2. Among those who are unsuitable for this honour are mothers who have a prison record or have been
punished for reprehensible behaviour, especially of the kind which contradicts the spirit of the Honour Cross
(for example, abortion). Also unworthy are mothers who -although they have not been punished under the law have seriously damaged the image of the German mother (for example, through prostitution or non-punishable
racial defilement).
3. The award of the Honour Cross will be considered in all cases where the offspring of the mother in
question meet the requirements of being able to function as capable racial comrades within the people's
community.
It follows that mothers from hereditarily ill and asocial families will not be considered for the award of the
Honour Cross... . No mother from an asocial large family [Grossfamilie] can apply for the Honour Cross.109
8.2.3
Eligibility for Sterilisation
The following two extracts concern women selected for compulsory sterilisation. The first is an appeal from the woman
herself (Emma F., 29) who has spent two spells in psychiatric hospitals, one of which has recommended that she be
sterilised, without her knowledge, as a ‘schizophrenic’.
I was informed in writing by the Hereditary Health Court in Offenburg of the decision of 15 May 1934
whereby I was to be rendered infertile. I reject this decision, and raise objections to it on the following
grounds. For a long time my nerves were so overwrought that I had to obtain medical treatment in the
psychiatric clinic at Freiburg. I was soon discharged from the clinic, because my condition had improved. I
soon returned to my job in the cigar factory, and since then I have worked there without interruption up
to the present day. I am almost the highest wage-earner in the factory, and my employers are always satisfied
with my work. I request that the foreman X be questioned about my activity in the factory. He should also be
asked whether he can say something about my mental state. My nerves have calmed down again, and for
some time I have been as mentally normal as any other healthy person. Although today I am still entitled to
invalidity pension, from the provincial insurance office in Baden, I have voluntarily foregone this right, since
I am fully capable of working. I cannot understand why they want to sterilise me, since I have done nothing
wrong morally or sexually. Every person can become mentally ill, which in my opinion is a form of illness
like any other illness, and which heals itself again. It would be otherwise if I pursued sexual desires and
wanted intercourse with men, or wanted under any circumstances to marry. That would be something differ ent, but I am very reserved, and do not want to know anything about men. I do not need to be made infertile,
it is not necessary in my case I have never given and will never give any opportunities for sexual intercourse
whereby I could become pregnant, thereby bringing suspect hereditary progeny into the world. Every
person is different from another, as is every .separate case. I therefore make application
to the Hereditary Health Court to abrogate the decision to sterilise me. I also petition for a reexamination of my psychological state.
The second extract is an appeal from a father on behalf of his daughter (Fanny N.), an unmarried mother who
had six children, five of them illegitimate, and had been judged ‘feeble-minded’
My daughter is absolutely not in agreement with this decision, and nor are we, my husband and I. Firstly,
because she is not feebleminded, but merely indifferent, and that is not a matter requiring sterilisation. The children
she has had are healthy and normal, and not one of them is an idiot. I think it is absolutely unnecessary to do something like this to her. You are doing her wrong, and you will reap the consequences of it, or we will take the matter
to our Führer, who himself is for the children. If the children were stupid it would be otherwise. One of them is a
girl of 9 whom I have with me, who doesn't do too well at school, but there are children of well-off parents
who don't do too well at school either, and therefore she is far from being feeble-minded. My daughter is marrying
again this year, and then she will take the two children she has in a children's home, and I will take the other. As
long as my husband and I are still alive, and we have brought up ten of our own, we can raise one more. Therefore
108
Himmler, quotd in The Kersten Memoirs 194-1945. Cited in Pine, FamilyPolicy. p.39
Award of the Honour Cross of the German Mother. Guidelines for the choice of mothers who can be nominated. Order no.
37/39, 15.2.39 (Verfiigungen,Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben, 1939, volume I, p. 346). Cited in Jill Stephenson, Women in Nazi
Germany, p. 146.
109
86
I hope you will acknowledge this letter and think again, if you want to avoid a mishap. There are many mothers
here in W. who have really stupid children, and for whom it would be more necessary to do something like this, but
it isn't done to them because a man is there. Up to now, my daughter had no husband, so you are doing to her
what you like. But we are still around and we still have rights over her. Many mothers would be overjoyed to
have such beautiful, healthy children as she has . . . I have . . . eight lads and two girls, and all of them are
healthy and right in the head, and I have always devoted myself day and night to the children, and I am
proud of them, and therefore I will never allow my daughter to be sterilised.110
8.3
Femininity
8.3.1
The Women's Question and its National Socialist Solution
Over and above the duty intrinsic to her gender of conserving her race and people there is also the holy task entrusted
to man and woman of enhancing and developing the inner, spiritual, and human qualities. This in the case of woman
culminates in the motherhood of the soul as the highest ennoblement of any woman, whether she is married or not.
Therefore a woman belongs at the side of man not just as a person who brings children into the world, not just as an
adornment to delight the eye, not just as a cook and cleaner. Instead woman has the holy duty to be a life companion,
which means being a comrade who pursues her vocation as woman with clarity of vision and spiritual warmth.[. ..]
To be a woman in the deepest and most beautiful sense of the word is the best preparation for being a mother. For the
highest calling of the National Socialist woman is not just to bear children, but consciously and out of total devotion to
her role and duty as mother to raise children for her people.[.. .]
The mother is also the intermediary for the people and national culture [Volkstum] to which she and her child belong.
For she is the custodian of its culture, which she provides her child with through fairy-tales, legends, games, and customs
in a way which is decisive for the whole relationship which he will later have to his people.[. . .] In a National Socialist
Germany the sphere of social services [Volksfürsorge] is predominantly the sphere of the woman. For woman belongs
wherever social services or human care is required.
Apart from these tasks of conserving the people, educating the people, and helping the people, the final area of
responsibility for the woman, one not to be undervalued, is her contribution to the national economy. Women manage
75 per cent of the total income of the people, which passes through her hands simply in running the home.[.. .]
The national economy includes agriculture. It is today less possible than ever to imagine the struggle for existence and
the toil involved in the economics of improving crops, refining breeds, and farming new land, activities which demand
constant attention and maintenance, without the contribution of woman to agriculture in overseeing and running the
farm.111
8.3.2
Masculine women
We must not allow the qualities of the masculine state (Männerstaat) and the virtues of the Männerbund
(male-bonded group) to develop unchecked to the point where they cause problems. In my opinion we are
currently witnessing an excessive masculinisation of all spheres of life . . . I am always horrified to see girls and
women - above all girls - marching around with expertly stuffed knapsacks on their backs. It is a nauseating sight.
It will be catastrophic if we masculinise women to the extent that sexual differences and the polarity between sexes
vanish. From there it is only a short step to homosexuality. 112
110
Cited in Michael Burleigh, The Racial State, pp. 254-8.
Paula Siber, Die Frauenfrage und ihre Losung durch den Nationalsozialismus (Berlin, 1933); repr. In Walter Gehl (ed.), Der
nationalsozialistischer Staat (Ferdinand Hirt: Breslau, 1933), 127-30.Cited in Roger Griffin, Fascism, p.137.
112
Source: Speech by Himmler, 1937, cited by Claudia Schopppmann ‘National Socialist Policies towards Female Sexuality’ in
Lynn Abrams and Elizabeth Harvey, Gender Relations in German History (London, 1996) pp. 177-188. Here, p. 184.
111
87
‘Asocials’
8.4
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 88) 16 May 1940
I. General
Treatment of Asocials
According to various reports the number of those arguing for legislation against asocial elements has increased
recently. The asocials in question here are those whose behaviour means they are cannot be considered for service
at the front, but who are in danger of reproducing if they are left at home. The opinion has been expressed that in
order to avert the biological danger which threatens the German people appropriate measures should be
implemented through the enactment of the Asocial Law which was prepared some time ago. Experts emphasise
that the general practice hitherto of rendering asocials infertile by declaring them weak-minded and treating them
according to the Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Progeny, will have to be abandoned very soon.
Such a procedure involves extending the concept of mental debility to untenable lengths, and on the other hand
real asocials would escape the necessary procedure.113
9.
Racism, Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust
9.1
Sinti and Roma
9.1.1
Memorandum on the Gypsy Question from Provincial Governor of the Burgenland, Dr. Tobias
Portschy, August 1938.114
‘German, if you want to be the grave-digger of Nordic blood in the Burgenland, just overlook the danger to it from
the gypsies’ Dr. Portschy.
[. . .]
Everybody who travels through the south-eastern border regions of the German Reich knows that one problem
must burn here in the hearts of responsible men: ‘the Gypsy question’.
Those of our great-grandfathers who are still alive, some of whom witnessed the second wave of gypsy settlement
in our villages, warn us every day in serious tones of the danger which exists on our border to the continued purity
of German blood.115
Camp Diary, Lackenbach
Saturday 1 November, 1941
Twenty gypsies, who were sent to the camp and received the camp numbers 2518 -2537. They came from Italy. [. .
.]
Tuesday, 4 November, 1941
Arrival of 301 gypsies from the Kripo in Linz, to be evacuated to Litzmannstadt; the latter were admitted to the
camp and given camp numbers 2541 - 2848; seven of them were sent back because they were of Aryan extraction.
- This morning the first transport of 1,000 gypsies left for Litzmannstadt; they were transported to Mattersburg in
lorries, and there loaded onto freight trains.
Wednesday, 5 November 1941
Number in camp: 1,626
The gypsy child, camp number 1925, Horvath Stefan (b. 1940) died at 2 a.m.
The gypsy child, camp number 102, Horvath Therese (28 .12. 1937) died at 3 a.m.
The gypsy child, camp number 1991, Horvath Raimund (23. 3. 1941) died at 5 a.m.
[. . .]
Friday 2 November 1941
This afternoon the second transport of 1,000 gypsies left for Litzmannstadt. They were loaded into wagons at
Lackenbach, departure around 4 p.m. 116
9.1.2
Description of Burgenland Gypsies in Dachau Concentration Camp by Colonel Walter Adam
(retired), 1947.
For several months the Burgenland Gypsies formed a group of their own. There had been efforts to find a humane
solution to the gypsy problem in Austria and Hungary from the time of Maria Theresa. The Third Reich found a
simply, genuinely National Socialist solution: the gypsies were herded together, men and boys came to Dachau,
what happened to the girls and women we never knew. The treatment of the gypsies was similar to the treatment of
113
Meldungen, 4, p.1145
The Burgenland was the easternmost province of Austria, and had a large population of Sinti and Roma (‘gypsies’).
115
Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, Widerstand und Verfolgung im Burgenland 1933-1945 (Vienna,
1983) p. 256.
116
Source: Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, Widerstand und Verfolgung im Burgenland 1933-1945
(Vienna, 1983) pp. 272-273
114
88
the Jews, and there were high mortality rates among them too. Then they were sent to other camps and I heard
nothing more of them.117
9.2
Anti-Semitism
The Jewish doctrine of Marxism rejects the aristocratic principle of Nature and replaces the eternal privilege of
power and strength by the mass of numbers and their dead weight. Thus it denies the value of personality in man,
contests the significance of nationality and race, and thereby withdraws from humanity the premise of its existence
and its culture. As a foundation of the universe, this doctrine would bring about the end of any order intellectually
conceivable to man. And as, in this greatest of all recognizable organisms, the result of an application of such a
law could only be chaos, on earth it could only be destruction for the inhabitants of this planet.
If, with the help of his Marxist creed, the Jew is victorious over the other peoples of the world, his crown will be
the funeral wreath of humanity and this planet will, as it did thousands of years ago, move through the ether devoid
of men.
Eternal Nature inexorably avenges the infringement of her commands.
Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself
against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord118
9.3
Nazi Anti-Semitic Policies
9.3.1
The Boycott of Jewish Shops: Goebbels’ Diary
April 1, 1933
The boycott against the international atrocity propaganda has burst forth in full force in Berlin and the whole
Reich. I drive along the Tauentzien Street in order to observe the situation. All Jews' businesses are closed. SA
men are posted outside their entrances. The public has everywhere proclaimed its solidarity. The discipline is
exemplary. An imposing performance! It all takes place in complete quiet; in the Reich too....
In the afternoon 150,000 Berlin workers marched to the Lustgarten, to join us in the protest against the incitement
abroad. There is indescribable excitement in the air.
The press is already operating in total unanimity. The boycott is a great moral victory for Germany. We have
shown the world abroad that we can call up the entire nation without thereby causing the least turbulence or
excesses. The Führer has once more struck the right note.
At midnight the boycott will be broken off by our own decision. We are now waiting for the resultant echo in the
foreign press and propaganda.
April 2, 1933
The effects of the boycott are already clearly noticeable.
The world is gradually coming to its senses. It will learn to understand that it is not wise to let itself be informed
on Germany by the Jewish émigrés. We will have to carry out a campaign of mental conquest in the world as
effective as that which we have carried out in Germany itself.
In the end the world will learn to understand us.
9.3.2
Count Harry Kessler’s Diary
Saturday, 1 April 1933
Paris
The abominable Jewish boycott has begun. This criminal piece of lunacy has destroyed everything that during the
past fourteen years had been achieved to restore faith in, and respect for, Germany. It is difficult to say which
feeling is stronger, loathing or pity, for these brainless, malevolent creatures.119
9.3.3
Victor Klemperer’s Diary
30th March, Thursday
Yesterday evening at the Blumenfelds with the Dembers. Mood as before a pogrom in the depths of the Middle Ages
or in deepest Tsarist Russia. During the day the National Socialists boycott call had been announced. We are
hostages. The dominant feeling (especially as the Stahlhelm revolt in Brunswick has just been played out and
immediately hushed up) is that this reign of terror can hardly last long, but that its fall will bury us. Fantastic
Middle Ages: ‘We’ - threatened Jewry. In fact I feel shame more than fear, shame for Germany. I have truly always
felt a German. I have always imagined: the 20th century and Mitteleuropa was different from the 14th century and
Romania. Mistake. - Dember describes the effects on business: Stock Exchange, setbacks for Christian industry - and
then 'we' would pay for all of it with our blood. Frau Dember related the case of the ill-treatment of a Communist
117
Walter Adam, Nacht über Deutschland. Memoirs from Dachau (Vienna, 1947) p.27. Cited in Dokumentationsarchiv des
österreichischen Widerstandes, Widerstand und Verfolgung im Burgenland 1933-1945 (Vienna, 1983) p. 281.
118
Mein Kampf, p.60
119
Harry Kessler, Diary of a Cosmopolitan, p.451
89
prisoner which had leaked out: torture with castor oil, beatings, fear - attempted suicide. Frau Blumenfeld
whispered to me, Dr Salzburg's second son, a medical student, has been arrested - letters from him had been found
in the home of a Communist. Our parting (after abundant good food) was like a leave-taking at the front.
Yesterday a wretched statement in the Dresdener Neueste Nachrichten – ‘on our own account’. They are 92.5 per
cent founded on Aryan capital, Herr Wollf, owner of the remaining 7.5 per cent, has resigned as chief editor, one
Jewish editor has been given leave of absence (poor Fentl!), the other ten are Aryans. Terrible! - In a toyshop a
children's ball with the swastika.
31st March, Friday evening
Ever more hopeless. The boycott begins tomorrow. Yellow placards, men on guard. Pressure to pay Christian
employees two months salary, to dismiss
Jewish ones. No reply to the impressive letter of the Jews to the President of the Reich and to the government. [...]
No one dares make a move. The Dresden student body made a declaration today: united behind ... and the honour
of German students forbids them to come into contact with Jews. They are not allowed to enter the Student
House. How much Jewish money went towards this Student House only a few years ago!
In Munich Jewish university teachers have already been prevented from setting foot in the university.
The proclamation and injunction of the boycott committee decrees 'Religion is immaterial', only race matters. If, in
the case of the owners of a business, the husband is Jewish, the wife Christian or the other way round, then the
business counts as Jewish.
At Gusti Wieghardt's yesterday evening. The most depressed atmosphere. During the night at about three - Eva unable
to sleep - Eva advised me to give notice on our apartment today, perhaps renting a part of it again. I gave notice today.
The future is quite uncertain [...]
On Tuesday at the new Universum cinema on Prager Strasse. Beside me a soldier of the Reichswehr, a mere boy,
and his not very attractive girl. It was the evening before the boycott announcement. Conversation during an
Alsberg advertisement. He: 'One really shouldn't go to a Jew to shop.' She: 'But it's so terribly cheap.' He: 'Then it's
bad and doesn't last.' She, reflective, quite matter-of-fact, without the least pathos: 'No, really, it's just as good and
lasts just as long, really just like in Christian shops - and so much cheaper.' He falls silent. When Hitler,
Hindenburg etc. appeared, he clapped enthusiastically. Later, during the utterly American jazz band film, clearly
yiddeling at points, he clapped even more enthusiastically.
The events of 21st March were shown, including passages from speeches, Hindenburg's proclamation laborious, his
breath short, the voice of a very old man who is physically near the end. Hitler declaiming like a pastor. Goebbels
looks uncommonly Jewish [...] We saw a torchlight procession and a great deal of marching awakening Germany.
Also Danzig with the swastika flag.
3rd April, Monday evening
On Saturday red posters on the shops: 'Recognised German-Christian enterprise.' In between them closed shops, SA
men in front of them with triangular boards: ‘Whoever buys from the Jew, supports the foreign boycott and destroys
the German economy.’ - People poured down Prager Strasse and looked at it all. That was the boycott. ‘Only
Saturday for the time being - then a pause until Wednesday.’ Excluding banks. Including lawyers and doctors.
Called off after one day - it has been a success and Germany is 'magnanimous'. But in truth a wild turnaround.
Evidently resistance at home and abroad and evidently from the other side pressure from the National Socialist
mob. I have the impression of swiftly approaching catastrophe. That the right wing cannot
go on participating much longer, cannot put up with the National Socialist dictatorship much longer, that on the
other hand Hitler is no longer free and that the National Socialists are urging ever greater use of force. Today the
rectors of Frankfurt University, the Technical University Brunswick, Kantorowicz, the director of the Bonn
University hospital, a Christian business editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung were arrested. etc. There will be an explosion
– but we may pay for it with out lives, we Jews.[…] Everything I considered un-German, brutality, injustice,
hypocrisy, mass suggestion to the point of intoxication, all of it flourishes here.
On Saturday evening in Heidenau to visit Annemarie and Dr Dressel. Both on the Right, both anti-National
Socialist and dismayed. But both isolated by the mood in their St John's Hospital. – On Sunday afternoon by myself
for an hour with the deeply depressed Blumenfelds. I complain at length about Eva, whose state of health suffers in
the extreme from the German catastrophe; I believe that in all the difficult years since Lugano I have never seen her
in such despair. At her request I've given notice here for the 1st of July. In order to save money, we decided to share
the flat and rent only three rooms. I have directed Pratorius to fence in my plot. 635M costs out of 1,100M reserves!
We are making frantic efforts to borrow 8,000 to 10,000M to build a small house or part of one. But it is now even
more hopeless than before. For us personally everything is also heading for catastrophe.
90
9.3.4
Persecution of the Jews
The radical anti-Semitic wing of the Nazis, pushing out from Nuremberg, has increased its activity markedly in the
last few months. World public opinion only really knows about the events in Munich, Berlin and Breslau.
In Munich there were Jewish pogroms organised from the middle of May to the end of the month, from
which the authorities later distanced themselves with public statements. In Breslau there have been repeated
‘pillory processions’ [Prangerumzüge], and ‘racial disgrace’ lists have been published, and then finally six ‘race
shame’ couples taken into custody by the Gestapo. In Berlin a branch of the Streicher propaganda organisation was
et up in the middle of May with great pomp and ceremony, and the Judenkenner was set up as a variation on the
Stürmer.120 The activity of the radical anti-Semites in Berlin has increased, and found its provisional high point in
the pogroms in the middle of July. The events in these three cities has been copied in almost all parts of the Reich.
[…]
Berlin: Even beyond the Kurfürstendamm the anti-Jewish demonstrations were very strong. In Neukölln, Moabit
and Pankow in particular many shop windows were daubed or covered in posters. On the Hermann Platz a crowd
of hundreds gathered in front of an ice cream parlour and rampaged. […] The Mayor, Sahm, has forbidden the
Jews entry to all public baths. The number of Stürmer display cabinets has increased tremendously, especially in
the new estates.
[…]
Under the name plate of the Jewish doctor Schlossberg, Berlin, a chemist who lives in the same house hung a
Stürmer display cabinet. The doctor demanded it be removed and the chemist refused. Dr Schlossberg got a
temporary injunction to get the cabinet removed. At this point the NSDAP took on the case and hung its own
Stürmer cabinet in the same place. When the doctor threatened another temporary injunction he was taken into
protective custody.
[…] The public baths in Mannheim, which were named ‘Herschel Baths’ because they were endowed by a Jewish
patron, Herschel, become completely Aryan on 10 July. Since that day non-Aryans have been forbidden to enter
the baths that were donated to the municipality by a Jew. The owners of the private pools are happy with the
prohibiion because it has increased their customers.121
9.3.5
Popular responses to Nazi Anti-Semitism
We have the following reports on the response of the public to the National Socialists’ anti-Semitic riots:
Berlin: In Wedding [a working-class district in north Berlin] too the windows of Jewish shops have been daubed,
but there have been no major riots anywhere. The whole operation finds no resonance with the public, at least in
the north of Berlin. People say to themselves: the whole thing is put on to distract the public’s attention from how
it really is under the Nazis. […] They say: the Jews have done nothing to us. A large Jewish department store in
Wedding is still doing very well, maybe even better than before. Even the small shopkeepers are not particularly
against the Jews. They themselves depend in part on the patronage of their Jewish customers.
Second report: In general one can say that the Jewish pogroms, the assaults on the Catholic church and the
prohibition of the Stahlhelm, taken together with the price increases have led to an opening up of the general
mood. People see all these developments as distractions, and presume that behind all these measures there are
serious difficulties and tensions in the government camp.
Nobody approves of the Jewish pogroms. Even people who sympathise with the NSDAP, reject this kind of
persecution of the Jews.
[…]
Bavaria: Very little notice is taken of the persecution of the Jews. That is especially true in the countryside.
Although the number of communities that have posted the well-known sign ‘Jews are not welcome here’ on the
road into the village have increased considerably, this has not lead to any general apprehension. The public does
not in any case take part in these artificial demonstrations.
South-west Germany: In Wangen the Streicher people had put up a notice board for the Stürmer. After a short
while it had suddenly disappeared, and was later found completely smashed up in a rye field by a mill pond. The
three who were responsible, cursed as ‘slaves to the Jews’ were arrested.
Second report: In a Hessian village a number of farmers were caught selling their cattle to Jewish merchants. The
names f the farmers were put up on the parish notice board. The whole village was furious, because basically
there’s no farmer there who hasn’t at some point sold cattle to a Jew. And apart from that they prefer to sell to the
Jews because they get a better price than they get from the co-operative, but above all because they get their
money straight away. The names were torn down from the notice board and a protest meeting was called. At this
‘Judenkenner’ is difficult to translate. Literally it means somebody who recognises Jews, presumably, in this conrtext, ‘for
what they are’.
121
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935 pp. 800-801
120
91
meeting the ‘Reich Food Estate’ was represented by the Nazi District Leader, Put (a member of the Reichstag),
and Mayor von Schlüchtern. Put asked: ‘What is the matter with you people, you always used to be such good
Nationalists. The business with the notice board is not so bad; their names would have been taken down anyway.
What’s your problem all of a sudden?’ Thereupon from the audience several voices at once: ‘We have no money
left.’ Put, in response: ‘Oh, no money! Me neither!’ Then peals of laughter broke out from the audience: ‘Oho, if
you have no money with three or four wages coming in, no wonder there’s nothing left for the rest of us.’ The
meeting went on in this manner with shouting to and fro, and Herr Put finished only with a promise that no
farmer’s name would appear on the notice board in future if he sold his cattle to Jews.
Third report: Publicans are being compelled, under threat of a boycott and ‘other consequences’, to mount boards
with the inscription ‘Jews are not welcome here’. Most pubs already have these signs. In a café in Kassel a regular
Jewish customer came across the sign one day. He took the landlady to task because she had never told him that he
was an unwelcome guest on her premises. The landlady apologised a dozen times and told the guest to stay, she
had to take the sign. […] In Kassel a Jewish woman was shopping at the market and a greengrocer called over to
her ‘Lady, you can buy form us, we’re no Nazis.’ He Jewish woman bought her vegetables and paid in silence for
the goods, then asked: ‘Is that true?’ The greengrocer responded: ‘Of course it’s true, the whole Nazi pack can
….’122
9.4
The Nuremberg Laws
9.4.1
Reich Citizenship Law, 15 September 1935123
§1
1) A subject of the State is a person who enjoys the protection of the German Reich and who in consequence has
specific obligations towards it.
2) The status of subject of the State is acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Reich and State
Citizenship Law.
§2
1) A Reich citizen is a subject of the State who is of German or related blood, who proves by his conduct that he is
willing and fit faithfully to serve the German people and Reich.
2) Reich citizenship is acquired through the granting of a Reich Citizenship Certificate.
3) The Reich citizen is the sole bearer of full political rights in accordance with the Law
§3
The Reich Minister of the Interior, in coordination with the Deputy of the Führer , will issue the Legal and
Administrative orders required to implement and complete this Law.
Nuremberg, September 15, 1935
At the Reich Party Congress of Freedom
9.4.2
Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour September 15, 1935124
Moved by the understanding that purity of the German Blood is the essential condition for the continued existence
of the German people, and inspired by the inflexible determination to ensure the existence of the German Nation
for all time, the Reichstag has unanimously adopted the following Law, which is promulgated herewith:
§1
1) Marriages between Jews and subjects of the state of German or related blood are forbidden. Marriages
nevertheless concluded are invalid, even if concluded abroad to circumvent this law.
2) Annulment proceedings can be initiated only by the State Prosecutor.
§2
Extramarital intercourse between Jews and subjects of the state of German or related blood is forbidden.
§3
Jews may not employ in their households female subjects of the state of German or related blood who are under 45
years old.
§4
1) Jews are forbidden to fly the Reich or National flag or to display the Reich colors.
122
Deutschland-Berichte, 1935, pp. 811-814
Reichsgesetzblatt, I, 1935, p. 1146
124
Reichsgesetzblatt, I, 1935, pp. 1146-1147.
123
92
2) They are, on the other hand, permitted to display the Jewish colors. The exercise of this right is protected by the
State.
§5
1) Any person who violates the prohibition under § 1 will be punished by a prison sentence with hard labor.
2) A male who violates the prohibition under § 2 will be punished with a prison sentence with or without hard
labour.
3) Any person violating the provisions under § 3 or 4 will be punished with a prison sentence of up to one year and
a fine, or with one or the other of these penalties.
§6
The Reich Minister of the Interior, in coordination with the Deputy of the Führer and the Reich Minister of
Justice, will issue the Legal and Administrative regulations required to implement and complete this Law.
§7
The Law takes effect on the day following promulgations except for § 3, which goes into force on January 1, 1936.
9.4.3
The First Supplementary Decree under the Provisions of the Reich Citizenship Law, 14 November
1935
§4
1) A Jew cannot be a Reich citizen. He has no voting rights in political matters; he cannot occupy a public office.
2) Jewish officials will retire as of December 31, 1935....
§5
1) A Jew is a person descended from at least three grandparents who are full Jews by race....
2) A Mischling who is a subject of the state is also considered a Jew if he is descended from two full Jewish
grandparents
a) who was a member of the Jewish Religious Community at the time of the promulgation of this Law, or was
admitted to it subsequently;
b) who was married to a Jew at the time of the promulgation of this Law, or subsequently married to a Jew;
c) who was born from a marriage with a Jew in accordance with paragraph 1, contracted subsequently to the
promulgation of the law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor of September 15, 1935
(Reichsgesetzblatt, I, p. 1146);
d) who was born as the result of extramarital intercourse with a Jew in accordance with Paragraph 1, and was born
illegitimately after July 31, 1936....125
9.5
Establishment of the Office for Jewish Emigration in Vienna126
The Reichskommissar for the Reunification of Austria with the German Reich Staff
Vienna I, August 20, 1938
To all offices of the Party and State in Austria
Undesirable interruptions and delays have occurred in the emigration of Jews; in addition, the question of Jewish
emigration has been dealt with inefficiently by certain offices.
To assist and expedite arrangements for the emigration of Jews from Austria a Central Office for Jewish
Emigration has therefore been set up in Vienna IV, at Prinz Eugen Strasse 22.
The Central Office will be responsible for dealing with the following matters, in cooperation with the Government
Offices concerned:
1. The creation of opportunities for emigration through negotiations for entry permits with the competent German
and other emigration organizations.
2. Obtaining the foreign currency required for emigration.
3. Establishment and supervision of professional re-training centres.
4. Cooperation with travel agencies and shipping companies to ensure the technical arrangements for emigration.
5. Supervision of Jewish political and other emigration associations with regard to their attitude concerning
emigration.
6. The issuing of guidelines and continuous contacts with all offices connected with the emigration of Jews from
Austria....
All Party offices and other authorities are instructed to pass on all applications for emigration to the Central
Office for Jewish Emigration immediately and without taking action of their own for the time being, and to send
125
Reichsgesetzblatt, I, 1935, p. 1333
Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Abteilung: Allgemeines Verwaltungsarchiv. Der Reichskommissar fuer die Wiedervereinigung
Österreichs mit dem Deutschen Reich (Austrian State Archives Department: General Administrative Archives. The
Reichskommissar for the Reunification of Austria with the German Reich), 1762/2.
126
93
all Jews anxious to emigrate to the above office. Jews who wish to emigrate are in future to apply only to the
Central Office for Jewish Emigration. This office will control further procedures and, in particular, obtain the
permits required for emigration from the competent office, and supervise the final emigration.
The Regulation applies, for the time being, to the Gau Vienna and Lower Danube. The procedures in other areas
are regulated by the Central Office for Jewish Emigration in consultation with the local Gauleiters.
A central office for Jewish Planning in conjunction with the Central Office for Jewish Emigration is definitely still
under consideration.
I entrust the general direction of these Central Offices to the SD-Führer of the SS Section Upper Danube and
Inspector of the Security Police, SS StandartenFührer Governmental Director Dr. Stahlecker. He is herewith
invested with the necessary powers to carry out his commission. In particular, he is entitled to order the transfer of
officials of the Authorities concerned with emigration to the Central Office for Jewish Emigration.
Heil Hitler!
signed Buerkel
Gauleiter
9.6
Security Service (SD) of the Reichsführer SS to the SD Sub-SectionVienna, 5 October 1938127
Re: Operation against Jews
At yesterdays meeting of leading representatives [of the Nazi Party] at the Local Group "Goldegg" (Vienna, subDistrict 3), it was announced by the head of the local group that in accordance with instructions from the Gau, a
stepped-up operation against the Jews was to take place through October 10, 1938. As many Jews as possible
should be caused to emigrate. If the Jews have no passports, then they will be pushed over the Czech border to
Prague without a passport. If the Jews have no cash money they would be given RM 40 − by the Gau for their
departure.
In this operation against the Jews the impression is to be avoided that it is a Party matter; instead, spontaneous
demonstrations by the people are to be caused. There could be use of force where Jews resist.
SD Branch, Vienna
9.7
Decisions taken at the Evian Conference on Jewish Refugees, July 1938128
Adopted by the Committee on July 14th, 1938
Having met at Evian, France, from July 6th to July 13th, 1938:
1. Considering that the question of involuntary emigration has assumed major proportions and that the fate of the
unfortunate people affected has become a problem for intergovernmental deliberation;
2. Aware that the involuntary emigration of large numbers of people, of different creeds, economic conditions,
professions and trades, from the country or countries where they have been established, is disturbing to the general
economy, since these persons are obliged to seek refuge, either temporarily or permanently, in other countries at a
time when there is serious unemployment; that, in consequence, countries of refuge and settlement are faced with
problems, not only of an economic and social nature, but also of public order, and that there is a severe strain on
the administrative facilities and absorptive capacities of the receiving countries;
3. Aware, moreover, that the involuntary emigration of people in large numbers has become so great that it renders
racial and religious problems more acute, increases international unrest, and may hinder seriously the processes of
appeasement in international relations;
4. Believing that it is essential that a long-range program should be envisaged, whereby assistance to involuntary
emigrants, actual and potential, may be coordinated within the framework of existing migration laws and practices
of Governments;
5. Considering that if countries of refuge or settlement are to cooperate in finding an orderly solution of the
problem before the Committee they should have the collaboration of the country of origin and are therefore
persuaded that it will make its contribution by enabling involuntary emigrants to take with them their property and
possessions and emigrate in an orderly manner;
6. Welcoming heartily the initiative taken by the President of the United States of America in calling the
Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian for the primary purpose of facilitating involuntary emigration from Germany
(including Austria), and expressing profound appreciation to the French Government for its courtesy in receiving
the Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian;
7. Bearing in mind the resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Nations on May 14th, 1938, concerning
international assistance to refugees:
Recommends:
127
Yad Vashem, Doc. 48
Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, July 6th to 15th, 1938...Record of the Plenary Meetings of the
Committee. Resolutions and Reports, London, July 1938. Yad Vashem, Doc. 45
128
94
8. a) That the persons coming within the scope of the activity of the Intergovernmental Committee shall be 1)
persons who have not already left their country of origin (Germany, including Austria), but who must emigrate on
account of their political opinion, religious beliefs or racial origin, and 2) persons as defined in 1) who have
already left their country of origin and who have not yet established themselves permanently elsewhere;
b) That the Governments participating in the Intergovernmental Committee shall continue to furnish the
Committee for its strictly confidential information, with 1) details regarding such immigrants as each Government
may be prepared to receive under its existing laws and practices and 2) details of these laws and practices;
c) That in view of the fact that the countries of refuge and settlement are entitled to take into account the economic
and social adaptability of immigrants, these should in many cases be required to accept, at least for a time, changed
conditions of living in the countries of settlement;
d) That the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement should not assume any obligations for the
financing of involuntary emigration;
e) That, with regard to the documents required by the countries of refuge and settlement, the Governments
represented on the Intergovernmental Committee should consider the adoption of the following provision:
In those individual immigration cases in which the usually required documents emanating from foreign official
sources are found not to be available, there should be accepted such other documents serving the purpose of the
requirements of law as may be available to the immigrant, and that, as regards the document which may be issued
to an involuntary emigrant by the country of his foreign residence to serve the purpose of a passport, note be taken
of the several international agreements providing for the issue of a travel document serving the purpose of a
passport and of the advantage of their wide application;
f) That there should meet at London an Intergovernmental Committee consisting of such representatives as the
Governments participating in the Evian Meeting may desire to designate. This Committee shall continue and
develop the work of the Intergovernmental Meeting at Evian and shall be constituted and shall function in the
following manner: There shall be a Chairman of this Committee and four Vice-Chairmen; there shall be a director
of authority, appointed by the Intergovernmental Committee, who shall be guided by it in his actions. He shall
undertake negotiations to improve the present conditions of exodus and to replace them by conditions of orderly
emigration. He shall approach the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement with a view to
developing opportunities for permanent settlement. The Intergovernmental Committee, recognizing the value of
the work of the existing refugee services of the League of Nations and of the studies of migration made by the
International Labour Office, shall cooperate fully with these organizations, and the Intergovernmental Committee
at London shall consider the means by which the cooperation of the Committee and the director with these
organizations shall be established. The Intergovernmental Committee, at its forthcoming meeting at London, will
consider the scale on which its expenses shall be apportioned among the participating Governments;
9. That the Intergovernmental Committee in its continued form shall hold a first meeting at London on August 3rd,
1938.
9.7
The Pogrom (Reichskristallnacht)
The Terror against the Jews
Everything seems to indicate that the campaign of annihilation against the German Jews has reached its final stage.
In these reports we present, at least in broad outline, the new legislative and police measures against the Jews; in
doing so we continue the chronicle which started with the beginnings of the National Socialist dictatorship, and
which has been continuously augmented ever since. Asked today what rights German Jews still have, one can only
answer: none. No right to a home - German courts have frequently decided that Aryan tenants cannot be expected
to share a block with Jews; no right to food - in many places the sale of groceries to Jews is forbidden; no right to
work - Jews have been gradually excluded from every profession; no right to even the most frugal possessions, no
right to freedom from physical abuse [koerperliche Integritaet], to defence against lawless attacks, not even the
right to leave the country with a proper passport and their own travel expenses.
On the basis of a decree from the Commissioner for the Four Year Plan of 24 November 1938, the Reich
Economics Minister determined the following at the beginning of December.
1. From 1 January 1939 no Jew may be a shopkeeper. For the most part, businesses are not to be sold, but
dissolved.
2. All businesses which are not closed down are to be sold.
3. Agricultural or forestry land and urban real estate are to be sold. If the sale is not completed punctually - and
above all if the owner is abroad - a trustee will be appointed , who can either run the business provisionally, or
wind it up, or sell it, in the place of the Jew, and who will be empowered to conduct any business or undertake any
legal proceedings, in or outside a court of law, as if he had full legal authority to do so.
4. […] Stocks, shares, bonds, securities and debentures are to be deposited, gold, sliver and jewellery may not be
sold freely, but only to the state, likewise works of art.
When selling property to private individuals Jews can be paid with state bonds, in sales to the state.
In accordance with the Supplementary Order of the Reich Finance Minister, the first part of the ‘contribution’ of
one billion129 is due on 15 December. It has to be paid in cash. Since this measure will compels Jews to undertake
a hasty sale of valuables and works of art a point of purchase has been set up by the Berlin Chamber of Trade on
129
i.e. one thousand million.
95
the orders of the Reich Economics Ministry, where Jewish goods will be bought after evaluation by experts; and
the goods extorted from the Jews are to be brought to this place from all over the Reich.
The Jewish owners of a demolished shop must make good all damages suffered by Aryans from their
own means before the surrender of the property, while the money from insurance claims goes to the state.
On 26 November the Reich Students Organisation withdrew all grants and loans to Jewish students and
demanded their repayment within two weeks.
Directly after the assassination in Paris all Jewish newspapers in Germany were prohibited indefinitely.
Later a replacement paper for the Jüdische Rundschau was allowed to appear. The newspaper may appear only
once a week, may comprise no more than one page and publish only official communications from Jewish
communities and organisations and Reich legislation.
By order of the Danzig Senate the Nuremberg Laws were introduced into the Free City of Danzig with
effect from 23 November. These laws also apply to Danzig citizens of Polish nationality.
[. . .]
In order to show that the pogroms which came after 9 November were a logical intensification in a terror campaign
which was already being waged, we have assembled a series of reports of terror against the Jews in the last few
months. We have divided these into the events before the assassination in Paris and after.
1. Before the Assassination
a) The Terror against the Jews in the Conquered Sudetenland
Whereas the Jews of Vienna were surprised by the German invasion before they could think of fleeing, the Jews in
the Sudetenland - at least theoretically - had the opportunity to flee (leaving their property behind). In the event
many preferred suicide to an uncertain fate. But even those who escaped in time saw their hopes of securing their
own bare survival betrayed. In numerous cases the Czech authorities ordered them to return to their German
‘homeland’ within 24 hours. The Germans for their part, drove large groups of Jews into the ‘no-man’s-land’ a
narrow zone between German and Czech territory. The unfortunate wandered around the fields there for weeks
without food or shelter, among them old people, pregnant women and children, until they succeeded, at least
temporarily, in gaining admission to Czechoslovakia. The same scenes were played out in the no-man’s-land on
the Austrian-Czech border around Brünn [Brno].
The Sudeten German Jews who did flee abroad attempted in some cases to get at least a small part of the
property they had left behind. One of our colleagues reports on the success of these attempts:
Sudetenland: The expropriation of Jews who have fled proceeds in such a way that the collections of the refugees’
debts to private citizens are validated by the local court, which immediately appoints a trustee to take over the
liquidation of the business. The temporary managers of the business are generally appointed trustees. If they are
answered at all, letters from abroad receive the reply that the owner must turn up in person to regulate his affairs.
The Jews who have remained in the Sudetenland suffer the fate of their fellows in the Reich. In the
description of pogroms in the following pages we include some reports from the Sudetenland.
b) The Long Term Programme
The regime has attempted to create the impression abroad that the pogroms raging since 10 November are the
consequences of the Grynszpan murder. In truth, only the tempo has been increased and awareness of foreign
opinion has been abandoned. It would take up too much space to recount all the local decrees and acts of terror that
have taken place since our last report on anti-Jewish terror (Heft 7/1938, p. A58ff.). We recall only that the
destruction of synagogues, which has played such an important part in the latest events, had already begun in the
summer, with the demolition of the Nuremberg synagogue. Since then, the synagogue in Kaiserslautern has been
razed to the ground by two explosions, the synagogues in Rodalben, Kusel, Albersweiler were ‘acquired’ by the
municipality and given over to ‘natural’ pursuits. The synagogue in Dortmund was pulled down, and the one in
Hamburg compelled to close. In order to illustrate the state of permanent terror, we also include the following two
from the reports we have received.
Silesia: With the exception of a few elderly people who were released, all the Jews who were recently imprisoned
were taken to the concentration camp at Buchenwald in Thuringia. Two families received notice that their men had
died in the camp of tuberculosis. The general conviction is that they were shot. The families of the prisoners have
suffered particularly badly. The wives, who no longer have any income because they have had to close the
business, go to the labour office. There they are given work. Particularly hard work is deliberately given to the
Jewish women. A woman who had had a textile business, for example, now works as a cleaner in a factory. The
emigration of Jews, even from the old territory of the Reich, has increased strongly. In Breslau (Wroclaw) Jews
have fled leaving everything behind. Their flats and businesses were sealed up.
Berlin: Plundering had already taken place on 30 June in the Grosse Frankfurter Strasse and the Münzstrasse. . . .
The windows of several shoe shops and a gold jewellery shop were smashed . . . The same happened at
Brandmann, watchmaker and goldsmith on the Münzstrasse, and the business was then raided again on 9
November.
In many cases there was plundering. A white collar worker at one company, for example, boasted, that
her father had brought home six pairs of shoes, and that she had got one of them. One of her colleagues
commented: ‘In the war plunderers in enemy territory were shot.’ Nothing happened to either of them.
For the last few months the police have also given the Jews a hard time whenever they could. If a Jew
crossed the road at an amber light, he had to be prepared to be arrested, spend a day or two at the police station and
still have to pay a fine afterwards. At the police station there are separate windows for Jews, and even separate
pens. Such measures have not yet been introduced by the post office and telephone authorities.
96
2. After the Assassination in Paris
a) The Pretext
On Monday 7 November Herschel Feivel Grynszpan, a seventeen-year-old Polish Jew shot Secretary vom Rath in
the building of the German embassy in Paris and severely injured him. Vom Rath died of the injuries. When asked
for his motive, Grynszpan declared: ‘I wanted to avenge my brothers, the Polish Jews who have been hunted out of
Germany’. Grynszpan’s father, who had lived in Germany for many years, had been arrested during the night in
Hanover, where he lived, along with the other Polish Jews living there, and driven to the frontier.
Immediately after vom Rath’s death there began in Germany the most brutal pogroms that the Nazi
regime has yet staged.
b) Incident Reports
Our reports can repeat only a small part of what happened during those days.
Those in power brazenly asserted that the arson attacks, plundering, and mistreatment were the
spontaneous revenge of the people for the assassination in Paris.
On the other hand it is clear that the pillaging of Jewish property was planned months ago with the
introduction of a special registration requirement for Jewish property. The assassination in Paris was merely a
convenient pretext, to extract a ‘fine’ of a billion130 RM from the Jews, and otherwise a different excuse would
have been found. It is also clear, however, that the pogrom was carried out by the SA, SS, NSKK and Hitler
Youth, and that ordinary people were as surprised as people abroad the following morning. That the ‘mob’ took
the opportunity to plunder here and there has nothing to do with ‘the people’s fury’.
[. . .]
Berlin: The whole operation was planned by the authorities three or four weeks previously. All Jews were
summoned to the police station on certain days in alphabetical order and told to bring with them any weapons in
their possession. . . . The weapons had to be surrendered whether or not the owner had a licence. This operation
had obviously been planned in order to make any resistance to the destruction and plunder impossible. Only after
the pogrom did the order come from Himmler for all Jews to give up their weapons, and soon afterwards the report
that large numbers of weapons had been confiscated.
Another preparation took the form of marking out all Jewish shops months ago, whereas previously an
indirect sign had been enough, in that all Aryan shops had to display a Labour Front poster. Now very second
window in a Jewish shop had to display the first name of the owner in oil paint in letters 20 cm. high. In some
districts, where the rules were applied strictly, the Jewish name Israel or Sara had to be added in addition.
During the says of the pogrom 60,000 Jews were arrested in Germany and 520 synagogues destroyed. Our
colleagues report:
Rhineland-Westphalia, First Report: Systematic operations against the Jews were started in Düsseldorf during the
night of 10 to 11 November. The SA and SS were already prepared and the fire brigade had also already been
warned in advance. The operations were systematic and ‘sudden’. Jewish shops were destroyed not only from
outside but also inside. In flats it was even more dreadful. First came the Gestapo. They behaved relatively
‘decently’. That is, the officers declared that they had been instructed to come and had to search the house for
prohibited literature etc. Nothing was destroyed in the process. But many Jews were taken away. Particularly
Polish Jews or Jews of Polish extraction.
During the Gestapo’s house search the stormtroopers busied themselves outside smashing windows and
doors. Then the SS appeared, and they carried out their work inside. Almost always all the furniture was destroyed
books and valuables were strewn around living rooms, the Jewish tenants were threatened and beaten. There were
true scenes of horror. Only now and again was there a decent SS man who let it be clearly known that he was only
doing his duty because he had received orders to go into the flat. We know, for example, of two students in SS
uniform who each smashed a vase and then reported to their superiors that they had carried out their orders.
Many Jews were dreadfully mistreated, and some were beaten. Many Jews from Düsseldorf Jews and
indeed from all over the Rhineland were taken to Dachau. In many cases Jews fled before the operation. This was
only possible because people, even the police and some Nazis warned the Jews and helped them. To this day an
Aryan in X. is putting up eleven Jews in his house . . .
Second Report: On 10 and 11 November the Nazis wreaked havoc in Cologne. They stormed the houses of Jews,
rich and poor, like commandos, smashed shop windows and in private houses smashed everything up as well. The
scene around the cathedral and Neumarkt was particularly bleak. There were still lots of Jewish junk shops there,
although some had already been ransacked and destroyed in previous years. [. . .]
In Duisburg . . . Jews were arrested en masse after their shops and houses had been smashed up and
plundered. 350 Polish Jews were loaded onto cattle trucks and taken off in the direction of the Polish border. [. . .]
South West Germany: . . . Fourth Report: A particularly sad sight was the participation of children in the
plundering. In so far as one can speak of excitement or enthusiasm in the operation at all, it was only among
children and young people. They have no experience of life and really see the Jews as criminals and villains, as
130
Ditto.
97
they are now generally taught to do. So young people saw it as an important and necessary thing to take part in the
destruction of Jewish property. And since they had been told that it was all stolen or acquired by unfair means,
they saw nothing reprehensible in taking a few bits and pieces home to cheer up their parents.
[. . .]
In Hindenburg the SA was excluded from the operation, which was carried out by the SS alone. The stormtroopers
are seen as unreliable. They stole too much when they were transporting Polish Jews over the German border. [. . .]
‘My mother could have had a fur as well’ related a child at the school in Hindenburg ‘but Mother did not want any
stolen goods.’ Other children of Nazis talk openly about all the things Daddy brought home when the shops were
plundered.’
c) Popular Disapproval
All reports are agreed that the riots were sharply disapproved of by the majority of the German people. During the
first days of the pogrom, several hundred Aryans were arrested for loudly stating their objections. A question often
asked is: ‘Whose turn is it after the Jews?’ As great as the general disapproval may be, however, one is forced to
observe that the brutalities of the pogrom hordes have cowed the people even more, and strengthened the notion
that any resistance against unrestrained Nazi violence is futile.
The following are extracts from our reports:
Rhineland-Westphalia, First Report: The brutal measures against the Jews have prompted great indignation among
the people. Many people spoke out and were arrested as a consequence. When it became known that a woman in
childbirth had been taken away, even a policeman said that this was too much: ‘What’s happening to Germany,
with methods like this?’. He too was then arrested. Even some of the Nazis were arrested for criticising the antiJewish measures.
Second Report: The measures against the Jews found no sympathy in Cologne. Even leading Nazis openly
expressed their dissatisfaction, probably because they could not simply ignore popular opinion. It was an
indication of how disappointed they were in the attitude of people in Cologne that on 16 November Streicher was
brought to Cologne in order to ‘explain’ about the Jews in the Congress Hall (Messehalle). Although there were
large posters about it for days, there were large gaps in the audience in the hall.
Who will be the next victims after the Jews? That is what they are asking here. Will it be the Catholics?
Or will there be a demand for everybody to surrender their property? People think that either of these options is
possible in an economic crisis.
Third Report: There is great indignation about this vandalism throughout the whole Wurmgebiet. This
was clearly expressed in one case when the SA smashed up a shop under cover of darkness , and were pelted with
stones, also under cover of darkness, from an orchard opposite. [. . .]
South West Germany: Nobody talks to the Nazis about the affair. But among the people in general the events are
disapproved of strongly. Local people did not take part in the disgraceful episode. There was no popular anger here
at the death of the embassy counsellor.
Bavaria: All our information suggests that most people had no part in this Nazi activity. When people got up in the
morning the Nazis had completed their work.
[. . .]
Many people have taken the Jewish women and children in and put them up. Women go shopping for the
Jewish women because it is now forbidden to sell them groceries.
[. . .]
Berlin: Since the Nazi regime was established there have, strictly speaking, been only two occasions when the
German people was united in widespread hostility to the terror regime: the first during the critical days of
September, when fear of war overcame fear of persecution when naked and conscious popular opposition to the
leader ship was clearly discernible; the second during the days of the anti-Jewish barbarism. [. . .]
The protests of the people of Berlin against the robbery and arson, against the crimes committed against
Jewish men, women and children of all ages were clear. They ranged from contemptuous looks and gestures of
revulsion, to open expressions of loathing and outspoken criticism. In the Weinmeister Strasse it was a police
sergeant and a junior office who protected two elderly Jewish women with six or seven children from the Party
mob, and finally managed to bring them to safety. In the Grosse Hamburger Strasse, where there is a Jewish old
people’s home, it was medical and ancillary staff from the nearby Hedwig hospital who prevented the elderly
Jewish people, who were now homeless, from being robbed by adolescents form the Hitler Youth.
In factories and offices, in workshops and behind shop counters, in the residential districts of Berlin
workers, clerks and junior civil servants expressions of disgust were to be heard at the ‘animal madness’. [. . .]
Second Report: The new measures against the Jews have met with general popular disapproval. Of course there are
individual expressions of approval, particularly from women.131
131
Deutschland-Berichte, 1938 pp. 1177-1208.
98
9.8
Regulation for the Elimination of the Jews from the Economic Life of Germany, November 12,
1938132
On the basis of the regulation for the implementation of the Four-Year Plan of October 18, 1936
(Reichsgesetzblatt, I, p. 887), the following is decreed:
§1
1) From January 1, 1939, Jews (§ 5 of the First Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law of November 14, 1935,
Reichsgesetzblatt, I, p. 1333) are forbidden to operate retail stores, mail-order houses, or sales agencies, or to carry
on a trade [craft] independently.
2) They are further forbidden, from the same day on, to offer for sale goods or services, to advertise these, or to
accept orders at markets of all sorts, fairs or exhibitions.
3) Jewish trade enterprises (Third Regulation to the Reich Citizenship Law of June 14, 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, I,
p. 627) which violate this decree will be closed by police.
§2
1) From January 1, 1939, a Jew can no longer be the head of an enterprise within the meaning of the Law of
January 20, 1934, for the Regulation of National Work (Reichsgesetzblatt, I, p. 45).
2) Where a Jew is employed in an executive position in a commercial enterprise he may be given notice to leave in
six weeks. At the expiration of the term of the notice all claims of the employee based on his contract, especially
those concerning pension and compensation rights, become invalid.
§3
1) A Jew cannot be a member of a cooperative.
2) The membership of Jews in cooperatives expires on December 31, 1938. No special notice is required.
§4
The Reich Minister of Economy, in coordination with the Ministers concerned, is empowered to publish
regulations for the implementation of this decree. He may permit exceptions under the Law if these are required as
the result of the transfer of a Jewish enterprise to non-Jewish ownership, for the liquidation of a Jewish enterprise
or, in special cases, to ensure essential supplies.
Berlin, November 12, 1938
Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan
Goering
Field Marshal General
9.9
The Radicalisation of Anti-Jewish Policy and the War
9.9.1
Hitler: Speech to the Reichstag, 30 January 1939133
Deputies, Men of the Reichstag! I implore you in particular not to forget one thing: It is apparently one of the
exquisite privileges of democratic, political livelihood, enjoyed in certain democracies, to indulge in artificially
feeding the flame of hatred against so-called totalitarian states. By a flood of partially distorted, partially
fictitious reports, these rouse public opinion against certain peoples who have done nothing to harm others nor
wish to undertake anything of this nature, but have only suffered from the great injustice done to them
throughout the decades.
[…]
The peoples of the world will realize within a short time that National Socialist Germany does not desire
to elicit the enmity of other peoples. Allegations of the aggressive designs entertained by our nation on other
peoples are the products of a deranged, hysterical mind or blatant lies by certain politicians struggling for
survival. In certain states, businessmen void of any conscience try to save their financial interests by propagating
these lies. Above all, it is international Jewry which seeks thereby to gratify its thirst for vengeance and its insatiable
hunger for profit. And this constitutes the greatest libellous claim ever levied against a great and peace-loving
nation.
After all, German soldiers have never fought on American soil other than for the cause of America's
independence and freedom. Yet American soldiers were shipped to Europe and contributed to the suppression of
a great nation struggling to preserve its liberty. It was not Germany that attacked America; it was America that
attacked Germany. And it did so, according to the findings of an investigative committee in the American House of
Representatives, without any compelling reason, other than perhaps capitalist considerations.
Nevertheless, let there be no doubt as to one point: all these attempts will not in the least sway Germany
from its reckoning with Jewry. I would like to say the following on the Jewish question: it is truly a shaming
display when we see today the entire democratic world filled with tears of pity at the plight of the poor, tortured
Jewish people, while remaining hardhearted and obstinate in view of what is therefore its obvious duty: to
132
133
Reichsgesetzblatt, I, 1938, p. 1580.
Domarus, Hitler, III, pp. 146-9
99
help. All the arguments with which they seek to justify their non-intervention lend only further support to the
stance of Germans and Italians in this matter.
For this is what they say: ‘We’—that is the democracies—"cannot possibly admit the Jews!" And
this those world powers claim who can boast no more than ten persons per square kilometre while we must
accommodate and feed 135 persons per square kilometre.
Then follow assurances: ‘We cannot take them unless they receive a certain monetary contribution
from Germany to facilitate immigration.’ Small matter that Germany has already been good enough to provide
for these elements for centuries, who possessed little more than infectious political and sanitary diseases. What this
people possesses today, it obtained at the cost of the not-so-cunning German nation by means of the most base
manipulations. What we do today is no more than to set right the wrongs these people committed. In the days
when the German nation lost its savings, accumulated throughout decades of hard work, thanks to the
inflation incited and nurtured by the Jews; when the rest of the world took the German nation’ assets abroad; when
it expropriated our colonial possessions; at that time such philanthropic contemplations did not yet play such an
influential role in these democratic statesmen's considerations. I wish to assure these gentlemen that, owing to a
fifteen-year-long crash course in democracy, we are today steeled against any sentimentality.
We had to live to see how, at the end of the war, after hunger and destitution had killed more than
800,000 children of our nation, because of the gruesome articles of a Diktat which the democratic, humane world
apostles had forced on us in the guise of a peace treaty, nearly a million dairy cows were driven from our barns. We
had to live to see, one year after the end of the war, over one million German prisoners of war still held captive
without any perceptible cause. We had to suffer the sight of how, along our frontiers, far more than one and a half
million Germans bereft of their possessions were driven from their homes with no more than their shirts on their
backs. We had to bear the sight of millions of our Volksgenossen torn from us, without anyone according them
a hearing, and were left without any means of sustaining themselves in the future.
I could supplement these examples by dozens of yet more gruesome ones. Do not reproach me on the
grounds of your humanitarian concerns. The German nation does not wish to be governed by another people; it
does not wish others to determine its affairs in its place. France to the French; England to the English; America to
the Americans, and Germany to the Germans!
We are determined to undercut the efforts of a certain foreign people to nest here; a people whose
members knew how to capture all leading positions. We will banish this people. We are willing to educate our
own nation to assume these leadership functions. We have hundreds of thousands of the most intelligent children
of peasants and workers. We will have them educated, and we are already educating them. We are hoping that
one day we can place them in all leading positions within the state along with others from our educated classes.
No longer shall these be occupied by members of a people alien to us.
Above all, as the literal meaning of the term already indicates, German culture is exclusively German; it
is not Jewish. Hence we shall place the administration and the care for our culture in the hands of our nation.
Should the rest of the world be outraged and protest hypocritically against Germany's barbarous expulsion of such an
extraordinary, culturally valuable, irreplaceable element, then we can only be astonished at the consequences such a
stance would imply.
Should not the outside world be most grateful to us for setting free these glorious bearers of culture and
placing them at its disposal? In accordance with its own statements, how is the outside world to justify its refusal
to grant refuge in its various countries to these most valuable members of the human race? For how will it
rationalize imposing the members of this race on the Germans of all people? How will the states so infatuated
with these ‘great guys’ explain why they are suddenly taking refuge with all sorts of pretences just in order to
deny asylum to these people?
I believe the earlier this problem is resolved, the better. For Europe cannot find peace before it has
dealt properly with the Jewish question.
It is possible that the necessity of resolving this problem sooner or later should bring about agreement
in Europe, even between nations which otherwise might not have reconciled themselves as readily with one
another. There is more than enough room for settlement on this earth. All we need to do is put an end to the
prevailing assumption that the Dear Lord chose the Jewish people to be the beneficiaries of a certain percentage of
the productive capacities of other peoples' bodies and their labours. Either the Jews will have to adjust to
constructive, respectable activities, such as other people are already engaged in, or, sooner or later, they will
succumb to a crisis of yet inconceivable proportions.
And there is yet one more topic on which I would like to speak on this day, perhaps not only
memorable for us Germans: I have been a prophet very often in my lifetime, and this earned me mostly ridicule. In
the time of my struggle for power, it was primarily the Jewish people who mocked my prophecy that, one day, I
would assume leadership of this Germany, of this State, and of the entire nation, and that I would press for a
resolution of the Jewish question, among many other problems. The resounding laughter of the Jews in
Germany then may well be stuck in their throats today, I suspect.
Once again I will be a prophet: should the international Jewry of finance (Finanzjudentum) succeed,
both within and beyond Europe, in plunging mankind into yet another world war, then the result will not be a
Bolshevisation of the earth and the victory of Jewry, but the annihilation (Vernichtung) of the Jewish race in Europe.
Thus, the days of propagandist impotence of the non-Jewish peoples are over. National Socialist Germany and
Fascist Italy possess institutions which, if necessary, permit opening the eyes of the world to the true nature of tills
problem. Many a people is instinctively aware of this, albeit not scientifically versed in it. At this moment, the Jews
are still propagating their campaign of hatred in certain states under the cover of press, film, radio, theatre, and
100
literature, which are all in their hands. Should indeed this one nation attain its goal of prodding masses of millions
from other peoples to enter into a war devoid of all sense for them, and serving the interests of the Jews exclusively,
then the effectiveness of an enlightenment will once more display its might. Within Germany, this enlightenment
conquered Jewry utterly in the span of a few years.
Peoples desire not to perish on the battlefield just so that this rootless, internationalist race can profit
financially from this war and thereby gratify its lust for vengeance derived from the Old Testament. The Jewish
watchword ‘Proletarians of the world, unite!’ will be conquered by a far more lofty realization, namely: ‘Creative
men of all nations, recognize your common foe!’
9.9.2
Heydrich’s Instructions on Policy and Operations Concerning Jews in the Occupied Territories,
21 September, 1939134
The Chief of the Security Police
Berlin, September 21, 1939
Schnellbrief
To Chiefs of all Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police
Subject: Jewish Question in Occupied Territory
I refer to the conference held in Berlin today, and again point out that the planned total measures (i.e., the final
aim − Endziel) are to be kept strictly secret.
Distinction must be made between:
1. the final aim (which will require extended periods of time) and
2. the stages leading to the fulfilment of this final aim (which will be carried out in short periods).
The planned measures require the most thorough preparation with regard to technical as well as
economic aspects.
It is obvious that the tasks ahead cannot be laid down from here in full detail. The instructions and
directives below must serve also for the purpose of urging chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen to give practical
consideration [to the problems involved].
I
For the time being, the first prerequisite for the final aim is the concentration of the Jews from the countryside into
the larger cities.
This is to be carried out speedily.
In doing so, distinction must be made
1) between the zones of Danzig and West Prussia, Poznan, Eastern Upper Silesia, and
2) the other occupied zones.
As far as possible, the areas referred to under 1) are to be cleared of Jews; at least the aim should be to
establish only few cities of concentration.
In the areas under 2), as few concentration centres as possible are to be set up, so as to facilitate
subsequent measures. In this connection it should be borne in mind that only cities which are rail junctions, or are
at least located on railroad lines, should be selected as concentration points.
On principle, Jewish communities of less than 500 persons are to be dissolved and transferred to the
nearest concentration centre.
This decree does not apply to the area of Einsatzgruppe 1, which is situated east of Cracow and is
bounded roughly by Polanice, Jaroslaw, the new line of demarcation, and the former Slovak-Polish border. Within
this area only an approximate census of Jews is to be carried out. Furthermore, Councils of Jewish Elders
(Jüdische Ältestenräte), as outlined below, are to be set up.
II
Councils of Jewish Elders
1) In each Jewish community a Council of Jewish Elders is to be set up which, as far as possible, is to be
composed of the remaining authoritative personalities and rabbis. The Council is to be composed of up to 24 male
Jews (depending on the size of the Jewish community).[…]
2) In case of sabotage of such instructions, the Councils are to be warned that the most severe measures will be
taken.
3) The Judenräte (Jewish Councils) are to carry out an approximate census of the Jews of their areas, broken down
if possible according to sex (and age groups): a) up to 16 years, b) from 16-20 years, and c) above; and also
according to the principal occupations. The results are to be reported in the shortest possible time.
4) The Councils of Elders are to be informed of the date and time of the evacuation, the means available for
evacuation, and, finally, the departure routes. They are then to be made personally responsible for the evacuation
of the Jews from the countryside.
The reason to be given for the concentration of the Jews in the cities is that the Jews have taken a
decisive part in sniper attacks and plundering.
5) The Councils of Elders in the concentration centres are to be made responsible for the appropriate housing of
the Jews arriving from the countryside.
For reasons of general police security, the concentration of the Jews in the cities will probably call for
regulations in these cities which will forbid their entry to certain quarters completely and that − but with due
134
Nuremberg Document PS-3363.
101
regard to economic requirements − they may, for instance, not leave the ghetto, nor leave their homes after a
certain hour in the evening, etc.
6) The Councils of Elders are also to be made responsible for the suitable provisioning of the Jews during the
transport to the cities.
There is no objection to the evacuated Jews taking with them their movable possessions insofar as that is
technically possible.
7) Jews who fail to comply with the order to move into cities are to be given a short additional period of grace
where there was sufficient reason for the delay. They are to be warned of the most severe penalties if they fail to
move by the later date set.
III
All necessary measures are, on principle, always to be taken in closest consultation and cooperation with the
German civil administration and the competent local military authorities.
In the execution [of this plan], it must be taken into consideration that economic requirements in the
occupied areas do not suffer.
1) Above all, the needs of the army must be taken into consideration. For instance, for the time being, it will
scarcely be possible to avoid, here and there, leaving behind some trade Jews who are absolutely essential for the
provisioning of the troops, for lack of other possibilities. But in such cases the prompt Aryanization of these
enterprises is to be planned and the move of the Jews to be completed in due course, in cooperation with the
competent local German administrative authorities.
2) For the preservation of German economic interests in the occupied territories, it is obvious that Jewish-owned
war and other essential industries, and also enterprises, industries and factories important to the Four-Year Plan,
must be maintained for the time being.
In these cases also, prompt Aryanization must be aimed at, and the move of the Jews completed later.
3) Finally, the food situation in the occupied territories must be taken into consideration. For instance, as far as
possible, land owned by Jewish settlers is to be handed over to the care of neighbouring German or even Polish
farmers to work on commission to ensure the harvesting of crops still standing in the fields, and replanting.
With regard to this important question, contact is to be made with the agricultural expert of the Chief of
the Civil Administration.
4) In all cases in which it is not possible to coordinate the interests of the Security Police on the one hand, and the
German civil administration on the other, I am to be informed by the fastest route and my decision awaited before
the particular measures in question are carried out.
IV
The Chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen are to report to me continuously on the following matters:
1) Numerical survey of the Jews present in their areas (according to the above classifications, if possible). The
numbers of Jews evacuated from the countryside and of those already in the cities is to be listed separately.
2) Names of the cities which have been designated as concentration centers.
3) The dates set for the Jews to move to the cities.
4) Surveys of all the Jewish [owned] war and other essential industries and enterprises, or those important to the
Four-Year Plan in their areas.
If possible, the following should be specified:
a) Type of enterprise (with a statement on possible conversion to really vital or war-important enterprises or ones
of importance to the Four-Year Plan);
b) Which factories should be most urgently Aryanized (in order to forestall possible losses);
What kind of Aryanization is proposed? Germans or Poles? (the decision to depend on the importance of
the enterprise);
c) The number of Jews working in these factories (specify those in leading positions).
Can operations at the enterprise be continued without difficulty after the removal of the Jews, or will it
be necessary to allocate German or possibly Polish workers in their place? In what numbers?
If Polish workers have to be used care should be taken that they are drawn mainly from the former
German provinces so as to begin to ease the problem there. These matters can be carried out only by means of
coordination with the Labor Offices which have been set up.
V
In order to reach the planned aims, I expect the fullest cooperation of the whole manpower of the Security Policy
and the SD.
The Chiefs of neighboring Einsatzgruppen are to establish contact with each other immediately in order
to cover the areas in question completely.
VI
The High Command of the Army; the Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan (attention: Secretary of State
Neumann), the Reich Ministry for the Interior (attention: State Secretary Stuckart), for Food and the Economy
(attention: State Secretary Landfried), as well as the Chiefs of Civil Administration of the Occupied Territories
have received copies of this decree.
signed Heydrich
102
9.9.3
Instructions for the Deportation of the Jews From the Palatinate (Pfalz), October 1940
Secret
Notes for the Responsible Officials
1. Only full Jews will be deported. Mischlinge, partners in mixed marriages and foreign Jews, as long as they are
not citizens of enemy nations or of areas occupied by us, will be excluded from the Aktion. Stateless Jews will, on
principle, be detained. Every Jew is considered fit to be moved; the only exceptions are Jews who are actually
bedridden.
2. In order to assemble the Jews collection points have been established in... The transport of those who are being
held will be by buses. Every bus will be accompanied by a Crime Police official as transport leader. He will have
with him, according to need, regular police, Gendarmerie or Crime Police. The transport leader is responsible for
the assembly, transport and supervision of his group until the departure of the train from the collection point.
3. Every transport leader will receive a list at the concentration point, noting the bus which he has been allocated,
the police officials who will work with him, and the names and addresses of the persons to be detained. Where the
names of the officials to work with him have not yet been listed they will be inserted later by the transport leader.
4. The transport leader will inform the officials working with him of the names and addresses of the persons to be
detained.
5. When the officials appointed for this purpose have received the personal information on the Jews, they will go
to the homes of those concerned. They will then convey to them that they have been detained in order to be
deported; it is to be pointed out at the same time that they must be ready to move in two hours. Possible queries are
to be communicated to the head of the collection point, who will clarify the issue; no delay in the preparations is to
be permitted.
6. Those who have been detained should take with them, as far as possible:
a) A suitcase or parcel with clothing for each Jew; the weight permitted is 50 kg. for each adult, 30 kg per child.
b) A complete set of clothing.
c) A woollen blanket for every Jew.
d) Food for several days.
e) Utensils for eating and drinking.
f) Up to RM 100 in cash per person.
g) Passports, identity cards or other identification papers. These are not to be packed but to be carried by each
individual.
7. [...]
8. A questionnaire is to be filled in for every head of a family or single Jew, in accordance with the sample
provided, and is to be signed by the official in charge.
9. Attention should be paid to the following before the apartment is vacated:
a) Livestock and other live animals (dogs, cats, cage birds) are to be handed over to the local head official,
chairman of the local farmers association or other suitable person against a receipt.
b) Perishable foodstuffs are to be placed at the disposal of the NSV [Nazi welfare organization].
c) Open fires are to be extinguished.
d) Water and gas supply is to be turned off.
e) Electrical fuses are to be disconnected.
f) The keys to the apartment are to be tied together and provided with a tie-on label with the name, city, street and
number of the house of the owner.
g) As far as possible the persons detained are to be searched before their departure for weapons, ammunition,
explosives, poison, foreign currency, jewellery, etc.
10. After the apartment has been vacated the entrance to the apartment is to be locked by the official and sealed
with the adhesive strip provided for this purpose. The keyhole must be covered by the adhesive strip.
11. After the persons detained have been taken to the bus the official will hand over to the transport leader the
objects or valuables, questionnaires and keys, for delivery at the concentration point.
12. After the transport leader has handed over the detainees at the concentration point he will check the list which
he received, amend it if required, and mark it as having been dealt with.
13. It is absolutely necessary that the Jews will be dealt with in a proper manner when they are detained. Excesses
are in any case to be avoided absolutely. 135
135
P. Sauer, ed., Dokumente ueber die Verfolgung der juedischen Buerger in Baden-Wuerttemberg durch das
nationalsozialistische Regime 1933-1945 ("Documents on the Persecution of the Jewish Citizens of Baden-Wurttemberg by the
National-Socialist Regime 1933-1945"), II, Stuttgart, 1966, pp. 236-237.
103
9.9.4
The Situation of the Jews in Germany in the Summer of 1941
At present, the number of Jews taken for labour service in Berlin is approximately 26,000 (possibly as many as
28,000); of these, 55 percent are males and 45 percent females. In the remainder of the Altreich (Germany before
1938) an addition of probably 25,000 Jews have been conscripted for labour service.
Those employed are men aged 14-60 years and women aged 16-50 years. Where persons are physically
fit these age limits are sometimes exceeded; in most cases such older persons, together with members of the
regular age groups of reduced working capacity, are used for so-called short hours (i.e., low-level auxiliary work
for approximately 40 hours a week), unless they are qualified or specialist workers who can be used in their
trade....
In general, these workers are used only in enterprises in which it is possible to keep them separated from
the Aryan workers, as required by law, which is mainly in industry. A large part, particularly of the women
workers and youth, are employed in the various Siemens enterprises, in several chemical works and enterprises of
the wood industry. In part (as at Siemens) the employment is on the assembling and adjusting, etc., of apparatus
and instruments for airplanes, etc., and in part sorting, packing, loading, etc.
In addition, a fairly large number of men is employed on the building of roads and laying of railway tracks.
Auxiliary workers of both sexes are used to handle goods for forwarding agents and in enterprises for the treating
and re-use of scrap materials, etc.
Only in special cases is use made [of Jews] in small places of work, and usually only specially trained
workers. Recently the City Administration has taken on Jews for street-cleaning. The working time depends on the
occupation and averages 40-55 hours for women and youth per week, and up to 60 hours for men....
The supply of foodstuffs is carried out within the framework of the War Economy Organization on the
basis of the ration cards generally used in the Reich (marked with the letter J); it is regularly announced in the
Jüdisches Nachrichtenblatt when the ration cards intended for Jewish households must be collected from the
various offices concerned. There is no central office for the issuing of ration-cards to Jews, and this would be
difficult to carry out owing to the large distances involved and the wide scattering of Jewish residences. Jews are
permitted to visit the ration-card offices for other purposes only once a week (for several hours set in the late
afternoon). Purchases may be made in any retail store between 16.00 and 17.00 hours daily....
There are no other restrictions concerning sources of supply, but, particularly in certain parts of the city
(such as the West, which is heavily populated by Jews), the number of stores is constantly increasing that will not
sell to Jews, with the result that there is an automatic concentration on some (usually large) stores. It is
increasingly common for announcements to be displayed in food stores that goods not on ration or in short supply
are not sold to Jews. As regards the re-soling and repair of shoes, which is linked to the Reich Clothes Ration-Card
for the rest of the population, an arrangement has been made to the effect that Jews may apply only to one
enterprise (Repair Station ALSI), which has branches in all parts of the city....
The Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland set up by the Implementation Order to the Reich
Citizenship Law created an organization for the Jewish population which, on the one hand, established obligatory
membership in place of the former customary voluntary adherence to local religious associations; and, on the
other, extended the organization to the total stratum of persons who are to be considered as Jews in the sense of the
Reich Citizenship Law, and is thus in a position to operate as an organization representing all Jews. At the same
time there are clear indications of a maximum possible centralization of Jewish organizations. Where the
predecessor of the Reichsvereinigung, the Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland, was a federal roof
organization for Jewish organizations in the Länder, the former separate bearers of the Reichsvertretung now
become branches of the Reichsvereinigung....
The number of places of religious accommodation has not been greatly reduced in the recent period. At
present there are 11 synagogues and prayer houses available in Berlin; in addition, most closed institutions (in
particular the Old Age Homes) have synagogues, but these are intended only for the inmates. As in other areas of
Jewish settlement in the Altreich, Berlin also has representatives of the various types of rites formerly common
(Conservative, Liberal, Reform, etc.). The synagogues have in part remained in their former locations, and in part
halls in school buildings or other public institutions of the Jewish community are used.
The religious personnel has been given up completely as a result of economy measures. Some are employed in
other administrative departments of the Community, so that the performance of their religious functions has now
become an additional occupation. Others, younger volunteer functionaries (including rabbis), have been taken for
labour service.
Expenditure for religious purposes is minimal, consisting of RM 7,000 per month...for the whole Altreich.136
136
Leo Baeck Institute, Jerusalem. From a report dated August 18, 1941, by Robert Prochnik, Vienna Jewish Community
104
9.9.5
Göring’s to Heydrich on Plans for the ‘Final Solution of the Jewish Problem’, 31July, 1941137
To the Chief of the Security Police and the SD,
SS Gruppenführer Heydrich
Berlin
In completion of the task which was entrusted to you in the Edict dated January 24, 1939, of solving the Jewish
question by means of emigration or evacuation in the most convenient way possible, given the present conditions, I
herewith charge you with making all necessary preparations with regard to organizational, practical and financial
aspects for an overall solution (Gesamtlösung) of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe.
Insofar as the competencies of other central organizations are affected, these are to be involved.
I further charge you with submitting to me promptly an overall plan of the preliminary organizational, practical
and financial measures for the execution of the intended final solution (Endlösung) of the Jewish question.
Göring
9.9.6
Hans Frank on the Extermination of the Jews, 16 December 1941138
...One way or another, I will tell you that quite openly - we must finish off the Jews. The Führer put it into words
once: should united Jewry again succeed in setting off a world war, then the blood sacrifice shall not be made only
by the peoples driven into war, but then the Jew of Europe will have met his end. I know that there is criticism of
many of the measures now applied to the Jews in the Reich. There are always deliberate attempts to speak again
and again of cruelty, harshness, etc.; this emerges from the reports on the popular mood. I appeal to you: before I
now continue speaking first agree with me on a formula: we will have pity, on principle, only for the German
people, and for nobody else in the world. The others had no pity for us either. As an old National-Socialist I must
also say that if the pack of Jews (Judensippschaft) were to survive the war in Europe while we sacrifice the best of
our blood for the preservation of Europe, then this war would still be only a partial success. I will therefore, on
principle, approach Jewish affairs in the expectation that the Jews will disappear. They must go. I have started
negotiations for the purpose of having them pushed off to the East. In January there will be a major conference on
this question in Berlin, to which I shall send State Secretary Dr. Buehler. The conference is to be held in the office
of SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich at the Reich Security Main Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt). A major
Jewish migration will certainly begin.
But what should be done with the Jews? Can you believe that they will be accommodated in settlements in the
Ostland? In Berlin we were told: why are you making all this trouble? We don't want them either, not in the
Ostland nor in the Reichskommissariat; liquidate them yourselves! Gentlemen, I must ask you to steel yourselves
against all considerations of compassion. We must destroy the Jews wherever we find them, and wherever it is at
all possible, in order to maintain the whole structure of the Reich... The views that were acceptable up to now
cannot be applied to such gigantic, unique events. In any case we must find a way that will lead us to our goal, and
I have my own ideas on this.
The Jews are also exceptionally harmful feeders for us. In the Government-General we have approximately 2.5
million [Jews], and now perhaps 3.5 million together with persons who have Jewish kin, and so on. We cannot
shoot these 3.5 million Jews, we cannot poison them, but we will be able to take measures that will lead somehow
to successful destruction; and this in connection with the large-scale procedures which are to be discussed in the
Reich. The Government-General must become as free of Jews as the Reich. Where and how this is to be done is
the affair of bodies which we will have to appoint and create, and on whose work I will report to you when the
time comes....
137
138
Nuremberg Document PS-710.
Nuremberg Document PS-2233.
105
9.9.7
The Wannsee Protocol139
Reich Secret Document
30 Copies
Protocol of Conference
I. The following took part in the conference on the final solution (Endloesung) of the Jewish question held on
January 20, 1942, in Berlin, Am Grossen Wannsee No. 56-58:
Gauleiter Dr. Meyer and Reich Reich Ministry for the Occupied
Office Director Dr. Leibbrandt Eastern Territories
Secretary of State Dr. Stuckart Reich Ministry of the Interior
Secretary of State Neumann Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan
Secretary of State Dr. Freisler Reich Minister of Justice
Secretary of State Dr. Buehler Office of the Governor General
Undersecretary of State Foreign Ministry Dr. Luther
SS OberFührer Klopfer Party Chancellery
Ministerial Director Kritzinger Reich Chancellery
SS GruppenFührer Hofmann Race and Settlement Main Office
SS GruppenFührer Mueller Reich Security Main Office
SS ObersturmbannFührer Reich Security Main Office Eichmann
SS OberFührer Dr. Schoengarth, Security Police and SD
Commander of the Security
Police and the SD in the
Government-General
SS SturmbannFührer Dr. Lange, Security Police and SD
Commander of the Security Police and the SD in the Generalbezirk Latvia as representative of the Commander of
the Security Police and the SD for the Reichskommissariat for the Ostland
II. The meeting opened with the announcement by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, SS
ObergruppenFührer Heydrich, of his appointment by the Reich Marshal1* as Plenipotentiary for the Preparation
of the Final Solution of the European Jewish Question.2* He noted that this Conference had been called in order to
obtain clarity on questions of principle. The Reich Marshals request for a draft plan concerning the organizational,
practical and economic aspects of the final solution of the European Jewish question required prior joint
consideration by all central agencies directly involved in these questions, with a view to maintaining parallel
policy lines.
Responsibility for the handling of the final solution of the Jewish question, he said, would lie centrally with the
ReichsFührer SS and the Chief of the German Police (Chief of the Security Police and the SD), without regard to
geographic boundaries.
The Chief of the Security Police and the SD then gave a brief review of the struggle conducted up to now against
this foe.
The most important elements are:
a) Forcing the Jews out of the various areas of life (Lebensgebiete) of the German people.
b) Forcing the Jews out of the living space (Lebensraum) of the German people.
In pursuit of these aims, the accelerated emigration of the Jews from the area of the Reich, as the only possible
provisional solution, was pressed forward and carried out according to plan.
On instructions by the Reich Marshal, a Reich Central Office for Jewish Emigration 3* was set up in January 1939,
and its direction entrusted to the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. Its tasks were, in particular:
a) To take all measures for the preparation of increased emigration of the Jews;
b) To direct the flow of emigration;
c) To speed up emigration in individual cases.
The aim of this task was to cleanse the German living space of Jews in a legal manner.
The disadvantages engendered by such forced pressing of emigration were clear to all the authorities. But in the
absence of other possible solutions, they had to be accepted for the time being.
In the period that followed, the handling of emigration was not a German problem alone, but one with which the
authorities of the countries of destination or immigration also had to deal. Financial difficulties such as increases
ordered by the various foreign governments in the sums of money that immigrants were required to have and in
landing fees as well as lack of berths on ships and continually tightening restrictions or bans on immigration,
hampered emigration efforts very greatly. Despite these difficulties a total of approximately 537,000 Jews were
caused to emigrate between the [Nazi] assumption of power and up to October 31, 1941.
These consisted of the following:
From January 30, 1933: from the Altreich Approx. 360,000
[Germany before 1938]
From March 15, 1938: from the Ostmark Approx. 147,000
[Austria]
139
Nuremberg Document NG-2586-G
106
From March 15, 1939: from the Protectorate Approx. 30,000
of Bohemia and Moravia
The financing of the emigration was carried out by the Jews or Jewish political organizations themselves. To
prevent the remaining behind of proletarianized Jews, the principle was observed that wealthy Jews must finance
the emigration of the Jews without means; to this end, a special assessment or emigration levy, in accordance with
wealth owned, was imposed, the proceeds being used to meet the financial obligations of the emigration of
destitute Jews.
In addition to the funds raised in German marks, foreign currency was needed for the monies which emigrants
were required to show on arrival abroad and for landing fees. To conserve the German holdings of foreign
currency, Jewish financial institutions abroad were persuaded by Jewish organizations in this country to make
themselves responsible for finding the required sums in foreign currency. A total of about $9,500,000 was
provided by these foreign Jews as gifts up to October 30, 1941.
In the meantime, in view of the dangers of emigration in war-time, and the possibilities in the East, the
ReichsFührer SS and Chief of the German Police has forbidden the emigration of Jews. 4*
III. Emigration has now been replaced by evacuation of the Jews to the East, as a further possible solution, with the
appropriate prior authorization by the Führer .
However, this operation should be regarded only as a provisional option; but it is already supplying practical
experience of great significance in view of the coming final solution of the Jewish question.
In the course of this final solution of the European Jewish question approximately 11 million Jews may be taken
into consideration, distributed over the individual countries as follows:
Country Number
A. Altreich 131,800
Ostmark 43,700
Eastern Territories5 420,000
Government-General 284,000
Bialystok 400,000
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 74,200
Estonia free of Jews
Latvia 3,500
Lithuania 34,000
Belgium 43,000
Denmark 5,600
France: Occupied territory 165,000
France: Unoccupied territory 700,000
Greece 69,600
Netherlands 160,800
Norway 1,300
B. Bulgaria 48,000
England 330,000
Finland 2,300
Ireland 4,000
Italy, including Sardinia 58,000
Albania 200
Croatia 40,000
Portugal 3,000
Rumania, including Bessarabia 342,000
Sweden 8,000
Switzerland 18,000
Serbia 10,000
Slovakia 88,000
Spain 6,000
Turkey (in Europe) 55,500
Hungary 742,800
U.S.S.R 5,000,000
Ukraine 2,994,684
Byelorussia, without Bialystok 446,484
Total: over 11,000,000
As far as the figures for Jews of the various foreign countries are concerned, the numbers given include only Jews
by religion (Glaubensjuden), since the definition of Jews according to racial principles is in part still lacking there.
Owing to the prevailing attitudes and concepts, the handling of this problem in the individual countries will
encounter certain difficulties, especially in Hungary and Rumania. For instance, in Rumania the Jew can still
obtain, for money, documents officially certifying that he holds foreign citizenship.
The influence of the Jews in all spheres of life in the U.S.S.R. is well known. There are about 5 million Jews in
European Russia, and barely another 250,000 in Asiatic Russia.
107
The distribution of Jews according to occupation in the European area of the U.S.S.R. was roughly as follows:
Agriculture 9.1%
Urban workers 14.8%
Trade 20.0%
State employees 23.4%
Professions medicine, press, theatre, etc. 32.7%
Under appropriate direction the Jews are to be utilized for work in the East in an expedient manner in the course of
the final solution. In large (labour) columns, with the sexes separated, Jews capable of work will be moved into
these areas as they build roads, during which a large proportion will no doubt drop out through natural reduction.
The remnant that eventually remains will require suitable treatment; because it will without doubt represent the
most [physically] resistant part, it consists of a natural selection that could, on its release, become the germ-cell of
a new Jewish revival. (Witness the experience of history.)
Europe is to be combed through from West to East in the course of the practical implementation of the final
solution. The area of the Reich, including the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, will have to be handled in
advance, if only because of the housing problem and other socio-political needs.
The evacuated Jews will first be taken, group by group, to so-called transit ghettos, in order to be transported
further east from there.
An important precondition, SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich noted further, for the carrying out of the evacuation
in general is the precise determination of the groups of persons involved. It is intended not to evacuate Jews over
65 years old, but to place them in an old-age ghetto Theresienstadt is being considered.
In addition to these age groups about 30% of the 280,000 Jews who were present in the Altreich and the Ostmark
on October 31, 1941, were over 65 years old Jews with severe war injuries and Jews with war decorations (Iron
Cross, First Class) will be admitted to the Jewish old-age ghetto. This suitable solution will eliminate at one blow
the many applications for exceptions.
The start of the individual major evacuation Aktionen will depend largely on military developments. With regard to
the handling of the final solution in the European areas occupied by us and under our influence, it was proposed
that the officials dealing with this subject in the Foreign Ministry should confer with the appropriate experts in the
Security Police and the SD.
In Slovakia and Croatia the matter is no longer too difficult, as the most essential, central problems in this respect
have already been brought to a solution there. In Rumania the government has in the meantime also appointed a
Plenipotentiary for Jewish Affairs. In order to settle the problem in Hungary, it will be necessary in the near future
to impose an adviser for Jewish questions on the Hungarian Government.
With regard to setting in motion preparations for the settling of the problem in Italy, SS ObergruppenFührer
Heydrich considers liaison with the Police Chief in these matters would be in place.
In occupied and unoccupied France the rounding-up of the Jews for evacuation will, in all probability, be carried
out without great difficulties.
On this point, Undersecretary of State Luther stated that far-reaching treatment of this problem would meet with
difficulties in some countries, such as the Nordic States, and that it was therefore advisable to postpone action in
these countries for the present. In view of the small number of Jews involved there, the postponement will in any
case not occasion any significant curtailment. On the other hand, the Foreign Ministry foresees no great difficulties
for the southeast and west of Europe.
SS Gruppenführer Hofmann intends to send a specialist from the Main Office for Race and Settlement to Hungary
for general orientation when the subject is taken in hand there by the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. It
was decided that this specialist from the Race and Settlement Main Office, who is not to take an active part, will
temporarily be designated officially as Assistant to the Police Attaché.
IV. In the implementation of the plan for the final solution, the Nuremberg Laws are to form the basis, 6* as it
were; a precondition for the total clearing up of the problem will also require solutions for the question of mixed
marriages and Mischlinge.
The Chief of the Security Police and the SD then discussed the following points, theoretically for the time being, in
connection with a letter from the Chief of the Reich Chancellery:
1. Treatment of first-degree Mischlinge
First-degree Mischlinge are in the same position as Jews with
respect to the final solution of the Jewish question. The
following will be exempt from this treatment:
a) First-degree Mischlinge married to persons of German
blood, from whose marriages there are children (seconddegree Mischlinge). Such second-degree Mischlinge are
essentially in the same position as Germans.
b) First-degree Mischlinge for whom up to now exceptions
were granted in some (vital) area by the highest authorities
of the Party and the State. Each individual case must be reexamined, and it is not excluded that the new decision will
again be in favour of the Mischlinge.
The grounds for granting an exception must always, as a
matter of principle, be the deserts of the Mischling himself (not the merits of the parent or spouse of German
blood.)
108
The first-degree Mischling exempted from evacuation will be sterilized in order to obviate progeny and to settle
the Mischling problem for good. Sterilization is voluntary, but it is the condition for remaining in the Reich. The
sterilized Mischling is subsequently free of all restrictive regulations to which he was previously subject.
2. Treatment of second-degree Mischlinge
Second-degree Mischlinge are on principle classed with persons of German blood, with the exception of the
following cases, in which the second-degree Mischlinge are considered
equivalent to Jews:
a) Descent of the second-degree Mischling from a bastard
marriage (both spouses being Mischlinge).
b) Racially especially unfavourable appearance of the seconddegree Mischling, which will class him with the Jews on external grounds alone.
c) Especially bad police and political rating of the second-degree Mischling, indicating that he feels and behaves as
a Jew.
Even in these cases exceptions are not to be made if the second-degree Mischling is married to a person of German
blood.
3. Marriages between full Jews and persons of German blood
Here it must be decided from case to case whether the Jewish spouse should be evacuated or whether he or she
should be sent to an old-age ghetto in consideration of the effect of the measure on the German relatives of the
mixed couple.
4. Marriages between first-degree Mischlinge and persons of
German blood
a) Without children
If there are no children of the marriage, the first-degree Mischling is evacuated or sent to an old-age ghetto. (The
same treatment as in marriages between full Jews and persons of German blood, [see] para. 3.)
b) With children
If there are children of the marriage (second-degree Mischlinge), they will be evacuated or sent to a ghetto,
together with the first-degree Mischlinge, if they are considered equivalent to Jews. Where such children are
considered equivalent to persons of German blood (the rule), they and also the first-degree Mischling are to be
exempted from evacuation.
5. Marriages between first-degree Mischlinge and first-degree
Mischlinge or Jews
In such marriages all parties (including children) are treated
as Jews and therefore evacuated or sent to an old-age ghetto.
6. Marriages between first-degree Mischlinge and seconddegree Mischlinge
Both partners to the marriage, regardless of whether or not there are children, are evacuated or sent to an old-age
ghetto, since children of such marriages commonly are seen to have a stronger admixture of Jewish blood than the
second-degree Jewish Mischlinge.
SS Gruppenführer Hofmann is of the opinion that extensive use must be made of sterilization, as the Mischling,
given the choice of evacuation or sterilization, would prefer to accept sterilization.
Secretary of State Dr. Stuckart noted that in this form the practical aspects of the possible solutions proposed
above for the settling of the children of mixed marriages and Mischlinge would entail endless administrative work.
In order to take the biological realities into account, at any rate, Secretary of State Dr. Stuckart proposed a move in
the direction of compulsory sterilization.
To simplify the problem of the Mischlinge further possibilities should be considered, with the aim that the
Legislator should rule something like: "These marriages are dissolved."
As to the question of the effect of the evacuation of the Jews on the economy, Secretary of State Neumann stated
that Jews employed in essential war industries could not be evacuated for the present, as long as no replacements
were available.
SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich pointed out that those Jews would not be evacuated in any case, in accordance
with the directives approved by him for the implementation of the current evacuation Aktion.
Secretary of State Dr. Buehler put on record that the Government-General would welcome it if the final solution of
this problem was begun in the Government-General, as, on the one hand, the question of transport there played no
major role and considerations of labor supply would not hinder the course of this Aktion. Jews must be removed as
fast as possible from the Government-General, because it was there in particular that the Jew as carrier of
epidemics spelled a great danger, and, at the same time, he caused constant disorder in the economic structure of
the country by his continuous black-market dealings. Furthermore, of the approximately 2½ million Jews under
consideration, the majority were in any case unfit for work.
Secretary of State Dr. Buehler further states that the solution of the Jewish question in the Government-General
was primarily the responsibility of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD and that his work would have the
support of the authorities of the Government-General. He had only one request: that the Jewish question in this
area be solved as quickly as possible.
In conclusion, there was a discussion of the various possible forms which the solution might take, and here both
Gauleiter Dr. Meyer and Secretary of State Dr. Buehler were of the opinion that certain preparatory work for the
final solution should be carried out locally in the area concerned, but that, in doing so, alarm among the population
must be avoided.
109
The conference concluded with the request of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD to the participants at the
conference to give him the necessary support in carrying out the tasks of the [final] solution.
9.10.
Genocide
9.10.1
Rudolf Höss, Commander of the Auschwitz Extermination Camp on Mass Killings140
In the summer of 1941, I cannot remember the exact date, I was suddenly summoned to the Reichsfuhrer SS,
directly by his adjutant's office. Contrary to his usual custom, Himmler received me without his adjutant being
present and said in effect:
"The Fuhrer has ordered that the Jewish question be solved once and for all and that we, the SS, are to implement
that order.
The existing extermination centres in the East are not in a position to carry out the large Aktionen which are
anticipated. I have therefore earmarked Auschwitz for this purpose, both because of its good position as regards
communications and because the are can easily be isolated and camouflaged. At first I thought of calling in a
senior SS officer for this job, but I changed my mind in order to avoid difficulties concerning the terms of
reference. I have now decided to entrust this task to you. It is difficult and onerous and calls for complete devotion
notwithstanding the difficulties that may arise. You will learn further details from Sturmbannführer Eichmann of
the Reich Security Main Office who will call on you in the immediate future.
The departments concerned will be notified by me in due course. You will treat this order as absolutely secret,
even from your superiors. After you talk with Eichmann you will immediately forward to me the plans for the
projected installations.
The Jews are the sworn enemies of the German people and must be eradicated. Every Jew that we can lay our
hands on is to be destroyed now during the war, without exception. If we cannot now obliterate the biological basis
of Jewry, the Jews will one day destroy the German people."
On receiving these grave instructions, I returned forthwith to Auschwitz, without reporting to my superior at
Oranienburg.
Shortly afterwards Eichmann came to Auschwitz and disclosed to me the plans for the operations as they affected
the various countries concerned. I cannot remember the exact order in which they were to take place. First was to
come the eastern part of Upper Silesia and the neighbouring parts of Polish territory under German rule, then,
depending on the situation, simultaneously Jews from Germany and Czechoslovakia, and finally the Jews from the
West: France, Belgium and Holland. He also told me the approximate number of transports that might be expected,
but I can no longer remember these.
We discussed the ways and means of effecting the extermination. This could only be done by gassing, since it
would have been absolutely impossible to dispose by shooting of the large numbers of people that were expected,
and it would have placed too heavy a burden on the SS men who had to carry it out, especially because of the
women and children among the victims.
Eichman told me about the method of killing people with exhaust gases in lorries,** which had previously been
used in the East. But there was no question of being able to use this for the mass transports that were due to arrive
in Auschwitz. Killing with showers of carbon monoxide while bathing, as was done with mental patients in some
places in the Reich, would necessitate too many buildings and it was also very doubtful whether the supply of gas
for such a vast number of people would be available. We left the matter unresolved. Eichmann decided to try and
find a gas which was in ready supply and which would not entail special installations for its use, and to inform me
when he had done so. We inspected the area in order to choose a likely spot. We decided that a peasant farmstead
situated in the north-west corner of what later became the third building sector at Birkenau would be the most
suitable. It was isolated and screened by woods and hedges, and it was also not far from the railway. The bodies
could be placed in long, deep pits dug in the nearby meadows. We had not at that time thought of burning the
corpses. We calculated that after gas-proofing the premises then available, it would be possible to kill about 800
people simultaneously with a suitable gas. These figures were borne out later in practice.
Eichman could not then give me the starting date for the operation because everything was still in the preliminary
stages and the Reichsfuhrer SS had not yet issued the necessary orders.
Eichman returned to Berlin to report our conversation to the Reichsfuhrer SS.
A few days later I sent to the Reichsfuhrer SS by courier a detailed location plan and description of the installation.
I have never received an acknowledgement or a decision on my report. Eichmann told me later that the
Reichsfuhrer SS was in agreement with my proposals...
140
R. Höss, Commandant of Auschwitz The Autobiography of Rudolf Höss, London, 1961, pp. 206-208.
110
9.10.2
Solution of the Jewish Problem in the District of Galicia141
Owing to the phrase ‘Galician Jew,’ Galicia was probably the small corner on earth most known and most
frequently mentioned in connection with the Jews. Here they lived in great, compact multitudes, forming a world
of their own, from which the rest of world Jewry renewed its population continuously. Jews were to be met with in
their hundreds of thousands in all parts of Galicia.
According to old statistics dating back to 1931, there were then about 502,000 Jews. This number is unlikely to
have diminished in the period between 1931 and the summer of 1941. There are no precise figures for the number
of Jews present when the German troops marched into Galicia. The figure of 350,000 was given by the Judenräte
of Galicia for the end of the year 1941. That this figure was incorrect can be seen from the records concerning
evacuation appended to this report. The city of Lvov alone housed about 160,000 Jews in the months of JulyAugust 1941....
Our first measure was to identify every Jew by means of a white armlet with the blue Star of David. In accordance
with a decree issued by the Governor General, the Interior Administration was responsible for the identifying and
registration of the Jews, as well as setting up the Judenrate.1* Our task as police was first of all to fight effectively
against the immense black market operated by the Jews all over the District. Energetic measures also had to be
taken against idlers loafing around and against do-nothings.
The best means for this was the establishment of Forced Labour Camps by the SS and Police Leader. There was,
first of all, work on the urgently needed reconstruction of [highway] Dg. 4., which was extremely important for the
entire southern section of the Front and which was in catastrophically bad condition. On October 15, 1941, a start
was made on the building of camps along the railroad tracks, and after a few weeks, despite considerable
difficulties, 7 camps had been put up, containing 4,000 Jews. More camps soon followed, so that in a very short
period of time the completion of 15 such camps could be reported to the Higher SS and Police Leader. About
20,000 Jewish laborers passed through these camps in the course of time. Despite all conceivable difficulties that
turned up on this project, about 160 km. have now been completed.
At the same time all other Jews who were fit for work were registered by the Labour Offices and directed to useful
work. Both when the Jews were identified with the Star of David and when they were registered by the Labour
Offices, the first indications were noted that the Jews were trying to evade the orders issued by the Authorities.
The control measures carried out as a result led to thousands of arrests. It became increasingly apparent that the
Civil Administration was not in a position to move the Jewish problem to an even reasonably satisfactory solution.
Because repeated attempts of the City Administration of Lvov, for instance, to move the Jews into a Jewish
quarter, failed, this question, too, was solved by the SS and Police Leader and his organizations. This measure had
become all the more urgent because in the winter of 1941 centres of typhus infection had appeared all over the
city, endangering not only the local population but, even more, the German troops either stationed in the city or
passing through....
Owing to the peculiarity that almost 90 percent of the artisans in Galicia consisted of Jews, the problem to be
solved could only be carried out gradually, as an immediate removal of the Jews would not have been in the
interest of the war economy. Not that one could observe that those Jews who were working made any special
contribution by their work. Their place of work was often only a means to an end for them: firstly, to escape the
sharper measures taken against the Jews; and, secondly, to be able to carry out their black-market dealings without
interruption. Only continuous police intervention could prevent these activities. Draconic measures had to be
introduced by us after it was noted in increasing numbers of cases that the Jews had succeeded in making
themselves indispensable to their employers by provided goods in short supply, etc. It is very sad to have to note
that the wildest black-market deals with the Jews were made by Germans who were brought here, and in particular
those in the so-called "operating firms" (Einsatszfirmen) or the "ill-reputed trustees" (berüchtigte Treuhander),
both of which operated Jewish firms taken from their owners. Cases were known where Jews seeking to obtain
some kind of working certificate not only did not ask for pay from their employers but paid regularly themselves.
In addition, Jewish "organizing"2* on behalf of their "employers" reached such catastrophic dimensions that
energetic action had to be taken in the interest of the reputation of the German people.
As the Administration was not in the position to overcome this chaos, and proved weak, the whole issue of Jewish
labor simply taken over by the SS and Police Leader. The existing Jewish Labour Offices, which were staffed by
hundreds of Jews, were dissolved. All work certificates issued by firms and official employers were declared
invalid, and the cards given to Jews by the Labour Offices revalidated by the Police.
In the course of this Aktion thousands of Jews were again caught in possession of forged certificates or labor
certificates obtained fraudulently by means of all kinds of excuses. These Jews were also sent for special treatment
(Sonderbehandlung). The Wehrmacht authorities in particular aided the Jewish parasites by issuing special
certificates without proper control... There were cases where Jews were caught with from 10 to 20 such
certificates. When Jews were arrested in the course of further checks, most of the employers felt obliged to attempt
to intervene in favor of the Jews. This was often done in a manner that can only be described as deeply shameful....
Despite all these measures for the regulation of Jewish labour, a start was made in April 1942 on the evacuation of
Jews3* from the District of Galicia, and this was carried out steadily.
When the Higher SS and Police Leader again intervened in the Jewish question in general on November 10, 1942,
and a Police Order was issued for the formation of Jewish quarters, 254,989 Jews had already been evacuated or
resettled. Since the Higher SS and Police Leader gave further instructions to accelerate the total evacuation of the
Jews, further considerable work was necessary in order to catch those Jews who were, for the time being, to be left
141
Yad Vashem, Doc. 159
111
in the armaments factories. These remaining Jews were declared labour prisoners of the Higher SS and Police
Leader and held either in the factories themselves or in camps erected for this purpose. For Lvov itself a large
camp4* was erected on the outskirts, which holds 8,000 Jewish labour prisoners at the present time. The agreement
made with the Wehrmacht concerning employment and treatment of the labour prisoners was set down in writing...
In the meantime further evacuation was carried out vigorously, with the result that by June 23, 1943, all Jewish
quarters could be dissolved. Apart from the Jews in camps under the control of the SS and Police Leader, the
District of Galicia is thus free of Jews (judenfrei).
Individual Jews occasionally picked up by the Order Police or the Gendarmerie were sent for special treatment.
Altogether, 434,329 Jews had been evacuated up to June 27, 1943.... [This is followed by a list of 21 camps in
which there were still 21,156 Jews.]
Together with the evacuation Aktionen Jewish property was collected. Valuables were secured and handed over to
the Special Staff "Reinhard." Apart from furniture and large quantities of textiles, etc., the following were
confiscated and delivered to Special Staff "Reinhard":
As of June 30, 1943:
25.580 kg. copper coins
53.190 " nickel coins
97.581 " gold coins
82.600 " silver chains
6.640 " chains, gold
4.326.780 " broken silver
167.740 " silver coins
18.490 " iron coins
20.050 " brass coins
20.952 " wedding rings gold
22.740 " pearls
11.730 " gold teeth bridges
28.200 " powder compacts silver or other metal
44.655 " broken gold
482.900 " silver flatware
343.100 " cigarette cases silver and other metal
20.880 kg. rings, gold, with stones
39.917 " brooches, earrings, etc.
18.02 " rings, silver
6.166 " pocket watches, various
3.133 " pocket watches, silver
3.425 " wrist watches silver
1.256 " wrist watches gold
2.892 " pocket watches gold
68 cameras
98 binoculars
7 stamp collections complete
5 travel baskets of loose stamps
100.500 " 3 sacks of rings, jewelry not genuine
3.290 " 1 box corals
0.460 " 1 case corals
0.280 " 1 case corals
7.495 " 1 suitcase of fountain pens and propelling pencils
1 travel basket of fountain pens and propelling pencils
1 suitcase of cigarette lighters
1 suitcase of pocket knives
1 trunk of watch parts
Currency: Bank Notes and Metal [this is followed by a
Detailed list of coins and bank notes of various
Kinds]....
There were also other immense difficulties during the Aktionen as the Jews tried to avoid evacuation by all
possible means. They not only tried to escape, and concealed themselves in the most improbable places, drainage
canals, chimneys, even in sewage pits, etc. They barricaded themselves in catacombs of passages, in cellars made
into bunkers, in holes in the earth, in cunningly contrived hiding places, in attics and sheds, inside furniture, etc.
As the number of Jews still remaining decreased their resistance became the greater. They used weapons of all
types for their defence, and in particular those of Italian origin. The Jews bought these Italian weapons from Italian
soldiers stationed in the district in exchange for large sums in zlotys....
Subterranean bunkers were discovered which had cleverly concealed entrances, some in the flats, and some out of
doors. In most cases the entrance to the bunker was only just large enough for one person to slip through. The
entrances to the bunkers were so well hidden that they could not be found if one did not know where to look....
112
Owing to increasingly grave reports of the growing arming of the Jews, the sharpest possible measures were taken
for the elimination of Jewish banditry in all parts of the District of Galicia in the last two weeks of June 1943.
Special measures were needed for the breaking up of the Jewish quarter in Lvov, where the bunkers described
above had been installed. In order to avoid losses to German forces, brutal measures had to be taken from the
outset; several houses were blown up or destroyed by fire. The astonishing result was that in place of the 12,000
Jews registered a total of 20,000 were caught....
9.10.3
From a Speech by Himmler before Senior SS Officers in Poznan, October 4, 1943 142
I also want to speak to you here, in complete frankness, of a really grave chapter. Amongst ourselves, for once, it
shall be said quite openly, but all the same we will never speak about it in public. Just as we did not hesitate on
June 30, 1934,* to do our duty as we were ordered, and to stand comrades who had erred against the wall and
shoot them, and we never spoke about it and we never will speak about it. It was a matter of natural tact that is
alive in us, thank God, that we never talked about it amongst ourselves, that we never discussed it. Each of us
shuddered and yet each of us knew clearly that the next time he would do it again if it were an order, and if it were
necessary.
I am referring here to the evacuation of the Jews, the extermination of the Jewish people. This is one of the things
that is easily said: "The Jewish people are going to be exterminated," that's what every Party member says, "sure,
it's in our program, elimination of the Jews, extermination - it'll be done." And then they all come along, the 80
million worthy Germans, and each one has his one decent Jew. Of course, the others are swine, but this one, he is a
first-rate Jew. Of all those who talk like that, not one has seen it happen, not one has had to go through with it.
Most of you men know what it is like to see 100 corpses side by side, or 500 or 1,000. To have stood fast through
this and except for cases of human weakness to have stayed decent, that has made us hard. This is an unwritten and
never-to-be-written page of glory in our history, for we know how difficult it would be for us if today under
bombing raids and the hardships and deprivations of war if we were still to have the Jews in every city as secret
saboteurs, agitators, and inciters. If the Jews were still lodged in the body of the German nation, we would
probably by now have reached the stage of 1916-17.
The wealth they possessed we took from them. I gave a strict order, which has been carried out by SS
Obergruppenführer Pohl, that this wealth will of course be turned over to the Reich in its entirety. We have taken
none of it for ourselves. Individuals who have erred will be punished in accordance with the order given by me at
the start, threatening that anyone who takes as much as a single Mark of this money is a dead man. A number of
SS men they are not very many committed this offence, and they shall die. There will be no mercy. We had the
moral right, we had the duty towards our people, to destroy this people that wanted to destroy us. But we do not
have the right to enrich ourselves by so much as a fur, as a watch, by one Mark or a cigarette or anything else. We
do not want, in the end, because we destroyed a bacillus, to be infected by this bacillus and to die. I will never
stand by and watch while even a small rotten spot develops or takes hold. Wherever it may form we will together
burn it away. All in all, however, we can say that we have carried out this most difficult of tasks in a spirit of love
for our people. And we have suffered no harm to our inner being, our soul, our character....
142
Nuremberg Document PS-1919.
113
9.10.4
Eyewitness Report from Treblinka143
...I stood in the line opposite my house in Wolynska Street, and from there we were taken to Zamenhof Street. The
Ukrainians divided up the loot amongst themselves before our eyes. They fought amongst themselves, valued and
sorted everything. Despite the great number of people there was silence in the street. A silent and cruel despair fell
upon all. Oh what despair it was! They photographed us as though we were animals from before the Flood. There
were also some who remained calm. I myself hoped that we would go home again. I thought they would check our
documents. An order was given, and we moved off from our places. Woe to us! The naked truth was revealed
before our eyes. Railway cars. Cars that were empty. That day was a fine, hot summer's day. It seemed as though
the sun was protesting against the injustice. What was the guilt of our wives, our children, our mothers? What was
it? The sun disappeared behind thick clouds. It is beautiful, warms and shines and does not wish to witness our
suffering and humiliation.
An order is given to get into the cars. Eighty are pushed into each car. The way back is sealed off. I had on my
body only trousers, a shirt and shoes. A backpack with other things and high boots had stayed at home. I had
prepared it because there were rumors that we would be sent to the Ukraine for work. The train was shunted from
one siding to another. I knew this rail junction well and realized that we were staying in the same place.
Meanwhile we could hear the Ukrainians amusing themselves, the sound of their shouting and cheerful laughter
reaching us. It was becoming increasingly suffocating inside the car, and from minute to minute there was less air
to breathe; it was all despair, blackness and horror... With indescribable suffering we finally arrived at Malkinia.
We stopped there all night. Ukrainians came into the car and demanded valuables. Everybody gave them up in
order to preserve their lives a little while longer.
...In the morning the train moved and we reached Treblinka station. I saw a train that passed us and in it people
who were hungry, ragged and half naked. They said something to us but we did not understand them. The day was
burning hot. The lack of air was terrible. As a result we were very thirsty. I looked out of the window. The
peasants brought water and charged 100 zloty for each bottle. I had no money, apart from 10 gold coins. Also a 2,
a 5 and a 10 in silver, with a portrait of the Marshal, that I had kept as a memento. So I was forced to do without
water. Others bought it. They paid 500 zloty for a kilogram of black bread. I was tortured by thirst until midday.
Then the future HauptsturmFührer came in and picked 10 men who brought us water. I assuaged my thirst a little.
An order was given to take out the dead, but there were none. At four in the afternoon the train moved off. We
arrived at Treblinka in a few minutes. It was only there that the blinkers dropped from our eyes. Ukrainians with
rifles and machine-guns stood on the roofs of the huts. The whole area was strewn with bodies, some dressed and
some naked. Their faces were distorted with fear and horror. They were black and swollen. Their eyes were frozen
wide open. Their tongues hung out, brains were spattered around and the bodies twisted. There was blood
everywhere. Our innocent blood. The blood of our children, our brothers and sisters. The blood of our fathers and
mothers. And we are without hope, we realize that we will not escape our fate....
There is an order to get out of the cars. Belongings are to be left behind. We are taken into the yard. There were
two large notice boards with orders to hand over gold, silver, precious stones and all valuables. Failure to do so
would bring the death penalty. On the roofs of the huts were Ukrainians with machine-guns. The women and
children were ordered off to the left and the men told to sit down in the yard, on the right. Some distance away
from us people were working: they were sorting the belongings taken from the train. I managed to steal over
among the workers, and began to work; I suffered the first lash from the whip of a German whom we called
Frankenstein. The women and children were told to take off their clothes.
...When we carried, or more correctly, dragged, the bodies away we were made to run, and were beaten for the
least delay. The dead had been lying there for a long time. They had already begun to decompose. There was a
stench of death and decomposition in the air. Worms crawled on the wretched bodies. When we tied on the belts,
an arm or a leg would frequently drop off. We also labored on graves for ourselves until dusk, without food or
drink. The day was hot, and thirst plagued us greatly. When we reached the huts in the evening each one of us
began to search for the people he had known the day before in vain - they were not to be found, they were no
longer among the living....
143
Shana be-Treblinka (Mi-pi Ed Reiya) (A Year in Treblinka by an Eye Witness), Jerusalem, 1945, pp. 5-14.
114
9.10.5
Evidence at Nuremberg n the Operation of the Gas Chambers 144
The transports were carried out as follows: at the beginning, when we arrived, when a Jewish transport came there
was a ‘selection.’ First the old women, the mothers and the children. They were told to get on trucks, together with
the sick and people who looked weak. They kept only young girls, young women and young men; the latter were
sent to the men's camp.
In general, it was rare for more than 250 out of a transport of 1,000 to 1,500 to reach the camp, and that was the
maximum; the others were sent to the gas chambers straight away.
At this "selection" healthy women between 20 and 30 years old were also chosen, and sent to the Experimental
Block. Girls and women, who were a little older or not chosen for this purpose, were sent to the camp and, like us,
had their heads shaved and they were tattooed.
In the spring of 1944 there was also a block for twins. That was at the time of the immense transport of Hungarian
Jews, about 700,000 persons. Dr. Mengele, who was carrying out the experiments, kept back the twin children
from all transports, as well as twins of any age, so long as both twins were there. Both children and adults slept on
the floor in this block. I don't know what experiments were made apart from blood tests and measurements.
M. Dubost: Did you actually see the ‘selection’ when transports arrived?
Vaillant-Couturier: Yes, because when we were working in the Sewing Block in 1944, the block in which we lived
was situated just opposite the place where the trains arrived. The whole process had been improved: Instead of
carrying out the "selection" where the trains arrived, a siding took the carriages practically to the gas chamber, and
the train stopped about 100 m. from the gas chamber. That was right in front of our block, but of course there were
two rows of barbed wire between. Then we saw how the seals were taken off the trucks and how women, men and
children were pulled out of the trucks by soldiers. We were present at the most terrible scenes when old couples
were separated. Mothers had to leave their daughters, because they were taken to the camp, while the mothers and
children went to the gas chambers. All these people knew nothing of the fate that awaited them. They were only
confused because they were being separated from each other, but they did not know that they were going to their
death.
To make the reception more pleasant, there was then - in June and July 1944, that is - an orchestra made up of
prisoners, girls in white blouses and dark blue skirts, all of them pretty and young, who played gay tunes when the
trains arrived, the "Merry Widow," the Barcarolle from the "Tales of Hoffmann," etc. They were told it was a labor
camp, and as they never entered the camp they saw nothing but the small platform decorated with greenery, where
the orchestra played. They could not know what awaited them.
Those who were taken to the gas chambers - that is, the old people, children and others - were taken to a red brick
building.
M. Dubost: Then they were not registered?
Vaillant-Couturier: No.
Dubost: They were not tattooed?
Vaillant-Couturier: No, they were not even counted.
Dubost: Were you yourself tattooed?
Vaillant-Couturier: Yes.
(The witness shows her arm)
They were taken to a red brick building with a sign that said "Baths." There they were told to get undressed and
given a towel before they were taken to the so-called shower room. Later, at the time of the large transports from
Hungary, there was no time left for any degree of concealment. They were undressed brutally. I know of these
particulars because I was acquainted with a little Jewess from France, who had lived on the Place de la
Republique....
Dubost: In Paris?
Vaillant-Couturier: In Paris; she was known as ‘little Marie’ and was the only survivor of a family of nine. Her
mother and her seven sisters and brothers had been taken to the gas chambers as soon as they arrived. When I got
to know her she worked on undressing the small children before they were taken into the gas chamber.
After the people were undressed they were taken into a room that looked like a shower room, and the capsules
were thrown down into the room through a hole in the ceiling. An SS man observed the effect through a spy hole.
After about 5 to 7 minutes, when the gas had done its job, he gave a signal for the opening of the doors. Men with
gas-masks, these were prisoners too, came in and took the bodies out. They told us that the prisoners must have
suffered before they died, because they clung together in bunches like grapes so that it was difficult to separate
them....
144
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946,
VI, Nuremberg, 1947, pp. 214-216.
115
10.
German Foreign Policy and the Nazis
10. 1
Imperial Foreign Policy: Bethmann Hollweg’s September Programme, 1914
The general aim of the war is security for the German Reich in west and east for all imaginable time. For this
purpose France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time. Russia must
be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal
peoples broken.
[…]
Furthermore: a commercial treaty which makes France economically dependent on Germany, secures the French
market for our exports and makes it possible to exclude British commerce from France. This treaty must secure for
us financial and industrial freedom of movement in France in such fashion that German enterprises can no longer
receive different treatment from French.
At any rate Belgium, even it allowed to continue to exist as a state, must be reduced to a vassal state, must allow us
to occupy any militarily important ports, must place her coast at our disposal in military respects, must become
economically a German province. Given such a solution, which offers the advantages of annexation without its
inescapable domestic political disadvantages, French Flanders with Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, where most of
the population is Flemish, can without danger be attached to this unaltered Belgium. The competent quarters will
have to judge the military value of this position against England.
1.
Luxemburg. Will become a German federal state and will receive a strip of the present Belgian province
of Luxemburg and perhaps the corner of Longwy.
2.
We must create a central European economic association through common customs treaties, to include
France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland (sic), and perhaps Italy, Sweden and Norway. This
association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be normally equal,
but in practice will be under German leadership and must stabilise Germany's economic dominance over
Mitteleuropa.
3.
The question of colonial acquisitions, where the first aim is the creation of a continuous Central African
colonial empire, will be considered later, as will that of the aims to be realised vis-à-vis Russia.
4.
A short provisional formula suitable for a possible preliminary peace to be found for a basis for the
economic agreements to be concluded with France and Belgium.
5.
Holland. It will have to be considered by what means and methods Holland can be brought into closer
relationship with the German Empire.
In view of the Dutch character, this closer relationship must leave them free of any feeling of compulsion, must
alter nothing in the Dutch way of life, and must also subject them to no new military obligations. Holland, then,
must be left independent in externals, but be made internally dependent on us. Possibly one might consider an
offensive and defensive alliance, to cover the colonies; in any case a close customs association, perhaps the cession
of Antwerp to Holland in return for the right to keep a German garrison in the fortress of Antwerp and at the
mouth of the Scheldt.145
10. 2
Hitler’s views on Foreign Policy: Mein Kampf
I still wish briefly to take a position on the question as to what extent the demand for soil and territory seems
ethically and morally justified. This is necessary, since unfortunately, even in so-called völkisch circles, all sorts
of unctuous big-mouths step forward, endeavouring to set the rectification of the injustice of 1918 as the aim of
the German nation's endeavours in the field of foreign affairs, but at the same time find it necessary to assure the
whole world of völkisch brotherhood and sympathy.
I should like to make the following preliminary remarks: The demand for restoration of the frontiers
of 1914 is a political absurdity of such proportions and consequences as to make it seem a crime. Quite
aside from the fact that the Reich's frontiers in 1914 were anything but logical. For in reality they •were
neither complete in the sense of embracing the people of German nationality, nor sensible with regard to geomilitary expediency. They were not the result of a considered political action, but momentary frontiers in a
political struggle that was by no means concluded; partly, in fact, they were the results of chance. With
equal right and in many cases with more right, some other sample year of German history could be picked out,
and the restoration of the conditions at that time declared to be the aim of an activity in foreign affairs. The above
demand is entirely suited to our bourgeois society, which here as elsewhere does not possess a single creative
political idea for the future, but lives only in the past, in fact, in the most immediate past; for even their backward
gaze does not extend beyond their own times. The law of inertia binds them to a given situation and causes
them to resist any change in it, but without ever increasing the activity of this opposition beyond the mere power of
perseverance. So it is obvious that the political horizon of these people does not extend beyond the year 1914. By proclaiming the restoration of those borders as the political aim of their activity, they keep mending the
crumbling league of our adversaries. Only in this way can it be explained that eight years after a world struggle in
which states, some of which had the most heterogeneous desires, took part, the coalition of the victors of those days
can still maintain itself in a more or less unbroken form.
145
Fritz Fischer, Germany’s aims in the First World War
116
All these states were at one time beneficiaries of the German collapse. Fear of our strength caused the greed
and envy of the individual great powers among themselves to recede. By grabbing as much of the Reich as they
could, they found the best guard against a future uprising. A bad conscience and fear of our people's strength is
still the most enduring cement to hold together the various members of this alliance.
And we do not disappoint them. By setting up the restoration of the borders of 1914 as a political programme for
Germany, our bourgeoisie frighten away every partner who might desire to leave the league of our enemies, since
he must inevitably fear to be attacked singly and thereby lose the protection of his individual fellow allies. Each
single state feels concerned and threatened by this slogan.
Moreover, it is senseless in two respects:
(1) because the instruments of power are lacking to remove
it from the vapours of club evenings into reality; and
(2) because, if it could actually be realised, the outcome
would again be so pitiful that, by God, it would not be worth
while to risk the blood of our people for this.
For it should scarcely seem questionable to anyone that even the restoration of the frontiers of 1914
could be achieved only by blood. Only childish and naive minds can lull themselves in the idea that they can bring
about a correction of Versailles by wheedling and begging. Quite aside from the fact that such an attempt would
presuppose a man of Talleyrand’s talents, which we do not possess. One half of our political figures consist of
extremely sly, but equally spineless elements which are hostile towards our nation to begin with, while the other is
composed of good-natured, harmless, and easy-going soft-heads. Moreover, the times have changed since the
Congress of Vienna: Today it is not princes and princes' mistresses who haggle and bargain over state borders; it
is the inexorable Jew who struggles for his domination over the nations. No nation can remove this hand from
its throat except by the sword. Only the assembled and concentrated might of a national passion rearing up in
its strength can defy the international enslavement of peoples. Such a process is and remains a bloody one.
If, however, we harbour the conviction that the German future, regardless what happens, demands the supreme
sacrifice, quite aside from all considerations of political expediency as such, we must set up an aim worthy of
this sacrifice and fight for it.
The boundaries of the year 1914 mean nothing at all for the German future. Neither did they provide a
defence of the past, nor would they contain any strength for the future. Through them the German nation will
neither achieve its inner integrity, nor will its sustenance be safeguarded by them, nor do these boundaries, viewed
from the military standpoint, seem expedient or even satisfactory, nor finally can they improve the relation in which
we at present find ourselves towards the other world powers, or, better expressed, the real world powers. The
lag behind England will not be caught up, the magnitude of the United States will not be achieved; not even
France would experience a material diminution of her world-political importance.
Only one thing would be certain: even with a favourable outcome, such an attempt to restore the borders of 1914
would lead to a further bleeding of our national body, so much so that there would be no worth-while blood left to
stake for the decisions and actions really to secure the nation's future. On the contrary, drunk with such a shallow
success, we should renounce any further goals, all the more readily as 'natio nal honour' would be repaired
and, for the moment at least, a few doors would have been reopened to commercial development.
As opposed to this, we National Socialists must hold unflinchingly to our aim in foreign policy, namely, to
secure for the German people the land and soil to which they are entitled on this earth. And this action is the only
one which, before God and our German posterity, would make any sacrifice of blood seem justified: before God,
since we have been put on this earth with the mission of eternal struggle for our daily bread, beings who receive
nothing as a gift, and who owe their position as lords of the earth only to the genius and the courage with which
they can conquer and defend it; and before our German posterity in so far as we have shed no citizen's blood out
of which a thousand others are not bequeathed to posterity. The soil on which some day German generations of
peasants can beget powerful sons will sanction the investment of the sons of today, and will some day acquit the
responsible statesmen of blood-guilt and sacrifice of the people, even if they are persecuted by their contemporaries.
And I must sharply attack those völkisch pen-pushers who claim to regard such an acquisition of soil as a 'breach
of sacred human rights' and attack it as such in their scribblings. One never knows who stands behind these
fellows. But one thing is certain, that the confusion they can create is desirable and convenient to our national
enemies. By such an attitude they help to weaken and destroy from within our people's will for the only
correct way of defending their vital needs. For no people on this earth possesses so much as a square yard of
territory on the strength of a higher will or superior right. Just as Germany's frontiers are fortuitous frontiers,
momentary frontiers in the current political struggle of any period, so are the boundaries of other nations'
living space. And just as the shape of our earth's surface can seem immutable as granite only to the
thoughtless soft-head, but in reality only represents at each period an apparent pause in a continuous
development, created by the mighty forces of Nature in a process of continuous growth, only to be
transformed or destroyed tomorrow by greater forces, likewise the boundaries of living spaces in the life of
nations.
State boundaries are made by man and changed by man. The fact that a nation has succeeded in
acquiring an undue amount of soil constitutes no higher obligation that it should be recognised eternally. At most it
proves the strength of the conquerors and the weakness of the nations. And in this case, right lies in this strength
alone. If the German nation today, penned into an impossible area, faces a lamentable future, this is no more a
commandment of Fate than revolt against this state of affairs constitutes an affront to Fate. No more than any
higher power has promised another nation more territory than the German nation, or is offended by the fact of
117
this unjust distribution of the soil. Just as our ancestors did not receive the soil on which we live today as a gift
from Heaven, but had to fight for it at the risk of their lives, in the future no völkisch grace will win soil for us
and hence life for our people, but only the might of a victorious sword.
Much as all of us today recognise the necessity of a reckoning with France, it would remain ineffectual in
the long run if it represented the whole of our aim in foreign policy. It can and will achieve meaning only if it offers
the rear cover for an enlargement of our people's living space in Europe. For it is not in colonial acquisitions that
we must see the solution of this problem, but exclusively in the acquisition of a territory for settlement, which will
enhance the area of the mother country, and hence not only keep the new settlers in the most intimate community
with the land of their origin, but secure for the total area those advantages which lie in its unified magnitude.
The völkisch movement must not be the champion of other peoples, but the vanguard fighter of its own.
Otherwise it is superfluous and above all has no right to sulk about the past. For in that case it is behaving in
exactly the same way. The old German policy was wrongly determined by dynastic considerations, and the future
policy must not be directed by cosmopolitan völkisch drivel. In particular, we are not constables guarding the
well-known 'poor little nations', but soldiers of our own nation.
But we National Socialists must go further. The right to possess soil can become a duty if without
extension of its soil a great nation seems doomed to destruction. And most especially when not some little nigger
nation or other is involved, but the Germanic mother of life, which has given the present-day world its cultural
picture. Germany will either be a world power or there will be no Germany. And for world power she needs
that magnitude which will give her the position she needs in the present period, and life to her citizens.
And so we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our preWar period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to
the south and west, and turn our gaze towards the land in the east. At long last we break off the colonial and
commercial policy of the pre-War period and shift to the soil policy of the future.
If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia and her vassal border states.
Here Fate itself seems desirous of giving us a sign. By handing Russia to Bolshevism, it robbed the Russian nation of
that intelligentsia which previously brought about and guaranteed its existence as a state. For the organisation of a
Russian state formation was not the result of the political abilities of the Slavs in Russia, but only a
wonderful example of the state-forming efficacy of the German element in an inferior race. Numerous mighty
empires on earth have been created in this way. Lower nations led by Germanic organisers and overlords have
more than once grown to be mighty state formations and have endured as long as the racial nucleus of the
creative state race maintained itself. For centuries Russia drew nourishment from this Germanic nucleus of its
upper leading strata. Today it can be regarded as almost totally exterminated and extinguished. It has been
replaced by the Jew. Impossible as it is for the Russian by himself to shake off the yoke of the Jew by his own
resources, it is equally impossible for the Jew to maintain the mighty empire forever. He himself is no element of
organisation, but a ferment of decomposition. The Persian 1 empire in the east is ripe for collapse. And the end of
Jewish rule in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state. We have been chosen by Fate as witness of a
catastrophe which will be the mightiest confirmation of the soundness of the völkisch theory.
Our task, the mission of the National Socialist movement, is to bring our own people to such political
insight that they will net see their goal for the future in the breath-taking sensation of 1. a new Alexander's
conquest, but in the industrious work of the German plough, to which the sword need only give soil.
It goes without saying that the Jews announce the sharpest resistance to such a policy. Better than anyone else
they sense the significance of this action for their own future. This very fact should teach all really nationalminded men the correctness of such a reorientation. Unfortunately, the opposite is the case. Not only in GermanNational, but even in ‘völkisch’ circles, the idea of such an eastern policy is violently attacked, and, as almost
always in such matters, they appeal to a higher authority. The spirit of Bismarck is cited to cover a policy which is
as senseless as it is impossible and in the highest degree harmful to the German nation. Bismarck in his time,
they say, always set store on good relations with Russia.146
10.3
The Foreign Office view on German Foreign Policy in 1933
/. General
The goals of German foreign policy are set first and foremost by the Versailles treaty. The revision of this
treaty—Germany's most pressing concern — absorbs most of its available energies. The further task of
exploiting opportunities which occur for Germany through the continuing changes in Europe and the world as a
whole, has to take second place to the revision of Versailles.
Just as the goals of our foreign policy are determined to a large extent by the Versailles treaty so also is their
realization, in the sense of its effects on Germany's general position of strength. The debilitating impact on
Germany of the Versailles treaty is far more extensive and lasting than the German people have generally
recognised. In the light of the growing importance of technical armaments (in comparison to size of population),
our military weakness is such that we have no prospect of achieving parity with France in the foreseeable
future through an armaments race. In view of our limited financial resources and the technical difficulties involved
in an expansion of the Wehrmacht, we shall require approximately five years to achieve military parity even
with Poland. In addition, there is the need to carry out the restructuring of German armaments fairly slowly
146
Mein Kampf, pp. 593-9
118
and quietly in order to avoid interventions, preventive actions, and diplomatic cris es. This applies to the
Reichswehr, Navy and police, and in particular to the Air Force, which is regarded as extremely important
abroad.
At the moment, our security vis-à-vis France depends in the first instance on the Locarno treaty with its AngloItalian guarantee, vis-à-vis Poland on our relationship with Russia, vis-à-vis all the other states almost entirely on
the general treaty arrangements (League of Nations, Kellogg Pact etc.) and on the desire for peace of almost
all nations which rests on economic considerations. In view of our interest in the Locarno treaty vis-à-vis France,
we have for the time being postponed the revision of the demilitarisation conditions for the Rhineland. The
situation in the east of Germany is particularly dangerous at the present time. The only prospect of a
successful repulsion of a Polish attack is in the event of Russian support, at least in the form of a Russian
mobilization on Poland's eastern frontier. Whether we can reckon with such support in a crisis is at the
moment uncertain.
//. The Revision of Versailles
In past years revision of Versailles has taken the form of an attack on it point by point (French artichoke
theory). One cannot in fact deny that the simultaneous pursuit of several goals, let alone the attempt at a total
revision, would have involved the danger of a complete failure (Examples: the failure to achieve the
immediate evacuation of the Rhineland at Locarno, or the liberation of the Saar at the Hague). In future too,
at any rate for the time being, we shall have to follow the method of revising particular aspects unless unexpected
circumstances open up another way. One must also consider that the plan of a total revision would increase the
danger of a compromise with a less satisfactory final result. To achieve the best possible result with the least
possible sacrifice we shall have to choose the most favourable moment for the revision of each particular part
of the treaty . . .
It is inadvisable to broach the question of the territorial revision of frontiers just yet so long as Germany is not
sufficiently secure militarily, financially, and economically, and, in particular, so long as the disarmament
question has not yet been settled. Until then, the territorial revision will have to be prepared—as hitherto—
through propaganda abroad (on the basis of the Wilson points, the deception of Versailles). Sticking to the
Wilson points is vital because the counter-propaganda operates quite successfully with the allegedly limitless
nature of our demands. In addition, we must maintain the political, economic, and cultural positions of the
Germans in the ceded territories even if this requires great financial sacrifices. However, although waiting
patiently, we must of course always be prepared for the territorial questions, above all the Eastern problem, to
come to a head on their own one day through natural developments, such as, for example, serious compli cations
between Danzig and Poland.
The main goal of the territorial revision remains the transformation of the Eastern frontier, whereby we must seek
to acquire all the relevant Polish territories at the
same time, and reject partial or intermediate solutions (only one more partition of Poland). Academic studies
relating to questions of ethnography, geology, communications etc., relevant to the drawing up of the
boundaries, are far advanced. On the other hand, the question of how we are to absorb the agricultural
surplus of these territories in future is still unclear. . . .
Danzig poses only one aspect of the problem of the corridor as far as we are concerned. Any special solution
which applies to Danzig alone must be rejected because it would compromise our overall objective.
///. The other foreign policy goals
The other foreign policy goals of Germany stem from the political and economic upheaval of Europe in
particular, from our geographical position, our economic bases (over-population, narrow raw material base),
from the necessity for the industry of all nations to open up new territories, the need to combat the industrialization of agrarian states etc. The most essential task is the strengthening of Germany in all spheres, while at the
same time avoiding political and economic danger zones. The encouragement and support of the German
minorities and the Germans abroad is particularly important in relation to this . . .
French and Italian policies vis-à-vis Austria coincide in the negative goal of preventing the Anschluss, but
conflict in the positive goal of incorporating Austria into their respective spheres of influence. The FrancoItalian rivalry puts Austria in a state of suspended animation and we can only hope that this situation will
continue until Austria can be incorporated into the Reich. The greatest danger for German unity would be a
Franco/Italian agreement on the basis of the incorporation of Austria into one or other of their spheres of
influence. The prospects of such an agreement are for the time being remote . . .
Our policy vis-à-vis the Little Entente must concentrate on trying to reduce its ties to France as far as possible
and, in particular, on stopping Czechoslovakia from linking itself too closely to Poland.
The best method of achieving this would undoubtedly be an economic policy which opened the German
market to the products of these lands. Above all, the direction of Yugoslavia's and Romania's foreign policy
could be significantly influenced in this direction in view of their present catastrophic economic situation.
These political considerations form the basis for our policy of economic support for the states on the lower
Danube (Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria), which found expression in our willingness to grant
preferences for wheat and in the aid which we gave to these states at international conferences, most recently
at the Stresa conference. A decisive factor in this was also the consideration that these markets, which show
considerable potential for the future must be kept open for German exports. However, the effectiveness of this
policy has been considerably reduced recently through the almost total curtailment of the agricultural exports
of these states of Germany. At the moment, apart from our willingness to offer economic support, we have
119
nothing with which to counteract the great political and financial pull of France. We must, therefore, continue
the Stresa policy and pursue it more effectively by increasing the exchange of goods with the states on the
Lower Danube as far as possible.
As far as Russia is concerned the most important point to make is that we cannot dispense with Russian support
against Poland. In this connection our good relations with the Russian army are particularly important since
they guarantee us information about the state of Russian armaments, which is indispensable if we are to avoid
unpleasant surprises.
In addition, there are important economic factors which only partly derive from the present economic crisis.
Through its substantial orders, Russia has gradually become the largest customer for German industrial goods.
The vigorous fight against the Communists and cultural Bolshevism in G.ermany does not need to damage
German-Russian relationships in the long term as is demonstrated by the example of Italy. At the moment, one
cannot deny that there has been a cooling off of these relations. In order to change this situation, we shall have to
pay particular attention to our relations with Moscow and, without running after the Soviet Union, make it clear
that, as far as we are concerned, we keep our domestic struggle against Communism strictly separate from our
diplomatic attitude to the Soviet Union. For this reason the extension of the Berlin treaty should be ratified as
soon as possible. A revival of German-Russian trade through an increase in the purchase of Russian products
as far as possible is equally desirable.
An agreement with Poland is neither possible nor desirable. We must maintain a certain degree of tension for
revision and to keep Poland down politically and economically. However, the situation is by no means without
danger since the present Polish government, recognising that its prospects are deteriorating with the continuing
strengthening of Germany and that France might become less keen on her alliance, is apparently toying with
the idea of a preventive war. The most immediate cause for this is naturally our territorial demands. Thus we
cannot avoid playing down public discussion of these to some extent for the time being. The maintenance of the
German presence in Poland, and particularly in Upper Silesia and in Danzig, which is not financially viable,
causes us particular concern and very considerable costs.
Conclusion
The present world situation is marked by political and economic tensions. The necessary economic solutions are
in many cases delayed or prevented by the existing political conflicts. In Germany's particular situation it is
necessary to avoid diplomatic conflicts for as long as possible until we have become stronger. The world
economic crisis gives us the great opportunity, through careful planning, to weather the storm better than others
and thereby to secure a reconstruction of the world economic situation to our advantage. This would enable us to
achieve a more favourable balance of forces, at least in Europe. By excluding political conflicts and
concentrating on economic questions, we would avoid military dangers which we are not at the moment equal
to.
A precipitate assertion of foreign policy demands would probably mobilise the important powers against us and
jeopardise the fulfilment of these demands for a long time to come. A period of complete tranquillity abroad for
a few years would in fact be a natural counterpart to the four-year programme for the reconstruction at home.
A period of relative quiet in foreign affairs would allow us to recover our
strength far more effectively than the launching of continual diplomatic conflicts which cannot lead to success.
How far this is tolerable from the domestic political angle I will not go into. On the other hand, considerable
disadvantages have to be weighed against the dual advantage of the period of tranquility and the maturing of
all our diplomatic demands. In the first place, there is the danger that our opponents will try to secure a
renewal of the period of tranquility and thereby a strengthening of the status quo. Furthermore, it will be
difficult to realize the idea in a form which not only excludes any recognition of the present frontiers but also,
which is desirable from our point of view, acknowledges the frontiers to be an open question. Finally, the concept
of a period of tranquility is so vague and open to so many interpretations that one would have to reckon with an
endless series of complaints about the failure to stick to agreements.
Perhaps the same goal could be achieved without bilateral or multilateral ties, for example, through a unilateral
declaration or multilateral discussion without a formal agreement. We would not then be forced to steer clear of
the great political questions. It would be sufficient for us to emphasize that, after the settlemen t of the
disarmament question, we would concentrate on economic and financial tasks. That would then lead to the
break-up of the opposition group into which most European states have formed in response to the new regime
in Germany and through concern about the future.
The essential points would be a close cooperation with England and Italy, the greatest possible reassurance for
the French government about these questions which particularly interest it (e.g. the German defence
programme), a good relationship with Russia, relations with the United States based on trust, and active
participation in all international questions. In addition, a precondition for this would be if the Government
were to formulate all foreign policy statements in a way appropriate to this end, and if all demonstrations by
groups and organizations closely associated with the Government which are calculated to provoke foreign
opinion were to be prevented. 147
147
Memorandum on German foreign Policy circulated to German ambassadors by the Foreign Office. Noakes and Pridham,
Nazism 3, pp. 490-491.
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10.4
Hossbach Memorandum on the Four-Year Plan 1937
Memorandum
BERLIN, November 10, 1937.
Minutes of a Conference in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, November 5, 1937, FROM 4:15 to 8:30 P.M.
Present:
The Führer and Chancellor, Field Marshal von Blomberg, War Minister,
Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Commander in Chief, Army,
Admiral Dr. h. c. Raeder, Commander in Chief, Navy,
Colonel General Goring, Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe,
Baron von Neurath, Foreign Minister,
Colonel Hossbach.
The Führer began by stating that the subject of the present conference was of such importance that its discussion
would, in other countries, certainly be a matter for a full Cabinet meeting, but he -the Führer - had rejected the idea
of making it a subject of discussion before the wider circle of the Reich Cabinet just because of the importance of
the matter. His exposition to follow was the fruit of thorough deliberation and the experiences of his 41/2 years of
power. He wished to explain to the gentlemen present his basic ideas concerning the opportunities for the
development of our position in the field of foreign affairs and its requirements, and he asked, in the interests of a
long-term German policy, that his exposition be regarded, in the event of his death, as his last will and testament.
The Führer then continued:
The aim of German policy was to make secure and to preserve the racial community [Volksmasse] and to enlarge
it. It was therefore a question of space.
The German racial community comprised over 85 million people and, because of their number and the narrow
limits of habitable space in Europe, constituted a tightly packed racial core such as was not to be met in any other
country and such as implied the right to a greater living space than in the case of other peoples. If, territorially
speaking, there existed no political result corresponding to this German racial core, that was a consequence of
centuries of historical development, and in the continuance of these political conditions lay the greatest danger to
the preservation of the German race at its present peak. To arrest the decline of Germanism [Deutschtum] in
Austria and Czechoslovakia was as little possible as to maintain the present level in Germany itself. Instead of
increase, sterility was setting in, and in its train disorders of a social character must arise in course of time, since
political and ideological ideas remain effective only so long as they furnish the basis for the realization of the
essential vital demands of a people. Germany's future was therefore wholly conditional upon the solving of the
need for space, and such a solution could be sought, of course, only for a foreseeable period of about one to three
generations.
Before turning to the question of solving the need for space, it had to be considered whether a solution holding
promise for the future was to be reached by means of autarchy or by means of an increased participation in world
economy.
Autarchy:
Achievement only possible under strict National Socialist leadership of the State, which is assumed; accepting its
achievement as possible, the following could be stated as results:A. In the field of raw materials only limited, not total, autarchy.
1) In regard to coal, so far as it could be considered as a source of raw materials, autarchy was possible;
2) But even as regards ores, the position was much more difficult. Iron requirements can be met from home
resources and similarly with light metals, but with other raw materials -copper,tin- this was not the case.
3) Synthetic textile requirements can be met from home resources to the limit of timber supplies. A permanent
solution impossible.
4) Edible fats-possible.
B. In the field of food the question of autarchy was to be answered by a flat "No."
With the general rise in the standard of living compared with that of 30 to 40 years ago, there has gone hand in
hand an increased demand and an increased home consumption even on the part of the producers, the farmers. The
fruits of the increased agricultural production had all gone to meet the increased demand, and so did not represent
an absolute production increase. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil, which
already, in consequence of the use of artificial fertilizers, was showing signs of exhaustion, was hardly possible,
and it was therefore certain that even with the maximum increase in production, participation in world trade was
unavoidable. The not inconsiderable expenditure of foreign exchange to insure food supplies by imports, even
when harvests were good, grew to catastrophic proportions with bad harvests. The possibility of a disaster grew in
proportion to the increase in population, in which, too, the excess of births of 560,000 annually produced, as a
consequence, an even further increase in bread consumption, since a child was a greater bread consumer than an
adult.
121
It was not possible over the long run, in a continent enjoying a practically common standard of living, to meet the
food supply difficulties by lowering that standard and by rationalization. Since, with the solving of the
unemployment problem, the maximum consumption level had been reached, some minor modifications in our
home agricultural production might still, no doubt, be possible, but no fundamental alteration was possible in our
basic food position. Thus autarchy was untenable in regard both to food and to the economy as a whole.
Participation in world economy:
To this there were limitations which we were unable to remove. The establishment of Germany's position on a
secure and sound foundation was obstructed by market fluctuations, and commercial treaties afforded no guarantee
for actual execution. In particular it had to be remembered that since the World War, those very countries which
had formerly been food exporters had become industrialized. We were living in an age of economic empires in
which the primitive urge to colonization was again manifesting itself; in the cases of Japan and Italy economic
motives underlay the urge for expansion, and with Germany, too, economic need would supply the stimulus. For
countries outside the great economic empires, opportunities for economic expansion were severely impeded.
The boom in world economy caused by the economic effects of rearmament could never form the basis of a sound
economy over a long period, and the latter was obstructed above all also by the economic disturbances resulting
from Bolshevism. There was a pronounced military weakness in those states which depended for their existence on
foreign trade. As our foreign trade was carried on over the sea routes dominated by Britain, it was more a question
of security of transport than one of foreign exchange, which revealed, in time of war, the full weakness of our food
situation. The only remedy, and one which might appear to us as visionary, lay in the acquisition of greater living
space -a quest which has at all times been the origin of the formation of states and of the migration of peoples.
That this quest met with no interest at Geneva or among the satiated nations was understandable. If, then, we
accept the security of our food situation as the principal question, the space necessary to insure it can only be
sought in Europe, not, as in the liberal-capitalist view, in the exploitation of colonies. It is not a matter of acquiring
population but of gaining space for agricultural use. Moreover, areas producing raw materials can be more usefully
sought in Europe in immediate proximity to the Reich, than overseas; the solution thus obtained must suffice for
one or two generations. Whatever else might prove necessary later must be left to succeeding generations to deal
with. The development of great world political constellations progressed but slowly after all, and the German
people with its strong racial core would find the most favorable prerequisites for such achievement in the heart of
the continent of Europe. The history of all ages- the Roman Empire and the British Empire- had proved that
expansion could only be carried out by breaking down resistance and taking risks; setbacks were inevitable. There
had never in former times been spaces without a master, and there were none today; the attacker always comes up
against a possessor.
The question for Germany ran: where could she achieve the greatest gain at the lowest cost.
German policy had to reckon with two hate-inspired antagonists, Britain and France, to whom a German colossus
in the center of Europe was a thorn in the flesh, and both countries were opposed to any further strengthening of
Germany's position either in Europe or overseas; in support of this opposition they were able to count on the
agreement of all their political parties. Both 'countries saw in the establishment of German military bases overseas
a threat to their own communications, a safeguarding of German commerce, and, as a consequence, a
strengthening of Germany's position in Europe.
Because of opposition of the Dominions, Britain could not cede any of her colonial possessions to us. After
England's loss of prestige through the passing of Abyssinia into Italian possession, the return of East Africa was
not to be expected. British concessions could at best be expressed in an offer to satisfy our colonial demands by the
appropriation of colonies which were not British possessions -e.g., Angola. French concessions would probably
take a similar line.
Serious discussion of the question of the return of colonies to us could only be considered at a moment when
Britain was in difficulties and the German Reich armed and strong. The Führer did not share the view that the
Empire was unshakable. Opposition to the Empire was to be found less in the countries conquered than among her
competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire could not be compared in respect of permanence; the
latter was not confronted by any powerful political rival of a serious order after the Punic Wars. It was only the
disintegrating effect of Christianity, and the symptoms of age which appear in every country, which caused ancient
Rome to succumb to the onslaught of the Germans.
Beside the British Empire there existed today a number of states stronger than she. The British motherland was
able to protect her colonial possessions not by her own power, but only in alliance with other states. How, for
instance, could Britain alone defend Canada against attack by America, or her Far Eastern interests against attack
by Japan!
The emphasis on the British Crown as the symbol of the unity of the Empire was already an admission that, in the
long run, the Empire could not maintain its position by power politics. Significant indications of this were:
(a) The struggle of Ireland for independence.
(b) The constitutional struggles in India, where Britain's half measures had given to the Indians the opportunity of
using later on as a weapon against Britain, the non-fulfilment of her promises regarding a constitution.
(c) The weakening by Japan of Britain's position in the Far East.
(d) The rivalry in the Mediterranean with Italy who -under the spell of her history, driven by necessity and led by a
genius was expanding her power position, and thus was inevitably coming more and more into conflict with
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British interests. The outcome of the Abyssinian War was a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy was striving to
increase by stirring up the in the Mohammeden world.
To sum up, it could be stated that, with 45 million Britons, in spite of its theoretical soundness, the position of the
Empire could not in the long run be maintained by power politics. The ratio of the population of the Empire to that
of the motherland of 9:1, was a warning to us not, in our territorial expansion to allow the foundation constituted
by the numerical strength of our own people to become too weak.
France's position was more favourable than that of Britain. The French Empire was better placed territorially; the
inhabitants of her colonial possessions represented a supplement to her military strength. But France was going to
be confronted with internal political difficulties. In a nation's life about 10 percent of its span is taken up by
parliamentary forms of government and about 90 percent by authoritarian forms. Today, nonetheless, Britain,
France, Russia, and the smaller states adjoining them, must be included as factors [Machtfaktoren] in our political
calculations.
Germany's problem could only be solved by means of force and this was never without attendant risk. The
campaigns of Frederick the Great for Silesia and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had involved
unheard-of risk, and the swiftness of the Prussian action in 1870 had kept Austria from entering the war. If one
accepts as the basis of the following exposition the resort to force with its attendant risks, then there remain still to
be answered the questions "when" and "how." In this matter there were three cases to be dealt with:
Case 1: Period 1943-1945.
After this date only a change for the worse, from our point of view, could be expected.
The equipment of the army, navy, and luftwaffe, as well as the formation of the officer corps, was nearly
completed. Equipment and armament were modern; in further delay there lay the danger of their obsolescence. In
particular, the secrecy of "special weapons" could not be preserved forever. The recruiting of reserves was limited
to current age groups; further drafts from older untrained age groups were no longer available.
Our relative strength would decrease in relation to the rearmament which would by then have been carried out by
the rest of the world. If we did not act by 1943-45' any year could, in consequence of a lack of reserves, produce
the food crisis, to cope with which the necessary foreign exchange was not available, and this must be regarded as
a "waning point of the regime." Besides, the world was expecting our attack and was increasing its countermeasures from year to year. It was while the rest of the world was still preparing its defenses [sich abriegele] that
we were obliged to take the offensive.
Nobody knew today what the situation would be in the years 1943-45. One thing only was certain, that we could
not wait longer.
On the one hand there was the great Wehrmacht, and the necessity of maintaining it at its present level, the aging
of the movement and of its leaders; and on the other, the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and of a
limitation of the birth rate, which left no choice but to act. If the Führer was still living, it was his unalterable
resolve to solve Germany's problem of space at the latest by 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45
would arise in cases 2 and 3.
Case 2:
If internal strife in France should develop into such a domestic crisis as to absorb the French Army completely and
render it incapable of use for war against Germany, then the time for action against the Czechs had come.
Case 3:
If France is so embroiled by a war with another state that she cannot "proceed" against Germany.
For the improvement of our politico-military position our first objective, in the event of our being embroiled in
war, must be to overthrow Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously in order to remove the threat to our flank in
any possible operation against the West. In a conflict with France it was hardly to be regarded as likely that the
Czechs would declare war on us on the very same day as France. The desire to join in the war would, however,
increase among the Czechs in proportion to any weakening on our part and then her participation could clearly
take the form of an attack toward Silesia, toward the north or toward the west.
If the Czechs were overthrown and a common German-Hungarian frontier achieved, a neutral attitude on the part
of Poland could be the more certainly counted on in the event of a Franco-German conflict. Our agreements with
Poland only retained their force as long as Germany's strength remained unshaken. In the event of German
setbacks a Polish action against East Prussia, and possibly against Pomerania and Silesia as well, had to be
reckoned with.
On the assumption of a development of the Situation leading to action: on our part as planned, in the years 194345, the attitude of France, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Russia could probably be estimated as follows:
Actually, the Führer believed that almost certainly Britain, and probably France as well, had already tacitly
written off the Czechs and were reconciled to the fact that this question could be cleared up in due course by
Germany. Difficulties connected with the Empire, and the prospect of being once more entangled in a protracted
European war, were decisive considerations for Britain against participation in a war against Germany. Britain's
attitude would certainly not be without influence on that of France. An attack by France without British support,
and with the prospect of the offensive being brought to a standstill on our western fortifications, was hardly
probable. Nor was a French march through Belgium and Holland without British support to be expected; this also
was a course not to be contemplated by us in the event of a conflict with France, because it would certainly entail
the hostility of Britain. It would of course be necessary to maintain a strong defense [eine Abriegelung] on our
western frontier during the prosecution of our attack on the Czechs and Austria. And in this connection it had to be
123
remembered that the defense measures of the Czechs were growing in strength from year to year, and that the
actual worth of the Austrian Army also was increasing in the course of time. Even though the populations
concerned, especially of Czechoslovakia, were not sparse, the annexation of Czechoslovakia and Austria would
mean an acquisition of foodstuffs for 5 to 6 million people, on the assumption that the compulsory emigration of 2
million people from Czechoslovakia and 1 million people from Austria was practicable. The incorporation of these
two States with Germany meant, from the politico-military point of view, a substantial advantage because it would
mean shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of forces for other purposes, and the possibility of creating new units
up to a level of about 12 divisions, that is, 1 new division per million inhabitants.
Italy was not expected to object to the elimination of the Czechs, but it was impossible at the moment to estimate
what her attitude on the Austrian question would be; that depended essentially upon whether the Duce were still
alive.
The degree of surprise and the swiftness of our action were decisive factors for Poland's attitude. Poland -with
Russia at her rear will have little inclination to engage in war against a victorious Germany.
Military intervention by Russia must be countered by the swiftness of our operations; however, whether such an
intervention was a practical contingency at all was, in view of Japan's attitude, more than doubtful.
Should case 2 arise -the crippling of France by civil war- the situation thus created by the elimination of the most
dangerous opponent must he seized upon whenever it occurs for the blow against the Czechs.
The Führer saw case 3 coming definitely nearer; it might emerge from the present tensions in the Mediterranean,
and he was resolved to take advantage of it whenever it happened, even as early as 1938.
In the light of past experience, the Führer did not see any early end to the hostilities in Spain. If one considered the
length of time which Franco's offensives had taken up till now, it was fully possible that the war would continue
another 3 years. On the other hand, a 100 percent victory for Franco was not desirable either, from the German
point of view; rather were we interested in a continuance of the war and in the keeping up of the tension in the
Mediterranean. Franco in undisputed possession of the Spanish Peninsula precluded the possibility of any further
intervention on the part of the Italians or of their continued occupation of the Balearic Islands. As our interest lay
more in the prolongation of the war in Spain, it must be the immediate aim of our policy to strengthen Italy's rear
with a view to her remaining in the Balearics. But the permanent establishment of the Italians on the Balearics
would be intolerable both to France and Britain, and might lead to a war of France and England against Italy -a
war in which Spain, should she be entirely in the hands of the Whites, might make her appearance on the side of
Italy's enemies. The probability of Italy's defeat in such a war was slight, for the road from Germany was open for
the supplementing of her raw materials. The Führer pictured the military strategy for Italy thus: on her western
frontier with France she would remain on the defensive, and carry on the war against France from Libya against
the French North African colonial possessions.
As a landing by Franco-British troops on the coast of Italy could be discounted, and a French offensive over the
Alps against northern Italy would be very difficult and would probably come to a halt before the strong Italian
fortifications, the crucial point [Schwerpunkt] of the operations lay in North Africa. The threat to French lines of
communication by the Italian Fleet would to a great extent cripple the transportation of forces from North Africa to
France, so that France would have only home forces at her disposal on the frontiers with Italy and Germany.
If Germany made use of this war to settle the Czech and Austrian questions, it was to be assumed that Britain herself at war with Italy- would decide not to act against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by
France against Germany was not to be expected.
The time for our attack on the Czechs and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Anglo-FrenchItalian war and would not necessarily coincide with the commencement of military operations by these three
States. Nor had the Führer in mind military agreements with Italy, but wanted, while retaining his own
independence of action, to exploit this favorable situation, which would not occur again, to begin and carry
through the campaign against the Czechs. This descent upon the Czechs would have to be carried out with
‘lightning speed.’
In appraising the situation Field Marshal von Blomberg and Colonel General von Fritsch repeatedly emphasized
the necessity that Britain and France must not appear in the role of our enemies, and stated that the French Army
would not be so committed by the war with Italy that France could not at the same time enter the field with forces
superior to ours on our western frontier. General von Fritsch estimated the probable French forces available for use
on the Alpine frontier at approximately twenty divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on
the western frontier, with the role, according to the German view, of invading the Rhineland. In this matter,
moreover, the advanced state of French defence preparations [Mobilmachung] must be taken into particular
account, and it must be remembered apart from the insignificant value of our present fortifications -on which Field
Marshal von Blomberg laid special emphasis- that the four motorized divisions intended for the West were still
more or less incapable of movement. In regard to our offensive toward the southeast, Field Marshal von Blomberg
drew particular attention to the strength of the Czech fortifications, which had acquired by now a structure like a
Maginot Line and which would gravely hamper our attack.
General von Fritsch mentioned that this was the very purpose of a study which he had ordered made this winter,
namely, to examine the possibility of conducting operations against the Czechs with special reference to
overcoming the Czech fortification system; the General further expressed his opinion. that under existing
circumstances he must give up his plan to go abroad on his leave, which was due to begin on November 10. The
Führer dismissed this idea on the ground that the possibility of a conflict need not yet be regarded as imminent. To
124
the Foreign Minister's objection that an Anglo-French-Italian conflict was not yet within such a measurable
distance as the Führer seemed to assume, the Führer put the summer of 1938 as the date which seemed to him
possible for this. In reply to considerations offered by Field Marshal von Blomberg and General von Fritsch
regarding the attitude of Britain and France, the Führer repeated his previous statements that he was convinced of
Britain's non-participation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France
against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict under discussion lead to a general mobilization in Europe,
then we must immediately begin action against the Czechs. On the other hand, should the powers not engaged in
the war declare themselves disinterested, then Germany would have to adopt a similar attitude to this for the time
being.
Colonel General Goring thought that, in view of the Führer 's statement, we should consider liquidating our
military undertakings in Spain. The Führer agrees to this with the limitation that he thinks he should reserve a
decision for a proper moment.
The second part of the conference was concerned with concrete questions of armament.
HOSSBACH
Certified Correct:
Colonel (General Staff)
10.5
Foreign Policy and Popular Opinion: Sopade Reports on the Anschluss
March 1938
1. The Annexation of Austria
The regime has tried to give the world the impression that the invasion of German troops was prompted only by
Seyß-Inquart’s call for help. The following reports prove the opposite:
Bavaria: In southern Bavaria military preparations were being forced at an unprecedented tempo from last
November. Rumours were circulating in Munich in February that a large number of new aircraft had been
allocated to Munich airport. Most of the newly built airfields on the Isar (from Munich towards Mühldorf) came
into operation in January. The increasingly frequent appearance of bomber and fighter squadrons, with up to 100
planes doing exercises together was a clear indication that the Luftwaffe on the Bavarian border had been
reinforced. In addition Panzer divisions from Würzburg had been stationed in Munich, and border garrisons were
put on alert, which we mentioned in earlier reports. A further cause for popular alarm was a mobilisation exercise
in the second week of February. In Chiemgau, for example, horses were requisitioned from farmers, collected in
the middle of the night and kept for three days, the border guards were put on alert and provided with weapons,
and the barracks were also put on alert.
That the German government intended to invade Austria was evident in Munich on 10 March. Around
midday on that day, , less than 24 hours after Schuschnigg had announced the plebiscite, troops were mobilised in
the Munich garrison. Soldiers had to report to their barracks in battle dress [feldmarschmäßig ausgerüstet]. Leave
had already been cancelled two weeks earlier.. . the troops were given no explanation, no addresses were held, and
their destination was not announced. Among the soldiers, therefore, there was a certain unrest. In the first hours
after dark the motorised divisions moved out.; in the course of the night infantry divisions, some of whom were
transported by rail, some on foot or in trucks. Their departure lasted the whole of Friday.148
...
The effect of the events in Austria on the popular mood was by no means uniform. . . [T]he effect on popular
opinion in the border areas was different to that in the interior of Germany. Along the border, and particularly
along the Czech border, people are much more preoccupied with the threat of war than in the interior, and this
anxiety has the effect of sobering people up. None of the reporters doubts that the plebiscite on 10 April produce
the usual unanimity, but many are already expressing the opinion that this plebiscite is not taken seriously.
[. . .]
Bavaria: The Hitler speech of 20 February was anticipated everywhere with great interest.. In contrast to other
occasions there was no apathy this time. Everybody was eager to know what Hitler would have to say, , and what
his position on Austria was. Schuschnigg’s speech had put he middle class opposition in a very good mood. People
were convinced that Hitler had suffered a defeat and that Austria would defend itself. We can also report that
within a few days active relations were established between Austria and middle class oppositional circles. Even in
Catholic circles there was new hope, and a reliance on Schuschnigg’s brave words. Thus was Hitler’s speech
anticipated with great excitement. It was a disappointment in so far as it was not possible to tell what Hitler
wanted. Nobody had expected that Hitler would, at this point, make a threatening war-like speech, without any
attempt to appease the West. So the effect of this speech was to increase the fear of war. Morale became more
depressed by the day. [. . . ] Radios were tuned to all the foreign stations, and everybody followed the course of
events, regardless of their political opinions.
Nevertheless the surprise was great on Friday morning. The wildest rumours spread immediately.: ‘War
has broken out.’ From Friday afternoon until 1 o’clock on Saturday, when the Führer’s proclamation became
148
Ibid, 1938, pp. 253-4
125
known, there was an unprecedented mood of panic. It was possible during these critical hours to form a picture of
how people would behave in the event of war breaking out.
Imagine the situation on Thursday 10 March: general political excitement, but no real unrest yet, because
Hitler’s intentions remained unknown. In the streets the normal scene. Suddenly there are rumours that the
garrison has been mobilised. And by evening the first divisions are already leaving Munich. I watched the
departure of the Intelligence Division in the Leonrodstrasse. The soldiers were so serious, that one knew that they
were not going on manoeuvres. Kitted out for war, and without any great fuss, they immediately aroused great
attention everywhere, although people are used to seeing marching soldiers. An onlooker asked me ‘What’s
happening?’. - ‘War, perhaps’ I answered. Immediately he struck up a conversation, in which he showed all of his
fear. As we parted he said, with an anxious face: ‘Who knows. perhaps we’ll all be dead by tomorrow’.
Early on Friday a lot of divisions were seen leaving [. . .] It was noticeable that there was little discussion
to be heard. People were extraordinarily serious. Most seem to understand - in contrast to 1914 - what a war
means.
On Friday evening all motor vehicles were requisitioned. Petrol could only be obtained with a special
pass. There was now a noticeable agitation in the town. You could see people running, fear on their faces. And
among them more soldiers. Extraordinary numbers of trucks, lots of people in the town centre. There was a state of
silent mobilisation.. It was now clear that war was just around the corner. There were few lighted windows to be
seen during the night. Many people were afraid that the first enemy planes would come that night.
Early on Saturday everything was in a state of agitation. Groups of women stood in front of grocers’
shops before they opened. The town was alive at seven in the morning as never before. . People ran past each
other, everybody handsome errand to see to. Queues formed in front of the shops. Bakeries were so completely
sold out that they had to close early. The police (der Ordnungsdienst) tried to persuade people that all this buying
was nonsense, but nobody paid any attention. Everybody wanted to cover themselves for the next few days,
because if the air raids came they would not be able to leave their houses. In some cases, accompanied by loud
protests from those waiting, the police demanded that shops closed.
The departure of the troops on Friday and Saturday went off without any sign of enthusiasm. There was
no sign anywhere of a fighting mood. When women discovered their relatives in the marching ranks, there were
moving farewell scenes. One mother tried to run between the rows and hold her son back. She kept shouting: ‘Stay
here Franzl, stay here!’. Nobody challenged the woman. She was pushed back by the soldiers. The soldiers
themselves had very serious faces. There was no singing, and there were no political demonstrations.
April/ May 1938
After the annexation of Austria and the ‘Plebiscite for the re-unification of Austria with the German Reich’, which
was simultaneously an election to the Reichstag, the heat was turned on Czechoslovakia. Nazi propaganda in the
Sudetenland made use of the close economic and ‘ethnographic’ links between communities on either side of the
border, particularly in Saxony. An especially effective form of German propaganda in the Sudetenland in 1938
was advertising for workers. ‘The more noticeable labour shortages became in Germany, the more the Bohemian
border areas were treated as a reserve pool of labour.’ Reich Germans were recruited first, and then Czech citizens,
both for work on the land, and in successful industries near the border. Beyond the economic rationale of covering
labour shortages, however, there was a propaganda dimension to the exercise. Only those workers belonging to the
Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP) or its affiliated organisations were accepted.
On 25 March the Ascher Zeitung (in Czechoslovakia) advertised for all unemployed Germans to meet at
a public house the following Sunday and bring their passports with them. The purpose was to recruit labour for the
Reichsbahn (state railways):
July 1938
The question of how far the German people is psychologically prepared for war is of decisive significance in
assessing Germany’s preparedness for war. From reports coming in to us independently of each other from all
parts of the Reich, it can be established that this moral potential for war is much smaller than it was in 1914.
Furthermore, the attitude of the people to war, on the basis of these reports, can be summed up in the following
observations: 1. The great mass of the people fear war, nobody believes Germany could win; 2. A large part of the
younger generation has been won over for war by the regime’s propaganda; 3. Substantial groups among the
regime’s opponents wish for war because they are convinced that the dictatorship can only be overthrown through
war, and they prefer a terrible end to endless terror. The following excerpts are taken from the most recently
arrived reports:
NORTH-WEST GERMANY: It is not true that the German people is enthusiastic for war. Whoever forms his
judgement about the German people from mass demonstrations, can unfortunately be all too easily come to the
false conclusion that the people stands in closed ranks behind the National Socialist movement. The superficial
observer sees arms soaring in the air and concludes from this uniformity of this movement that people have an
inner sense of common purpose.
In reality the attitude towards the war is different among different groups in the population. Without
doubt the fundamental feeling is that war will be dreadful. But a section of the working class has, apparently
through a certain fatalism, already come to terms with it, just as they have had to come to terms with so many
other unpleasant things over the years. That war is coming is something like unalterable destiny. One cannot avoid
it.
126
The effects of brown propaganda are already noticeable among young people on the other hand, without them
being under the spell of National Socialism, and without the people themselves being conscious of it. The
incredible pressure of an exclusively one-sided influence is difficult to resist.
[. . .]
For our comrades war is the only hope. As difficult as it is for true friends of peace, they see no other
way to the overthrow of the dictatorship.
A large part of Hitler’s fanatical following - not all - is against the war. They believe that Hitler does not
seriously want war, that he is only bluffing. They believe in Hitler’s reassurances of peace. These people simply do
not recognise that the regime’s entire domestic and foreign policy must lead to war, and that all the Nazis’
preparations are orientated towards it. They will only wake up, when the war is there.
SOUTH-WEST GERMANY: First Report: The general mood among Hitler’s opponents can be summed up in the
sentence ‘If only there would be a war.’ People simply cannot imagine any other end to the dictatorship than defeat
in war. This mood is by no means restricted to Socialists, it extends into some Catholic circles as well. People
simply say: It cannot be worse than it is now, anything is better than this dictatorship. So they wish for war,
although they are actually against war in principle. If the French came today, they would be cheered by a large
section of the population, even if they came under French occupation. Nobody thinks about the consequences a
war could have. It’s the same as the Reichswehr illusion: the hope for war is greatest among the politically
uneducated, who for years have believed that one day the Reichswehr will overthrow Hitler.
BAVARIA: [. . . ]The attitude among young people is different. It wants to go forward and sees in the Nazis the
multipliers of German power and greatness. To win them over to war should not be difficult. How long it would
last is another thing. At youth rallies where the situation in Czechoslovakia was described there were shouts of
‘We want war! - Smash them! To Prague!’ Young people are the most convinced that Germany will have great
military successes in a future war. ‘The advantages the others have in firepower and food, we have in speed.’ said
one young functionary.
In oppositional circles, and also among Catholics the resolute attitude of Czechoslovakia has aroused
great sympathy. ‘At last Hitler has found resistance, and he has found not at the Black Sea but in the Sudetenland.’
The deeper the hatred of the regime, the greater the enjoyment. There will be a war, people say, Hitler can only go
on at the cost of a war. War is the great hope of the opposition, for the general conviction is that only war can
overthrow fascism. If war is to come, it is better that it comes soon. But Hitler lost confidence. What will he do
now? Is he waiting for a better opportunity, or will he attack anyway if there is no other way out? And will the
others be vigilant? Will the western powers be loyal to Czechoslovakia? Won’t Britain make concessions again
and seek an understanding with Germany? - These are the questions which occupy the minds of those who follow
events from a politically informed position, and want the fall of the regime at any price. Such attitudes are these
days increasingly to be found in certain intellectual circles as well.
[. . .]
Military circles are very pessimistic about coming developments. A senior officer from the Munich garrison said in
a conversation that the Czech air force and the Czech artillery are excellent. In his opinion, Czechoslovakia could
resist alone for three months. That would be enough to bring the others into the war. Although the German army is
better prepared and will have great success at the beginning of the war, it will have to be a short war if Germany
wants to win. He himself does not now believe there will be a war. - Similar views are to be heard among officers
generally. Czech mobilisation has had a very sobering effect. 149
SOUTH-WEST GERMANY: Soldiers are becoming more discontented month by month. There are general
complaints that their treatment and the food are much worse than a year ago. Formerly it was the case that soldiers
thought that the first year was bad and the second year much better. Now those who six months ago wanted to
serve longer , say ‘I’m not doing another day.’ And this is not only the case among the sons of working class
families, but among men from the families of civil servants and from families whose politics are thoroughly
nationalist. Even the sons of war veterans are no exception. Some examples:
A young man who has a leading position in the HJ (Hitler Youth) wanted six months ago to volunteer as
soon as he was seventeen. Now, under the effect of stories from his elder brother, who is already in the army, he
prefers to wait until they send for him.
A soldier who had volunteered for labour service, and had gone willingly into the army, is now very
unhappy.
[. . .]
Everywhere is the same: if somebody leaves the army, he wants nothing more to do with the SA and the
SS.150
10.6
The Munich Agreement
GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been
already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the
following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this
agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfilment:
149
150
Ibid, pp. 684-8
Ibid., p. 691
127
(1) The evacuation will begin on 1st October.
(2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th
October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be
held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.
(3) The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed
of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.
(4) The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1st October.
The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order:
The territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October; the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of
October; the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October; the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and
7th of October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the aforesaid
international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.
(5) The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to
be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The
same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the
Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite
will be held.
(6) The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. The commission
will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain
exceptional cases, minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be
transferred without plebiscite.
(7) There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six
months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the
option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the
said transfer.
(8) The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from
their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak
Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment
for political offences.
Munich, September 29, 1938.
ADOLF HITLER,
NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
EDOUARD DALADIER,
BENITO MUSSOLINI.151
10. 7
Sopade Reports on the Munich Crisis
September 1938
a) Before the Munich Agreement
In the weeks before the Munich agreement the fear of war which had long been present in Germany reached its
high point. We have reported year in and year out in these pages that the great majority of the German people does
not want war. Despite the regime’s uninhibited war propaganda this did not change during the last few weeks. As
always there were exceptions to this general feeling during the last few weeks. There were many people who were
completely convinced right up to the meeting in Godesberg that Hitler was only bluffing, that he was in no
circumstances in any position to risk a war. You cannot wage war against the whole world, they said, when even
before it starts you have to take down park railings because of the shortage of iron. As always, there were also
groups of people who were in favour of war. Young people were in favour of war, in so far as they had not become
involved with the military. Nazi functionaries were also in favour of war - provided that they had not been at the
front during the last one. Many opponents of the regime were also in favour of war, because they believed that it
would lead to the rapid collapse of the regime.
A war for the ‘liberation’ of the Sudetenland would have been anything but popular. Several reports
indicate that despite the extent and approach of German propaganda it was not successful in winning over the
German people for the Sudeten Germans’ ‘liberation struggle’. There was some enthusiasm for the annexation of
Austria, but never for the annexation of the Sudetenland. Even the Nazis were not able to get such a movement off
the ground.
If it had come to a war this time, then it is possible to say without exaggeration that the moral potential
for war would have been much weaker in Germany than in the western democracies, still less than that of the
Czech people. Germany was not ready for war - either technically, or financially, and least of all psychologically.
b) After the Munich Agreement
[. . . ]
Again, Hitler achieved his goal without war. That too will not fail to make an impression on the German people.
Right up to the last minute fear of war was on the increase among the broadest sections of the population. Is it not
inevitable, in the wake Hitler’s most recent bloodless victory, that anxiety will give way to the conviction that
151
Source: Yale Law School Avalon (Documents) Project: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon
128
Hitler can demand what he wants, and the others will always give in? Will the Führer’s megalomania not spread to
ever broader sections of the population?
South West Germany: The Munich Agreements have enraged the Nazis’ opponents. Large numbers of workers
feel that in future Hitler will be able to get whatever he wants. In many circles people are more or less furious at
the behaviour of France and Britain. And one finds this mood even among people whom one would never have
considered opponents of the Nazis. [. . . ]
Of course some are happy that the Sudeten German districts are united with the Reich, but there is no
trace of enthusiasm. Many people ask: ‘Why doesn’t Mussolini hand over the hundreds of thousands of South
Tyroleans, who are better Germans anyway?’.
Ruhr Valley: After the dull tension of the last few weeks the results of Munich affected the population like the
happy ending of a wonderful fairy tale. This great joy was related only to the fact that the immediate danger of war
was removed. Diverse as attitudes to Hitler’s policies may be, everybody is agreed on one point: Hitler’s power
has been enormously reinforced yet again. [. . . ]
Catholics, and particularly Catholic workers, have mixed feelings. Like everybody else, they too are
glad that war has been temporarily avoided. Nevertheless they are concerned at the strengthening of Hitler’s
power, and expect a renewal of his reckless domestic policies, which will hit Catholic circles very hard.
The prevailing mood among Social Democratic workers is one of desperation. We too were relieved
when it became clear that the great slaughter had been postponed. But every one of us also knows that war was not
avoided due to Hitler’s love of peace, but through a serious defeat of democratic politics. We are saying to each
other quite simply that war will certainly come, , and the longer it is postponed by the sacrifices of the
Democracies, the more dreadful it will be. We realise, with impotent rage, that the great democracies betray all
their friends again and again , if it enables them to escape themselves.
[. . .]
Danzig (1 October): A strong sense of relief took hold of the population of Danzig yesterday. You could see this
feeling in the face of almost everybody you met in the street. On Friday the streets presented a very unusual
picture. Danzig is usually dead in the evenings. All the more remarkable then were the large numbers of people on
the streets until late into the night, standing on street corners chatting, or sitting in bars and coffee houses, or in
working class districts standing on doorsteps in groups. I went through the whole city, visiting all kinds of districts.
Everywhere it was the same picture.
Most noticeable were the many drunks one saw staggering through the streets. It was ‘fortunate’ that
Friday was pay day for the workers and the last day of the month for clerks and civil servants. People risked a few
Gulden in order to ‘feel human’ again. One saw drunks from all classes. 152
November 1938
[. . .] The reincorporation of the Saarland and the reintroduction of general conscription in 1935 brought the regime
great and lasting propaganda successes among the lower middle classes and the peasants, if not among the working
class. It is already clear that the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland have not had the same effect. Reports
from the Reich are in agreement that normal life has been resumed surprisingly quickly. The man in the street
says: Hitler took Austria and it hasn’t made anything any better. Now we had to have collections for the ‘poor
Austrians’ as well. Now he’s taken the Sudetenland and it still won’t get better and we shall have to have
collections for the ‘poor Sudetenlanders’.
[. . .]
These observations do not alter the fact, however, that the man in the street says, at the same time: Hitler
always succeeds.
BAVARIA: It might have been expected that the great success against Czechoslovakia would have boosted the
party at home and enhanced the image of the regime. After all, to unite all Germans in one Reich, and, moreover,
to do it without a war, is surely an achievement which ought to bring popular acclaim. It is very surprising,
therefore, that all the reports from here are in agreement in he observation that the conquest of the Sudetenland has
had even less effect than the occupation of Austria. One almost has the impression that people do not know how to
measure the scale of this foreign policy success. Although people were glad that war had been avoided once again,
but for many this was as far as the celebration went. What have we gained with the Sudetenlanders? This was the
question ordinary people are asking. People had read continuously in the press how poor and starved the
Sudetenland was, how devastated its industry etc. As a matter of course there followed great collections and
deductions from wages on behalf of the poor Sudeten Germans, which had the effect of confirming the newspaper
reports. So what do the Sudetenlanders bring with them? New taxes, more collections, more sacrifices, new Hitler
fanatics! In the same way the Austrians were referred as ‘stupid’, the Sudeten Germans are referred to as ‘thick
Bohemians’. One reason for the astonishing ineffectiveness of this Hitler success seems to be the ever increasing
depoliticisation of the people. Whatever is written in Germany about the growing power and greatness of the
Reich, the experience of ordinary people is little more than that they have to work more in order to stay alive. So
what good to people are the Sudetenlanders? It’s nice that it was achieved without a war, and that all Germans are
now together, but even the Hitlerite middle classes reflect any further than this on the matter. Some sections of the
younger generation might get carried away by Hitler’s great power plans, but not most people.
152
Deutschland-Berichte, 1938 pp. 913-944
129
In middle classes circles a war is still thought to be unavoidable. The weakness of the democracies has
undermined any respect for their foreign policy, and French foreign policy in particular is despised. Nevertheless
people are convinced that the Western powers give in because their rearmament is incomplete. It will take another
year or two and the England will say ‘no’ and there will be a war. And everybody knows that England will be able
to hold out longer with its arms than Germany. In addition the German press reports the increasing rearmament of
other states every day. If there are no particular shortages of groceries at present, everybody is gradually coming to
feel nevertheless that there is ‘enough to manage’, but that that will not do indefinitely, and in particular that a war
cannot be won in this way. People are convinced: a war will come when Britain is fully rearmed, and Germany
will probably lose it.
Despite all the official propaganda, popular attitudes to Italy have not become any more sympathetic.
Those travelling in Italy with ‘Strength through Joy’ add to this feeling by reporting that the Italians are not really
sympathetic towards the Germans and that Italian workers speak harshly of Mussolini.153
10. 8
Hitler Speech at the Berlin Sportpalast, 26 September, 1938
The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger
that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know well
enough that I should not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic Constitution. For these democracies
which indulge in phrases about peace are the most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no democracy,
but a man; and with him I succeeded, in precisely twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years
in the first instance, entirely removed the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring
lasting pacification. We realise that here are two peoples which must live together and neither of which can do
away with the other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way for understanding,
then, had to be found; it has been found; and it will be ever further extended. Certainly things were hard in this
area. The nationalities and small national groups frequently quarrelled among themselves. But the main fact is that
the two Governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two
countries, possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more
worth than all the chattering in the League of Nations Palace at Geneva. 154
10.9
Sopade Reports on Preparations for War
The General Situation in Germany, January 1939
Last month we reported a deterioration in the general mood in Germany, which meant that the attitude
of population to the dictatorship was more critical after a year of undreamed of foreign policy successes than it was
a year previously. The National Socialists are fully aware of this fact. [. . .]
The deterioration of morale has affected the middle classes above all. The expectation that these circles
above all would applaud Hitler’s foreign policy successes has not been met. The attitude of the middle classes
towards the dictatorship is now determined by other factors . . . We take the following from a report from Saxony.
It comes from a reporter with a middle class background, who is not associated with the Social Democratic
movement, but has many links with businessmen, intellectuals and officers:
It is dreadful to have to live in a country whose government not only tolerates such shameless things as
Jewish pogroms, but orders them, and wants to provide a legal basis for them. One would be ashamed to be
German if one did not know that the majority of the people is united in its passionate rejection of these brutalities.
Among my circle of acquaintances there is not a single person who is not filled with outrage at this outbreak of
bestiality, which one recognises only from the bleakest ages of human history. Even long-standing members of the
party try to plead their innocence, and again and again one hears them saying: ‘This is not what I wanted’.
During the worst days of the persecution of the Jews, a number of my acquaintances, among them even
senior civil servants, were eager to help the Jews in defiance of Nazi threats, and often gave them cover for several
days in their own homes, and made great efforts to help them flee abroad.
How senseless the destruction of property was; it was reckoned in millions and in the end is a loss to the
whole nation. It is quite right that the foreign insurers who underwrite the German companies have refused to pay
up for damages caused on the orders of the government. It is also logical that most people refuse to carry on saving
empty toothpaste tubes and sardine tins when they are forced to look on as those in authority order a massive
destruction of property.
The operation against the Jews has created new and bitter enemies for the regime not least among the
upper middle classes, who were initially very sympathetic to National Socialism, and who have only gradually
moved towards a sort of opposition. On social occasions, tea parties, musical evenings and so on, one finds that
fewer and fewer official party functionaries have been invited. It is the done thing in such circles these days to
distance oneself from the Nazi regime. And at those gatherings where one is not being watched or overheard, the
regime and its senior representatives are the objects of sarcastic irony and passionate complaint. Propaganda
Minister Goebbels is the object of particularly lively criticism, but the other worthies are not spared either. Hitler
himself, whose name was once scarcely mentioned in such discussions, is increasingly charged with the main
responsibility for all these events, on account of his silence, toleration and even his overt defence of them. On such
153
154
Ibid. pp. 1161-1163.
Avalon Project: Documents cited in the Official Records of the Tribunal, British Blue Book
130
occasions one often comes across senior Reichswehr officers who make no secret of their aversion to the regime:
indeed, they are the leading critics. For example: An air force officer, stationed in northern Germany was present
at a gathering at the house of a friend of mine. He reported of his officer corps that all sworn Nazis are avoided
like the plague, and attempts are made to obstruct them in every possible way. ‘If only the whole German people
shared our attitude’, he added ‘things would be much better in Germany’. [. . .]
Yet however numerous these signs of an inner rejection of the regime; however widespread the disapproval of its
acts and the emergence of individual opposition, none of it yet constitutes a serious threat to Hitler . . . At best
these developments find their political expression in a sort of passive resistance [Resistenz], which is reflected in a
thousand aspects of everyday life. [. . .]155
February 1939
The dominant factor in the general mood Germany still appears to be anxiety about war. The German people lives
in expectation of a war. Not that people believe that such a war might break out tomorrow or the day after. But
they cannot imagine that the whole thing can end in anything other than a war. Not that they are in a position to
understand the extent of international tensions. But they see how Germany increases war its preparations for war
daily.156
March 1939
In the period covered by this report Germany’s relationship with Poland has moved to the focal point of European
politics since the conquest of Czechoslovakia and Memel. [. . .]
Danzig: On the day the Easter holidays began, on 28 March, all school halls and gyms in Danzig were cleared.
Infantry weapons and police uniforms were transported to the halls. Large quantities of straw have also been taken
to schools. The uniforms are supposed to be for the SA. It was also very noticeable that even on Saturday 1 April ,
further transports of weapons were stored in two schools [. . .]157
10.10
The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact
The Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desirous of
strengthening the cause of peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R and proceeding from the fundamental
provisions of the Neutrality Agreement concluded in April 1926 between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached
the following agreement:
ARTICLE I
Both High Contracting Parties obligate, themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and
any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers.
ARTICLE II
Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other
High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power.
ARTICLE III
The Governments of the two High Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain continual contact with one
another for the purpose of consultation in order to exchange information on problems affecting their common
interests.
ARTICLE IV
Neither of the two High Contracting Parties shall participate in any grouping of powers whatsoever that is directly
or indirectly aimed at the other party.
ARTICLE V
Should disputes or conflicts arise between the High Contracting Parties over problems of one kind or another, both
parties shall settle these disputes or conflicts exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion or, if necessary,
through the establishment of arbitration commissions.
ARTICLE VI
The present treaty is concluded for a period of ten years, with the provision that, in so far as one of the High
Contracting Parties does not denounce it one year prior to the expiration of this period, the validity of this treaty
shall automatically be extended for another five years.
ARTICLE VI
The present treaty shall be ratified within the shortest possible time. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin.
The agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is signed.
Done in duplicate, in the German and Russian languages.
MOSCOW, August 23, 1939.
For the Government of the German Reich:
V. RIBBENTROP
With full power of the Government of the U.S.S.R.:
V. MOLOTOV
155
Deutschland-Berichte, 1939 pp.9-12.
Ibid, p. 119.
157
Ibid. p.267.
156
131
10.11
Popular opinion and civilian morale following the Invasion of Poland
10.11.1 Sopade Reports
August-October 1939
I. The War
1. The Invasion of Poland
The following reports confirm two well-known facts: Firstly, the unimaginable brutality of Germany’s behaviour
and, secondly, the fact that the action against Poland - in contrast to a war against Britain or France - is approved
of by many sections of the German people. (We repeatedly drew attention to this fact in the last months before the
outbreak of the war; . . . )
DANZIG: Anti-Polish sentiment in Danzig has increased with the outbreak of the war. We can explain that by the
fact that people did not want a war and hold the Poles responsible. One could hear extremely anti-Polish remarks
being made by people who are in no way Nazis and who have otherwise been quite reasonable in their
observations. [. . .]
SOUTH-WEST GERMANY: I have already repeatedly reported that the war against Poland is, by and large,
extremely popular among the German people. So the operations against Poland did not exactly lead to a
deterioration of popular morale. Only after it became increasingly clear, despite all attempts to jam radio signals,
that it had led to war with the West as well, did a somewhat more subdued mood emerge. With observations such
as these, however, one must always remember that attitudes vary to such an extent between different social groups
that one can scarcely make general statements.
CENTRAL GERMANY: In the last few weeks before the outbreak of war flysheets were distributed in the area
around Genthin, Tangermünde and Havelberg, which claimed that the Poles even wanted to conquer this area.
Now even the last grumblers would understand that the Führer’s action against Poland was perfectly justified.
These flysheets did not fail to make an impression on people, and they were easily persuaded that they had to
defend their homeland [Heimat] against the Polish threat. [. . .]
The latest report from Brandenburg Province indicates a different sort of popular attitude:
Polish prisoners of war have been held at the lime works near X since the middle of September. Local people took
a great interest in the prisoners and gave them whatever they could. Thereupon the Nazis intervened and although
people were not forbidden outright to give things to the prisoners, they were forbidden to hand over their gifts in
person. Instead the items have to be left at the guard room, in order to be passed on to the prisoners. In reality
everything is passed on to the NS Welfare Organisation.
Finally there is the following report from Berlin:
There is widespread doubt about the numbers of wounded announced so far [. . .]158
II. The Situation at Home
1. The General Mood
Reports do not yet permit reliable conclusions to be drawn about the present mood of the German
people. What was true earlier is doubly so in wartime: in a country where free public opinion is suppressed by all
possible means it is much less consistent than in a free country. The following two reports from neutral travellers,
which describe the mood in western Germany should be read with this disclaimer in mind.
First Report: I had already got into conversation with SS men on the train. They were self-important and
boastful. Poland was finished and nobody, neither England nor France, would be able to re-establish it as an
independent state. Especially not England, which would be destroyed in this war, if it really lasted.
Indeed, many people whom I had previously known thought level-headed, and very reticent towards the
regime were intoxicated by the invasion of Poland. Even women. I met a woman who had always been very nice
to me. Now she was very agitated and attacked me with reproaches. We - i.e. my compatriots and I - were to blame
for the war according to the woman. When I asked in astonishment how we, who are after all neutral, could be to
blame, the woman replied: We know all about that sort of pretence. She knew this holier-than-thou approach,
which was only a means of staying nicely out of the war. There was no real neutrality. It was all lies and treachery.
The British, those grocers, were inciting the whole world against Germany, just because they did not want to give
up any of their wealth. And they had other people do their fighting for them. Why did England not let us,
Germany, sort out our own affairs with Poland? Because they were afraid that Germany might become too strong.
But England would see what it would get out of this war. This time British domination would be finished.
The Nazis are madder than ever. Yes indeed, they say, we know that Hitler wanted this war against
Poland. Of course they approve of co-operation between Hitler and Stalin. Hitler has taken England for a ride, he
had been too smart for the British. Russia would be sorted out. At some point Hitler would call Russia to a halt.
‘It’s high time somebody showed the British that they can’t rule the world forever.’ That was the reasoning behind
the Führer’s tactics. [. . .]
Only one woman, who had just come from Czechoslovakia, was critical. This woman is a Sudeten
German, she was a supporter of Henlein before the occupation of the Sudetenland and, like many others,
welcomed the annexation of the Sudeten territories. She is the wife of the owner of a large factory. This woman
wailed: ‘Where will it all end? We were so happy before, compared with now. We were doing well and the people
had enough to eat too. Now there are shortages of everything. If only we had known.
158
Deutschlandberichte 1939, pp. 965-968
132
Of course, not everybody is carried away. But it must be admitted that the number of those who try to
understand, who think in relatively objective terms, is very small. Not that the majority are enthusiastic and only
the minority is calm. Oh no! There is no enthusiasm anywhere. Among the majority it is more a case of rage and
hatred, which leads to loud outbursts. Everybody wants peace, but the regime’s supporters believe that it is Britain
that is breaking the peace, and opponents believe that it is Hitler’s fault if war now breaks over Europe.
The minority consists of political people from the middle class and the older working class. These
groups are very anxious. They are still uncertain in estimating the chances for Germany in the war. Hitler has
always been successful so far, and it is impossible to tell how things will end this time. Perhaps the British and the
French have miscalculated. [ . . .]
Second Report: My old acquaintances in X and then in Y stormed me with a thousand questions. They were better
informed about the military and political situation than I had assumed. There was hardly one of them who did not
listen to German language broadcasts from foreign radio stations.
But it struck me that people in all social classes talked much more about food than politics. Everybody is
worked up about the question about how they get their rations. How can I get myself a little bit more.159
November 1939
After the Assassination Attempt in Munich
The general mood in Germany during the last few weeks has naturally been dominated by the assassination
attempt in the Munich Bier Keller. It is not the task of these reports to enter into the guessing games about whether
the attempt was set up by the Gestapo, or by Hitler’s opponents in his own party. We must restrict ourselves to
describing the popular responses to the attempt. The following reports have been received:
BERLIN, First report: The assassination attempt was a bigger surprise than the pact with Russia. The excitement
was immense. The wildest rumours circulated. Hitler himself had been killed. it was not true at all that he was
already back in Berlin. Hess was also dead, Goering had been spared because he was not in Munich. He had
definitely known in advance that something was going to happen. The attempt had been instigated by the Goering
clique. It had been carried out by the army, and much else besides. There was almost nobody who would not have
been greatly agitated by the affair. The foreign radio stations contributed a great deal to this excitement and were
listened to a great deal during these days, particular the British.
Finally, however, official propaganda, managed to prevail in this case too. A few days after the
assassination attempt it was widely held that it had been done by the British. Official German propaganda had an
easy task in so far as nobody was in a position to find any other explanation that was even remotely plausible.160
Source: Deutschland-Berichte 1939 p. 1023.
10.11.2 SD Reports on the Domestic Political Situation at the Outbreak of War
23 October 1939
The general mood is calm. The continuing desire for peace among a large section of the population,
which is expressed in the most diverse rumours about secret peace negotiations with France, has not, in general,
undermined the inner will to fight. [. . .]
In several districts, particularly in the countryside, it has been noticed that political rumours have been
spread by soothsayers, clairvoyants, gypsies etc., which in many cases have spread confusion among the people.
Rumours to be heard in various parts of the country, that by a certain date - generally in the near future - the war is
to be halted, generally originate from such quarters. [. . .]
The generally positive mood has recently given rise in many parts to the emergence of war humour. . .
For example, a satirical song to the tune of ‘O Christmas tree’, with the words ‘O Chamberlain, O chamberlain,
what is to be come of you’ soon spread across the entire country; and a mock prayer: ‘Father Chamberlain, which
art in London, cursed be thy name, thy kingdom perish. . .’161
Source:
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 17) 17 November 1939
I. General Mood and Situation
Following the lack of success of Dutch-Belgian attempts to begin peace negotiations, rumours of an
imminent major attack on Great Britain are circulating among the public. [. . .]
It is reported from Würzburg, Dresden and Bremen that local Party and/or NSV branches have written
letters to various people in their districts in which those concerned were severely reprimanded for donating too
little in the last Winter Relief collections. These letters are said to have been crass and written without detailed
knowledge of the economic position of recipients. They have therefore created disaffection among the populations
of the districts concerned.
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 18) 20 November 1939
I. General Mood and Situation
159
Ibid. pp. 975-7
Ibid., p. 1023
161
Meldungen, 2, pp. 361-362
160
133
Spreading of rumours by soothsayers, clairvoyants, gypsy women etc.
The rumour-mongering by soothsayers, clairvoyants, gypsy women etc. has increased again recently,
particularly in rural areas. Most of the rumours are about the end of the war, which is still predicted at some point
in the very near future. Similar rumours have been spread in the areas around Reichenberg, Salzburg and Bayreuth
by gypsy women. It is reported from Königsberg that the gypsy village on the outskirts of the town there is
veritably over-run with ‘seekers of the truth’. It is reported from Silesia that in various villages there the stupid
custom of horoscopes is spreading.162
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 29) 15 December 1939
I. General
The general mood is good. The radio and press announcements relating to the false rumours about
Christmas have been welcomed everywhere. It has also been very good for morale that a large part of the armed
forces has been granted leave, or the prospect of leave, at Christmas or immediately afterwards. Interest in foreign
policy has receded of late.
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 31) 20 December 1939
I. General
The news of the sinking of the armoured ship ‘Graf Spee’ was a surprise for the public. The way in
which the press had reported the Graf Spee’s battle off the River Plate estuary led a large part of the population to
misunderstand the position of the ship completely. [. . . ] The order of the Führer himself to sink the ship was
almost universally understood, and not criticised in any way.
The reshuffle in the British cabinet, which came as a surprise to German public opinion, has created the
general impression that there is a measure of uncertainty within the British government , and this has had a
generally positive effect on popular morale. On the other hand, the announcement that Field Marshal Goering is to
take over the management of the war economy has reinforced the impression of our own strength. It has also given
rise to a general confidence that the shortages of coal and potatoes will be quickly overcome. 163
162
163
Meldungen, 3, pp. 475-476
Ibid, p. 573; p. 589; p. 627
134
11.
World War II and the Nazi New Order in Europe
11.1.1
The General Situation in Germany (Completed on 8 January 1940)
1. Enigmatic Germany
It is more difficult than ever to give a reliable assessment of the general situation in Germany, and in
particular of the morale of the German people. The reports which we have received in the last few weeks do not
permit an unambiguous conclusion. The best general overviews are those of two foreigners, one by an American,
and the other by a neutral European. [. . .]
An American on the German people
The following letter comes from an American who spent some time both before and after the outbreak of war in all
parts of Germany except the East:
In my experience the outbreak of war has contributed more to weakening the Hitler myth than anything that has
ever been said against Hitler. When I speak of ‘weakening’ I mean the beginnings of a process, not the immediate
destruction of faith in Hitler. The psychology of most Germans is not easy for us Americans to understand. We
have never really known anything like a leader cult. . . Something in the German character has a tendency towards
the hero-worship and fanatical defence of deified Kaiser or Hitler or whoever. Thus most Germans, including
Hitler’s opponents, had actually convinced themselves that Hitler would succeed in doing everything ‘peacefully’,
he would avoid war, and achieve who knows what else besides. These people have received rather a smart shock . .
. A different characteristic of these noisy and apparently self-confident people has been revealed; that is that they
suddenly no longer really believe in themselves and expect help from other quarters.
I want to illustrate this with the example of one man, whom I have known for some months, a lawyer
who is in part ‘racially’ Jewish. Although effectively ejected from the Volksgemeinschaft he defended Hitler’s
foreign policy as great. When I set him thinking about the effects of the conquest of Czechoslovakia on Britain and
America, he said triumphantly that it would soon be forgotten. I replied that he should remember that France had
not forgotten Alsace-Lorraine for 44 years, and that world had not forgotten Belgium for four years of war. There
may have been power political considerations, of course, but the moral forces, or even the psychological reactions
to German policy were strong. The exceptionally talented and well-educated gentleman merely smiled in a
superior way. And it was not only in him that I encountered this cynicism, unintelligent in its ignorance of the
world. I would almost like to believe that in Germany, more than in other large states, there people with
outstanding expert knowledge, who are courteous, well-brought up, but who show a contempt, of which they
themselves are scarcely aware, for the world beyond Germany’s borders. Forgive me if I term this ‘deutsche
Dummheit’. (The two words are in German in the English text). [. . .]
Travel Report of a neutral European
My second journey into the Third Reich brought me back to major cities in western Germany. . . .
When I attempt to put down on paper the contradictory diversity of my impressions from observations and
conversations, I am guided by the wish to give more than a simple summary of details. To state the essential
briefly: a psychological transformation is taking place among the German people under the effects of war, albeit
slowly, accompanied by severe labour pains, and not without backsliding.
This time I did not leave to chance my discussions with people in the Third Reich - in so far as they were
concerned with political matters. . . . During these ten days I met very few people who spoke out against the
regime openly and unconditionally. Naturally, a much of this was due to reserve towards a foreigner, although that
was not the decisive reason. Every conversation I had with a German started with the premise that Germany was
involved in a defensive war and that one had to stand by one’s country in wartime. The spiritual isolation behind
the iron curtain, and the effects of propaganda, sharpened by fear of the consequences of any expression of a
different opinion, removes people further and further from all discussion of German foreign policy. I continuously
heard the same neat sentence: ‘England started this war’. This simple sentence . . . silences complaints about food
shortages and ration coupons. At the moment belief in the miracle of German victory is in full bloom.
[. . .]
During our discussion [with the concierge of a block of flats in an industrial town] visitors arrived. Two older
metal workers, taciturn Westphalians, who obviously wanted to discuss confidential matters with their friend.
Although both the doormen vouched for my credentials, my own attempts to tempt some political or social
observations from the visitors were entirely unsuccessful. Not that it was mistrust! I merely find my own
observation confirmed: the working people of Germany, who have undergone so many trials, consciously isolate
themselves with their interests and feelings, from the rest of the world. Although National Socialism claims to have
replaced ‘classes’ with the ‘national community’ there were never such sharp social divisions during the republic
as there are now. [ . . .]164
11.1.2
The General Situation in Germany (Completed on 6 February 1940)
1. The Domestic Front
164
Deutschland-Berichte 1940 pp. 9-17
135
In the year 1937 the Reich Leader of the SS and Head of the German Police, Heinrich Himmler, gave a speech to
the officer corps of the armed forces in which he outlined the tasks of the German police in the event of war.
Although this speech was kept strictly secret its contents were published in Neuer Vorwärts on 26 September
1937. In this speech, Himmler said literally:
In a future war we shall have not only the army’s front on land, the navy’s front at sea and the air force’s
front in the air space above Germany, we shall have a fourth theatre of war as well: inside Germany
Now the war is here, and the talk is not just secret but quite open, although it is not of the theatre of war
of war inside Germany, but of ‘the domestic front’. Thus the regime itself confesses that it has to wage not only an
external war, but an internal one as well, that the dictatorship has not only external but also internal enemies and
that the totality of the National Socialist war also includes a conflict with its own people. [. . .]
RHINELAND-WESTPHALIA, [. . .] Second report: This is no longer any sort of life, the way we are force to live
now. Dictatorship everywhere, on the street, at home, everywhere constraint and subordination. Quite apart from
the shortages of fat, meat, coffee, tea, clothes and underwear, the heaviest burden on the family is that one is no
longer master of the way one’s children are educated. One has to stand by and watch as they are educated against
every principle that is sacred to us, watch them being spoiled. Schools and youth organisations are training
children to be spies on their own families, without the children realising what they are being used for. If one
opposes this, and tries to work against the school education, there is the fear that the children will be taken away
with the justification that the parents are unfit to bring up children. In Cologne there are hundreds of families
whose children are in the National Socialist educational home.
Wives and mothers are inundated with countless letters, treatises, pamphlets, exhortations and recipes.
The success of this propaganda is very small. . . . For this propaganda contributes nothing, it only means more
sacrifices. But what do mothers have left to sacrifice. They themselves have already had to give up everything.
And now the war takes the only things they have left: husband and children.165
11.1.3
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 75) 10 April 1940
I. General
The military occupation of Denmark and Norway has made a huge impression on the entire German
people and was welcomed with unanimously enthusiastic approval. . . . The events were the subject of lively
discussion everywhere, in town and country, at work and on the streets, , and further announcements about the
course of events are awaited with lively anticipation. . . . Expressions such as ‘The Führer was quicker than the
western powers yet again’ are to be heard everywhere. The measures are also seen as proof that the decisive
initiative in this war lies exclusively with Germany.166
Source:
During 1940 the general section of the daily reports of the SD was invariably dominated by reactions to war news.
During and after the attack on Scandinavia, the Low Countries and France, the reports emphasised widespread
jubilation, during the Battle of Britain excitement and growing impatience. Finally, in the autumn, the positive
mood gave way to a more uncertain one as people became convinced that the war would be a long one, and were
disappointed about the failure to launch a massive attack on Britain. In addition, German interference in Balkan
politics, combined with Italy’s unsuccessful invasion of Albania and Greece, confused popular opinion and
created fertile ground for rumour-mongering. (Many of the rumours turned out to be true).
April 1940
I. THE GENERAL SITUATION IN GERMANY
1. Attitudes to the War [. . .]
BERLIN: A mood has developed which is optimistic about the outcome of the war. It never even crosses the
minds of most people that Germany might lose this war. The petty bourgeoisie, so often cursed by Hitler, is least
of all inclined to think that the war could end in any other way than a German victory. 167 Only very people worry
about the way the war might end. Of course, many would like to see Hitler overthrown, but they have a mortal fear
about the consequences of defeat. People do not wish to believe in the possibility because they do not want to think
about the consequences, particularly the economic consequences, of defeat. 168
NB: The Sopade ceased to publish its reports from Germany shortly before the fall of Paris.
11.1.4
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 97) 17 June 1940
I. General
165
Ibid., p. 95
Meldungen, 4, p.975
167
Petty bourgeoisie is a very approximate translation of Spießertum, which is a pejorative term to describe particularly narrowminded and petty (lower) middle class people.
168
Deutschland-Berichte, 1940, p.229
166
136
The news of the entry of German troops into the French capital, which was surrendered without a fight,
was greeted in all parts of the Reich with unprecedented enthusiasm. In many streets and public squares there was
loud rejoicing, and heartfelt demonstrations of enthusiasm. In recognition of the strategic and moral significance of
this latest German victory, there was universal expression of the opinion that it would soon be followed by the
capitulation of the whole of France. Surprise at the fall of Paris was reported unanimously from all parts of the
Reich, although it was somewhat diminished by the fact that hours before the announcement there were rumours in
circulation that Paris had fallen.169
11.1.5
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 104) 11 July 1940
I. General
‘Is the war against England going to begin, and how long will it last?’ These are still the questions
which preoccupy the entire German people. The population is becoming more impatient by the day. Rumour and
speculation multiply. If the nature of the conflict with England has dominated conversation hitherto, there are now
more and more frequent rumours that peace negotiations have been initiated. Thus it was claimed recently, for
example, that Lloyd George and the Duke of Windsor were in Berlin to negotiate peace with the Reich
government, that Churchill had fled, the King of England was going to abdicate, and that there was to be a
complete reshuffle of the British government. It is particularly striking that astrological predictions are
increasingly taken into account again in speculation about coming events.
The secret Anglo-Zionist contract was scarcely taken seriously, and was generally made the subject of
popular humour.170
Source:
11.1.6
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 131) 10 October 1940
I. General
According to reports the present mood of the population is characterised by a certain nervousness,
which is explained in part by the anxieties, becoming apparent everywhere, about how long the war will last. It
also a consequence of the general political situation, which is unclear to most people. Although the people’s
general confidence in victory has by no means been shaken, there is nevertheless a noticeable impatience about
further military developments. The fact that the population only ever hears about the battle with England, and is
left in the dark about political developments, creates general uncertainty in political assessments, and this in turn
gives rise to widespread rumours. Thus there have been rumours in many parts of the Reich for several days that
German troops have invaded Romania. Other rumours add that these troops are on their way to Greece. Germany
has first of all to secure the sources of oil that are important for its supplies.
.
11.1.7 Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 133) 17 October 1940
I. General
The general mood continues to be characterised by uncertainty and impatience. Very few national
comrades still believe in that there is any end to the war in sight. The focus of interest remains the despatch of a
German military commission to Romania. 171
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 177) 7 April 1941
According to reports we have received so far from various parts of the Reich, the Führer’s proclamation
and the invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece by German troops at this early point has been a surprise, but has had
the effect of calming the population.172
11.1.8
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 196) 23 June 1941
I. General
According o the reports we have received from all parts of the Reich the news of the outbreak of war
with the Russia has caused great surprise among the population, above all the timing of the offensive in the East.
Widespread rumours in recent days of an imminent agreement with Russia and a visit by Stalin to the Reich have
contributed to this. Many were convinced that a conflict was no longer to be expected. [. . .] It is remarked with
pride that the Führer was quick to recognise the real intentions of both Russia and England. If Germany now
resorts to arms, then this is a necessity in order to destroy the plans and conspiracies of the real enemies. In the
view of many national comrades there would have had to be a conflict with Russia sooner or later anyway. At the
moment the great military machine of Germany and her allies is ready; any later it would perhaps have been more
difficult to annihilate decisively an enemy which was getting stronger and stronger. [. . .] The population is aware
of the gravity and the implications of this conflict, but the dominant mood is one of calm, collected confidence.
169
Meldungen, 4, p.975
Meldungen, 5, pp. 1362-1363
Ibid, pp. 1653-4, 1677
172
Meldungen, 6, pp. 2185-2186
170
171
137
The anxious say it will be very difficult to conquer these vast territories. Ultimately, however, there is always great
faith in the invincibility of German soldiers.173
11.1.9
Report on the Domestic Political Situation (No. 356) 4 February 1943
I. General
The announcement of the end of the battle in Stalingrad has been a deep shock for the whole people. The
speeches on 30 January, and the proclamation of the Führer have been kicked into the background by this event
and play a smaller part in national comrades’ serious conversations than the many questions about the events in
Stalingrad. The most common questions are about the number of sacrifices [Blutopfer]. Speculation ranges from
60,000 to 300,000. People estimate that the majority of those fighting at Stalingrad have been killed. People waver
between two points of view about those who have been taken prisoner. Some declare that being taken prisoner is
worse than death because the Bolsheviks will treat those whom they have taken alive in an inhuman way. But
others say that it is a good thing that not everybody has been killed, and that there is still a hope that some of the
will later return. It is the relatives of those at the Battle of Stalingrad who suffer particularly from these conflicting
responses and the uncertainty that arises from them.
[. . .]
There is a general belief that Stalingrad is a turning point in the war. While fighting spirits see Stalingrad as an
obligation to concentrate all forces on the front and at home in a final struggle, weaker characters are inclined dot
see the beginning of the end in Th. fall of Stalingrad.174
Source: Reports from Regional SD Offices 14 July 1944
General
The latest events, particularly the swift advance of the Russians have meant that the thoughtful mood of
the last few weeks has spread, and led to the spread of a certain anxiety yet again about the eastern front. Although
one cannot speak of a definite anxiety psychosis an increasingly pessimistic assessment of the present situation is
nevertheless noticeable. (Northern Germany).
[. . .]
All the efforts of the military leadership to direct the main interest of the population to the western front have not
been able to divert the fixed attention of national comrades on the east.
Report to the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, 19 March 1945
Mood and Attitude of the Working Class
In a report from Mecklenburg the mood of the working class is described as good. In the conviction that
there is no alternative but to grit one’s teeth and survive, workers are doing what they are told and trusting the
Führer.
A detailed examination of the report, however and a series of remarks recorded verbatim in working
districts that the leadership is subject to criticism among this class and expressions of class conflict are articulated.
There are more and more demands for the Führer to get rid of the traitors and saboteurs who obviously
occupy the highest positions. The Führer should also listen to the workers and conduct a purge of the civil service,
the armed forces and the party, and he should do it now, not after the war, since such a purge would give a great
boost to the war effort both at the front and at home. 175
11.1.10 Report from the files of the provisional Dönitz government, end of March 1945
People and leadership
The development of the military situation since the breakthrough of the Soviets from the Baranow bridgehead as
far as the Oder has burdened our people more heavily day by day. Since then every individual sees himself
confronted with the question of his bare existence. [Jeder einzelne sieht sich seitdem vor die nackte Existenzfrage
gestellt]. The situation prompts questions, appearances [Erscheinungen] and behaviour which force the people’s
relationship with the leadership and the national community into an extreme test of endurance [Zereißprobe]. And
there is little difference in all of this between military and civilians, party members and non-party, leaders and led,
ordinary people [einfache Volkskreisen] and the educated classes, workers and bourgeois, town and country, east
and west, north and south, those who supportNational Scoialism, and those who reject it, church members and
those not affiliated with the churches.
The following basic facts are to report:
1. Nobody wants the war to be lost. Everybody passionately wants us to win.
2. Nobody believes any more that we will win. The spark of hope that has survived so far is about to be
extinguished.
3. If we lose the war then it’s our own fault, and not the fault of the little man but the leadership.
173
Meldungen, 7, pp. 2426-2427
Meldungen, 12, pp. 4750-4751
175
Meldungen, 17, p. 6645; p. 6732
174
138
4. The people has no more confidence in the leadership. People are very critical of the party, of particular leading
individuals and of the propaganda.
5. For millions the Führer is the last chance and the last hope, but even the Führer is drawn further into the general
criticism . . .every day.
6. The will to fight and the confidence of national comrades in themselves and each other is being eroded by
doubts about the sense in continuing to fight.
Re: 1.Nobody wants the war to be lost. Everybody passionately wants us to win.
Since the Soviets’ breakthrough every National Comrade [Volksgenosse] knows that we are confronted with the
greatest national disaster, with the most severe consequences for very family and every individual. The whole
nation [Volk], independent of any distinctions, is filled with daily growing concern. With the evacuees and
refugees from the East the horror of war has reached every town and village of the shrinking Reich. Everybody has
been touched by the extent to which the air raids have destroyed such normal life as had survived. The population
is suffering dreadfully from the terror bombing. The connections between people have been largely broken. Tens
of thousands of men at the front are today still without news of their relatives, their wives and their children,
whether they are alive and where they are. The do not know whether they were killed by bombs long ago, or
massacred by the Soviets. Hundreds of thousands of women remain without news of their husbands and sons, who
are somewhere out there, and are constantly filled with the thought that they can no longer be among the living.
There is a general stress that binds family and kin together; if the most extreme fortune breaks over Germany then
people who belong together want to be together to bear it.
Of course there are stilted [kramphaft] attempts here and there to calm oneself with the thought that it
might not be so bad at the end. After all a people of eighty million cannot be exterminated to the last man, woman
and child. The Soviets cannot actually turn against the peasants and the workers, because they are needed in every
state. Great attention is paid in the West to everything that comes through from the areas occupied by the English
and Americans. Behind all such consolation, however, is a profound anxiety, and the wish that it might not come
to that.
For the first time in this war the food situation is an issue. People are no longer satisfied by what they
get. Bread and potatoes are in short supply. Women in the cities are already having difficulty finding food for their
children. On top of all the other misfortunes there is now the spectre of hunger.176
.
11.2
The Nazi New Order in Europe
11.2.1
A Post-War Summary of the Planning for the New Order in 1940177
summer of 1940 saw not only the occupation by German troops of the major part of the European
continent, from the Atlantic Coast to the borders of the U.S.S.R., but also the publication of German plans
for the economic reorganization of Europe after the conclusion of hostilities. Up to that time German writers
and speakers had been concerned mainly with protests, first against the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles,
and then against the withholding from their people of adequate Lebensraum. But by the end of the campaign
in Western Europe the long-cherished dream of a German-controlled Europe had become a reality, and
with this a new phase in German propaganda began.
Germany's conquests were but the necessary first step in the building up of a 'New Order' for Europe,
a New Order which was to initiate another golden age. The complete bankruptcy of economic liberalism had
been demonstrated in the inter-war period, and the Fascist states alone had succeeded in finding a way to
prosperity. This solution Germany was prepared to share with other states, but to achieve success Europe must
be united under German leadership. Europe was too limited in size to b e divided into a large number of
small artificial states, and, despite any sentimental reasons that the small states might have for wishing to
retain their complete independence, they should realize that their destiny lay with that of the Greater
German Reich.
THE
It may be comprehensible [said Rosenberg], it may even be right that a small nation does not wish to be ruled by another
nation of the same size. We are, however, convinced that a small nation does not demean its honour by putting itself under the
protection of a very large nation and of a great Reich. . . . To recognize the greatness of a Reich like the German one, which
after a thousand years of the greatest tribulation now stands once more in its own strength before all eyes, is not a sign of weak
will or of dishonourable attitude, but is the recognition of a vital law, of the demands made by the destiny of European
existence.178
Provided that the nations of Europe were prepared to accept their destiny 'there would be no economic crises to
destroy prosperity, bringing in their turn unemployment and terrible social and moral diseases'. 179
176
Ibid., 6734-5
Patricia Harvey, ‘The Planning of the New Order in 1940’, in Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee’ (eds.) Hitler’s
Europe (Oxford, 1954). The volume was a part of the Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946 published by the Royal Institute
of International Affairs
178
Deutschlandsender (B.B.C. monitoring), 9 July 1940.
179
Ibid. 14 July 1940.
177
139
No complete and comprehensive plan for the setting up of the New Order was ever published. A
series of statements was made by different people, and to suit different occasions, with the result that many gaps
were left and many contradictions remained unchallenged. The nearest ap proach to an official and
comprehensive statement of German intentions was given by Walther Funk, Reich Minister of Economics and
the Minister entrusted by Goring with the formation of plans for the New Order, on 25 July 1940, but even
Funk denied the existence of a hard and fast plan. 180 Nevertheless, from the various sources available, it
has been possible to build up some picture of the Europe which the Nazis planned to create after they had
brought the war to a successful conclusion.
The basis of the new economic order was to be the formation in Europe of a single economic
community working under German direction. Centralized planning was to take the place of unorganised
liberalism, and throughout Europe a high level of employment would be assured by means of adequate credit
creation.
International division of labour was to be encouraged as far as possible. The benefits to be gained from such a
policy had already been shown by the relationships built up between Germany and the countries of South Eastern Europe between the wars, and they would be even greater in the increased area of the New Europe. It
was economic lunacy, said Funk at the Vienna State Fair in September 194O, 181 for each country to produce
everything from buttons to locomotives if for that purpose it had to estab lish at high cost a heavy industry
which could be maintained only by tariffs, subsidies, and restrictions on imports; in place of this, specialization
should be developed among European states for the benefit of all. None of the German writers or speakers
made clear, however, the means by which this specialization was to be achieved. Government control over
industry on the lines of that established in the Reich was obviously envisaged, and a suggestion was made
that international cartels, already responsible for much valuable preparatory work, might be enlarged and
strengthened, at the same time being brought under the supervision of some central authority. It was
recognized that the problems of division of labour for a whole continent differed from those for a single
country, and it was stated that it might be necessary to scrap nationally profitable industries in the interes t of
the whole. The inference was, although this was not openly stated, that, where a conflict of interests was likely
to arise between the Reich and one of the other European countries, the former's wishes would receive
favourable treatment.
As far as can be seen, the tendency envisaged throughout non-German, Europe was towards at any
rate partial de-industrialization. Europe, when
viewed as a whole, was deficient in foodstuffs and fodder; increased agricultural production was desirable, and,
in view of the fact that European agriculture was on the whole less profitable than industry, the Germans were
likely to prefer that the change-over to agriculture should take place in countries other than the Reich. 182 The
policy of increased agricultural production in South-Eastern Europe was to be continued, but this area would
not retain the armament and auxiliary industries (such as machinery and locomotives) for whose products
there was no demand; the Yugoslav textile industry was also described by one writer as 'irrational from a
European point of view'. 183 Even in Western Europe, although complete de-industrialization was, of course,
out of the question, certain changes were envisaged. Denmark in future was to reduce her cattle and dairy
production and to increase her output of corn and fodder; Norway was to aim at agricultural self-sufficiency;
and even France was in future to be regarded primarily as an agricultural economy and the exporter of
valuable foodstuffs.184
The reorganization of the European economy was to be assisted by the conclusion of long-term
agreements between Germany and the member countries guaranteeing to the latter a safe export outlet for years
to come. On the basis of these agreements it would be possible to adjust the export structures of the countries
concerned to the requirements of Greater Germany and of other European countries, and such agreements
would be of particular importance to agricultural countries because of the need for long-term planning in this
sphere. As economic relations widened in scope, so would the advantages to be gained by the participating
countries increase.
Trade between the member states of the New Europe was also to be assisted by abolishing the evils of
exchange fluctuations which, if left in existence, would detract from the value of the long-term agreements
mentioned in the previous paragraph. European currencies were no longer to be linked with gold as they
had been in the past; their value would be fixed by the state-controlled economic system. 'We shall never
pursue a currency policy which makes us in any way dependent on gold, because we cannot tie ourselves to a
medium of exchange the value of which we are not in a position to determine.'185 After a preliminary period of
adjustment, transactions between the member countries were to be carried out on the basis of fixed exchange
rates. The maintenance of these rates would, of course, depend upon the institution in the member countries of
rigid price control and supervision, on the lines of those adopted in Germany before the war. As regards the
settlement of trading accounts, the system of bilateral agreements built up by Germany since 1933 would in
180
Südost-Echo, 26 July 1940; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 29.
Völkischer Beobachter, 3 September 1940.
182
'Industry is (in Europe) more productive than agriculture. Net outputs per person engaged in manufacture (measured at the
world price of the product so that the effects of protection do not enter in) appear to have been between 60 and 100 per cent,
higher than outputs per male worker in agriculture and mining, similarly measured, in European countries in recent years'
('The German New Order in Europe', Bulletin of International News, 25 January 1941, xviii. 70).
183
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 April 1941
184
Ibid. 24 May 1941.
185
Funk's speech of 25 July 1940 (Siidost-Echo, 26 July 1940; Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1939-46, ii: Hitler's Europe, p. 33).
181
140
time give place to a system of multilateral trading by which all the European countries would settle their
trading accounts in Reichsmarks through a central clearing house in Berlin. Germany, said Landfried (State
Secretary in the Ministry of Economics) at the opening of the Cologne Trade Fair in September 1940, was
working towards the return of the old system of multilateral clearing, with Berlin as the financial centre of
Europe, and trade barriers reduced to a minimum. 'International restrictions on exports and foreign trade
which today still separate European nations from one another must speedily be abolished.' 186
The relationship between the New Europe and the rest of the world was a subject for constant
discussion. International division of labour, combined with the development of agriculture and of mineral
production, was to free Europe from dependence upon the supply of essential products from the rest of the
world. The actual amount of trade carried on with the outside world would depend upon a number of
factors, notably the exact territorial extent of the New Europe and the standard of living required within it.
No clear picture was ever given of the area to be covered by the New Europe, but on the whole it seems to have
been envisaged in 1940 as including the whole of continental Europe, from the Atlantic coast to the borders of
the U.S.S.R., with the probable inclusion of the Mediterranean area and even of the African continent as a
whole. 2 According to one writer it was increasingly recognized that the Europe which was to be reformed by
Germany and Italy included the whole of Africa; Europe, with a strong German centre and a resurrected
Mediterranean area, had to be united with Africa into one political continent.187 Some suggestions were also
made for the ultimate formation of a partnership between Germany and Italy, Russia, and Japan for the
control of the whole land-mass stretching between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
Within the smaller area complete autarky would mean certain restrictions on the standard of
living. Continental Europe, excluding the U.S.S.R., could exist without supplies from other countr ies,
but this would mean certain deprivations; coffee, tea, and cocoa would have to be forgone, and tobacco would
satisfy only 50 per cent, of normal requirements; shortage of fats would prove a serious problem in the short
run, but in time it should prove possible to meet the deficit through increased cultivation of oil-producing plants;
shortage of fodder was likely to decrease the number of livestock which could be kept; the consumption of cotton
would have to be reduced by two-thirds, and that of silk by one-half, while jute would be unobtainable; the
most serious problem of all in the long run was likely to be the lack of such metals as copper, lead, tin, nickel,
and zinc. Germany did not propose, however, to change over to a perfectly self-sufficient economy. Funk
summed up the position as follows:
It is not a question of autarky or export, but of autarky and export, which requires a proper understanding of
the term. We shall consider it important to trade our high-quality industrial products in exchange for raw
materials in the world markets. But here we make a reservation. We must take care that there is a sufficient
supply in the European economic area of all those commodities which make this area economically independent of
other areas. We must therefore guarantee its economic freedom. That is largely a question of living standards.
For instance, in future we should not need to import a single ton of oil from overseas markets if we were to limit
our consumption of petroleum products by rationing. But if everyone is to be free to drive a car as much as he
likes and if as many cars as possible are to be produced, then there is nothing to stand in the way of our
importing this extra oil from world markets, because in case of need consumption can be reduced to the amount
we ourselves can produce. This is even more true of consumption of goods such as coffee, tea, cocoa, &c. We
shall have to be careful lest in time of need the economic area of Greater Germany should become dependent, as
regards what it can produce itself, upon forces and powers over which it has no control.188
At first sight the German plans for the economic reorganization of Europe appeared to have certain
advantages even from a non-German point of view. The benefits promised to those European nations co-operating in the New Order sounded impressive. Economic liberalism had failed during the inter-war period to provide
a means of combating the depression and of securing a reasonable level of employment, and the introduction of
some form of state control and planning was one of the possible solutions. Interest in the possibilities of cooperation between European states had increased after the First World War; and the years between the
foundation by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi of the Pan-European Union in 1923 and the outbreak of the Second
World War were marked by a series of conferences and plans designed to promote European economic
collaboration3 including the so-called Briand and Van Zeeland Plans and the setting-up of a Commission of
Inquiry for European Union to work within the framework of the League of Nations. At first sight the New
Order might seem to be yet another attempt, this time sponsored by Germany and Italy, to achieve
international co-operation within the European continent.
On closer consideration, however, the situation seemed rather different. A united Europe might
gain benefits from co-operation between the member states, but the main benefits were earmarked for
Germany herself. 'The coming peace-time economy', said Funk, 'must guarantee for Greater Germany a
maximum of economic security and for the German nation a maximum consumption of goods to raise the
level of the nation's well-being. The European economy must be adapted to achieve this aim.' 189 The
prospect for the more industrialized states and for those relying to a considerable degree upon overseas trade was
gloomy, since it was explicitly stated by the Germans that these countries would have to make radical
186
New York Times, 16 September 1940.
Kölnische Zeitung, 6 October 1940.
Funk's speech of 25 July 1940.
189
Ibid.
187
188
141
alterations in their economic structures. Those countries relying purely upon agriculture and mining were in
a different position. The provision of a large German market, secure over a period through the promised
long-term agreements, would remove the anxieties felt as a result of more efficient overseas competition. But,
judging from the course of events in South-Eastern Europe in the years preceding the Second World War, the
position would not be wholly favourable, despite German accounts of the success of Germany's trading policy
in that area. Germany certainly paid high prices for her agricultural imports from South-Eastern Europe,
but the countries concerned were in their turn forced to pay high prices for their imports from Germany
and were prevented, by the working of the clearing agreements negotiated with the Reich, from
switching their purchases elsewhere. Another problem to be faced in the long run, and one for which the New
Order offered no solution, was that of overpopulation in the agricultural areas of South-Eastern Europe. 190
Outside Europe, too, the New Order was likely to have unfavourable effects upon Germany's former
trading partners. According to Funk, and to other German writers and speakers, the New Europe would be
perfectly prepared to trade with other areas, but only on certain terms. The mono poly of Britain and the
United States in world trade would have to be broken, the New Europe refusing any longer to 'submit to
political and economic terms dictated to it by any extra-European body'. 191 Europe would be willing to
trade with individual nations, but would refuse to enter into negotiations with any combination of nations.
'We do not need North America as an intermediary in trading with South American coun tries', said Funk.
'Either Germany trades with South America on the basis of free agreements with sovereign states, or she does
not trade with South America at all.' 192 German Europe, on the other hand, would refuse to trade with other
nations except as a single unit; the New Europe would be capable of existing, if need be, without external
trade relations, but other countries would be forced, by their need for industrial goods, to seek trade relations
with Europe.
The clearest indication of the true nature of the proposed New Order was provided, however, by
the actions taken by Germany in the countries already under her control before the publication of plans for the
reorganization of Europe. Overseas countries and those of Western Europe might, in the summer of 1940, be
prepared to listen to the grandiose German plans for the introduction of a new golden age; the Austrians,
Czechs, and Poles were already enduring German rule.
11.2.2
Werner Daitz on the need for a ‘’Greater Economic Area’ in Europe, controlled by Germany, 31
May 1940193
For more than two decades I have been pointing out in numerous articles, speeches and books that the liberal
world economic system, which operated under the auspices of the English pound and the English fleet will
inevitably dissolve into several autonomous or autarkic economic blocks or large economic spheres [Grossraumwirtschaften]: into a dollar block, a yen block, a rupee block, and a continental European mark block.
This development has been accelerated as a result of the English blockade of Germany in the years
1914-1918 and now again during 1939-1940. The present blockade, in particular, has rendered unavoidable the
construction of a continental European Grossraumwirtschaft under German leadership as a measure of economic
self-defence on the part of the European mainland. The reorganization of the European continent, this eternal
core area of the white race, will thereby secure the economic recovery and independence which are essential.
This economic cooperation of the continental European nations must follow the motto: Europe for the
Europeans. European economic requirements must be met in the first place by goods produced in Europe
itself and exchanged there, and only then by those of other economic blocks or Grossraumwirtschaften in
exactly the same way as other Grossraumwirtschaften which are in the process of formation declare:
America for the Americans, East Asia for the Asians, India for the Indians etc. As a final goal to ensure
peace, a continental European Grossraumwirtschaft under German leadership must embrace all the peoples of
the mainland from Gibraltar to the Urals and from the North Cape to the island of Cyprus with their natural
colonial extensions radiating out into Siberia and beyond the Mediterranean into Africa. . .
It is essential, however, to note that for foreign policy reasons this continental European
Grossraumwirtschaft under German leadership must not be termed a German Grossraumwirtschaft; for, the
moment that happens then, presumably for reasons of prestige, the Italians will want to set an Italian
Grossraumwirtschaft, Soviet Russia as Soviet Russian Grossraumwirtschaft etc. This would seriously complicate
the construction of a genuine continental European Grossraumwirtschaft under German leadership or indeed make
it impossible. A Grossraumwirtschaft embracing the whole of the European mainland is, however, necessary in
order to take on successfully the huge economic blocks of North and South America, the Yen block, and the
possible surviving remnants of the Pound block. Thus, it appears politically inappropriate to seek to create merely
a German Grossraumwirtschaft, although of course the firm economic integration of those countries of western,
northern, and south-eastern Europe which are directly dependent on Germany must be our first war and
peace aim. If we wish to secure the economic leadership of the European continent which is absolutely
necessary in order to strengthen the economy of the European continent as the core area of the white race, and
which will in fact do so, then for understandable reasons we must not publicly proclai m it as a German
190
See 'The German New Order in Europe', Bulletin of International News, 25 January 1941, xviii, 72-73.
Funk's speech of 25 July 1940.
Ibid.
193
Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 3, pp. 885-6
191
192
142
Grossraumwirtschaft. As a matter of principle, we must always only speak of Europe, for German leadership of
it will emerge naturally from the political, economic, cultural, and technological weight of Germany and
from its geographical position. Similarly, with the help of our German economic system, as it has been created
by the National Socialist revolution and through a skilful trade policy, the Mark will establish itself as the
standard currency on its own, just as the pound, the dollar, and the yen have established themselves as the
standard currencies in their economic spheres. . .
11.3
Hitler on Europe 194
8-9 and 9-10 August 1941
The basic reason for English pride is India. Four hundred years ago the English didn't have this
pride. The vast spaces over which they spread their rule obliged them to govern millions of people — and
they kept these multitudes in order by granting a few men unlimited power. It would obviously have been
impossible for them to keep great European areas supplied with foodstuffs and other articles of prime necessity. There was therefore no question for them, with a handful of men, to regulate life on these new
continents. In any case, the Anglicans never sustained the slightest effort of a missionary description. Thus it
was that the Indians never suffered any attack of this sort upon their spiritual integrity.
The German made himself detested everywhere in the world, because wherever he showed himself he began to
play the teacher. It's not a good method of conquest. Every people has its customs, to which it clings, and
nobody wants lessons from us. The sense of duty, as we understand it, is not known amongst the Russians.
Why should we try to inculcate this notion into them?
The German colonists ought to live on handsome, spacious farms. The German services will be
lodged in marvellous buildings, the governors in palaces. Beneath the shelter of the administrative services, we shall gradually organise all that is indispensable to the main tenance of a certain standard of living.
Around the city, to a depth of thirty to forty kilometres, we shall have a belt of handsome villages connected
by the best roads. What exists beyond that will be another world, in which we mean to let the Russians live
as they like. It is merely necessary that we should rule them. In the event of a revolution, we shall only have
to drop a few bombs on their cities, and the affair will be liquidated. Once a year we shall lead a troop of
Kirghizes through the capital of the Reich, in order to strike their imaginations with the size of our
monuments.
What India was for England, the territories of Russia will be for us. If only I could make the
German people understand what this space means for our future! Colonies are a precarious possession, but
this ground is safely ours. Europe is not a geographic entity, it's a racial entity. We understand now why
the Chinese shut themselves up behind a wall to protect themselves against the eternal attacks of the
Mongols. One could sometimes wish that a huge wall might protect the new territories of the East against
the masses of Central Asia; but that's contrary to the teachings of history. The fact is that a too great feeling
of security provokes, in the long run, a relaxation of forces. I think the best wall will always be a wall of
human breasts!
If any people has the right to proceed to evacuations, it is we, for we've often had to evacuate our
own population. Eight hundred thou-and men had to emigrate from East Prussia alone. How humanely
sensitive we are is shown by the fact that we consider it a maximum of Brutality to have liberated our
country from six hundred thousand Jews. And yet we accepted, without recrimination, and as something
inevitable, the evacuation of our own compatriots!
We must no longer allow Germans to emigrate to America. On the contrary, we must attract the
Norwegians, the Swedes, the Danes and the Dutch into our Eastern territories. They'll become members of
the German Reich. Our duty is methodically to pursue a racial policy. We're compelled to do so, if only to
combat the degeneration which is beginning to threaten us by reason of unions that in a way are
consanguineous.
As for the Swiss, we can use them, at the best, as hotel-keepers.
We have no reason to dry up the marshes. We shall take only the best land, the best sites. In the marshy
region, we shall install a gigantic lain for manoeuvres, three hundred and fifty kilometres by four
hundred, making use of the rivers and the obstacles nature supplies.
It goes without saying that it would be a small thing for our war-lined divisions to get the upper
hand over an English army. England is already in a state of inferiority by reason of the fact that she cannot
train her troops on her own territory. If the English wanted to open up wide spaces within their own
frontiers, they'd have to sacrifice too many country-houses.
[…]
17-18 September 1941
Hitler’s Secret Conversations, introduced by Hugh Trevor Roper (New York, 1953). The text of the book is based on notes
made by secretaries to Hitler and collected under the supervision of Bormann. It is published in Germany as Monologe im
Führer-Hauptquartier, and in Britain as Hitler’s Table Talk.
194
143
The struggle for the hegemony of the world will be decided in favour of Europe by the possession of
the Russian space. Thus Europe will be impregnable fortress, safe from all threat of blockade. All this opens
up economic vistas which, one may think, will incline the most of the Western democrats towards the New
Order.
The essential thing, for the moment, is to conquer. After that everything will be simply a question of
organisation.
When one contemplates this primitive world, one is convinced that nothing will drag it out of its
indolence unless one compels the people to work. The Slavs are a mass of born slaves, who feel the need of a
master. As far as we are concerned, we may think that the Bolsheviks did us a great service. They began by
distributing the land to the peasants, and we know what a frightful famine resulted. So they were obliged, of
course, to re-establish a sort of feudal regime, to the benefit of the State. But there was this difference, that,
whereas the old-style landlord knew something about farming, the political commissar, on the other hand,
was entirely ignorant of such matters. So the Russians were just beginning to give their commissars
appropriate instruction.
If the English were to be driven out of India, India would perish. Our role in Russia will be
analogous to that of England in India.
Even in Hungary, National Socialism could not be exported. In the mass, the Hungarian is as lazy
as the Russian. He's by nature a man of the steppe. From this point of view, Horthy is right in thinking that
if he abandoned the system of great estates, production would rapidly decline.
It's the same in Spain. If the great domain s disappeared there, famine would prevail.
The German peasant is moved by a liking for progress. He thinks of his children. The Ukrainian
peasant has no notion of duty.
There is a peasantry comparable to ours in Holland, and also in Italy, where every inch of
ground is zealously exploited—also, to a certain extent, in France.
The Russian space is our India. Like the English, we shall rule this empire with a handful of men.
It would be a mistake to claim to educate the native. All that we could give him would be a halfknowledge — just what's needed to conduct a revolution!
It's not a mere chance that the inventor of anarchism was a Russian. Unless other peoples, beginning with the
Vikings, had imported some rudiments of organisation into Russian humanity, the Russians would still be
living like rabbits. One cannot change rabbits into bees or ants. These insects have the faculty of living in a
state of society — but rabbits haven't. If left to himself the Slav would never have emerged from the narrowest
of family communities.
The Germanic race created the notion of the State. It incarnated this notion in reality, by
compelling the individual to be a part of a whole. It's our duty continually to arouse the forces that
slumber in our people's blood.
The Slav peoples are not destined to live a cleanly life. They know it, and we would be wrong to persuade
them of the contrary. It was we who, in 1918, created the Baltic countries and the Ukraine. But nowadays
we have no interest in maintaining Baltic States, any more than in creating an independent Ukraine. We
must likewise prevent them from returning to Christianity. That would be a grave fault, for it would be
giving them a form of organisation.
I am not a partisan, either, of a university at Kiev. It's better not to teach them to read. They won't love us
for tormenting them with schools. Even to give them a locomotive to drive would be a mistake. And what
stupidity it would be on our part to proceed to a distribution of land! In spite of that, we'll see to it that the
natives live better than they've lived hitherto. We'll find amongst them the human material that's
indispensable for tilling the soil.
We'll supply grain to all in Europe who need it. The Crimea will give us its citrus fruits, cotton
and rubber (100,000 acres of plantation would be enough to ensure our independence).
The Pripet marshes will keep us supplied with reeds.
We'll supply the Ukrainians with scarves, glass beads and everything that colonial peoples like.
The Germans — this is essential — will have to constitute amongst themselves a closed society, like a
fortress. The least of our stable-lads must be superior to any native.
For German youth, this will be a magnificent field of experiment. We'll attract to the Ukraine
Danes, Dutch, Norwegians, Swedes. The army will find areas for manoeuvres there, and our aviation will
have j the space it needs.
Let's avoid repeating the mistakes committed in the colonies before1914. Apart from the
Kolonialgesellschaft, which represented the interests of the State, only the silver interests had any chance of
raising their heads there.
The Germans must acquire the feeling for the great, open spaces. We must arrange things so that
every German can realise for himself [what they mean. We'll take them on trips to the Crimea and the
Caucasus. There's a big difference between seeing these countries on the lap and actually having visited
them. The railways will serve for the transport of goods, but the roads are what will open the country to us.
144
11.4
Economic exploitation of Europe
11.4.1
Göring to Reich Commissioners and Military Commanders of Occupied Territories, 6 August
1942195
Göring . . . In all the occupied territories I see the people living there stuffed full of food, while our own
people are starving. For God's sake, you haven't been sent there to work for the well-being of the peoples
entrusted to you, but to get hold of as much as you can so that the German people can live. I expect you to
devote your energies to that. This continual concern for the aliens must come to an end once and for all.
I have the reports of what you are planning to deliver in front of me. When I contemplate your
countries it seems like nothing at all. I could not care less if you tell me that your people are collapsing from
hunger. They can do that by all means so long as no German collapses from hunger.
Heavy attacks have been made on German cities in the Ruhr area. The population have suffered
appallingly. Next door to the Ruhr area lies rich Holland. It could send far more vegetables to this hard hit
area that it has done. I could not care less what the Dutch gentlemen think about that. It would not be a bad
thing if the resistance of the Dutch population was greatly weakened, for they are nothing but a nation of
traitors to our cause. I don't really blame them for that. In their place I might well do the same. But we do
not have the job of feeding a nation which inwardly rejects us. If this nation is so weak that it can no longer lift
a hand except where we can employ it, all the better. If it is that weak then it won't revolt just when our rear is
being threatened. I am only interested in the people in the occupied territories who work producing armaments
and food. They must get just sufficient so that they can do their work. I could not care less whether the Dutch
gentlemen are Teutons or not. Because if they are then they will be all the more stubborn, and great
personalities in the past have already shown how one deals with stubborn Teutons. Even if various complaints
are made, you have done the right thing because the fate of the Reich is the only thing that matters . . .
Now, as to the deliveries to the Reich. Last year France delivered 550,000 tons of bread corn and
now I demand 1.2 m. tons. I want suggestions on how it is to be done within a fortnight. No more
discussion. It does not matter what happens to the French: 1.2m. tons will be delivered. 550,000 of fodder grain,
now 1 million! 135,000 of meat, now 350,000: 23,000 of fats last year, now 60,000! Cheese—last year they didn't
deliver any, so this year they will deliver 25,000. Last year 125,000 of potatoes, this year 300,000. No wine last
year, this year six million hectolitres. 15,000 of vegetables last year, this year 150,000. 200,000 of fruit last year,
this year 300,000. Those are the deliveries from France.
The Netherlands: 40,000 of bread grains, 45,000 of fodder grains, 35,000 of meat, 20,000 of fats, 85,000
of potatoes, 45,000 of root crops, 30,000 of sugar, 16,000 of cheese, 1 million of vegetables, 10,000 of
vegetable seeds. (Interjection from Seyss-Inquart)
They ought to find it easy to make 1 million. Then take the whole harvest. You can swap around: a
bit less vegetables, a bit more fats. I don't care.
Belgium is a poor country. But not as poor as all that or as you try to make out. They won't need to
deliver bread grains, but they won't get any. But don't forget to send me 50,000 tons of fodder corn. They
won't get fats, I don't want any either. I want 20,000 tons of sugar, 50,000 tons of potatoes, 95,000 tons of
fruit.
Norway: They've got fish: 400,000.
(Terboven 'We delivered more last year')
500,000!
(Terboven: Then I must ask you to get the Navy to return the trawlers).
I know, we must discuss that with the Navy. You must give some meat, How much?
(Interjection: Nothing)
Haven't you got any fodder corn either?
(No!)
(Terboven: The Wehrmacht is largely fed by me) . . .
Gentlemen. I would like to add something. I have an incredible amount to do and an incredible amount of
responsibility. I haven't time to read letters and memos in which you tell me that you can't do what I ask of
you. I only have time to find out from time to time through a short report from [Herbert] Backe whether the
demands are being met. If not, then we shall have to meet again in rather d ifferent circumstances.
195
Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, 3, pp. 901-2
145
Resistance: The ‘Night and Fog Decree’, 7 December 1941.196
11.5
The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
[stamp] SECRET
Directives for the prosecution of offences committed within the occupied territories against the German State or
the occupying power, of December 7th, 1941.
Within the occupied territories, communistic elements and other circles hostile to Germany have increased their
efforts against the German State and the occupying powers since the Russian campaign started. The amount and
the danger of these machinations oblige us to take severe measures as a determent. First of all the following
directives are to be applied:
I. Within the occupied territories, the adequate punishment for offences committed against the German State or the
occupying power which endanger their security or a state of readiness is on principle the death penalty.
II. The offences listed in paragraph I as a rule are to be dealt with in the occupied countries only if it is probable
that sentence of death will be passed upon the offender, at least the principal offender, and if the trial and the
execution can be completed in a very short time. Otherwise the offenders, at least the principal offenders, are to be
taken to Germany.
III. Prisoners taken to Germany are subjected to military procedure only if particular military interests require this.
In case German or foreign authorities inquire about such prisoners, they are to be told that they were arrested, but
that the proceedings do not allow any further information.
IV. The Commanders in the occupied territories and the Court authorities within the framework of their
jurisdiction, are personally responsible for the observance of this decree.
V. The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces determines in which occupied territories this decree is to
be applied. He is authorized to explain and to issue executive orders and supplements. The Reich Minister of
Justice will issue executive orders within his own jurisdiction.
11.6
From the Decree concerning the Conditions of Employment of Eastern Workers,
June 30, 1942197
The Ministerial Council for Defence of the Reich orders with force of law:
SECTION
I.
DEFINITION OF EASTER N WORKER
1. Eastern workers are those labourers of non-German national origin who inhabited the
Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine, the General Commissariat for White Russia, or territories bordering on
these
territories to the east or on the former free states of Lithuania and Estonia,
and who were brought into the German Reich, including the Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravia, and employed there after the occupation by the
German armed forces.
SECTION II. CONDITIONS QF EMHJOYMENT
PARAGRAPH 2. General Conditions. The eastern workers employed in
the Reich have an employment relationship of a special type. German
labour code and labour protection provisions shall be applicable to them only in so far as specifically stated.
.
PARAGRAPH 3. Compensation, (i) The eastern workers employed in the Reich shall receive compensation
graded according to their work.
(2) The amount of this compensation shall be determined from the tables
which are attached as an appendix to this decree.
(3) In determining the compensation which is to be paid individual eastern workers under the appended tables, the
point of departure (the reference wage) shall be the wage-rate (hourly, piece, and premium wage-rates) of
comparable German workers.
If a part of the reference wage consists of payment in goods, such payment shall be considered equivalent, in
determining this wage, to the rate calculated for it for German workers in the enterprise in event of payment in cash.
Social security deductions and payments of all kinds to which the German workers are subject shall not be included in
the determination of the reference wage.
With respect to incentive payments, these shall be computed, in determining the reference wage, at the same rate at
which they are made to German workers in the enterprise for the same work. If the eastern worker's production
falls behind the average production of a German worker, a correspondingly reduced reference wage will be the
point of departure in determining the compensation to be paid him.
PARAGRAPH
196
Nuremberg Document No. L-90
Raphaël Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. Laws of Occupation. Analysis of Government. Proposals for Redress
(Washington, 1944) pp. 556-8
197
146
Extra pay for difficult work, dirty work, etc. shall be included in determining the proper reference wage for
calculating the individual eastern worker's compensation.
(4) The eastern worker shall receive compensation only for work actually performed; but the regulations on idleness
resulting from bad weather may be applied in his case.
(5) Higher compensation than that determined under these provision may not be paid to eastern workers.
PARAGRAPH 4. Extra Rates and Other Payments. Except as otherwise provided by the General
Manpower Authority eastern workers sha ll have no claim to extra compensation for overtime on
Sunday, holiday, and night work. Per diem and maintenance payments, as well as travel and board expense
payments may not be made.
5. Payment in Goods, (i) The compensation due the individual eastern, worker according to the tables
appended to this decree shall be paid in cash at the end of the regular pay period for the enterprise after deduction
of the equivalent of payments made in goods. The board and room furnished by the employer shall be
computed according to the rates specified by the tables appended to this decree. Other payment in goods, such as
clothing, shoes, etc., shall be computed at proportionate prices.
(2) Employers may cover the commutation cost of eastern workers to and from the place of work for the entirety
of eastern workers employed by them and make deductions for this expense from the amounts to be paid in cash
according to the tables.
PARAGRAPH 6. Compensation in Case of Illness. For days on which the eastern worker is unable to work on
account of sickness or accident, free board and room only shall be furnished by the employer, unless
hospital care is given. In other respects the sick care of these workers shall be regulated by prescriptions issued by
the Reich Minister of Labour.
PARAGRAPH 7. Leave and Family Visits. Leave and family visits will not be granted for the present. Detailed
regulations concerning the institution of leave and family visits will be issued by the General Manpower
Authority.
PARAGRAPH 8. Pay Invoices. Pay invoices shall not be issued to eastern
workers.
.
PARAGRAPH 9. Exceptions. The Reich Trustee or Special Trustee of Labour may permit exceptions from the
provisions of this decree in regard to the calculation of compensation.
SECTION III. EASTERN WORKERS TAX
PARAGRAPH 10. Tax Obligation, (i) Employers who use eastern workers within the German Reich, including the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, are subject to a tax in amounts specified by the tables appended to this decree
(Eastern Workers Tax).
(2) Agricultural employers must pay only one half of this tax.
[…]
11.7
Defeat
11.7.1
Police President of Hamburg Report on Firestorm (August 1943)198
[ . . . ] The impression created by viewing a burnt-out city pales beside the fire itself: the howling of the firestorm,
the cries and moans of the dying and the crashes of the falling bombs. [ . . . ]
The reason for the damage being so serious and, above all, for the unusual number of deaths compared with
previous raids, is the fact that firestorms developed. They, and in particular the one during the second major attack
on the night of 27/8 July, created a situation which must be described as novel and hitherto inconceivable in every
respect.
[...]
Firestorms and their characteristics are established phenomena well known in the history of urban fires. The
physical explanation for them is simple. As a result of a combination of a number of fires the air overhead
becomes heated to such an extent that, because of its reduced specific gravity, it develops a tremendous upward
pressure which creates a very strong suction effect on the surrounding air masses pulling them towards the center
of the fire in a radial direction. As a result of the firestorm and, in particular, the tremendous suction effect, winds
are produced which are even stronger than the well-known wind strengths [1-12]. As in the case of meteorology so
also in the case of firestorms the air movement is produced by a rebalancing of differences of temperature. But,
while in the case of meteorology these temperatures are generally of the order of 20–30 degrees Celsius, in the
case of firestorms there are temperature differences of 600 or even 1,000 degrees. This explains the huge force
generated by the firestorms which cannot be compared with normal meteorological processes. [ . . . ]
The development of a firestorm is encouraged or hampered by the architectural conditions of an affected area in
the same way as by the type, extent and size of the original fires. In Hamburg the firestorms originated in areas in
which the buildings were close together and densely populated and in which, therefore, the type and density of the
198
Source: Jeremy Noakes, ed., Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 4: The German Home Front in World War II. Exeter: University of
Exeter Press, 1998, pp. 554-56.
147
buildings affected already provided favorable preconditions for the development of a firestorm. The affected areas
in Hamburg were characterized by narrow streets with big blocks of flats with large numbers of courtyards,
terraces etc. In these yards fireballs could develop very rapidly which became, in the truest sense of the word,
mantraps. The narrow streets formed fire channels through which the long flames were whipped.
As a result of the concentric enemy attacks and the heavy concentration of incendiaries a huge number of fires
developed in such areas in a very short time. It should be noted in particular that there were not only roof fires but,
as a result of phosphor bombs and liquid [petrol and rubber] bombs, in many areas large blocks of flats were
suddenly set alight from the bottom floor. The fires could develop with incredible speed since roofs had been torn
off, walls had caved in, windows and doors had been torn out of their frames or smashed by concentrated attacks
with high-explosive bombs and mines and on these the fires could feed without any hindrance. For these reasons,
the intermediate stage of the fire's development, which in the case of previous raids it was possible to combat and
which produced some of the biggest successes of the Hamburg civil defense forces, did not occur. For in many
places extensive fires developed in a very short time. And because of the laws of physics, which have been
outlined above, a firestorm developed in every one of these districts where there was an extensive fire. The suction
effect of the firestorm in the larger or largest of these extensive fire areas had the effect of pulling in the already
superheated air of the smaller fire areas. So the cores of the most ferocious fire areas sucked the fires from the
smaller fire areas towards them. As a result of this phenomenon, fires in the smaller fire areas were pumped up as
if by bellows, since the central suction effect of the largest and strongest extensive fires had the effect of pulling in
the surrounding masses of fresh air. In consequence, all the fires grew into a single huge conflagration.
In order to form an impression of this massive firestorm which was created from countless smaller fires, one must
bear in mind that, for example, the area affected by the major raids on 28 July was some 5.5km long and 4km
wide, i.e. 22 sq. km in extent.
[...]
The speed with which the fires and firestorm developed negated all plans and every attempt by the population to
fight them. Houses which in the previous raids had been able to be saved by the brave actions of the civil defense
and other forces, fell victim to the flames. In many cases escape routes were cut off before the need to escape
became apparent.
After the alarm was sounded, the civil defense forces waited in their shelter, the firefighters in the extended civil
defense and factory defense units were at their posts awaiting the start and progress of the raid. Sticks of highexplosive bombs shattered the houses down to their foundations. Already a short time after the first explosive
bombs had fallen, a huge number of fires had started as a result of a massive amount of incendiaries mixed with
high-explosive bombs. People who now wanted to leave their shelters in order to see what was happening or to
fight the fire were met by a sea of flames. Everything around them was on fire. There was no water and, in view of
the huge number of fires and their extent, any attempt to put out the fire was useless from the start.
[...]
The fact that even now on some days up to a hundred or more corpses are being found and removed provides only
a feeble impression of what happened. Overall, the destruction is so devastating that, in the case of many people,
there is literally nothing left of them. On the basis of a layer of ashes in a large air raid shelter, doctors could only
provide a rough estimate of the number of people who died there, a figure of 250–300. It will only be possible to
produce an exact figure when all the people who were living in Hamburg at that time who are still alive have once
more registered with the authorities.
The horrific scenes which occurred in the area of the firestorm are indescribable. Children were torn from the
hands of their parents by the tornado and whirled into the flames. People who thought they had saved themselves
collapsed in a few minutes in the overwhelmingly destructive force of the heat. People who were fleeing had to
make their way through the dead and the dying. The sick and frail had to be left behind by the rescuers since they
themselves were in danger of burning.
[...]
And each one of these nights of fire and flames was followed by a day which revealed the horror in the pale and
unreal light of a smoke-covered sky. The heat of high summer, increased to an intolerable degree by the embers of
the firestorm, the finest of dust particles from the churned-up earth and the ruins and rubble of the destroyed city
which penetrated everywhere, soot and ashes raining down, and again heat and dust, and over everything a
pestilential smell of decomposing bodies and smoldering fires bore down on the population.
And these days were followed by new nights with new horrors, even more smoke and soot, heat and dust, with still
more death and destruction. People were given no time to rest or to plan the rescue of their belongings or to look
148
for their relatives. The enemy drove on with ceaseless attacks until the work of destruction had been completed.
His hatred reveled in the firestorms which mercilessly destroyed people and things with equal force.
The seemingly utopian [sic!] vision of a major city in rapid disintegration without gas, water, light and transport,
with formerly flourishing residential districts turned into deserts of stone, had become reality.
The streets were covered with hundreds of corpses. Mothers with their children, men, old people, burnt, charred,
unscathed and clothed, naked and pale like wax dummies in a shop window, they lay in every position, quiet and
peaceful, or tense with their death throes written in the expressions on their faces. The situation in the air raid
shelters was the same and made an even more gruesome impression because, in some cases, it showed the last
desperate struggle which had taken place against a merciless fate. Whereas in one place the occupants were sitting
quietly on their chairs, peaceful and unscathed as if they were sleeping and had unsuspectingly been killed by
carbon monoxide gas, elsewhere the existence of the fragments of bones and skulls showed how the occupants had
sought to flee and find refuge from their prison tomb.
It will be impossible for anybody ever to imagine or conceive the horrific and gruesome scenes which must have
occurred in numerous air raid shelters which were buried. Posterity will only be able to maintain a respectful
silence in the face of the fate of these innocents who fell victim to the bloodthirstiness of a sadistic enemy.
The behavior of the population which at no time and nowhere displayed signs of panic and was worthy of the
greatness of this sacrifice showed its commitment. It befitted the Hanseatic spirit and character which, during the
raids, found its finest expression in comradeship and assistance and solidarity and, after the raid, demonstrated
through its deeds an unshakeable determination to rebuild the city.
11.7.2
Mathilde Wolff-Mönckeberg’s Letter Describing the Aftermath of the Hamburg Firestorm (24
August 1943)199
During the night of Tuesday-Wednesday there was yet another terror attack, such a heavy one that it seemed to me
even more horrifying than the one we had had on Saturday. After the siren had gone, there was only a little
shooting at first, then all was quiet and we thought it was over. But then it started as if the whole world would
explode. The light went out immediately and we were in darkness, then a tiny flickering light. We sat with wet
towels over nose and mouth and the noise from one direct hit after another was such that the entire house shook
and rattled, plaster spilling from the walls and glass splintering from the windows. Frau Leiser fainted and lay on
the floor, her sweet baby was frozen with fear, nobody uttered a sound, and families grabbed each other by the
hands and made for the exit. Never have I felt the nearness of death so intensely, never was I so petrified with fear.
With every expansion we thought the house would come down on top of us, that the end was there; we choked
with the smell of burning, we were blinded by sudden flashes of fire. And the stillness.
The following morning Maria reported that all women and children had to be evacuated from the city within six
hours. There was no gas, no electricity, not a drop of water, neither the lift nor the telephone was working. It is
hard to imagine the panic and chaos. Each one for himself, only one idea: flight. We too – W. raced to the police
station for our exit permits. There were endless queues, but our permits were issued because we had a place to go
to. But how could we travel? No trains could leave from Hamburg because all the stations had been gutted, and so
Harburg was the nearest. There were no trams, no Underground, no rail-traffic to the suburbs. Most people loaded
some belongings on carts, bicycles, prams, or carried things on their backs, and started on foot, just to get away, to
escape. A long stream of human beings flooded along the Sierichstrasse, thousands were prepared to camp out,
anything rather than stay in this catastrophic inferno in the city. During the night the suburbs of Hamm,
Hammerbrock, Rothenburgsort and Barmbeck had been almost razed to the ground. People who had fled from
collapsing bunkers and had got stuck in huge crowds in the streets had burning phosphorus poured over them,
rushed into the next air raid shelter and were shot in order not to spread the flames. In the midst of the fire and the
attempts to quench it, women had their babies in the streets. Parents and children were separated and torn apart in
this frightful upheaval of surging humanity and never found each other again. It must have been indescribably
gruesome. Everyone had just one thought: to get away. W. tried vainly for some kind of vehicle. Most people in
our house made hasty impromptu arrangements, carrying bits and pieces into the cellar, and we also towed away a
few things. Since nobody could cook, communal kitchens were organized. But wherever people gathered together,
more unrest ensued. People wearing party badges had them torn off their coats and there were screams of “Let's
get that murderer.” The police did nothing. We had another alarm during the night, but only a short one. Maria
stayed the night with us because she had had such an awful time in the bunker with the heat and the stink,
collapsing people, drunkenness and over aggression, howling children everywhere.
11.7.3
Aerial Images of Central Hamburg after "Operation Gomorrah" (28 July 1943)
199
Source: Mathilde Wolff-Mönckeberg, On the Other Side: To My Children from Germany, 1940-1945. Translated and edited
by Ruth Evans. London and Sydney: Pan Books, 1979, pp. 78-79;
149
11.7.4
Dresden in the Aftermath of Allied Bombing (February 13-14, 1945)
150
11.7.5
Policemen in the Tiergarten (1946) Friedrich Seidenstücker
151
11.7.6
Pictures of the 12th US Army Group I: COBLENZ, MARCH 1945. In the background the
forts at Ehrenbreitstein
152
11.7.7
Munich Main Railway Station, March 1945
153
11.7.8
TIME Magazine article from 30 April 1945
The Suicides
For the killers the time had come to kill themselves. Nazi officials and bigwig Germans began to practice the act
for which their language has an expressive word—Selbstmord, self-murder. Near the Swiss border, Frau Gertrud
Heissmeyer Scholtz-Klink, Reichsfrauen-führerin of all the Nazi women's organizations, was reported to have
taken her life. In Weimar, after viewing the horrors of Buchenwald, the Mayor and his wife died by slashing their
wrists. In Nürnberg, Nazi Boss Karl Holz shot Mayor Willi Liebel and then himself. In Leipzig Herr Dr. Bundin
chose to die by a method in keeping with his professional interests (he was owner of a big bazooka factory). To a
caviar-and-cham-pagne banquet he invited 100 of his cronies. When the last course was eaten, the fat cigars
smoked and the fine cognac gone, Herr Bundin pressed a button. He had mined the banquet hall. He and his guests
were atomized into dust. In Leipzig G.I.s scouted the deserted Rathaus (City Hall), reported: "There's some civilian
stiffs upstairs." In his solid mayoral chair sat Oberbürgermeister Alfred Freiberg, his sightless eyes fixed on the
carved ceiling. In armchairs beside him, waxen-faced in death, sat his matronly wife and bespectacled daughter. In
an adjoining room Stadtkämmerer (City Treasurer) Kurt Lisso, his wife and daughter also sat in poisoned death.
The rigid bodies of four Volkstürmers sprawled in other offices. Two, it was plain, had sat across a table, sipping
brandy until one had drunk enough to pick up a machine pistol, shoot his comrade and then himself.
154