Administrative Reform and Tidal Waves from Regime Shifts:
Reverse Effects of Thaksin’s Tsunami on Autonomization
Bidhya Bowornwathana
Faculty of Political Science
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
Email: bidhya.b@chula.ac.th
Paper for the SCANCOR-SOG/IPSA Workshop, CERAS Building 204, Stanford University,
California, U. S. A., 1-2 April 2005
Introduction
The argument of this article is that regime shifts (Bowornwathana, 1994) or the change in
the systems and styles of government, produces tidal waves (or tsunamis) that affect the
direction and progress of administrative reform. The analogy of tidal waves is taken from
the recent 26th December 2004 tsunami that had devastated Thailand and some Asia
countries. The use of waves to describe changes is not uncommon (Huntington, 1991,
Toffler, 1980; and Doorenspleet, 2000). Tidal waves from regime shifts vary in terms of
height and strength. For example, when the system of government transforms from
democracy to dictatorship, the regime shift can cause tidal waves that have drastic
repercussions on the process of administrative reform in a country.
Or when after
winning the elections the opposition party becomes the government, administrative
reform may also experience tidal waves. Or when a coalition government becomes a
single-party government, the tidal waves triggered may be less violent for administrative
reform than the case of a polity that radically swings from democracy to dictatorship. Or
when there is a change of the person or agency in charge of administrative reform, one is
likely to see big waves in the making despite the fact that government’s official reform
policies remain unchanged.
1
This paper, first, proposes a preliminary framework to conceptualize the phenomenon of
regime shifts and their tidal waves. Second, examples of major regime shifts causing tidal
waves or tsunami are drawn from the Thai experience from 1932 to the present. In
particular, the Thaksin Administration (2001-present) is a good case of a major regime
shift from democratic governance to democratic authoritarianism that is generating tidal
waves that overflow the process of autonomization of the state of the 1990s. The
direction of administrative reform of the democratic governance era of the 1990s was Uturned by Thaksin. Instead of autonomization of the state, Thaksin tsunami has reversed
the process with prime ministerialization (Bowornwathana, 2004a), that is, by
introducing administrative reform that further consolidates political power and
government authority in the hands of a single person,- Prime Minister Thaksin himself.
The Conceptual Framework
The Regime Shifts Perspective
Regime shifts refer to changes of systems and styles of government in a country: for
example, from colonial rule to independence; from military rule to democracy; from
communist rule to democracy as in the case of Eastern European countries (Derlien and
Szablowski, 1993) or as in the case of German unification (Schroter and Rober, 1997);
from coalition government rule to a single party rule as in the case of the Thaksin
Administration; and from authoritarian rule to democratic governance. Unstable political
systems experience regime shifts more often than stable ones. But regime shifts are not
limited to unstable political systems. For example, when Margaret Thatcher of the
Conservative Party assumed office, administrative reform took a new course and
eventually after about eight years rule ended in installing major changes in the British
government system. Or when President George W. Bush replaced Bill Clinton as the U.
2
S. President, the direction of reinventing government set course by former Vice President
Al Gore’s National Performance Review Office was substituted with Bush Government’s
own administrative reform policy. Or when Bill Clinton became the US President for the
second term, the reinvention government program changed its emphasis from creating a
government that work better and cost less to a more customer-evaluative perspective.
The last one is an example of a small wave created by a minor regime shift.
However, the changes from regime shifts in unstable polities are usually more turbulent
than in stable regimes. Tidal waves or tsunamis appear in unstable political systems
more often than in stable ones. Developing countries are in general more prone to major
radical changes than developed countries. The regime shifts factor plays a key role in our
understanding of administrative reform in these unstable polities. Thailand is a good
example of a polity which experience recurring tsunamis in administrative reform.
Several implications follow from the regime shifts perspective. First, the regime shifts
perspective assumes that administrative reform must be understood from a time-series
dimension. Snap shot studies of particular reform programs are insufficient for our
understanding of administrative reform. The regime shifts perspective argues that the
study of a particular administrative reform initiative must not stop after the cabinet has
passed a resolution or parliament an act. We must approach the study from a longitudinal
perspective and see how a reform plan survives and adopts itself through the years even
after a regime change. Recent studies on reform support a long-term perspective see
Grindle, 2003; Dierickx, 2003; Ehn, Isberg, Linde, and Wallin, 2003; Aberbach, 2003;
Kickert, 2003, Barzelay, 2003; Peters, 2001).
Second, the regime shifts perspective contends that administrative reform is revolutionary
in nature, not incremental. Radical changes (or tidal waves) follow after regime shifts.
Previous reform plans are challenged and replaced by new reform missions and
strategies.
Third, unstable political systems that experience tsunamis face reform
continuity. Tidal waves are likely to produce reform hybrids because previous reform
measures are altered to fit the governing reform principles of the new regime. However,
3
other factors, such as policy preferences of reformers and choices made during the
borrowing process, can also encourage hybridization (See Pollitt, 2004; Bowornwathana,
2004b). Fourth, the length of time in power of a government is an important factor that
prolongs the staying power of a reform. The longer the government stays in power, the
better the chances are for the reform blueprints and measures to be institutionalized
within the government system.
Fifth, the new tsunami brings in a new set of values and beliefs about government which
are likely to clash with the old ones. Administrative reform is therefore truly political,
not purely a managerial exercise (Bowornwathana, 2000, 2001a). The political nature of
reform intensifies further when time passes, and government is confronted with a do-ordie choice between the new and the old. Sixth, tsunami-prone unstable polities are likely
to have accumulated various reform measures introduced by previous governments and
regimes that were able to survive the tidal waves. Therefore, a reformed government at
one point is sometimes a mix of contrasting and overlapping reform perspectives
introduced during different regimes throughout the years. This cumulative nature of
reform has been pointed out by several scholars (Stillman II’s, 2003; Bevir and Rhodes,
2003; Christensen (2003); Christensen, Laegreid and Wise, 2002; and Christensen and
Laegreid, 2002). In short, administrative reform in polities with regime shifts is therefore
complex and sometimes confusing for many.
The Concept of Tidal Waves
Tidal waves from regime shifts can be classified according to the height or size of the
waves (from giant tidal waves to small waves), their impact on previous reforms (from
replacement to supportive), and their frequencies of occurrence,-that is, how often
throughout the years have regime shifts produce tidal waves that have accumulative
effects?
How many layers of reforms caused by tidal waves have piled up in the polity
under investigation?
4
Regime shifts can create various waves from small ones to tidal waves. Tidal waves or
tsunami are likely to occur when there is a major change of systems of government such
as replacing military rule with democratic rule. A radical change in the direction of
administrative reform usually follows after a regime shift. Without any major change in
systems of government, however, big waves can also build-up: for example, through a
major change of government reform policy. Small waves are more often seen. Small
waves occur under various conditions: a minor change in government’s stand on a reform
policy; change in the persons and agencies in charge of reform; and incremental changes
proposed by bureaucrats for domain expansion and career advancement goals such as a
proposal to restructure the organization or strategic plans with clauses that allow agencies
to expand.
Tidal waves or tsunami are of special interest in the study of administrative reform
because they are “big bang” reforms that usually reverse the original direction of
administrative reform of previous governments and can be both or either restorative or
disastrous to the polity. Imagine the case of the Maya Bay Beach in Krabi, Thailand
where the movie “The Beach” was filmed amidst criticisms from local environmentalists
that the filming had destroyed and altered the natural landscape of the beach. After the
recent December 26, 2004 tsunami, the beach was completely “cleaned” and its
landscape looks like it had returned to its original natural condition. Some species of
tortures and sea life that disappeared long time ago have re-emerged. However, many
human lives, houses, boats, trees, plants were lost.
Administrative reform is an instrument that political leaders use to further their political
goals. A military government finds ways to tighten control over the state machine. A
democratic government proclaims the goals to serve the citizen who, in principle, owns
the country. The dilemma between the strong and weak state traditions may encourage
believers to split into two opposing groups. The arriving of tidal waves opens up door of
opportunities for stakeholders to maneuver in favor of their political ambition and
economic interests.
5
Regime shifts also have an impact on the reform diffusion process. After a tsunami,
reform blueprints and prototypes from foreign countries may still be retained. However,
the reform models are likely to be twisted to meet the political objectives of the new
person or group in power. Beautiful and ugly reform hybrids may mushroom. For
example, an absolute ruler hybridizes governance reform blueprints to enhance his own
authoritative power. Leaders of a new government adopt the democratic governance
perspective and NPM techniques of reform in the name of democracy, but find ways to
consolidate their power in government. Roughly speaking, democracies tend to favor
reform in line with the principles of democratic governance. Meanwhile, authoritarian
rules tend to concentrate on NPM efficiency improvement techniques.
The nature of the political system is also important.
If the political system of the
borrowing country is rather compatible with the political system where the reform
originated, then the chance is that that reform blueprint is likely to survive tidal waves.
However, the fact is that reform approaches such as governance and NPM originate from
Western countries such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the United States.
The reform ideas are diffused among the European countries with similar political
systems. However, for developing countries with unstable regimes, the borrowing of
Western reform ideas becomes more complicated: they do not share similar political
principles and systems, and regimes are short-lived. In developing countries, reform
diffusion becomes political-driven, and hybridization of western reform blueprints occurs
more often.
The Effects of Tidal Waves
After a new government is installed, the question is always what to do with the wanted
and unwanted reforms of the past. The difficulty and easiness involved in changing
previous reform measures depend on their legal formats. For example, the comparative
6
levels of difficulty in altering or terminating a previous reform that is an act, executive
order, cabinet resolution and government policy varies. Some reforms are already in
progress with government commitments on manpower and budget, and they have already
built-up supporters who benefit from the reform.
There are several ways that reformers can respond to tidal waves of regime shifts. First,
one can replace the old reform plan with a new one. Second, one can cancel the old
reform plan without any replacements. Third, one can monitor the development of
former reform measures by downplaying their significance and growth. Fourth, one can
alter the old reform plans to meet the objectives of the new leaders. Fifth, one can leave
the former reform plan alone without introducing any changes. However, substantial
discretionary power would be used to accommodate the political goals of the new leaders.
Polities experiencing several reform shifts encounter several tidal waves that are
accumulative.
For example, administrative reform policies may have shifted back and
forth between democratic and authoritarian traditions, strong state and weak state
traditions, and centralized and decentralized administrations. Thus, contradictory reform
legacies may co-exist. Frequent turnarounds of reform directions may confuse
government officials.
Radical swings in reform policies may have left old visions,
missions, reform-related regulations and organizations in place, thus, resulting in, for
example, bureaucratization of reform work in the bureaucracy. The longer one stays in
power, the more “reform garbage” one might have left for the next tsunami to clean.
I shall next show how the regime shift from democratic governance to democratic
authoritarianism in 2001 may have likely produced what I called Thaksin’s Tsunami that
is having a profound effect in reversing the direction of democratic governance reform of
the 1990s into a particular version of authoritarianism, prime ministerialisation, or
administrative reform that aimed at consolidating state power in the hands of a single
person, the prime minister.
7
Administrative Reform of the Thai Polity
Tidal Waves and Regime Shifts
In my opinion, there have been four tidal waves or tsunamis in the modern history of
administrative reform of Thailand. The first one occurred because of a regime shift from
absolute monarchy to bureaucratic polity in 1932. I shall call this first tidal wave the
Military Tsunami. Military leaders took turns to assume political power, and
administrative reform was undertaken to centralize power in the hands of military
dictators. A giant ministry, the Ministry of Economic Development was established, and
the power of central agencies such as the Budget Bureau was strengthened. A single
hierarchy with a strong military leader on top was the ideal structure. The guiding values
were loyalty to the dictator, following orders, spoils and nepotism, and corruption. The
principle of a government that is accountable to the citizen did not exist. Mass media and
the press were harshly censored. Some Prime Ministers during this period were Field
Marshall Pibulsongkram, Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat, General Thanom Kiitikachorn.
In a bureaucratic polity, politics was a struggle for power among the military elite. While
retaining their powerful military positions, military leaders assumed political positions. It
was common for short-lived elected governments to be overthrown by a military coup
d’etats. In short, the Military Tsunamis favored administrative reform that consolidates
power in the hands of a single military dictator. Thus, the authoritarian tradition of
administrative reform was very much alive despite the fact that the overthrow of absolute
monarchy was supposed to end absolute rule (Bowornwathana, 2004c).
8
The second tidal wave occurred because of a regime shift from bureaucratic polity to
fragile democracies during 1973 to around 1992. Governments were short-lived, and
regime survival became am important factor in administrative reform (Bowornwathana,
1994). I shall call this tidal wave, the Democracy Tsunami. After the Students Uprising
in 1973, the practice of military rule was shaken. Former Prime Ministers during this
period such as Seni Pramoj, Kukrit Pramoj, General Kriensak Chamanan, General Prem
Tinnasulanond, and General Chatichai Choonhavan ruled with the support of a coalition
government. Administrative reform was marked by a struggle for power between the
bureaucratic elite and the elected politicians. Reform was geared toward strengthening
the power of politicians and political institutions. Though military rule was no longer
accepted, elected coalition governments were fragile. Bureaucrats still retained sizable
power over the “Yes Ministers.” However, in the process, elected politicians became
increasingly powerful. Political power was diffused because of the nature of coalition
governments. Government power consisted of multiple centers of power in the hands of
separate coalition partners who shared control of ministries. The divided coalition
government was bundled together at the top by the prime minister who played the role of
a compromising and coordinating leader. In this regard, government was still highly
centralized.
The political and administrative values of fragile democracies were:
choosing the right patron, more sophisticated corruption and spoils practices, and being
with the winning side in politics. Freedom of the mass media and the press improved.
The third tidal wave occurred during 1992 to 2000 due to a regime shift from fragile
democracies to democratic governance. I shall call this tidal wave the Governance
Tsunami. Globalization and democratization were two major forces for the tidal wave.
The World Bank, IMF, UNDP, ADB all played a major part in encouraging Thailand to
move into the direction of “good governance.” (World Bank, 2000; United Nations,
2003; Asian Development Bank, 1999). The new 1997 Constitution of Thailand laid
down the foundation for a democratic governance regime, for example, accountability
mechanisms such as the Constitution Court and Administrative Court were set up. Prime
Ministers during this short governance period included Chuan Leekpai, Banharn
Silapaacha, and General Chavalit Yongchaiyut. The principles of democratic governance
9
such as accountability, citizen power, honesty and integrity, decentralization, smaller
central government that does less, and strong civil society dominated Thailand. The ideal
government structure was one were power was distributed among multiple centers of
power. Autonomization of the state became an important objective of administrative
reform. Corruption was less tolerated than in the days of bureaucratic polity. Freedom of
the mass media and the press was practiced. In principle, elected politicians were the
bosses of “Yes Bureaucrats.”
The fourth tidal wave began with the coming to power of Prime Minister Thaksin in
2001. From then to the present (2005), Thailand saw a regime shift from democratic
governance to democratic authoritarianism. Scholars repeatedly pointed out the
increasing absolute power of Thaksin (McCargo and Pathmanand, 2004; Boonmee, 2004,
Crispin and Tasker, 2001; Pasuk and Baker, 2004; Pinthong, 2004). I shall call this latest
tidal wave the Thaksin Tsunami. The process of democratic governance was reversed
with the introduction of an administrative reform policy that aims to consolidate
government power in the hands of Thaksin, a phenomenon I called prime
ministerialization. The authoritarian tradition of administrative reform based on a strong
state tradition reappeared. (Bowornwathana, 2004c). The power of ministers, politicians,
and bureaucrats were minimized with the return of the single hierarchy model of
government with a super leader or CEO on top. Government politicians and bureaucrats
are being converted into company employees. Government reform was geared toward big
government. New ministries created to facilitate the businesses of capitalist politicians
were created such as the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology.
Accountability was defined as accountability to the super CEO Thaksin. The reform
target was to undermine the traditional power of the bureaucracy and bureaucrats. Under
the Thaksin administration, loyalty to the country’s CEO prime minister is shown by
facilitating the businesses of the Prime Minister and his close associates. To win votes
from the majority poor and remain in power, populist policies are used as political
instruments.
10
Table 1 illustrates the four regime shifts, tidal waves, and their effects on administration
reform.
Two dimensions are used to construct the Table. First, one looks at the
concentration of government power: whether power is in the hands of a single center of
authority or distributed among multiple centers of authority. In a hierarchy, there is a
single center of authority and superiors determine the actions of subordinates. In a flat
structure, there are many centers of authority, and “each member is tied to others by
horizontal linkage.” (Landau, 1991, p. 7). In this regard, autonomization is a process that
loosens up the single center of authority by creating many independent or self-governing
centers of authority.
The second dimension covers the nature of politician-bureaucrat relationships or the
question of who have power over whom, politicians or bureaucrats? The politicianbureaucrat perspective has been one of the major concerns of students of governance for
a long time (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman, 1981; Peters and Pierre, 2001; and
Bowornwathana, 1996, 1999, 2001b). Recent studies on politician-bureaucrat power
relations are for example, Maor’s (2004) study about the implications of political
executives losing control over corruption investigations of senior officeholders following
the creation of anti-corruption mechanisms;
Graham Wilson and Anthony Barker’s
(2003) observation that changes in the Whitehall model have reduced the degree to which
British politicians have been unusually dependent on a career bureaucracy that is
insulated from partisan politics ; Hans-Ulrich Derlien’s (2003) observation about the
growing party politicization of the administrative elite in Germany; and Ian Thynne’s
(2003) proposed framework for the study of politicians and administrators.
From these two dimensions of Table 1, four political regimes emerge: the bureaucratic
polity, fragile democracies, democratic governance, and democratic authoritarianism.
To sum up, the four tidal waves produced by the four regime shifts are: the Military
Tsunami (when regime shifted from absolute monarchy to bureaucratic polity), the
Democracy Tsunami (when regime shifted from bureaucratic polity to fragile
democracies), the Governance Tsunami (when regime shifted from fragile democracies to
11
democratic governance), and the Thaksin’s Tsunami (when regime shifted from
governance to democratic authoritarianism).
TABLE 1: Tidal Waves, Regime Shifts, and Their Effects
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Bureaucratbureaucrats more
politicians more
Politician
powerful than
powerful than
Relationships
politicians
bureaucrats
government
power
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------single
military tsunami
Thaksin tsunami
center of
(absolute monarchy
(democratic governance
authority
to bureaucratic polity)
to democratic authoritarianism)
Pibul, Sarit, Thanom,
bureaucratic polity
1932-1973
Thaksin
democratic authoritarianism
2001-present (2005)
reform for
military dictatorship
reform for
prime ministerialization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------multiple
centers of
authority
democracy tsunami
(bureaucratic polity
to fragile democracies)
Prem, Anan
fragile democracies
1973-1992
governance tsunami
(fragile democracies to
democratic governance)
Chuan, Banharn, Chavalit
democratic governance
1993- 2000
reform for
reform for
regime survival
autonomization of the state
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12
Reverse Effects of Thaksin Tsunami: From Autonomization to Prime Ministerialization
I shall next explain the reverse effects of Thaksin Tsunami (2001-present) on the
direction of one aspect of administrative reform, that is autonomization of the state. The
purpose is to show how the Thaksin Tsunami is causing a complete U-turn on the
direction of autonomization. Instead of autonomization of the state, the state is becoming
more and more prime ministerialized. Under Thaksin Administration, administrative
reform is the process of creating a super prime minister who has absolute control of the
state machine.
Autonomization of the State refers to a process of change from a single or unitary
administrative system to a multiple administrative system
(Bowornwathana, 2005a,
forthcoming). In a single administrative system, all public organizations are under a
single hierarchy structure. So called-autonomous public organizations (APOs) created
are, in practice, not independent from the chain of command of the single hierarchy. On
the other hand, in a multiple administrative system, not all public organizations are under
a single hierarchy. Ministries are transformed into single-purpose APOs that are rather
independent (at arms-length) from the single hierarchy. Government expansion results in
a smaller hierarchical core with increasing number of APOs surrounding at a distance.
The hierarchical structure of government is eventually being transformed into a network
structure.
Autonomization is a product of democratic governance reform and new public
management. The concept originates from experiences in governance reform of Western
developed countries particularly the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia,
Scandinavian countries. Autonomization comes hand in hand with the principle of a
smaller government that does less (Bowornwathana, 1997). One way to achieve this is to
13
separate policy from implementation. Government retains its policy making function.
Implementation function is carried out by task-specific agencies on a contractual basis
with chief executives in charge of agencies. At the end, government ministries will
consist of numerous small public organizations which are autonomous from the central
core. Scholars have described the reformed public sector resulting from autonomization
by several names such as “self-organizing networks,” (Rhodes, 1996) “hollowing out of
the state or the hollow state,” (Milward and Provan, 2000; Erik-Hans Klijn, 2002) and
steering rather than rowing (Osborne and Gaebler, 1991). The trend in many western
countries is to autonomize the state by creating autonomous public organizations such as
executive agencies of the United Kingdom and crown entities of New Zealand.
For Thailand, the author had suggested that “autonomization” should be seen in a broader
meaning. There are three forms of autonomization of the state: agency-type autonomous
public organizations (APOs),
APOs mandated by the 1997 Constitution, and local
government APOs. (Bowornwathana, 2005a, forthcoming). A state that is strong in
autonomization is one that has created a large number of APOs that are “autonomous”
from the central government. Autonomization runs counter the traditional hierarchical
model of Thai government in which all public organizations such as departments and
state enterprises are directly under the prime minister and cabinet members.
Before Thaksin, during the period of democratic governance (1993-2000), Thailand was
fast heading toward the direction of democratic governance that supported multiple
administrative systems.
Accordingly, the power of the central government was to be
shared by APOs and others non-government actors such as the civil society,
communities, associations, and the private sector.
There are several reasons why the governance tsunami of the regime shift from fragile
democracies to democratic governance did not have much of an impact.
First, the
governance period was too short (1993-2000) and abruptly reversed by Thaksin.
Second, there was a strong resistance from the elite such as the military, the bureaucracy,
and businessmen who were uneasy with the increasing power of the public citizen.
14
Third, the democratic principle of the citizen as owners of the country is new, and the
level of political understanding among the majority poor is inadequate. Nevertheless, the
governance tsunami was able to set up structures of governance such as accountability
organizations like the Ombudsmen, the Constitutional Court, and the National Counter
Corruption Commission.
The 1997 Constitution was a landmark for governance
development because it had incorporated several principles of democratic governance.
Fourth, the coming to power of Thaksin has proved to be the main reason why
democratic governance failed to progress. Thaksin is more concerned with consolidating
government power in his hands rather than develop democratic governance. In fact,
democratic governance stood in the way of Thaksin because the democratic governance
advocates multiple centers of power. But Thaksin sees himself as the super CEO of the
country who, like any company CEOs, should have the freedom to manage his company.
Table 2 presents the likely reversed effects of regime shift from democratic governance
to democratic authoritarianism (Thaksin Tsunami) on autonomization. First, instead of
autonomizing the state, Thaksin Tsunami is prime ministerializing the state. The strong
state tradition is pushed even further by the Thaksin Tsunami. The principle of a smaller
government that does less was substituted by the conventional principle of big
government that does more. More steering, less rowing was turned into more steering,
more rowing. The Thai State has not hollowed out, on the contrary, it has thickened.
Contrary to the idea of self-organizing networks, Thaksin is centralizing all government
work.
The decentralization movement of the 1990s was slowed down by Thaksin
Government’s efforts to retain strong centralization (Mutebi, 2004). The ideas of CEO
provincial governors reinforce the strong state tradition. The civil society, communities,
NGOs that were so vibrant and active during the 1990s were discredited and regarded as
“enemies” of the Thaksin Government. Freedom of the mass media, which was so much
praised in the 1990s, was suppressed and censored by the Thaksin Government. Charges
of government interference in the selections of members of several accountability
institutions such as the National Counter Corruption Commission and the Constitution
Court abound. Autonomous public organizations were seen as additions, not substitutes,
15
of the bloated bureaucracy. The norms of professionalism among bureaucrats are
replaced by “loyalty to Thaksin,-” the company CEO boss.
It is still too early to make final conclusions about the reversed effects of Thaksin
tsunami on autonomization of the state. There are many factors to be considered as
follows: the length in office of Thaksin and his persistence to pursue prime
ministerialization, the increasing power of business politicians over bureaucrats, the
strength of the antonomists or those who support autonomization to resist prime
ministerialization, and lastly, the support of the public towards democratic governance.
TABLE 2: Reverse Effects of Thaksin Tsunami on Autonomization
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Democratic Governance
Democratic Authoritarianism
(autonomization of the state)
(prime ministerialization of the state)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Smaller government, does less
More steering, less rowing
Hollowing government
more self organizing networks
autonomous public organizations
Decentralization
big government, does more
More steering, more rowing
Thickening government
Thaksin (central government) does everything
tighten central control
slow down decentralization
CEO Provincial Governors
Accountability mechanisms
Thaksin’s increasing influence
Check and balance system
weakening check and balance system
Civil society
subdued
Communities
subdued
NGOs
subdued
Private sector
divided
Freedom of press
suppressed, buy-outs
Professional bureaucrat
loyal company employees
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
16
Conclusion
To conclude, the Thaksin Tsunami seems to be gaining strength in terms of its reverse
effects on democratic governance. With Thaksin returning as the Prime Minister for the
second term, there is a good chance that the Thaksin Tsunami may wipe out “the plants
and marine lives” brought by the governance tsunami during the 1990s. By reforming
the government with the principles of prime ministerialization, Thaksin is reinstating the
centralization tradition of the Thai government and reviving the traditional Thai values of
subordination to a strong single authority. In short, the process of autonomization of the
Thai State may be aborted in the near future. The longer Thaksin and his group of
business politicians remain in power (Bowornwathana, 2005b, forthcoming), the greater
the chance they can reform government by widening the gap between the ideal
autonomized state under democratic governance, and the strong state in the real world.
Until, of course, another governance tsunami hits Thailand again.
The regime shift perspective and the tidal wave analogy may proof useful to the
comparative study of administrative reform in polities experiencing frequent regime
shifts. One needs to study administrative reform longitudinally and considers the reverse
effects caused by tidal waves from regime shifts.
----------------------------------------
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