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Environmental Migration: Trials and Tribulations of a Changing and Evolving
Earth
by Beata Safari
21 November 2012 (Fall 2012)
SIT Switzerland – International Relations and Multilateral Diplomacy
Gyula Csurgai and Alexandre Lambert
The George Washington University
International Relations Major with Concentration in European and Eurasian Studies
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Table of Contents
I.
Preface and Acknowledgments........………………………………………3
II.
Analysis
III.
A.
Introduction...…………………………………………………………4
B.
Background and Terms.………………………………………………4
C.
Demystifying the Existence of Environmental Migration.……………7
D.
Projected Climate Change…………………………………………..10
E.
Projected Movement...………………………………………………15
F.
Impediments to Advocacy……………………………………………19
G.
What has been achieved?……………………………………………25
H.
Conclusion: So – What should we do?....……………………………28
Bibliography....……………………………………………………………31
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Preface and Acknowledgments
When tackling a research project universal in nature, collaboration is necessary and
crucial. There are numerous people I would like to thank for providing me with the opportunity
to study abroad and for leading me down the right path. First and foremost, I thank my parents,
Argine and Tigran Safari, for supporting me with endless love and generosity. Without your
support, I unquestionably would not be in Geneva undertaking this overwhelming task. I’m also
grateful for the support of the university while abroad. I’d like to thank the School for
International Training for hosting a program in Switzerland that adhered to criteria at the George
Washington University for my major. If not for that, I would not have chosen the program. On
that note, I’d like to thank Aline Dunant, Gyula Csurgai and Alexandre Lambert for being so
helpful and understanding when I announced that I was changing my topic. I appreciate all of
your help and advice tremendously. Finally, I would like to thank the individuals who took time
out of their hectic work schedules to meet with me and provide me with further resources and
advice: Mary Jean Burer, Sandro Cattacin, Vicken Cheterian, Heikki Mattila, José Riera and
Ivan Ureta.
I believe that the subject of environmental migration presents one of the most intriguing
and fascinating developments of today’s modern society. The fact that this issue cannot be
conceptually generalized owing to many changing variables and conditions makes it that more
difficult to resolve. Though these events may have been predictable in nature, we overlooked the
conditions these people were in and it took us by surprise. Had we paid a particular attention to
the environmental migration, we could have prevented the loss of human lives as well as further
deterioration of economic conditions of the countries that were affected.
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Introduction
People have been migrating because of critical or deteriorating circumstances in their
environment for centuries. Yet only recently did environmental migration become a hot topic.
Vicken Cheterian, a journalist at CIMERA, argues that only in the past ten years has climate
change become a “fashionable” issue. Before then, it was a hushed topic discussed furtively
among intellectuals. Migration, especially in the case of environmental migration, is typically
viewed under a negative light. Currently, the figure endorsed by the International Organization
for Migration predicts that there will be 200 million environmental migrants by the year 2050. In
spite of its reputation—and the overwhelming projection by 2050—, migration should not be
seen as an impediment: rather, links have been found between migration and sustainable
development, as pertaining to both the emigration and the immigration countries. In this paper,
we will investigate current theories on climate change and environmental migration, and
ascertain what is being done on the international forum to advance the awareness of these
entities. Only once that is concluded, could we attempt to reveal sensible solutions to ensure
protection for these peoples.
Background and Terms
Several theories explain why individuals are alarmed with the coming of the millennium.
The more realist theory claims that two American army generals were debating on what the next
topic of concern would be after the Cold War, and decided that it was climate change. The more
practical of the two theories describes human carelessness as one of the leading causes of
amplified displacement of peoples. Human carelessness further intensifies land degradation,
pollution of the water, air and soil, and desertification; this brings about more disastrous changes
in rain-fall patterns, sea level rise, and changes in temperature. Inhabitants are increasingly
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exposed to floods, droughts, hurricanes, among others, and these climate changes, amid other
aggravators, contribute to forced migration. People leave their homes (typically in
underdeveloped countries) and most often move within their own countries, although these
countries are the most ill-prepared to accommodate the movement. The new movement stresses
these migratory regions, leading to even greater overpopulation, in turn additionally depleting
water and food sources, whilst intensifying sanitation issues. Cheterian says that “the climate
cannot digest itself.” Environmental migration is a brutal cycle that will continue
notwithstanding what actions people may take. Fortunately, the negative impact of migration
may be overturned into a multitude of beneficial outcomes. Climate change incentivizes
sustainable development, a quicker emergency response system, advancement of technology and
much more.
International migration can be distinguished between three different types. The macro
theory is founded on the two principles of “push” and “pull” factors that exist between an
emigration country and an immigration country, respectively. In other words, “push” factors
distance people from their country of origin and “pull” factors attract people to countries of
destination. The meso theory places responsibility on a more intricate system of linkages
between states, such as networks. Migration is said to take place within a migration system in
which particular states are bound together by agreements, common identities and inherent
responsibilities towards each other. The micro theory acknowledges that individuals make
decisions based on a weight system of pros and cons.1 Upon recognition of the power of the
individual, the theory combines the macro and meso theories to form a system of balances:
individuals are pushed away from their country of origin and pulled into the country of
Christina Boswell. “Addressing the Causes of Migratory and Refugee Movements: The Role of the European
Union.” New Issues in Refugee Research, 2002.
1
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destination; upon arrival at the country of destination, immigrants encourage those back home by
sharing their new experiences, creating the system of linkages described by the meso theory.
Next, let us explain climate change. According to scientists David Huber and Jay
Gulledge, it is naïve to believe that climate change could have triggered a specific event. No
discernible event can be decisively attributed to a change in the environment. In point of fact,
climate denotes “the average of many weather events over a span of years” and change signifies
“varying averages over time.”2 Thus in this paper, climate change dictates the varying averages
of weather events over a span of years. Although the term specifies what categorizes a variation
in the macroclimate, it is still very general and could refer to a number of meteorological
changes. I would further like to underline that assigning blame is not the purpose here: it would
be quite callow to accredit humans or catastrophic events as the sole perpetrators of climate
change. Under the next subtitle, Demystifying the Existence of Environmental Migration, the trap
of the term will be resolved.
The final definition is that of environmental migration. Here it is imperative to
distinguish between environmental migrants and environmental displacees. Environmental
migrants are people who “chose to move voluntarily from their usual place of residence
primarily due to environmental concerns or reasons,” while environmental displacees are people
who “are forced to leave their usual place of residence, because their lives, livelihoods and
welfare have been placed at serious risk as a result of adverse environmental processes and
events (natural and/or triggered by people).”3 Note, these people do not move due to political,
religious or economic reasons, at least not primarily. Granted, there are further complications
Daniel G. Huber and Jay Gulledge. “Extreme Weather and Climate Change: Understanding the Link and Managing
the Risk.” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, December 2011. pp. 2
3
Olivia Dun, François Gemenne, and Robert Stojanov. “Environmentally Displaced Persons: Working Definitions
for the Each-For Project.” Each-for Project, 2007. pp. 2
2
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with these definitions. An individual may move voluntarily yet feel forced to do so because of
worsening conditions. Graeme Hugo contends that involuntary migrants “do not make
preparations; maintain greater commitment to origin; are likely to be in a state of stress; are less
likely to bring assets and; are less likely to have connections at origin.”4 It falls to clarifying the
degree of force versus choice when distinguishing a voluntary from an involuntary immigrant.
Demystifying the Existence of Environmental Migration
The primary concern in pushing the issue of environmental migration is first establishing
its existence. After plentiful discussion of the phenomenon, it would appear to be simple;
however, evidence is hardly accommodating. To agree that environmental migrants exist, one
must prove that the main—if not the only—reason that they move is due to environmental
decline. One of the biggest elements of this trend coming under fire is that of desertification. For
example, soil erosion and deforestation are environmental issues wrestled with in Haiti, yet there
is no indication of any migration flows taking place because of the change in climate (though this
may be attributed to high levels of poverty and immobility due to geographical isolation; will be
further elaborated towards the end of this subsection). And how does one distinguish between
migration caused by the environment and traditional relocation? Within the Sahel—the belt of
land approximately 1,000 km wide that separates the Sahara desert in the north from the
Sudanian savanna in the south—there is a “culture of environmental migration,” cultivated by
the nomads due to a constantly changing environment. Whether it is due to nomadic pastoralism
or long-distance trade, families are accustomed to relocating permanently, a tendency impossible
to find in Haiti, a smaller and poorer block of land. Though the culture might have evolved from
Graeme Hugo. “Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the
Pacific.” Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, pp. 12
4
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the prevailing difficult environmental conditions in the region, only in 2012 has proof surfaced
that individuals in the Sahel emigrate due to newly-deteriorating circumstances (this is the Sahel
Crisis 2012).5
There are a number of ways we could resolve the question of the existence of
environmental migration. Correlation does not indicate causation, so although changes in an
environment may coincide with increased patterns of migration flow, there may in fact be no
direct link between the two. In the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in
the 21st Century, the authors stressed that it is due to “associated changes in and combined
effects of, precipitation patterns, storms, and sea level rise; loss of biodiversity, and ecosystem
services; and resulting health risk, food and livelihood insecurity”6 that people emigrate. An
argument against climate migration states that migrants are simply looking for an excuse to move
and attribute it to environmental changes in order to gain amnesty in their countries of
destination; this could not be farther from the truth. In reality, movement across international
borders is considered disadvantageous and even sacrilegious. Movement displays a separation
with one’s culture, family and land. Individuals deliberate extensively and “calculate the relative
advantages of moving against the relative advantages of staying behind.”7 Thus, one way to
resolve the issue is to acknowledge climate change as an instigator of forced migration. Some
researchers even prefer a different term, survival migration, to detract attention away from
different causes of movement and towards a better understanding that multiple stressors could
push people to leave their homes (Figure 1 demonstrates the complex nature of the “drivers” of
migration). Or better yet, instead of identifying climate change as the sole perpetrator of forced
Richard Black. “Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?” New Issues in Refugee Research, 2001, pp. 5
Chairperson’s Summary “Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21 st Century.” Oslo, 7
June 2011.
7
James Morrissey. “Rural-Urban Migration in Ethiopia.” Force Migration Review, 2008. pp. 29
5
6
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migration, it is more feasible to describe the change as a threat multiplier, which heightens
existing socioeconomic and environmental disturbances.
Figure 1 – The Foresight Project, 2011
Finally, we verify what it is that makes environmental migration such a threat. If a few
thousand people moved, that would not constitute an international crisis. Estimates of how many
people will move because of the threat of climate change have proved an almost impossible topic
for researchers to agree on. The estimate of 200 million immigrants was mentioned earlier, but it
is only one of many predictions. A clear distinction has yet to be made between a climate
migrant and a climate refugee—the issue is deciphering which one of the two is moving
voluntarily or is forcefully displaced. Norman Myers, a social scientist, has attempted to predict
displacement by climate change: his figures have ranged from 150 million in 1993 to 200 million
in 2007 by 2050. In an interview with Christian Aid in 2010, Myers suggested his new
approximation of 250 million climate migrants; the organization misreported that number and
claimed that 1 billion people could be displaced by climate change. Evidently, governments
recognize that many groups of people will emigrate, and so refuse to take responsibility for
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environmental migration because they are so threatened. More about this will be discussed in
Impediments to Advocacy.
Projected Climate Change
In this subsection, several cases will be brought to light: examples of pressing
environmental concern, as well as specific concerns plaguing regions and countries.
Africa is one of the most susceptible continents to climate change because of multiple
strains and its low adaptive capability. Between 75 million and 250 million people will be
exposed to increased water stress owing to difficulties in river-basin management and the
extraction and pollution of water, in addition to increased drought risk in northern and southern
Africa and augmented runoff in East Africa.8 Areas suitable for agriculture are expected to
decrease and harvests from rain-fed agriculture will be reduced fifty percent by 2020. Further
aggravating food security and malnutrition will be falling fisheries resources caused by rising
water temperatures in large lakes. Coastal areas with large populations will be affected by sealevel rise, the adaptation of which could amount to 5-10% of select countries’ GDPs.9
Disputably the two biggest impediments to sustainable development in Africa are
droughts and desertification. The definition of droughts in use here is water deficit. Droughts are
instigated by variations in climate and further exacerbated by human activity. Among the
aggressors are an excessive build-up of heat on the surface of the earth, reduced cloud cover, and
disparities in temperature, all of which lead to a drastic reduction of rainfall. Deforestation,
overgrazing and improper farming techniques trigger soil degradation. These unhealthy farming
8
Martin Parry, Osvaldo Canziani, Jean Palutikof, Paul Van Der Linden, and Clair Hanson, eds. Climate Change
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 2007. pp. 48
9
Martin Parry, Osvaldo Canziani, Jean Palutikof, Paul Van Der Linden, and Clair Hanson, eds. Climate Change
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 2007. pp. 13
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techniques reduce the soil’s ability to retain water and be recycled, further endangering
agriculture.
Desertification is defined as land degradation resulting from variation in climate and
human activity. The largest initiators of the process of degradation are soil erosion—caused by
reduced agricultural productivity—drought and poverty.10 Although it is common to cite
improper farming techniques as one of the perpetrators of desertification, it has been found that
desertification is fraught with human causal indicators. Poverty and complete dependency on
natural resources by the poor further heightens the process of desertification. In some areas of
Africa, productivity losses reach 50 percent. Senegal is a country strongly affected by improper
use of the land: lack of proper management of organic and mineral fertilizers has provoked
immobilization—the decomposition of organic matter that keeps it from being accessible to
plants—and soil organic matter loss.11
Climate change in Asia will affect the greatest number of people at one time. Glacier melt
in the Himalayan Range would increase flooding, rock avalanches, simultaneously decreasing
river flows as the glaciers draw back. This will take place within the next two to three decades,
but remark that although the process will begin soon it will be very gradual, and will not
resemble the cataclysmic events as they are over exaggerated by film screenwriters. Freshwater
reserves are projected to sharply decrease, affecting more than a billion people by 2050. Rises in
coastal water temperature, floods and droughts are expected to bring endemic morbidity and
mortality, in turn worsening the toxicity and gravity of cases of cholera in South Asia.
Suffering the most from loss of biodiversity would be Australia and New Zealand, in rich
sites such as the Great Barrier Reef and Queensland Wet Tropics. Population growth and coastal
United Nations Economic and Social Council. “Fifth Meeting on the Africa Committee on Sustainable
Development (ACSD-5).”
11
Richard Black. “Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?” New Issues in Refugee Research, 2001, pp. 4
10
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development are expected to amplify risks from sea-level rise and further critical hazards of
storms and coastal flooding by 2050. Reduced precipitation and added evaporation would deepen
water security issues in southern and eastern Australia as well as in New Zealand, by 2030. The
region is comparatively well-suited to adapt to impending climate change due to its developed
economies and scientific capabilities, but there are considerable hardships to implementation of
defense mechanisms to combat extreme events.12
Europe will be affected by a multitude of environmental changes: retreating glaciers,
longer growing seasons, sift of species ranges, health impacts due to a heat wave of unmatched
proportion, flooding, and decreased precipitation. Changes in the environment will complicate
the economic sector, as regional differences in natural resources and assets will be more
emphasized than before. The risk of inland flash floods, coastal flooding and erosion will be high
due to storminess. Highlands will confront glacier retreat and reduced snow cover inevitably
leading to reduced winter tourism. Summer tourism in Southern Europe will likewise be affected
because of higher temperatures, less water availability, and projected heat waves and wildfires,
all of which enable safety hazards. Crop productivity and hydropower potential will be adversely
affected as well. Northern Europe is expected to be subjected to more recurrent winter floods,
threatened ecosystems and ground instability. Some adaptation to climate change is possible in
Europe, specifically if proactive risk management adaption plans are put into effect.
The worst transformation likely in South America is the steady tropical deforestation and
ensuing replacement thereof by savanna in eastern Amazonia. In dry areas, agricultural land will
lead to salinization and desertification, thus threatening the productivity of important crops and
rendering it difficult for livestock to remain secure, culminating in supplementary food security
12
Martin Parry, Osvaldo Canziani, Jean Palutikof, Paul Van Der Linden, and Clair Hanson, eds. Climate Change
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 2007. pp. 14
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issues. Food security will additionally be endangered by alterations in precipitation patterns and
the vanishing of glaciers, leading to water insecurity. Any efforts to adapt to the climate change
will be stalled by “lack of basic information, observation and monitoring systems; lack of
capacity building and appropriate political,
institutional and technological frameworks; low
income; and settlements in vulnerable areas,
among others.”13
North America is arguably the most
prepared region and the one with a comparatively
smaller volume of projected changes. Western
mountains are projected to experience warming,
causing decreased snowpack, greater winter
flooding and less summer flows, intensifying the
struggle for already over-allocated resources.
Forests will be disturbed by pests, diseases and
fire, with a higher risk of affected land area. Cities
already prone to heat waves are expected to
encounter more occurrences, greater intensity and
longer duration with the potential for hostile health
impacts. The existing level of adaptation is
irregular and currently preparedness for greater
Figure 2 – IPCC, 2007
13
exposure is not high.
Martin Parry et al., eds. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 2007. pp. 14
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The Polar Regions (the North and South Poles) have overcome documented changes in
composition and range of plants and animals. The regions have experienced greenness, an
increase in biological productivity, and a change in both species ranges and abundances of
species. The retreat of Arctic sea ice has already led to expanded marine access, adjustments in
coastal biological production and increased coastal wave action. Further reduction in freshwater
ice will distress lake and water ecology, in addition to requiring changes in transportation. Arctic
human communities have been adapting to these changes by modifying their wildlife
management and hunting practices; however, stressors combined with climate change will
challenge adaptive capacity and escalate susceptibility. The projected impact of global warming
is especially high with regards to the North Pole, as Figure 2 shows. Enough ice would have
melted by 2100 to allow a northwest passage and a northern sea route. Traditional ways of life
are being threatened and investments need to be made to relocate physical structures and
communities.14
Let us take into account one case study: Yemen. With a population of 24.8 million,
Yemen is suffering from an estimated net migration rate of -1 migrant per every 1,000 people,
amounting to 24,800 individuals relocating from Yemen between 2010 and 2015.15 The
conundrum is this: Yemen’s fertility rate is one of the highest in the world, standing at 6.2 births
per woman, a growth of 3% in its population annually. Its high birth rate points to an enormous
youth bulge, with 50% of the population aged less than 15 years old.16 What explains the
migration away from the country is the strain Yemen’s rapidly growing population puts on an
already burdened resource base. Aquifers in major cities are expected to dry up in the next 15 to
14
Martin Parry, Osvaldo Canziani, Jean Palutikof, Paul Van Der Linden, and Clair Hanson, eds. Climate Change
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, 2007. pp. 56
15
International Organization for Migration. “Yemen – Facts and Figures.” April 2012.
16
Manea, Elham. “The Perils of Yemen’s Cunning State.” NOREF Report, 2012. pp. 4
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30 years. Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, has been under speculation for the past decade, with
researchers claiming the capital’s water supply would be close to depletion by 2010: currently,
the estimate stands at a complete exhaustion 20 years from now. The World Bank lists three
causes of Yemen’s exhaustion of water resources: “climate change-induced alterations of
rainfalls which are starting to exacerbate the country’s aridity; extension and intensification of
agriculture; and fast growth of urban centres.”17 Due to overpopulation in city centers and thus
scarcity of water residents are forced to leave their homes to move elsewhere, or else die of
thirst.
Contrary to popular opinion that climate change is slow and will not affect today’s
population, our environment is changing every year, and as was demonstrated, certain changes
will take effect within the next two to three decades. Though slow, climate change is indeed
upon us and we feel its effects everywhere: river flooding in Europe is becoming a constant
concern, the growing number of hurricanes in the Caribbean puts those in coastal regions on
alert, and mud sliding in China and South America are new phenomena, which require new
warning and emergency systems. Likewise, these climate changes are sometimes extreme
enough to cause people to move.
Projected Movement
Now that we have come to the conclusion that climate change exists and that
environmental migration would follow, we look at who would actually be moving. As we have
noted in a previous section, the Sahel region is rife with migration patterns: this could be seen in
its negative migration rates. States that primarily belong in the Sahel region include Mauritania,
17
Raleigh, Clionadh, Lisa Jordan, and Idean Salehyan. Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and
Conflict. Social Development Department. World Bank, 2009, pp. 17
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Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan and Somalia. Mali in particular, has historically been a crossroads for
immigrants traveling to neighboring countries and to other regions in Africa and Europe. Hence,
it has been particularly susceptible to migration and has been the focus of many refugee
resettlement and family reunification programs brought on by the International Organization for
Migration.
It is no news that countries situated in the Sahel regularly experience food crises and
instances of malnutrition. The Sahel has been labeled a crisis zone, as 18 million people now
face fatal food shortages. The European Union contributed $51 million to West Africa’s Sahel
region—in effect, to Mali and Niger—to combat child hunger and distribute food to those in
need. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has attributed the
growing scarcity to an “uneven pastoral situation, flooding, the locust threat and high grain
prices combined with widespread poverty and high vulnerability.”18 The stress put on the
environment has already triggered individuals to evacuate. The residents of Diakassdé, a small
village located in the north of Senegal, have individually decided to leave their town, as harvests
from 2011 were almost non-existent, leading to a tremendous exodus emptying three-quarters of
the town. Confronted by food shortages, no water security and no harvests because of absence of
rainfall and pest infestations, inhabitants packed up their things and went to search for warmer
areas fertile with food and pasture.19
The Micle Project, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research,
whose goal is to “contribute to a better understanding of the complex relationships between
18
Food and Agriculture Organization. Situation Update: The Sahel Crisis 2012. Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations. United Nations, 31 Oct. 2012.
19
Moustapha Diallo. “Sahel: Migrating Early to Avoid Drought and Destitution.” IFRC. The International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 7 Feb. 2012.
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(climate-related) environmental changes and migration,”20 released supported estimates of
environmentally-displaced individuals owing to actual climate changes. The statistics are below:
People potentially at risk of being displaced because of desertification: 135 million
People who have fled due to flood, famine and environmental disasters: 24 million
People at risk of sea-level rise by 2050: 162 million
People at risk of droughts and other climate change events by 2050: 50 million21
Certain trends in migration are very predictable because of already-established migration
networks. The following are some predicted trends of African migration associated with changes
in climate: Algeria/Morocco to France, Côte d’Ivoire to Mali/Burkina Faso, Somalia/Ethiopia to
Yemen, Tunisia to Italy, Senegal to Ghana/Nigeria, and the list continues. The reason there are
predicted trends is due to the existence of aforesaid migration networks, which play a critical role
in a family’s destination decision. Migration networks are formed when a pioneer traveler moves
to a destination, and by this means, provides incentive for others in the community to follow.
Others tend to follow because the pioneer offers “social capital,” which encompasses in itself
special opportunities, assistance in moving and a pledge of support upon arrival.22 These
migration networks increase the prospect of international movement because there is an inherent
implication that the costs and risks of the transition are lower than the expected returns and
benefits thereof.
Climate migrations could also be aided by personality assessments: as Mr. Sandro
Cattacin, Professor of Sociology in the University of Geneva, says, “Those who choose to
20
Diana Hummel, Martin Doevenspeck, and Cyrus Samimi, eds. Climate Change, Environment and Migration in
the Sahel: Selected Issues with a Focus on Senegal and Mali. Micle Project: Migration, Climate and Environment,
2012, pp. 2
21
Diana Hummel, et al, eds. Climate Change, Environment and Migration in the Sahel: Selected Issues with a Focus
on Senegal and Mali. Micle Project: Migration, Climate and Environment, 2012, pp. 9
22
Hugo. “Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific.” Climate
Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, pp. 24
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emigrate, even if it is within their own countries, possess a certain personality. They are
entrepreneurs; almost unafraid.” Cattacin maintains that typically migrants will move within
their own countries
and soon thereafter
cross international
borders to find a better
life. Likewise a
precursor to
movement is social or
economic prosperity.
The Foresight Project
has isolated the
variables of
vulnerability to
Figure 3 – The Foresight Project, 2011
environmental change and wealth/level of capital to ascertain a correlation between social
capital, ability to move and vulnerability to environmental change. A “reduced level of capital
means that they are unable to move away from situations of increasing environmental threats;
yet, at the same time, this very lack of capital makes them even more vulnerable to
environmental change” (a graph illustrating this correlation is found in Figure 3).23 The
significance of this discovery is the deduction that the international scene needs to help those
who cannot afford to move, called the “Trapped Population.” But therein lies the difficulty, as
the following section proves.
23
Richard Black, Neil Adger, Nigel Arnell, Stefan Dercon, Andrew Geddes, and David Thomas. Migration and
Global Environmental Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities. Foresight: Migration and Global
Environmental Change, 2011. pp. 11
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Impediments to Advocacy
A considerable part of the problem rests in the United Nations’ lack of a definitive term
for environmental migrants. As such, there have been no attempts at affirming a convention or
means of approaching the issue to allot funds for distressed governments, especially in regions
such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.
Once it is established that environmental migration or displacement (if there is ever a
proper definition) is an international concern, governments will argue over whether or not they
have a responsibility to take action against climate change. In order to play that card, it falls to
underlining that ultimately, widespread migration would lead to destabilization of governments
and weakening of the economic structure of a multitude of countries. Unfortunately governments
would be left to fight with the result of environmental migration and not the cause—climate
change. Richard Black poses a fundamental question: “[I]f protection and assistance were
extended by the international refugee regime to ‘environmental refugees,’ would this help or
hinder the battle to focus the world’s attention on pressing environmental problems?” There is a
common American phrase that declares any publicity good publicity. If we were to extend this
belief to the recognition of climate migration, there is reason to believe that publicity would only
help to focus the world’s attention on environmental problems. Since migration caused by
changes in climate is something no government would want, perhaps measures would be taken to
avoid its progression, particularly with regards to the environment. Unfortunately, some climate
changes have been taking place for so long and/or are inevitable that conceivably not all
environmental changes could be slowed down.
The only way a government would believe that it has a responsibility for action is if there
is an admission to wrongdoing. A government could only admit to misconduct if its duty or
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responsibility had been violated. An international court would need to resolve that the harm
conducted was foreseeable. The perfect example would be to take carbon emissions: the risks of
carbon emissions have only been revealed relatively recently. If a court succeeds at resolving
that the harm was foreseeable, the biggest obstacle emerges and that is to conclude causation.
Because “climate is affected by several factors interacting in complex ways, it is difficult for
scientists to tease out what percentage of any climate change is affected by GHGs, and it is even
more difficult to determine what percentage is affected by a specific polluter or group of
polluters.”24 Beyond the complexity in attributing harm to a State, most often the State is not the
primary emitter. Though international law recognizes that one state cannot be the only actor
responsible, the court is left to decide whether the one state must be punished for its damage or
whether it should share responsibility for its actions. The International Law Commission states
that situations may surface in which
several States by separate internationally wrongful conduct have contributed to cause the
same damage. For example, several States might contribute to polluting a river by the
separate discharge of pollutants… In such cases, the responsibility of each participating
State is determined individually, on the basis of its own conduct and by reference to its
own international obligations.25
Taking actions towards reducing climate change constitutes a painful task for politicians.
Constantly bombarded with issues of pressing urgency and potentially impacting the lives of
millions of citizens, leaders must continuously prioritize their duties. Especially in democratic
states, heads of state are persistently concerned with taking the proper steps towards reelection;
that implies taking the reins on plans concerning national security and on life improvement
24
25
Cashman and Abbs. “Global Climate Change and US Law.” American Bar Association, 2008. pp. 201
ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful Acts (n 279) pp. 317-18
Beata Safari 21
before considering sustainability projects. In governments which function on a 3- to 4-year
presidency, or whose political offices are limited to ten years, the attention is better spent on
concerns that are immediate, not in the next five to ten years. Therefore, taking action against
climate change and aiding those in need needs to be placed at the forefront of every domestic and
foreign policy agenda. As is the case in most questions that are long-term, grass-roots
organizations need to take an active role in informing governments of the proximate nature of
our global crisis. Better yet, the plentiful agencies of the United Nations need to facilitate the
discussion on global environmental migrants and as such it would be better to assist the
government in dealing with environmental migration than to force it to assert its role in
neglecting its own policies on climate change.
Now we broach the problem of the United Nations programs. The one and only
complaint that the departments share in common is that they do not receive enough funding to
support their copious initiatives. Dr. Ivan Ureta of the Geneva Institute of Diplomacy argues that
the United Nations departments receive too much funding. What they should be doing is
allocating the funds more successfully. Part of the solution lies in not spending as much money
on the benefits United Nations employees receive. Close to all United Nations employees are
entitled to an almost tax-free livelihood. They do not pay an income tax and their tax-free
benefits may even extend to large purchases, such as vehicles.26 Aside from the money, because
the UN departments are constantly in competition with each other—save for a few exceptions—
the departments refuse to cooperate. Lack in communication results in departments often
working on similar topics and not advancing very far because they cannot share funds and ideas.
The European Union has taken some tangible—albeit problematic—efforts towards
developing a migration prevention policy. The first direction that the EU has taken includes the
26
“Pay and Benefits.” UN Careers. United Nations, 2012.
Beata Safari 22
formation of the High Level Working Group (HLWG). The Working Group has formed some
audacious recommendations, such that:
i. The HLWG shall facilitate and co-ordinate the opinions and activities of its Members,
with a view to providing coherent and sustained European leadership throughout the
GEO initiative…
ii. The HLWG shall ensure co-ordinated European inputs for the realisation of the
GEOSS 10-Year Implementation Plan…
iii. The HLWG representatives shall inform their respective national authorities and
organisations that are responsible for environment and sustainable development issues of
the progress of the GEOSS initiative, with a view to influencing their activities and
contributions to the optimum benefit and use of the initiative.27
Unfortunately, the HLWG does not have the means to follow through on its goals, as the
organization does not have controls and wants for executive power. It has an almost
unmanageable structure. It consists of all 27 EU member states, plus the acceding country
Croatia, the candidate country Turkey, and four countries associated with the Seventh
Framework Programme—Iceland, Israel, Norway and Switzerland. Given its unusual
amalgamation of members, the working group must operate outside of the typical European
Commission structure for communicating and executing external policy, thus providing it less
leverage than if it were a typical group.
The second route the EU chose was its attempts to incorporate policy between different
Directorates-General—the main departments of the Union—, particularly the Justice and Home
Affairs (JHA) and Development and External Relations. This route has the chance to prove more
“European GEO High Level Working Group.” Research and Innovation in the European Commission. European
Union, Dec. 2011.
27
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efficient than the HLWG, simply because it constitutes a big part of the traditional framework of
the EU and can therefore be more efficient. Yet, as in the United Nations, this collaborative
effort has its faults. The branches of the Directorates-General have different concerns and share
different priorities, and are furthermore complicated by the political sensitivity of the programs
they would be pushing for in the arena of migration policy. Boswell offers some solutions to
increasing the efficiency of this EU endeavor:
1) “develop[ing] a more comprehensive and systematic approach to migration and
refugee prevention, through a policy framework that categorises causes, phases of
escalation, and possible policy responses, and which can be used as a starting-point for
specific country analyses; 2) discerning the EU’s potential contribution to preventive
policies for each type of cause or phase of escalation, and defining where it should
cooperate with other partners; and 3) defining possible areas of conflict or overlap
between migration prevention and other external relations goals.”28
In effect, the only way the European Union could approach encroaching environmental
migration is to identify what are some possible causes of increased migration and what the
European Union can do to at least alleviate some of the tension that it places on both incoming
and outgoing countries. Instead of approaching migration as a hypothetical situation, it is
necessary to brainstorm some concrete explanations and demand that rival departments work
together to sample ideas and recognize where it is that the EU falls short and needs help from
outside governments or international organizations.
What has been one of the most successful at setting the cogs in motion was the
Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios, also known as the Each-for Project.
Boswell. “Addressing the Causes of Migratory and Refugee Movements: The Role of the European Union.” pp.
22-3
28
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Lasting the length of two years, work on the project began in 2007 and research concluded in
May 2009. With the hopes of identifying root causes of forced migration, inspecting the
relationships between migration and environmental degradation, and analyzing and forecasting
environmental disintegration processes, the project members were able to provide plausible
scenarios for instances of forced migration.29 Apart from identifying some key components that
lead to environmental change, the members of the project appealed to the recognition of
environmentally forced migrants/refugees in an international treaty. They argued that without
recognition in a treaty, environmental migrants would never be afforded the same or similar
rights as refugees, per the 1951 Refugee Convention. What the project was most successful at
was developing a five-pronged approach which encompasses,
1. Requirement for a strong scientific basis: there is a need to put in place programmes
to allow a better understanding of the cause-effect mechanisms between environmental
degradation and forced migrations.
2. Increasing awareness: it is important to raise worldwide knowledge-based public and
political awareness of the issue and its environmental, social and economic dimensions
3. Improving legislation: following the two steps above there is then a need to put in
place a framework of recognition of environmental migrants/refugees either in a separate
Convention or anchor it in Intergovernmental Environmental Treaties.
4. Giving the means for adequate humanitarian aid: there is a need to empower the
relevant entities in the United Nations system and other major assistance organisations
to provide aid to environmental migrants/refugees, particularly when considering the
displacement of entire communities.
Andras Vag. “Each-for EU Project - Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios.” Each-for EU
Project - Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios. European Commission, 2008
29
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5. Strengthening institutions and policies: the final suggestion is that concepts need to be
devised and institutions reinforced or created in order to be able to assist the flux of
forced environmental migrants, both at the international and national levels.30
Besides all of the other impediments, the attitude towards immigration needs to be
rehabilitated. Shortly after the Arab Spring, 25 000 people migrated to Italy by way of the
Mediterranean Sea from North Africa, mostly Tunisians fleeing the economic difficulties that
caused the upheaval. Unable to house all of its new inhabitants, Italy pleaded with Tunisia to
take back its people. On 5 April 2011, the Tunisian government agreed to receive two flights of
repatriated emigrants from Italy. The Italian government offered the Tunisian government
coastal-patrol equipment and $220 million in support as compensation for their efforts. Apart
from sending away large numbers of emigrants from its country, Italy hoped the repatriation
would dissuade other interested parties in traveling to Italy to run away from their government.
In fact, the bribe was not stimulus enough for the Italian government: the Italian interior
minister, Roberto Maroni, appealed for an emergency regulation to equally reposition the
migrants across EU member states. The EU rejected the application arguing that Italy received a
relatively low quantity of requests for asylum and thus should cope.31 Italy serves as a perfect
example of what immigrants are up against worldwide, especially in Europe, a hot destination for
migrants.
What has been achieved?
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change publishes new research every six years
in the form of working papers, which it passes on to the United Nations to serve as a knowledge
Fabrice Renaud, et al. “Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?” InterSecTions. United
Nations University, May 2007, pp. 33-6
31
“Take My Migrants, Please: An Influx of North Africans Causes a Headache for the Government.” The
Economist, 2011
30
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basis for use in future initiatives and conventions. The IPCC provides the foundation reference
point for the United Nations on the progress of climate change. It does not stand for any views,
but rather delivers neutral, unbiased research on the status of the environment. Every six years,
the panel turns to its 195 member states, and its partner non-governmental and intergovernmental
organizations to ask for their recommendations on finding new researchers and scientists to
publish work for the IPCC. The beauty of the system lies in the power of seeking new brains and
new opinions every six years. Individuals are then chosen by the panel on the basis of credibility,
experience and regional location. There are several downfalls to this system. Chosen scientists
must be from all over the world, which means that if there is an abundance of talent concentrated
in one country, only the bare minimum will be selected from that country while panel members
may struggle to locate capable researchers in a smaller, less gifted work force in another country.
Also present is an inherent bias towards scientists who are favored by the government for
whatever reason, which makes one wary of the risk of prejudice. Ultimately what is most
disconcerting is that the men and women who are chosen already lead very complicated and busy
lives: they do not quit or pause their habitual work for the sake of completing research for the
IPCC. In fact, it has been found that many a time research conducted for the IPCC was an
impediment to the individuals’ work lives so they often passed down their research to be
completed by assistants or people less qualified.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees released The Nansen Initiative: A
Protection Agenda for Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement, an initiative that serves as
evidence of progress that the UNHCR has made over the past year. Work began in December
2011 at the 60th anniversary of the 1951 Convention on the States of Refugees, during at which
time Norway and Switzerland spoke about the need for a more lucid and reliable approach for
Beata Safari 27
the protection of externally-displaced people (across international borders and due to natural
disasters). “Switzerland together with Norway is cooperating with other states and interested
parties in trying to achieve a better understanding of such cross-border movements. The aim is to
identify the best practices and develop a consensus on the best way to assist and protect those
concerned.32 Their pledge became the basis of the Nansen Initiative, which incorporates the
Pledge, the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, the Cancun Agreements, and the
Kampala Convention. At the core of the Initiative, sit the three pillars of the protection agenda:
international cooperation and solidarity, standards of treatment of affected people, and
operational responses. The essence of the Initiative is the belief that “we don’t know enough”
and those who choose to commit pledge to work through sub-regional consultations, the
establishment of a consolidated knowledge base, and an ongoing global dialogue to disseminate
a Protection Agenda. According to the timeline, it is estimated that the process will last two to
three years, beginning with the formation of focus committees, followed by the construction of a
solid knowledge base from the bottom-up, thus fostering enlightened global discourse for the
entirety of a year, and wrapping up with the distribution of the Protection Agenda.
One of the UNHCR’s guiding principles in the quest for protection of environmental
migrants is the evasion of the term “refugees.” José Riera, Senior Policy Adviser of the Policy
Development and Evaluation Service, places confidence in the UNHCR’s respect for the terms
“migrant” or “displacee” over refugee because of the nature of the difficulty in designating an
individual as a refugee. Under the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention the term “refugee” is
applied to an individual whom “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
José Riera and Bruno Stolze, eds. “Proc. of Pledges 2011: Ministerial Intergovernmental Event on Refugees and
Stateless Persons.” UNHCR Ministerial Meeting, 2012. pp. 147-8
32
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the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country.”33 Because of the convention’s strong basis on persecution of the
individual, it is unjustifiable to use the term for people escaping their countries with the
intentions of dodging worsening conditions due to climate change.
So -- What Should We Do?
During the course of the paper, we have ascertained that it is wrong to think that only
certain areas of the world will be affected by climate change. Climate change is a global
phenomenon and will affect every single individual on the planet (if not by the physical climate
change then by the migration that follows). The difference is that certain countries in certain
regions have developed better mechanisms to adapt to impending changes whilst others are
wholly unprepared. Juan Somavia, the Director General of the International Labor Organization
Office in Sri Lanka, believes that “poverty anywhere is a threat to prosperity everywhere.”34 In a
manner of speaking, he is right. Residents in those regions which have underdeveloped
infrastructures and whose residents must seek unorthodox methods of cultivating the land are illprepared and the most vulnerable to climate change. This category of individuals will gradually
begin moving first within their own countries and then will prepare to cross international borders
to live in areas that do not anticipate problems adjusting. In fact, Mr. Somavia’s statement is
rooted in the poverty-environment hypothesis, first brought to the scene in 1987, when the World
Commission on Environment and Development (also known as the Brundtland Commission)
connected two previously unrelated subjects:
33
United Nations. High Commissioner for Human Rights. Geneva: n.p., 1951. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.
34
Quintus Perera. “ILO DG says ‘Poverty Anywhere Is a Threat to Prosperity Everywhere.’”Asian Tribune, Apr.
2009.
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Many parts of the world are caught in a vicious downwards spiral: Poor people are
forced to overuse environmental resources to survive from day to day, and their
impoverishment of their environment further impoverishes them, making their survival
ever more difficult and uncertain.
Though the spokesperson never hinted at the specific factors at play, nor where he had
ascertained the statement from, the fact remains that a correlation has been discovered (please
refer to Figure 2).
Throughout the entirety of this paper, we have tackled with several complications. We
have confronted definitions at odds with each other (environmental migrant/refugee/displacee),
identified and predicted hotspots for climate change, projected future patterns of migration,
examined the necessity of humanitarian aid, discussed the importance of international
recognition of environment migration, and recognized virtuous strides towards protection of
these individuals. It may seem that during the course of this analysis, treaties and conventions
were credited as the only answers to many an issue raised. This could not be farther from the
truth. Despite the fact that international agreements are a vital incubator for this topic, no one can
deny that there is still the incertitude of: what State will ratify it? Will it then implement it? Will
the treaty be enforced? Will it then become a key component in the State’s foreign policy? A
treaty or a convention must be fully supported by the political will and action of a State in order
to have any just cause for existence. As it stands, an international agreement could only be valid
(ergo, serve its purpose), if bilateral and regional agreements follow suit. Smaller agreements are
the bread and butter of international agreements because while international attention is the most
rewarding, regional agreements would be able to more rapidly and effectually set into motion
targeted outcomes.
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Of the countless publications published and research conducted, I consider the
Commission on Climate Change and Development as having hitherto been able to develop the
best-rounded approach in support of environmental migrants. Instead of fitting all migrants into a
protection paradigm, the Commission has proposed six goals:
1. ensuring that migrants have the same rights and opportunities as their host
communities
2. reducing the costs of moving money and people between areas of origin and
destination
3. facilitating mutual understanding among migrants and host communities
4. clarifying property rights where they are contested
5. ensuring that efforts to assist migrants inclxude host communities, and
6. strengthening regional and international emergency response systems.35
The Commission on Climate Change and Development has recognized that environmental
migrants may be afraid to move without the knowledge that they would be treated properly and
have a place to stay. Moreover, enhanced regional and international emergency response systems
would lessen the catastrophic effect of the environmental change on the communities, thus
reducing the costs of moving people (as less would need to leave). A final thought: not all
patterns of migration could be compressed into a single protection paradigm or a ready-set
formula (though the CCD came pretty close). What we can do is shine a brighter light on these
issues to encourage sustainable development, broaden the range of solutions, and strengthen
communities.36
35
Barnett, Jon, and Michael Webber. Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate Change. CCD
Commission. Commission on Climate Change and Development, n.d., pp. 2
36
Jane McAdam. Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law. Oxford, 2012, pp. 210-1
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