13.1 ABNORMAL START
Monitor ITT during normal start. If the ITT rate of increase appears likely to
exceed 925C or no rise in ITT is evident within 10 seconds after selecting LOW IDLE
with the condition lever, proceed as follows:
*1.
*2.
Condition lever – FUEL CUTOFF (note ITT decrease to below 790C ).
Starter – OFF.
CAUTION
Starter use is limited to 40 seconds on, 60 seconds off,
40 seconds on, 60 seconds off, 40 seconds on, then 30 minutes off.
Note
If starting attempt is discontinued and another start is attempted, allow 60 seconds delay
to drain fuel and cool starter, then motor the starter for 15 seconds minimum. Allow the
engine to come to a complete stop before another start is attempted
2
13.2 EMERGENCY ENGINE
SHUTDOWN ON THE DECK
If an emergency situation dictates immediate discontinuation of
engine operation such as fire, fire warning light, chip light, etc., stop
aircraft if moving, request assistance as necessary and proceed as follows:
3
*1.
*2.
*3.
*4.
Condition levers – FUEL CUTOFF.
Firewall valves – CLOSED.
Boost pumps – OFF.
Fire extinguisher- As required.
NOTE
The engine fire extinguisher is a single-shot system with
one cylinder for each engine. Do not attempt engine restart
until the cause of the fire is determined and corrected.
*5.
*6.
Gang bar – OFF.
Evacuate aircraft.
4
13.3 LOSS OF BRAKES
5
In the event of wheelbrake failure, maintain directional control
with rudder, nosewheel steering, or differential power. Use propeller
reversing or beta range as required to assist in deceleration. If possible
maneuver into an open area and allow the aircraft to stop. Do not attempt
to taxi the aircraft. A brake shuttle valve sticks occasionally, which results
in loss of brakes for either the Pilot or Copilot, or both. After the aircraft is
stopped, the shuttle valve can sometimes be reseated and brakes restored
by pulling aft on the top of the brake pedals.
6
13.4 HOT BRAKES
7
Hot brakes usually are caused by excessive or heavy braking
action. If hot brakes are suspected, stop the aircraft utilizing reverse thrust
and minimum braking, request assistance if necessary, and allow the
brakes to cool utilizing propwash. Allow the brakes to cool and ensure the
brakes are inspected prior to further operation..
CAUTION
The high energy absorbing capacity of the
Wheelbrakes is capable of locking the wheels during
Maximum braking, which may result in blown tires.
8
13.5 BRAKE FIRE
9
*1.
Firefighting assistance – Request.
*2.
Stop aircraft.
*3.
Emergency Engine Shutdown on Deck Checklist – Execute.
WARNING
All crewmembers are to stay a safe distance away
from the aircraft. It is preferable to stay well behind the
aircraft. If a wheel explodes because of rapid cooling, the
fragments tend to fly out sideways from the heat of the fire.
Do not attempt to fight the fire.
10
13.6 JAMMED CONTROLS
ON DECK
11
In the event that any jamming or binding of flight or engine
controls is experienced on the ground, check yaw damp and autopilot
OFF, maintain the controls in the jammed or binding condition and call for
immediate inspection.
12
14.1 ABORTING TAKEOFF
The decision to abort or continue the takeoff is dependent on length of
remaining runway, airspeed, gross weight and density When aborting a takeoff, proceed
as follows:
WARNING




Mechanical stops incorporated in the throttle quadrant prevent rapid movement of the power
levers from the beta range to the flight range. Downward pressure must be applied to the
power levers to permit movement into the flight range and allow power to be added.
A misrigged linkage between a power lever and corresponding propeller could cause
directional problems while reversing during an aborted takeoff or landing rollout. If
directional control problems are encountered while reversing, advance both power levers
toward FLIGHT IDLE to minimize the effects or asymmetric propeller reversal. Maintain
directional control with rudder, nosewheel steering, and brakes.
Single-engine reversing, may be applied if required. Use extreme caution if takeoff surface is
not hard and dry.
Part XI accelerate-stop distances are increased by approximately 900 feet with the condition
levers at HIGH IDLE and no reverse is utilized (see figure 26-7).
13
*1.
*2.
*3.
*4.
Announce “Abort.”
Power levers – IDLE.
Reverse – As required.
Brakes – As required.
Immediately prior to departing the prepared surface:
*5.
Condition levers – FUEL CUTOFF.
As soon as practicable:
*6.
Firewall valves – CLOSED.
*7.
Boost pumps – OFF.
*8.
Fire extinguisher(s) – As required.
*9.
Gang bar – OFF.
*10.
Evacuate aircraft.
14
14.2 ENGINE FAILURE
DURING TAKEOFF
15
If an engine fails during takeoff roll before the aircraft
becomes airborne, use the ABORTING TAKEOFF procedure
in paragraph 14.1.
16
14.3 ENGINE FAILURE
AFTER TAKEOFF
If an engine fails after takeoff and sufficient runway remains, land
and bring the aircraft to a stop. If an engine failure occurs after takeoff and
insufficient runway remains to make a safe landing, proceed as follows:
17
*1. Power – As required.
*2. Gear – UP.
*3. Airspeed – As required (VXSE or VYSE).
WARNING
If the autofeather system is being used, retarding
either power lever before the feathering sequence is completed will
deactivate the autofeather circuit and prevent automatic feathering.
*4. Emergency Shutdown Checklist – Execute.
WARNING
A positive single-engine rate of climb will not be obtained in any
configuration with the inoperative engine propeller windmilling.
18
14.4 TIRE FAILURE
19
If tire failure occurs during takeoff roll, use the
ABORTING TAKEOFF procedure in paragraph 14.1. Maintain
directional control with rudder, nosewheel steering, and brakes
as necessary.
20
14.5 ABNORMAL TAKEOFFS
21
14.5.1 Obstruction clearance takeoff
14.5.2 Soft-field takeoff
14.5.3 Short-field takeoff
22
VMC MINIMUM CONTROL
SPEED
23
86 KIAS
CONFIGURATION:
 GEAR UP
 FLAPS UP
 PROPELLER WINDMILLING (DEAD ENG.)
 LIVE ENGINE TAKEOFF POWER
 5 ANGLE INTO LIVE ENGINE
24
VSSE
MINIMUM SAFE ONE-ENGINE
INOPERATIVE SPEED
25
91 KIAS
CONFIGURATION:
 GEAR UP
 FLAPS UP
 PROPELLER WINDMILLING (DEAD ENG.)
NOTE
ENGINES SHOULD NOT BE
INTENTIONALLY RENDERED
INOPERATIVE BELOW THIS SPEED.
26
VXSE
BEST SINGLE-ENGINE ANGLE
OF CLIMB SPEED
27
102 KIAS
CONFIGURATION:




GEAR UP
FLAPS UP
PROPELLER FEATHERED (DEAD ENG.)
LIVE ENGINE MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS POWER
28
VYSE
BEST SINGLE-ENGINE RATE
OF CLIMB SPEED
29
110 KIAS
CONFIGURATION:




GEAR UP
FLAPS UP
PROPELLER FEATHERED (DEAD ENG.)
LIVE ENGINE MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS POWER
30
15.1 ENGINE FAILURE
The T-44 exhibits no unusual handling characteristics at speeds above Vmc.
Refer to Part XI for the climb or cruise performance that can be expected in an engine-out
situation. Directional control (figure 14-1) is a function of airspeed and power, varying
directly with airspeed and inversely with power. An increase in asymmetrical power at
any given airspeed results in mild yaw, accompanied by a more pronounced proverse roll
into the dead engine. The rate of roll and yaw varies directly with the rate of power
increase on the operative engine. These can easily be controlled with aileron and rudder.
Rudder trim is sufficient to maintain balanced flight at airspeeds above approximately
100 KIAS. At speeds below 100 KIAS, full rudder trim must be supplemented by
constant rudder pressure. At full rudder trim only a few inches of rudder travel will
remain. The use of flaps will not significantly affect directional control, but will
adversely affect performance. Figure 27-5 shows that a positive climb rate cannot be
obtained with full flaps (100%) and gear down at any gross weight .
31
WARNING
If full flaps are used during a single engine approach, the waveoff
procedure described in paragraph 7.18 will result in a loss of
approximately 200 feet before a positive rate of climb can be established.
An indication of impending engine failure or flameout usually is
preceded by unstable engine operation. One or a combination of symptoms may
prevail, such as fluctuating turbine rpm, torque and ITT; illumination of fuel
system warning lights; dropping oil pressure; and loss of thrust. In the event
engine failure or unexpected flameout occurs, an emergency shutdown should be
performed. An airstart may be performed if the engine failure cannot be
attributed to :
Mech, 0verheat, Vibration, Explosion, 0 N1, Fuel fumes, Fire
A flameout condition is indicated by a drop in ITT, torque, and turbine
rpm.
32
15.2 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
CHECKLIST
33
*1.
Power Lever – IDLE.
WARNING
If the autofeather system is being used, do not retard the failed engine power
lever until the feathering sequence is completed. To do so will deactivate the autofeather
circuit and prevent automatic feathering.
*2.
*3.
Propeller – FEATHER.
Condition Lever – FUEL CUTOFF.
In case of confirmed/suspected fire or fuel leak, continue checklist. If not proceed to
DEAD ENGINE CHECKLIST in paragraph 15.3.
4.
5.
Firewall valve – CLOSED.
Bleed air – CLOSED.
WARNING
If the bleed air valve is left open, smoke or
fumes may enter through the pressurization system.
6.
Fire extinguisher – As required.
34
7.
Dead Engine Checklist – As Required.
15.3 DEAD ENGINE CHECKLIST
35
1. Cabin temperature mode – OFF (CP).
2. Vent blower – As required (CP).
3. Crossfeed – CLOSED (P).
4. Boost pump (failed engine) – OFF (P).
5. Transfer pump (failed engine) – OFF (P).
6. Fuel control Heat (failed engine) – OFF (P).
7. Autofeather – OFF (P).
8. Propeller Sync – OFF (P).
9. Autoignition (failed engine) – OFF (CP).
10. Generator (failed engine) – OFF (CP).
11. Electrical load – Monitor (P).
WARNING
The landing gear warning system will not function if the power lever for the
failed engine is placed forward of a position corresponding to 79 +/-2 percent N1
rpm.
36
15.4 JAMMED POWER LEVER
There have been occasions when power levers have jammed in the T-44 in
flight, leaving the pilot with no capability to change the corresponding
engine power setting. Should this occur, check all engine instruments and
the nacelle for abnormal indications. If no abnormal secondary indications
are detected, consideration should be given to keeping the engine running
unless controllability becomes a factor. Land as soon as practicable.
37
Prior to landing, the engine should be secured as follows:
*1.
*2.
Condition lever (failed engine) – FUEL CUT OFF.
Emergency shutdown checklist – Execute (P).
WARNING
The landing gear warning system will not function
if the power lever for the failed engine is placed forward
of a position corresponding to 79 +/-2 percent N1 rpm.
38
15.5 AIRSTARTS
Airstarts accomplished with the assistance of an operating generator (cross
generator start) or with the battery only should be successful at all
altitudes and airspeeds. A started assisted airstart should normally be
attempted regardless of generator availability unless conditions warrant a
windmilling airstart.
39
CAUTION

Unless a greater emergency exists, the cause for engine failure should
be determined before attempting an airstart.

Above 20,000 feet, starts tend to be hotter. During engine acceleration
to idle speed, it may be necessary to periodically cycle the condition
lever to FUEL CUTOFF to avoid an over temperature.

Electrical loads not consistent with the flight conditions should be
reduced.
40
15.5.1 STARTER-ASSISTED
AIRSTART
Started assisted airstarts may be attempted at all altitudes and airspeeds,
precluding mechanical malfunctions.
1. Power lever (failed Eng) – IDLE.
2. Prop lever (failed Eng)–
FEATHER.
3.Cond lever(fail Eng)–FUEL
CUTOFF.
4. Cabin temp mode – OFF (CP).
5. Vent Blower – AUTO (CP).
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Radar – OFF/STANDBY (CP).
Anti–ice/deice – As required (P).
Firewall Valve – OPEN (P).
Transfer Pump – AUTO (P).
Boost Pump – ON (P).
Crossfeed – AUTO (P).
Generator (failed eng) – OFF (CP).
41
13. Battery charger – OFF (CP).
14. Starter (failed engine) – IGN &
ENG START (check ignition indicator
light on).
WARNING
If the engine was shutdown by closing
the firewall shutoff valve, time to light
off may exceed 10 seconds.
CAUTION
Operating engine ITT may increase
approximately 50 C because of
generator loading. If conditions permit,
retard operating engine to reduce the
possibility of exceeding ITT limits.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Condition lever – LOW IDLE.
Starter (N1 above 50%) – OFF (P).
Propeller – Unfeather (P).
Power – As required (P).
Generator – Reset/ON (CP).
Battery Charger – ON (CP).
Fuel control heat – ON (P).
Bleed air – OPEN (CP).
Electrical equip– As required (CP).
Condition lever – HIGH IDLE (P).
Instruments/Nacelles – checked (P,
CP).
42
15.5.2 WINDMILLING AIRSTART
43
*1. Power lever (failed Eng) – IDLE.
*2. Propeller lever (failed Eng)– Full Forward.
*3. Condition lever (failed Eng)–FUEL CUTOFF.
*4. Firewall valve – OPEN.
*5. Autoignition – ARM.
CAUTION
Windmilling airstarts above 20,000 feet or below 2,200 prop rpm may exceed ITT limits.
*6. Condition lever – LOW IDLE.
WARNING
If the engine was shutdown by closing the firewall shutoff valve, time to light off may
exceed 10 seconds.
Power – As required.
8. Generator – Reset/ON (CP).
9. Autoignition – OFF (CP).
*7.
44
10. Condition – HIGH IDLE (P).
15.5.3 ENGINE FAILURE
(Second Engine)
In the event of dual-engine failure, proceed to the appropriate Airstart
checklist. Do not feather both propellers if a windmilling airstart is
intended. Should all attempts to restart either engine fail, transition to the
maximum glide range airspeed (130 KIAS, gear up, flaps up, and
45
propellers feathered) or maximum glide endurance airspeed (102 KIAS,
gear up, flaps up, and propellers feathered) as necessary.
WARNING
In the event of dual failure at low altitude and airspeed, there may be insufficient airflow
to maintain propeller and engine N1 speeds to drive the engine for light-off. In this case
consideration should be given to engaging both starter switches vice utilizing the
autoignitions for the attempted light-off. With electric heat or air conditioning motor
operating, battery power to the starter motors is significantly reduced. The fact that
neither propeller is feathered will significantly reduce glide range and endurance during
the relight attempt.


NOTE
No wind glide range is approximately 2 nm/1,000 feet. Subtract .2nm per 10 knots of
headwind.
With a dual-engine failure, only battery power is available. Should battery
conservation be a consideration, refer to dual generator failure procedure.
46

If all electrical power is lost following a dual-engine failure, placing the battery
charger switch off may restore electrical power to the aircraft.
15.6 SINGLE-ENGINE
CROSSFEED
47
1.
2.
3.
4.
Boost pumps – ON.
Transfer pumps – AUTO.
Crossfeed – OPEN (check crossfeed light on)
Boost pump – OFF (nonfeeding tank) (check respective
FUEL PRESSURE light out).
48
15.6.1 TO DISCONTINUE
SINGLE-ENGINE CROSSFEED
49
1. Boost pumps – ON.
2. Crossfeed – CLOSED.
3. Boost pump – OFF (failed engine).
50
15.7 IN-FLIGHT FIRE
51
Fire in flight is a critical emergency
requiring the pilot to assess,
diagnose, and take prompt corrective
action.
52
15.8 SMOKE/FIRE OF
UNKNOWN ORIGIN
The smoke/fire of unknown origin checklist is intended to be utilized when smoke,
fumes, or fire is discovered within the aircraft and the source of the malfunctioning unit is
cannot be readily identified and isolated. The checklist attempts to provide an organized
means of eliminating as many sources of fire or smoke as can be controlled from the
cockpit. The last five items of the checklist serve to (1) assist in the
continuing attempt to isolate the problem source and (2) restore power
essential for sustained safety of flight. Pausing between the last five steps
53
of the checklist may help to isolate the fire should the problem be
electrical in nature.
1. Alert the crew – (P).
2. Cabin temperature mode – OFF (CP).
3. Vent blower – AUTO (CP).
WARNING
Repeated or prolonged exposure to and/or inhalation of high concentrations of
bromotriflouromethane or its decomposition products should be avoided. The liquid may
cause frostbite if allowed to contact the skin.
NOTE
If the source of the fire is known, immediately turn off all affected electrical circuits and
fight the fire with the handheld fire extinguishers. If fire source cannot be isolated,
continue the checklist.
54
4. Oxygen masks/mic switch (100%) – As required (P, OBS, CP).
WARNING
Avoid the use of 100% oxygen near an open flame.
NOTE
While utilizing oxygen, if the interphones are selected to establish internal
communications, the speaker function of the speaker/phone mixer switches will
deactivate the interphones. A headset will be required to receive/monitor external
communications while simultaneously utilizing the interphones.
5. Bleed air – CLOSED (CP).
6. Emergency descent – As required (P).
NOTE
Good judgement should be exercised before deciding on an emergency descent in the
case of a fuselage fire. When oxygen is provided for the entire crew, staying at high
altitude and depressurizing may help to control fuselage fires.
55
7. Pressurization – DUMP (CP).
8. Emergency transmission – As required (CP).
9. Gang bar – OFF (P).
NOTE
After securing all electrical power, the following instruments are still available: copilot
turn and slip, pitot static instruments, N1 ITT, propeller rpm, clocks and standby
compass.
10. All electrical switches – OFF (P).
WARNING
If fire cannot be controlled, land or ditch immediately.
11. Battery – ON (P).
12. Generators (one at a time) – ON (P).
56
13. Battery Charger – ON (P).
14. Inverters (one at a time) – ON (P).
15. Essential equipment – ON (individually until fire source located) (P).
15.8.1 ENGINE FIRE
57
Illumination of the FIRE warning light is usually the first
indication of engine compartment fire. Confirm if possible that
fire actually exists by checking engine instruments and nacelles.
Sunlight can cause illumination of a warning light. Even if no
secondary indications are observed, consideration should be
given to shutdown of the affected engine.
If fire is confirmed or secondary indications are noted,
perform EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST in
paragraph 15.2
58
15.8.2 WING FIRE
59
There is little that can be done to control awing fire except to shut off fuel
and electrical systems that may be contributing to the fire or which could
aggravate it. Slipping the aircraft away from the burning wing may help.
Outboard wing electrical items in each wing that may be individually
secured from the cockpit are the Navigation and Strobe lights and the
fuel vent heaters. In addition, the left wing contains the AOA sensor and
sensor heating circuits. Inboard wing systems should be secured using the
gang bar.
WARNING
Consideration should be given to landing or ditching the aircraft
immediately, depending on circumstances and seriousness of the fire.
60
Severe wing fires have been known to destroy wing spar integrity in a
very short time. Some cases have been documented as low as 90 seconds.
15.9 SMOKE AND FUME
ELIMINATION
Attempt to locate, isolate and extinguish the fire or source of
smoke or fumes prior to initiating the smoke removal procedures. If the
source of smoke/fumes cannot be readily determined and eliminated,
proceed with the smoke/fire of unknown origin checklist. Attention must
be given to the engine as a possible source by closing the bleed air valves.
61
Prior to depressurizing, consider minimum safe enroute altitude
and crew oxygen requirements.
If immediate smoke removal is thought necessary, proceed as
follows:
*1. Oxygen masks/MIC – switches (100%) As required.
*2. Pressurization – DUMP.
After the aircraft is depressurized, both the pilot or copilot storm
windows may be opened. However, this could draw smoke into the flight
station. Consideration should be given to an emergency descent and
immediate landing.
NOTE
Nauseating fumes from residual desalination solution can enter the cockpit via bleed air
for air-conditioning/pressurization and are often detected immediately after takeoff.
62
Provided no secondary indications exist, closing the bleed air valves will significantly
reduce the intensity of the nauseating fumes.
15.10 OIL SYSTEM FAILURE
63
An oil pressure indication below 85 psi is
undesirable and should be tolerated only for the completion of
the flight. Closely monitor the engine instruments and engine
nacelle for secondary indications. Consideration should be
given to shutting down the engine and landing as soon as
possible; otherwise, reduce power on the engine and land as
soon as practicable. Oil pressure below 40 psi and/or
temperature that exceeds 99C is unsafe and requires that either
the engine be shut down or a landing be made as soon as
64
possible using minimum power to sustain flight. In either case,
the discrepancy must be noted on the appropriate maintenance
form for correction prior to the next flight.
15.10.1 CHIP DETECTOR
LIGHT ILLUMINATED
65
Illumination (or flicker) of the CHIP DETECT light indicates
that metal particles may be present in the propeller reduction
gearbox. In the event of a CHIP DETECT light illumination on
the affected engine and unless a greater emergency exists,
66
perform EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN CHECKLIST in
paragraph 15.2.
15.11.1 ENGINE-DRIVEN
FUEL PUMP FAILURE
67
The engine-driven fuel pump will sustain engine
operation after failure of the electric boost pump;
however, failure of the engine-driven pump will result
in flameout.
68
Perform the EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN
CHECKLIST in paragraph 15.2.
69
15.11.2 TRANSFER
PUMP FAILURE
Illumination of the LH or RH NO FUEL TRANSFER light indicates a
possible failure of the corresponding transfer pump.
1. Check total and nacelle fuel quantity.
If no fuel remains in the wing tanks:
2. Transfer pump – OFF.
If fuel remains in the wing tanks:
70
3. Transfer pump – OVERRIDE.
If light remains on:
4. Transfer pump – OFF.
NOTE
Consider alteration of the flight plan because of unavailable
fuel trapped in the wing (approximately 28 gallons).
5. Land as soon as practicable.
71
15.11.1 BOOST PUMP FAILURE
A boost pump failure with crossfeed in AUTO will be noted by
illumination of the FUEL CROSSFEED annunciator light. The failed
boost pump is identified by momentarily placing the crossfeed switch in
the closed position. The red LH or RH FUEL PRESSURE light will
illuminate indicating the failed boost pump.
1. Failed boost pump – OFF.
2. Crossfeed – OPEN.
NOTE
Determination of range range without resorting to suction lift is dependent
upon fuel load remaining on the side opposite the failed boost pump.
72
3. Land as soon as practicable.
NOTE
If range because of crossfeed operation is critical, suction lift may be
utilized at all cruise altitudes but should be discontinued in favor of
crossfeed (boosted pressure) when initiating descent for landing in the
event of a missed approach.
CAUTION
Engine driven fuel pump operation without boost pump
fuel pressure is limited to 10 hours. This time shall be recorded
73
15.12 FUEL LEAKS
A fuel leak may be evidenced by the smell of fuel in the cockpit, a rapid
drop in fuel quantity, or sighted visually. The first concern of the crew
must be to guard against the outbreak of engine fire. Consideration should
be given to securing electrical systems that may contribute to the outbreak
of a wing fire. Outboard wing electrical items in each wing that may be
individually secured from the cockpits are the navigation and strobe lights
74
and the fuel vent heaters. In addition, the left wing contains the AOA
sensor and the sensor heating circuits. Inboard wing systems may be
secured using the gang bar. If a wing or nacelle fuel leak is evidenced and
power is not necessary to sustain flight or reach a safe destination,
consideration should be given to securing the engine as follows:
*1. Condition lever – FUEL CUTOFF.
*2. Emergency Shutdown checklist – Execute.
75
15.13 FUEL SIPHONING
If fuel cap siphoning occurs, proceed as follows:
1. Airspeed – 140 KIAS.
2. Land as soon as practicable.
76
NOTE
Extreme nose low attitudes will
aggravate the fuel siphoning condition.
15.14.1 GENERATOR FAILURE
77
If a generator fails (indicated by illumination of the respective RH or LH
GEN OUT annunciator), all nonessential electrical equipment should be
used with caution to avoid overloading the remaining generator. Loads in
excess of single-generator output will drain the battery.
When generator failure is indicated, proceed as follows:
*1. Generator – OFF, reset momentarily, then ON.
NOTE
 Release the generator switch slowly from the spring-loaded reset position to the ON
position to prevent tripping the opposite generator off.
 Normal voltage in the reset position indicates a failure of the generator control rather
than the generator.
If the generator will not reset:
2. Generator - OFF.
78
Operating generator – Do Not Exceed 1.0 Load.
Land as soon as practicable.
WARNING
Should smoke and/or fumes be detected immediately following a generator failure, the
origin could be in the generator control or an internal generator malfunction. Intermittent
utilization of the corresponding engine bleed air valve may help confirm an internal
malfunction. If smoke and fumes persist for an internal malfunction, consideration should
be given to securing the corresponding engine to stop generator rotation and eliminate the
hazard.
3.
4.
15.14.2 DUAL-GENERATOR
FAILURE
NOTE
If all electrical power is lost following a dual-generator
79
failure, placing the battery charger switch off may restore electrical power to
the aircraft.
1. Cabin Temp mode, Electric Heater, Anti ice/deice, Lights – OFF.
2. Emergency Voice Report – Completed.
3. Gang Bar – OFF Unless Instrument Meteor Conditions (see below).
WARNING
With a total loss of electrical power, the cabin will depressurize as the bleed air valves
are spring-loaded closed. If the cabin altitude exceeds 10,000 feet, supplemental oxygen
for all occupants of the aircraft should be considered.
4. Boost pumps – OFF.
5. Both inverters – OFF Unless IMC (see below).
6. Pull the following circuit breakers:
a.
b.
c.
d.
Left and Right feeder bus CB for No. 2 subpanel bus.
Left and Right fuel panel bus CB.
No. 1 Avionics CB (Unless IMC; see below).
RMI No. 1, Radar, CP Flt Dir IND, No.2 FLT DIR CBs.
80
e.
f.
LH fuel flow, LH oil Temp CBs.
RH bleed air control, Prop Sync, Annunciator PWR, flap motor and flap
indicator CBs.
7. Turn Copilot SPK/Phone to SPK (so Pilot can hear Copilot Audio).
8. Identification friend or foe – MANUAL.
9. Turn on battery. The pilot turn/slip, UHF, IFF and Gear indicators will
be powered to ensure gear down and locked after manual extension.
NOTE
With dual-generator failure, a no flap landing and
manual gear extension should be anticipated in all cases.
81
15.14.3 EXCESSIVE
LOADMETER INDICATIONS
(OVER 1.0)
Excessive loadmeter indications are generally caused by an excessive
battery charge rate or an electrical system ground fault.
1. Battery/ammeter – Note.
If a charge rate in excess of 30 amps is indicated:
2. Battery switch – OFF.
82
3. Battery Charger – OFF.
If loadmeter still indicates over 1.0:
4. Nonessential loads – OFF.
NOTE
Loadmeter splits of greater than 0.1 are indicative of abnormal generator
paralleling. With the air-conditioner or electric heater activated, an
excessive loadmeter indication for the left generator may be indicative of a
current limiter failure.
15.14.4 ILLUMINATED
BATTERY CHARGE LIGHT
83
Illumination of the battery charge light may indicate one or more of the following
malfunctions: hot battery, temperature sensor failure, cell imbalance, battery charger
system failure, or bus overvoltage. If this light illuminates, proceed as follows:
*1. Battery volt/ammeter – checked (P).
*2. Generator loadmeters – checked (P).
If battery charge and generator load is less then 7 amps/ 0.7 load:
*3. Land as soon as practicable.
If battery charge and/or generator load is greater then 7 amps/ 0.7 load:
*4. Battery – OFF (P).
*5. Charger – OFF (P).
*6. Land as soon as possible.
WARNING
Operation with the battery charger switch off and the battery switch on (following and
illuminated battery charger light) could cause thermal runaway, resulting in a fire and/or
battery explosion.
NOTE
84
Thermal runaway is a self-destruct mode involving two primary factors: high battery
temperatures and constant potential overcharging. This phenomenon is a result of the
breakdown of the cellophane has barrier between plates in the cell. High battery
temperatures physically weaken the cellophane by the scrubbing action of the rapidly
rising gas bubbles. The combination of these actions can deteriorate the cellophane gas
barrier to the point where oxygen gas will reach the cadmium plates. The resulting
chemical reaction produces large amounts of heat, accelerating degeneration of the
cellophane gas barrier until the plates are finally shorted and the cell destroyed. A shorted
cell results in increased battery current and an even higher over-charging and gassing of
other cells, rapidly leading to complete battery destruction. The heat produced in thermal
runaway can result in fire or explosion.
85
15.14.5 INVERTER FAILURE
1. Fail inverter – OFF.
2. Check for ac bus switchover.
3. Land as soon as practicable.
86


NOTE
After a total as power failure, only the following items are available:
fuel flow, oil pressure, oil temperature, pilot and copilot turn and bank
indicators, pitot static instruments, N1, ITT, propeller rpm, clocks,
NCS-31A, AOA indexers, radio altimeter, standby compass.
With a dual-inverter failure, the only equipment available is DME,
radar, VOR (audio only), ADF-LF (audio only), transponder (mode
C), and marker beacons. For communication purposes, both UHF and
VHF will be available.
87
15.14.6 INSTRUMENT INVERTER
FAILURE
88
Illumination of the INST INV annunciator light
indicates loss of the 26-VAC step-down transformer.
Torquemeter indications will be erroneous.
89
15.14.7 CIRCUIT BREAKER
TRIPPED
1. Nonessential circuit – Do Not reset in Flight.
90
2. Essential circuit
a. Circuit breaker – Push to Reset.
b. If circuit breaker trips again – Do Not Reset.
91
15.14.8 SUBPANEL FEEDER
CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPPED
92
A short is indicated:
DO NOT RESET IN FLIGHT
93
15.15.1 PRIMARY GOVERNER
FAILURE/MALFUNCTION
*1. Attempt to adjust propeller rpm to normal operating range by
manipulating the propeller lever. If normal rpm limits are restored,
continue operation. If normal governing range cannot be maintained:
94
*2. Power lever – IDLE.
*3. Propeller lever – FEATHER.
WARNING
Propeller rpm exceeding 2,420 may result in
Reduction gearbox failure and/or N2 turbine damage.
NOTE
 The engine with the disabled propeller may be operated to provide
electrical power.
 The right propeller may not fully feather with the propeller sync on.
4. Emergency Shutdown Checklist – As required.
95
15.15.2 PROPELLER LINKAGE
FAILURE
If the propeller governor control linkage fails, the affected propeller will
go to 2,200 rpm or maintain the last rpm setting.
If a propeller linkage failure is suspected, proceed as follows:
1. Manipulate the propeller lever to positively determine if the cockpitpropeller control is lost.
96
2. If cockpit propeller control is lost and rpm remains within safe limits,
match the opposite propeller’s speed with the uncontrolled one and
land as soon as practicable.
CAUTION
Reversing without the propellers being in
high rpm may damage the reversing linkage.
97
15.15.3 ALTERNATE PROPELLER
FEATHERING
If the Propeller linkage or governor fails and when the propeller has not
feathered by itself or the normal feathering procedures are ineffective, the
propeller can be feathered utilizing the autofeather system. In this
situation, should a need for feathering arise, proceed as follows.
1. Power lever – IDLE (failed propeller).
98
2. Condition lever – FUEL CUTOFF.
3. Autofeather – ARM (P).
4. Power levers – Above 90-percent N1 position (P).
NOTE
Do not pull the power lever to idle during the
autofeathering sequence as the autofeather
system would be disarmed while feathering.
5. Emergency Shutdown Checklist – Execute (P).
99
15.17 ELECTROTHERMAL
PROPELLER DEICE
Abnormal readings on the propeller deice ammeter (normal: 14 to 18
amps)
1. Zero amps
a. Propeller deice switch – Check position.
100
b. If OFF, reposition to ON.
c. If on, system is inoperative. Switch – OFF.
2. Zero to 14 amps
a. Continue operation.
b. If propeller imbalance occurs, increase rpm briefly to aid in ice
removal.
3. Eighteen to 23 amps
a. Continue operation.
b. If propeller imbalance occurs, increase rpm briefly to aid in ice
removal.
4. More than 23 amps
a. Do not operate the system.
101
15.18 SURFACE DEICE
102
If boots fail to inflate: Operate Manually.
If boots fail to deflate: Pull SUR DE-ICE circuit breaker and
reset as necessary to operate boots.
WARNING
Stall speeds will significantly increase
with the wing deice boots inflated.
103
15.19 LOSS OF
PRESSURIZATION
If gradual pressurization loss is experienced:
1. Cabin altitude – Checked (P).
2. Pressurization controller – Checked (P).
104
3. Bleed air – Checked (CP).
4. Press dump test switch – TEST (CP) (hold 15 seconds).
NOTE
If activating the test switch restores pressurization, it may be necessary to hold the switch
in test until the cabin altitude profile is adjusted to 10,000 feet or less. If pressurization is
regained through the test switch, pulling the PRESS CONTROL CB will remove electric
power from the system, thereby maintaining pressurization.
If unable to restore pressurization:
5. Oxygen mask/Microphone switch (100 %) – As required (P,CP, OBS).
6. Descend – As required (P).
CAUTION
On Descent when cabin altitude matches pressure altitude, ensure the
PRESS CONTROL CB is reset to preclude landing pressurized.
105
15.20 EXPLOSIVE
DECOMPRESSION
If explosive decompression occurs, the cabin pressure changes
to the outside pressure in less than 1 second.
106
*1. Oxygen mask/MIC switches (100%) – As required.
*2. Descend – As required.
107
15.21 EMERGENCY DESCENT
PROCEDURE
The emergency descent procedure is a maximum effort descent intended
to be used for a sustained descent. Aircraft damage and meteorological
conditions should be considered.
108
*1.
*2.
*3.
*4.
*5.
*6.
Power levers – IDLE.
Propellers – Full forward.
Flaps – As required.
Landing gear – As required.
Airspeed – As required.
Windshield heat – As required.
CAUTION
DO not exceed airframe limitations.
109
15.22 CABIN DOOR OPEN LIGHT
ILLUMINATED
110
If the CABIN DOOR OPEN warning light illuminates, indicating the
airstair door may not be secure, ensure all passengers and crewmembers
are seated with seatbelts fastened and depressurize cabin.
WARNING
Do not attempt to check the airstair door for security until the cabin
is depressurized and the aircraft is on the ground. If the cabin is
pressurized and the door is not completely latched, any movement
of the handle toward the locked position may cause a rapid and
complete unlatching and opening of the door.
111
15.23 AUTOPILOT
DISENGAGEMENT
The following conditions will cause the autopilot to disengage
automatically:
Any interruption or failure of power, vertical gyro failure, activation of vertical gyro fast
erect, a flight control system power or circuit failure, activation of electric elevator trim,
or an autopilot trim failure.
The autopilot may be intentionally disengaged by any of the following
methods.
112
1. Actuation of AP/YD disconnect switch (either control wheel).
2. Movement of autopilot engage lever to DIS position.
3. Actuation of go-around button (left power lever) (yaw damper remains
on).
4. Pulling flight director/autopilot circuit breaker.
5. Turning off BATT/GENS (gang bar) or avionics master switch.
If an engine fails disengage the autopilot, retrim aircraft, and reengage
autopilot if desired. If autopilot is used in conjunction with an instrument
approach, maintain 120 KIAS for single engine approach speed until
landing is assured.
113
15.23.1 AUTOPILOT TRIM
FAIL LIGHT
If the AUTOPILOT TRIM FAIL light illuminates:
114
1. AP/YD disconnect – Depress.
2. Retrim aircraft.
3. Reengage autopilot.
115
15.24 IN-FLIGHT DAMAGE
If the aircraft should sustain damage because of a midair collision, bird
strike, or overstress, the single most important concern is maintaining or
regaining aircraft control. Monitor engine and flight instruments for
unusual indications.
1. Check controls for freedom and correct response.
2. Prior to landing, a landing configuration check should be conducted
above 5,000 feet. The aircraft should be checked for controllability in
116
the landing configuration by slowly decreasing airspeed in 10 knot
increments to determine the minimum airspeed at which the aircraft
can be safely controlled for landing.
3. Land as soon as possible with minimum control movement.



WARNING
Careful consideration should be given before making any
configuration changes
Airframe deformation may significantly increase stall speed.
Fly approach a minimum of 10 knots above minimum controllable
speed to provide a safe margin for landing and possible waveoff.
117
15.24.1 CRACKED WIDSHIELD
1. If positively determined that the crack is on the external panel, no
immediate action is required.
118
CAUTION
Windshield wipers may be damaged if used on a cracked outer panel.
NOTE
Heating elements may be inoperative in area of crack.
2. If the crack is on the inner panel of windshield or cannot be
determined, gradually descend and slowly depressurize the aircraft to 2.5
psi or less differential pressure within 10 minutes. Visibility through the
windshield may be significantly impaired.
119
15.24.2 CRACKED CABIN
WINDOW
120
If a crack appears in a cabin window, depressurize the
aircraft and/or descend to a lower altitude.
121
16.1 SINGLE-ENGINE LANDING
Fly a normal pattern and perform the landing checklist as
appropriate.
Extend full flaps only if required, and then only after there is no possibility
of a waveoff. If altitude cannot be maintained while maneuvering for
122
landing, the landing gear and flaps should be retracted, then lowered and
checked down when landing is assured. Do not extend full flaps until gear
is down and locked. Make a normal touchdown, reducing power during
the flare. Avoid excessive or abrupt changes in power. A feathered
propeller will result in less drag and may cause the aircraft to “float”
during landing. After touchdown, apply the brakes and reversing as
required.
WARNING
The landing gear warning horn shall not be overridden in the traffic pattern or during the
final segment of an instrument pattern/approach where intent or potential for landing
exists.
Single engine reversing may be applied if required. Use extreme caution if landing
surface is not hard and dry.
123
16.2 SINGLE-ENGINE
WAVEOFF/MISSED APPROACH
The decision to wave off must be made as early as possible. For single –
engine climb performance, refer to chapter 27.
*1. Power – As required, Establish Positive Rate of Climb (Vx minimum)
*2. Flaps – APPROACH (unless already UP).
124
WARNING
A single-engine full-flap waveoff is left to the discretion of
the pilot, but is not recommended because of the poor
waveoff capability of the aircraft in this configuration.
*3. Gear – UP.
WARNING
The landing gear is raised when the rate of descent
has stopped or there is no possibility of a touchdown.
*4. Flaps – UP.
*5. Propeller _ 1900 Rpm.
NOTE
Reducing propeller rpm to 1900 reduces drag, enhancing climb performance.
125
16.3 FLAP SYSTEM FAILURE
126
There are no provisions for emergency flap operation. If wing flaps
are inoperative and function cannot be restored, land the aircraft in the
existing flap configuration. Refer to figure 31-1 for landing distance. If a
split-flap condition is encountered, return the flaps to the previously
selected position. The aircraft has been flight-tested under all possible
asymmetric flap configurations and found to be fully controllable within
the normal operating envelope.
NOTE
The wing flap motor circuit breaker may be pulled
to prevent inadvertent flap movement.
127
16.4.1 LANDING GEAR UNSAFE
UP INDICATION
1. Gear handle – DN.
2. Gear position – Check.
128
3. If a safe down indication is obtained and is confirmed visually, land as
soon as practicable.
NOTE
Prior to landing, obtain a visual gear position check by utilizing the air-toair (from another aircraft) or the tower fly by method. It is possible to have
a safe gear indication and not have three complete tire or wheel assemblies
remaining on the aircraft.
4. If a safe gear down and locked indication is not obtained or visual
check indicates unsafe conditions, proceed to the Landing Gear Unsafe
Down Indications procedures.
129
16.4.2 LANDING GEAR UNSAFE
DOWN INDICATION
1.
2.
3.
4.
Landing gear relay circuit – Check.
Landing gear indicator circuit breaker – Check.
Landing gear motor circuit breaker – Check.
Cockpit gear position indicators – Check.
a. Conduct press-to test for faulty bulbs in position light indicators.
b. If an unsafe green (for down) light is accompanied by a red light in
the landing gear handle, momentarily retard both power levers
below the position corresponding to 79 +=-2 % N1. Check for
presence or absence of flashing wheels up lights and gear up
130
warning horn. If no wheels up lights or him is detected, all three
gears are most probably in a safe down position.
c. AOA indexer lights – Check if illuminated. Absence of
illuminated AOA indexers could indicate premature landing gear
motor cutoff, which is indicative of an electrical problem. In this
case if all gears are indicating unsafe, manual gear extension to a
safe down should be considered.
d. For a right main unsafe, activate propeller sync and check for a
prop sync light. If on, the right main has dropped from its uplock.
e. For a nosegear unsafe, activate the landing/taxi lights and note the
presence or absence of generator load increase. If a load increase is
noted the nosegear is not in its uplock.
131
NOTE
The windshield heat, propeller deice, and engine lip boot heat incorporate a lockout
mechanism that overrides the operation of the electric heater. Ensure these systems
are secured prior to performing check of the left main landing gear.
f. For a left main unsafe, select manual heat and position the electric
heat switch to NORMAL. Note generator load. Then hold the electric
heat switch in the GRD MAX position and look for a significant
generator load increase. If a significant load increase is noted, the left
main is not in its uplock.
5. Gear position (visual) – Check.
6. If a visual check indicates a gear down condition land as soon as
practicable.
7. If the visual check confirms that the gear is not down and locked,
determine if the malfunction is electrical or mechanical by comparing
visual indications with cockpit gear indications and gear CB positions.
132
If the problem appears to be electrical, raise the gear handle attempt a
manual gear extension, and obtain a visual check prior to landing.
NOTE
Attempt gear emergency extension only if electrical malfunction.
If the problem appears to be mechanical, proceed as follows:
8. Landing gear handle – Select UP.
9. Gear position (visual) – Check.
10. If the visual check confirms the landing gear are retracted, a gear up
landing is recommended (refer to gear up landing in paragraph 16.4.7).
If the gear are not retracted, refer to the procedures concerning landing
with gear up or unsafe. Time permitting, consult the home squadron
through direct communications if possible or through an ATC/FSS relay.
CAUTION
Do not taxi with an unsafe gear indication.
133
16.4.3 LANDING GEAR
EMERGENCY EXTENSION
134
Airspeed – 120 KIAS recommended (155 KIAS MAX).
Autopilot – As required.
Landing gear relay circuit breaker (LDG GEAR) – Pull.
Landing Gear handle – DN.
Clutch disengage lever – Lift and Turn Clockwise.
Manual Extension handle – PUMP until 3 green indicator lights
illuminate. Approx. 50 strokes are required to fully extend the gear.
CAUTION
Reduce stroke length when nosegear indicates safe. Do not pump handle
after all 3 gear down position lights are on. Further movement of the
handle could damage the drive mechanism, precluding normal retraction.
Do not stow handle or move any landing gear controls, reset any landing
gear switches or circuit breakers until the aircraft is on the ground and the
cause of the malfunction has been determined and corrected.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
135
16.4.4 LANDING GEAR
RETRACTION AFTER PRACTICE
MANUAL EXTENSION
136
1.
2.
3.
4.
Emergency engage handle – Rotate counterclockwise and push down.
Extension lever – STOW.
Landing gear relay circuit breaker (CP subpanel) – Push in.
Landing gear handle – UP.
137
16.4.5 AIBORNE LANDING GEAR
INSPECTIONS
138
1. Conduct sufficient cockpit-to-cockpit communications to coordinate a
controlled join up, inspection and separation.
WARNING
Abrupt changes in airspeed, attitude and altitude shall be avoided.
2. Inspecting aircraft should check the general condition of the landing
gear, tire inflation, mechanical downlock and j-hook in extended position,
landing gear doors, and any indication of a hydraulic leak.
139
16.4.6 LANDING WITH ONE
MAIN GEAR UP OR UNSAFE
CAUTION
Field arresting cable should be removed from the
runway to minimize structural damage to the aircraft.
140
NOTE
Night emergency egress may be facilitated by pre-positioning the threshold
and spar lighting switch to on and turning on the aft compartment lighting.
Before touchdown:
1. Crew/passenger emergency briefing – Completed.
2. Seat belts/harnesses – Secure (passengers assume braced position).
3. Landing checklist – Completed.
After touchdown:
4. Power levers – IDLE.
5. Condition levers – FUEL CUTOFF.
6. Use aileron and rudder to maintain direction control, keep wings level
7. Brake – As required.
8. Firewall valves – CLOSED.
9. Boost pumps – OFF.
10. Fire extinguisher – As required.
11. Gang Bar – OFF.
12. Evacuate aircraft.
141
16.4.7 LANDING WITH NOSE
GEAR UP OR UNSAFE
If all attempts to lock the nosegear fail, retract the main gear, complete the
gear up landing procedure and execute a gear up landing. If the main gear
cannot be retracted, make a normal approach with power using minimum
of wing flap to hold nose up as log as possible after touchdown. Lower
nose gently to the deck. DO NOT USE BRAKES.
WARNING
Safe and expeditious egress from the aircraft may be difficult
because of the nose low/tail high attitude after landing.
CAUTION
Field arresting cable should be removed from the
runway to minimize structural damage to the aircraft.
142
NOTE
Night emergency egress may be facilitated by pre-positioning the threshold
and spar lighting switch to on and turning on the aft compartment lighting.
Before touchdown:
1. Crew/passenger emergency briefing – Completed.
2. Seat belts/harnesses – Secure (passengers assume braced position).
3. Landing checklist – Completed.
After touchdown:
4. Power levers – IDLE.
5. Condition levers – FUEL CUTOFF.
6. Firewall valves – CLOSED.
7. Boost pumps – OFF.
8. Fire extinguisher – As required.
9. Gang Bar – OFF.
10. Evacuate aircraft.
143
16.4.8 GEAR UP LANDING
Touch down at 85 KIAS
NOTE
Night emergency egress may be facilitated by pre-positioning the threshold
and spar lighting switch to on and turning on the aft compartment lighting.
Before touchdown:
1. Crew/passenger emergency briefing – Completed.
2. Seat belts/harnesses – Secure (passengers assume braced position).
3. Clutch disengage handle – Lift and Turn Counterclockwise.
4. Manual extension handle – Stowed.
5. Landing gear relay circuit breaker (LDG GR) – PULLED.
6. Flaps – APPROACH.
144
NOTE
 Because of decreased drag with gear up, tendency will be to overshoot the approach.
 If conditions permit, place the gang bar off prior to touchdown.
Immediately prior to touchdown:
7. Condition levers – FUEL CUTOFF.
After touchdown:
8. Power levers – IDLE.
9. Condition levers – FUEL CUTOFF (only if power was utilized to touchdown.)
10. Brake – As required.
NOTE
In previous T-44 gear up landings, directional control
was maintained utilizing brakes and rudder control
11. Firewall valves – CLOSED.
12. Boost pumps – OFF.
13. Fire extinguisher – As required.
14. Gang Bar – OFF (if not cut off while still airborne).
15. Evacuate aircraft.
145
16.4.9.1 MAIN TIRE FLAT
146
1. Land on runway side favoring good tire.
2. Opposite brake – As required.
147
16.4.9.2 NOSEWHEEL TIRE FLAT
148
If the nosewheel tire is flat, nosewheel stability will be
reduced. Maximum aerodynamic braking should be utilized.
Light wheelbraking should be applied only as required to
maintain directional control.
149
16.4.10 BRAKE FAILURE
150
1. Maintain directional control with rudder and asymmetrical
power.
2. Stop aircraft using propeller reversing to aid in deceleration.
3. Do not attempt to taxi with a brake failure.
151
16.5.1 SOFT FIELD LANDING
If a landing is to be made on a soft unprepared surface such as
mud, tall grass or snow, plan a normal full flap power approach until
entering the flare. Decelerate to the slowest possible airspeed just prior to
touchdown, using power to control the final rate of descent to as slow as
possible. Make a full stall touchdown with power on. Do not stall prior to
touchdown as the nose attitude and rate of descent will be unacceptable.
On touchdown, apply full back (up) elevator and leave power on. Reduce
power slowly. Do not use brakes unless absolutely necessary every
152
precaution must be taken to prevent the nosewheel from digging into the
surface. The nose tire should be deflated to 35 psi prior to this type of
landing.


CAUTION
DO not reverse with nosewheel off ground
Use of reverse in surface areas containing loose sod or
small stones may cause propeller blade erosion
NOTE
Extending the ice vanes will reduce the amount
of loose particles ingested by the engine
when landing on an unprepared surface.
153
16.5.2 SHORT FIELD LANDING
If a landing must be made on a runway where the usable surface is equal to or less than
150 percent of the minimum run required based on figure 31-1, the following procedure
should be used: Make full flap approach, slowing to 1.2 Vso, but not less than 91 knots
on short final. Plan to touch as near the end of the runway as is commensurate with
safety. Crossing the end of the runway, retard the power levers and land the aircraft. After
touchdown, apply maximum reverse, retract the flaps, then apply the brakes gradually,
increasing brake pressure to the maximum possible without sliding the tires or locking a
brake. If no obstacle is to be considered, plan a slightly shallower approach than for a
normal landing. If an obstacle dictates the use of a steeper descent, plan the descent to
clear the obstacle and continue the approach. A partial power reduction over the obstacle
will allow a steeper angle of descent to the flare.
154
1. Landing checklist – Completed.
2. Condition levers - HIGH IDLE.
NOTE
Additional float may be expected
3. Props – Full Forward.
4. Power levers – Lift and MAX REVERSE upon touchdown.
5. Flaps – UP.
6. Brakes – As required.
CAUTION
Application of hard braking prior to raising the flaps may result in
skidding tires and/or locked wheelbrakes, resulting in blown tires.
NOTE
Reverse thrust is most effective at higher rollout speed, while
wheelbraking is most effective at lower speeds.
7. Condition levers – LOW IDLE.
155
16.6 FORCED LANDING
NO POWER
NOTE
Night emergency egress may be facilitated by
pre-positioning the threshold and spar lighting switch
to on and turning on the aft compartment lighting.
156
1. Configuration
a. Do not extend full flaps until landing is assured.
b. A gear up landing should be considered based on the type of
touchdown surface.
2. Selecting a landing area
a. Select landing area of adequate size to accommodate the aircraft,
preferably free of obstacles and smooth. Cultivated fields are most
desirable. Swamps, boggy ground, shallow lakes, and forest should
be avoided if possible.
b. Land aircraft into the wind as near as possible.
3. Landing the aircraft
a. Th landing should be made at the slowest speed commensurate
with complete control.
b.
If landing into trees, fly into them. Do not attempt to land on the tops.
157
16.9 DITCHING CHECKLIST
158
Announce intention to ditch and time to impact – Completed (P).
Mayday report – Completed (CP).
Transponder – As required (CP).
Pressurization – DUMP (CP).
Lifevests – On and adjusted (P, OBS, CP).
Seatbelts – Fastened (P, OBS, CP).
Gear – UP (P).
Flaps - As required (P).
Passengers assume braced position.
WARNING
Do not unstrap from the seat until all motion stops. The possibility of injury and
disorientation requires that evacuation not be attempted until the aircraft comes
to a complete stop.
Evacuate through emergency exit or airstair door. Take liferaft and first aid kit.
WARNING
Do not remove the raft from its carrying case inside the aircraft.
Do not inflate raft before launching.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
159
16.10.1 DITCHING POWER
AVAILABLE (BOTH ENGINES)
160
1.
2.
3.
4.
Gear – UP.
Flaps – APPROACH.
Rate of Descent, 100 feet per minute(fpm) during final stages of
approach (last 300 feet utilizing radar altimeter); approximately 21
units AOA.
90 KIAS
NOTE
If a no-flap ditch is required, increase airspeed to 100 knots.
161
16.10.2 DITCHING POWER
AVAILABLE (SINGLE ENGINE)
162
1. Gear – UP.
2. Flaps – APPROACH.
WARNING
In the event of single-engine full-flap ditchings, abnormally high power requirements
resulting from the use of full flaps will result in marginal controllability at all but
minimum gross weights. Reconfiguration from full flaps to APPROACH flaps may
result in settling and/or stall. The use of APPROACH flaps is strongly recommended
in single engine ditchings.
3. Rate of Descent, 100 feet per minute (fpm) during final stages of
approach (last 300 feet utilizing radar altimeter); approximately 19 to
21 units AOA.
4. 90 KIAS
NOTE
If a no-flap ditch is required, increase airspeed to 100 knots.
163
16.10.3 DITCHING
NO POWER AVAILABLE
1.
2.
3.
Gear – UP.
Flaps – UP.
Rate of Descent should be such that airspeed be maintained at 130
knots (maximum glide KIAS) until approximately 200 feet AGL. At
this time, transition should be made to approach flaps allowing
airspeed to bleed off with a slight noseup attitude prior to impact by
using radar altimeter or any visual reference to the water surface.
Water entry should be at approximately 90 knots, 21 units AOA, with
a maximum rate of descent of 500 fpm.
164
NOTE
Flaps and/or radar altimeter may be inoperative because of no generator
and low battery voltage.
 If no-flap ditch is performed, adjust airspeed to enter the water at
approximately 100 KIAS with a maximum rate of descent of 500 fpm.
It is essential that an attempt be made to control the attitude of the aircraft throughout the
ditching until all motion stops.
WARNING
Do not unstrap from the seat until all motion stops. The possibility of
injury and disorientation requires that evacuation not be attempted until
the aircraft comes to a complete stop.
Evacuate through emergency exit or airstair door. Take liferaft and first aid kit.
WARNING
Do not remove the raft from its carrying case inside the aircraft.
Do not inflate raft before launching.
CAUTION
Keep liferaft away from any damaged surfaces which might tear it

165
16.11.1 EMERGENCY EXIT
HATCH
166
1. Open cover.
2. Push release button.
NOTE
If the aircraft is still pressurized and the release button will
not push, pull hooks to overcome residual pressure and then
push release button.
3. Pull handle and push out hatch.
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16.12 RAFT INFLATION
CAUTION
Keep liferaft away from any damaged surfaces that might tear it.
1. Locate liferaft.
WARNING
Do not remove the raft from its carrying case inside the aircraft.
Do not inflate raft before launching.
NOTE
In order to avoid loss of raft; retain control of the raft retention
lanyard after deployment.
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a. Grasp raft and remove to emergency exit hatch or main exit
door.
b. Locate raft retention lanyard.
c. Push raft out emergency exit hatch.
d. Inflate raft by pulling sharply on inflation handle (continuation
of retention lanyard).
2. Locate and retain first aid kit.
NOTE
 The first aid kit is stored on the forward side of the stub
partition in the aft cabin.
 The first aid kit should be tied down in the center of the raft to
prevent it from being lost in case the raft capsizes.
3. Exit aircraft.
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16.13 LIFE PRESERVER
INFLATION
170
After exiting the aircraft:
1. Pull downward on the inflation toggle to inflate life
preserver.
WARNING
Do not inflate life preserver inside the aircraft.
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16.14 RAFT BOARDING
172
1. Link arms forming a human chain and swim toward the raft.
2. Upon reaching the raft, form the human chain around the perimeter
with individuals grasping raft-boarding lanyard.
3. Begin boarding one at a time at the designated area
4. The first survivor to board the raft shall assist the remaining survivors
and ensure raft loading is balanced to protect against overturning in
rough seas.
5. Locate and deploy the sea anchor.
6. Erect canopy for protection against the elements
7. When all survivors have boarded the raft, senior member shall assume
command and ensure that the following is accomplished:
a.
b.
c.
The necessary emergency aid has been rendered.
An inventory of survival equipment, food, and water is available.
Assign areas of responsibility to those on board (i.e., SAR watch, water-bailing
duties, organizing inventory).
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