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Ambiguity continues to remain the huiimark of India's nuclear policy and diplomacy.
When the CTBT 'Conference of the UN Disarmament Commission resumed in Geneva,
India was torn between the horns of a dilemma. It reiterated its inability to sign the draft
treaty as it emerged from the Geneva conference. At the same time, it declared that it had
no intention to block the passage of the accord. If there is no voting on the draft, which is
what most people expect, India will go along with the international consensus on the
profound need for a treaty to ban all manners of nuclear testing and at the same time
record its demur with the present draft of the test ban treaty. Indhi's final position about
the treaty will be known only when it menders through the complicated process of Front
government in Delhi has bought time with the decision announced officially in
Parliament on July 15 by the External Affairs Minister, Inder Kumar Gujral that "we will
not be the spoilers" at Geneva though India will not sign the CTBT.
The new government, created with components of as many as 13 political parties, almost
each of them with limited political support, has to formulate its CTBT policy -- and a
larger and far more complex nuclear policy - in the midst of several strong contrary pulls.
There is a very vocal and organised bomb lobby which demands that India denounce the
draft CTBT, make one or more nuclear explosions, declare itself & nuclear weapons
power (one or two members of the lobby claim that this can be done by India even
without tests), and then sign CTBT at par with the Nuclear-Five. Much less vocal but
now quite assertive is the antibomb lobby which has been trying to build public opinion,
wiJiout much success that India subscribe to CTBT without surrendering its nuclear
option. The issue is still to be discussed at the, Steering Committee of the 13 parties that
has been set up to oversee the functioning of the government.
The Congress, led by P.V. Narasimha Rao which lost the rec66
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at the Disarmament Commission conference in Geneva. The Foreign Secretary, Salman
Haider, told the Geneva conference in clear terms on March 21, when Rao was stili Prime
Minister, "we do not believe that the acquisition of nuclear weaporfs is essential for our
national security and we have followed a conscious decision in this regard. "This was as
clear a statement as could be made by the Rao government in support of CTBT.
After the parliamentary poll, the Hindu-nationalist party, BJP formed a government-ontria! for 13 days and then quit because it could not muster a majority to support it in the
Lok Sabhn. The BJP is known to be in favour of India going nuclear. This was
announced in clear terms in its election manifesto, though as Prime Minister, Atel Behari
Vajpayee tried to mute the BJP position with ambiguities so characteristic of India1*;
nuclear policy. However, the bomb lobby became II the more vocal. By the time the
United Front government was created with the outside support of the Congress party in
parliament, there was a loud, wellorchestrated demand by the bomb lobby that India
"walk out of the Geneva conference." The decision of Mr. Gujral to give Salman Haider a
year's extension (he was due to retire on June 30) brought a strong attack on the Foreign
Minister as the Foreign Secretary was regarded as committed to the CTBT.
Mr. Gujral's first decision was to reject the bomb lobby's demand that India condemn the
CTBT draft and walk out of the Geneva parleys. India deliberations trying until the end to
covert the nuclear powers, particularly the United States that there must be a linkage
between CTBT and a time frame for complete nuclear disarmament, he decided.
Meanwhile, India's decision not to sign the CTBT "as it stood now" remained firm.
The government, however, soon yielded some ground f o the bomb lobby, unwilling as it
was to be seen compromising on "national security" perceived to be under threat from
continued cooperation, open as well as cldestine, between a full-fledged nuclear power China - and a nuclear capable state, Pakistan covering the country's western, eastern,
north-western as well as north-eastern Hanks.
So on June 20, the Indian Ambassador to the Geneva conference, Ms. Arundhuti
Mukherjee, declared that "our national security considerations (have) become a key
factor in our decisionmaking "with regard to the CTBT. On July 15, the Foreign Minister
allowed himself to be more explicit on the vital issue. In a statement in the Upper House
of Parliament, Mr. Gujral reiterated India's threat perceptions from China and Pakistan
(without naming cither country) and declared that India "will not allow its nuclear option
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be restricted in any manner and would take all necessary measures to cope with any
threat that might be posed to its security." Implicit in this statement was the Indian
perception that by signing CTBT in its present form India would be signing away its
option to conduct nuclear tests. This was unacceptable specially because "other countries
-in our region continue with their nuclear weapons programmes whether openly or in a
clandestine manner." Gujral reiterated India's complaint that the nuclear powers had
shown no inclination to engage in nuclear disarmament. He also repeated India's inability
to "associate itself with the international verification system" being pushed by the United
States.
At the same time, added the Foreign Minister, India did not ish to be the spoiler at
Geneva. It adopted a "responsible" attitude towards the CTBT parleys. It had put forward
various proposals aimed at making CTBT truly comprehensive and not porous enough to
enable nuclear powers to refine their warheads and develop their arsenals at tests sites
and laboratories, and earnestly pleading for a linkage between CTBT and complete
nuclear disarmament within a reasonable time. India would respect whatever consensus
other nations might reach and would expect all nations to similarly respect the valid
reason for its inability to sign the CTBT "as it stood now."
India joined the Geneva deliberations when they reopened
- on July 29. The CTBT draft that emerges from Genevsi will go to the UN General
Assembly for final voting. India will continue to interact with the world powers about the
draft treaty. There is no agreement so far on the nuber of countries that must sign the
treaty before it can come into force. This will presumably require quite a bit of secret and
open diplomacy. India's views will continue to be pressed during the entire process of
negotiations prior to the coming into force of the CTBT.
While Gujral rejected any restrictions imposed by outside powers on India's freedom to
take whatever measures were necessary to protect national security, he made two
constructive affirmations which deserve serious attention of the international community.
First, he stressed the need for further negotiations. "We are willing to negotiate with other
countries" about a time-frame for complete nuclear disarmament, he declared. Such
negotiations were part of the CTBT process, and might even work as a catalyst.
On its own part, the United Front government intends to conduct negotiations with China
on nuclear issues. Diplomatic exchanges are now going on to prepare for high-level
exchange of views. Would China be willing to conclude agreements with India
committing the two powers not to im- their nuclear capability68
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against one another, and China not to station nuclear missiles on Tibet? Would China
agree to have the latter commitment to be verified by a their party reconnaissance? Could
China convince India that it is not engaged in any kind of nuclear collaboration with
Pakistan? Could an accord be concluded between China, India and Pakistan as nuclearcapable powers and China a full-fledged nuclear power?
India has definitely gone back on its clearly stated position of over three decades that a
CTBT would not be a disarmament measrrc, its objective being exclusively to prevent
further testing of nuclear weapons. The nuclear option is now an icon of India's security
policy. That, however, does not mean that India will undertake nuclear tests and proclaim
itself to be a nuclear power. Gujral's second important declaration was that "we do not
need nuclear weapons now." Whether India would need them tomorrow, "I do not know."
This was a clever way of using the tools of ambiguity to keep both the nuclear powers
who are against proliferation and the nuclear lobby in the country satisfied for the time
being.
One can seriously question if the United Front government has a mandate to go in for
nuclear weapons. India's "security concerns" generate a mountain of polemics. They have
not been deliberated upon by a responsible body with the transparency that one can
expect of a democratic dispensation. A dozen or so voices do not reflect a national
position. Nor is it of any use to claim that in any public opinion poll, the overwhelming
will support exercising the nuclear option. They will because they do not know the
extreme complications of the issue. Indeed the cost-benefit of going nuclear has not been
worked out, nor has India developed a nuclear warfare' doctrine nor has it set-up the
requistic command control mechanism.
Above all, the curcl dichotomy between the acquisition of nuclear weapons with over 350
million Indians living below the poverty line will inhibit and most probably restraint any
government's move to make India a nuclear weapons power unless and until there is clear
and present nuclear threat from China. Prime Minister Deve Gowda' recent word-picture
of how urban India has been pampered with all kinds of subsidies since independence at
the cost of the 70-80 per cent of Indians who live in the villages make the dichotomy
even sharper. After all, the demand for nuclear weapons is articulated by a small minority
of the ura elite who have been seduced by the false majcstry of weapons of mass
annihilation.
•ent election to parliament, had apparently determined to go along with CTBT. Mr. Rao
had personally assured President Clinton in 1993 that India jvould not obstruct the
passage of CTBT