Australia and the Asia-Pacific
R. James Ferguson © 2007
Week 5:
Australian Defence Policy: Evolving Methods and New Threats
Topics: 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Introduction: A Regional Advantage?
From The British Empire to the US-Alliance as Security Guarantee
Beyond Self-Reliance in the Regional Setting
Revising Defence Roles For the 21st Century
Points of View: Risks of the Current Defence Posture
Bibliography and Further Resources
1. Introduction: A Regional Advantage?
A nation's participation in war and the way its conceives of its security have a
direct impact on its foreign policy, its wider international relations, and upon its
identity. Changes in defence policy, in particular, are often responses to, or causes
for, major adaptations in the international system, or in regional priorities. In
this lecture, we will focus on the 'facts' of Australia's defence posture, capabilities and
doctrine from the 1990s until 2007, with a brief mention of how this has emerged over
the last century. It must be stressed that security and defence involve much broader
issues than just military capability. Issues of transnational policing, 'peace support'
roles, political use of defence policy to gain international support, engagement in UN
or coalition activities, impact on national identity politics and perceptions of Australia
overseas are some of the overlapping 'grey' areas that have emerged in the last five
years (DFAT 2003). Thus the Minister for Defence in 2007 could note that defence
operations include protection of 'Australia, its people, interests and values' (Brendan
2007). As noted in a recent Australian Defence Force (ADF) publication, the ADF is
responsible for 'the protection of Australia, our people and our national interests,
whenever and wherever those interests lie.' (Department of Defence 2007c).
During the 1980s Australia had a full time force of some 70,000 personnel, supported
by approx. 28,000 reservists. As of 1998, the active force was 57,400, with general
reserves of 33,650 (Chipman 1998). In 1999, the total active force was based on
55,200 persons, with 27,730 reserves (Chipman 2000). Through 2006-2007
Australia's force was based on 51,610 active personnel and approx 17,200
reserves (Kerr 2006; Chipman 2007; Chipman 2005), with plans to lift this to 57,00
by 2016, though gaining enough new high level recruits and retaining skilled
personnel remain problematic (Walters 2007b). This force includes a Special
Operations Command with a special operations headquarters, 1 SAS regiment, 1
commando battalion, and 1 ‘incident response’ regiment plus signals and service
support groups (Chipman 2007; Chipman 2005; see further below). Through 2010 it is
planned that the regular army might increase by 1,500, and switch to a new
1
'hardening and networking' plan for the mobile battlefield, a process that may cost
up to $1.6 billion (Walters 2005; Department of Defence 2005).
Approx
Deployments
of
http://www.defence.gov.au/)
Australian
Forces,
Mid-2007
(from
Operation Catalyst - Iraq -1575 - Rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq.
Operation Astute - Timor-Leste - 1100 - Restoration ofstability to Timor-Leste.
Operation Slipper - Afghanistan - 970 - International coalition against terrorism.
Operation Deluge - Support to the APEC Meeting in Sydney, Sept 2007 [Numbers
undeclared]
Operation Resolute - Australia's offshore maritime areas - 450 [Support]
Operation Anode - Solomon Islands -140 - Regional Assistance Mission to the
Solomon Islands (RAMSI).
Operation Mazurka - Sinai Peninsula, Egypt
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).
-
25
-
Contribution
to
the
Operation Azure - Sudan -15 United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).
Operation Paladin - Middle East -12 - UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO).
Operation Tower - Timor Leste - 4 - United Nations Office in Timor Leste
(UNOTIL).
Through 1999-2007 there has been a major upward revision of defence spending,
force structure and levels, in part due the serious load of peace-keeping operations
in East Timor, then in reaction to the terrorism threat at the global, regional and
national level, and to deployments in Iraq whose budgetary cost for 2005 was $445
million (Thomson 2005) and increased deployments into Afghanistan through 20062007. Increases of 3% per year in defence spending have been confirmed for that
period by the government, with defence spending for new acquisitions guaranteed up
to 2015, with a strong increase of 6-8% annually 2005-2006 in part due to government
budgetary surplus (Thomson 2007; Gittins 2006; Chipman 2007). Likewise, roles in
UN mandated peacekeeping or regional peace-support tasks (East Timor, and
‘permissive intervention’ in the Solomon Islands, future extended operations in
southern Afghanistan to soon come under NATO command) and coalition operations
(Iraq) have suggested that these overseas operations will be a major component of
enlarged tasks for the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Thus through 2006
Australia had approximately 2,000 troops deployed in East Timor, a peak force 1,400
in Iraq which dropped to around 700, while commitments to Afghanistan will rise to
1,000 by 2008, with efforts currently focused on the southern Oruzgan Province,
bassed around a Reconstruction Task force backed up by a security team (Department
of Defence 2007b; Dutter 2006; Walters 2006; www.defence.gov.au/opslipper/).
Likewise, from late June 2007 up to 100 Australian defence personnel will be used in
in Operation Outreach to indigenous communities in Central Australia to provide
2
'logistics, communications, mobility and local liaison support to site assessment teams
that are led by the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous
Affairs (FACSIA)' (Department of Defence 2007a).
These realities have also forced a major expansion of intelligence agencies, plus a
call for a restructuring of how they operate. There is also theoretical interaction
among these different roles: it has been argued that weak or failing states might
become a haven for international criminal and terrorist activities, e.g. operating
out of states in turmoil, e.g. Afghanistan and Somalia (see Menkhaus 2004). On this
view, there is a strong need for international states to intervene in such cases (as in
East Timor, the Solomon Islands and potentially PNG, Dibb 2007; see lectures 2-3).
Likewise, there has been a recent effort to link military and peacekeeping operations
into a wider regional cooperation that can sustain ‘peacekeeping capacity’ (Cottey
& Forster 2004). It has yet to be systematically applied in the Asia-Pacific region. It
has also been argued that any army force that is deployed will need to be supported
by strong air and naval forces, entailing the ongoing modernisation of most
weapons platforms through 2007-2020 (see further below).
The Australian force retains a relatively small personnel base, in the absence of
either conscription or near universal 'national service' (as experienced in Switzerland,
Singapore, or South Korea for example). Through 1999-2000, the Howard
government began a review process that led to a white paper in 2000 (a white paper
is major policy document) which has signalled a partly revised conception of how the
military should be used. There was followed by a further serious update in 2003
and again in late December 2005, a Defence Management Review (2007), a major
Defence Priorities assessment for 2007-2008, a 'road map' for Joint Operations for
the 21st Century (Department of Defence 2000-2007), plus annual reports (see
resources below). In part, this has been in response to the crises in Indonesia, East
Timor, the 'global' threat of terrorism, Coalition activities with the US and UK, and
combined with an updated off-shore coast-guard surveillance ability and efforts to
better control of fisheries in Australia's EEZ (exclusive economic zone). Likewise,
sustained deployment of over 3,000 personnel annually into operations, combined
with rotation needs and support, has placed a major strain on Australian abilities.
The key conclusions of the 2005 update included a focus on: * Terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the consequences
of state fragility and failure remain the most immediate strategic challenges for
Australia.
* The ADF needs to confront current international security issues such as terrorism
in Iraq and Afghanistan whilst helping build capabilities in South East Asia.
* The ADF will continue to be called on to provide humanitarian assistance, disaster
relief, civil emergency response, offshore evacuation and peacekeeping capabilities
on an ongoing and often short-notice basis.
* Continuing strategic complexity and uncertainty means that we need to build a
balanced Defence Force that is versatile, robust, joint and integrated.
* Defence industry is critical to meeting the ADF's capability needs and the
Government is committed to policies that will build an internationally competitive
Defence industry to support, sustain and upgrade Defence assets.
(www.defence.gov.au/update2005/)
3
At around 1.9% through the mid-1990s till 2005 and circa 2% of GDP in 2007,
Australia defence spending was also quite moderate (compared with approx. 5% for
the US and in real terms, with similar adjusted figures for China), but in regional
terms (Southeast Asia) it was by far the largest program in economic terms
(Malaysia spent $US2.47 billion and Indonesia $US2.5 billion on defence in 2005,
Chipman 2005). Through 2000-2007, however, the defence budget has increased,
in part due to perceived regional instability, but also due to the need to purchase a new
generation of high-tech equipment. It was $14.3 billion in 2001, 14.6 billion in 2002,
increased slightly again in 2003 (Chipman 2003), with an operational annual budget
of approx. $16-17.5 billion for 2003-2005, and $19.6 billion for 2006, and $22
billion in 2007 (Walters 2007a; Chipman 2007; Chipman 2005; Thomson 2005;
Department of Defence 2003). On this basis, defence was one of the few areas of
government spending that was allowed serious increases from 2001, indicating its
heightened importance in Australian national policy. The Howard government
estimated that with growth in economy of above 3%, it was possible for these
increases to be contained at around 1.9% of GDP through to the year 2010, slightly
above average East Asian rates of around 1.55% of GDP for 2005 (Chipman 2007;
Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force; Department of Defence 2003b, p31). The
defence budget remains in general terms more than three times that of the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade. From the 1990s onwards in national terms Australia's
budget remains by far the largest within the Southeast Asian zone, e.g. Singapore
spent US$5.57 on defence in 2005, but considerably lower than PRC spending at an
adjusted PPP $US of 87 billion for 2004 (Chipman 2007; Chipman 2005; Ball & Kerr
1996, p48).
This level has been maintained in part to address extended peace-keeping, alliance
and security roles, but also to allow the ongoing purchase a new round of
weapons technology (‘weapons platforms’) including new mobile artillery (Cotterill
2005a), armed reconnaissance helicopters (22 Tiger helicopters from Eurocopter,
based on French and German designs and worth a total of $1.2 billion, Sheed 2004),
and interrum fighter support based on 24 Super Hornet Fighters (costing $6.6.
billion), a long-replacement fighter aircraft (the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter), new in-air
re-fuelling tankers, AWACS, and Air Warfare Destroyers with anti-missile systems
through 2008-2020 (Walters 2007a; Department of Defence 2006b).
The counterbalance to Australia's small force structure has been the reliance on 'force
multipliers', i.e. modern technology, aircraft, ships, new weapons systems,
surveillance systems, improved intelligence and communications, to ensure that small
numbers of personnel can still be very effective. The head of this force during the
1980-1990s was 75 FA-18 fighter aircraft (then approximately twice ASEAN's
advanced fighters), and 21 F-111C long range strike aircraft, augmented by some 15
extra F-111Gs to ensure the long-life viability of this part of the Australia's airdefence, at the cost of some $150 million (see Wrigley 1994; Stephens 1996. Approx.
70 FA-18s are currently operational and are being upgraded with new systems until
the new fighter is available). These combined forces give Australia a definite
advantage in regional fighter and strike forces. Yet it may become harder in the longterm to retain this regional strategic advantage. Southeast Asian and PRC airforces
are going through some modernisation, e.g. a variety of F-16s, MiG29s, and Su-27s
for Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, the last of which has the most
4
modern Southeast Asian Force, while PRC uses modern Russian aircraft such as the
Su-27 and Su-30 Flanker fighters (Chipman 2004; Stephens 1996, p47). On this basis,
Australia is moving towards the acquisition of a new fighter, the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter, combined with airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, inflight re-fuelling, and 'high-altitude long endurance unmanned aerial aircraft'. In one
view this means that in the 2010s the RAAF 'from being somewhat overmatched by
potential adversaries' will come to posses 'the most advanced air force in the AsiaPacific after the U.S." (Griffin 2007)
It seems tat a new phase of defence modernisation, along with new missile and space
capacities deployed by the U.S, Japan, China and in the future Australia could signal
a new arms race (see lecture 4). However, this is partly offset due to high levels of
security cooperation in the region, and no major state in East Asia that might be
postulated as a realistic invading enemy (China may fit the role of regional
competitor, depending on long term trends). The ASEAN Regional Forum was
partly created to ensure regional cooperation and transparency to ensure defence
spending would not become destabilising (Mak 1995, p22). Furthermore, through
the 1990s regular airpower conferences including ASEAN states and Australia and
New Zealand have been held in Darwin to clarify potential areas of cooperation and
reduce misunderstandings, followed by regular meetings of the ARF and by greater
military dialogue both within ASEAN and via the Shangri-La Conference (see Heller
2005; Water & Lax, 1994). Likewise, ASEAN itself through 2003-2006 is debating
the formulation of a more formal ASEAN Security Community through 2012, a
trend that would further reduce inter-national tensions (Xinhua 2003; Kyodo News
2003; see lecture 6).
Australian naval forces are also oriented towards an ability to interdict forces
away from the Australian coast, with an emphasis on missile frigates, Anzac
frigates (currently being upgraded), two new amphibious landing ships, and
conventional submarines to take on these roles (Australian 2007a; Department of
Defence 2006). These will be augmented by three new anti-missile systems on three
Air Warfare Destroyers in the next decade (Cotterill 2006). The standing army had a
northern orientation, with small components ready for relatively rapid deployment.
Through 1999-2007 this orientation came under new challenges. The Australian
Navy found itself in sustained operations to interdict ‘boat people’ in western and
northern waters, a task which led to controversies about the turning back of immigrant
boats towards Indonesia, the rescue of non-documented arrivals from sinking boats,
and the high cost in using major naval vessels in these policing roles. This has led to
some calls for the creation of an independent coast guard, or at least the purchase
of new small vessels for this role without undermining the existing navy budget. At
present coastal surveillance has been extended through the use of private
contractors that coordinate their coastal monitoring (Coastwatch), contract worths
some $900 million (Ferguson 2005d) with the Navy and Airforce, while two new
patrol boats have been ordered to patrol oil and gas infrastructure in the northwest
shelf (Thomson 2005). Through 2006, there has been an upgrade of the facilities of
Surveillance Australia, which has a 12 year coastwatch contract, using light aircraft
which will in future be augmented by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (possibly including
long-range vehicles) and increased satellite abilities (Ferguson 2007c). In part this can
5
increase interception of illegal fishing, with some 35 'illegal' boats being spotted on a
daily basis (Dodd 2006), as well as sustaining border protection. At present this is 'an
all over government' response designed to draw support different parts of government
to protect Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), control coastal waters
and frontiers, with special cooperation between the Defence Force and Customs to
create the Border Protection Command, BPC (Department of Defence 2006).
From 1999, Australian soldiers and support units have found themselves in extended
peacekeeping and peace-making roles, while elite units have been involved in
search and destroy, ground reconnaissance and security protection operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. This has led to a 2004-2007 debate as to whether the direct
defence of Australia remains the ADF's major role, or whether new extended
global roles are now their major focus. Extended deployments overseas beyond
the region would require a different type of army and defence structure (Dibb
2005), an issue which will need to further refining through 2006-2008 (Borgu 2005).
There are several major factors to note about Australia's defence orientation: A. An ongoing difficulty in defining a set enemy or direct threat from a given
nation state (with the exception of World War II), combined with a nagging
sense of vulnerability and, in the past, fear of invasion 'from the north'. Yet
post-1975, there has been a general shift in the region from '"threat-driven"
defence calculation to one that is uncertainty-based (Mak 1995, p22). This
theme of preparing for uncertainties, not existing, clear threats, was
reiterated in Paul Dibb's review of Australia's Defence: 'There is no conceivable
prospect of any power contemplating invasion of our continent and subjugation of our
population.' (Dibb 1986, p4). This has then shifted to dispersed operations in
the relation to the 'war on terror', in regional activities in the 'arc of
instability' (see lectures 2-3), and support for wider global roles with allies
or in multilateral operations. This 'uncertainty planning' remains a feature
of defence planning through 2007, and includes an uncertain strategic
environment, likely short warning time for a crisis, and short 'capability
warning time' in which to develop new abilities in the defence force
(Department of Defence 2007c). These diversified and expanded roles may
mean that even with increased spending, that there may be gaps in
equipment, personnel and training during the next several years (Strategic
Comments 2006).
B. Likewise, threat's such as international terrorism can strike at widely
different targets and interests regionally and globally, once again making
defence planning problematic. International terrorism has emerged as a major
threat, but also with high degrees of uncertainty as to possible targets, time
of attack, organisations involved, and possible head-quarters or operational
bases. As we have seen (week 4), this makes pre-emption, deterrence, and
defence planning highly difficult. It has also boosted the importance and
problem of reliable, fast, and un-politicised intelligence (see below).
Likewise, regardless of the number of successful detections and arrests, it only
takes one major attack for to succeed for terrorists to be seen to achieve
their goals to some degree (Lewis 2003, p45). Overall, an extra $1.1 billion
dollars have funded a package of new domestic security measures through
6
2004-2005 (Thomson 2005). Total expenditure on such threats has been in the
order of $5 billion since 2001, with ASIO stating that at least 1 terrorist attack
on Australian interests has been aborted each year (Walters 2005b). It has been
argued that although Al Qa'ida has been weakened since 2001, that new,
independent terrorist groups, now highly security conscious, might
become operational in Southeast Asia (Walters 2005b) as well as South Asia
and the Middle East. On this basis, recent bombings and attempted bombings
in the UK through 2005-2007 and intensified bombing attacks in Iraq and
Afghanistan, with claims of a 25% rise of such attacks through 2006
(Associated Press 2007).
C. In spite of being a medium power in traditional military terms, Australian
troops have been regularly deployed overseas. This has continued recently
in support of U.S./Alliance activities, or in UN operations (in the 1990s,
Australian troops were involved in UN operations in Cambodia, Cyprus,
Egypt, Middle East, Rwanda and East Timor), and newer coalition operations
(Afghanistan, Iraq). In the past, of course, Australia fought overseas, often in
support of Britain or other allies (the Boer War, World War I, most of World
War II, the Malayan emergency, the Korean War, operations in Borneo during
the confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia 1963-1965, the Vietnam
War). Australia through the 1990s was regularly involved with joint operations
and training exercises with Southeast Asian neighbours, though often these
were hosted in Australia (see Ball & Kerr 1996). Likewise, Australia is engaged
in fairly wide ranging air and naval patrols of sections the Indian and
Pacific Oceans, using 18 P-3C Orion aircraft, some operating out of
Butterworth airforce base in Malaysia, with prospects of some of these roles
being taken extended by unmanned vehicles (UAVs) and a smaller number of
Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft in future (Ferguson 2007c; Strategic Comments
2006; Ball & Kerr 1996). From December 1997, the Howard government
formally shifted Australian defence thinking to a wider regional posture, rather
than just focusing on Australia and its immediate environment, through a new
Strategic Policy. Through 2001-2007 this trend of overseas engagement has
deepened with the view that new security threats, in cooperation with
partners, should be met wherever they occur, a policy which leads to
further global engagement. This sparked some regional concerns, e.g. in
Malaysia, Indonesia and PRC, of Australia becoming too assertive within the
Southeast Asia region, but overall recent Australian efforts in East Timor and
the Solomon Islands through 2005-2007 have been accepted as efforts at
stabilising ‘fragile’ states.
D. From the mid-1990s a range of signals indicated an Australian shift towards
regional engagement with both north-east and south-east Asia. By June
1996 a virtual web of security arrangements (Greenlees 1997a, p1) had been
brokered with regional states. This was perhaps not surprising in relations with
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines, but political-military
dialogue was also been commenced with South Korea, China and Vietnam.
The trouble with this plan was that although it aimed at regional
stabilisation, it placed a much larger burden on the Australian armed
forces to be able to operate overseas, as well as to defend Australian
territory and air/sea approaches. Through 1999-2001 this regional engagement
was somewhat reduced (especially with Indonesia), was re-engaged in part
7
through 2002-2007, this time on the basis of anti-terrorism efforts (especially
with Indonesia and in future cooperation with the Philippines), as well as
region wide efforts to reduce money laundering and related funding flows to
terrorist groups, e.g. via the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC. In general
terms, the emphasis on 'cooperative security' or the move towards a 'security
community' across the region has slowed (via the adoption of a norm-based
system for preventing and then managing conflicts (see Bristow 2005;
Grant 2005) has become a second track for defence policy through 20052007. Events through 1999-2007 have demonstrated the real costs and
benefits of regional engagement, both financially and in terms of sustained
impact of foreign affairs and the need for long-term engagement in wider
regional agenda. It also required a better equipped and trained army with
'hardened capabilities' for working in hostile environments overseas
(Department of Defence 2005).
E. Through 2001-2007 Australia began to view the Indo-Pacific in terms not just
of positive trade flows and institution building, but began to speak of ‘regions
of disorder’ centred on flash-points such as North Korea and Taiwan, as well
as the identification of a range of transnational threats that needed better
management and increased cooperation among nations: Globalisation, with its vastly expanded flows of trade, finance and people, has
created more opportunities for transnational crime, including the illegal
movement of drugs, people and arms. The scale of these flows is immense
and can overwhelm the capabilities of many nations. It is estimated, for
example, that four million people are smuggled each year across borders,
earning people smugglers between $14 billion and $20 billion. This flow puts
enormous pressure on the policing and other resources of receiving and
transit countries. Modern, transnational criminal networks have become more
flexible and are exploiting the advances of communications technology.
Transnational crime will demand greater international cooperation in law
enforcement, intelligence, border and financial controls, blurring the line
between international and domestic security. Building effective police, legal
and other networks with other countries, particularly in Australia's region, will
be crucial for dealing with organised crime in Australia. It will be important,
too, to focus the work of international organisations on transnational problems
with which national governments, acting alone, cannot always deal. (DFAT
2003, Chapter 2)
F. Aside from transnational terrorism, the Department of Foreign Affairs
indicated a number of other human, resource, and environmental issues
that fell into the ambit of ‘transnational challenges’: 




The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 12
million refugees and an additional . . . internally displaced people around the
world.
The UN Drug Control Program estimates that the annual illicit drug trade is worth
between $800 billion and $1000 billion a year, a sum larger than the combined
GDPs of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
In December 2002, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/ AIDS estimated
that 7.2 million people in the Asia-Pacific region had AIDS or were HIV-positive.
Research commissioned by the World Bank estimates that world fishing capacity
exceeds sustainable levels by between 70 per cent and 100 per cent in many
temperate and tropical fisheries worldwide.
The World Water Council estimates that by 2025, 2.4 billion people in South and
East Asia will be living in conditions of water stress, as strong economic growth
8
leads to greater use of water by households and industry. (DFAT 2003, Chapter
2)
G. Thus, defence planners through 2000-2007 began to think of the way that
such transnational challenges would impact on Australia’s region, with
special focus on Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and PNG, including
stabilisation, security, humanitarian, and disaster relief roles (DFAT 2003; Molloy
2004). This means that the defence forces have to sustain several, very diverse
roles: Pointing to this year's $22 billion defence budget, Nelson [Brendan Nelson,
Minister for Defence] said that taxpayers will have to get used to higher levels
of defence spending in response to emerging global and regional challenges.
"I do not doubt that Australians should become accustomed to, and
expect and support, this kind of sustained investment in the foreseeable
future," Nelson said
"We are ensure that we maintain our high-end war-fighting capability
and at the other end security and stabilisation operations in our region."
(Walters 2007a).
This shift over the last decade a serious re-orientation of security and defence
issues, one not yet fully reflected in defence spending or force structure. To
understand the significance of these radical changes, we need to briefly look at trends
since 1901.
2. From The British Empire to the US-Alliance as Security Guarantee
A part of the British Empire and then a Commonwealth, Australia's military and
defence orientation was at first largely based on English models and views. As
'colonials', Australian troops were sent during the 19th century to participate in British
conflicts in the Sudan, in the Boxer Rebellion in China, and the war in South Africa in
the 1890s.
In 1909, Australia first introduced military training and founded the Royal Military
College at Duntroon (at this time relying on the British Royal Navy to control the
seas). At this time, German's forces in the Pacific, including a naval squadron, and
their Pacific island colonies were seen as a potential threat. It was only in 1913,
however, that the Australian navy (RAN) and a naval college were developed in
order to help protect trade routes. We can interpret Australia defence policy as then
based on British defence and a secondary level of national capacity: It is easy to interpret Australian strategy and defence policy before the First World
War as the payment of a premium - in the form of land forces - on a British insurance
policy - in the form of the Royal Navy. At the same time, the creation of a Royal
Australian Naval squadron can be interpreted as a form of second cover, or third-party
insurance. (West 1983, pp5-6)
From World War I, onwards, of course, Australia committed its troops readily as
part of its association with and loyalty to British interests, though the expected
9
trade-off was that Australia expected protection by Britain. However, the use of
Australian troops in World War I also allowed Australia to sign the Peace Treaty as a
sovereign nation, thereby raising Australia's international profile. Prime Minister
Hughes, for example, ensured that Australia secured a mandate over Papua New
Guinea, as a small token to Australia's suffering (and contributions) in the Great War.
The inter-war period saw mixed trends. In 1921 the Royal Australian Air Force
(RAAF) was created as a separate service, but in the 1920s, defence spending was
generally cut, and Australia's defence was considered part and parcel of 'Imperial
Defence' (West 1983, p7). For a short time Australia had visions of building up a
power 'two ocean' navy, but by 1924 this project had been scuttled by imperial
agreements reducing naval spending (Cowman in Stevens 1997). Australia found
itself one small ally to the UK. Wars in Europe and operations in the Middle East
were one key formative element of Australian military experience.
Yet by 1939 Australia once again found itself not only in wars in Europe, but in 1941
when Japanese forces engaged in a major Asia-Pacific expansion and seized
energy resources in the Dutch East Indies, Australia found itself engaged in a major
Asian war. Britain was in fact too stretched by the desperate war in Europe and the
Middle East to defend Australia. This was symbolised both by the fall of Singapore,
and the inadequacy of British naval forces throughout the region (this has been
controversially interpreted as a form of British treachery, see Day 1988, but it is more
likely that Britain underestimated the Japanese threat, and simply had no further
resources to spare). As a result Australia had no choice but to turn to a new 'great
and powerful' ally, the United States.
It was on this basis, and at first in fear of a possibly remilitarised Japan after World
War II, that an Alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the United States
(ANZUS) was concluded. From then on, the relationship with the U.S. remained a
corner-piece of Australia's defence policy, a trend not even stopped by New
Zealand's effective withdrawal from ANZUS in 1985. It must be stressed that the
ANZUS treaty was a loosely framed alliance document, rather than any absolute
guarantee of Australian security, but seems to have been revived as a major part of
alliance politics in the Asia Pacific (see Tow & Albinski 2002).
10
Australian war-dead were left throughout the Middle East and Europe after two World Wars
(Photo from the Goldsmith Archive)
In large measure this growing alliance was due to the fact that the U.S.-Australia
relationship then formed part of combined Western actions against communism in
Asia. On this basis, Australian troops fought in the Korean War (1950-53), the
Malayan communist insurgencies of the 1950s, and in the Second Indochina War
(1965-75, i.e. the 'Vietnam War'). Hence Australia was engaging in a policy of
Forward Defence, i.e. defending Australia's perceived interests by sending them to
meet threats overseas. This was part of the so-called domino theory, whereby the
collapse of South Vietnam could lead to collapses of friendly states to
communism/nationalism in Thailand, then Malaysia, then Indonesia, then pose a
direct threat to Australia itself.
With the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and the Nixon (or Guam) doctrine (July
1969) calling for U.S. allies to take more responsibility for their own defence
("burden-sharing"), Australia had to reconsider its defence position. It soon abandoned
Forward Defence and decided on a more direct defence of Australia and its interests,
i.e. a policy sometimes called Continental Defence or Fortress Australia, a policy
continued from the mid to late 1970s. This doctrine was not totally isolationist; it did
hope for a stable Pacific Ocean. Yet at the same time the Whitlam Labor government
in 1973 saw no major direct threat to Australia for the next 15 years. On this basis,
likewise, the Australia was also unwilling to confront Indonesia over its occupation of
East Timor, something which was viewed as the ‘rectification’ of an out of date
Portuguese colonial exception in the region. These events, of course, would lead to a
later reversal of policy through the late 1990s (see lectures 1-3).
3. Beyond Self-Reliance in the Regional Setting
11
There were obvious problems with this doctrine of only directly defending Australian
territory: 'In a sense, anything beyond the shore-line is forward defence, and any allied
bases inside a 'Fortress Australia' may invite attack, unless 'Fortress Australia' also
entails isolation and neutrality' (West 1983, p10). It is not surprising, therefore, that a
number of reviews of Australia's defence forced a real change in orientation.
These started with: 



1986 - The Dibb review, outlining possible 'threats' that prepared the ground for the
1987 Defence White paper
1987 - The White Paper on Australian defence, which called strongly for a policy of
self-reliance (though within the context of the American alliance), and with an
emphasis on the ability of Australian forces to deal with low level threats, especially
in Australia's northern region
1994 Australian Defence White paper with further modifications in 1997, with
new weapons and regional capacities for power projection.
The revised Defence White Paper of December 2000, with new roles in
Defence Update of 2003, and updated capacities outlined in the Defence Update
of 2005, and further updates through 2006-2007.
This self-reliance policy relied upon a layered defence (or defence in depth),
meeting threats at different levels of proximity to the Australian mainland, using
different types of forces. The aim was to make it very difficult to cross the sea and air
gap, and to deal with any small units that might make it to continental Australia, i.e. it
was a denial strategy (see Dibb 1986, p8This layered defence required: A. A surveillance ability to detect and thereby stop intruders in Australian air and
sea approaches, especially in the north
B. A strike and interdiction capability from air and sea to destroy enemy forces
before they establish, or resupply, encroachments on Australian territory.
C. A flexible and mobile ground force capable of attacking enemy incursions and
defending dispersed population and resource centres, especially in the north.
These trends were further developed in the 1994 Australian Defence White paper
with further modifications in 1997, and revised in the Defence White Paper of
December 2000, with new roles in Defence Update of 2003 (see further below). The
1994-2000 period reiterated most of these themes of defence-in-depth, sea and air
interdiction, strategic counter-strike, and the use of technological advantage in
an age of modernisation. The main aim of the Australian Defence Force remained
the defence of Australian territory (a theme first emphasised in the 1903 Defence Act)
and its air and sea approaches, though secondary roles included regional
engagement, commitments to allies, and participation in UN operations
(Department of Defence 1994).
Defence orientation remains towards self-reliance, though in the context of the
alliance relationship with the United States, and new multilateral roles, trends
which has deepened through 2001-2007. The basic idea that Australia should be
12
able to handle local threats and stop any first attack, but that wider or sustained
conflict with major power in the Asia-Pacific region would by necessity draw in the
region's major power, the United States, a trend strengthen with the emerge of the U.S.
as a predominant superpower willing to use its geo-strategic power in support of
political goals (see lecture 4). This reliance on a dominant power is re-iterated in
various DFAT and Department of Defence documents, including foreign affair's white
paper (DFAT 2003), and re-iterated as of great benefit and as a 'substantial force
multiplier for Australia's defence and intelligence capacities' (Department of
Defence 2005b).
Several other trends, however, also emerged through the 1990s: * Without a direct threat, the defence force role was defined in the context of
regional and global uncertainties (Department of Defence 2005b; DFAT 1994).
* The role of APEC, ASEAN and ARF were also noted, but within perceived
limits based on instabilities in the nearby Pacific, transnational threats in Southeast
Asia, and perceptions of possible future tensions based on PRC's growing power
(Dibbb 2007; Department of Defence 1994).
* It was also suggested that the kind of war most likely to occur in the region would
be a 'short-warning conflict', in which the survival of the nation would not be at
issue, but in which Australia's interests could suffer damage. Australia would seek to
settle such conflict on its own terms, if need be engaging in escalation options
including 'strategic strike' against military assets or 'selected infrastructure'
(Department of Defence 1994, pp24-29). Through 1997-2001 there were
sustained moves towards a greater regional capability which could deal with
more serious conflicts. These expectations were partly fulfilled through 2001-2007
by the spectre of regional transnational terrorism, but the targets under attack
now might be Australian citizens, firms, and interests abroad, radically
changing the focus for security thinking (see Dibb 2007; Nelson 2007; Department
of Defence 2000 & 2003).
Australia through the mid and late 1990s from strict self-reliance towards the notion
of regional interdependence and the idea of building a ‘regional security
community’. Whether this role can be sustained with the changed conditions in
Indonesia and the South Pacific remains to be seen. From 2001 this sphere of
potential engagement has been widened to include a wider engagement in East Asia
issues (including North Korea and PRC), a wider, potentially global, footprint for
possible Australian operations in coalitions (Afghanistan, Iraq), the role of
Australia in satellite communications in support of National Missile Defence systems
and the eventual acquisition of Air Warfare Destroyers, which could fit into theatre
missile defence networks (Coterril 2006), and a near-global exchange of intelligence
among several networks (especially the U.S., U.K., Canada, and New Zealand, but
also with linkages into NATO and ASEAN information flows, particularly from
Singapore and Malaysia, and more deeply with Indonesia from 2002-2006). From this
point of view, the main abilities of the ADF had been defence and regional
engagement, with modest ability to influence events beyond the Asia-Pacific
13
region (Dibb 2005) and limited support for 'peace' operations, but had drifted
towards wider roles through 2001-2007 (Dibb 2007).
This has led some commentators to argue that Australia in fact has become more
militant and militaristic in its thinking, with an excessive emphasis on military
strike aircraft and multi-billion dollar systems which can only be viewed as threats
against regional nations. The 2000-2005 strategic policies envisioned an even better
armed force able to operate more effectively at a distance from Australian shores
(Department of Defence 2003, 2005a, 2005b; 2007c). A new round of weapons
acquisitions has suggest that Australia may be able to ensure regional technological
superiority and strong power projection abilities.
From this point of view, these maintaining regional superiority and self-reliance
approaches may have undermined the development of a comprehensive common
security approach in the region, and in so far as it is pre-emptive, may not be based
on a perception of a 'just defence' system. In other words, Australia’s support for the
vision of a shared ‘security community’ in Southeast Asia has become
problematic (see Acharya 2001). Though an emerging security community has been
loosely supported within Australia’s foreign affairs policy and via support for the
ASEAN Regional Forum, this might be offset by Australia’s relative power
advantage. To pursue both lines, Australian defence policy would need to avoid
mixed signals and deepen regional cooperation, an issue which has been problematic
since the intervention in East Timor and the shadow of the pre-emptive, so-called
‘Howard Doctrine’ through 2002. It is in this context that through 2005 PRC has been
critical of the ANZUS treaty, has warned Australia not to become involved on the
Taiwan issue and in 2007 against Ballistic Missile Defence plans. Hence, one
secondary concern for Australia has been that Asia-Pacific cooperation, especially
among ‘great powers’, should increase rather than become more competitive.
4. Revising Defence Roles for the 21st Century
Over the last two decades Australia has continued upgrading its defence
capabilities, involving heavy forward commitments of funds (guaranting growth
in defence spending of 3% per year, but in the order of 6-8% for 2006-2007
(Thomson 2007). It is also expected that sometime between 2013-2018 that Australia
will operate superior fighters, acquiring some 100 new generation fighters (F-35
Joint Strike Fighter) that will be technological advanced enough to secure air
dominance (even against quite good Russian aircraft such as the Su-27 or Su-30). In
the long run, this has increased the ability of Australia to project power into the
region, or to cooperate in regional operations.
In spite of increased spending, the posture does not fully overcome the standard
dilemma of conventional verses new roles for Australia defence forces:
In other words, do we develop a force designed to defeat or deter a conventional
threat to Australia or do we prepare for a more likely but still quite challenging need for
forces to take part in lower levels of conflict, essentially in peace keeping or peace
enforcement operations? (Hartley 2001, p28)
14
Under the impact of events through 2001-2007, a second main focus is on the
linkage among transnational terrorism, instability in Southeast Asia, and the
possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It was argued that: Australia’s strategic environment has changed. The threats of terrorism and WMD are
real and immediate. For the foreseeable future, any ADF operations are likely to occur
within the context of regional contingencies, the War on Terror, efforts to counter the
proliferation of WMD or to otherwise enhance global security and stability.
(Department of Defence 2003, p25).
On this basis, the government increased the size of Special Forces, created a
Special Operations Command from 2002 (Lewis 2003), created a new Tactical
Assault Group, will upgrade or replacement its helicopter fleet (see Ferguson 2006),
expanded Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological and Explosive defence
abilities, via an Incident Response Regiment plus support from the Defence Science
and Technology Organisation, DSTO, (Ferguson 2007a; Australian 2007b ). Part of
the fear hear has been that terrorists might acquire and deploy WMD or nuclear
weapons (Walters 2005b), if not in a Western country, then in one of their allies. The
legal basis for military involvement in operations against terrorism within Australia
are based on the 1903 Defence Act, whereby the military can aid civil authorities
during emergencies (e.g. floods etc), but also on a 2001 amendment which allows
the ADF to help maintain public order when armed force may be required
(Lewis 2003, p46). The ADF has some limited role in dealing with domestic terrorism
since 1978, but specialised anti-terrorist units were developed in the 1980s. These
forces were deployed in relation to the 1982 Brisbane Commonwealth Games, the
2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the 2002 Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting (CHOGM) in Queensland (held under very high security), security for the
Rugby World Cup 2003, and more generally now in planning to meet possible
terrorist attacks (Lewis 2003, p47; Department of Defence 2003b). Such coordination
is not through a single home-land defence unit or minister, but coordinated across
government agencies, including the National Security Committee of the Cabinet, the
National Counter-Terrorist Committee, and the Protective Security Coordination
Centre, the so-called ‘all-of-government’ response concept (Lewis 2003, pp48-52).
To support these trends, Australia was forced into greater self-reliance in various
defence industries. Thus Australia built its own fighter aircraft in World War II as a
stop-gap measure until large scale resource reinforcements could arrive from Britain
and the U.S. From the 1960s onwards, Australia also tried to build its own aircraft,
either on license (e.g. the early Mirages licensed from France), or of its own design.
This applied increasingly to Australian ships and other equipment, though due to the
high costs of creating a defence industry, many elements were imported, e.g.
Abrams and Leopard tanks, and (problematic) Black Hawk helicopters. At the same
time, some substantially Australian-built platforms were developed and deployed
through the 1990s, e.g. the ANZAC frigates and the Collins class submarines, as
well as the Steyr infantry rifle, specialised missile systems and mine-sweeping
systems were sold overseas, earning around $600 million a year (Kerr 2006b; Blair
1995, p179).
15
For the current government, there may be major problems with how they approach this
issue. Most national arms industries around the world are subsidised and also
operate under a national favoured purchasing scheme (a pattern followed in
France, India, China, Russia, the U.S., the UK, Switzerland, Sweden and Germany,
though there is now greater coordination of such policies within an EU framework),
though. Advanced European and American equipment such as helicopters (Tiger
Reconnaissance helicopters, Chinook airlift helicopters, the problematic Seasprite for
the Navy), tanks (such as the Abrams tank which will begin to be delivered to
Australia in 2006) and 'smart' armaments now tend to dominate in Australia's
acquisitions. Over the last decade, Australia has sought to buffer the high costs of
new weapon systems but having some part of the production and much of the
maintenance covered by Australian-based firms, e.g. in ship building and some
avionics systems. It has also become partners in the initial development and design
of some new systems, e.g. the F-35 fighter and possibly in the future a new MultiMission Maritime Aircraft, MMA (Ferguson 2005c) giving it some influence overs its
design. In the long run, major suppliers from the U.S. may also try to channel
purchasing to their own equipment, arguing that training and procedural compatibility
is needed among such close allies. Naval construction, even if using overseas plans,
has been routed to Australian builders, e.g. for 3 new air-warfare destroyers and two
amphibious ships (Barker 2004).
There are certain areas where Australian science and technology has been able to
develop an edge in defence industries, e.g. the Jindalee Operational Radar
Network, which can detect targets over the horizon at long range, as far as 3,000 km
beyond the Australian cost, allowing initial surveillance of the 'sea-air' gap to the
north. The system is advanced, but has cost a start-up cost of $1.1 billion, and was not
fully operational until 1999 (Greenlees 1996c). Nonetheless, in the long term
Australia will need to import advanced weapon systems, especially aircraft, from
the U.S. and Europe at escalating prices. This improves inter-operability with
Australia's major ally, but also exposes us to rapidly rising costs in an industry where
the sky literally is the limit. There has been some diversification with the purchase of
European helicopters, plus added Australian inputs in some naval and air
technologies. However, such purchases can still be controversial, e.g. the
problematic rebuilt Super Seasprite helicopters, for naval use, with a billion dollars
having been spent on the 11 items that have been grounded due to safety and
operational problems, with the $1 billion project still 'in limbo' through 2007 (Kerr
2007; Sydney Morning Herald 2006).
Through 2005-2006 a new agency, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO)
became a separate budgetary unit that aims to enhance and rationalise ongoing
spending, supported by testing and research from the Defence Science and
Technology Organisation (DSTO) which also has a research and development role
(Ferguson 2007a). However, the DMO has had its own share of controversy through
2006: Some tenders for military kit had allegedly been written so that only one company
would qualify for the work.
It was alleged DMO had ordered protective vests that glow in the dark through night
vision goggles, making our soldiers a clear target.
16
The inquiry was also looking into reports of combat jackets made of flammable
material, helmets that obstructed vision, body armour that did not fit, packs that could
injure backs and boots that caused serious foot injury.
There were allegations of conflicts of interest as some DMO staff had left and taken
jobs with the private firms they had been dealing with.
Disciplinary action is expected against several DMO employees, but the inquiry did not
deter Air Vice Marshal Norm Gray, who resigned last month as deputy chief of the
DMO, from taking over tomorrow as chief executive of Thales Australia, 50 per cent
owner of ADI, the largest defence contractor in the country.
Thales is competing for the $2 billion contract to build two large amphibious ships for
the Royal Australian Navy. (Walker 2006)
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), in spite of small
budget of around $440 million, has been able to maintain advanced research in
hypersonic aircraft, in support for the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar system, methods
to detect and protect against improvised explosive devises, and providing Science and
Technology support for anti-terrorist operations, e.g. detection of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear attacks (Ferguson 2007a; Australian 2007b).
Through 2003-2007 the Australian government has moved ahead with the
modernisation of existing equipment, as well as major acquisitions designed to
equip the ADF through the first half of the 21th century. These include: 



A new multi-role fighter aircraft to replace the FA-18s and F111s, almost
certainly the joint strike fighter (F-35), with total cost in the order now upgrade
from $12 billion to $15.5 billion, with 70-100 units being purchased (Stewart
2007; Walters 2005). The project has over-run costs by more than 12% in the
US, with the units only becoming fully operational through 2015-2018,
though with some transfer of technology development as part of the deal
(Stewart 2007; La Franchi 2006). On this basis, the government has ordered
24 Super Hornet fighters as a 'bridging fighter' for local air superiority
(with advance radar and missile abilities) at $6.6 billion dollars (Ferguson
2007b).
Has ordered 22 Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopters, and 12 MRH90
copters to lift troops in combat zones, and seeks to phase out the current Black
Hawk helicopters through late 2007-2015, which have also been criticised for
safety problems in naval operations due to lack of flotation devices (Kerr
2007; Cooper 2007; Ferguson 2005). Some initial failures to meet
specifications have been reported through 2006 for the Tiger helicopters,
including problems with 'weapons and navigation systems' (Sydney Morning
Herald 2006).
Five new Airbus KC-30B tankers, which will extend the range of the FA18
fighters and the F-35's into regional missions, have been delayed but will be
operational by 2009 (Ferguson 2007d; Ferguson 2005b).
Six Boeing 737 Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C)
aircraft, but these aircraft, 'the long-range eyes and ears of the upgraded
Hornets, are 26 months behind schedule. Boeing and the DMO confirmed in
17





February that engineering and software integration difficulties with the
Wedgetail’s radar, communications and electronic warfare systems had pushed
the delivery date from February 2007 to March 2009' (Ferguson 2007d).
The electronics upgrade and then replacement of the AP-3C Orion surveillance
aircraft through 2015, using a mixture of manned and long-range,
unmanned surveillance vehicles (Ferguson 2005c; La Franchi 2006).
Purchase of heavy lift aircraft to replace the older Lockheed C-130H
transports, a project based on four C-17 Globemaster aircraft (La Franchi
2006). Two American C-17s were used to rapidly deploy Australian troops to
East Timor in late May 2006 (Vadnais 2006).
The acquisition of 3 Air Warfare Destroyers (AWD) at a total of around $6
billion, with Spanish and US designs being considered (Cotterill 2006; Walters
2005). This could be deployed as part of a wider missile shield system in the
region, or to defend amphibious task forces overseas (Borgu 2005).
The purchase of two new amphibious ships to move and land army forces,
circa $2 billion (Walters 2005).
New 155mm mobile artillery to be phased in circa 2008, worth $600-750,
plus Abrams tanks million (Cotterill 2005a)
This is a large commitment that will run for 10-20 years, indicating the need, but the
dangers, of forward planning based on weapon systems. The plan here seems to be
to create a highly flexible force with regional superiority in the medium term.
Thus, the Future Joint Operations Concept suggests that by 2030: 



The ADF could 'defend Australian territory against any credible threat without
relying on the combat forces of other countries . . .'
Contribute to, or lead, regional coalition operations, or contribute to 'distant'
operations.
Support UN, multilateral, humanitarian and disaster operations
Work with other departments and 'provide regional situational awareness to a
global commitment of military force' (Department of Defence 2007c)
5. Points of View: Risks of the Current Defence Posture
It is possible, of course, that the politics of the defence force, its spending and
structure are not just based on external threats and rationally perceived tasks and roles.
Australia's past involvement in war has become part of the ANZAC identity, and in
the 1994-2007 stated defence postures seem correlated with national pride and the
ability to maintain international commitments. This view argues that Australia's
gain more respect and regional influence by having a strong military force. This
may be true up to a point, but only to where such respect does not become fear due to
an increased security dilemma. There are other ways that armies increase prestige:
the presence of a strong army and advanced 'weapon platforms' (the sexy language of
high tech) indicates to Australia that 'it is somebody', that it can compete on the world
stage and be the best (within its means) with the handling of modern military
equipment. Modern weapons systems have a symbolic dimension as well, and can de
linked to patterns of national identity. Australia also has a proud ANZAC tradition,
18
and claims that its soldiers are among the most professional and best in the world.
Unit pride is found in all the services, but especially among elite commando and airservice (SAS) units. Australian army units have claimed to be extremely tough (they
were highly respected by the Turks and Germans in earlier wars), some are experts in
jungle warfare, and current elite units have played a leading role in insertion
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (2001-2007).
Yet the danger may be that such traditions can blind Australia to its own needs,
and to a neglect of alternative ways to conceive of security. It may also blind
Australia to some of the harsh realities concerning military spending. To indicate just
a few: 
Though Australia has had a very advanced attack fighter force, training costs need to
be fully factored in alongside equipment levels (for ongoing skills shortage, see Kerr
2006). As old aircraft such as the F111c are eased out through 2010-2012,
operational gaps have had to be filled before new fighters are fully operational
through 2015-2018. This reminds us that defence equipment research,
development and procurement works on long cycles (10-15 years), but the
strategic environment can change very quickly in response to new crises or
political changes (months or years). Such planning may 'live in the past' while new,
non-traditional threats become more dominant. Thus, the ADF has to be a balanced
force able operate as is at any stage (see Department of Defence 2007c)

Are naval resources sufficient to really cover our naval access areas, particularly
in Western Australia, and with coverage of the Indian Ocean? This problem has
plagued defence planners since the 1980s (Davis 1994) but has come to the forefront
over the last 6 years. This problem was highlighted by the unexpected arrival of
several refugee boats to parts of northern Australia through 1999-2001, thought most
boats are detected well out to sea by air patrols. The issue here may be less of
interception verses detection, combined with preventive approaches (e.g.
ongoing regional dialogue on refugee flows). This gap may be filled by
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs), satellites, and new intelligence gathering, but
remains a real problem in terms of Australian perceptions of security. Thus through
early 2006 drones have been trialed as part of a combined approach to 'combat illegal
fishing, drug running and people smuggling in the remote northwest region, which
extends about 2000km along the northern coast of Western Australia' (Watts 2006).
This problem has been partly reduced through cooperation between the Defence
Force and Customs to create the Border Protection Command, BPC
(Department of Defence 2006).

Likewise, though Australian air and sea power could interdict a medium sized
invasion armada, how well does it deal with low intensity threats such as
terrorism, resource destruction, climate change, or international drug and
arms smuggling? Older postures still drive much of the defence budget, in
spite of these issues being noted in recent defence analysis (Department of Defence
2007c). It may be that this will aid the security of the state, but not the security of the
economy or the citizens, i.e. it does not guarantee comprehensive national
security, nor human security (see Lizée 2002; Capie & Evans 2002; Kettle & Smith
1992; Salla 1995).
19

Modern strategists and academics have warned that future wars with technologically
advanced nations could be over in hours if not minutes, i.e. this is not just a matter of
nuclear war, but with new conventional smart weapons (including cruise missiles),
the winner will be the nation with the best information map of the enemy's location
(Gray 1996). According to one estimate, the Gulf War against Iraq was a deep war
waged behind enemy lines, with most of the enemy's command and control, and
radar and intelligence centres, being severely compromised within the first hour, or at
least the first day (at the same time, there was a lot of U.S. propaganda in the Gulf
War press feed - e.g. the Patriot anti-missile missiles were far less effective that
shown on television). Furthermore, it is now possible to beam live satellite
information, exactly specifying targets, in real time, to front line commanders. Wars
will not just be a question of building 'smart-bombs', but will in a sense be
'knowledge wars' (see Toffler & Toffler 1993). Australia has begun to plan for
these contingencies, with prototypes for live-wired infantry troops with tactical
displays. The number of modern and expensive 'platforms' may be much less
important than getting the best and most reliable information. To date, of course,
Australia remains largely reliant on the U.S. for global intelligence and satellite
imaging for much of its intelligence data outside of Southeast Asia, but plans have
been developed from 2004-2005 for more satellites to monitor Australian waters and
their approaches, perhaps up to 1,000 nautical miles in the Maritime Identification
Zone (Ferguson 2005d). Likewise, the networking and hardening of a mobile
army is one of the upgrade visions of the Australian Army through 2005-2010
(Department of Defence 2005).

Although Australia has a number of intelligences agencies, including ASIO, ASIS
(Australian Secret Intelligence Service, which has secretive operatives in Australia and
overseas), DIO (the Defence Intelligence Organisation), Defence Signals Directorate
(DSD) and the Australian Imagery Organisation (AIO). and the Office of National
Assessments (ONA), it is not clear how fast and independently these groups can
operate. Scandals involving intelligence officers from 1999 indicate that our services
may not be as reliable as some hoped, with concerns about political issues, e.g. crossimpact on Indonesia, shaping some assessments (Kerijn 2004; Stewart 1999; Stewart
& McGregor 1999; see lectures 1-2). Through 2001-2003 there have been concerns
about how accurate assessments have been on WMD, Iraq, and Indonesia. There
have also been concerns about lobbies within security and intelligence (e.g. ‘pro’
Indonesia or China lobbies, as well as the influence of Chinese spies and diplomats
through 2005), and to what degree intelligence is shaped by political expectations and
the view of government (for the views of Lieutenant Colonel Lance Collins, see
Brown 2004), e.g. the need to support the U.S. alliance. Through 2000-2006 there
has been a massive expansion of intelligence funding and operations, with a
three-fold increase of staff. However, this has not guaranteed a three-fold quality or
quantity of intelligence. As noted by one journalist, intelligence collection often has
to rely on suspect sources: Intelligence is only information by a fancier name. It can be right, wrong, or, more
often, trivial, so quality control matters.
Nevertheless, intelligence differs form other information because it is
sometimes collected by bribery, theft and other illegal methods. (Toohey 2004)
Such information can be very hard to confirm, leading to a need for critical
assessments that do not stray into wishful thinking or dominant perspectives based
on prejudice. On this basis, there has been a call for a serious review of the
20
intelligence services, with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute calling for a major
overhaul which might include the appointment of an intelligence Director
responsible for coordinating and overseeing all these agencies, plus the creation of a
special training college to give enhanced and uniform training to their staff. This is
crucial in relation to the transnational challenges listed above, and in preventing
transnational terrorism in particular (Lewis 2003, p50). Questions have also been
raised about the degree of early warning Australian intelligence may have had
on the 2006 crisis in East Timor, and whether this intelligence was well used to
brief local and regional governments (see Tanter 2006).

Through 2004-2006 the ADF has also been involved in disaster relief operations,
while in earlier periods the ADF has helped in some infrastructure and aid delivery
operations in East Timor, Indonesia, PNG and elsewhere. While a secondary role, it
has been argued that new equipment, e.g. surveillance aircraft, could have an
extended role in avoiding loss of life or humanitarian disasters, i.e. an extension of
current coast watch operations. However, the political aspect of these operations, as
in Aceh, also needs careful consideration, where Indonesian army units were keen to
see foreign troops leave.

More radical options can be considered, e.g. the creation of stronger regional ties
which would allow a stronger, truly cooperative security system to develop in East
Asia. This could result in Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and other nations
coordinating air and sea power. There are some serious negative implications,
though, if we ask who such a collective security system might oppose. That such
a framework is possible is already indicated by the still-existing FPDA, the Five
Power Defence Arrangements which committed England, Australia, New Zealand,
Singapore and Malaysia into a single cooperative framework.1 Originally aimed at
defending a vulnerable Malaysia and Singapore, the FDPA then became a useful
starting point for further cooperation in coordinating training, control of airspace and
defence cooperation generally (see Bristow 2005). A widened collective involvement,
including Indonesia and other nearby states, and coordinated either through ASEAN
or the ARF, could be useful in monitoring piracy in the region (see Chin 2003;
Renwick & Abbott 1999), in controlling the illegal movements of people and
smuggling, and in avoiding conflicts or accidents between regional military forces. A
certain degree of coordination, for example, has already been achieved between
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia in patrolling the shared Malacca Strait, and
multilateral conferences on transnational issues were held in Bali from 2002. In the
long run, however, strong cooperation with China (PRC) and Japan would be
needed for any cooperative security agenda to emerge.

The current shift in operations and planning has suggested some move way from
self-reliance towards 'low intensity stabilisation operations', involving defence
forces on the ground that need protection, and a move away from 'self sufficiency'
towards multilateral operations that 'understands that the ADF will operate with
support from multiple global sources' (Air Chief Marshal Houston in Walters 2007b).

Different roles and procurement of capabilities suggest there is a split between
planning for expeditionary forces (based on the army with air and naval
1
For the initial treaty of 1971, see the Internet at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1971/21.html
21
support) and conventional high-technology defence of Australia. Likewise,
there is a role-split between coping with non-conventional threats such as
terrorism and conventional war-fighting capabilities (Dibb 2007). Paul Dibb
(2007) has suggested that three major military roles face Australia in the coming
decade: a) Support for operations in the nearby 'arc of instability', which suggests that
Australia may need a larger army.
b) It is 'imperative that we have the best military capabilities in South-East
Asia', with a clear technological lead in regional terms.
c) 'Third, Australia faces an historical shift in the balance of power in Asia. The
emergence of a strong China capable of challenging Japan and, in the longer
term, the United States will mark a fundamental shift in our strategic
circumstances. We will need strong forces capable of demonstrating that
we are a serious military power, able to defend Australia and, where
appropriate, our alliance interests. This points to advance combat aircraft
(including for strike), follow on submarines to the Collins, and capable air
warfare destroyers. (Dibb 2007)

Another way to test the current posture of the Australian defence structure is to ask,
do we need it at all? Could we moving towards a policing/coast guard emphasis,
rather than a traditional military emphasis? If not, should we go all the way in selfreliance and veer towards unallied armed neutrality (which might involve boosting
defence spending up to around 5%)? Alternatively, should we reconceptualise
security radically, bringing in new notions to deal with economic, environmental,
security and criminal threats? This would demand a radically changed defence
conception (see Lizée 2002; Capie & Evans 2002; Smith & Kettle 1992), and major
reorientations of defence spending towards a 'problem task force' approach. Such a
re-think may be required as the true implications of globalisation, including
mobility of finance, services, technology and people, become apparent. In such a
view, transnational problems cannot be dealt with preventively as though they
were military threats, but need to met by appropriate models of development,
political representation, and legitimate policing. It has already been recognised
by the ADF that it should have a support rather than lead role in dealing with
many of these challenges (Department of Defence 2007c). In some cases, for
example, terrorist activities are a criminal policing issue as much as a defence force
one, requiring coordination across agencies (Lewis 2003, p52). Likewise, the costs of
alliance politics, and the degree to which Australia can pick and choose its
level of cooperation is now limited by a host of commitments and ongoing patterns
of weapons purchases and intelligence sharing (Hartcher & Marriner 2004).
Metaphorically, an ally may have to continue its contributions to guarantee any
sort of 'security insurance' in the 21st century.
It can be seen, then, that defence policy is framed by domestic, regional, alliance,
and global politics, and has clear foreign policy as well as security implications.
These political aspects shape the force structure as much as purely strategic and
military concerns. In the Indo-Pacific region generally, debate over the next decade
will not be over whether 'more' or 'newer' is better, but how such forces should be used
and their posture during peace-time. At present, the Australia Defence Force has
found itself stretched in fulfilling several pressing needs: alliance commitments,
regional role playing, coalition intervention, modernisation demands, roles in regional
22
stabilisation and anti-terrorism activities. This has resulted in a more modern and
capable force based on increased defence spending, but one still beset by economic,
training, planning and doctrinal pressures.
6. Bibliography and Further Resources
Resource
A wide range of useful official information will be found at the Australian Department
of Defense webpage at http://www.defence.gov.au/
An Overview of Australia’s Annual Security Outlook 2003, in relation to the ASEAN
Regional Forum, will be found at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/documents/security_outlook_2003.html
The Parliamentary Library of Australia has created a useful Website called Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Internet Resources with links to a wide range of defence and security data
at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/fad/index.htm
ASPI, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a think tank addressing new security issues for
Australia and the region, will be found at http://www.aspi.org.au/
The ABC has a large range of web archives, articles, and transcripts of interview that can
be searched via www.abc.net.au
Voluntary Further Reading
BRISTOW, Damon " The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Southeast Asia's
unknown regional security organization", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27 no. 1,
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CHIN, Kin Wah "Southeast Asia in 2002: From Bali to Iraq - Co-operating for
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Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, Canberra, Department of Defence, 2000 [Internet
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE Defence Review 2000 – Our Future Defence Force,
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2003,
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MOLLOY, Ivan (ed.) The Eye of the Cyclone: Issues in Pacific Security, Sippy Downs, PIPSA
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23
TANTER, Richard "Ten questions about East Timor for which we need answers", The
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